ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 1/25 EK PT

Annex E.4.15

Public ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 2/25 EK PT

SOUTH : THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION

Europe Report N°205 - 7 June 2010

lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

GEO-OTP-0001-1242 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 3/25 EK PT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS i I. IN.TRODUCTION 1 II. POST-RECOGNITION DEVELOPMENTS 2 A. THEPOPfilJ\TION 2 B. TIIE Soc10-EcoNOMIC SITUATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 4 l. Local conditions .4 2. Russian aid and corruption 6 C. RUSSI/\ '8 MILITARY PRR8F.NCE-SOOTH 0SSETIJ\ '8 STRJ\ TRGTC V /\LUE 7 Ill. LOCAL POLITICS 9 A. CoMPr:rnroN FOR RlJ8SIJ\N RRSOlJRCKS 9 B. Tl IE RULE OF LAW ANI) HUMAN RIOI ITS 12 C. FUTURE PROSPECTS 13 IV. GEORGTAN-OSSETTAN RELATIONS 15 A. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 15 B. Dt-:TENTTONS 16 C. DISPLACEMENT ISSUES 17 V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 19 A. THE GENEV J\ T /\LKS 19 B. FIELD PRESENCE 20 C. TIIE EU MONITORINGMI SSION 21 VI. CONCLUSION 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF G.EOROlA 24 B. MAP OF Soun 1 OssHTIA 25 C. MAP OF sotrra 0SSETIA SHOWING VILLAGES UNDER GEORGIANAND 0SSETIAN CONTROL PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 26 D. AnOUTTIIEINTERNATIONALCRl SIS GROUP 27 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRll:FINGS ON ElJROPli SINCE 2007 28 F. CRJSlS GROUP BOAR!) OFTRUSTEES 29

GEO-OTP-0001-1243 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 4/25 EK PT

lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

Program Report N°205 7 June 2010

SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION

EXECUTIVE SUlVIMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

South Ossetia is no closer to genuine independence now threats on its own North Caucasus territory, Moscow than in August 2008, when Russia went to war with has preferred to work with Kokoity and his entourage, and extended recognition. TI1c small, rural terri• who have shown unshakeable loyalty, rather than try a tory lacks even true political, economic or military auton• different leadership. omy. Moscow staffs over half the government, donates 99 per cent of the budget and provides security. South Os• All but four countries, including Russia, continue to rec• setians themselves often urge integration into the Russian ognise South Ossetia as part of Georgia, and Ossctians Federation, and their entity's situation closely mirrors that and Georgians cannot avoid addressing common prob• of Russia's North Caucasus republics. Regardless of the lems much longer. Lack of freedom of movement and slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction, extensive high• detentions of people trying to cross the administrative level corruption and dire socio-economic indicators, there boundary line (ABL) spoil the lives of all, regardless of is little interest in closer ties with Georgia. Moscow has ethnicity and risk increasing tensions. The EU monitoring not kept important ceasefire commitments, and some mission (EUMM) in Georgia could play a vital role in 20,000 ethnic Georgians from the region remain forcibly promoting stability and acting as a deterrent to further displaced. At a minimum, Russians, Ossetians and Geor• military action. but with Russia and South Ossetia resist• gians need to begin addressing the local population's ba• ing its access, its effectiveness and response capability is sic needs by focusing on creating freedom of movement limited. and economic and humanitarian links without status pre• conditions. Periodic talks in Geneva bring Russia. Georgia and repre• sentatives from South Ossetia and together The war dealt a heavy physical, economic, demographic but are bogged down over the inability to conclude an and political blow to South Ossetia. The permanent popu• agreement on the non-use of force. Much less effort has lation had been shrinking since the early 1990s and now been made to initiate incremental, practical measures that is unlikely to be much more than 30,000. The $840 mil• would address humanitarian needs. Positions on status are lion Russia has contributed in rehabilitation assistance irreconcilable for the present and should be set aside. The and budgetary support has not significantly improved immediate focus instead should be on securing freedom local conditions. With its traditional trading routes to the of movement for the local population and humanitarian rest of Georgia closed, the small Ossetian economy has and development organisations, which all parties arc block• been reduced to little more than a service provider for the ing to various degrees. The South Ossctians should be Russian military and construction personnel. Other than pressed to respect the right to return of ethnic Georgians, the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC), no while should be more supporti vc of the few who international humanitarian, development or monitoring either stayed in South Ossetia or have been able to go organisation operates in the region; dependent on a single home. The Ossctians should lift their conditionality on unreliable road to Russia, the inhabitants are isolated. the work of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (JPRM) that has been created to deal with day• Claims and counterclaims about misappropriation of to-day issues along the ABL. reconstruction funds complicate the relationship between the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity, and his Russian lt will take a long time to rebuild any trust between the prime minister and undermine internal cohesion. While South Ossctians and Georgians, but a start is needed on Russia controls decision-making in several key spheres, steps that can make the confrontation more bearable for such as the border, public order and external relations, it the people and less risky for regional stability. has allowed South Ossetian elites a degree of manoeuvre on such internal matters as rehabilitation, reconstruction, education and local justice. Preoccupied with security

GEO-OTP-0001-1244 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 5/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page ii

RECOMMENDATIONS To the Authorities in South Ossetia:

To All Sides: 8. Refrain from arbitrary detentions of Georgian citizens and violation of their freedom of movement; release 1. Agree urgently, without posing status or other politi• those detained since the August 2008 war; and coop• cal preconditions, on basic cooperation mechanisms erate with international mediators in investigating and implementation modalities to ensure: cases of missing and detained people. a) movement across the administrative boundary line 9. Recognise the rights of Georgian lDPs and facilitate (ABL) for local inhabitants and humanitarian and their step-by-step return. developmental organisations; I 0. Allow the EUMM and other international officials b) rights to property and return; and and organisations full access to South Ossetia. c) economic freedom. I 1. Discuss day-to-day issues and security with Georgia; facilitate small-scale economic and social activities To the Government of the Russian Federation: across the ABL: and resume participation in the joint lPRM. 2. Implement fully the ceasefire agreements, which 12. Put priority on eradicating high-level corruption; pur• oblige Russia to reduce troop levels to those mandated before 8 August 2008, withdraw from previously sue those who embezzle reconstruction assistance; unoccupied areas and allow access for international and allow greater freedom for civil society initiatives. monitoring and humanitarian assistance missions to South Ossetia, particularly the EU Monitoring To the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and Mission (EUMM). other international actors: 3. Encourage the South Ossctian authorities to engage 13. Engage with Russian authorities in support of full with the Georgian government to lower tensions and implementation of the 2008 ceasefire agreements. prevent incidents in the conflict zone and to partici• 14. Continue or renew contacts with authorities and civil pate in the joint TPRM. society groups in South Ossctia: support dialogue 4. Ensure that the right of return for Georgian internally between Georgian and South Ossctian authorities, as displaced persons (lDPs) is recognised; facilitate well as Georgian and South Ossctian civil society their return to South Ossetia; and monitor and pre• groups. vent human rights violations in South Ossctia. 15. Continue efforts to monitor the human rights situa• 5. Put strict controls on all transfers from the Russian tion, with a special focus on freedom of movement, federal budget to South Ossetia to limit corruption. arbitrary detentions and political and socio-economic rights; and advocate the implementation of interna• To the Government of Georgia: tional norms and principles, including the UN Guid• ing Principles on Internal Displacement. 6. Define, publicise and implement a generous policy on movement across the A BL for all residents, while Tskhinvaliffbilisi/lstanbul/Moscow/ continuing both to refrain from arbitrary detention of Brussels, 7 June 2010 South Ossetian residents and to cooperate with inter• nationaJ bodies (Council of Europe, [CRC, EUMM) in investigating cases of missing and detained people. 7. Facilitate small-scale economic activity across the ABL; encourage the EU, UN, Organisation for Secu• rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international bodies to develop initiatives to loosen South Ossetian dependence on Russia; and apply the Law on Occupied Territories to support these activi• ties in line with the new State Strategy on Engage• ment through Cooperation.

GEO-OTP-0001-1245 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 6/25 EK PT

lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

Europe Report N°205 7 June 2010

SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION

I I. INTRODUCTION and distributing rehabilitation and development aid to the areas of South Ossetia it administered. T11e strategy back• fired, however: for most Ossetians, Sanakoev was a trai• 111e dramatic events of August 2008 caught most of the tor, the aid a brib~ and the policy an attempt to divide the world by surprise. Not only did Russia and Georgia go to Ossctian nation. , war over tiny South Ossetia, but Russia also recognised that region as an independent and sovereign state. Until Russia's influence had been increasing since late 2001, then, South Ossctia had not seemed a priority issue for when the pro-Moscow candidate, Eduard Kokoity, was either the Georgian or Russian governments, as it pos• elected the region's president. TI1c next year Russia be• sessed neither Abkhazia's strategic Black Sea coastline gan distributing passports to South Ossetians. Jn 2006, nor its economic attraction.' Russian officials began referring to the leaders in both and (Abkhazia) as presidents and Unrest there was not new, however. South Ossetia had filling South Ossetia 's governing structures with its own been wracked by conflict in the early l990s, when it de• former security officers. manded self-determination following the collapse of the , and Georgia sought to preserve its own ter• Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in Feb• ritorial integrity.' A 1992 ceasefire established a peace• ruary 2008 was a tu ming point in the already deteriorat• keeping force (PKF) and a civilian commission, the Joint ing relations between Georgia and Russia. Moscow said it Control Commission (JCC), which brought Georgians, was a precedent applicable to the South Caucasus, and it Russians and representatives of'North (Russian) and South was no longer bound by restrictions the Commonwealth Ossetia to the negotiating table along with officials from of independent States (ClS) had set with regard to South the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Ossetia and Abkhazia in the immediate post-Soviet pe• (OSCE). For a decade and a.half. an uneasy stalemate was riod, including those banning military contacts. lo March maintained, during which relations between Georgians and 2008 the Duma held hearings on recognition of the two Ossctians remained relativelv cordial as thcv travelled entities' independence. TI1e next month, outgoing Presi• freely to each other's territory and engaged i~ mutually dent Vladimir Putin, incensed that NATO heads of state beneficial trade. at the Bucharest Summit had made an explicit promise to Georgia to one day admit it to membership, instructed his 111e security situation began to deteriorate in 2004, when government to establish formal relationships with South the Georgian authorities initiated a major anti-smuggling Ossetia and Abkhazia. operation in the conflict zone. Negotiations aimed at re• solving the conflict were stalemated, while exchanges of The climax came with the August 2008 war, which not fire, killings, kidnappings, sheJling, mine explosions and only caused hundreds of casualties and large population other ceasefire violations became routine. Beginning in displacements on both sides, but also shut down commu• 2006, the Georgian government.attempted anew strategy nication between the capitals. Tbilisi lost control of the to win the hearts and minds of ethnic Ossetians. This in• entire territory of South Ossetia, including 2 l ethnic Geor• volved supporting an alternative, pro-Georgian, Ossetian gian villages in the districts ofTskhinvali and Znauri." administration, led by an Ossctian, Dmitry Sanakoev, as well as the Ak.halgori region and Pcrevi, a village on the western edge of South Ossetia.' Since then, ordinary

1 Crisis Group Europe Report N°l 93, Georgia and Russia: 3 Sec Crisis Group Europe Report N°183. Georgia's South Os• <;lashing over Abkhazia, 5 June 2008. setia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly, 7 June 2007.

GEO-OTP-0001-1246 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 7/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page ?

Georgians and Ossetians alike have continued to suffer, II. POST-RECOGNITION while the personal animosities and uncompromising views DEVELOPMENTS of the Russian and Georgian leaders have become en• trenched.

