The Eurozone Profiteers / 1/ Table of Contents
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THE EUROZONE PROFITEERS / 1/ www.corpwatch.org TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 Welcome to the Casino 5 Who Owes Whom? 7 Research by Ester Arauzo Azofra, Pratap Chatterjee, GERMAN BANKING: PAROCHIAL AND OVERBANKED, OR SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL? ................................. 11 Christina Laskaridis, Puck Lo, Myriam Westdeutsche Landesbank: A Jumbo with Engines on Fire and Nowhere to Land 14 Vander Stichele, and Joris Tieleman Depfa and Hypo Real Estate: One-Eyed Man Becomes King in the Land of the Blind 16 Thanks also to Kenneth Haar, Steven Hill, Lily Smith, Commerzbank: Property Lending Can Be a Mug’s Game 19 and Martin Pigeon, who provided valuable input and support for this report. FRENCH BANKING: LESS STATE = LESS HAPPINESS ....................................................................................21 Société Générale: Arrived with a Swagger, Brought Down by a Gamble 23 Crédit Agricole: Ready to Forget Cautious Lessons About Banking 25 Edit & design: Terry J. Allen Dexia: Using Public Funds to Support a Casino 27 Cover design: Pratap Chatterjee Cover cartoon: Khalil Bendib LENDING FRENZY ..................................................................................................................................................31 Spain: An Airport Without Planes, and the Never-Ending Property Boom 33 Greece: Of Disappearing Debt and Illegal Loans 35 Cyprus 39 Ireland: From Miraculous Beast to Failed Civilization 30 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................................................................43 Odious Debt 43 Time to Investigate the Bankers and Bureaucrats 45 ENDNOTES ..............................................................................................................................................................47 PHOTOS AND GRAPHICS .......................................................................................................................................56 www.corpwatch.org / 2 / THE EUROZONE PROFITEERS THE EUROZONE PROFITEERS / 3/ www.corpwatch.org INTRODUctiON: Welcome to the Casino he impressive rise and sudden fall of the “experts,” and yet still ended up flat on their backs. Greek, Irish and Spanish economies after they Greece too, to some extent, followed the economic Tjoined the EuroZone is often framed as a story policies dictated by conventional wisdom. Now it turns of profligate governments and lazy citizens who spent out that the experts were wrong and their metrics for too much and ended up deep in debt. The international success were often measuring irrelevant data. Thus community – notably the European Union (E.U.) – has when an unforeseen $8 trillion housing bubble in the been portrayed as a misguided group of bureaucrats who United States collapsed, it spread around the world like gave these foolish people billions to save them from their a tsunami. own recklessness and overspending. There has been much debate among economists But there’s more to the story. There are lessons for on how the creation of the euro without supportive KH everyone in understanding what happened in places infrastructure like a banking union caused this crisis AL I L like Spain and Ireland, for example, which have become in Europe. This report will add to that discussion by BEN the quintessential “canaries in the mineshaft” -- coun- analyzing the role of six specific banks that joined this D I B . tries that did everything right, according the economic roller coaster ride by helping to finance and promote the www.corpwatch.org / 4 / THE EUROZONE PROFITEERS THE EUROZONE PROFITEERS / 5/ www.corpwatch.org boom, only to be engulfed by it when the property bub- Or take the case of Georges Pauget, the CEO of Who Owes Whom? ble burst, first in the U.S. and then across the Atlantic. Crédit Agricole in France, who bought up Emporiki Bank In the end, these banks had to be rescued by their of Greece for €3.1 billion in cash in 2006. Over the next respective governments, damaging public balance sheets six years, Emporiki lost money year after year, blowing and resulting in indebted governments even in Ireland money on one foolish venture after another, until finally, and Spain, which were running government surpluses Crédit Agricole sold it for €1 – not €1 billion or even hen Lehman Brothers, the New York such as the European Financial Stability Fund and the with low debt before the EuroZone crisis. The banks that €1 million – but a single euro to Alpha Bank in October investment bank, collapsed in September European Stability Mechanism which made money we chose represent a cross-section