Practical Issues Arising from the Introduction of the Euro
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Practical Issues Arising from the Introduction of the Euro 143 business days to go before January 1999 Issue No 8 11 June 1998 Practical Issues Arising from the Introduction of the Euro PRACTICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ISSUE NO 8 INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO 11 JUNE 1998 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 5 CHAPTER 2 ARRANGEMENTS FOR WHOLESALE EURO PAYMENTS AND 13 SECURITIES SETTLEMENT CHAPTER 3 THE CONVERSION WEEKEND 25 CHAPTER 4 THE MONEY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 39 MARKETS AFTER THE CONVERSION WEEKEND CHAPTER 5 THE BOND MARKETS AFTER THE CONVERSION WEEKEND 50 CHAPTER 6 THE EQUITY MARKETS AFTER THE CONVERSION WEEKEND 61 CHAPTER 7 INFORMATION PROVIDERS 68 CHAPTER 8 FUND MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 76 CHAPTER 9 BUSINESS, RETAIL AND PUBLIC SECTOR PREPARATIONS 89 CHAPTER 10 OVERARCHING ISSUES 95 CHAPTER 11 FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY 109 PRACTICAL ISSUES ADDRESSED IN PREVIOUS ISSUES 116 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 117 INTERNET ADDRESSES FOR INFORMATION ON THE EURO 119 Cartoons by Basil Hone CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ‘May weekend’ decisions 1 Over the weekend of 1-3 May, European political leaders decided that 11 Member States fulfilled the necessary conditions to adopt the single currency, ie all 15 EU Member States except the UK, Denmark and Sweden, which had made clear they did not wish to join at this stage, and Greece, which was judged not to meet the necessary economic conditions. This decision had been widely anticipated for some time, and been seen as a virtual certainty following the end-March publication of the Commission and EMI Convergence Reports. 2 Decisions were made during the weekend in three other areas. First, nominations were made for the European Central Bank (ECB) President, Vice-President and the four other Executive Board members. Proposed terms of office were also announced. The European Parliament later affirmed the nominations, after hearings, and political leaders subsequently confirmed them by written procedure. The chosen names were universally accepted in the financial markets as individually very strong candidates and collectively as representing an outstanding ECB Executive Board. 3 Second, ECOFIN adopted the Article 109l(4) Regulation on the legal framework for the use of the euro (see Chapter 10); and a Regulation under Article 105a(2) of the Treaty on the denominations and technical specifications of euro coins. In addition, the Council took note of three Commission Recommendations on practical aspects of the introduction of the euro (on which details were given in the March Practical Issues). 4 Third, political agreement was reached that the rates at which the participating currencies will be irrevocably linked from 1 January 1999 will be based on the present ERM bilateral central rates (see Chapter 3). Ministers also agreed a declaration on additional fiscal commitments and economic reforms (see Chapter 11). 5 The decisions on the Executive Board membership enabled the ECB to be established on 1 June, when the EMI simultaneously entered into liquidation. Chart A shows the other significant events in the planned introduction of the euro in the first-wave Member States. ECB governance 6 The two main decision-making bodies of the ECB are the Governing Council and the Executive Board. The Governing Council comprises the Executive Board members and the 11 Governors of the participating national central banks (NCBs). The President of ECOFIN and a member of the Commission may participate in its meetings without a right to vote. The Governing Council’s responsibilities include: ● formulating the monetary policy of the euro area, including decisions on how to define monetary objectives and interest rates; ● adopting the guidelines and making the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of all functions of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); 5 PLANNED TIMETABLE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO IN FIRST-WAVE MEMBER STATES CHART A Publication of Commission ‘Conversion and EMI Article 109j(1) weekend’ Convergence Reports ● Participating Member States chosen ● Bilateral conversion rates announced Informal ● Date for introduction ● ECOFIN Recommendations for Executive National of euro notes and coin (York) Board of ECB banknotes and coin remain ● Probable mass changeover of ● ECB operational decisions legal tender retail activity to euro Maximum dual legal ● Testing of systems ● End of legal transition period tender period ECB formally established and EMI enters liquidation 6 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 European Council (Cardiff) Publication of ● Irrevocable locking of conversion rates Latest date for 1997 outturn data withdrawal of legal ● Euro becomes a currency in its own right Publication of tender status from ● Single monetary policy commences EMI Annual Report ‘No compulsion, no national currency ● ECB operations and new issues of government prohibition’ in notes and coin debt denominated in euro use of euro ● Redenomination