Some Styles of Thought in Science: Examples Applied to the History Of

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Some Styles of Thought in Science: Examples Applied to the History Of ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; and give theories of vera causa wide berth, for good Some Styles of reason. They are leery of any attempt to extrapolate causes from observations, conÞning themselves to Thought in Science: laws and the extraordinarily rare causal theory. The 1859 publication of DarwinÕs On the Origin Examples Applied of the Species is a watershed event, in the neutrally geographic sense of that wordÑrecognized regardless to the History of of how you feel about it. Subsequently, scientists established functionalism, based on the adaptation Evolution of critters to their niches via natural selection, as the dominant paradigm in evolutionary biology for virtually all of the 20th century and still going strong by Erik Rau into the 21st. Functionalism explains diversity among species of critters through adaptation to either the In the vastly cluttered secondhand shop of tasks those critters perform or the environment philosophical ideas, there is a large but somewhat they live in or both. Though he wasnÕt the Þrst to empty cardboard box labeled ÔSCIENCE.Õ A few terms do so, Darwin clearly propounded the supremacy rattle around inside, some of which look very similar of adaptation over conservation of structure in to each other. When these terms are unpacked and natural selection: ÔHence every detail of structure in tried out on a few actual theories, however, we begin every living creature (making some little allowance to see how they might work. What follows is a short for the direct action of physical conditions) may discussion of some often-used but little-identiÞed be viewed, either as having been of special use to epistemological terms in the philosophy of science, some ancestral form, or as being now of special use and their roles illustrated through part of the history to the descendants of that form,Õ (Darwin 200) and of evolution. this supremacy was then taken up as inevitable by Cautious realism and cautious inductivism can subsequent researchers. be unsatisfying scientiÞc paradigms. Since both One of the main criticisms of functionalism is that exclude stark ultimate causes, their organic natures while newly generated causes of traits supplant old leave us feeling a little unsure of our footing, walking ones in endless succession, there is no examination on a frozen lake. This lack of absolute conviction of whether functionalism is the best way to explain doesnÕt imply any lack of scientiÞc progress, however. these traits. The deÞnitive tactic of functionalism is to Cautious inductivism, such as that discussed by Sir atomize a critter into traits, all of which are optimized John Herschel in Familiar Lectures on ScientiÞc Subjects to their fullest extent, except where more optimization is a generalization that sharply limits the gathering would compromise some other function. The only and sorting of knowledge whereas cautious realism is limit to natural selectionÕs power under functionalism milder--a sort of reluctance to overreach on the same is the trade-off between one trait and another. topic. As new scientiÞc information is developed Structuralism is an alternative theory for and theories are proposed, cautious realists will craft explaining changes in critters and species, which uses theories using new information but hesitate to force a different approach to that of functionalism, above. the universe to Þt inside those theories, preferring Structuralists see features of critters as both the things instead to use the most predictive theory of a given that are optimized through natural selection (traits), moment without asserting anything about the true and the unselected byproducts of those optimizations. nature of the universe. One of the classic examples Thus some things are not traits as such: the human of cautious realism is found in the astronomy of the chin being one example that is rather a byproduct of late 16th and early 17th centuries. At a point after the two other separate traits: an articulated lower jaw and work of Brahe, Kepler, and Copernicus but before a respiratory canal separate from our feeding tube. GalileoÕs telescope observations, a cautiously realistic The headlining debate of biology in the late astronomer could use a heliocentric model of the 18th centuryÑbetween Geoffroy and Cuvier with Cosmos without discarding two thousand years of their slogans of ÔUnity of Type,Õ and ÔConditions of physics. Cautious inductivists take this a step farther Existence,Õ respectivelyÑopened in a not-always- 61 civil discussion about structure and function in Stephen Jay Gould used very different rhetorical Europe at the Institut in