'Partible Persons' in Melanesia and Polynesia Author(S): Mark S
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Motherless Sons: 'Divine Kings' and 'Partible Persons' in Melanesia and Polynesia Author(s): Mark S. Mosko Reviewed work(s): Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 697-717 Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2804170 . Accessed: 26/04/2012 17:09 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Man. http://www.jstor.org MOTHERLESS SONS: 'DIVINE KINGS' AND 'PARTIBLE PERSONS' IN MELANESIA AND POLYNESIA MAIU S. MOSKO HartwickCollege Two disparateformulations of personalagency have recentlybeen proposedin PacificIslands ethnology.From Melanesia, on the one hand,Strathem has introducedthe 'partibleperson' who, in acting,is subtractivelydecomposed into his or her compositeparts or relations.From Polynesia, on theother hand, Sahlins has invokedthe image of the 'divine king' in whose heroicallyexpansive actionsother members of society are hierarchically encompassed. This articleexplores the opposed implicationsof these two models in a single instanceof a Melanesian chieflysociety - the Austronesian-speakingAmoamo (North)Mekeo of Papua New Guinea. By comparingthe pol- itico-ritualcapacities of Mekeo commonersand hereditaryofficials in maritaland mortuary exchange,it is suggestedthat the agencyof Polynesianas well as Melanesianchiefs might be best characterizedin termsof personal'partibility' rather than heroic 'hierarchy'. In her recentbook, The genderof thegft (1988), MarilynStrathern contrasts Melanesiansociality and imagesof the 'person' with Westernnotions of the 'individual'and 'society'.The interestingaspect of thisjuxtaposition, however, lies in the noveltyof her termsand in the way she has carefullylocated them in dialoguescomprising Western orthodoxy, within different constructions we have about ourselvesand Melanesians.This articleendeavours to broadenthat com- parisonby proposing another one internalto thePacific itself, between Melanesia and Polynesia.Specifically, I counterpose Strathern's construction of theMelane- sian 'partibleperson' with the model of the 'heroic' or 'divine king' recently developedby Sahlins(1985a; 1985b; 1991) forPolynesia. Given the networkof overlappingethnological axes distinctiveto the Pacific, thereare severalreasons why this reorientation of Strathem'sarguments is prob- ablyinevitable, and possiblyfruitful. First, the similarities and differencesbetween Melanesia and Polynesiahave fordecades attractedconsiderable attention and debate,and in those discussionsSahlins (1963; 1989) has playeda conspicuous part (see also, forexample, B. Douglas 1979; Allen 1984; Mosko 1985: ch. 9; Thomas 1989). Secondly,on the basisof linguisticand culturalcriteria, one of the two major ethnographicregions which figureprominently in Strathem's discussions,the Austronesian-speaking Massim, straddles the Melanesia/Polynesia divideand arguablypossesses more in commonwith Fiji, Hawaii, New Zealand, Tonga and so on, thanwith the othermajor region of herMelanesian focus, the non-Austronesian-speakingNew GuineaHighlands. Man (N.S.) 27, 697-717 698 MARK S. MOSKO Thirdly,Polynesia has alreadybeen invokedin certainother influential works as epitomizingnon-Westem societies by explicitcontrast to the modern,'indi- vidualistic'societies of the West. I referhere, of course, to the criticalplace which Polynesiahas held in Dumontiansociology. Just as Strathernhas relied upon thedistinction between 'gift' and 'commodity'economies (Gregory 1982), Dumont haslong heldup Polynesia,along with India, as an exemplarof a certain mode of sociality- 'hierarchy'- whereinthe a priorirelation between the 'indi- vidual'and 'society'of Westernideology and socialscience is profoundlyaltered or displaced(Dumont 1959: 9-10, 11-12, 16, 29-30, 32-4; 1960: 52-3; 1980: 48-9, 213, 364-5). In his more recentwritings on Polynesia,Sahlins (1985a; 1985b; 1991) has drawnheavily from the Dumontian formulation of'hierarchy'.1 Giventhat various elements of Strathern'streatment of Melanesian sociality devi- ate fromthe Dumontian approach (see, for example,Strathern 1987: 280-1; 1988: 13, 15, 72, 99, 102-3, 321-2; cf.M. Douglas 1989: 18), a new and provo- cativecontrast between Melanesia and Polynesiais implied.More curiouslystill, Dumont himselfhas alreadypointed to Melanesiaas yieldingconceptual formu- lationswhich departfrom the hierarchicalorders typified by both India and Polynesia(1979: 789; see Mosko n.d.1; n.d.2; in press). But more can