Analogy and Communication

philosophies

Article Analogy and Communication

Enrique Dussel † Facultad Filosofía y Letras (School of Philosophy and Literature), Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana (Autonomous Metropolitan University, UAM), Mexico City 04510, Mexico; [email protected] See www.enriquedussel.com. † Received: 31 December 2018; Accepted: 17 April 2019; Published: 5 June 2019

Abstract: Analogy makes possible the dialogue between people. This dialogue, at the intercultural level and from distinct ontological comprehensions of life, cannot be achieved from a univocal pretension of meaning. Analogy permits, especially at the rhetoric level of Political Philosophy, an adequate interpretation of such complex concepts as people, state or rights. A semantics of these concepts by similarity allows us to advance in the process towards a better interpretation of the other interlocutor’s expression though never reaching identity.

Keywords: analogy; communication; dialogue

1. Introduction Univocal communication is only possible when the meaning of the words or signs that it involves is abstract. In the case of human communication, when a human being communicates with another regarding their ontological, biographical, historical, personal world, the enunciation loses equally and to a greater extent its univocal quality, because the horizon of sense1 (the “comprehension of being” that M. Heidegger referred to, which is not identical to that of other such worlds) gives to each of the entities of the world a distinct sense2 (which is what one seeks to communicate within the context of an existential dialogue between persons), which leads certain philosophers to speak of an inevitable degree of incommunicability, because of the ontological incommensurability of the worlds that constitute the subject of the enunciation at issue. Here we would be then in the case opposite to that of a determined univocal character; which is to say that here we are confronting the virtually absolute equivocal character of incommunicability, even though the same word3 does not have the same meaning (which is why it is opined that the word uttered by the person who enunciates is incomprehensible for the listener, who seeks to achieve a univocal understanding, which is identical). To the contrary, I will argue here that there can be a communication through similarity, but which is not identical, of the same word in each of the worlds of the interlocutors involved, since the expression of one can have, in the world of the other a meaning which is distinct but similar4, and thus approximately

1 The “meaning” (semantic relation) indicates the reference of the word or concept to the thing (be it real or reasoned); its “sense” (its ontological relation) (sens in French, Sinn in German) indicates the respective relationship of the thing or meaning within the totality of the world (Welt in M. Heidegger). See ([1], chapters 2.3.3–2.3.8, 2.4.3) and Glossary of concepts. Analogy, difference, distinction, identity, etc. 2 In this writing there are three words that will be employed with semantic precision: (1) the word “difference” (differentia in Latin) refers to a univocal identical character, (2) “distinction” (distinctio) to analogical similarity, y (3) “diversity” (diversitas) indicates the non-equivalency between the meaning of the two above. 3 For example, when one says “I love you!” to one’s partner. 4 Is it possible for example for the interlocutors of a dialogue to attain the same interpretation of the sense of “love”? For one of these perhaps, it means servicing one’s own self through the other in order to fulfill their own egotistical appetites (mere éros); while, by contrast, for the other, it might mean friendship in service of mutuality (philía); or it could also mean a unconditional and disinterested affection committed to the construction of the happiness of the Other (agápe) without

Philosophies 2019, 4, 31; doi:10.3390/philosophies4020031 www.mdpi.com/journal/philosophies Philosophies 20192019,, 44,, 31x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 23

thus approximately comprehensible (which could increase mutual comprehension by means of a comprehensibledialogue within the (which context could of “analogical increase mutual time” comprehension6). by means of a dialogue within the 5 contextAnd of so, “analogical between the time” univocal). character that presupposes a simplification of the semantic content of thatAnd which so, between is communicated, the univocal and character the equivocal that presupposes character of a simplificationthat which is diverse of the semantic without contentshared ofmeaning, that which we must is communicated, situate the use and of theanalogy equivocal which character has reference of that to which the communicative is diverse without reason shared that meaning,makes it wepossible must situatefor there the to use be of greater analogy flexibility, which has richness reference of to content the communicative and the possibility reason that of makesundertaking it possible a dialogue for there between to be greater human flexibility, worlds, richness cultures of contentor realities and which the possibility unfold ofdiachronically undertaking awithin dialogue a temporal between context: human this worlds, begins cultures with a or mi realitiesnimum which level unfoldof mutual diachronically comprehension within and a temporalthen can context:increase thisthrough begins the with widening a minimum of the levelcommon of mutual semantic comprehension framework where and then the canhermeneutical increase through action theof the widening word of of the the other common gradually semantic assumes framework more fully where and the deeply hermeneutical the meaning action of ofthe the words word and of the of otherthe world gradually of the assumes other. Analogy more fully comes and closer deeply to the iden meaningtity without of the ever words fully and coinciding, of the world as of in the the other. case Analogyof the asymptotic comes closer line to (moment identity without3 of the ever figure fully below coinciding, which asrepresents in the case an of impossible the asymptotic point line of (momentidentity). 3 of the figure below which represents an impossible point of identity). ClarificationClarification regardingregarding Figure Figure1: The1: The limits limits of a processof a process of communication of communication are marked are bymarked extremes by (1)extremes and (3), (1) and and it is(3), between and it theseis between that the these similarity that isthe achieved, similarity around is achieved, which communicativearound which dialoguecommunicative is practiced, dialogue as in is the practiced, case of an as asymptotic in the case line of (a)an whichasymptotic represents line (a) the which increase represents in analogical the similarity,increase in from analogical 1 to 2 insimilarity, c, but which from never 1 to coincides2 in c, but with which equivocal never incommunicabilitycoincides with equivocal (1) nor withincommunicability a perfect degree (1)of nor univocal with a perfect communication degree of (3).univocal This advancecommunication in the “temporal (3). This advance dimension in the of communication”“temporal dimension (b) does of communication” not arrive at a level (b) does of identity, not arrive although at a level permits of identity, a greater although understanding permits througha greater the understanding time of the dialogue through through the time an increasingof the dialogue of “fusion through of horizons” an increasing (of the kindof “fusion analyzed of byhorizons” H. Gadamer, (of the see kind Figure analyzed 5). by H. Gadamer, see Figure 5).

b a 23 c Figure 1.1. BetweenBetween equivocality equivocality and and a fully communicativecommunicative identical character lies the temporaltemporal dimension of communication withinwithin thethe contextcontext ofof thethe similaritysimilarity achievedachieved byby analogy.analogy.

Neither thethe totally totally univocal univocal character character of identical, of identical, monosemic monosemic consensus consensus that clearly that andclearly precisely and encompassesprecisely encompasses all differences, all differences, nor the incommensurability nor the incommensurability of incomprehension of incomprehension as an impossibility as an ofimpossibility purely equivocal of purely communication, equivocal communication, but instead the but polysemic instead analogical the polysemic room analogical of similarity room which of makessimilarity a consensus which makes or agreement a consensus possible, or agreemen but whicht possible, nonetheless but which permits nonetheless the tolerant permits respect the of comprehensiontolerant respect throughof comprehension the distinction through of the the Other. distinction of the Other. I seekseek to to counterpose counterpose here here the logicthe logic of alterity of alteri centeredty centered around similarityaround similarity and analogical and distinctionanalogical asdistinction an alternative as an toalternative that of the to logic that ofof totalitythe logic centered of totality around centered identity around and diidentityfference and in thedifference Hegelian in sense.the Hegelian Moreconcretely, sense. More this concretely, implies the this confrontation implies the confrontation of analogous of reason analogous withthat reason of the with univocal that of reason.the univocal This reason. is more This crucial is more than crucial ever withinthan ever the within context the of context the need of the for need analogous for analogous reason reason that is necessarythat is necessary in every in inter-human every inter-human act of communication, act of communication, and especially and asespecially part of theas interculturalpart of the planetaryintercultural dialogue planetary that dialogue is so necessary. that is so necessary. I willwill alsoalso exploreexplore belowbelow examples examples will will illustrate illustrate the the use use of of analogous analogous reason reason within within the the context context of contemporaryof contemporary themes themes that thethat world the isworld grappling is grappling with: the possibilitywith: the ofpossibility interpreting of theinterpreting interpellation the ofinterpellation the Other in of the the existential Other in the conditions existential of everyconditions day life,of every and givenday life, the and intensified given the demands intensified for thisdemands in critical for this contexts; in critical the contexts; possibility the of possibility the intercultural of the intercultural dialogue referred dialogue to above, referred which to above, is so necessarywhich is so in necessary order to overcomein order to the overcome univocal the character univocal of character modern Eurocentrism, of modern Eurocentrism, in order to open in order the to open the path towards an epistemological decolonization, and the treatment of notions which have been asserted to be ambiguous, such as people within the context of political philosophy, whose seeking a return: to love without being loved. The bare expression “I love you!”, without further explanation, does not guaranteebare expression any certainty “I love of coincidingyou!”, with without the further Other in explanation, terms of the meaningdoes not of gu thisarantee expression. any Thiscertainty still constitutes of coinciding then a risk, an act of faith (which I will address below in terms of the analogia fidei)! 5 Representedwith the Other by b inin figureterms 1. of the meaning of this expression. This still constitutes then a risk, an act of faith (which I will address below in terms of the analogia fidei)! 6 Represented by b in figure 1. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 3 of 23

Philosophies 2019, 4, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 23 path towards an epistemological decolonization, and the treatment of notions which have been asserted ambiguity can be transformed into clarity through the application of the logic of analogy. This in turn to be ambiguous, such as people within the context of political philosophy, whose ambiguity can be makes it possible to focus on the multiple analogical distinctions that have a certain degree of transformed into clarity through the application of the logic of analogy. This in turn makes it possible similarity and analogized distinctions, and to highlight which of these are most significant, from to focus on the multiple analogical distinctions that have a certain degree of similarity and analogized which the distinct meanings of what has been analogied can be derived (which is much more than a distinctions, and to highlight which of these are most signiﬁcant, from which the distinct meanings of “familiarity of words”). what has been analogied can be derived (which is much more than a “familiarity of words”).

2. How How Analogy Analogy Has Has Been Been Forgotten Forgotten in Modernity If we undertake aa historicalhistorical review,review, we we can can see see that that that that there there were were certain certain epochs epochs when when the the use use of ofanalogy analogy was was more more common common and and that that in in other other moments moments it virtuallyit virtually disappeared. disappeared. It hadIt had a greata great deal deal of ofpresence presence from from the pre-Socraticsthe pre-Socratics until Platountil [Pl2].ato Plato [2]. inPlato effect in takes effect the takes term ἀtheναλ termoγία ἀναλογίαfrom Heraclitus. from Heraclitus.But it is Aristotle But it whois Aristotle lays the who basis lays for the its basis definitive for its recognition. definitive recognition. Terminologically thenthen analogyanalogy is is Greek Greek in in origin, origin is, is principally principally used used in in mathematics, mathematics, and and then then its itsuse use is broadened is broadened to other to other contexts, contexts, such assuch in theas in case the of case Aristotle of Aristotle (and from (and there from itis there then it projected is then projectedinto other into Hellenistic other Hellenistic schools of schools thought). of thought). The Stagirite The Stagirite writes that: writes “being that: is “being said in is many said in distinct many 7 ways”distinct (τ ways”ὸὂνλέ γεται(τὸὂνλέγεται πoλλαχ ῶπολλαχῶςς)6. This “is) . said”This “is (λέ said”γεται ()λέγεται situates) ussituates at the us level at the of the level word, of the the word, term, theand term, of the and denominative of the denominative character of character the linguistic. of the Nonethelesslinguistic. Nonetheless the concept the of analogy, concept accordingof analogy, to accordingPaul Ricoeur, to Paul was Ricoeur, marginalized was marg by theinalized linguistic by the turn linguistic [3], and thisturn must [3], and be explained.this must be explained. From the beginning I’d like to employ a figure figure (such as those that Charles Peirce customarily designed, withwith the the assumption assumption that that each each icon employedicon employed has a conceptual has a conceptual meaning); meaning); from my perspective from my perspective this is the best way to synchronically represent the complexity of the question of analogy. this is the best way to synchronically represent the complexity of the question of analogy. This has to This has to do with the diversity between analogy and the univocal character of identity. do with the diversity between analogy and the univocal character of identity. In the first place, then, let us situate ourselves within the context of identity and difference so In the first place, then, let us situate ourselves within the context of identity and difference so that that we can compare it with the contrasting character of analogy and distinction. we can compare it with the contrasting character of analogy and distinction. Clarification of Figure 2. Identity encompasses within its horizons multiple semantic Differences Clarification of Figure2. Identity encompasses within its horizons multiple semantic Di fferences (Df1: Difference 1; Df2: Difference 2; etc.). In mathematical conjugate signs it could be expressed in (Df1: Difference 1; Df2: Difference 2; etc.). In mathematical conjugate signs it could be expressed in this manner: “Identity” is expressed as the Totality of internal Differences: Identity = Difference 1 + this manner: “Identity” is expressed as the Totality of internal Differences: Identity = Difference 1 + Difference 2 + etc. Difference has no fundamental alterity with respect to Identity. Within the context Difference 2 + etc. Difference has no fundamental alterity with respect to Identity. Within the context of communication, when one employs univocal words one gets tangled in tautology, since the of communication, when one employs univocal words one gets tangled in tautology, since the horizon horizon of Identity is the same as that for Differences. R. Jacobson’s model of communication of Identity is the same as that for Differences. R. Jacobson’s model of communication presupposes this presupposes this tautological identity in communication (the message codified by the communicator tautological identity in communication (the message codified by the communicator is decodified by the is decodified by the person who receives the message; there is no difficulty in decodification because person who receives the message; there is no difficulty in decodification because both are assumed to both are assumed to share the same universe of meaning; the “pretension of intelligibility of J. share the same universe of meaning; the “pretension of intelligibility of J. Habermas also presupposes Habermas also presupposes univocal identity). univocal identity).