of institutions that 2012. Crédit Agricole’s cumulative loss? €5.3 billion.2 W2008, the global economy went into shock. available from major international lenders to make sure helped trigger the crisis, although they are not necessari- Then there was Georg Funke, who ran Depfa, a Ger- The stock market plunged. U.S. and European banks the payments on the loans to private banks would con- ly the biggest banks nor the worst banks that took part in man public mortgage bank. Depfa helped Athens get a froze lending to each other, afraid that they tinue to be serviced. (As of June 2013, Greece the boom and the bust. Our goal is to add to this dynam- star credit rating, raised €265 million for the Greek gov- might be next. The New York has been promised €207 billion, ic debate by illustrating the public-private policy choices ernment railway, helped Portugal borrow €200 million to Times called October the Spain €100 billion, and concerning the banking and finance sectors that, in total, build up a water supplier, and gave €90 million to Spain “wildest month in Ireland an additional nearly brought the EuroZone to the point of collapse. to construct a privately operated road in Galicia. For a the history of Wall €85 billion.)10 For Europe, this economic crisis has been a wake-up while, the middle class in Greece like the middle classes Street.”7 Euro- Under this call. The last few years has shown the limitations of an in Spain and Ireland, benefited from the infrastructure pean leaders, scheme, the old economic model which, like in the U.S., relies on spending stimulus. When Depfa nearly collapsed in sensing stockholders of speculative asset bubbles which in turn leads to unsus- 2008, Funke was fired.3 catastrophe, private banks tainable private debt. These are just three examples of over-eager Belgian, announced an were protected French, and German banks that faced financial ruin after unprecedented together with The Gamblers shoveling billions of euros for get-rich-quick schemes trillion-euro bail- mom-and-pop throughout Europe, investments in subprime mortgages Picture a fictitious EuroZone casino with a gambling out to ensure that depositors in places in the U.S., as well as grandiose public schemes that table piled high with million-euro chips. Each chip major banks in France, like Belgium, France and were often abandoned half way through. represent a real mega-loan from a group of elite bankers Germany, and the U.K. did not Germany who had entrusted Today high stake rollers have moved into gamble on in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the go under. their savings to their national banks, only the debt created by the EuroZone crash. Dan Loeb of U.K. who, over the past dozen years during boom times, The impact of this crash on the smaller and poorer to have those banks gamble their depositors’ savings on Third Point hedge fund scored $500 million gambling shoveled out money as fast as they could to borrowers in nations in Europe was not immediate, but unfolded in risky loans in places like Greece, Ireland and Spain. on Greek debt last December4 while Achilles Risvas countries, including Greece, Ireland, and Spain. slow motion over the next few years. For example in May Irish and Spanish debt burdens ballooned practically and Jason Manolopoulos run Dromeus Capital, another Southern Europe is dotted with monuments to this 2012 Bankia—Spain’s fourth largest bank—asked the overnight as governments were forced to take on debt hedge fund that made millions this past January.5 Mean- 8 frenzied lending. An airport in Castellón, in eastern government for a €19 billion bailout, while four Greek to save the collapsing private sector. Bond spreads on while, Andreas Vgenopoulos of Laiki Bank in Cyprus Spain got a lavish loan in March 2006. It still has no banks—Alpha Bank, Bank of Piraeus, Eurobank, and government loans—which determine the cost for borrow- lost €3 billion buying discount Greek bonds with savings planes, but it does feature a sculpture of Carlos Fabra, National Bank of Greece—needed a cash injection of ing—doubled to levels not seen since the 1990s. entrusted to him by faraway Russians.6 These hedge 9 the regional politician who initiated the project.1 A little €18 billion. Had these countries controlled their own curren- funds and their exotic investment instruments such as digging shows the hand of Dexia Banco Sabadell, a Bel- As Greece’s crisis raised fears of a default on its cy, they would have been able to print money and risk derivatives and credit default swaps are supposed to be gian-French bank that helped provide tens of millions of loans, European leaders feared a domino effect could inflation to pay off their debt. Instead, they all were tied a means to help manage