The situation is further complicated by both the absence A. THE POPlJLATION of diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia and Moscow's military control of South Ossctia. Despite The figures are highly politicised and difficult to verify, signing ceasefire agreements on 12 August and 8 Sep• but the pre-1991 population of98,000 has declined sharply tember 2008, which required the parties to pull their troops due to two decades of political and economic instability." back to pre-war positions, Russia has kept its forces in TI1e de facto authorities" claim a current population of and Perevi, as well as the Kodori Valley (Ab• 72,000, 80 per cent of which is ethnic Ossetian." The khazia). On 30 April 2009, it concluded agreements giv• Georgian government says it is between 8,000 and ing it joint authority to secure South Ossctia's borders, 15,000.11 lntemational observers calculate around 20.000, and on 15 September, it signed a 49-year renewable with considerable seasonal fluctuation.12 A comprehensive agreement with Tskhinvali on maintaining a military base. and probably reasonably accurate study by an independ• ent Russian researcher estimates 30,000, including around 13 This report gives a snapshot of the state of affairs in 17,000 in Tskhinvali, a few thousand each in , South Ossetia, particularly the extent of Russian involve• Znauri, Dmcnisi and Akhalgori villages and a handful in ment. lt also suggests areas of the possible cooperation high mountain villages." between Georgians, South Ossctians and Russians that is urgently needed to de-escalate tensions and start building confidence between the parties. Crisis Group carried out field research in South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia." A 8Thc last census in the region took place in 1989. The overall companion report on Abkhazia was published in early population of the Ossetian autonomous ob last was then 98.527, 2010.7 including 28,544 ethnic Georgians and 65.270 ethnic Osscuans. Before the 2008 war, there was already much disagreement about numbers: Tskhinvali argued there were up to 82.000 Ossctians: Tbilisi said there were ..io,ooo Ossetians and 35.000 Georgians. See Crisis Group Report. Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict.op . cit. 9The authorities. officials and government of South Ossetia are all considered "de facto", due to the entity's 1111sc11lcd legal status. To avoid redundancies and heavy phrasing, however. this report docs not preface every use of those nouns with that qualifier. This pragmatic usage should not be construed as carrying or im• plying any substantive meaning. 10 Sec Ossctian information about the region on the wcbpagc of the de facto president. at llttp://presidentrso.m/republic/. 56.000 voters were registered for the May 2009 parliamentary elections. ''B lOjf\}{OH Ocerau ofiaaponosaasr oxomare.rsasie pesy.rsra• Tw napnaMCHTCKHX .Bb16opos'· ["Final Results of the parliamcn• tary elections are made public in south Ossetia"], REC informa• tion Agency, 8 June 2009, http://comi..nf.org/node/116648019 l. 11 Crisis Group interviews, Georgian officials, Tbilisi. March• May 2010. 12Crisis Group interview, OSCE representatives, Vienna. Feb• ruary 2010. NATO officials estimate the population to be 10, 000-12,000, Crisis Group interview, NATO official, Brussels, April 2010. 131 n addition to 17,000 inhabitants in Tskhinvali town, there arc Russian construction workers. military and border guards. Ac• cording to the Russian embassy in South Ossetia, up to 7,000 scale looting and robbery from Ossetian militias. though no Russian citizens travel to SouU1 Ossetia yearly. Crisis Group casualties have been reported. interview, Tskhinvali, March 2010. 6 14 While Georgian and de facto South Ossetian authorities were Varvara Pakhomenko. ''06JITde:\il>IB ocrpos. 3aMeTKH o .ueMo• both forthcoming in providing information and assistance, Cri• rpacjlHH ioro-oceruacxoro KOH

GEO-OTP-0001-1247 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 8/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page]

Ossetians have been leaving Georgia, including South gian villages around Tskhinvali are now inhabited by Ossetia, since the early 1990s. Many of the some 60,000 no more than five mainly elderly families. The South Os• displaced then from Georgia (excluding South Ossctia) sctian authorities say that they arc not ready to discuss the have yet to regain property rights or be compensated for return of ethnic Georgians who "provided their territory their losses. is Perhaps l 0,000 ethnic Georgians were dis• to Georgian anncd gangs and committed unlawful acts"." placed from South Ossctia to the rest of Georgia after the Today 110 more than 2,500 ethnic Georgians remain i11 first conflict." Housing, land and property issues are South Ossetia, mostly in the Akhalgori district." Only a extremely complex and sensitive questions, as ownership few hundred, in cthnical ly mixed families, Iivc elsewhere, and control have changed several times since the 1990s essentially in four villages in Znauri district, two villages due to repeated displacement. in Java district. and in the capital, Tskhinvali.23

The displacements that resulted from the August 2008 The situation in the Akhalgori region is unique: it was war affected at least two thirds of the local population. under Tbilisi's control from 1992 until August 2008;~4 it which probably numbered between 50,000 and 60,000 at never experienced violence, had a large ethnic Georgian the time. Russian authorities claim they evacuated 36,000 population and was well integrated into Georgian politi• South Ossctians to North Ossctia, 17 but this seems exag• caJ and social structures." An approximate 5,000 ethnic gerated to justify the military intervention. The number of Georgians fled Akhalgori in autumn 2008 and are regis• those who fled was likely more on the order of 14,000 to tered as IDPs in the Tserovani settlement. close to the '16,000.1 s The great majority of these were able to return Georgian capital, Tbilisi. But the administrative boundary to their homes by the end of August by spring 2009, only between Akhalgori and the rest of Georgia remains open l,200 of these refugees remained in North Ossetia. to those with local residency papers: they are able to check on their property, look after elderly relatives and cultivate Approximately 20,000 ethnic Georgians fled when Rus• their land.26 Some stay permanently, but concerns about sian troops and Ossctian militias entered their villages on security and bad living conditions inhibit more sustain• ·10 August and have been unable to return .19 Their homes able return," even though Tskbinvali says they arc wel• were systematically looted, torched and in some cases come. JDPs are also nervous about returning to villages bulldozed by South Ossctian militias even after the 12 Augustceasefire." Completely destroyed, the former Geor-

for the May 2009 parliamentary elections and data received di• used against ethnic Georgians in South Ossctia both during and rectly from representatives of the local governments. after the August 2008 conflict". vol. 1. p. 27, 30 September 2009. 15 According to the 1989 census, 97.658 ethnic Osscuans lived Crisis Group interview, Russian human rights activist. Mos• in the rest. of Georgia, almost twice as many as in South Ossctia. cow, February 2010. Today, no more than 38,028 remain, Some 12,500 Ossetians ~1 South Ossetian officials refer to the Georgian security forces, from this first wave of displacement arc still registered as refu• deployed in former Georgian villages, as "armed gangs". Crisis gees in North Ossetia and 3,0!XJ in South Osseria. "The humani• Group interview, South Ossetian official, Tskhinvali, April 20 IO. tarian consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia: 22 Half the population of the Akhalgori region is estimated to be follow-up to Resolution 1648", report of the Committee on ethnic Georgian. mainly elderly and members of mixed fami• Migration, Refugees and Population, Council of Europe, 9 lies. Given the seasonal migration in Akhalgori and parts of Apri I 2009, http://assembly.coe.int/Ma inf.asp?! ink=/Documents/ Znauri, the number of ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia is be• WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC 11859.htm. lieved to increase to 4,000-5,000 at times of planting and har• 16Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°38, Georgia-South Ossetia: vesting. Crisis Group interview. Russian researcher. Moscow, Refugee Return the Path to Peace, 19 April 2005. April 2010. 17 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Con• 23They remain in the villages of Akhalsheli. Nedlati, Okona and llict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), 30 September 2009. Lopan in Znauri: in the villages of Sinaguri and Tcdclcti in Java. 18 Varvara Pakhomenko, "06KrneMhrH ocrpos. 3aMeTKH o zte• 24 During Soviet times, it was within South Ossetia's adminis• Morpa~au1 10rooceTID1CKOfO KOHKeHuca" l'Thc inhabited island: notes on the demog• it was made into a distinct district separate from South Ossctia. raphy of the South-Ossctian conflict exodus and return of refu• 2~ The population was highly mixed in 1989. with 54 per cent gees" I, Polit.ru, l February 2010. Available at: www.polit.ru/ ethnic Georgians; this figure was 85 per cent in 2002. The i.IJStitutes/2010/02/011 demo. html. Georgi.an currency circulated. and there were few direct trans• 19Crisis Group phone interview, UNRCR representative, 21 portation and trade links with South Ossctia Sec Crisis Group April 2010. Europe Briefing N°53, Georgia-Russia: Still insecure and ~0The Parliamentary Assembly of U1e Council of Europe (PACE) Dangerous, 22 June 2009. called those abuses "ethnic cleansing". "The consequences of 26 UNHCR classifies them as "people in an I DP-like situation", the war between Georgia and Russia", PACE Resolution 1633, as full-scale return bas not happened. 2 October 2008. The IIFFMCG noted that "several clements 'l:i Crisis Group interviews. IDPs from Akhalgori and residents suggest the conclusion that ethnic cleansing was indeed prac- of Akhalgori, Tserovani, February-April 20 I 0.

GEO-OTP-0001-1248 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 9/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page4

along the administrative boundary close to where Russian tered as unemployed in2010,comparedto 1,717 in 2009:'5 or South Ossetian forces are stationed." However, it is doubtful that these numbers are reliable.

B. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND 1. Local conditions RECONSTRUCTION The region is traditionally agricultural, but the sector is failing. Georgian farmers arc gone, their fields and vine• South Ossetia's natural isolation.i" coupled with the con• yards now wasteland. The rest of the available land is still flict with Tbilisi, has left the economy devastated. After state owned, and a lack of agricultural technology pre• the war and closure of the administrative boundary with vents effective utilisation. The market for products is un• Georgia, it has had to be entirely reoriented towards developed. Local produce meets only 20 per cent oflocal Russia, without whose aid public-sector wages could not demand." Exporting surplus produce like apples and be paid. The budget may have increased by halt: from peaches to Russia is not profitable due to high customs 2.7 billion roubles ($87 million)" in 2009 to 4.3 billion duties." A preferential customs arrangement is being dis• roubles ($'140 million) in 2010, but 98.7 per cent of the cussed, but Russian tariffs on South Osscrian products arc total is Russian aid.31 President Kokoity claimed that still in place. Local farmers do not supply the Russian 120 million roubles ($3.8 million) were raised in taxes." military, because the Russian defence ministry deals only but the local tax committee claims revenues of only $2.4 with large contractors, who are absent in South Ossetia.38 mi II ion .33 Small and medium-sized businesses arc limited to small• Budget details were formerly kept secret by local au• scale trade, cafcs, markets. hairdressing salons. auto repair thorities and have only been discussed publicly for the shops, bakeries and a few minor enterprises. Around two first time in 2010.34 Most likely, many basic economic thirds of local businesses arc trade-related. The influx of indicators, such as inflation and GDP per capita, arc not Russian military and construction workers produced a calculated at all, making it impossible to analyse economic post-war catering boom, but other businesses arc recover• performance accurately. TI1c region's labour and employ• ing slowly, because the credit system is weak. A success• ment office reports d1at only 682 people have been rcgis- ful local entrepreneur earns only $500-$1,000 per month."

