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A Study of Science Teachers' Opinions and Their Implications PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN RELATION TO CURRICULAR AND PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES: A study of science teachers' opinions and their implications. by VASILIOS KOULAIDIS Thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree of the University of London. Institute of Education University of London, 1987. 1." UNN. / 2 ABSTRACT This study sought to capture how science teachers view scientific knowledge from a philosophical-epistemological perspective. The philosophical themes investigated were scientific method, criteria of demarcation, patterns of scientific change and problems related with the construction of reality. Furthermore, an attempt was made to investigate the relation teachers' views on these matters both to certain curricular issues (the question of integration and the meaning of the terms "content" and "process") and to some pedagogical issues (assumptions about learning, instruction and aspects of classroom activities). For this purpose, a framework was proposed for the analysis of the relevant issues. This framework consists of a number of distinctions. These distinctions were organised employing the technique of systemic network analysis, so as to lay the basis not only for the construction of the research instrument but also for the analysis of the empirical evidence. The epistemological systems taken into account in the a-priori analysis are: inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism (Popper, Lakatos), contextualism (Kuhn) and relativism (Feyerabend). At the ontological level, the contrast is mainly focused on the differences between idealism and realism (pragmatism is also included). Three stages can be distinguished in the analysis of the data. The first stage is a systematic description of the data and shows that the dominant pattern in teachers' philosophical and epistemological views . tends to be close to contextualism. It indicates that teachers tend to prefer the introduction of integrated science curricula, and in terms of pedagogy, to stress pupils' ability to think in abstract terms, as well as to emphasise a teacher-centred approach. In the second stage, a classification of responses into distinct categories (i.e. inductivism, relativism, etc.) was made on the basis of each individual following consistently a particular path of the network. The outcome suggests that indeed the Kuhnian system of thought is favoured consistently more than any other system. The third stage is an analysis of the correlations of teachers' views within and across the three components (philosophical, curricular and pedagogical). On the basis of this analysis, a tentative conclusion is that there are two relatively autonomous regions of "educational theory" as held by teachers, namely epistemological and pedagogical views on the one hand and ontological and curricular views on the other. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful for the financial support and leave of absence granted to me by the Greek Ministry of Education during the academic years 1983 to 1986. My supervisor prof. Jon Ogborn gave me unflagging support and so many hours of valuable discussions. If this research has anything to offer, his clear guidance, insights and assistance in all areas have mostly contributed. I am greatly indebted. I also want to thank Joan Bliss for kindly letting me use a chapter of her bock as yet unpublished and for letting me try a first version of the research instrument in Chelsea College. I owe too my thanks to Leslie Beckett not only for his help during the Diploma course but also for arranging the administration of the research instrument to North and South London Science Centres. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all P.G.C.E. students at the Institute of Education (academic year 1983-1984) and to the teachers of North and South London Science Centres, who so kindly agreed to participate in the research. Without them this research could not have been done. My thanks are particularly due to my fellow students working under prof. Ogborn for their many constructive suggestions and comments. To my friend Diana Aronstam, who spent so many hours helping me to polish the language I am also deeply grateful. Without the support and love of Lenio Tsarna I could never have completed this thesis. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page Title. 1 Abstract. 2 Acknowledgements. 3 Table of contents. 4 List of tables. 8 List of diagrams and figures. 12 Chapter I: INTRODUCTION. 13 1.1 Rationale and delineation of the questions. 13 1.2 The overall research plan. 19 Bibliographical notes. 22 Chapter II: CURRICULAR AND PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES: A brief overview of certain features of the educational landscape. 11.1 Curricular issues: The question of science integration. 24 Bibliographical notes. 29 11.2 Pedagogical assumptions: Learning, instruction, classroom activities. 30 11.2.1. Assumptions about learning. 31 11.2.2 Assumptions about instruction. 36 11.2.2 Assumptions about classroom activities. 