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DR-CONGO December 2013 COUNTRY REPORT: DR-CONGO December 2013 Introduction: other provinces are also grappling with consistently high levels of violence. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR-Congo) is the sec- ond most violent country in the ACLED dataset when Likewise, in terms of conflict actors, recent international measured by the number of conflict events; and the third commentary has focussed very heavily on the M23 rebel most fatal over the course of the dataset’s coverage (1997 group and their interactions with Congolese military - September 2013). forces and UN peacekeepers. However, while ACLED data illustrates that M23 has constituted the most violent non- Since 2011, violence levels have increased significantly in state actor in the country since its emergence in April this beleaguered country, primarily due to a sharp rise in 2012, other groups including Mayi Mayi militias, FDLR conflict in the Kivu regions (see Figure 1). Conflict levels rebels and unidentified armed groups also represent sig- during 2013 to date have reduced, following an unprece- nificant threats to security and stability. dented peak of activity in late 2012 but this year’s event levels remain significantly above average for the DR- In order to explore key dynamics of violence across time Congo. and space in the DR-Congo, this report examines in turn M23 in North and South Kivu, the Lord’s Resistance Army Across the coverage period, this violence has displayed a (LRA) in northern DR-Congo and the evolving dynamics of very distinct spatial pattern; over half of all conflict events Mayi Mayi violence across the country. The report then occurred in the eastern Kivu provinces, while a further examines MONUSCO’s efforts to maintain a fragile peace quarter took place in Orientale and less than 10% in Ka- in the country, and highlights the dynamics of the on- tanga (see Figure 2). As such, while the Kivu province is going low-intensity conflict in Orientale and Katanga. clearly the most conflict-affected region in the DR-Congo, January 2001 Election of President Joseph Kabila January 2009 DR-Congo-Rwandan military operation April 2012 December 2002 against CNDP M23 established Kinshasa and rebel groups sign peace deal to end Second Congo War Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities, DR-Congo, January 2001 - September 2013. 1 This ACLED Country Report was compiled by Emily Cunningham using ACLED data. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting [email protected]. Follow ACLED on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis: @ACLEDinfo COUNTRY REPORT: DR-CONGO December 2013 Figure 2: Conflict Events by Type, North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale, January 2001 - September 2013. M23 in North and South Kivu: on the part of the Congolese army, supported by UN troops, M23 was forced to resume peace talks with Kin- M23 is a militant rebel group founded in April 2012 by shasha, held in Uganda for the first time since May of the predominantly Tutsi members of the National Congress same year. To date the Congolese army has recovered all for the Defence of the People (CNDP), with documented M23’s strongholds in North Kivu (Radio Okapi 2013) and military and financial links to Rwanda (United Nations the rebel group has surrendered arms in eastern DR- 2012). It takes its name from the March 23rd peace agree- Congo. However at the time of writing, a ment forged in 2009 between the gov- definitive agreement has yet to be ernment and CNDP rebels, integrating As of November 2013, reached. them into the national army. the Congolese army has CNDP, the predecessor of M23, were Three years after the agreement, for- recovered all M23 themselves formed from predominantly mer CNDP members, led by General strongholds in North Kivu Tutsi former members of the Rally for Bosco Ntaganda, mutinied in response Congolese Democracy (RCD), a rebel to Kinshasha’s perceived unwillingness and the rebel group has group which played a key role in the to implement the terms of the peace surrendered arms. Second Congo War (1998-2003). Their deal and the group has gained promi- Peace talks have resumed activities reached a peak in October nence since then. They have remained 2008 when, like their M23 descendants, highly active in North and South Kivu, but a definitive agreement the group attempted to seize the city of with a notable spike in activity during has yet to be reached. Goma (Stearns 2012: 40). Over the the group’s control of Bunagana and course of the group’s transformation Rutshuru in July 2012 and reaching a from CNDP to M23, certain commenta- peak in November 2012 when the rebels held the strate- tors have highlighted the relative homogeneity of the two gic city of Goma for ten days (see Figure 3). The capture of organisations (Stearns 2012a: 52). Goma proved a pivotal moment in the M23’s campaign, demonstrating the group’s ability to control a major city