Relatively large production is limited to a state-owned company. Bagiata, producing bottled mineral water. and ;:~For instance, to U1e villages ofErgneti, Koshka, Mcreti, Gugu• two Soviet-era factories making mechanical parts and taantkari and Zemo Khviti, along the ABL. Crisis Group inter• views, returnees, Gori region, February-April 2009. In Ergneti. enamelled wire, buttheyopcrateatonly about20 percent upper Nikozi, Ditsi, Percvi and Knolcvi, access 10 many fields capacity. A brewery in Akhalgori, which previously be• and pastures is blocked by R11ssia11 and Ossctian security forces. longed to a private Georgian company, was nationalised 29The 3,900 sq. km. region of SouU1 Ossetia is on U1e southern and re-opened by the Ossctian administration but is now edge of the Range. linked with Russia by a closed again/" The near absence of private investment single asphalt road and the Roki Tunnel, built in the 1980s. Be• fore its construction, only mountain tracks linked South Osscna to Russia. 3° Crisis Group interview, local official, Tsklunvali, April 2010. ·1~"HoHJta MKpT•uiH: I0>1rna.J1 OcCTWI Hy,.maeTcn s L

GEO-OTP-0001-1249 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 10/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page i can be explained by the unstable security situation, under• Local analysts estimate 90 per cent of everything sold in developed legal framework and high level of corruption.41 South Ossetia is now imported from Russia. The price of Even ethnic Ossctian businessmen operating in Russia basic commodities is 50 to 100 per cent higher than in refrain from investing." Russia's southern districts, mainly due to high transpor• tation costs and monopolies." for example, the price of Before the closure of the administrative boundary with apples has risen after the war from 30 cents to $1 per kilo; the rest of Georgia, a thriving black market had developed. meat has increased from $5 to $7 per kilo; while sugar Until 2004 most of the economy was based on semi-legal has increased from $1 to $1.50 per kilo. If such goods or illegal transit, from which many authorities, law enforce• were imported from the rest of Georgia, prices could ment personnel, average people and even Russian peace• decline again. However, the presence of large numbers of keepers benefited." Ordinary Ossetians brought Russian Russian military and construction workers has aJso fuelled goods into South Ossetia, and Georgian traders bought price hikes. For example, rent for a two-room apartment them to be re-sold without proper customs clearance. Simi• in Tskhinvali has risen from around $50-$100 to $300- larly, Georgian farmers sold their products to Ossctians, $500, which is comparable to prices in Tbilisi or the larger who re-sold them in Russia. South Ossctian retailers often cities of die North Caucasus. visited a large market near Tbilisi (Lilo) to buy cheap clothes and household equipment for re-sale. The largest employer is the public sector, where salaries have increased: for example, teachers· wages have grown Immediately after the war some construction materials from 3,000 roubles ($100) a month before the war to collected in the empty Georgian villages were sold locally 7,000-8,000 roubles ($230-$260) in 2010. The security or exported to North Ossctia, but this source has since forces, with an average monthly salary of $250-$400, been exhausted." Local authorities and Russian forces offer the male population the best employment option. did not prevent this practice, although it is inconsistent Post-war reconstruction projects have also provided op• with property rights guaranteed by the European Conven• portunities, but mainly for unskilled labourers, since most tion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms." contractors come from Russia with their own skilled workers." Families commonly have at least one member working in Russia.

There arc two local, state-owned banks but no foreign banks to the prime minister, and its restart was not approved by those or automated teller machines (AT M), even Russian. There close lo U1e president. Crisis Group interview. Ossetian activ• was a failed attempt to open a Russian-Dagcstan bank ists, Tskhiuvali, April 2010. Some 670 people arc employed in branch in Tskhinvali after the war . .ii1 The postal system is these factories. "IlyTH CT

GEO-OTP-0001-1250 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 11/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Poge ti vali and Akhalgori was started by a Russian contractor that half of graduates wishing to pursue it go to Russia, before the 2008 war but not finished yet, so four-wheel• which has quotas for them. 56 drive vchiclcsnccd three hours to make the rrip.f'Four or five buses and taxis travel from Tskhinvali to Vladikav• The socio-economic situation in the Akhalgori region re• kaz, North Ossctia every day for 250 roubles ($8) and 350 mains dire. Electricity and gas, which prior to the war came roubles ($12) per person respectively. Travel is extremely from the adjacent region, have been shut off by difficult from February to April, when avalanches and Tbilisi, which says it cannot control their use in Akhal• falling rocks can block the lone road to Russia. gori." Electricity is now supplied from Tskhinvali, where authorities say they are still hopeful Georgia will resume Even though medical services arc free, the population the gas supply .58 Salaries arc paid both by Tbilisi and prefers treatment outside the region, as local clinics do Tskhinvali, but locaJ public sector employees complain only the simplest operations and provide minimal treat• Tbilisi's payments have been irregular.59 The Akhalgori ment. While there is no longer easy access to Georgian post-war Ossctian administration has generally attempted medical services," a few urgent cases were brought to to establish cordial relationship with local Georgians, but hospitals in Gori and Tbilisi in 2009 with International poor social services, especially health and education, dis• Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) help." Only those courage return, even where the security situation is rela• with internal Russian passports arc entitled to free health tively st.able. care in Russia." South Ossetia's some 1,600 retirees re• ceive monthly pensions from the local budget these have 2. Russian aid and corruption recently doubled to a still largely symbolic 520 roubles ($.17).54 However, most are also registered in North Os• Russia's aid to South Ossctia since August 2008 has been setia and thus receive Russian pensions of around $245 massive: 26 billion roubles ($840 million), about $28,000 monthly. for each resident." This includes rchabi litation and budg• etary assistance, as well as Moscow city budget support TI1e education system is poorly developed. Instruction is for a large housing project and Gazprom-funded construc• mainly in Russian and foJlows the Russian school curricu- tion of gas pipelines between Russian and South Ossctia." 1 um. However, in some schools in the districts of Znauri, Java and Akhalgori instruction is in Georgian and follows the Georgian curriculum. TI1e numbers of students in some village schools docs not exceed tcn. Iu 2010, 430 students is staffing- much of the scientific and teaching personnel has graduated. Higher education is poor," and it is estimated left in the past twenty years. S<.i Russia.allocated 200 places for South Osscrians in 2009, but in 20 l 0 the education ministry sent in only 180 applications. "Il0"1Tl1 200 asmycxuaxoe WJ\OJJ JO>Jrnoii Occruu 6y.i!.yT yLJ1{ThCH e poccifficK11x eysax" !'·Nearly 200 school graduates ·50Thereare plans to asphalt the road in 2011. which would sub• in South Ossetia will study in Russian universities"), Osinform, stantially reduce travel times. 25 May 2010; 25 places were also allocated for post-graduate 51 There are no official statistics, but local analysts estimate that studies. Crisis Group interview, de facto education minister, before the war, 80 percent. of residents sought health care out• Tskl1invali. April 2010. side South Ossetia, 40 per cent in Georgian cities. According to 57 Two Georgian officials explained that the gas could not be South Ossctia 's health and sociaJ development ministry. there easily resumed. because the pipe feeding into Akhalgori is dam• are three hospitals (republican, tuberculosis and maternity) in aged and privately owned by an ethnic Georgian businessman. Tskhinvali. five dispensaries, three health centres, an emergency In addition, Georgia does not want to provide gas that could be clinic and a. retirement home for elderly people. In the regions used by the Russian border guards and military. Crisis Group there are three clinics, 49 obstetric stations and ten outpatient interviews, Tbilisi, May 2010. clinics. Crisis Group interview, de facto minister, Tskhinvali, 58 SouU1 Osselian authorities say they want to reach an agreement March 20JO. with Georgians on resumption of the gas supply: they threaten 52 Even this has become mo re difficult in the past several months, to close off water to adjacent Georgian villages. Crisis Group and the health and social development minister says such travel no interview, SouU1 Osselian official, Tskhinvali. April 2010. longer occurs. Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, March 20 I 0. 59For instance, school teachers were not paid by Tbilisi from 53The South Osscuan population docs not. generally have inter• January 2010 until May. when a lump sum was transferred. nal Russian passports which are for residents of the Federation. Crisis Group interview, lDPs from Akhalgori and Akhalgori Moscow finances a special fund for treatment in Russia. but residents, February-May 2010. only for serious illnesses. 438 pcop1c were reimbursed 41 mil• 60 Western aid to Georgia in the same period has been $4.5 bil• lionroubles ($1.3 million) in 2009. Crisis Group interview, health lion - about $1,200 per resident. and social development minister, Tskhinvali, March 2010. 61 Transcript of a meeting between Putin, Kokoity and Brovtsev 54 Crisis Group interviews, South Ossetian official, Tskhinvali, on 31 May 2010 available atthe official web page of the Prime April 2010. Minister of the Russian Federation, at http://premier.gov.ru/events/ 55Thc South Osselian State University building and library news/I 0802/; South Ossetia also receives gas and electricity were damaged during the 2008 hostilities, but the main problem from Russia at reduced rates comparable to or even less than

GEO-OTP-0001-1251 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 12/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 7

Yet, aid issues have begun to create a rift between Mos• supposed to have been finalised by the end of2009.m But cow and Tsk.hinvali. Relations hit a low in February 2009, officially only 85 residential buildings and 102 houses when Russia suspended funding after its Accounts Cham• were completed." South Ossctian authorities say the money ber found that only about $15 million of about $55 mil• allocated for private housing was insufficient.69 All these lion in priority aid had been delivered and only $1.4 million numbers seem highly exaggerated and may disguise had been spent." Until funding resumed the next month, embezzlement, as there arc no more than 100 apartment the de facto government was unable to pay salaries, pen• buildings in South Ossetia." Making it harder yet to obtain sions and other benefits, including to its own officials.63 an accurate picture, the reconstruction process includes not only the apartment buildings damaged in the war, but The reconstruction of administrative buildings, schools, also those which were already dilapidated. kindergartens, Tskhinvali hospital and some residential areas, 385 units in all, is complete." Nevertheless, the vast The Russian auditors visited again in late March 2010. majority of pri vatc houses and apartments that were dam• Their findings have not been made public yet, but Russia aged remain uninhabitable, and the displaced must still continues to send money and has pledged an additional 5. 7 take shelter with relatives and neighbours or in railway billion roubles ($185 million) for infrastructure projects, cars." The "Moscow settlement", financed from the city including roads and the water supply, in 2010.71 Russian budget of the Russian capital," is the only successfully diplomats say they would like to switch from grants to completed project of private housing. It was built in the credits but that this is unlikely for ten to fifteen years." village of'Tamarashcni, ncar Tskhinvali. where Georgian homes stood until they were bulldozed in 2008. Even C. RUSSIA'S MILITARY PRESENCE• these new homes remain unused, because utilities have not yet been installed. SOUTB 0SSETTA'S STRATEGIC VALUE

Russian authorities in charge of South Ossctian rehabili• Military-security decisions arc delegated to Russia through tation say out of the 8.5 billion roubles ($275 million) bilateral agreements. A day after President Medvcdev signed allocated in 2008-2009 for reconstruction, the l billion the September 2008 ceasefire with President Sarkozy roubles ($32 mi Ilion) envisaged for private housing should of France (then tbe EV presidency) to withdraw from have been enough to rebuild 400 houses. TI1e restoration Georgia, the Russian defence minister made it clear that of 283 apartment buildings and 322 private houses was Moscow intended to deploy 3,800 troops in the break• away entities." A year later, as noted, military coopera• tion agreements provided authority to station troops and maintain military bases in South Ossctia for 49 years," as well as jointly protect the borders, for renewable five• those of Russian Federation regions: 11 cents per cubic metre year periods." of gas and 20 cents per kilowatt of energy compared, for exam• ple, to ten cents and 75 cents respectively in North Ossetia.

