Intelligence: Communication and Theory of Mind

Chapter 1 Intelligence: Communication and Theory of Mind In his book, The Intimate Ape, Shawn Thompson (2010) tells how primatologist Biruté Galdikas was surprised when Siswi, a female orangutan, seized her notebook and pen and began drawing. Siswi wanted to participate in Galdikas’ activity to demonstrate her competence and companionship. Siswoyo, Siswi’s mother, also used pen and paper and was quite careful in how she used the stylus. According to Galdikas, this is not simple imitation but “social bond- ing” where the orangutan wants to assert her level of equality with the human being (quoted in Thompson 124). But the two stories from Thompson’s book that impact my discussion deal with primatologist Willie Smits. Uce was an infant orangutan rescued and raised by Smits and then released into the wild after two years. Some years later Smits encountered Uce in the forest accompanied by a male. There was a mutual recognition between the human and the orangutan along with touch greetings and eye gazing. Uce let Smits hold her baby. Then Uce bit off and shared with Smits a Licuala leaf. Apparently, when Smits first released Uce into the wild years earlier and when she was reluctant to go, he had shared a Licuala leaf with her for reassurance. So this intelligent gesture by the mature Uce is quite symbolic. As Smits says, “she realized she could put herself in my mind” (quoted in Thompson 189). Here is yet another compelling story involving Willie Smits. There was an orangutan who made a disk from an orange peel and wrapped it in strands of burlap. He gave this token to Smits as a gift, actually placed it in Smits’ hand and closed the man’s fingers over it. As Thompson says, and I agree, this was a means to communicate symbolically, like Uce. While some would dismiss these stories as merely anecdotal and not reflec- tive of anything extraordinary, I’d disagree. For example, Sue Savage-Rumbaugh had bonobos use lexigrams to communicate, so nonhuman primates can understand signs. In fact, the ability of great ape species to learn and communicate in sign language demonstrates symbolic understanding. Moreover, because we have a very long evolutionary history, and because we share in our complex branching through evolution the characteristics and traits of other primate species, I’d maintain that we can find in elemental form the nascent and basic human behaviors in great apes. This book is not about great apes; it’s about human artistic culture. But as these stories demonstrate, there is a strong social compo- nent to art making behavior that is tied up with cognition and emotions. Here I © Koninklijke Brill NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004356269_003 intelligence: communication and theory of mind 9 use the word cognition in a manner suggested by Frans de Waal (2016), where cognition relates to how an organism apprehends and processes information. How well an organism completes the course of cognition is intelligence. Great Ape Intelligence and Communication Primatologist E.W. Menzel (1971) discusses how a group of young chimpanzees communicates information about the environment and asks: “How do animals impart, convey, and exchange information with each other; and what sorts of information can they convey?” This question applies to us as well. For one thing, we know that animals of all species feel and express emotions. How did we transfer among individuals and groups cognitive and emotional information in our prehistoric past, and what impact did that subsequently have on the evolution of material and artistic culture? Menzel completed about one thousand tests and concludes that a chimpanzee can communicate to others information about the quality, quantity, and whereabouts of resources. Menzel says that this non-linguistic communication centers on a type of shared atten- tion. Susan Essock-Vitale and Robert Seyfarth (1987) confirm that great ape concept formation, insight or spontaneous intelligence, social tool use, and especially self-conceptualization are integral to their repertoire of adaptations for social and not physical reciprocal interactions. As Brian Hare (2001b) asks, do chimpanzees know what other chimpanzees know? Not only is the answer yes, but importantly the knowledge is used for social strategies. As examples: a chimpanzee sees fruit in trees but refrains from looking so as not to alert others; a chimpanzee can hide emotional states by covering parts of the face with hands; chimpanzees can follow the gaze of not only other chimpanzees but of human beings. Hare found that competitive situ- ations, e.g., for food resources, reveal how one chimpanzee knows what another doesn’t and so strategizes for himself. Hare (2001a) says that all primate intelligence has been shaped by the highly competitive social environment in which they evolved. Nearly one hundred trials conducted by Malini Suchak et al. (2016) prove, on the other hand, that chimpanzees can mitigate competition and pun- ish freeloaders for the sake of cooperation. These findings make sense consider- ing our common descent and how communication is necessary in a shared goal. At any rate, Hare is generally correct to say that primates are competitors, and this competition for food and reproductive resources has shaped their morphology and behavior. Facial and bodily signals, he says, are evolved to ma- nipulate others, as in temper tantrums, intimidation displays, screams or hoots, and grooming. Does a chimpanzee understand that another one acts not from .

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