FigureFigure 2. 2. DiverseDiverse components components of of the the logical logical conceptuali conceptualizationzation of of Identity/Difference. Identity/Diﬀerence. Univocality.

The minimum componentscomponents ofof thethe concept concept of of the the univocal univocal are are identity, identity, understood understood in termsin terms of the of thetotality totality (whole (whole which which has has been been signified) signified) and and diff difference.erence. We We must must therefore therefore consider consider the the moment moment of of identity (Id) (in Greek τὸ αυτό8, in Latin identitas, in French identité, in English identity, in Germany Identität) as that which is common, and as the moment of the diversity implied by all 6 Metaph., Z, 2, 1003 a 33. According to the Stagirite there were four different ways of denominating or predicating being: as an “accident” ( συµβεβηκ ὀ ς ); as a “potency” and “act”; as a “truth”, and according to the “scheme of categories” (Metaph., E, 2, 7 1026Metaph. a 34ss)., Z, 2, 1003 a 33. According to the Stagirite there were four different ways of denominating or predicating being: as an “accident” (συμβεβηκὀς); as a “potency” and “act”; as a “truth”, and according to the “scheme of categories” (Metaph., E, 2, 1026 a 34ss). 8 Aristotle, Metaph., E, 1, 1018 a 12. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 4 of 23

Philosophies 2019, 4, x FOR PEER REVIEW 4 of 23 identity (Id) (in Greek τὸ αυτó7, in Latin identitas, in French identité, in English identity, in Germany DifferenceIdentität) as(Df) that (the which latter is is common, expressed and in as Greek the moment as διάφορα of the, in diversity Latin differentia, implied by in all French Difference différence, (Df) (the inlatter English is expressed difference, in Greekin German as διά Unterscheidungϕo%α, in Latin di9).ff erentia,In Greek in Frenchthought di thefférence, identity in Englishattributed diff erence,to its conceptualizationin German Unterscheidung of being was8). Inimposed Greek thought over that the implied identity by attributed an analogical to its conceptualization approach, although of being the “One”was imposed or “Being”, over which that impliedcould be by framed an analogical analogically approach, as to an although entity (thing, the “One” ens in or latin, “Being”, Dasein which in german),could be are framed as such analogically (that is asto tosay, an in entity terms (thing, of their ens inessence latin, Daseinas “One” in german), or “Being”) are asthe such same (that as is themselves:to say, in terms univocal of their and essence identical. as “One”Being is or not “Being”) analogical, the same but asrather themselves: can be said univocal to predicate and identical. itself analogicallyBeing is not upon analogical, the basis but ratherof the can entity be said (in toLati predicaten we could itself analogicallyexpress this uponas: analogia the basis entis). of the entityThe univocal(in Latin self we can could be expressenunciated this as:analogically analogia entis).in terms The of univocalousía, of self quality, can be quantity, enunciated relationship, analogically etc. in Thingterms (ens, of ous Dasein)ía, of quality, is not Being quantity, (esse, relationship, Sein), but is etc. itsThing distinctions; (ens, Dasein) that is isto not say, Being distinctive (esse, Sein), modes but of is predicatingits distinctions; the same: that isBeing. to say, distinctive modes of predicating the same: Being. ThisThis logical logical terminologyterminology isis also also found found in the in ontologiesthe ontologies of the Chineseof the andChinese Hindustani and Hindustani dimensions dimensionsof Asia (as of those Asia of (as the those Upanishads, of the Upanishads, Lao Tse or Confucius), Lao Tse or inConfucius), part among in thepart original among peoples the original of the peoplesAmericas of (inthe theAmericas doctrine (in of the Pacha doctrine in Quechua of Pacha or Aymara in Quechua among or theAymara Incas), among and among the Incas), many otherand amongpeoples. many These other could peoples. thus beThese described could asthus univocal be described universal as univocal traditions universal (and for traditions example B. (and Spinoza for examplecould be B. included Spinoza amongcould be these). included among these). TheThe framing framing of of the the issue issue shifts shifts with with the the Semite Semite world world which which understands understands Being Being itself itself from from an an analogicalanalogical perspective perspective (analogia (analogia essendi) essendi) which which is ispredicated predicated the the Being Being between between a acreator creator of of the the universeuniverse and and those those who who have have been been created. created. Philo Philo of of Alexandria confronts thisthis didifficulty:fficulty: thethe creatorcreator is isand and predicatespredicates Being,Being, andand the same thing occurs occurs wi withth creatures creatures that that are, are, which which are are entities entities (things, (things, entia),entia), and and Being Being is is also also predicated predicated as as to to these. these. No Noww “being “being itself” itself” is is expressed expressed in in two two ways: ways: in in terms terms ofof the the eternal, eternal, creator creator Being, Being, and and in in terms terms of of the the be beinging of of the the entity entity (ens), (ens), which which has has been been created. created. A A newnew comprehension comprehension of of being being itself itself has has been been mediated. mediated. Because Because of of this this a atension tension appears appears between between two two poles:poles: the the created created and and the the creator; creator; which which is to is say to say between between the thecreated created totality totality (A), (A), andand the alterity the alterity of theof creator the creator (B); this (B); thisanalogy analogy is situated is situated within within the horizon the horizon of the of sacred the sacred (not necessarily (not necessarily that of that the of religious).the religious). ClarificationClarification of of Figure Figure 3.3. A: A: ontological totality,totality, withwith univocalunivocal character character and and univocal univocal identity. identity. B: B:exteriority, exteriority, understood understood as as trans-ontological trans-ontological alterity alterity of of the the Other. Other.

FigureFigure 3. 3.Totality/Alterity.Totality/Alterity.

ItIt was was the the Acadian, Acadian, Babylonian, Babylonian, Palestinian, Palestinian, peoples, peoples, with with influence influence in in Egypt, Egypt, together together with with the the Phoenicians,Phoenicians, Hebrews, Christians,Christians, and and Muslims Muslims who who resolved resolved this dilemma this dilemma through theirthrough exploration their explorationand deployment and deployment of the logic ofof analogy. the logic This of analogy. issue had This not beenissue studied had not with been precision studied in with Indo-European precision inEurasia Indo-European nor in the Eurasia original nor civilizationsin the original of civili thezations Americas, of the although Americas, there although are clear there indicators are clear of indicatorsits existence. of its existence. ItIt is is because because ofof thisthis that that the the Semites Semites transformed transformed the doctrinethe doctrine of the of analogy the analogy of the entityof the (analogia entity (analogiaentis) into entis) an analogy into an ofanalogy being of itself being (analogia itself (analogia essendi). essendi). TheThe Christian Christian philosophers philosophers of of the the first first centuries centuries A.D A.D (the (the so-called so-called “Fathers “Fathers of of the the Church” Church” from from thethe school school of of Alexandria), Alexandria), andand laterlater the the Arabs Arabs (from (from Al Al Kindi Kindi in Aleppoin Aleppo in the in 9ththe century9th century A.D), A.D), seized seized upon analogy in manner radically different than that of the Greeks who preceded them. This thinking experiences the being of those who have been created (mediated through the proposition of a 7radicalAristotle, act Metaphof ex .,nihilo E, 1, 1018 creation, a 12. described as such in Latin since Tertulian [4]; and as ouk ex ontos: 8 The word Differenz of Latin etymological origin is also employed.

9 The word Differenz of Latin etymological origin is also employed. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 5 of 23

Philosophiesupon analogy 2019, 4 in, x mannerFOR PEER radically REVIEW different than that of the Greeks who preceded them. This thinking5 of 23 experiences the being of those who have been created (mediated through the proposition of a radical act οὐκἐξὄντωνof ex nihilo creation, in the Greek described of the as Seventies such in Latin which since was Tertulian translated [4]; from and asHebrew: ouk ex “from ontos: non-being” oὐκἐξὄντων10) asin thesomething Greek of “distinct” the Seventies from which the eminence was translated (eminent fromia) Hebrew:of the being “from of non-being”the creator.9 )It as can something thus be “distinct”understood from that the when eminence the Hellenic (eminentia) logic within of the Ju beingdaeo-Christian of the creator. thought It can is thus accepted be understood in the Eastern that whenMediterranean the Hellenic after logic the within 2nd century Judaeo-Christian A.D, the new thought logical is accepted configuration in the Eastern of the “analogy Mediterranean of Being” after itselfthe 2nd (analogia century essendi). A.D, the new logical configuration of the “analogy of Being” itself (analogia essendi). The handling ofof thisthis analogyanalogy culminates culminates in in Byzantine Byzantine philosophy, philosophy, which which comes comes to to be be employed employed by byMuslim Muslim Arabs Arabs as in as the in casethe ofcase Avicenna of Avicenna (or Ibn (o Sina)r Ibn (from Sina) Samarkand(from Samarkan to Bukhara),d to Bukhara), passing throughpassing throughthe Baghdad the Baghdad of Al´Farabi of Al´Farabi and Fatimid and Cairo, Fatimid until Cairo, Averroes until (or Averroes Ibn Rushd) (or Ibn (in Rushd) the caliphate (in the of caliphate Cordoba ofand Cordoba in the Berber and in city the of Berber Fez by city Maimonides), of Fez by andMaimonides), arriving very and late arriving during very the Latin-Germanic late during the Middle Latin- AgesGermanic in Paris Middle in the Ages 13th in century, Paris in throughthe 13th greatcentury, teachers through such great as Thomas teachers Aquinas, such as Thomas and culminating Aquinas, andultimately culminating in Duns ultimately Scoto. in Duns Scoto. A new creative phase of analogy emerges during modernity, during the era of the Renaissance through the philosophies of Thomas de Vio Cayetano and Silvestre de Ferrara up through Juan de Santo TomTomásás inin 17th17th centurycentury Spain.Spain. Let us review in summary what we have covered thusthus far.far. ClarificationClarification ofof Figure Figure4: Sm:4: Similarity;Sm: Similarity; Dt1: Analogical Dt1: Analogical Distinction Distinction 1; Dt2: Analogical 1; Dt2: DistinctionAnalogical Distinction2; Dtn: other 2; analogical Dtn: other Distinction. analogical Distinction. In mathematical In mathematical conjugate signs conjugate “Similarity” signs could“Similarity” be expressed could bein termsexpressed of the in common terms of traits the orcommon coincidence traits betweenor coincidence distinctions between that havedistinctions been analogized that have inbeen the analogizedfollowing manner: in the following “Similarity manner:= analogical “Similarity Distinction = analogical 1 Distinctionanalogical 1 Distinction ∩ analogical 2 Distinctionanalogical 2 ∩ ∩ ∩distinctions analogical n.distinctions To the extent n. To that the communicationextent that communication increases the increases similarity the (Sm), similarity this is(Sm), filled this with is filledincreasing with meaningincreasing and meaning sense, withoutand sense, losing without the diversity losing the10 of diversity the peculiar11 of the analogical peculiar distinctions analogical (Dt1,distinctions Dt2, Dtn) (Dt1, of Dt2, each Dtn) of the of analogized each of the components. analogized components.

Figure 4. DiverseDiverse components components of of the the logical logical concep conceptt of of Similarity/Distinction. Similarity/Distinction. Analogy.

The logic of analogyanalogy didifferentiatedﬀerentiated between between various various kinds kinds of of analogy, analogy, for for example example between between that that of ofintrinsic intrinsic attribution attribution or proportionality,or proportionality, each each with variouswith various internal internal subdivisions. subdivisions. It is perhaps It is perhaps during duringthe 16th the and 16th 17th and centuries 17th centuries that this doctrinethat this achieveddoctrine itsachieved greatest its levels greatest of complexity levels of complexity11. I cannot12 go. I cannotinto this go in into full this detail in givenfull detail the dimensionsgiven the dimensions of this writing. of this writing. The essentialessential logicallogical components components of of the the analogy analogy are are two, two, and and can can be describedbe described as (a) as similarity (a) similarity (Sm) (Sm)designated designated in Greek in byGreek the word by theὅµo ιwordoς, similitudo ὅμοιος, insimilitudo Latin, Ähnlichkeit in Latin, in Ähnlichkeit German, ressemblance in German, in ressemblance in French, similarity in English, and (b) Distinction (Dt) which does not have such a

9 Macabeos II, 7, 28. The complete text says: “that Yahveh has made them from non-being and that the race of human beings was made in the same way”. The “prevalent political order” thus is not eternal but created, and can be transformed when it 10 Macabeosis unjust. One II, 7, is 28. in this The sense complete an atheist text or says: non-fetishistic “that Yahveh non-believer has made in the them order from which non-being dominates. and that the race of 10 humanI have noted beings above was that made we shouldin the treatsame three way”. words: The “prevalentdifference, distinction politicaland order”diversity thus. J. is Derrida not eternal tried tobut distinguish created, andbetween can dibeff étransformedrence from diff éwhenrance, it attributing is unjust. to One each is new in this meanings. sense an On atheist my part, or sincenon-fetishistic the early 1970’s, non-believer as a critique in the of orderDerrida, which I suggested dominates. that it was better to use the word distinction in the analogical context instead of différance, but this led to much misunderstanding because of broader ignorance as to the doctrine of analogy (such as the critique undertaken by my 11 Icolleague have noted Ofelia above Schutte). that See we [1 ]should chapters treat 2.2.5 three and 2.4.3. words: difference, distinction and diversity. J. Derrida tried to 11 distinguishThere can be nobetween better introduction différence from than thedifférance, authoritative attributing one presented to each by new [5] and meanings. also that ofOn [6 ]my (Beuchot’s part, since extensive the early work 1970’s,on analogy as a can critique be consulted of Derrida, on the Web);I suggested see also [that7]. it was better to use the word distinction in the analogical context instead of différance, but this led to much misunderstanding because of broader ignorance as to the doctrine of analogy (such as the critique undertaken by my colleague Ofelia Schutte). See [1] chapters 2.2.5 and 2.4.3. 12 There can be no better introduction than the authoritative one presented by [5] and also that of [6] (Beuchot’s extensive work on analogy can be consulted on the Web); see also [7]. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 6 of 23

