ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 1/25 EK PT Annex E.4.15 Public ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 2/25 EK PT SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION Europe Report N°205 - 7 June 2010 lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE GEO-OTP-0001-1242 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 3/25 EK PT TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS i I. IN.TRODUCTION 1 II. POST-RECOGNITION DEVELOPMENTS 2 A. THEPOPfilJ\TION 2 B. TIIE Soc10-EcoNOMIC SITUATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 4 l. Local conditions .4 2. Russian aid and corruption 6 C. RUSSI/\ '8 MILITARY PRR8F.NCE-SOOTH 0SSETIJ\ '8 STRJ\ TRGTC V /\LUE 7 Ill. LOCAL POLITICS 9 A. CoMPr:rnroN FOR RlJ8SIJ\N RRSOlJRCKS 9 B. Tl IE RULE OF LAW ANI) HUMAN RIOI ITS 12 C. FUTURE PROSPECTS 13 IV. GEORGTAN-OSSETTAN RELATIONS 15 A. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 15 B. Dt-:TENTTONS 16 C. DISPLACEMENT ISSUES 17 V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 19 A. THE GENEV J\ T /\LKS 19 B. FIELD PRESENCE 20 C. TIIE EU MONITORINGMI SSION 21 VI. CONCLUSION 23 APPENDICES A. MAP OF G.EOROlA 24 B. MAP OF Soun 1 OssHTIA 25 C. MAP OF sotrra 0SSETIA SHOWING VILLAGES UNDER GEORGIANAND 0SSETIAN CONTROL PRIOR TO 7 AUGUST 2008 26 D. AnOUTTIIEINTERNATIONALCRl SIS GROUP 27 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRll:FINGS ON ElJROPli SINCE 2007 28 F. CRJSlS GROUP BOAR!) OFTRUSTEES 29 GEO-OTP-0001-1243 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 4/25 EK PT lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE Program Report N°205 7 June 2010 SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION EXECUTIVE SUlVIMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS South Ossetia is no closer to genuine independence now threats on its own North Caucasus territory, Moscow than in August 2008, when Russia went to war with has preferred to work with Kokoity and his entourage, Georgia and extended recognition. TI1c small, rural terri• who have shown unshakeable loyalty, rather than try a tory lacks even true political, economic or military auton• different leadership. omy. Moscow staffs over half the government, donates 99 per cent of the budget and provides security. South Os• All but four countries, including Russia, continue to rec• setians themselves often urge integration into the Russian ognise South Ossetia as part of Georgia, and Ossctians Federation, and their entity's situation closely mirrors that and Georgians cannot avoid addressing common prob• of Russia's North Caucasus republics. Regardless of the lems much longer. Lack of freedom of movement and slow pace of post-conflict reconstruction, extensive high• detentions of people trying to cross the administrative level corruption and dire socio-economic indicators, there boundary line (ABL) spoil the lives of all, regardless of is little interest in closer ties with Georgia. Moscow has ethnicity and risk increasing tensions. The EU monitoring not kept important ceasefire commitments, and some mission (EUMM) in Georgia could play a vital role in 20,000 ethnic Georgians from the region remain forcibly promoting stability and acting as a deterrent to further displaced. At a minimum, Russians, Ossetians and Geor• military action. but with Russia and South Ossetia resist• gians need to begin addressing the local population's ba• ing its access, its effectiveness and response capability is sic needs by focusing on creating freedom of movement limited. and economic and humanitarian links without status pre• conditions. Periodic talks in Geneva bring Russia. Georgia and repre• sentatives from South Ossetia and Abkhazia together The war dealt a heavy physical, economic, demographic but are bogged down over the inability to conclude an and political blow to South Ossetia. The permanent popu• agreement on the non-use of force. Much less effort has lation had been shrinking since the early 1990s and now been made to initiate incremental, practical measures that is unlikely to be much more than 30,000. The $840 mil• would address humanitarian needs. Positions on status are lion Russia has contributed in rehabilitation assistance irreconcilable for the present and should be set aside. The and budgetary support has not significantly improved immediate focus instead should be on securing freedom local conditions. With its traditional trading routes to the of movement for the local population and humanitarian rest of Georgia closed, the small Ossetian economy has and development organisations, which all parties arc block• been reduced to little more than a service provider for the ing to various degrees. The South Ossctians should be Russian military and construction personnel. Other than pressed to respect the right to return of ethnic Georgians, the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC), no while Tbilisi should be more supporti vc of the few who international humanitarian, development or monitoring either stayed in South Ossetia or have been able to go organisation operates in the region; dependent on a single home. The Ossctians should lift their conditionality on unreliable