The data reveals however that the two groups have dis- both militarily and politically. tinct conflict profiles reflecting tactical changes adopted as the group evolves. Overall M23 are significantly more Currently, the future of M23 seems far less certain. Fol- violent than their CNDP predecessors, which could indi- lowing a series of key territorial gains in September 2013 cate that M23 has a higher operational capacity in terms 2 COUNTRY REPORT: DR-CONGO December 2013 Figure 3: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Type, M23, DR-Congo, April 2012 - September 2013. of funding and logistics, that it has higher rates of popular Regionally, both CNDP and M23 rebels were highly active support, or that the response of Congolese and interna- in North and South Kivu, with negligible violence levels tional military actors has increased in intensity. outside the Kivu provinces and approximately five times The average rate of conflict events for as many events in North Kivu as in South Kivu (see Figure 4). ACLED data CNDP during the period 2006 to 2008 Violence against civilians was 8 per month while M23 engaged in constitutes only 6% is also uniquely placed to track en- gagement patterns between conflict an average of 17 conflict events per of CNDP activities, month during the period April 2012 to actors in the DR-Congo and reveals September 2013. Likewise, fatality fig- while almost half (46%) that while both CNDP and M23 en- ures also reflect a sharp increase in vio- of M23 events gage primarily with the Congolese lence levels as the group transformed. army, they also interact with a range target civilians, of other actors including UN forces CNDP’s average monthly fatality levels reflecting a dramatic during the same 2006 to 2008 period and Mayi Mayi militias. were approximately 4 casualties per tactical shift in the During early 2008, CNDP engaged in month, rising to an average of 32 fatali- transformation frequent clashes with Mayi Mayi mili- ties per month attributed to M23 during of the group tants from the PARECO faction and the period April 2012 to September throughout its existence, the group 2013. from CNDP to M23. engaged sporadically with UN forces. Tactically, violence against civilians constitutes only 6% of M23 however engaged in more fre- quent interactions with UN troops, as well as intermittent CNDP conflict activities while 46% of M23 events target civilians. These figures seem to indicate quite a dramatic clashes with a variety of Mayi Mayi factions. Furthermore, in early 2013 a splinter group of M23 emerged and tactical shift in approach between CNDP and M23. For both groups, the majority of battle events do not involve clashed a number of times with its parent rebel group any changes in territorial control. This could indicate that around Rutshuru in North Kivu, highlighting once again for both groups the creation of ‘disorder and widespread the complex multiplicity of violent actors engaged in con- violence’ is ‘a strategic goal in itself’ (Stearns 2012a: 52). flict across the DR-Congo. 3 COUNTRY REPORT: DR-CONGO December 2013 Figure 4: Maps of CNDP and M23 Conflict Event Locations, DR-Congo, January 2006 - September 2013. The LRA in northern DR-Congo: differs significantly to some other countries where the LRA are active. The Lord’s Resistance Army has long been an active player in the Congo’s network of conflicting groups, having first In the Central African Republic, 81% of the LRA’s activities become active in the DR-Congo in January 1999. Over the target civilians but conversely in Uganda, while overall course of the dataset, the LRA have event levels are much higher across the been predominantly active in Orien- ACLED data reveals that recording period than in the DR-Congo tale province, with 97% of the group’s over two thirds of LRA or in the Central African Republic , the percentage of these events directly tar- violent activity taking place there. activities in the DR-Congo More specifically, the group perpe- geting civilians falls to 43%, with an aver- trated approximately two thirds of its directly target civilians, age of approximately 4 civilian casualties violence in the Haut-Uele district, with with an average rate of 12 per event. a further 10% in Bas-Uele and 8% in civilian fatalities per The LRA’s activities in the DR-Congo Ituri. The LRA also engaged in sporadic event. This compares to have declined very significantly since low-level activity in Kivu, Équateur and mid-2012, following a peak in violent Kasai-Oriental, accounting for the re- over 80% of LRA events in events in early 2008. While the group maining 3% of activities. the Central African continues to be active in the Central Tactically, the LRA gained global noto- Republic involving civilian African Republic, LRA event levels have riety for extremely brutal attacks on all but subsided in the DR-Congo (see civilians and forced recruitment of targeting, and 43% in Figure 5).
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