be said of the contrastbetween Melanesian and Polynesian socialityas representedby Strathernand Dumont, respectively.Although they sharea keen scepticismregarding the comparativeutility of the Westernnotion of the 'individual',Strathern - unlikeDumont - also rejectsorthodox anthropo- logical constructionsof 'society' as reifications.2Both authors have sought resolutionof the same problem- i.e. the ethnocentrismor sociocentrisminher- ent in the notion of the unitary'individual' - but in oppositedirections, as it were. Where Dumont would holisticallyencompass the 'person', or mergea multiplicityof such 'persons',within the greatersocial totality,Strathern parti- tionsevery 'person' into his or hercomposite and detachableparts and relations. But even thisfalls short of apprehendingthe most salient theoretical issue now on the Oceanic horizon.For on the one hand,Strathern, with her model of the 'partibleperson', and on the other,Sahlins (1981; 1985a; 1985b; 1991), withhis programmeof structuralhistory which currentlyrepresents the mostcelebrated applicationof Dumontiansociology, have each developedpowerful theories of socialaction - theorieswhich profoundly diverge. The essenceof thisdifference concernsthe specificdynamics of agencyattributed to the epitomizing'person' foreach region.For Strathern,the (Melanesian)'person' is a not a unitary'indi- vidual' but a 'dividual', multiply or plurally constitutedof the earlier contributionsand relationsof otherpersons. Action thereby consists in detaching and revealingthe person'sinternal capacities as previouslycomposed of the ac- tionsof otherpersons. In acting,the 'person' externalizesthose internal parts or contributions,and agency consistsin a process of personaldecomposition. It shouldbe added thatthis view ofsociality does not dependupon therebeing any hierarchicalarrangement among the detachableparts. For Sahlins,however, the 'person'is epitomizedin the divineking or chief whose heroic capacitiesand actionssummarize, unify, encompass and thusex- pansivelyinternalize the relations of society'smembers as a whole.Such figuresare 'social-historicalindividuals' (1991: 63). Personsof thismagnitude personify their MARK S. MOSKO 699 respectivesocieties almost literally, that is, as 'heroic societies',and the histories markedby theiractions are describedas 'heroichistories'. Moreover, such divine kingsand heroicsocieties are indicativeof a certaintype of social solidarityand organization- Dumontian'hierarchical' as distinctfrom both the 'mechanical' and the 'organic' of Durkheim.Quoting Johanson(1954: 180) on the New Zealand Maori,for example, Sahlins says of thePolynesian chief that he 'livesthe lifeof a whole tribe,... standsin a certainrelation to neighbouringtribes and kinshipgroups, and ... gathersthe relationshipto other tribesin his person' (1985a: 35). The followingpassages augment this view: At once encompassingand transcendingthe society,the divine king is able to mediate its relationsto the cosmos - which thus also responds,in its own naturalorder, to his sovereign powers (Sahlins 1985a: 34). Here historyis anthropomorphicin principle,which is to say in structure.Granted that history is much more thanthe doingsof greatmen, is alwaysand everywherethe lifeof communities; but preciselyin these heroic politiesthe king is the conditionof the possibilityof community (1985a: 34-5). This reallyis a historyof kingsand battles,but only because it is a culturalorder that, multi- plyingthe action of the king by the systemof society,gives him a disproportionatehistorical effect(1985a: 41). The king assumes,and in his own personlives, the life of the collectivity... the expressionas ontologyof a principleof extension,such as makesthe people particularinstances of the chief's (cumancestor's) existence (Sahlins 1985b: 207). Fromthese and otherindications, it would appearthat the efficacy of thePolyne- siandivine hero lies preciselyin his (or her)hierarchical 'supercomposition'. It shouldbe observedthat this construction involves an importantdeparture fromSahlins's (1972) earlieranalysis of Polynesianredistributive reciprocity. There,chiefs and commonersalike were conceivedas essentiallyintegral beings, reciprocallyexchanging and centralizingquantities of materialwealth and ser- vices. The differenceis thatin the earlierformulation there is no hintthat with actsof exchange the 'boundaries' of chiefly or commonerpersons impinged upon or encompassedone another. Now men do not personallyconstruct their power over others;they