1)2 A report released in December 2008 by Russia's federal au• diting agency also found that only eight of the 111 structures 67 scheduled for renovation by the end of 2008 had been com• "Crcncas OTBCTCTBettHOCTli ~tCCTKblX BJl(lCTCH '.UCCb Ha1160- pleted. Work on 38 had not even begun. "Disrepair in South nee BbICOI

GEO-OTP-0001-1252 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 13/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page S

TI1e 4th military brigade of the Russian army, officially Preliminary estimates say road rehabilitation in South Os• 82 3,800 troops, is currently responsible for South Ossetia.76 setia will cost 10 billion roubles ($325 million). A new It is located in Tskhinvali, Java and the village of Kan• road between South and North Ossctia through the disputed chaveti, in Akhalgori .77 Crisis Group has been told of the Mamison Pass has also been discussed." Russia announced construction of an additional military base in the village a tender to build heliports in Java and Akhalgori." of Sinaguri, close to the administrative boundary on the west. Reportedly, a smaller unit is deployed in , a Moscow has deployed an estimated 900 border troops former ethnic Georgian village." These bases, on high along South Ossctia's administrative boundary with the hills, give Russia the potential to dominate substantial rest of Georgia, replacing Ossetia.n security forces. ~5 On parts of eastern and western Georgia. While control of request from the de facto authorities, Russian experts arc Akhalgori might not have special value for the de facto currently helping to demarcate the "state borders", despite authorities, it is only 50 km. from Tbilisi, so of high stra• strong Georgian protests." Twenty frontier posts that tegic value for Moscow." Backed up with tanks, artillery, arc being built, not least to monitor Georgian military multiple rocket launchers and air defence systems.i" it communications and movements, arc expected to be com• poses a serious threat to the Georgian capital. as well as pleted by 2011. ~7 to the east-west highway, which Russian troops seized in the 2008 war, in cffoct dividing the country. Georgian experts estimate that the same operation could now be carried out in one hour. By thus solidifying its presence, Russia may also be able to keep a closer eye on parts of its own restive North Caucasus territories. vidc about. 35 billion nibbles for the reconstruction TRAN SCAM i11 the North Ossetia"]. Interfax, 12 January 2010. Russia has also been restoring and building transportation S2 "26 asrycra 2008 r. COCTOHJiaC.b pa60•J3Jf nocunca MHH.HCTpa routes that have potential for dual civilian-military use. It rpascnopra P(!) Hrops Jlcarrrmra a Ccecpnyro Occnoo" , .. A plans to spend 35 billion roubles ($1.2 million) on reha• working trip of the Minister of transportation Igor Levitin in bilitation of the trans-Caucasian highway (TRAN SCAM) North Osscua, 26 August 2008"]. website of the transport min• and the Roki Tunnel (scheduled to be finished in 2012).81 istry, www.mintrans.ru, 26 August 2008. Western diplomats also talk of Russian plans to build a road from Akhalgori to the adjacent north eastern Kazbegi district. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Tbilisi. April 20 I 0. Kokoity has made claims lo that region, saying it was illegally transferred to Georgia in ;6 Western analysts estimate there arc 3,000-4,500 Russian troops, Soviet times. The Kazbcgi road was the single route linking the in addition to FSB border guards, of which 800 are in Akhalgori. countries before the Roki Tunnel. Crisis Group interview, OSCE and NATO representatives. 83Mamison is a high mountainous pass between Georgia and Vienna and Brussels, February-March 20 JO. Russian bases in Russia, close to the administrative boundary with South Ossctia South Ossetia have T-72 and T-90 Tanks. 150 BMP-2, 12-nun Recently, a Russian border guard spokesperson in North Ossetia BM-21 Grad, 152mrn howitzer 2C3, S-300 air defence systems said his troops controlled it. Georgian authorities denied Ute and aircraft. "Russian deploys T-90 tanks near Georgia's bor• information, saying access is impossible this time of year due der', Pravda, 19 May 2009; M. Barabanov, A. Lavrov and Y. to snow. Since the 1990s Georgia has controlled the pass sta• Tseleiko, "Tanks of August", Centre of Strategic Analysis and tioning border guards there from May to October. If Russians Technologies, Moscow, August 2009. at www.cast.ru/lilcs/thc , have replaced them, Uris is likely lo cause further tensions. "Apc• tanks_of_august_sm.pdf. rutt.a:3C: norpaunocr P(!) Ra MaMHCOHCl\OM nepesare CO"l~aH no 77 Prior to F ebruary 2010. only 1, 700 Russian troops were based JKOHOMK'IecKID1 npaxaaasr'' f'Areshidze: frontier guards of in South Ossctia, The rest were at a military base in Mozdok, RF at. Mamison pass created for economic reasons"], Kavkasky North Ossetia, with semi-annual rotations. Russian military Uzel, I I May 2010. analysts explain that that was due to South Ossetia 'slack of in• i140n 12 March 2010, al www.zakupki.gov.ru/Notiflcation. frastructure. However, Russia appears to have finalised the con• aspx?Purchascld=70980-t. struction of military bases in South Ossetia and moved the en• 8~EUMM representatives and locals say border incidents have tire brigade there. Crisis Group interview, Russian military ana• decreased since Russian troops were deployed. Russian troops lyst Moscow, March 2010; "4-» socHHa» 6aJ.:1 MttH06opoHb1 are to guard South Ossctia 's borders until it forms its own guard P 6y ncr nOJJHOCTbl-0 6a'3Hp0BaTbCH B IO>KHOH Occrau" r·Thc service. Agreement on "Join! Efforts to Protect State Borders of 4th military base of the Ministry of Defence will be fully based South Ossetia", op. cit. 86 in South Ossetia"], Regnum, 1 February 2010. "Baacra I'pyaaa B1>IC1)1naror rrporaaaeaapsauan rpananu c 78Crisis Group interview, Russian NGO representative. Pcrcvi IO>• s.i.w.e.UtT Ha pcKOHCT{)Y Kwuo Tpaacxaaa Ha Tcpp1no• H.bL'( socunux roponxos" ["20 border military towns will be p1nt Ces. Ocenrn OKO.-YO 35 M."l}).il. py6.11eif' !"Russia will pro- built in South Ossetia"] Kavkasky uzel, 13 October, 2009.

GEO-OTP-0001-1253 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 14/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page9

Confident of Russian protection, South Ossetia is sub• Ill. LOCAL POLITICS stantially downsizing its military. According to local offi• cials, the security structures contain some 5,000 person• nel, 3,000 of whom were soldiers before the war, ~8 butthe A. COMPETITION FOR RUSSIAN RESOURCES military component is to be cut to 200 in two years." Up to 600 who once served in the Russian and Ossct.ian In September 2008, when its troops still occupied the peacekeeping forces were dismissed in 2009, and some Georgian "buffer zone", adjacent to South Ossetiaand 1,000 interior forces arc expected to be made redundant Abkhazia, Russia signed agreements of "Friendship and in 2010.9(1 Such a significant reduction involves some Cooperation" with both breakaway regions, pledging to risk; almost every household keeps unregistered weapons. help protect their borders. The signatories granted each A sudden release of several thousand poorly educated, other the right to military bases in their respective territo• unskilled young men could not only increase already high ries, recognised dual citizenship and established common unemployment, but also aggravate crime and stimulate transportation, energy and communications infrastruc• social and political unrest." It could also increase smug• turc." The agreements arc valid for ten years and can be gling into North Ossetiaand the rest of Georgia and cause renewed every five. Thus, Russia has consolidated its more out-migration of South Ossetians to Russia. military presence in both regions, instead of withdrawing forces to pre-conflict positions as stipulated by the Med• TI1e de facto authorities do not appear to harbour any res• vedev-Sarkozy agreement. It says recognition has brought ervations about the extensive Russian military presence. a "new reality", so "bilateral" cooperation accords take The local population generally regards it as the guarantor precedence over the ceasefire accord." of its security, even if many complain that the troops have taken local jobs. Both local and Russian analysts agree Russia assumed the responsibility of securing international that if the economy does not develop. the region will in recognition of South Ossetia. To date, however, only effect tum into a Russian garrison, since the military already Nicaragua, Venezuela and the tiny island of Nauru have accounts for about one sixth of the population. Some civil acted, receiving in return significant financial support." society activists admit that even if they dislike the exces• These diplomatic ties bring almost nothing of practical sive presence, they arc in no position to oppose it.92 value to South Ossetia; communication and trade are dif• ficult, if not physically impossible.f Moscow has failed to achieve recognition from any European government or even strategic allies in Central Asia.

However, Russia has played a crucial role in providing support for state and institution building in South Ossctia. Most of the ruling elite, including the prime minister, vice prime minister and ministers of defence, economic devel• opment and finance, have been transferred from Russia

93 This general agreement stipulated conclusion of separate and 88 Crisis group interviews, South Ossetian officials and analysts, more comprehensive economic and military agreements .': Agree• Tskhinvali. March-April 2010. ment of Friendship and Mutual Assistance", at http://tours. 89Kokoily said security is now provided by Russia, and South krcmlin.ru/text/docs/2008/09/206582.shtrnJ. Ossetia needs to move from war to peace to develop the econ• 94 Russian officials refer to the post-recognition situation as the omy. "The issue of security is of secondary importance. Eco• "new reality" to justify policies and actions in South Ossetia and nomic development is the priority .... This is also indicative Abkhazia, for example the veto of the OSCE presence in Geor• that while all Europe and the whole world is arming Georgia, gia. Statement by Anvar Azimov permanent representative, at we are reducing and reforming the ministry of defence". Crisis OSCE Permanent Council, 18 June 2009, www.osce.org/ Group interview, Tskhinvali, March 20 I 0. documents/html/pdftohtml/38101 _ en.pdf.html. 90 Some in South Ossctia. believe it should retain a strong army, 95Bcforc its recognition, Venezuela received $2.2 billion in credit in case Russia should ever suspend military support. Others Nauru received $50 minion, while both Venezuela and Nicara• think it should use Russian aid to develop the economy. Crisis gua signed big anns and energy deals with Moscow. "Moscow Group discussions, local residents, analysts, Tskhinvali. March• grants Venezuela $2.2 billion loan", Russia today, 14 Septem• April 2010. ber 2009; "Russia buys a tiny ally: Nauru", Los Angeles Times, 91 Crisis Group observations and interviews, local analysts, 18 December 2009: "Russia, Venezuela sign oil and gas deals", Tskhinvali, March-April 2010. Russian attempts to disarm the Associated Press, 26 September 2008. population after the war met with resistance and were dropped. 96 South Ossetia does not plan to open embassies in these states, 92 Crisis Group interviews. Russian and South Ossctian analysts as it has 110 citizens in them, Crisis Group interview, South Os• and residents, Tskhinvali and Moscow, February-April 20 I 0. setian "embassy" representative, Moscow, March 2010.