road to Russia, the inhabitants are isolated. the work of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (JPRM) that has been created to deal with day• Claims and counterclaims about misappropriation of to-day issues along the ABL. reconstruction funds complicate the relationship between the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity, and his Russian lt will take a long time to rebuild any trust between the prime minister and undermine internal cohesion. While South Ossctians and Georgians, but a start is needed on Russia controls decision-making in several key spheres, steps that can make the confrontation more bearable for such as the border, public order and external relations, it the people and less risky for regional stability. has allowed South Ossetian elites a degree of manoeuvre on such internal matters as rehabilitation, reconstruction, education and local justice. Preoccupied with security GEO-OTP-0001-1244 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 5/25 EK PT South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition Crisis Group Europe Report N°205, 7 June 2010 Page ii RECOMMENDATIONS To the Authorities in South Ossetia: To All Sides: 8. Refrain from arbitrary detentions of Georgian citizens and violation of their freedom of movement; release 1. Agree urgently, without posing status or other politi• those detained since the August 2008 war; and coop• cal preconditions, on basic cooperation mechanisms erate with international mediators in investigating and implementation modalities to ensure: cases of missing and detained people. a) movement across the administrative boundary line 9. Recognise the rights of Georgian lDPs and facilitate (ABL) for local inhabitants and humanitarian and their step-by-step return. developmental organisations; I 0. Allow the EUMM and other international officials b) rights to property and return; and and organisations full access to South Ossetia. c) economic freedom. I 1. Discuss day-to-day issues and security with Georgia; facilitate small-scale economic and social activities To the Government of the Russian Federation: across the ABL: and resume participation in the joint lPRM. 2. Implement fully the ceasefire agreements, which 12. Put priority on eradicating high-level corruption; pur• oblige Russia to reduce troop levels to those mandated before 8 August 2008, withdraw from previously sue those who embezzle reconstruction assistance; unoccupied areas and allow access for international and allow greater freedom for civil society initiatives. monitoring and humanitarian assistance missions to South Ossetia, particularly the EU Monitoring To the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and Mission (EUMM). other international actors: 3. Encourage the South Ossctian authorities to engage 13. Engage with Russian authorities in support of full with the Georgian government to lower tensions and implementation of the 2008 ceasefire agreements. prevent incidents in the conflict zone and to partici• 14. Continue or renew contacts with authorities and civil pate in the joint TPRM. society groups in South Ossctia: support dialogue 4. Ensure that the right of return for Georgian internally between Georgian and South Ossctian authorities, as displaced persons (lDPs) is recognised; facilitate well as Georgian and South Ossctian civil society their return to South Ossetia; and monitor and pre• groups. vent human rights violations in South Ossctia. 15. Continue efforts to monitor the human rights situa• 5. Put strict controls on all transfers from the Russian tion, with a special focus on freedom of movement, federal budget to South Ossetia to limit corruption. arbitrary detentions and political and socio-economic rights; and advocate the implementation of interna• To the Government of Georgia: tional norms and principles, including the UN Guid• ing Principles on Internal Displacement. 6. Define, publicise and implement a generous policy on movement across the A BL for all residents, while Tskhinvaliffbilisi/lstanbul/Moscow/ continuing both to refrain from arbitrary detention of Brussels, 7 June 2010 South Ossetian residents and to cooperate with inter• nationaJ bodies (Council of Europe, [CRC, EUMM) in investigating cases of missing and detained people. 7. Facilitate small-scale economic activity across the ABL; encourage the EU, UN, Organisation for Secu• rity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international bodies to develop initiatives to loosen South Ossetian dependence on Russia; and apply the Law on Occupied Territories to support these activi• ties in line with the new State Strategy on Engage• ment through Cooperation. GEO-OTP-0001-1245 ICC-01/15-4-AnxE.4.15 13-10-2015 6/25 EK PT lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE Europe Report N°205 7 June 2010 SOUTH OSSETIA: THE BURDEN OF RECOGNITION I I. INTRODUCTION and distributing rehabilitation and development aid to the areas of South Ossetia it administered. T11e strategy back• fired, however: for most Ossetians, Sanakoev was a trai• 111e dramatic events of August 2008 caught most of the tor, the aid a brib~ and the policy an attempt to divide the world by surprise.