Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: an Extension of the Basic Data*
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FORMAL ALLIANCES, 1816-1965: AN EXTENSION OF THE BASIC DATA* By MELVIN SMALL Wayne State University and J. DAVID SINGER University of Michigan In an earlier number of this Journal, we able to others whose work embraces the published our findings on the distribu- two decades following Hiroshima and tion of formal alliances among the mem- Nagasaki.3 bers of the interstate system during the While much of the theoretical and me- period between the Napoleonic Wars and thodological discussion found in the World War II. Our purpose there was to earlier paper need not be repeated here, present a systematic and quantitative some of the latter problems are suffi- description of all formal alliances, their ciently different to merit brief attention; membership, duration, and type, as well this is particularly true of our data sour- as the procedures we used in generating ces and their reliability, to which we will those data (Singer and Small, 1966b). address ourselves at the outset. Following While our major motivation was to that, we will identify and justify the com- provide the empirical basis for a number position of the post-1945 interstate sys- of inquiries into the correlates of war tem and its major power sub-system, during that 125 years, it also seemed describe the three classes of alliance with likely that these data might be of use to which we are concerned, outline the others in the scholarly community. 1 coding and measuring procedures, and Since completing the original paper, then present our results in a variety of however, we have been under some forms. Throughout, we will compare our compulsion to extend our data beyond procedures and results with those of the World War II and up to the quite recent original study and note any deviations past, so that the period on which we therefrom; those who utilize these data concentrate is now the 150 years from are urged to note such deviations, espe- 1 January 1816 to 31 December 1965. cially as summarized in the Appendix. Some of the pressure has been self- induced and some has come via encour- The sources of information agement from the increasing number of For a great deal of diplomatic informa- scholars who are now engaged in data- tion, one may readily turn to the diplo- based, quantitative research in interna- matic archives of many national govern- tional politics.2 At the outset, we had ments and to the published volumes planned to restrict the entire project to which subsequently embrace and codify the 1816-1945 period, but for a variety of a large portion of those archives. But scientific as well as policy reasons we later this only holds true for materials which decided to extend it up through the mid- are at least two (and often, more) decades 1960’s. Given this set of considerations, in the past; few, if any, governments it now seems appropriate to up-date the make such documents available until earlier study and make our findings avail- twenty or more years after the fact. For 258 the earlier study, then, we had the docu- foreign consumption - as strictly de- mentary evidence to make us quite con- fensive moves, undertaken reluctantly in fident that all relevant alliances had in- the face of potential aggression. Fourth, deed been identified. But for the more in light of the consequences of America’s recent years, it looked as if we might be failure to make explicit its commitments in somewhat the same situation as was to South Korea before June of 1950, the Wilhelmstrasse in 1910; it was known there has since been a strong desire to for example, that some sort of undertak- reduce the ambiguities and uncertainties; ing existed between France and Britain, secrecy would not be useful in such a but the German Foreign Office could not context. Finally, as the material which be at all certain what the specific com- follows will make abundantly clear, it is mitments were. Similarly today, Western nearly impossible to think of any allian- scholars know that the U.S.S.R. and ces that have not already been consum- North Vietnam enjoy some sort of frater- mated - and publicized. In every part of nal relationship, for instance, but cannot the world, just about any alliance that ascertain whether a formal alliance was one could reasonably expect to be made contracted, no less ascertain the nature since 1945 has been made. of the obligations involved. And even if Thus, despite the unavailability of the we know that a formal alliance does standard archival sources, we are per- exist, and have identified it, we still may suaded that the present compilation wonder whether there are secret provi- includes virtually every single alliance sions which significantly alter the pub- which satisfies the criteria which are licly stated arrangements, and which may described below. In addition to the not become known until the archives are United Nations Treaty Series and the eventually opened. League of Nations Treaty Series, we have The picture is not, however, quite as turned to the governmental and second- bleak as it might appear. First of all, in ary sources cited in Table 3 and in the the period since World War I, and even References for the texts of the sixty-two more since World War II, the League and qualifying alliances extant during the the United Nations have maintained a post-World War II period.5 registry wherein all treaties, conventions, and agreements may be recorded by the Membership in the system signatory governments. While registra- It may be recalled that in the earlier tion is not compulsory, the consensus paper we differentiated between the to- is that a very large percentage of all post- tal interstate system and its more re- 1945 agreements have been deposited stricted sub-systems: that comprising with the Secretariat.4 This gives us, at the most of the European and a few of the least, a single and comprehensive source most important non-European states with which to begin. Second, with the (which we called the central system), and many changes in the culture of diploma- that comprising the major powers only. cy, its increasing visibility, and the height- Those states which did not qualify for ened role of ideological appeals and pro- inclusion in the central system were paganda moves, governments are less assigned to the peripheral system. The and less prone to undertake secret com- central peripheral distinction might have mitments. Third, and closely related, the been quite justified during the period initiators of most of the alliances of the 1816-1919, but by the end of World past two decades have been eager to War I, most of the independent nations present them - both for domestic and of the world were sufficiently interde- 259 pendent, and the primacy of Europe was is the judgment and consensus of the sufficiently ambiguous to permit the ter- historians who specialize in the diplomacy mination of that distinction as of 1920.6 of the period, and who, in turn, largely In this paper, therefore, the only two reflect the consensus of the practitioners. types of nations are those which qualify The other might be more objective cri- for the interstate system, and those five teria, such as military power, industrial which comprise the major power sub- capability, or diplomatic status. system after 1945. Fortunately enough, both sets of cri- The justification and a detailed de- teria produce essentially the same set of scription of our coding procedures will nations. Thus, for most of the nineteenth be found in Singer and Small (1966a) and and that part of the twentieth century Russett, Singer, and Small (1968), but embraced in the Correlates of War pro- they may be summarized here. Essentially ject, we find that those states which score any putatively sovereign state with a at or very near the top in military-indus- population of at least 500,000 was includ- trial capability and diplomatic status are ed, provided that it enjoyed the de facto the same ones assigned to the major diplomatic recognition of the two ’legit- power category by those whose research imizers’, France and Britain. This latter focuses on the several epochs and regions requirement was only used up through involved.8 Out of this consensus comes 1919, and since then the basic criterion the following. Going back to the pre- has been either: (a) membership in the World War I decades, we included: Eng- League or the United Nations, or (b) a land, France, Germany, Austria-Hun- population of 500,000 or more and rec- gary, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the Uni- ognition by any two major powers.7 Be- ted States. When the debris and chaos of cause the 1816-1945 period was marked that war were cleared away (by the mid- by the consolidation and redistribution 1920’s) the Hapsburgs were gone, but of empires and by many major wars, the the other seven remained in (or had re- composition of the interstate system un- turned to) the ranks of the major powers. derwent frequent shifts. The post-1945 In the wake of World War II, the ranks system, on the other hand, shows greater were further reduced, leaving in 1946 stability. While we do see an appreciable only the U.S.S.R. and the United States upsurge in system size due to the ’liquid- plus England and France; and with the ation of colonialism’, the only other consolidation of the Communist revo- change is the disappearance of two mem- lution and their creditable showing in the bers.