French, similarity in English, and (b) Distinction (Dt) which does not have such a common equivalent in Greek nor in German12 (although in the latter we could eventually decide upon Verschiedenartichkeit as the closest equivalent), but it does have a uniquely Latin expression through the word distinctio, which in both French and English is distinction. All of the secret and utility of analogy can be found in making an effective use of practices of communication between diverse worlds (be they singular or collective) and within the context of rhetorical confrontations where it should be understood that words (phrases, sentences, “linguistic games” [speech acts], etc.) must be elected and the meaning of the expressions of Other/s must be interpreted conveniently for the purposes of mutual and adequate comprehension as part of the communication which is desired. Diversity then must be clearly distinguished from (a) a polysemic similarity (Sm) and from (b) from a monosemic identical character; from (c) an analogical distinction (Dt) (which has similarity to the remaining distinctions), and from (d) a mere difference (Df) (directed at that which is diverse within a horizon of identical dimensions). On the other hand, the diversity of distinctions (together with that of other distinctions) is not equivalent to mere equivocal ambiguity, which for its part should not be confused either with the diversity of analogical similarity nor with the “familiarity of words” referenced in Wittgenstein’s linguistics13. A purely non-identical character which is not different and which does not have analogical distinction either is the absolute diversity: the equivocity. The equivocal is more diverse (sharing the same word, but not its meaning) than the distinct is from that which is similar. The distinction has more in common (with other distinction) than the difference is from that which is different, when it is situated within a horizon of the identity14. The studies and uses of analogy, then, travelled a long path from Plato or Aristotle until Hegel himself in the 19th century or Max Müller in the 20th, although their content underwent a series of historical transformations. During the stage of Indo-European Eurasia this process was determined by certain ontological limits. Within the context of this framework of thinking in general, and among the Greeks in particular, being was predicated analogically in terms of entities as I have noted previously, but being itself was not analogical, but univocal, since it was itself predicated on being identical. Authors from the modern period in Northern Europe will employ analogy secondarily, as to fragmentary questions, in their logical reflections- both Kant and Hegel [7], but it will not be a hegemonic philosophical question as widely debated as it was during the so-called Middle Ages, since secularization set aside the relationship between the creator and those created, and with that the “analogy of Being” itself. The problem will be reborn with Franz Brentano15, and within the renovation of the Neo-Scholastic School, which was relaunched in Freiburg and Louvain, especially among thinkers who situated themselves within the horizon of predominantly German ontology such as J. Maréchal [9], J. Lotz ([10] pp. 35–108), K. Rahner [11,12], E. Coreth [13], B. Lakebrink [14], G. Siewerth [15] or E. Przywara [16], who developed the concept of analogy in the 20th century. But this will continue to be a secondary strain of thought that will not penetrate into the center of the discussion regarding the linguistic turn of the Vienna Circle [17]. This is ultimately due to the fact that Central European or Anglo-Saxon thought, since the Enlightenment, has been situated within the univocity of identity/difference, in part as a result of the increasing process of secularization (wherein the Being of the creator disappears from the horizon of philosophical reflection). Analogy as a result became irrelevant within the philosophy most studied by the European and North American philosophical community.

12 This is reﬂected in a certain imprecision among the authors who have addressed this topic. 13 The “family of words” is less common than similarity; it is only a certain etymological or terminological equivalence which has less strictly semantic consistency. When it is denominated (word) and semantic (conceptual) it can be an analogical similarity. 14 Which is to say the equívocal is absolutely not common; that which is similar is such in part, because it has same in common; the identical is the absolutely commmon (κoινóς). 15 Reference [8], which was the point of departure of M. Heidegger’s philosophy. PhilosophiesPhilosophies 2019Philosophies 2019, 4, ,x 4 FOR, xPhilosophies FOR2019 PEER ,PEER 4, REVIEWx FOR2019 REVIEW ,PEER4, 31 REVIEW 7 of7 23 of 23 7 of 23 7 of 23

TheThe point point ofThe ofdeparture pointdeparture of departureof ofthe the relationship relationship of the relationship is veryis very divers diversis very when when divers being being when or orentity being entity is or whatis entitywhat refers refersis what to to refers to wordword (a), (a), whichword which is(a), 3.whenis which Fromwhen the theisthe word when Analogyword is the theis wordthe ofpoint thepoint is of Entitythe ofde pointparturede (partureAnalogia of ofde ofparturethe Entisthe reference reference) of to the the to reference Analogy tothe the being being to of or the the orentity being Wordentity (b): or ((b):Analogia entity (b): Verbi ) a) a) ReferenceReferencea) ofReference ofbeing beingThe or of orthink pointbeing think→ of →orto departure thinktothe the word→ word to of the the word relationship is very divers when being or entity is what refers to b) b) ReferenceReferenceb) ofReference oftheword the word word (a), of→ whichthe →to wordtothe the is being when→ being to or the the orthe being wordthe think think or is thethe pointthink of departure of the reference to the being or entity (b): EverythingEverythingEverything I have(a) I have saidReference said I until have until now said of now being expressesuntil expresses or now think the expresses the rela torelationship thetionship the word rela (a):tionship (a): from from being (a): being from or orentity being entity towards or towards entity the towards the the → word;word; which whichword; is tois which tosay,(b) say, the Referenceis the toword say,word signifies, the ofsignifies, theword word W signifies, Wexpre expretosses, theWsses, expremanifests being manifestssses, or the themanifests thinkthe thing thing to the tothe thingthe being being to or the orthe being the entity. entity. or the entity. → TheThe relationship relationshipThe relationship at atissue issue is atisone issueone regarding regardingis one regardingthe the construction construction the construction of ofmeaning. meaning. of Butmeaning. But now now IBut willI willnow seek seek I towill to seek to Everything I have said until now expresses the relationship (a): from being or entity towards undertakeundertake undertakean aninverse, inverse, an rarely inverse,rarely travelled travelled rarely path travelled path am among pathong ancient ancientamong and andancient contemporary contemporary and contemporary authors authors who authorswho address address who address the word; which is to say, the word signifies, W expresses, manifests the thing to the being or the analogy,analogy, whichanalogy, which is representedis which represented is represented by by relation relation by (b). relation(b). (b). entity. The relationship at issue is one regarding the construction of meaning. But now I will seek to In Ineffect, effect, withinIn within effect, the the withincontext context the of ofcontexta secondarya secondary of a secondaryand and neglected neglected and currentneglected current within withincurrent German German within Idealism, German Idealism, an Idealism, an an undertake an inverse, rarely travelled path among ancient and contemporary authors who address authorauthor passes passesauthor from from passes the the “System from “System the of “System ofIdentity” Identity” of (it Identity” (itis notablyis notably (it isclear notablyclear here here clearhow how thhere isth is how denominatedis denominated this is denominated as asa a as a analogy, which is represented by relation (b). systemsystem of ofthatsystem that which which of that is Identical,is which Identical, is whichIdentical, which is tois which tosay say one is one towhich saywhich oneis univocal)is which univocal) is tounivocal) toa metaphysics a metaphysics to a metaphysics of ofliberty liberty of liberty In effect, within the context of a secondary and neglected current within German Idealism, an (whose(whose first first(whose steps steps werefirst were steps taken taken were in in1809), taken 1809), expressed in expressed 1809), expressedas asa doctrinea doctrine as aof doctrine ofthe the will, will, of and the and which will, which and is manifestedis which manifested is manifested author passes from the “System of Identity” (it is notably clear here how this is denominated as a fullyfully in inhis fullyhis university university in his universitylectures lectures in lectures inBerlin Berlin inin in 1841Berlin 1841 in ininterms 1841terms of in ofa terms critiquea critique of aof critiqueofHegelian Hegelian of thought.Hegelian thought. I thought. amI am I am system of that which is Identical, which is to say one which is univocal) to a metaphysics of liberty referringreferring toreferring toF. F.Schelling Schelling to F. inSchelling inhis his Vorlesungenüber Vorlesungenüber in his Vorlesungenüber die die Offenbarung. Offenbarung. die Offenbarung. This This is whereis whereThis he is he expoundswhere expounds he expoundsthe the the (whose first steps were taken in 1809), expressed as a doctrine of the will, and which is manifested fully horizonhorizon from horizonfrom which which from can canwhich be beunderstood understoodcan be understood what what we we mightwhat might werefer refer might to toin refer inthe the firstto firstin instance the instance first a instance doctrinea doctrine a doctrine in his university lectures in Berlin in 1841 in terms of a critique of Hegelian thought. I am referring to F. regardingregarding regardingthe the analogy analogy the of analogy ofthe the word: word: of the the analogiaword: analogia the verbi. analogia verbi. The The verbi.problem problem The is problem nois no longer longer is situatedno situated longer from situatedfrom the the from the Schelling in his Vorlesungenüber die Offenbarung. This is where he expounds the horizon from which perspectiveperspectiveperspective of ofthe the “analogy “analogy of the of “analogy ofbeing” being” (analogíaof (analogíabeing” essendi)(analogía essendi) (a), essendi) (a), but but instead instead(a), but begins beginsinstead to to bebegins bethought thought to be of thought ofin in of in can be understood what17 17 we might refer to in the first instance a doctrine regarding the analogy of the termsterms of oftheterms the “analogy “analogy of the of “analogy ofthe the word” word” of the(b) (b) word”. . (b)17. word: the analogia verbi. The problem is no longer situated from the perspective of the “analogy TheThe point point ofThe ofdeparture pointdeparture of fordeparture for the the new new for implanting theimplanting new implanting of ofanalogy analogy ofhas analogyhas its itsorigin origin has in its inalterity. origin alterity. inAlter alterity.Alter speaks speaks Alter speaks of being” (analogía essendi) (a), but instead begins to be thought of in terms of the “analogy of the to tous usof ofthe theto Other us Other of whichthe which Other transcends transcends which transcends the the totality totality the of ofourtotality our own own of world our world own (“world” (“world” world in (“world” inthe the Hegelian Hegelian in the sense Hegelian sense for for sense for word” (b)16. Schelling,Schelling, Schelling,or orthe the existential existentialor the existentialHeideggerian Heideggerian Heideggerian world world understood understood world understood in interms terms ofin of theterms the kind kindof ofthe ofontological kindontological of ontological The point of departure18 18 for the new implanting of analogy has its origin in alterity. Alter speaks horizonhorizon that horizonthat E. E.Levinas Levinas that E.sought Levinassought to toexploresought explore to). exploreNonetheless). Nonetheless18). Nonetheless Levinas Levinas tended Levinastended to tosituatetended situate theto the situateOther Other asthe asan Other an as an to us of the Other which transcends the totality of our own world (“world” in the Hegelian sense “absolutely“absolutely“absolutely Other”, Other”, as Other”,asa transcendentalitya transcendentality as a transcendentality that that appeared appeared that toappeared torevere revere andto and revere accept accept and the the acceptinfinite infinite the distance distanceinfinite distance for Schelling, or the existential Heideggerian world understood in terms of the kind of ontological impliedimplied by impliedby the the equivocal equivocalby the equivocalcharacter character ofcharacter ofthe the Infinite. Infinite. of the By Infinite.By discovering discovering By discovering the the priority priority the and priorityand superiority superiority and superiority of of of horizon that E. Levinas sought to explore17). Nonetheless Levinas tended to situate the Other as an alterityalterity he healterityseems seems tohe to situateseems situate himselfto himselfsituate in himselfinthe the face face in of the ofthe theface incomprehensible, incomprehensible, of the incomprehensible, the the incommunicable, incommunicable, the incommunicable, the the the “absolutely Other”, as a transcendentality that appeared to revere and accept the infinite distance sacredsacred which whichsacred he hewhichinterpellates. interpellates. he interpellates. Because Because of Because ofthis, this, upon ofupon this, reading reading upon Levinas’ readingLevinas’ work,Levinas’ work, the the work,question question the wasquestion was was implied by the equivocal character of the Infinite. By discovering the priority and superiority of alterity awakenedawakened awakenedin inme me as asto in towhether me whether as to the whether the interpellation interpellation the interpellation of ofthe the Other Other of canthe can beOther becomprehensible, comprehensible, can be comprehensible, decipherable, decipherable, decipherable, he seems to situate himself in the face of the incomprehensible, the incommunicable, the sacred which or orsusceptible susceptibleor susceptible of ofinterpretation, interpretation, of interpretation, which which would would which demand demand would a certaindemand a certain similarity a similarity certain betweensimilarity between the between the to tosay say (lethe (ledire to dire say (le dire he interpellates. Because of this, upon reading Levinas’ work, the question was awakened in me of ofLevinas) Levinas)of which Levinas) which is interpellatedis which interpellated is interpellated in interms terms of in ofwhat terms what has ofhas beenwhat been saidhas said (lebeen (ledit) saiddit) from from(le thedit) the perspective from perspective the perspective of of of as to whether the interpellation of the Other can be comprehensible, decipherable, or susceptible of transcendenttranscendenttranscendent alterity alterity and and alterity of thatof that and which which of thatis decodifi is which decodifi edis decodifi edand and interpreted interpreteded and interpreted by by the the person person by thewho who person listens; listens; who which which listens; which interpretation, which would demand a certain similarity between the to say (le dire of Levinas) which is tois tosay say theis the topossibility possibilitysay the possibilitythat that the the listener thatlistener the will listenerwill capture capture will the capturethe meaning meaning the that meaning that is intended,is intended, that is byintended, by the the one one by who thewho one who is interpellated in terms of what has been said (le dit) from the perspective of transcendent alterity and listens,listens, who wholistens, hears, hears, who who who hears, has has “ears who “ears to has hear”to “earshear” a truly toa trulyhear” meaningful meaningful a truly meaningful meaning meaning (that meaning (that is tois sayto (that say that isthat tothe saythe one onethat who whothe one who of that which is decodified and interpreted by the person who listens; which is to say the possibility hearshears who whohears is obedientis obedientwho is can obedient can capture, capture, can understand, capture, understand, understand, de cipherdecipher the de the ciphermeaning meaning the of meaning ofthe the word word of utteredthe uttered word by byuttered the the by the that the listener will capture the meaning that is intended, by the one who listens, who hears, who Other).Other). And AndOther). it wasit was And at thisat it this was moment, moment, at this to moment, tocontextualize contextualize to contextualize the the absolute absolute the transcendental absolute transcendental transcendental equivocal equivocal characterequivocal character character has “ears to hear” a truly meaningful meaning (that is to say that the one who hears who is obedient of ofthe the Other, Other,of theemerged emergedOther, theemerged the necessity necessity the tonecessity toretrain retrain toagain againretrain to tothe again the “logic “logic to theof of analogy”:“logic analogy”: of analogy”:the the Other, Other, themeta- meta-Other, meta- can capture, understand, decipher the meaning of the word uttered by the Other). And it was at this physical,physical, ethical,physical, ethical, real, ethical,real, interpellates interpellates real, interpellates with with words words with th atthwords atcan can atth atleastat leastcan be at beunderstood leastunderstood be understood derivatively derivatively derivatively or or or moment, to contextualize the absolute transcendental19 19 equivocal character of the Other, emerged the interpretedinterpretedinterpreted in insome some way: inway: some which which way: is tois which tosay say can is can tobe saybeattained attained can be initially attained initially by initially by undertaking undertaking19 by undertaking a hermeneutical a hermeneutical a hermeneutical necessity to retrain again to the “logic of analogy”: the Other, meta-physical, ethical, real, interpellates interpretationinterpretationinterpretation by by means means byof ofsimilaritymeans similarity of withsimilarity with what what withis saidis whatsaid (le (le isdit saiddit de de Levinas)(le Levinas) dit de by Levinas) by the the Other Otherby thefrom from Other the the from the with words that can at least be understood derivatively or interpreted in some way: which is to say perspectiveperspectiveperspective of ofwhat what that ofthat person,what person, that as asperson,the the mere mere as presence the presence mere of presence ofthe the naked naked of corporalitythe corporality naked corporality said said (le (ledire). dire).said It (le isIt theisdire). the It is the can be attained initially18 by undertaking a hermeneutical interpretation by means of similarity with ¡Ecce¡Ecce homo! homo!¡Ecce prior priorhomo! to toall prior allwords. words. to allThe Thewords. word word Theof ofth word eth Othere Otherof thhas ehas Otheras asits itshasmeaning meaning as its ameaning certaina certain semanticala semanticalcertain semantical what is said (le dit de Levinas) by the Other from the perspective of what that person, as the mere distinctiondistinctiondistinction from from the the wordsfrom words theof ofthewords the world world of theof of theworld the listener, li ofstener, the but libutstener, thanks thanks but to toanalogythanks analogy to (which analogy(which is isneither(which neither is neither presence of the naked corporality said (le20 dire).20 It is the ¡Ecce homo! prior to all words. The word of univocalunivocal norunivocal nor equivocal) equivocal) nor equivocal)one one can can come onecome closercan closer come to toits closer itsmeaning meaning to its meaningthrough through 20similarity through similarity: similaritycommonly: commonly: commonly held. held. F. F. held. F. the Other has as its meaning a certain semantical distinction from the words of the world of the listener, SchellingSchelling expoundedSchelling expounded expounded the the a priori a priori the necessity necessitya priori of necessity of“rev “revelation”elation” of “rev (Offenbarung: elation”(Offenbarung: (Offenbarung: the the Word Word expressedthe expressed Word byexpressed by the the by the