GEO-OTP-0001-1254 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 15/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 10 and are under its control." Security and military structures elected again in 2006, with 98 per cent of the vote in an have been controlled bv senior officers of the Federal election criticised by Georgia, the EU, U.S. and others.l'" Security Forces (FSB) for many years." A Russian jour• In May 2009, the pro-Kokoity forces obtained a majority nalist described even pre-war South Ossetia as a joint in parliamentary elections. business venture between FSB generals and Ossctian entrepreneurs using money allocated by Moscow for the Control over Russian financial resources has become the competition with Georgia." This has not changed; the source of political rivalry between Kokoity and his prime current defence minister, Major-General Yuri Tanacv, minister, Vadim Brovtscv,'?' a fonncr Russian business• was previously head of an intelligence department of the man who was appointed in August 2009 but recently has Urals military district."? Russia's influence over external been severely criticised by government officials and the relations and security is so decisive it arguably under• local media for allegedly turning a blind eye to and perhaps mines the claim to independence.'?' profiting from embezzlement of reconstruction funds.l'" Local officials have also complained that "guest special• Nevertheless, Eduard Kokoity, the de facto president, ists from Russia" arc unprofessional, yet better paid than docs appear to maintain limited control in certain spheres they arc.!" Brovtscv has strongly denied allegations of of internal politics. Russian analysts compare this to wrongdoing and reportedly sued a number of media sources, Chechnya, where President Kadyrov has been given a vir• including Russian Regnum, over them.l'" tually free hand in internal affairs as long as he maintains stability and remains loyal to Moscow."? Kokoity has Such open differences between the Ossetian ruling elite been able to concentrate internal power and control over and officials transferred from Russia arc not new, but this the entity's limited print and electronic media.l'" Criti• is the first time that a Russian official has so clearly re• cism of local officials, and particularly Russia's policy, is sisted pressure from Kokoity. Some analysts believe that portrayed by the authorities as pro-Georgian "treason". Kokoity and other local officials want to be in charge of financial inflows so they can profit from them more eas• Kokoity, a former wrestling champion of Soviet Georgia, ily, while Moscow. to maintain some control over fund• came to office in 2001 from bis previous position as ing, supports Brovtscv. But Georgian observers argue that South Ossctian trade representative to Russia. He was re- Kokoity has the more direct links to the Russian tender• ship.109 On 31 May 20 ·10. he and Brovtsev demonstrated unity when meeting with Prime Minister Putin.110Never• thclcss, divisions arc unlikely to disappear quickly . In a V' Though the de Iacto president has the authority lo dismiss bis potentially positive development, a new structure - the cabinet, as he did immediately after the war, when he appointed Southern Directorate of the Ministry of Regional Devel• a new one composed mainly of officials from Russia with no prior tics to South Osscua. Sec www.presidentrso.ru/ opment of Russia - assumed oversight of reconstruction govcrnmcnt/. wThis includes the former de facto secretary of the South Os• sctian Security Council, Russian army Colonel Anatoly Baran• kevich; former defence minister, Russian army Major General 104 See Crisis Group Report, Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict. Vasily Luncv; chairman of the South Ossctian Committee of og.cit. State Security (KGB). FSB Lieutenant General Boris Attoev 1 5 Brovtsev is the former director of a construction firm based and others. Luncv commanded the 58th (Russian) Anny, fight• in uc Ural city of Chelyabinsk. Allegedly he is close to Ute Rus• ing in South Ossetia against Georgia, 9-18 August 2008. Tile sian regional development minister, Viktor Basargin. "Power FSB in Russia is the successor to the Soviet-em KGB. struggle under way in South Ossetia ., . RFE/RL, 19 April 2010. 99Y ulia Latiuina in "Einc Lcinc fiir den Baron" ["A line for the j(l6"B I011rnoii Occrua aa-raracs »H(j)op~iauw.oHH

GEO-OTP-0001-1255 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 16/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 11 in 2009, according to analysts at least partially to tackle leader "except for odious figures who attack the president", embezzlement and control the money inflow .111 provided people "don't go onto streets with weapons" .116

Meanwhile, Moscow continues to pay subsidies and accept The small opposition has little freedom to organise. Local the risk that funds are being misused, apparently due to fear authorities have denied permission for demonstrations in that instability in South Ossetia could exacerbate the tense Tskhinvali, accusing the organisers of cooperating with North Caucasus situation. Kokoity's complete loyalty Georgian security forces and aiming to destabilise the compensates for any concerns, and Russia is not expected rcgion.T'Anatoly Barankcvich, an ex-secretary of the to try to replace him before the end of his term in 2011.11" Security Council who fought fiercely against Georgia in the 2008 war, openly criticised Kokoity for fleeing the There is no doubt that reconstruction is slow and often front-lines and was fired shortly after, is considered per• mediocre. It is also clear that the war and its aftermath sona non grata by the de facto authorities, a status shared have undermined the South Ossetian authorities' already by Jussocv. low popularity, thus giving the Kokoity team an incentive to find a scapegoat in Brovtsev.113 The regime's perceived Civil society is poorly developed, and the Jines between it inability to defend the region during the fighting, deal and the state often blur. Although more than I 00 organi• with urgent humanitarian needs and complete reconstruc• sations are registered, only about ten appear to be active. tion has caused widespread discontent. However, this is Western funding that previously came through Tbilisi largely confined to private conversations and is unlikely has stopped.!" NGO representatives say activism means to lead to political activism in the near future. clashing with authorities, hence, activists often become opposition politicians. Officials and politicians also tend That said, these factors have begun to make Ossetian to position themselves as activists.!" Although, the au• alternatives seem more attractive. Three opposition groups thorities do not bar NGOs from internationally-funded can be identified. One, based in Moscow, is led by an Georgia-South Ossetian dialogue projects, they usually 114 ethnic Ossetian businessman, Albert Jussoev. A second, select the participants from within a close circle of gov• in North Ossetia, is composed of former officials who crnmcnt-opcratcd organisarious.P' Independent initiari vcs could not obtain seats in the new parliament.115 Both have a.re highly suspect, and their founders arc often called limited direct contact with the South Ossctian population, traitors.'?' Targeting them as the enemy distracts attention propose no systemic changes and thus have little local support.The third. kn0\·\.11 as "Iron" and founded by Temur Tskhovrebov, is not registered as a party and is rather srnal I.

While it has not yet made a significant impact its appeal 116Crisis is increasing. Russian support for these groups is negligi• Group interview, Russian diplomat, Tskhinvali, April 2010. ble. A Russian diplomat asserted that Moscow's main 117 "3,ayap.u KoKOHTb1: «Bosnyx Occrun - He .0...111 opaH>KeBOH concern is stability, and it can deal with any opposition sapasu» '' ["'Eduard Kokoity: Ossetian air - not for the orange Pilf!gue''], Osinform, 15 April 2010. 1l!The authorities recently announced they would finance op• position parties and civil society organisations. Crisis Group in• terviews. South Ossetian officials. Tskhinvali, March-April 20 IO. 119For example, Tskhovrcbov continues to be a civil activist and edit. a newspaper. 111 Crisis Group interviews, South Ossetian and Russian ana• 120The authorities require NGOs to notify them about their for• lysts. Tskhinvali. April 2010. eign trips and to obtain approval before participating in projects 112 Crisis Group interviews, Russian and South Ossetian ana• with foreign organisations. Crisis Group interviews, local activ• lysts. Moscow and Tskhinvali, February-March 2010. ists and officials, Tskhinvali, March-April 2010. 113 121 Sergei Markcdonov "Ka« «noccopanacs» BMHM BnM1tMH• For example, a series of cyber and verbal attacks were car• poBw1 c 3i:cyap.41;0M .[.l.iK.a6eeaH•JeM" l"How did Vadim Vladi• ried out on participants in the "Georgian-South Ossetian citizens' merovich quarrell with Eduard Jabaevich"], Ekho Kovkaza, 5 forum", supported by a Dutch organisation, IKV Pax Christi. May 2010. Sec ''KOMMeHTaptttt pcaaxropa: «H11,i1,ep.1IaH.UCKHH «naan», 11mt 114 Albert Jussocv, an ethnic Ossctian from South Ossctia, is <

GEO-OTP-0001-1256 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 17/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 12

from local problems and mistakes.122 Only a few inde• ery" and "hindering the movement" of the 58th Russian pendent Russian NGOs work in the region.123 army to South Ossetia but released a month later.127

Another destabilising factor is the lack of effective judi• B. THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS cial recourse thus far for war victims.!" Immediately after the conflict, the Russian General Prosecutor's office in• South Ossctian legislation is not adequately developed terviewed almost all South Ossetian victims and sent and is mostly a carbon copy of Russian law.1"4 For exam• 3,300 complaints to the European Court ofHuman Rights ple, crossing the administrative boundary between South (ECHR). Complaints were also filed at the International Ossctia and the rest of Georgia is interpreted as a viola• Criminal Court (ICC). The quality of those submissions tion of Article 322 of the Russian Criminal Code, on the was poor. Most applicants arc not even aware they were illegal crossing of Russia's state borders. Several Soviet• sent on their behalf.129 Georgian human rights organisa• cra laws also remain in force. The judiciary is neither tions sent about 150 complaints against Russia to the ECHR independent nor impartial. For instance, two Georgian on behalf of some 1,000 applicants. uo Georgia sent com• citizens (Chikhladzc and Kapanadzc) were detained with• plaints about Russia to the International Court of Justice out a hearing for eight months. A fter detentions by both and ECHR.131 The ICC prosecutor is gathering informa• sides attracted international attention in 2009, they were tion from both sides to decide whether to open an investi- convicted in a Sunday trial.125 Procedural violations and delayed investigations and trials are common. Pre-trial detainees, including women and children, are kept with convicted criminals in the same prison. 127"J0,1ataJ1. Occras: "Ilene 6paTbes Kosaceux" ["SoutJ1 Os• sctia: Case of'Kozacv brothers"]. Kavakazsky uzel, 11 Novem• The small opposition lacks effective legal recourse. TI1c ber 2008. 12!$Thc detention of Fatima Margieva, the editor of'an opposition South Ossctian prosecutor's office initiated 80 looting newspaper, is illustrative. She was arrested in February cases butobtained only five convictions. Only one criminal case was opened. for the murder of an ethnic Georgian civilian. The 20 I 0 for illegal possession of weapons the previous Russian prosecutor's office refuses 10 open a criminal investi• May, though South Ossetians commonly keep weapons at gation at the request of representatives of the affected Georgian home.12" She was sentenced conditionally for two years residents, and the Georgian prosecutor's office docs not effec• and released on 4 June. On another occasion, Kokoity's tively investigate crimes committed against South Ossetian resi• bodyguards beat up and arrested the Kozacv brothers - dents. Crisis Group interview, Russian human rights defender. two North Ossctian businessmen who voluntarily fought Moscow, February 2010. See also, "Up in Flames: Humanitarian during the war but accused the de facto president of flee• Law Violations and Civilian Victims in 1J1e Conflict over South ing the frontlincs. TI1e Kozacvs were charged with "trcach- Ossetia", Human Rights Watch, 23 January 2009: "Georgia/ Russia: Civilians in the line of fire: The Georgia-Russia con• flict", Amnesty lntcrnaticnal, 18 Novcmber2008; and .. In August Ruins". report of non-governmental organisations on human rights and humanitarian law violations during the August 2008 war, Tuilisi, May 2009. 129The testimony of victims is often confusing and unreliable. Complaints often lack witnesses or documents certifying the death or Ute loss of property. For example, people sometimes with South Ossetian counterparts, was accused of vtreason" by claim they spent four days in the basement and that on 11 August, the authoritiesa nd the government-controlledT V station, Imedi. when they came out, they were seized by Georgian soldiers or 12~ Crisis Group interviews, South Ossctian analysts, Tskhinvali, U1a1 Georgia bombed on 12 August near the town of Java. From March-April 20 l 0. the war's chronology, it is clear that these dates are incorrect. 123 A joint legal assistance project was implemented by a Rus• None of these applicants have exhausted domestic remedies. sian and a Georgian NGO. The pro-Kremlin youth movement, '·Ka'ICCTBO M