39 Bibliographical notes. 41 Chapter III: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 43 III.1 Introduction. 43 111.2 Inductivism: A traditional position. 46 111.2.1 The basic tenets. 47 en 111.2.2 The historical predecessors: Empiricism. J4 111.2.3 A critique: The seductiveness of intuition. 54 111.2.4 Some further aspects of an Inductive image of science. 58 111.2.5 Encapsulating the Inductive image of science. 59 Bibliographical notes. 61 111.3 Hypothetico-Deductivism: A continental tradition. 63 111.3.1 The main Hypothetico-Deductivistic theses: A "rational" tableau of science. 64 111.3.2 A critique: The dilemma persists. 73 5 111.3.3 The Hypothetico-Deductivistic image: A synopsis. 74 Bibliographical notes. 76 111.4 Contextualism: Two interpretations of Kuhn. 78 111.4.1 The main themes: Evolution or Revolution. 78 111.4.2 A critique: The fundamental tension. 86 111.4.3 The Kuhnian images of science. 88 111.4.4 Representing the Kuhnian images of science: Two sets of statements. 90 111.4.4.1 First image: Contextualism A. 91 111.4.4.2 Second image: Contextualism B. 92 Bibliographical notes. 93 111.5 Relativism: A libertarian view. 95 111.5.1 The main thesis: "Anything goes". 95 c n III ..4J A critique: Does "anything goes" mean that in practice "everything stays"? 103 111.5.3 A depiction of Relativism. 105 Bibliographical notes. 107 111.6 Knowledge and the Ontological question. 109 111.6.1 Outline of scope of discussion. 109 111.6.2 Realism and Idealism. 111 111.6.3 Ontology in the context of Scientific Knowledge. 117 111.6.4 Some tentative connections: Linking the Epistemological and Ontological levels. 122 111.6.5 Reflecting an image. 125 Bibliographical notes. 127 Chapter IV: SYSTEMIC NETWORK ANALYSIS. 130 IV.1 The origin and historical background. 130 IV.2 An exposition of Systemic Network Analysis technique. 131 IV.3 The Systemic Network used in the construction of the research instrument. 134 Bibliographical notes. 144 Chapter V: GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. 145 V.1 Systemic Network Analysis and questionnaire construction. 145 V.2 A proposed frame. 149 V.3 Some general remarks. 152 Bibliographical notes. 155 6 Chapter VI: REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE. 156 VI.1 Introduction. 156 VI.2 The frame: A set of distinctions. 156 VI.3 A "descriptive" analysis: A cartography of the ground. 160 VI.4 A critique: The comprehensiveness of the literature. 168 VI.4.1 Exploratory/Descriptive studies. 168 VI.4.2 Normative studies. 175 VI.5 The dimensions of this study. 176 Bibliographical notes. 178 Chapter VII: THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT. 182 VII.1 Description of the instrument. 182 VII.2 Research assumptions and the type of the instrument. 185 VII.3 The format of the instrument. 188 VII.4 Summarising the position. 190 Bibliographical notes. 191 Chapter VIII: THE EMPIRICAL ELEMENT. 192 VIII.1 The empirical element: Outline of the strategy for analysis. 192 VIII.2 The Sample. 195 VIII.3 The Instrument. 196 VIII.4 Descriptive data analysis. 197 VIII.4.1 Descriptive analysis of the data: Philosophical component. 198 VIII.4.2 Descriptive analysis of the data: Curricular component. 203 VIII.4.3 Descriptive analysis of the data: Pedagogical component. 207 VIII.5 Analysis of group responses: How the positions are reflected by the "collective" opinion. 212 VIII.5.1 Philosophical component: An image of science. 212 VIII.5.2 Curricular component. 217 VIII.5.3 Pedagogical component. 218 VIII.6 Second stage: Analysis of theme patterns. 220 VIII.6.1 Philosophical component. 221 VIII.6.2 Curricular and Pedagogical component. 227 VIII.6.3 Discussion of positions identified. 233 VIII.6.4 An analysis of the "eclectic" category. 237 VIII.? Third stage: A study of correlations. 244 7 Correlations within components. 248 VIII. 7.2 Correlations across components. 260 VIII.B Reliability and validity. 267 Bibliographical notes. 269 Chapter IX: DISCUSSION OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. 270 IX.1 A brief narrative: The study. 270 IX.2 The conclusions: Recounting and discussing. 271 IX.3 Overview: The main findings and some suggestions for further research. 286 IX.4 Some personal reflections. 289 Bibliographical notes. 290 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 291 APPENDIX 1. 304 APPENDIX 2. 315 APPENDIX 3. 339 8 LIST OF TABLES. Page T1.1 The composition of the components. 21 T2.1 Arguments for specialised subjects and for integrated science. 28 T2.2 Meaning of content and process in science education. 28 T3.1 Philosophical-epistemological systems. 122 14.1 References for the theme of "scientific methodology". 135 T4.2 References for the theme of "criteria of demarcation". 136 T4.3 References for the theme of "pattern(s) of scientific change". 136 T4.4 References for the theme of "status of scientific knowledge". 137 15.1 A proposed framework for the methodological location of studies. 150 T6.1 Normative - Ideothetic studies. 160 T6.2 Exploratory - Descriptive studies. 160 T6.3 The "subject matter" of the studies. 161 T6.4 Character and subject matter of the studies.
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