of most ‘in’ government debt into euro ● Wholesale financial activity expected to move rapidly to euro UK Presidency of the EU STAGE 2 STAGE 3A STAGE 3B PERIOD OF CHANGEOVER SCENARIO ● adopting the Rules of Procedure, which determine the ECB’s internal organisation; ● taking the necessary steps to ensure compliance by NCBs with ECB guidelines and instructions, in relation to all ESCB functions; ● deciding on various issues relating to ESCB financial matters, including the transfer of foreign reserve assets to the ECB, foreign reserve assets retained by NCBs, monetary income, and the allocation of ECB profits and losses; ● initiating judicial proceedings before the European Court of Justice; ● initiating the process for simplified amendments to the ESCB Statute; and ● adopting regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions. 7 In general, the Governing Council operates on a one-person, one-vote basis, with decisions based on a simple majority. The main exceptions are in relation to various financial matters, where only the NCB Governors vote, on a weighted basis, with decisions taken by qualified majority. 8 The Executive Board, which comprises the President, Vice-President and four other full-time members, has certain express powers granted in the Treaty, namely to: ● implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and decisions laid down by the Governing Council, giving the necessary instructions to NCBs; ● prepare Governing Council meetings; and ● be responsible for the current business of the ECB. 9 This is not an exhaustive list, however, because in some cases the ESCB Statute does not specify whether the Governing Council or the Executive Board is to take the relevant decision. It will be for the Governing Council to allocate responsibilities including, where appropriate, giving delegated powers to the Executive Board. Each Executive Board member has one vote and, unless otherwise provided, decisions are to be taken by simple majority. 10 The Bank of England is a member of the ESCB but, because the UK has opted-out, the Bank is not represented on the Governing Council. It is, however, represented on the General Council, which comprises the President and Vice-President of the ECB and the Governors of all 15 EU NCBs (the other members of the Executive Board, together with the President of ECOFIN and a member of the Commission, may also participate in the meetings but are ineligible to vote). 11 The General Council’s responsibilities are listed in full in Article 47 of the ESCB Statute, although their precise scope is not entirely clear: they will only be clarified as practical experience is gained of the ECB in operation. They comprise: ● taking over the tasks of the EMI in relation to ‘out’ NCBs; ● contributing to ECB advisory functions concerning national and Community legislation; 7 ● contributing to the collection of statistical information, the ECB’s reporting activities, the ESCB’s financial accounts, the application of the ECB’s capital key provisions, and the establishment of the ECB’s conditions of employment; ● helping to prepare the decisions necessary for the remaining ‘outs’ to join the single currency; ● deciding whether ‘out’ NCBs should be required to pay up part of their share of the ECB’s capital, as a contribution to the ECB’s operational costs. 12 In addition, the Dublin European Council in December 1996 agreed that the General Council would monitor the functioning of ERM2, and serve as a forum for monetary and exchange rate policy co-ordination as well as for the administration of the intervention and financing mechanism. Legal acts of the ECB 13 The ECB is a legislative authority in its own right. It is empowered by the Treaty in certain fields to make regulations, take decisions, make recommendations and deliver opinions. An ECB regulation is analogous to a regulation of the Council of Ministers, in that it is binding in its entirety and directly applicable; but only in participating Member States. Similarly, the ECB may adopt decisions, which are binding on those persons in participating Member States to whom they are addressed. The ECB is expected to be entitled to impose fines on undertakings which breach its regulations or decisions. It remains unclear to what extent the ECB will resort to regulations and decisions in the performance of its tasks. In any event, such instruments will not apply to ‘outs’. Bank of England Act, 1998 14 The Bank of England Act, 1998 came into force on 1 June. The Act provides, inter alia, for the operational independence of the Bank for the conduct of monetary policy in the UK. When introducing the Bill last year, the Government made clear that the proposals were not intended to be compatible with the requirements for central bank independence set out in the Maastricht Treaty. The EMI made the following points on the Bill. ● Operational independence does not go far enough to comply with the Treaty requirements for participation in the single currency: the power retained by Government to set objectives for monetary policy does not separate monetary policy sufficiently from political decisions. ● The arrangements for the Court of Directors do not meet the Treaty requirements for personal independence in relation to the performance of ESCB-related tasks.