GEO-OTP-0001-1257 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 18/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 13 gation. Effective investigation of crimes committed during pendence .... South Ossetia is not going to become part of the war would enhance the victims' confidence in the Russia".137 But on the eve of the May 2009 parliamentary legal mechanisms in place. Justice could also help promote elections, he said integration into North Ossctia and Rus• reconciliation. sia should continue, and his ruling party's slogans called for immediate unification.':" Since then, however, this idea seems to have again lost some of its public appeal.139 C. FUTURE PROSPECTS Visitors can sense significant pro-Russian sentiment and Russia's quick recognition of South Ossctia as an inde• an appreciation of the opportunities Moscow offers. A pendent state surprised many, including the South Ossctians Russian passport is essential for an education or a job in themselves. Though Moscow had insisted since early 2008 Russia. According to the Russian embassy in Tskhinvali, that the recognition of Kosovo by the U.S. and many around 34,000 residents, essentially the entire population EU member states created a precedent with serious impli• except Akhalgori residents, have them. Since recognition, cations for a number of conflicts, the decision seemed only children of current Russian citizens can automati• poorly thought out and impulsive. In private conversa• cally obtain Russian citizenship, but all residents can now tions, Russian diplomats and analysts question the wisdom enter Russia with South Ossctian passports, which was of an action that not only damaged Russia· s international previously impossible.':" T11c vast majority of residents image but could also potentially spur secessionist sentiment hold both citizenships. in the North Caucasus.132 Even those who considered rec• ognition necessary to protect the ethnic Ossetians' rights Many ordinary Ossctians thus consider unification the best arc sceptical about the entity's development potcntial.133 option for the social and economic opportunities it would offer. They also believe it would put locaJ authorities under Nobody seems to have a clear vision of South Ossctia's Moscow's stricter control and reduce corruption.141 But final status. "Yes. we will be part of the Russian Federa• some civil activists and analysts arc more committed to tion", Kokoity announced immediately after recognition. developing South Ossetia's independence. T11ey suggest "Now we arc an independent state, but we look forward the de facto president's dependence is so high that "in the to uniting with North Ossetia and joining the Russian long run. if Russia's interests changed, it could even force Federation".134 Moscow, however, has never backed uni• Kokoity to reconcile with Tbilisi". Others, who consider fication. which could be seen as calling into question the independence impracticable, say, .. independence will not depiction of its August 2008 actions as a purely humani• tum into statehood·'.142 tarian i ntcrvcntion.l'" Tt immediately repudiated Kokoity, say in~ "South Ossetia doesn't wish to join up with any• Jn North Ossetia, immediately after the 2008 war, the idea 36 one". The de facto president then said he had been mis• of a "united Ossetia" grew in popularity, but the enthusi• understood, and "we are not going to relinquish our inde- asm quickly disappeared. This can be explained by the traditional loyalty of political elites to Moscow and the communal tensions which originated in the early 1990s 1~2 Crisis Group interviews, Russian diplomats and analysts, with the influx of South Ossetian refugees to North Os- Moscow and Brussels. 2009-2010. 133 Crisis Group intervi~ws. Russian analysts. Moscow, February• March 2010. 134 "Georgia conflict: South Ossetia seeks to merge with Russia", 137''South0ssetiaSends Russia Mixed Signals", The New York RFE/RL, 29 August 2008; Kokoity 's 200 l election changed the Times. 11 September 2008. nature of Georgian-South Ossctian negotiations. If his prede• 138Varvara Pakhomcnko, "T11w1-lHa 11 sb16opb1·· ["Silence and cessor was more conciliatory, Kokoity and bis government re• elections" I, Polit.ru, 7 June 2009; see also by the same author, peatedly called for South Ossetia 's integration into Russia. On "IOjKffaJI Ocerxa HaI\aH)'He Bbl6opoB .. ["South Ossetia on the 5 June 2004, the Ossctian legislature appealed lo lhc Duma for eve of elections"], Polit.ru, 31 May 2009. 139Crisis incorporation. On 22 March 2006, Kokoity said he was plan• Group observations and interviews, local analysts, ning a similar appeal to the Constitutional Court of Russia. See Tskllinvali, May 2010. Crisis Group Report, Avoiding War in South Ossetia, op. cit. 140 Since I March 20 l 0, South Ossctians can travel to Russia with 135Russian officials, accusing Tbilisi of"gcnocidc" of the Os• internal identification cards based on a visa-free travel agree• setian nation and claiming 1,500-2,000 civilian dead in Tskhin• ment, text at http://mfa-rso.su/node/8. vali - a claim never substantiated - argued they were obliged lo HI Crisis Group discussions, South Ossetian residents, Tskhin• mount a large operation in Georgia. The Russian prosecutor's vali, February-April 20 l 0. According to a Russian diplomat, office later declared 162 civilians were killed. "Ilyran: npoac• Moscow has no plans for annexation, despite local demands: xoaauiee B 1-0JKHOH Oceraa - 3TO reHOJ.J,11,,]. OCeTHHCKOro aapo• "We explain to them that Moscow already has enough prob• na" !"Putin: what's happening in South Ossetia is a genocide of lems because of recognition, so unification with Russia is not the Ossetian people"]. Interfax, 9 August 2008. possible". Crisis Group interview. April 2010. 136"SoutJ1 Ossctia docs not want to join Russia, says Moscow". H2 Crisis Group interviews, South Osscuan analysts and activ• The Guardian, 11 September 2008. ists, Tskhinvali, March-April 20 I 0.

GEO-OTP-0001-1258 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 19/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 14

setia. Ossetian unification would set a precedent for bor• term is impossible: "Even Putin did not go for it".149 Nev• der changes on au ethnic basis in other parts of Russia ertheless, Kokoity has said this is an internal matter and and most likely exacerbate conflicts in the North Cauca• t h at constit. unona. I amen d mcnts arc an option. . t'o· sus, especially with the Ingush, As it is, recognition of South Ossctia was negatively perceived in Chechnya and Ingushctia and intensified separatist sentiments among the Ci rcassians. 143

Reintegration with Georgia is not considered at any level, even if there were to be a change of government in Thilisi. Politicians and civil activists acknowledge the geographi• cal links but say they would like only to build "neighbourly relations". Some also say that before 2004 an arrangement to remain within Georgia's internationally-recognised borders might have been possible, but this opportunity was lost.!"

Since recognition, South Ossctia has increasingly come to resemble a North Caucasus republic, and Moscow's approach to it is similar. Over 80 per cent of North Cau• casus republics· budgets come from the federal ccntrc.!" and. as in South Ossetia, internal political dynamics mainly revolve around the struggle for control of these resources.':" Private businesses remain underdeveloped. and the public sector is the main source of income. together with remit• tanccs. Moscow relics on a single loyal political force and ignores the opposition and civil society."?

The main difference is that in South Ossctia the president is elected rather than appointed by the Russian president. This gives Kokoity some additional autonomy. especially in internal matters. Whether he will use his majority in the rubber-stamp parliament to claim a third term in 2011 is a lively debate topic.!" The Russian head of his ad• ministration, Sergey Naryshkin, has ruled it out, stating that there is a "need to preserve the Constitution of South Ossetia". A Russian diplomat told Crisis Group a third

143 Crisis Group observations in the North Caucasus and inter• views, Russian analysts, Moscow, March-April 2010. 144 Crisis Group interviews. South Ossetian activists and politi• cians, TskhinvaJi, March-April 20l0. 145 For instance, Ingushetia's 20 JO budget is 12 million roubles, three times more than South Ossetia 's; 89 per cent comes from Russia's budget, However, its population is ten times that of South Ossetia. ".6Jo,ll,)J

GEO-OTP-0001-1259 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 20/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 15

IV. GEORGIAN-OSSETIAN RELATIONS Georgians, saying that before the war, "for better or worse, we lived together, but now we have nothing't.!" Even to• day, limited economic links exist. Some from Tskhinvali Georgian-South Ossetian relations, which had been rela• go to Akhalgori, from where they cross into the rest of tively cordial at the people-to-people level, were seriously Georgia, bypassing checkpoints. Some South Ossctian affected by the August 2008 conflict. Geographic prox• :fa.nncrs buy grapes from Georgians to make winc.1.57 Travel imity, family ties and economic interest make it likely from Tskhinvali to Akhalgori is partially restricted. most that links will redevelop over time. But currently it is not probably to limit these contacts.!" Obstacles to freedom only post-war trauma and perceptions of wrongdoing that of movement also affect Georgian TDPs, but even more so block communication, but also tough regulations limiting the elderly who have been left behind in South Ossetia freedom of movement. without support.!" Special rules apply for Akhalgori and the village of Per• A. FREEDOM OF l\'IOVEMENT cvi. Russian border guards allow Akhalgori residents to enter South Ossetia with official Russian translations of Access to South Ossetia remains limited. Local authori• Georgian ID cards."? On average 500 people cross daily ties consider the only legal entry to be from Russia, with in both directions.'?' Georgian police register them, ask• South Ossctian and Russian documentation. Foreign na• i ng where they are going, for how long and why. 162 tionals should have at least a dual-entry Russian visa."" LocaJs complain that the police do not give Georgian or Georgia's Law on Occupied Territories, however, regards Ossetian ambulances free passage. Even though Georgian entry via the Roki Tunnel as illegal and stipulates that authorities claim that all South Ossetians can freely cross foreign nationals, including Russians, must enter South the ABL at Akhalgori (but also at other points along the Ossctia from Georgian-controlled territory or bear crimi• ABL), Crisis Group has heard of some cases of residents nal rcsponsibility.P? being tu med back, apparently arbitrarily'Y

Since October 2008, South Ossetia has closed tbc admin• The Georgians allow in only limited amounts of food and istrative boundary line (ABL), which it treats as a "state goods and prohibit construction materials and furniture, border". Acknowledging local needs, it pledges, but with• because. they say. these might be used by the Russian mili- out details, to open two crossing points in 2010. possibly in Ergncti and Znauri.153 Before August 2008, South Os• setians travelled with Georgian or Soviet identification 156Crisis cards. Now, Georgian authorities state that South Ossetian Group interviews, residents of border villages, March• residents can generally travel freely in the country pro• Afril 2010. 15· Crisis Group interview, Georgian and SouU1 Ossetian NGos· vided they have residency documentation.!" However, in rcrrcscntativcs, Tbilisi, March 2010. practise the situation is more fluid; it is difficult to cross 1 ~ At the police post at the entrance to Akhalgori. everyone is into Georgian-controlled territory anywhere except from registered, while. according to the locaJ administration, all for• Akhalgori; and whether someone is allowed to cross or eigners, including Russians, need authorisation from the de-facto not is often left to the discretion of local police. Georgia foreign ministry to travel there. has also drawn up a "black list" of persons who will be 159Crisis Group interviews. lDPs, Gori, February 2009; report detained if they cross.!" fear of detention, based on lack of Walter Kalin, U1e Secretary-General' s rcprcrcscntativc on the of knowledge and public dissemination of the procedure human rights of IDPs, A/H RC/I 0/13/ Add.2, 13 February 2009. applied, stops many from South Ossetia from travelling to l6