17 17 :The, , dabar followingdabar following).). The The followingexpression following expression expression expression alludes to this .(דברHebrew, dabar , dabar). ( ( The דבר Hebrew) דבר ) A wordA word that17 that Ain word Greekin 16Greek that Awasword inwas translated Greekthat translated in was Greek as translated λόγοςas was λόγος translated, and ,as and inλόγος as Semiticinλ Semiticó,γ andoς, Hebrew and in Hebrew Semitic in Semitic .[Juan (Juan ,basar, 1, 1, 14)., 14).1,)” See 14).( JuanSee my See my, book1, my 14).book [book18 See ].[18]. my[18]. book [18בשר”(basarbasar flesh basar)” ( ( (Juan ;בשר ) בשר) ) becomesbecomes dabar flesh) flesh becomesflesh דבר(( )dabarWord; dabardabar) becomes דבר) ) דבר )alludesalludes to this:toalludes this: “The “The to “TheWord this: Word Word “The 17 18 18 Levinas’ Levinas’18 classic Levinas’classic book book Levinas’classic [19], [19], develo book classic develo [19],ps book psthis develo this [19 theme], theme developsps asthis asto thistheme whatto what theme isas “b is asto eyond“b towhateyond what being”is is “bbeing” “beyondeyond (“más (“más being”being” allá allá (“mdel (“más delá ser”;s all ser”; alláá delaudelà delaudelà ser”; ser”;deaudel de audelàà de l‘ê trede), as to the l`êtrel`être), as), toas theto the world worldworld of Heidegger,of of Heidegger, Heidegger, and and and of of ontology.of ontology. ontology. All All ofAll of this thisof I this have I have I expressed have expressed expressed in numerous in numerousin numerous works since works works 1970 since that since I do not cite specifically l`être), ashere to the (See: world www.enriquedussel.com of Heidegger, and/obras of ontology.). All of this I have expressed in numerous works since 19701970 that that I do1970 I donot thatnot18 cite Momentcite I specifically do specifically not(1) citeof figurehespecifically rehe (See: 1re. (See: www.enriquedussel.com/obras). he www.enriquedussel.com/obras).re (See: www.enriquedussel.com/obras). 19 19Moment Moment19 (1) Moment(1)of figureof figure 1(1). 1of. figure 1. 20 20Asymptotic Asymptotic20 AsymptoticMoment Moment (3) Moment(3)of theof the same (3)same offigure thefigure 1.same 1. figure 1. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 8 of 23

Philosophies 2019, 4, x FOR PEER REVIEW 8 of 23 but thanks to analogy (which is neither univocal nor equivocal) one can come closer to its meaning19 throughOther in similarity:the face of commonlythe obedient held. listener) F. Schelling as a source expounded of a posteriori the a priori knowledge, necessity which of “revelation” preferably (Orefersffenbarung: to the Absolute. the Word Levinas expressed broadens by the Otherthe phen in theomenology face of the of obedientrevelation listener) as an epiphany as a source which of a posterioritakes into knowledge, account the which anthropological preferably refers revelation to the of Absolute. the Other, Levinas and broadensespecially the of phenomenologythe Other as an ofexistence revelation which as an is epiphany situated whichwithin takes the intogreatest account alterity the anthropologicalpossible of the revelationlistener, in of the the case Other, of and the especiallydestitute, of of those the Other who asare an sufferin existenceg, of which“the widow, is situated the orphan, within thethe greatestpoor, the alterity foreigner”, possible all of of these the listener,being expressions in the case ofpresent the destitute, in the Semite of those Code who of are Hammurabi suffering, of3700 “the years widow, ago the21. orphan, the poor, the 20 foreigner”,The first all ofexpressions these being as expressionsto the Other, present the oppre in thessed, Semite the excluded, Code of Hammurabi and as those 3700 who years have ago been. negated,The firstare indecipherable expressions as tointerjections, the Other, thewhich oppressed, are not theyet excluded,comprehensible, and as thosenot yet who words, have proto- been negated,words, cries are indecipherable “-¡Ayyyy!”; the interjections, cry of pain of which the one are notwho yet suffers, comprehensible, the pain of notthe yetone words, who suffers, proto-words, which criesunfolds “-¡Ayyyy!”; in the distinct the cry interpellating of pain of the expositions one who su offfers, the thetortured, pain of of the the one crucified who su slaveffers, (like which Spartacus unfolds inor thethe distinct founder interpellating of messianic expositionsChristianity), of theof th tortured,e woman of dominated the crucified by slave sexism, (like or Spartacus the indigenous or the founderperson martyred of messianic by the Christianity), conqueror in of 16th the womancentury dominatedLatin America, by sexism, or the wage or the worker indigenous exploited person by martyredmodern European by the conqueror capitalism in 16thor in centurythe colonial Latin world America, of the or Global the wage South, worker etc. exploited by modern EuropeanOnce capitalism we situated or ourselves in the colonial at the worldanthropological of the Global level South, (not as etc. to the Infinitoe22 but with respect to humanOnce webeings), situated in the ourselves face of revelation at the anthropological (Schelling’s levelOffenbarung) (not as to and the Infinitoeof the “word21 but of with the respectOther”, toand human seeting beings), forth infrom the this face word of revelation as a point (Schelling’s of departure, Offenbarung) in search and of its of themeaning “word (as of thereflected Other”, in andrelationship seeting forthb, above: from from this the word word as atowards point of the departure, being, towards in search meaning: of its meaning analogia (asverbi), reflected analogy in relationshiptakes on a central b, above: relevance, from the because word towardsthe majority the being,of meaningful towards existential meaning: analogiaexpressions verbi), in daily analogy life, takesand in on particular a central the relevance, dialogue because that is theestablished majority between of meaningful distinct existential interlocutors expressions and diverse in daily fields life, of andaction in particularor praxis (be the they dialogue political, that economic, is established gend betweener-related, distinct etc.), interlocutorsall obviously andemploy diverse analogy fields and of actionnot an oridentical praxis (becharacter they political, which is economic, univocal. gender-related, etc.), all obviously employ analogy and not anThat identical which character H. G. Gadamer which is referred univocal. to as a “fusion of horizons” is precisely the process of an increaseThat whichin similarity H. G. Gadamer which referredbegins, to at as athe “fusion first ofmoment, horizons” from is precisely a level the processof greater of an or increase lesser inincommunicability similarity which begins,or incomprehension at the first moment, in communicat from a levelion of(such greater as that or lesserdefended incommunicability by certain Anglo- or incomprehensionSaxon communitarian in communication thinkers [20]), (suchand can as thatincrease defended through by certainthe intensification Anglo-Saxon of communitariansimilarity made thinkerspossible [20by]), dialogue, and can increasealthough through it will the never intensification attain a fully of similarity identical made convergence possible bybetween dialogue, its althoughinterlocutors it will (this never is represented attain a fully by identical arrow a convergence of Figure 1 at between the beginning its interlocutors of this text, (this which is represented indicates bythe arrow passage a of from Figure 1 a1 3).at the beginning of this text, which indicates the passage from 1 a 3). ClarificationClarification of of FigureFigure5 .5. (Sm) (Sm) The The analogical analogical similarity similarity that that increases increases gradually gradually as as those those engaged engaged inin dialoguedialogue assumeassume thethe worldworld ofof thethe Other.Other. (Dt1(Dt1 yy Dt2)Dt2) PointsPoints ofof departuredeparture ofof thethe mutualmutual revelationrevelation whichwhich unfoldsunfolds fromfrom thethe perspectiveperspective ofof itsits exteriorityexteriority (secret,(secret, mystery).mystery). AlthoughAlthough Dt1Dt1 yy Dt2Dt2 remainremain distinctdistinct (not(not di ffdifferenterent in termsin terms of the of identity the identity that would that seekwould to dominate seek to them,dominate but ratherthem, analogically but rather distinct,analogically which distinct, permits which them permits to remain them themselves to remain within themselves the overall within convergent the overall framework convergent of similarity)framework increase of similarity) their communityincrease their in community dialogue (the in dialogue community (the in community this context in isthis that context which is they that havewhich in they common, have in as common, peers). as peers).

FigureFigure 5.5. “Fusion“Fusion ofof horizons”horizons” oror communicationcommunication withinwithin thethe logiclogic ofof analogy.analogy.

19 Asymptotic Moment (3) of the same ﬁgure 1. 20 Issues that I addressed going all the way back to 1961 in my book [18] after I stayed for two years in Israel from 1959 to 1961. 21 The grounding of analogy with regard to the Semite creator Being is placed here between parentheses: I do not deny this, but do not situate it either as the principal philosophical referent of analogy, taking into account the predominant context in which we are immersed of a secular world. If post-secularization continues to deepen we might then equally address this 21 theme, Issues but that here I addressed it is not yet going essential all to the do way so. back to 1961 in my book [18] after I stayed for two years in Israel from 1959 to 1961. 22 The grounding of analogy with regard to the Semite creator Being is placed here between parentheses: I do not deny this, but do not situate it either as the principal philosophical referent of analogy, taking into account the predominant context in which we are immersed of a secular world. If post-secularization continues to deepen we might then equally address this theme, but here it is not yet essential to do so. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 9 of 23 Philosophies 2019, 4, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 23

The analogical “fusionThe of analogical horizons” “fusion23 of the of worlds horizons” of those22 of theenga worldsged in of dialogue those engaged permits in those dialogue permits those who participate in thewho community participate of in communication the community to of be communication themselves and to beto be themselves distinct, all and the to time be distinct, all the time becoming more of abecoming community more in similarity of a community (in pluriversal in similarity truth), (in beyond pluriversal the equivocal truth), beyond character the of equivocal character the indifference of ofthe the Other indiﬀ anderence one of step the Otherprior to and their one domination step prior to by their an imposed domination supposedly by an imposed supposedly identical character (whereidentical one character of those (where in dialogue one of has those been in subsumed dialogue has by the been oppressor subsumed who by imposes the oppressor who imposes their identical, univocaltheir identical,truth, with univocal a universality truth, withclaim) a24 universality. claim)23. It is because of all ofIt this is because that the of logic all of of this analogy that the demonstrates logic of analogy its essential demonstrates character its within essential the character within the context of experiencescontext of ofdialogue experiences in the of dialoguemost diverse in the dimensions, most diverse from dimensions, the perspective from the perspectiveof the of the concrete concrete horizons ofhorizons singular of persons, singular but persons, especially but within especially the framework within the of framework community-based of community-based and and social social processes, asprocesses, well as those as well of an as economic, those of an political, economic, gender-related, political, gender-related, racial or similar racial character, or similar character, in which in which we are embeddedwe are embedded and engaged. and engaged.