Paris. In England Þfty years devices when he made his critique of adaptationism. later, Richard Owen espoused structuralism when Gould published his paper The Spandrels of San Marco his expertise with comparative osteology led him and the Panglossian Paradigm in 1979, and attacked the to propose somewhat obscure correspondences in same certainty of adaptation that Owen contested the bones of bats, moles, horses, and humans. Owen 150 years earlier. Neo-Darwinists ossiÞed the held to cautious inductivism with these varieties adaptationist paradigm with an unending sequence of cohesion to an archetype, even going so far as to of discarded hypotheses; Gould offered simpler say ßat out that, ÔTo what natural laws or secondary structuralist explanations instead. Unlike OwenÕs causes the orderly succession and progression of such use of repetitive arguments to establish structural an organic phenomena may have been committed we similarities, Gould dissects the adaptationist are as yet ignorantÕ (Owen 86). Owen was responding paradigm itself, and then proceeds point by point. in part to a competing theory involving an ultimate As discussed above, he argues against the tactics of cause: the metaphor of animals designed to their atomizing every critter into traits and viewing each purpose by their Maker as are vehicles such as a hot- trait as optimized. The prior example of the human air balloon, a locomotive, and a sailing ship designed chin is taken directly from Gould. His analysis of the to their purpose by their maker. chin is that it is not a trait unto itself, but a byproduct OwenÕs cautious inductivism contrasted sharply of two overlapping growth Þelds that coincidentally with the full-throated adaptationism and theological makes us more like Dudley Doright. ultimate cause popular in other publications of the Gould also cites as a ßaw the frequent changes time. The Bridgewater treatises (commissioned in of tack amongst adaptationist argumentsÑif one the early 19th century for the purpose of showing off argument fails, another will serve just as well. His the intricacy of GodÕs creations) and other works abundant examples of about-face maneuvers in kept adaptationism closely linked to creationism, adaptationist research papers cover Eskimo face so Owen tried to divide and conquer. Salting many shapes (described Þrst as adapted for cold weather references to Christian doctrine throughout his text, and second for chewing tough stuff like muktuk) he emphasized religious solidarity while criticizing and mollusk shell patterns (as camoußage, or adaptation. OwenÕs tour de force of explication perhaps as structural reinforcement). The next step with limbs from widely disparate vertebrates leaves in GouldÕs deconstruction is the claim of imperfect little doubt that while adaptation does play a role understanding of a critters ecological niche as a cure in making a bat look different from a horse, the fact for a paucity of adaptive explanations for traits. This that the body plans of the bat & the horse cleave to also leads to a paradigm where a lack of immediate a common archetype doesnÕt allow for totality of utility in a trait renders it totally inexplicable. And adaptation. indeed, due to the inßuence of Gould and others, On the third hand in this discussion about adaptationism is beginning to yield pride of place to causality, Darwin was not shy about touting natural structuralism in evolutionary biology. selection both as a mechanism for the change of GouldÕs critique carries issues into the modern one species to another, and as an ultimate cause for arena that have been debated since Galileo tried to sell adaptation. Organizing these preceding authors into his telescope as signal intelligence technology. But as divisions by their style of epistemology can place science exists as much in the context of society now as Darwin together with the natural philosophers, since then, we can expect that the demesnes of scientists are both he and they have ultimate causes, and casts shaped by similar winds of thought and change. The Owen into another camp of cautious inductivists tools we have examined need not go back into their like Von Baer and Geoffroy. OwenÕs stance on the dusty boxÑthey can be useful, if kept in good order. change in critters with time is unequivocal in the last paragraph of ÔOn The Nature of Limbs.Õ The two main points on that change are: Þrst, it happens, and second, we donÕt know why it happens. He then goes a step further: we donÕt know why it happens, but it doesnÕt have to be God. Not only is Owen a cautious inductivist, he is also a cautious realist. Like some other controversial scientiÞc authors, Owen may have used cautious realism to ease the passage of his ideas among criticism both collegial and religious. 62 .
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