GEO-OTP-0001-1260 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 21/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 16

tary or the Ossetian administration.1 r.4 Three attempts and B. DETENTIONS interventions by an international organisation were needed for a local teacher to bring a printer donated by the organi• Due to restrictions on freedom of movement, people have sation to Akhalgori for a youth club.!" These restrictions been detained on both sides of the administrative bound• complicate the lives of residents, who complain that, unlike ary line. While detentions are usually brief, some last for IDPs, they receive no state aid, so have little motivation months, further poisoning relations. Before August 2008, to rernain.l'" Russian border guards say they do not limit Ossetians and Georgians travelled freely, but after the what is being brought in but require a certificate from the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian "bufferzo ne" local administration indicating the type and volume of villages in October 2008, large-scale arrests began. In some goods.167A11 sides should agree on generous categories of cases. residents of South Ossetiawho travelled there were goods that local citizens can transport and make this list• detained by Georgian police and charged with the exten• ing public to put an end to apparently arbitrary decisions sive looting and pillage that had taken place. Copycat at check points. detentions of ethnic Georgians followed, often by family members who did not know the whereabouts of the Os• Pcrcvi, in the Sachkhcrc district of Georgia, is occupied sctian detainees. South Ossctian and Russian forces also by Russian troops who arc stationed on both sides of the began detaining the local Georgians for illegally crossing village. Travel is only possible to Georgian-administered the "state border". areas with passports between 7am and 9pm. An inhabitant who fails to return home by that time must find some• In many cases detainees had unknowingly crossed the ABL, where else to spend the night.168 Even children go through which runs through Georgian and Ossetian villages, agri• "passport control" on their way to school. Traditionally a cultural land and woods. Farmers have to cross it to go cattle-breeding area, pasture lands arc now on the other to their gardens or visit a neighbour in the same village.'?' side, where a Russian military post is being built in the For example, sixteen Georgian woodcutters crossed the village of Sinaguri. A farmer bitterly complained: "If my boundary unintentionally while working in the forcsts.!" cow runs across the boundary, 1 have to show my inter• The Georgians and South Ossetians never implemented national passport to get it back".169 In al I but a few instances, an informal agreement their representatives reached to Russian troops have prevented the EU Monitoring Mis• charge detainees under administrative Jaw, entailing warn• sion (EUMM) and humanitarian organisations. such as ings and interrogation, but not dctcntion.173 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UN HCR) and the TCRC, from entering.!" South Ossetian authorities say Excluding Akhalgori, ·100-200 local residents per day risk they have no claim to this vii lage and that Russian troops detention by crossing the administrative boundary, either will withdraw as soon as the road linking Ossetian vil• unintentionally or to attend funerals, visit markets, relatives lages is built. or graveyards or check on property .174 A handful - up to ten some days - arc detained briefly by Russian guards. ris The Russian chief of FSB border troops in South Ossetia said his men have detained 172 people - Ossetians and l(A Russian border officers inquired about buying and bringing Georgians - for border crossing since their arrival.176 in construction materials from other parts of Georgia for their military bases. Crisis Group interviews. local residents. Akhal• fiOri, March 2010. 65Crisis Group interview, Akhalgori teacher, Tbilisi, 2010. 166 IDPs in Tserovani complain of very high communal fees. 111 Thus, the village of Knolevi. in Kareli region, is cut in two During the agricultural season, they will probably go back to by IJ1e boundary line. For Ossetian residents, it is sometimes Akhalgori, but do not wish to give up houses inTserovani. Cri• difficult to move from one border village to another, because sis Group interviews, IDPs. Tserovani, February 2010. parts of the road are Georgian-controlled. IDPs confirm that 167 Crisis Group interview, local residents, Akhalgori. March people secretly cross through fields. gardens and woods. Crisis 2010. Obtaining such a document, especially for products har• Group interviews, border villagers and !DPs, South Ossetia and vested locally, is sometimes difficult. Tserovani, Februarv 2010. 168 Crisis Group interviews, Percvi residents and South Osscuan 172"EUMM on inspection of 16 men's detention site", Civil officials, Tskhinvali, February-April 2010. Georgia, 29 October 2009. 169 Crisis Group interviews, Perevi residents, February 2010. P3Crisis Group interviews, international interlocutors, Tbilisi, 170Russian border guards allow access to Perevi and the Akhla• Vienna and Brussels. March-April 2010. gori region lo all Georgian citizens but not to humanitarian or• 174 Crisis Group interviews. South Ossctia officials, locals and ganisations,do ctors, etc. "PoccHHCKHe soeaasre He snycTHJIH international interlocutors,Tskhinvali and Tbilisi, March-April epa-iea s ceno Ilepesa .11.IUI. OCMOTJ)a »orreaeii" ["Russian mili• 2010. taries did not allow doctors to the village of Perevi"], Kavkaz• 175 Crisis Group interviews, South Ossetian authorities, Russian skyuzel, 9 April 2010. UNHCR was able to travel there once in border guard and local residents. Tskhinvali, April 2010. May 2010, Crisis Group interview, UNHCR staff,Tb ilisi, May 176"06yCTJ)OHCTBO rocrpaaauu IO)KHOH Oceraa c Fpyaacii 2010. n:TaHHpYfOT sasepunrn, K 2012 r" l''Construcrion of the state

GEO-OTP-0001-1261 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 22/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 17

While most detentions end quickly, some become what "He did not keep his promise to facilitate the release of Council of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for Human Rights our citizens detained in Tskhinvali".183 Thomas Hammarberg has tenncd "hostagc-taking't.!" In summer-autumn 2009, Georgian police held five South The inability to define and implement a mechanism to Ossctia residents for four months, despite a court ruling guarantee freedom of movement is an indication of how ordering their release. The South Ossctians then arrested bad relations are. Tskhinvali and Tbilisi should immedi• five teenagers from an adjacent Georgian village and con• ately end the detention practices and fully cooperate on victed them of "illegal border crossing". The Georgian security matters within the Incident Prevention and Re• police have detained fifteen Ossetians for lengthy periods sponse Mechanism (IPRM), a forum designed to facilitate since the war. By March 20 I 0, all had been released, and discussion of local incidents by the parties (sec below). there have been none since.178 Eight Georgian citizens are At the least, they should continue to cooperate to investi• still in jail in Tskhinvali, and authorities say they will gate the cases of missing and detained people. TI1at sensi• only be released when Georgia frees Ossetians who were tive issue should not block die talks in Geneva. but should detained before the war. 179 Georgia rules this out, arguing rather be considered at the working level, supported by that they are convicted of killings. smuggling and terror• the 1CRC, or within the lPRM, lest it become over• ism. South Ossetia also claims seven missing persons: politicised and block progress on other issues. TI1ey should four in the war and three in October 2008.180 37 ethnic also work with the CoE and EUMM, as well as the TCRC, Gc orgi.ans Ilave b ccu nn. ssmg . si . nce th c war. 181 to reach agreement on measures to regulate crossing of the ABL, especially for local residents and for family re• Hammarberg has assumed a mediating role on detentions un ification. and in support of the Geneva talks, the negotiation format provided for in the l 2 August 2008 ceasefire agreement. C. DISPLACEMENT l.SSUES He travelled to the region for the first time in August 2008, mediating the release of dozens of Georgians and The most pressing human rights issue is the inability, de• Ossctians. He hired two international experts, who inves• scribed above, of the 20.000 Georgians displaced from tigated the disappearance of three Ossetian teenagers in South Ossetia to return and regain their property. TI1ey October 2008 and continue to cooperate with both sides. still hope to do so, though the destruction of their homes However, neither side is fully satisfied with the Commis• makes this impossible in the immediate term, sioner. According to the South Ossetian authorities, "the co-chairs of the Geneva discussions unfortunately dragged South Ossetian representatives are opposed to lDP re• Hamrnarberg into a political adventure. The main aim of turns. Kokoity told Crisis Group: "Those who voluntarily their work now is to facilitate the resumption of border left their houses are not considered refugees. Neither are negotiations by all means" .1 ~2111e Georgians complained: those who voluntarily bu med their houses in order to pre• vent Ossctians and Russians taking them over. These peo• ple are not refu~ees. They are citizens who voluntarily left border of South Ossetia and Georgia expected to be completed 41.n their houses";' violation ofintcrnational sta.ndards,185 it~2012"']. Osinform, 24 May 2010. 17' "Hostage-taking should be unacceptable, and an internation• they also condition any possi blc return of Georgians on ally supervised investigation into the cases of missing persons the re tum of those Ossetians who left Georgia in the early should be conducted", Harnmarberg said in Tbilisi. "Human Riglus Chief on Missing, Detained Persons", Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 4 December 2009. OSCE officials used the term "hu• 183Crisis Group interview, Georgian official, Tbilisi, February maubargaining". Crisis Group interview, Vienna, March 2010. 2010. 178 Crisis Group interviews. Georgian and Russian human rights 184 Crisis Group interview, de facto President Eduard Kokoity, activists, Tbilisi and Moscow, February-March 20 Io. Tsklliuvali, March 2010. 179In August 2008, according to "protocols of exchange of de• 185 Attaching conditions to the right to return is not in accor• tainccs", Georgia handed over 34 people lo Ossctians, seven of dance with international human rights law or the Guiding Prin• whom, it said, had been convicted of criminal offences commit• ciples 011 Internal Displacement Principle 5 stales that "all led before the war. Up to 25 Ossetians detained before the war authorities and international actors shall respect and ensure re• arc in jail in Georgia. Crisis Group interview, Russian human spect for their obligations under international law, including rights activist, Moscow, March-April 2009. human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as 18°Crisis Group interviews, South Ossetian officials, Tskhin• lo prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement vali, April 2010. of persons". The Guiding Principles were presented to Ute Com• 181 Nine military, three police and 25 civilians. It is generally mission on Human Rights in 1998 by the then representative to accepted that their burial place is known by Georgian and South Ute UN Secretary-General for internally displaced persons. The Ossetian authorities. Crisis Group interviews, Georgian authori• UN Commission and the Genera] Assembly unanimously took ties, Tbilisi, February 2009. note of the Principles, welcomed theiruse as an important stan• 182Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian official, Tskhinvali. dard. and encouraged UN agencies, regional organizations, and March 2010. states to disseminate and apply them.

GEO-OTP-0001-1262 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 23/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 18

1990s, 186 and on immediate signing of an agreement on dents of South Ossetia do not generally occupy vacated the non-use of force. 187 Georgian houses, but some residential areas in the village ofTamarasheni have been demolished, and anew "Mos• TI1e return of ethnic Georgian IDPs to villages surround• cow settlement" has been built there for war victims,"? ing Tskhinvali (Kurta, , Achabeti, and both actions that violate international norms.!" Eredvi) is also perceived negatively by local Ossetians. They says there were inter-ethnic tensions in the lead-up ln December 2006, after many years of hesitation and in• to the war, and Tbilisi would likely plant Georgian "spe• ternational pressure, Georgia's parliament passed a law to cial forces together with the local villagers". There seems address the property claims of ethnic Ossetians who lived to be more openness about return to ABL villages and the in Georgia until the conflict of the early 1990s. However, villages of Vanati, Bcloti, Artsikhcvi. Avncvi and Nuli, it has essentially been shelved, and no meaningful discus• where Georgians and Ossetians lived peacefully after the sions have begun. The problem ofOssetian refugees from 1990s conflict. Ossctians, whose Georgian and as well as the first conflict is still acute in both South and North Ossctian relatives lived in these villages, hope returns will Ossctia, where about 15,000 of them still do not have be allowed, though they do not dare demand this from their own homes. An estimated 5- 7 per cent of Tskhin• Tskhinvali.188 vaii 's current population arc believed to be IDPs from Georgian regions.!" Early return is possible in Akhalgori and several bound• ary zone villages, 189 where people regularly come back to Possession of housing and land has changed several times, check their property, though they arc afraid to stay or cul• due to multiple waves of violence and displacement. The tivate their land .190 "Die local Ossctian de facto authorities legal situation is further complicated by the fact that much in A khalgori have expressed ....~ I lingncss to cooperate with land was state-owned during the Soviet period. To lower international organisations and welcome ethnic Georgian tensions 011 the ground, all sides should consider design• returnees. During a visit to Akhalgori in winter 2009, ing and implementing mechanisms for addressing prop• UNHCR representatives received requests from town erty claims and allowing the step-by-step return ofTDPs, officials for assistance in supporting returns. But Tskhin• with the help of international organisations. vali blocked this. maintaining its conditionality on humani• tarian access and demanding that all aid come through Russia.!" Georgian, Russian and South Ossctian authori• ties should do more to agree on security measures that would allow return to these areas, with monitoring by the EUMM.