4. Faith-Based Analogy4. Faith-Based (Analogia Analogy Fidei) [27], (Analogia pp. 156–174 Fidei ) [27], pp. 156–174 A metaphysical experienceA metaphysical (which experience I have frequently (which I have expressed frequently in written expressed form in writtenas a meta- form as a meta-physical physical one in orderone into orderunderline to underline its differentiation its differentiation from fromthe mere the mere metaphysics metaphysics of ingenuous of ingenuous realism), which realism), which forfor E. Levinas E. Levinas is in is infact fact suffused suffused with with ethics ethics as as such, such, with with its its origin origin in in a a face face to to face face experience (which between the visage of oneone person and that of (פניםאלפנים :experience (which in Hebrew is expressed by panim el panim person and that of anotheranother withoutwithout anyany intervening mediation, situates us us before before the the problem problem of of a a analogia fidei (an analogia fidei (an analogyanalogy ground ground in faith oror whichwhich isis faith-based)faith-based) which which involves involves a morea more complex complex level of development level of developmentthan than that that of of an an analogia analogia verbi verbi (verbal (verbal analogy). analogy). At At the the origin origin of of dialogue dialogueor or ofof daily existential or daily existential or personalpersonal communication,communication, when when those those who who are are in in dialogue dialogue do do not not yet yet know know each each other, when the Other other, when the Otherexpresses expresses his orhis herself or herself initially initia (thelly (the first first epiphany) epiphany) or revelation or revelation (or the (or word the word of the Other understood of the Other understoodin terms in ofterms a communication of a communicati groundedon grounded in intimacy in thatintimacy must that express must its express mystery, its its self-identity, what mystery, its self-identity,it is most what intimately, it is most and intimately, which is and not which frequently is not exposed frequently24 for exposed fear of25 its for use fear against of the person who its use against the personreveals who it), all reveals of this cannotit), all of be this fully cannot deciphered. be fully When deciphered. the Other When is revealed the Other and rendersis account as to revealed and renderssomething account secretas to something within their secret world, within the person their world, who receives the person that who trembling receives utterance that can only capture trembling utterancea can portion only of capture the semantic a portion content of the which semantic has beencontent expounded. which has This been does expounded. not involve a concept which This does not involvecan a be concept immediately which interpretedcan be immediately in a univocal interpreted manner in by a univocal an interpellated manner listener;by an it is not possible interpellated listener;under it is suchnot possible circumstances under tosuch decipher circumstances the semantic to decipher content the of the semantic word that content emerges of from the world of the word that emergesthe Other; from whatthe world is experienced of the Other; involves what only is experienced an initial approximation. involves only an initial approximation. If a person in need says to their interlocutor: “I am hungry, feed me!” does their hunger have the same meaning as the hunger of the one who has been interpellated? Does the interpellated have the certainty of meaning that this hunger provides an honest grounding for an ethical interpellation? Is 23 “Within the analysis of a hermeneutical process the attainment of a horizon of interpretation is in reality a fusion of horizons” (see [21] p. 477). Gadamer further writes that the “space of fusion…increases” in which that which is “similar” in both worlds is highlighted thanks to the unfolding of the time of dialogue: “If one 22 takes a step towards (understanding)“Within the analysis the of situation a hermeneutical of another process human the attainment being, one of a horizonwill understand of interpretation that person, is in reality a fusion of horizons” (see [21] p. 477). Gadamer further writes that the “space of fusion ... increases” in which that which is “similar” in both and will become consciousworlds of is highlightedtheir alterity, thanks of their to the irreducible unfolding ofsingularity, the time of dialogueprecisely: “If because one takes it ais step one towardswho (understanding) the separates oneself fromsituation one’s own of another situation. human This being, motion…always one will understand involves that an person, ascent and towards will become a higher conscious level of of their alterity, of their similarity, which transcendsirreducible both singularity, one’s own precisely singularity because and it isthatone ofwho the separates other” ([21], oneself p. from 379). one’s Thisown is preciselysituation. This motion ... always involves an ascent towards a higher level of similarity, which transcends both one’s own singularity and that of the other” the function of similarity within analogy and not of fusion (understood as an exclusion of the Other) of the ([21], p. 379). This is precisely the function of similarity within analogy and not of fusion (understood as an exclusion of the univocal universalityOther) that demands of the univocal the submission universality thatof th demandse Other theto an submission identity ofgr theounded Other toin anthe identity enunciation grounded in the enunciation of of the ego that expandsthe its ego sameness that expands as an its samenessinternal diffe as anrence; internal in disum,fference; the inpretension sum, the pretension of the subsumption of the subsumption of of the Other in the world of itself which implies the Other’s annihilation. the Other in the world23 of itself which implies the Other’s annihilation. 24 The logic of univocity is diverse from that of the logic of analogy. Regarding this theme I am writing a text along the lines The logic of univocity isof diverse others that from focus that on of the theanalectical logic of analogy. method of Regarding the Philosophy this theme of Liberation. I am writing See [[22 a] text § 36, along pp. 156 ss] (there is a French the lines of others thattranslation focus on of the this analectical text [22]; [23 method] or in [of1] thesethe Philosophy and other writings of Liberation. can be consulted See [22] at §www.enriquedussel.com 36, pp. 156 /obrao/work). ss] (there is a French Regardingtranslation my of position this text as [22]); to the issue[23] or of analecticsin [1] these(see and [5], pp.other 69–76). writings can be consulted at 24 www.enriquedussel.com/obraIn the Levinas o /work).´ philosophy Rega tording “expose” my position oneself ([1 as] chapter to the 4.2.6:issueExposition of analectics) means (see not [5], only pp. to 69– “make oneself known”, but also to risk remaining in public in a vulnerable way, when that confrontation might imply “exposing” oneself to be attacked, 76). misunderstood, or to become the victim of aggression. Regarding the meaning of “exposition”, which Levinas employs as a 25 In the Levinas´ philosophytechnical to term“expose” in his oneself writings, ([1] he respondedchapter 4.2.6: to the Exposition question) I posedmeans to not him only at a to forum “make at the oneself University of Louvain in 1972 known”, but also to byrisk opening remaining his jacket in public with both in handsa vulnerable and “exposing” way, when his chest, that saying: confrontation “Like this, might as one wouldimply in exposing themselves in front of a firing squad!” “exposing” oneself to be attacked, misunderstood, or to become the victim of aggression. Regarding the meaning of “exposition”, which Levinas employs as a technical term in his writings, he responded to the question I posed to him at a forum at the University of Louvain in 1972 by opening his jacket with both hands and “exposing” his chest, saying: “Like this, as one would in exposing themselves in front of a firing squad!” Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 10 of 23 the plea for food because this person does not want to work, or because they are a professional beggar and is deceiving those they interpellate? And if the person who has been interpellated hears these words and decides to feed the one who has plead for this, will they be fulfilling justice in this way or promoting vagrancy on the part of the beggar? If the listener does not have empirical certainty as to the accidental or structural necessity of the poverty at issue, can their act in giving alms under such circumstances be considered just? Here we stand in the face of an act of daily existence which has a great deal of density. Anyone who responds to a supplicating plea of interpellation on the part of an Other, who has before them only the empirical presence of the poor that is revealed primarily through their visage and by an “utterance” (without necessity yet of characterizing it as something that “has been said”), cannot demand proof under these circumstances to mitigate their responsibility of fulfilling the duty of feeding the hungry. In this case, we should therefore “take as true” (fürWahrhalten) the word of the other, and feed the hungry upon the basis of our faith, and of the con-fidence that is awakened by the veracity that is manifested (a phenomenon), which appears phenomenologically and becomes apparent through the visage of the Other that presents itself as the epiphany of a human being (not the mere phenomenological apparition of some-entity, not a thing) through the mediation of a supplicating word. The feeding of the poor has its origin in a faith-based (with-faith) action which is not undertaken upon the basis of proven empirical knowledge as to the needs of the Other, but instead because the actor believes in that person, and because of this attributes validity to the word which is believed to be true which occupies the place that knowledge as to an empirical fact would otherwise fill (which can be confirmed a posteriori through proofs which would make it possible to conclude the existence of a truth as to the content of an interpellation, so that an act of authentic justice can be fulfilled). Meanwhile it is faith which provided the sufficient foundation (ratio) for this action. And so this is how food is donated from and upon the basis of the word of the Other due to an ethical urgency. Which is to say, upon the basis of an empirical fact which has been not fully proven and is not known, but is founded upon an act of will that moves or exerts an imperative force upon practical reason so that this action, this alms can be carried out25. Medieval philosophy described faith or the act of belief as an act whose foundation was an act of will, which constituted the origin or motivation of a decision whose unfolding enabled the possibility of a cognitive act (assentire) which will later (a posteriori) reach the interpretation of what has been said by the person who is interpellating, and as to which the interpellated person did not initially have full knowledge as to the full univocal content or meaning of that which future knowledge, and this passage from (consentire) to intellection would provide, due to the urgency of the situation:

“Assent (adherence) properly belongs to the intellect [intellectus]; while consent belongs properly to the will (voluntatis), because consent etymologically is founded upon the ability to feel-with-others”26. “Belief does not have a cognitive grounding unless it is based ﬁrst within the realm of will and its imperatives”27.

Which is to say, that will, impelling belief in an Other, in their person, imposes the content of the enunciated word upon the cognitive act; and also thereby substitutes the evidence of the possible demonstrative evidence (from that which has been said and is not yet verified) through a decision which has been willed and mobilizes action; and which moves or motivates intelligence through an act of will which accepts the content of the word upon the basis of the confidence deposited in the Other as a sufficient foundation for undertaking the corresponding praxis which is required.

25 Of course Mao Tse-tung, drawing from the neo-Confucian pedagogy of Wang Yang-ming, would recommend: “-¡Don’t give him a ﬁsh, teach him how to catch one!”. 26 “Et ideo assentire proprie pertinent ad intellectum, quia importat absolutam adhaerentiam ei cui assentitur; sed consentire est proprie voluntatis quia consentire est simul cum alio sentire” (Thomas de Aquino, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 1, resp; Marietti, Torino, 1964, p. 281 a). 27 “Credere autem [ ... ] non habet assensum nisi ex imperio voluntatis” (Ibid., a. 3; p. 287 a). “Cum igitur ﬁdes sit in intellectu secundum quod est motus et imperatus a voluntate” (Ibid., a. 5; p. 291 a). Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 11 of 23

This also means that if one does not have a full conceptualization through the one who has been interpellated in the meaning of the word proferred by the interpellating Other, there would not either be the possibility of carrying out an action at their service that is urgently needed. A prior form of verification, or proven conceptualization of the truth of the word and of the veracity of the needy supplicant would be necessary to take action. In the case of a rational act of faith reason is impelled instead to break the impasse of the impossibility of action without having achieved full knowledge in identity, grounded in a foundation similar from that of mere univocal knowledge in action. In effect, voluntary affective motivation based in the love-for-justice inherent in the limbic system over that of the neocortical system (as a neurological brain specialist would put it [24]), mobilizes the one who has been interpellated through faith expressed in belief of the other from the perspective of the recognition of their dignity (which is given a hierarchical rank in this context within the context of an intersubjective love grounded in alterity), which impels the intelligence to accept the Other’s word as if its truth were already proven. So let me reiterate here. One who receives the revelation of an Other from the opening up of their subjectivity undertakes an action because they believe, because they have faith in the word of the Other in the face of the impossibility of verifying (in the first instance) the truth of what has been revealed. I will describe here the logic that explains this as analogia fidei, because it is faith in the Other that permits its acceptance as reason (Grund) or the foundation of this act, prior to the full grasping of the concept contained in the word of the Other which has not yet been justified rationally nor discursively by the subjective cognition of the one who has been interpellated. F. Schelling expounded some reflections regarding this theme in his university classes entitled Regarding Revelation which I would like to draw upon here, at an anthropological level, when he writes that he approaches “revelation in the first instance as an authentic source of knowledge (Erkenntnisquelle)” ([25], p. 398). He goes further to say:

“Wisdom, which all the task of knowing directs itself towards as an end, we call faith (Glaube) [ ... ] Faith should not be referenced as a knowledge which is unfounded, but instead should be understood as that form of knowledge which is the most well-founded [das allerbegründetste], because it possesses has that which can vanquish any doubt, and which is so absolutely positive, that any transcendence towards a higher term of reference is impossible”.28

The analogical moment enters into play then simultaneously thanks to the fact that reason captures interpellation, revelation, the word of the Other from the minimal semantical similitude that the word possesses within the world of the interpellated. One knows what it is to be hungry; knows that hunger is satisfied by food; has no semantical clarity as to what kind of hunger is being felt in concrete terms, nor what its origin or sense might be as it interpellates, but through similarity (the minimum fusion of horizons) approximately captures or semantically interprets its content. The pain expressed through its visage moves the person who has been interpellated, touches their sensibility [26], their affect, their will. It will have time still to unfold, through the development of the capturing of the meaning of the similar word of the Other, and thereby of a better understanding, consensus, communication, that will make possible the cognitive grasping of the content of the word due to future dialogue. In this way it will be more possible to understand in future the characteristics and origin of this hunger. Nonetheless there will never be a grasping, conceptualization or completely univocal or identical interpretation between two persons in dialogue regarding the meaning of a word profferred within the framework of an initial interpellation. The meaning of the hunger of one will never be the identical univocal hunger of an Other.

28 Reference [25], p. 407. I have applied in an anthropological sense a text by Schelling that has anthropological intention. At the human level it is possible to “pass towards another term; this would the “time of dialogue”. In this sense the revelation of the Other constitutes an epiphany of the mystery of exteriority of that which is kept within the intimacy of the Other. See Dussel, Filosofía de la Liberación, 2.4.7.3, p. 46. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 12 of 23

Faith in the person of an Other, and thus in their word, thus opens up the possibility within a minimal fusion of horizons for an analogical similarity to be possible through the will of communication which is enabled upon the basis of the respect and love-for-justice which is sacred to the person of the Other. In this way analogy makes it possible for discursive reason to grow out of a minimal similitude until a greater degree of mutual comprehension made possible through the time of dialogue can unfold. But additionally the revelation of the Other as an interpellation of justice puts into question the univocal ontological totality and launches anew the dialectical creation of the new, of the unexpected and of that which has not been planned as a result of the prevailing totality. This is why I wrote in 1973:

“That revelation of the Other. [ ... as an interpellation of justice] has put into question the ontological level which is now recreated from a new dimension. The discourse becomes ethical and the new fundamental ontological level (which is univocal) is revealed as non-original, and as open from the ethical perspective [the Other as an analogical exteriority] which is revealed afterwards (ordo cognoscendi a posteriori) as that which was before (the prius of the ordo realitatis) [ ... ] The acceptance of the Other as another already presupposes the ethical option, choice and ethical commitment which is at issue: it is necessary to negate oneself as a totality, and to aﬃrm oneself as ﬁnite, to be atheist as to the foundation from the perspective of identity” ([27], pp. 162–163); see also ([22], p. 116]).

With all the passion typical of a work written in my youth, I argued then:

“If philosophy were merely a theory, a reﬂected understanding of being and an interpretation that had been thought through as to an entity, the word of the Other would be unfailingly reduced to what has been said and interpreted mistakenly from the perspective of the prevailing foundations of Totality [of my Totality ... ]. To take the word of the Other as univocal as to one’s own is the kind of ethical evil which corresponds to the fanatic, an ethical fault which condemns the person who engages in it because it represents a capital error of the intelligence [ ... ]. To consider the word of the Other within the similitude of my world, conserving its meta-physical distinction which is supported in the Other, is to respect analogy as if it were revelation; and is to fulﬁll the duty of committing oneself in humility as to the happiness of the Other” ([27], pp. 170–171]).

5. Analogy as to the Polysemic Concept of “People” One of the most longstanding and still contemporary polemics in Latin American political philosophy has to do with the concept of the “people” [28]. Who or what is the people? What is the function of this concept in politics? What is their origin and how do they develop or enter into crisis? Might this not be a concept that is so complex that it would be better to abandon it so that further confusion is not encouraged, given its ambiguity? I believe that the logic of analogy is the methodical path for the resolution of this controversy in political philosophy, especially within the context of the Philosophy of Liberation. For some the concept of the people is ambiguous, contradictory, or slippery and therefore does not serve as a category for political interpretation (as Horacio Cerruti argues). Others, inspired by B. Spinoza, prefer to develop concepts such as the multitude and deny that of the people (such as Antonio Negri). Others elect to employ the term as a valid category, but do so within the semantic realm of populism (as Ernesto Laclau does, through a populism that ultimately expresses the complexity of political action as such). Within the latter context the term is used with disdain by others, considering that demagogical policies which are “populist” simply follow the fashion of the day or of “short term” options which simply seek electoral approval by majorities influenced by the mass media in order to exercise power for the sake of power, or in service to a nationalist or authoritarian political project (generally employed by neoliberal politicians). For his part, Antonio Gramsci describes the people within the terminology of his philosophy of politics as the “social bloc of the oppressed”. Fidel Castro considers the people, a category he employs Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 13 of 23 frequently, from the perspective of its everyday meaning, but describing it at a more complex level in terms of the multiple actors which constitute it, and considers it to be a basic collective political actor. Even in the analysis undertaken in his work by Walter Benjamin, as interpreted for example by G. Agamben29, the category of the people has a polysemic political meaning drawn from Paul of Tarsus: the “people which is not mine” as opposed to “my people”, which must be distinguished from the “rest”, collectively, and singularly from the “meshiakh”. How can we resolve the confusion resulting from such a broad array of meanings? I think that the method of analogy can come to our aid in this context by shedding light upon a dimension of similarities among all of these words which reference different political concepts and moments, understanding that the distinction between their varying semantical contents is at the same time analogical in character30. The First Distinction (Dt1). Perhaps the most widely shared meaning, which is perhaps because of this the most valid but the most imprecise, which could be traced in search of the dimension of analogical similarity as to the plurality of meanings of the word people (pueblo in Spanish; meanings which reflect multiple analogical distinctions). This search could be summarized as follows: a people is the totality of the population or the members of a political system (at least in the classical, stabilized, hegemonic sense on the part of under “historical power bloc”31), with common history and language, which inhabits the same territory (or at least did so at the moment when it was definitively constituted). This sense of people thus constitutes the principal analogical distinction. At this stage the contradictions among the people are not still being addressed. The Second Distinction (Dt2). In a stricter and still more critical way, one can refer to the people, in a Gramsci´s sense, as the “social bloc of the oppressed” within a given social system. This sector enters into action at certain strategic moments, which A. Badiou defines as the “event” (l´événement) which is when

“[ ... ] the dominant class has lost consensus (consenso), is no longer the ruling class but only the dominant one, exercising purely coercive force, which indicates that the great masses of the people have distanced themselves from the traditional ideology, and no longer believe in what they did previously” ([30], p. 311).

In this case the people are an eﬀect of a rupture [29] between the components of a political community, because there are members who are not considered to be part of the people or are “anti-people”. This implies an analogical distinction which is restrictive of the term’s broader meaning. This is what Fidel Castro describes in detail as follows:

“We understand by the people, when we speak of struggle, of the great mass of those who have not been redeemed [ ... ], who demand great and wise transformations of all kinds and are determined to achieve them, when they believe in something and someone, and most of all when believe sufficiently in themselves [ ... ]. We refer to the people then, if we are thinking in terms of struggle, of the 600,000 Cubans who are without work [ ... ]; of the 400,000 agricultural workers [ ... ]; of the 100,000 small farmers [ ... ]; 30,000 teachers and professors [ ... ]; 10,000 young professionals [ ... ]. These are the people, who suffer every day such plights and who are therefore able to fight with all of their courage” ([31], p. 39).

This understanding of the people is not only analogical with respect to other possible semantic contents of the word, but is also in itself constitutively analogical. And this is so because it acts collectively as an expression of those who are oppressed systemically in the economic, political,

29 Reference [29]. In particular when he expounds the theme of “Il popolo diviso” (the people divided), the “rest” or “remnant” is the whole (“il totto e la parte”) ([29], pp. 50–59). 30 Consider figure 4, where each distinction (Dt1, Dt2, etc.) indicates a different analogical exercise in the construction of meaning. 31 In A. Gramsci´s denomination [30]. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 14 of 23 cultural and other fields, as the base of new social movements which are articulated with critical new political parties. Movements and parties can be diversified analogically from each other in terms of the distinctions between their demands, their objectives (the feminist movement is distinct in terms of its liberation demands from those of the anti-racist movement, as is the anti-capitalist one from that which is environmentalist, these in turn from indigenous movements, etc.). Social movements have particular objectives32, which must be articulated with those of others through dialogue, the translation of their demands or needs, and through the negotiation of their interests in terms of a “fusion of horizons”, which can be transmitted through new progressive political parties with broader aims that articulate national objectives. This socio-political totality thus has similarities, both in terms of its social movements as its objectives or interests, which play the role of analogical distinctions, whose articulation becomes hegemonic33 when undertaken by a collective actor which can have “contradictions within its core”. The Third Distinction (Dt3). It must also be taken into account that the category of exteriority is essential with regard to the definition of the people in terms of its secondary meaning. Because the people are not only the bloc of the oppressed (those who are exploited and as a result alienated or passive) within the Totality of the prevailing system, but who equally resist and struggle from the perspective of a certain exteriority, within a dimension where the people can live, reconstruct and strengthen themselves in creative ways in order to be positioned to grow and intervene as collective actors of political, cultural, economic, and environmental action regarding the system which is dominant. The people as an exteriority constitute an essential cultural and overall strategic reserve34. I refer to them in this context as the plebs, who erupt in history as a collective actor that presents itself in the face of the prevailing political system as a creative force, as a hyperpotentia (beyond the mere potentia of the political community which has become fetishized in its decadence as a repressive force) and who put into question the dominant system as such. This is the people in the third analogical meaning. (Dt3). I have defined all of this initially in my book Twenty Theses on Politics, [18] in Theses 11 and 12. The critical destructive presence of the people as hyperpotentia constitutes itself as a political community grounded in a collective political actor directed at the creation of a new political system that arises subsequent to the collapse of the previous dominant system. The plebs thus become a populus. The Fourth Distinction (Dt4). There is yet another analogical distinction of the people, that of “populism”, which is defective in my view (and which E. Laclau does not adequately distinguish from that of the popular)35, which could be described in terms of the relationship between the members of the people and all of its inhabitants are understood as a mass or “multitude” (as A. Negri understands this term) pursuant to the organization of a state within a specific territory (Dt1), with a nationalist option attached (either from the right or the left), where no rupture is produced between the people and the anti-people I have referenced above, which ultimately falls into an ambiguity which is criticized by some, both in Europe and in Latin America, and elsewhere, in terms of charismatic leaders who are unscrupulous and demagogical. Sometimes there are deliberate confusions provoked by dominating groups, which confuse the liberation action of truly popular leaders with mere populists, based on

32 Each particular interest plays the role of an analogical distinction within the national interest, which is in sum the pluriversality of analogical similarities which it contains. The people’s political project as a whole then contains within it an analogical similarity. 33 The concept of hegemony is inherently analogical, because the common project or cause (which is hegemonic but not dominating) fulfills the distinct interests of the movements and parties which are its articulated subjects through the people as a whole. See [32] thesis 11.17, figure 11.1. 34 In figure 6, I differentiate between the system of domination in terms of its character as the prevailing system (A: the people understood as Dt1), as the oppressed (B: Dt2), and in terms of the oppressed understood from the perspective of their exteriority, as a reserve for the future (C: Dt3). 35 Popular refers to the analogical distinctions classified as Dt2 and Dt3, while populist, in the Latin American context, falls into the ambiguity of assuming a social whole,(Dt1) which is defined negatively from liberal or neoliberal perspectives as merely a submission to the fulfillment of the whimsical, superficial will of the people as a mass or multitude from a quasi-Nazi or Fascist perspective. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 15 of 23

Max Weber’s understanding of charisma focused on leaders who hide their will to dominate behind this kind of legitimacy. In this short writing I cannot go into this in greater detail, but only seek to highlight that taking into account the logic of analogy one can develop a value-based description and judgment as to the diﬀerent ways of conceptualizing the people. This in turn makes it possible to criticize certain trends which are in fashion, and to the contrary highlight others.