South Ossetia' s parliament is drafting a law on the nation• aii sati on of property that is aimed at ethnic Georgian lD Ps' abandoned homes and land."? As described above, rcsi-

186''Everybody talks about Georgian refugees today More than 100,000 refugees arc on Ute territory of Russia Who 19-~Restoralion of apartment buildings in U1e village of Kuna, will speak up for the rights ot Osserians who left Truso Valley, previously the Sanakoev administration's headquarters, is also which has always been the territory ofOsset.ia and has suddenly under way. Crisis Group observation, Kurta, April 2010 .There become the territory of Georgia? Who will protect Ute rights of arc discussions about. a military airport in the former Georgian ethnic Ossetians who do not have the possibility to come and villages of Tarnarasheni and Achabeti, but funds are not yet look after the graves of their ancestors?" Crisis Group inter• available. "MaaooopoasrPoccaa TIOCT[)OHT s 1-0)KHOH OceTHH view, de facto President Kokoity, Tskhinvali, March 2010. cospcMeHHbltt aaponopr" [''Russian Defense Ministry to build 187 Crisis Group .interview, South Ossetian official, Tskhinvali, a modern airport in South Ossetia" I, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 30 April 2010. April 2009. 188Thc 194 majority of Ossctians from mixed families also fled to rDP property must be protected by the relevant authorities the rest of Georgia during the war and rcmai n Ute re. Crisis Group against deliberate destruction, unlawful appropriation, occupa• interview, South Osset.ian residents, Tskhinvali and border zone tion and use. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, villages, February-April 2010. Article 13 (2): Interuational Covenant on Civil and Political 189These villages arc Brgncti, Koshka, Mcrcti, Gugutaantkari Rights, Article 12 (4 ); International Covenant on the Elimination and Zemo Khviti, and parts of Knolevi and Zeredaa.ntkari. of AU Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 5 (d) (ii); and 190Crisis Group interviews, IDPs and residents of border zone Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection Handbook, areas in Gori region, February 20 IO. UNHCR (Geneva, 1996). Customary human rights law is bind• 191 Crisis Group interview, UNHCR official, Brussels, June 2009. ing even on parties that have not signed a specific convention. Er-Crisis Group interview, South Ossctian official, Tskhinvali. 195 Crisis Group interviews, South Osselian officials and ana• April 2010. lyst, Tskhinvali, April 2010.

GEO-OTP-0001-1263 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 24/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 19

V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE not only infrastructure, but also livelihood recovery, psy• chological rehabilitation and humanitarian aid - South Ossetia was excluded, as it refused access to the Joint Until August 2008, the international community, led by Needs Assessment Mission and other international actors." the OSCE, played a significant role in and around South Russia's assistance has filled much of this gap but, as Ossetia, but it has since become I ittle more than a by• explained above, has not been effectively monitored. stander. In the summer of 2009, the OSCE Mission to Moreover, it does not target post-war needs, such as psy• Georgia, which included eight observers in South Ossetia, chological rehabilitation, livelihood recovery, capacity was closed after Russia, alone among the 56 member states, building for civil society and media institutions, justice vetoed its renewal, arguing that as South Ossetia was now sector reform and human rights issues.i'" independent, it could no longer remain part of the Geor• gian mission.l'" OSCE monitors, who had been travelling Shut out by Russia and South Ossetia, the EU and the to South Ossetia since 1992, never regained access after OSCE have, nevertheless, remained partially engaged the August 2008 fighting, though their presence was man• through the Geneva talks and the EUMM. dated in the 8 September Sarkozy-Mcdvcdcv agrccmcnt.!" TI1c South Ossctian authorities now say that "they bald I A. THE GENE VAT ALKS no credibility in our eyes. They only conducted their intelligence activities here, while at the critical moment TI1e 2008 ceasefire agreements stipulated the opening of when they could have intervened to stop the war ... [Tlhcy discussions on "security and stability" -the Geneva talks, decided to remain silent and abandon South Ossctia .... co-chaired by the EU, OSCE and UN and with the par• The international comrnunitv will have to work hard to re• ticipation of Georgia, Russia, the U.S., and Abkhazian habilitate their image in the eyes of the Ossetian nation"!" and South Ossetian representatives. Working groups on security issues and on humanitarian problems were ere• Until 2008, South Ossetia also benefited from international ated.2"3 The tenth round was held on 30 March 20 I 0, with rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance, which it has the next meeting on 8 June. So far, however, they have now largely forfeited. A €10 million Economic Rehabili• done scarcely more than provide a table at which to meet; tation Program (ERP), including rehabilitation of basic little political will to resolve substantive problems is infrastructure. economic development and confidence apparent. building, had been endorsed by South Ossctia and Geor• gia in 2006 and was in the process of being implemented Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia insist that non-use of when the fighting broke out. 199 Georgian-Ossctian dia• force agreements be signed between Tbilisi and Sukhumi logue initiatives between local officials and civil society and Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. Georgia argues that it is already representatives also existed.f" But when in autumn 2008 bound by the 2008 ceasefire and is willing to sign new Georgia received $4.5 billion for post-war rehabilitation- agreements only with Moscow and provided they include clauses allowing international monitoring of the "de• militarisation" of the regions and full withdrawal of Rus• 1%Tl)1ing fora compromise, the Greek OSCE chairmanship has sian troops.i" It says of Russia. "on the one hand, it at- urged free movement by monitors across the ceasefire line and outlined a "status neutral" formula for the OSCE presence. omitting mention of either Georgia or South Osseua Russia re• .ie:ted it. See Crisis Group Briefing, Georgia-Russia. op. cit. ZQJ A team led by the World Bank undertook the Joint Needs 19' "International observers from the OSCE will continue lo Assessment Mission in Georgia in September 2008. Findings carry out their mandate iJ1 their zone of responsibility in accor• became the referencefo r the donors conference, where 38 coun• dance with the number and deployment scheme as al August 7, tries and fifteen international organisations pledged to support 2008, without detriment to possible future adjustments decided Georgia with $4.5 billion over three years. "Summary of Joint by the Standing Council of the OSCE". Implementation of the Needs Assessment Findings Prepared fortbe Donors' Confer• Plan of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French Presi• ence of October 22, 2008 in Brussels", UN. World Bank. at dent Sarkozy. August 12 2008, hUp://eng.krcmlin.nt!specchcs/ www.ungcorgia.ge/uscrfitc.s/filcs/GEJNA2008.pdf. 2008/09/08/2208_ type82912typc82914typc82915 _ 206283 .shtrnl. 20~The ICRC is the only international organisation in South Os• 19lj Crisis Group interview, high-ranking South Ossetian official, setia. ln 2009, it implemented economic development projects Tskhinvali, March 2010. for residents of border villages and refugee families, allocating 199For more details on the ERP, nm by OSCE, sec Crisis Group mini-grants ($1,700) to open small businesses: in 2010, ii dis• Report, Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict,op . cit.; and OSCE tributed seeds and fertilizers to 3 ,600 families in rural areas. Crisis Mission to Georgia pamphlet. 25 February 2008, at www.osce. Group interview, ICRC representative, Tskhinvali. April 2010. org/gcorgia/item , I I_ 29837.html. 203Thc meetings are co-chaired by the EU, OSCE and UN. On 200DialO!,'lle has been facilitated by the Norwegian Refugee the format, see Crisis Group Briefing, Georgia-Russia. op. cit. Council and Mercy Corp Conflict ManagementG roup in 1996- 2(H Crisis Group interview, Georgian official, Tbilisi, February 1998 and the Dutch IK V Pax Cristi since 2007. 20 IO. Prior to the war, the Russian peacekeepingco ntingent was

GEO-OTP-0001-1264 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 25/25 EK PT

South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page 20

tempts to legitimise the occupied territories and insists on Ossetian civilians.212 It also says it will continue to refuse Georgia signing an agreement on the non-use of force, participation until the whereabouts of missing Ossetians while on the other, it tries to evade responsibility and pre• arc known. Russian officials say that meetings should be tend that it has nothing to do with the ongoing situation"."0~ resumed and that they will insist the South Ossetians at• By pressuring Georgia on a non-use of force agreement, tend. 213 After eight months of suspension, a brief meeting Moscow also deflects attention from its own failure to within the framework of the South Ossctian IPRM was implement the ceasefire agreements. International actors held on 3 June and dealt with missing persons but ended should remain engaged with the Russian authorities in without discussion of any other substantial issues. order to encourage full implementation of the 2008 cease• fire agreements. Progress on humanitarian issues has also been slow. The humanitarian group is negotiating a document on "agreed For the 8 June Geneva meeting, Russia has put forward principles", which could serve as a basis for such practi• a new draft proposing "unilateral obligations on non-use cal activities as access to utilities (water. gas), legal status of forcc".~06 Based on this, Georgia, Abkhazia and South and documentation of TDPs, property and restitution, Ossctia would sign separate letters, addressed to the prcsi• UNHCR-organiscd information sessions on registration den t of the UN Security Council, stating unilateral non• and profiling of displaced persons/returnees and "go and use of force pledges. Russia docs not propose to sign the sec" visits based on lessons learned from other interna• letters itself, as it does not consider itself'a conflict party.207 tional settings. Ultimately these should be implemented The Georgian authorities arc critical, while the South Os• on the ground, but here too the Ossctians show less inter• setians are threatening a walkout, claiming that Georgia's est than the Georgians or the Abkhazians and link any failure to sign such a document means it is preparing progress to a non-use of force agreement. 21~ another war. 20~ Boris Chochiev, the chief South Ossctian representative, said. "if the Russian draft is not accepted 8. FIELD PRESENCE by the next meeting on 8 June, 1 do not see any sense in talking anymore .... for us, this version is better than Early in the Geneva talks, the EU proposed the "dual en• nothing ... but we want a full agreement, because we do try" principle for humanitarian access to South Ossetia not foci safe as long as the I Georgian President I Saakashvili from Georgia and Russia. Tbilisi has accepted, but the regime is in powcr".209 South Ossetians, like the Russians, continue to insist that The most tangible result achieved by the Geneva talks has all international humanitarian agency personnel - with the been the establishment of an Incident Prevention and exception ofa few individuals preparing the Geneva talks Response Mechanism (TPRM) in February 2009, under - travel only via Russia."! Distrust of outside organisa• which the parties agreed to undertake joint efforts to pre• tions is high. The de facto authorities sec any foreign vent incidents on the ABL through regular meetings be• involvement as an existential threat and say, "access will tween local actors responsible for security issues. It has be possible only if I international organisations I do not worked fairly well in Abkhazia.i'" and Russia appears to engage in sabotage and subversive activities't.i'" High• support the format as "good management of the status level Ossetians claim that they want assistance but insist that international organisations "look for excuses for not quo".211 But South Ossetia has suspended meetings, first on procedural grounds, then because of the detention of bringing in aid, for not assisting ... who needs their rags and blankets? [Tlhey should help people to reconstruct their houses I W le are open to humanitarian organisa- tions, but there is no one to help".217 ln fact, international stationed in South Ossctia in accordance with the 1992 Sochi agreement to which Georgia was a signatory. M "Pact on non-use of force: capitulation or prevention of ag• ~rcssion?" [in Georgian], Radio Tavisuplcba, 24 January 2010. 212Crisis Group interview. South Ossctian official. Tskhinvali, 06''Y•JaCTHHKH )l(eHeBCK}IX,il.HCK)'CCHRn pHlUUil[ npeztnoaren• April 2010. 21 Hbll Poccueii npoeicr o aenpusteaeaau CW1b1" ["Participants of Crisis Group interview, Russian foreign ministry official, the Geneva Discussion received a draft proposal on non-use of Moscow, May 2010. force from Russia"], Vzgliad, 31 March 2010. ~14Crisis Group interview, international negotiators and Rus• ::oi Crisis Group interviews, Russian foreign ministry official and sian official, Istanbul and Moscow, April 2010. international participants in Geneva talks, Tbilisi and Moscow, 215Crisis Group received the same reply when it requested to April-May 2010. visit South Ossctia from Georgia. 200 Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian official, Tskhinvali, ~16 Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian official, Tskhinvali, April 2010. March 2010. 209 Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, April 20 I 0. 217The authorities in Tskhinvali also claim that the absence of zro Seventeen meetings have taken place between Georgian and international aid is another obstacle to the return of Georgian Abkhazian representatives in . IDPs. Crisis Group interview. South Ossctian official, Tskhin• 211 Crisis Group interview, EU official, Istanbul, April 20!0. vali, April 2010.

GEO-OTP-0001-1265