6. Analogy within the Context of Intercultural Dialogue and Epistemological Decolonization The logic of analogy also includes an ethics of respect regarding the Other, and a patience vested in the long term of debate needed in order to comprehend the Other’s of truth claim, and the possibility of arriving at rational agreements without having achieved the kind of identity that frequently undermines the possibility of the ascertaining the validity of opinions necessary in order to act together. The hypothesis of a ragione debole in G. Vattimo, for example, which attacks the dominating reason of modernity, which is considered dogmatic and authoritarian, seeks to lay the groundwork for an ethics of communication, but in order to do so falls into a certain kind of skepticism that ends up putting into question all of the strict varieties of rationality, and at the same time negates critical reason, which is not weak and which has all the right to express a grand narrative, although this might be epic and not tragic in character. For this reason it might perfectly reformulate the question from the perspective of the affirmation of an analogical reason, which is neither weak nor skeptical, in the Nietzschean sense, and which is capable of criticizing modern reason, approaching it in terms of its character as a univocal rationality trapped within an exclusionary and dominating logic of identity and difference. It is similarity rather than identity which permits a greater degree of movement that lays the basis for the realization of a constructive and critical analogical dialogue between distinct positions which retain a dimension of similarity where a fusion of horizons regarding the themes to be addressed respects distinctions without demanding identity between them. Within a global horizon that is not merely Eurocentric, and from the perspective of the critical position inaugurated by epistemological decolonization, the practice of the use of analogical reason is very fertile within the context of so-called “intercultural dialogue”, which is so necessary in ethical, theoretical, and political terms. In effect, the positions opposed to analogy can be described within two limits which can be, contradictorily to the extent that (a) it is thought that humanity will achieve through dialogue, or violence, the cultivation of a future pluriversal culture, which could not be anything but a type of modernity such as that experienced by Europe since the end of the 15th century, or at its contrary extreme, (b) the fundamentalism that propounds the juxtaposition of equivocal cultures which are different upon the basis of their return to their origins, and for whom European modernity should be negated completely. In between these two polarities, (a) the first, which seeks to impose the truth claim of univocal European identity and the second, (b) which proposes the destruction of modernity, which in its view is corrupt, imposing an equivocal position as to the radical, essentialist and irreconcilable contradiction which judges it as blasphemous and diabolical, a third path opens: (c) which is that of the analogical character of the dialogue between distinct existent cultures which recognize the dignity of others, and also of modernity. Beyond the univocal universalist identical logic (centered around the duality between identity and difference), the pluriversality of analogy (centered around similarity and distinction) makes it possible to initiate a process of intercultural dialogue which is honest and ethical, in which each interlocutor can have a “truth claim”, which seeks to reach a validity claim among the members of other cultures. This validity becomes legitimate thanks to the mediation of consensus through a fraternal praxis and the use of rational argumentation, which can achieve agreement through a convergence in the Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 16 of 23 similarity of the semantic content in dispute. Such “validity”36, does not demand identity. If there is an adequate accord regarding this similarity it will advance towards greater comprehension which is mutually enriching as an expression of the development of the dimension within which the worlds of the interlocutors can fuse. It is not a matter of the skepticism as to admitting many truths, but instead of the argumentative discussion of distinctive truth and validity claims as to proposals that retain a certain distinction from the perspective of similarity, but not of identity, which is ontologically impossible. The different positions which confront each other objectively frequently proceed from an incommensurable complexity and diversity of reality itself, understood from the perspective of diverse worlds, and in subjective reference to the cognitive finitude of human beings in the face of their own reality (as X. Zubiri would say), and of the meaning grounded in the world of the Other. If we take for example the experience of “nature” it is understood that this has distinct meanings in distinct cultures. In modern civilization nature is simply the raw material of labor which can be transformed thanks to technology, which can be sold and bought as an extension of land, and which can be exploited through agriculture in order to conduct business through agricultural production. It is an object and a thing which lies at one’s disposal, and a resource of poietic and instrumental reason. In the native cultures of the original inhabitants of the Americas such as the Mexicas, the Mayas, Chipchas, Tupi-Guarani, human beings hold a sacred respect for Mother Earth. They experience this in terms of a world within which37 a human being is only a part, the child of a Mother that nourishes and has generated us and which demands care and veneration because we have our origin in Her (through the evolution of life which is a terrestrial phenomenon) and to Her we shall return. If there were to be an intercultural dialogue between the members of distinct cultures, analogically speaking, and if they sought to communicate to each other the meaning of “nature” they would have to take into account this kind of polysemic distinction. This would involve grappling with distinct existential (analogical) meanings which although they have a certain similarity between them (in the end nature is that nonhuman realm where we find ourselves in terms of a daily interiority, not in the face of Her, but rather within Her). Intercultural dialogue as to nature begins with a quasi-abysmal incomprehension, but slowly, within the framework of the time of revelation that each one receives from the Other, a “fusion of horizons” emerges (Figure4), and the dimension of similarity gradually increases. There will never be a point of univocal existential experience, nor of the identical grasping of the meaning that the Other attributes to this experience, but there will be a progressive enrichment through the grasping of a polysemic concept in a world which is increasingly common in character, where a mutual and progressive comprehension is possible. All of the themes or experience of a culture can be reflected in dialogue with members of other cultures, and this would permit the construction of a pluri-versal (not uni-versal)38 world which is what this kind of dialogue is intended to achieve.

36 Validity in English (Gültichkeit in German, “validité in French), is not the same as “truth”(Wahrheit, verité). “Truth” is the reference (Bezug in German, référance in French) of the cognitive subjectivity of reality; whereas “validity” is instead, a reference to a member with respect to a community of communication and to the acceptance or not, by other members of the community, as to the argument being expounded for their approval or disapproval, for its validation (not verification) or invalidation (not falsification in the Popperian sense). This truth claim is not the same as a validity claim. The time for dialogue, for honest discussion, is a time when not all those participating in the dialogue have a truth claim, and during which those claims which are held will be put to the test. During this period when the arguments put forth by a member have not been accepted, they do not yet rise to the level of “truth claims”, since this stage of fulfillment is only achieved if the opponents support the judgment as truthful to begin with. At the global level of inter-philosophical, inter-cultural, or inter-religious dialogue, the time of pluriversality is the moment when the prevailing character of a recognized, mutual horizon of Similarity (Sm) is achieved but not one of Identity. In any case there can be an acceptance of aspects that at the beginning of the discussion were considered to be heterogeneous or distinct, but which will gradually achieve greater Similarity, although they will never become fully identical. This situation could take centuries to mature. 37 It is not merely an object [ob-ject], which has been flung in front of the subject [sub-ject], but instead the totality of the planetary biosphere in which (within which) human beings received their life through the evolution of this nature (metaphorically, but in reality it is our origin, our mother, our habitat). 38 The reference here is not to a universal globalized culture, but to a worldwide global pluriverse. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 17 of 23

Rational dialogue should have as its ethical principle an attitude of respect towards the “analogical pluriversality” of humanity that could lay the basis for progressive mutual understanding, capable of accepting in a non-contradictory manner the truth claims of another culture, which we will no longer seek to refute (which is to say, seek to render false39) but instead to undertake together the long slow but ever deepening path of understanding the meaning of the linguistic and conceptual components of the other cultural world, in order to assimilate the inﬂuences of other cultures through the fusion of horizons in similarity, which in any case will not achieve an identical consensus, but instead a broader understanding necessary and suﬃcient for a world that postulates the possibility of perpetual life and peace. The analogical method in Latin America is necessary as a path that can be followed in order to undertake dialogues among distinct cultures within the same continent, between the cultures of its original inhabitants, of creoles, mestizos and people of African descent, and also applies as a method for analogical dialogue as well among the peoples of a continent that shares the similar culture.

7. The Pluriversality of Transmodernity or a Future New Civilization as an Analogical Concept During the long duration of intercultural dialogue convergence towards a New Civilization in a global Age of Transmodernity demands clarity as to the meaning of a pluriversal global culture, which could avoid falling into the univocal character of today’s transnationalized modernity, and could instead be a culture capable of articulating all existing cultures within a framework of similarity. Within this framework the mutual peaceful construction of humanity that will gradually subsume the most distinct, important and valuable aspects of regional cultures, without the need to annihilate them or impose upon them the uniform identity of a dominating culture of the world, as Hegel imagined, which was intended to subjugate all of the rest. It is necessary to imagine, for centuries, how the slow process of construction of a polysemic global culture might unfold through similarity, constructed through the contributions of the millenarian distinctions of existing cultures. I wrote 45 years ago:

“We refer to the analogical universality [today I would say “pluriversality”] of all of humanity uniﬁed through the distinct character of its integral parts, where each one, without losing its own cultural personality, could nonetheless participate in a communication without borders imposed by closed forms of nationalism. This is not the univocity of a humanity dominated by a single Empire, but instead a single global Homeland based on the solidarity between the freedom of its parts. But there is no universal philosophy (abstract, univocal, nor concrete). There is no philosophy without more40. There are philosophies, that of each authentic philosopher, that of each people that has expressed itself through reﬂective thought, which is not directly communicable but which can be communicated analectically; and this because the word of each philosophy is respected as distinct because it is dialogical” ([27], p. 241]).

There I stated explicitly that what we refer to today in terms of an (analogical) global pluriversality as to a culture that is to come, which will go beyond that of European Modernity’s pretensions as a global culture, towards what we have described as a Transmodern global Age. The Islamic concept of Tawheed clearly refers to the revelation of the Islamic Absolute which has been revealed in distinct ways to diverse peoples, which highlights the analogical presence of a distinct revelation for each cultural community from the perspective of a fundamental similarity. Within this framework it is not necessary to annihilate the truth claims of an Other, but instead to discover the similarity between varying truth claims attributable to the participants in an inter-cultural (inter-philosophical) dialogue.

39 Popperian falsiﬁcation. 40 This was in essence the aspiration of the great philosopher Leopoldo Zea, who conceived of philosophy as a “philosophy without more”. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 18 of 23

From the perspective of the univocity of identity, one’s “possession of the truth” is imposed upon others engaged in that dialogue, since the one who has that certainty presupposes a priori that they

Philosophieshave to “defend” 2019, 4, x FOR the PEER truth, REVIEW not necessarily purely through argumentation or the honest exercise18 of 23 of a coherent ethical action of an enunciated truth. In the final analysis, in the face of the resistance of orderthe Other, to move there the is other no room interlocutor for anything to accept but domination the truth that through has been force proposed. (in the final This instance: is the purely war) in tautologicalorder to move universal the other expansion interlocutor of the to “truth” accept theof the truth dominator. that has beenDialogue proposed. is superfluous, This is the and purely the violencetautological of arms universal is valid expansion from the ofperspective the “truth” of ofthe the fundamentalist, dominator. Dialogue as a means is superfluous, to impose truth and on the thoseviolence who of ignore arms isit. validThis is from a logic the that perspective becomes of irrational the fundamentalist, to the extent as that a means it strips to the impose Other truth of the on honestthose whoand ignoreethical it.freedom This is of a logicargumentation, that becomes of rejecting irrational arguments to the extent overall that itor strips specifically the Other to reject of the themhonest because and ethical of how freedom they fall of short argumentation, of a rational, ofresponsible, rejecting arguments free, and equally overall symmetrical or specifically exchange. to reject Thethem univocal because universality of how they that fall is short imposed of a rational, through responsible, coercion is free,necessarily and equally dominating symmetrical and irrational. exchange. TheThe univocal transmodern universality culture that of is the imposed future throughAge that coercion is being issketched necessarily in the dominating present must and be irrational. the fruit of a qualitativeThe transmodern leap in culturehumanity, of the which future we Age coul thatd isreference being sketched in terms in of the the present following must diachronic be the fruit stages.of a qualitative leap in humanity, which we could reference in terms of the following diachronic stages. FirstFirst stage. stage. At At the the origins origins of of Modernity, Modernity, with with the the opening opening to to the the Atlantic Atlantic of of Europe Europe which which was was besiegedbesieged by by the the Ottoman Ottoman Empire, Empire, and and the the resulting resulting co conquestnquest of of Latin Latin America America (1492, (1492, followed followed by by that that ofof the the American American continent continent as as a a whole), whole), this this modern modernityity subsumed subsumed through through domination domination the the cultures cultures of of thethe original original inhabitants inhabitants of of the the Americas, Americas, constituti constitutingng the the essential essential dual dual structure structure which which underlies underlies the the newnew Age Age of of the the world world during during this this period: period: modernity/coloniality. modernity/coloniality. Modernity Modernity constitutes constitutes itself itself in in the the samesame instant instant that that it it subsumes subsumes American culturescultures (during(during itsits firstfirst three three centuries) centuries) which which are are negated negated in intheir their exteriority. exteriority. ClarificationClarification of of Figure Figure 66:: (A) (A) Totality. European culture develops as modernity. (B) An entity (think,(think, ens) ens) that that has has been been subsumed, subsumed, such such as as the the cu culturesltures exploited exploited by by coloniality coloniality and and modernity. modernity. (C) (C) StructuresStructures that that are are positioned positioned in in terms terms of of exteri exteriorityority as as the the colonial colonial domination domination of of modernity. modernity.

Figure 6. Modernity constitutes itself through the domination of colonial cultures. Figure 6. Modernity constitutes itself through the domination of colonial cultures. Non-European cultures are not respected in their (analogical) alterity but are instead subsumed Non-European cultures are not respected in their (analogical) alterity but are instead subsumed (B), thereby negating their exteriority and incorporating them to the world-system as an integral part of (B), thereby negating their exteriority and incorporating them to the world-system as an integral part the univocal horizontality of the totality of modernity, for example as colonies of the capitalist system, of the univocal horizontality of the totality of modernity, for example as colonies of the capitalist that is fed by the extraction of external (alien) wealth which produces the alienation of other cultures. system, that is fed by the extraction of external (alien) wealth which produces the alienation of other The so-called modern Age is produced and reproduced through the colonial exploitation of knowledge, cultures. The so-called modern Age is produced and reproduced through the colonial exploitation of resources, wealth, labor, technology, types of food, etc. which make it possible for Europe to constitute knowledge, resources, wealth, labor, technology, types of food, etc. which make it possible for Europe itself as the modernizing center of a new Age. to constitute itself as the modernizing center of a new Age. Second stage. After approximately five centuries of coloniality, the peoples, peripheral, dominated Second stage. After approximately five centuries of coloniality, the peoples, peripheral, and supposedly “backward” cultures (as modern Europe perceives them), following the Second dominated and supposedly “backward” cultures (as modern Europe perceives them), following the World War which is prolonged by the U.S’ intervention in it, begin the first stage of “becoming Second World War which is prolonged by the U.S’ intervention in it, begin the first stage of conscious” of the status of under-development which the structures of modern domination have “becoming conscious” of the status of under-development which the structures of modern organized to produce their inevitably impoverished state which is reflected in all relevant cultural and domination have organized to produce their inevitably impoverished state which is reflected in all civilizational dimensions. These are the national liberation movements in Africa and Asia which had relevant cultural and civilizational dimensions. These are the national liberation movements in Africa been foreshadowed by movements for independence in Latin America at the beginning of the 19th and Asia which had been foreshadowed by movements for independence in Latin America at the century. It was only during the second part of the 20th century that these peoples enter a second stage beginning of the 19th century. It was only during the second part of the 20th century that these of consciousness which is deeper than that achieved during their initial stage of political emancipation. peoples enter a second stage of consciousness which is deeper than that achieved during their initial stage of political emancipation. This involves the negation of the introjection of modernity into the consciousness of the dominant classes of the elites in the colonies (or postcolonies) that reproduce the culture and the civilizing ethos of the modernizing metropolis. This second emancipation has been denominated as that of epistemic cultural emancipation. Third stage. Taking as its place of enunciation (locus enuntiationis) not the subsumed and merely dominated moment of the colonial world (B in figure 6) and less still the positionality of the Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 19 of 23

This involves the negation of the introjection of modernity into the consciousness of the dominant classes of the elites in the colonies (or postcolonies) that reproduce the culture and the civilizing ethos of the modernizing metropolis. This second emancipation has been denominated as that of epistemic cultural emancipation. Third stage. Taking as its place of enunciation (locus enuntiationis) not the subsumed and merely dominated moment of the colonial world (B in Figure6) and less still the positionality of the modern world itself (A in figure)41, but instead the exteriority disdained by modernity (and because of this, not destroyed or exploited because it was ignored, but at the same time contaminated42) (C in the same figure), the critic situated in the peripheral world must initiate a task of archaeological reconstruction of their own cultural and popular memory. This critic must reconstruct “against the grain” (as Walter Benjamin put it), from the perspective of the oppressed who have been vanquished by modernity, and from that of the memory or history of the ethical, mythical nucleus of their own culture (as P. Ricoeur suggested), the epic of their own millenarian civilizations (for example those of China, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Islamic world, Bantu Africa, the original peoples of Latin America, etc.), and of their knowledge, technologies, economies, politics, poetry, art, etc., which in many cases are much more ancient than those of modernity and have continued to resist and invent new uses and customs during the Modern Age (despite its coloniality). These cultures are not eternal identical essences; they are cultural structures that evolve with the lives of their peoples and cannot reproduce their past in their futures. But they can continue to live and to evolve their distinct worlds. This task of reconstruction cannot be undertaken by the modern European scientist or sage, because they are alien or foreign to these contexts, and do not know the colonial languages as mother tongues, have not eaten their food with an educated palate, and have not lived their climates, clothing, and homes through such sensibilities. These are often forgotten processes which have been rendered invisible and condemned as backward, rude, or barbarian even by many within the peripheral peoples who have been silenced successively since the end of the 15th century (beginning with Latin America, continuing through India, Southeast Asia, the Islamic world, and Africa). Fourth stage. In order to construct a new transmodern civilization, a new world, information is necessary through intercultural dialogue with other cultures that suffered the same kinds of domination of modernity, in order to learn other values, other literatures, other histories, economies, politics, esthetics, practices, other ways of understanding gender, etc. The idea is not to univocally imitate another culture: the focus now is to initiate a dialogue where the kind of fusion of horizons can be produced that I have sought to explain and depict above (Figure5). This will include the kind of translation of languages, uses, aptitudes and worlds that Boaventura de Sousa Santos has suggested. The idea is in effect to carry out the approach of the analogia fidei on a global scale. This is envisioned as a dialogue where each culture learns from other cultures in a manner which is conscious of the analogical distinction of each theme which is addressed: without either identity nor equivocality. But the learning that is to take place is not through domination or imposition of one upon another, but from the perspective of a symmetry of rights, without violence, within the framework of a reasonable (rational) dialogue, which includes choosing and deciding along the way what aspects of the other culture are convenient from each culture’s perspective. And between these cultures the objective is

41 When the creole colonial or postcolonial elites adopt a “modernizing” attitude (which is to say pretend to apply to their cultures and peoples the civilizing model of European modernity) they only succeed in producing a contradictory praxis: the pretension of developing themselves upon the basis of the same idealized modernity that had its origin in the constitutive moment of the coloniality of its peripheries. A periphery without colonies of its own to exploit can never duplicate the destructive achievements of modernity/coloniality. Even worse, the same revolutionary postcolonial frequently assumes the epistemic structures of modernity (and even of the fundamentalist movements that have the pretension of opposing themselves radically to modernity). This is a secondary level of coloniality, or a very subtle and generalized form of inversion of the original inversion. 42 For example the indigenous languages of the colonized peoples and their myths, rites, esthetics, ethics, respect for Mother Earth, the ancestral vestiges of their economic, political, family and gender practices, etc. Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 20 of 23 not just a South-South dialogue of excolonies with excolonies, but also of modern culture that is not universal, but rather particular and provincial, which was imposed nonetheless with its “universality claim”, based upon the extraction of resources of all of the world’s distinct cultures from the perspective of the universal univocity imposed through violence, and not with justice for the benefit of the common good of humanity, but instead in service to the accumulation of global wealth enjoyed solely by the system’s center, by Europe- and today by the United States. This should not be a fundamentalist dialogue that negates all of modernity’s validity, but must be one instead that knows how to differentiate between what is convenient for the cultures of the Global South and what is harmful. It should not be a fundamentalist position, but equally it should be free of the coloniality of knowledge, being, existence, which negates itself. What we need is an epistemological, cultural, and technological decolonization that has a distinct project for a new future civilization, not to return to a tradition of the past which cannot be repeated, but instead to advance towards another that ought to continue with the ontological, ethical, cultural traces of one’s own traditions, which are alive, within a new future civilization. This does imply the negation of tradition nor the transformation into substance of the inexistent eternity of a tradition to which one should return; but instead the dialectical and analogical creation of a new totality that takes the best and the most essential from the own tradition, innovated within a new distinct totality: similar to the previous stages of tradition, but constitutive of a distinct new Age of the same tradition. Fifth stage. What is at stake here has been explored above. Proceeding upon the basis of the South-South and South-North global dialogues, and the production of instrumental mediations and of an ethical and ontological transformation of subjectivity, a vital growth of postcolonial cultures can continue, as they decolonize their interpretations, epistemes, technologies, their projects in all fields and dimensions (not only in the economic context, but also those which are political, cultural, with reference to gender and the overcoming of patriarchy, beyond white racism, and the ecocidal mentality grounded in a secularist and purely quantitative interpretation of nature, etc.). All of these are processes with analogical distinction, which is to say that they are grounded in a recognition of these distinct characteristics and challenges and do not take a univocal approach towards them. When someone enunciates the theme of human rights in Latin America for example they should have an understanding as to the analogical distinction and character of this concept in the centenary Arab legal tradition and philosophy, for example. And the same logic should be applied to all of the components of a culture, of a civilization, and of economic and political structures. Clarification of Figure7. A, B, C, etc.) Moments of the cultures dominated, exploited, alienated or subsumed as mediations of Modernity. A’, B’, C’, etc.) Moments which are positioned in the Exteriority to Modernity, and which are the points of departure of historical development (analogically distinct moments). Lines a, a’, etc.) Distinct growth of each culture. The Line from Modernity to Transmodernity shows a dialectical process of a prevailing totality (Modernity) towards another future totality (the global cultural pluriverse of the transmodern Age, with analogical similarity). This dialectical process is a passage (Übergang), which is simultaneously analogical to the extent that there are components in Transmodernity that were not given in Modernity (which means that there is therefore similarity between the two), and that they were not even in potentia (the Aristotelian dynamis) in Modernity. This is to say, that they would therefore be impossible if this was merely a univocal passage within the identity. But the intervention of the contributions from the Exteriority of Modernity (indicated by A’, B’, C’, etc., and by the lines) transform the process into a creatio ex nihilo (out of nothingness43) from Modernity to Transmodernity.

43 This is ignored by all within the Marxist tradition, including F. Engels; but Karl Marx indicates that “living labor”, alienated as “wage labor” in the “surplus time” of “surplus labor” undertakes a “creation of value from the nothingness” (Schöpfung des Wertes aus Nichts) of capital: this is “surplus value” (see [[33] § 9.3, pp. 368 ss.] and [[34], pp. 243–244]). The trans-ontology (metaphysics or ethics as understood by E. Levinas) of creation is the ﬁnal instance of the thinking of the great critic of capital. I think that he could cease to employ a category that was rooted in his Semitic tradition (coming from a family of rabbis with Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 21 of 23 Philosophies 2019, 4, x FOR PEER REVIEW 21 of 23

Transmodernidad

N´ A´ A Modernidad N

B´ B C C´

Figure 7. DevelopmentDevelopment based based upon upon one one culture culture (with (with analog analogicalical distinction) distinction) and its dialectical dialectical passage towards a new global civilization, aa newnew GlobalGlobal Age.Age.

Sixth stage. The future systemsystem (D),(D), the the age age of of the the world world subsequent subsequent to to the the modern modern Age, Age, will will not not be bea another a another modernity modernity that that has beenhas been fully fully realized realized (J. Habermas), (J. Habermas), nor an nor alter an Modernity alter Modernity (Antonio (Antonio Negri), Negri),nor possible nor possible other modernities other modernities based upon based each upon of the each cultures of the within cultures the within Global the South Global (as suggestedSouth (as suggestedby the Moroccan by the philosopherMoroccan philosopher Taha Abdurrahman), Taha Abdu norrrahman), a non-capitalist nor a non-capitalist modernity(B. modernity Echeverria), (B. Echeverria),etc. Instead etc. what Instead is unfolding what is isunfolding a transition is a transition and transformation and transformation into another into globalanother Age, global another Age, anothercivilizational civilizational process, anotherprocess, kind another of personal kind of and personal collective and peoples’collective subjectivity, peoples’ subjectivity, which will involve which willleaving involve modernity leaving behind, modernity in a mannerbehind, similarin a manner to how similar modernity to how in Europemodernity (and in only Europe there) (and implied only there)leaving implied medieval leaving German medieval feudalism German behind feudalism (remembering behind that (remembering no other culture that anywhereno other culture else in worldanywhere history else was in world feudal). history I have was described feudal). this I have Age in described terms of Transmodernity,this Age in terms in of order Transmodernity, to distinguish init fromorder Postmodernity, to distinguish withoutit from Postmodernity, yet attributing towithou it a positivet yet attributing identity of to its it own.a positive Postmodernity identity of has its own.been aPostmodernity positive step inhas the been face a of positive Modernity’s step in agony the face which of Modernity’s produced a partialagony which self-criticism produced of its a partialown limitations. self-criticism Postmodernity, of its own limitations. the final, agonizingPostmodernity, cultural the movement final, agonizing of modernity cultural itself,movement still has of modernity asitself, its placestill has of enunciation,modernity as and its itsplace creators of enunciation, and cultivators and areits creators still modern, and cultivators although they are stillare criticalmodern, of although the univocity they of are their critical own of culture. the univocity Transmodernity of their own instead culture. is being Transmodernity constructed throughinstead isthe being efforts constructed of those critical through forces the who efforts think, of those act and crit projectical forces themselves who think, from act outside and project of and themselves beyond the frommodern outside horizon, of and from beyond the perspective the modern of anotherhorizon, geopolitics, from the perspective from the regions of another and dimensionsgeopolitics, offrom the worldthe regions thathave and dimensions been ignored, of negated,the world exploited, that have and been from ignored, what Parmenidesnegated, exploited, conceived and of from as realms what Parmenidesof “non-being”. conceived of as realms of “non-being”. But the creator of Transmodernity, of a newnew Civilization,Civilization, is not a fundamentalist who merely negates modernity, nor someone who is backward or traditional who becomes modern, nor someone who seeks to reproduce from the basis of each tradition a modernity of their own which is in fact impossible to reproduce. Thanks Thanks to to the the possibility possibility of of overcoming overcoming the provincialization of modernity (a task which requires the negation of its pretensionspretensions of universality) the futurefuture of a civilization, a world, a culture, a pluriversal (grounded in the similarity of analogy) world Age, is possible, where the distinctdistinct distinctiondistinction of of each each diverse diverse culture culture is respected,is respected, but but also also where where it is it possible is possible to lay to the lay basis the basisfor the for fusion the fusion of the distinctof the distinct horizons horizons of these of cultures, these cultures, through theirthrough gradually their gradually increasing increasing similarity, similarity,through mutual through understanding, mutual understanding, complementary complementary recognition andrecognition valuing, and and valuing, tolerance. and The tolerance. contrary wouldThe contrary be identity, would which be identity, in itself iswhich impossible, in itself but is impossible, which in any but case which would in implyany case the would impoverishment imply the impoverishmentof humanity, since of ithumanity, would involve since it the would imposition involve by the a single imposition people by of a asingle culture people identical of a toculture itself identical to itself corresponding to that which dominates the world, through the domination of a single language, history, mythical world, and poetry: a Jewish tradition of over 400 years, on the part of his German father and Dutch mother). Here the logic of analogy could be applied“This between people (a) (Volk) the being isof livingin the labor, global which histor is the “creativey of that source epoch (schöpferische […] the Quelle one) of that value” dominates (living labor is the creator),(herrschende). y (b) the being Againstof the eff thatect:“surplus absolute value”, right which (absol is autes mere Recht), thing (which as bearer is to say, in a creature).the present of the Philosophies 2019, 4, 31 22 of 23 corresponding to that which dominates the world, through the domination of a single language, history, mythical world, and poetry:

“This people (Volk) is in the global history of that epoch [ ... ] the one that dominates (herrschende). Against that absolute right (absolutes Recht), as bearer in the present of the development of the Spirit of the world (Weltgeistes), are arrayed the Spirits of those peoples with no rights at all (rechtlos)”.44

This would be the culmination of Nietzsche’s Will to Power, which would be self-aﬃrmed politically on a global scale as univocal, proclaiming itself as the only absolute global, exclusionary truth. This would be in essence the solitude of tautological unanimity. The total infernal boredom of modern fetishized totalitarianism! Analogy instead makes it possible to open ourselves towards the path of a rationality which is not only discursive or in dialogue but which also unfolds through pluriversal (not universal) similarity, which makes conviviality, recognition possible as well as an inevitably fragile but active and open tolerance, where many worlds can interact in solidarity by recreating themselves and each other, thereby permitting the innovative adventure of the unexpected and creative interpellation of the Other, which in order to be an Other must care for45 its space, its distinction, and not merely its internal and functional diﬀerence within the univocal totality that is deadened through the certainty of tautological repetition. Analogy allows the creation of the new without the loss of the beauty of the plurality within the unity or community of the polysemic similarity, that unites without dominating, and which permits dialogue and does not demand that one forgets their own millenarian cultural distinction, and thus lays the basis for future centuries characterized by greater convergence. The landscape is no longer that of abstract argumentative rhetoric that leads to the competitive destruction of the Other, but instead the dialogical and harmonic complementarity which makes it possible to recognize alterity.

Funding: This research received no external funding. Conﬂicts of Interest: The author declares no conﬂict of interest.

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