CHAPTER FIVE
BUDDHIST PRACTICE AND YOGĀCĀRA EPISTEMOLOGY
In this, more technical, chapter, we shall take a closer look at Liang’s use of Yogācāra. First, we shall present Liang’s claim of Yogācāra being a remedy against the shortcomings of Western epistemology. Next, we shall briefly present the main ideas of the school and, more importantly, the important changes Liang introduced, on purpose. These changes will then be evaluated against the background of Liang’s overall project as presented in the previous chapters.
Criticisms of Western Epistemology
For Liang, Western epistemology fell into two traps: dogmatism (dud- uan 獨斷) and skepticism (huaiyi 懷疑). According to his definition of dogmatic views, everything could be known, and knowledge was therefore boundless. For example, Liang claimed that the categories of “liberty” or “providence”, which were philosophical postulates, or the category of an “end,” which was a scientific postulate, were all dogmatic since they lacked evidence.1 When looking at the history of Western thought, Liang held that epistemology had been contami- nated by a metaphysics founded on false assumptions. For example, metaphysics first postulated the notion of a universe and then, through an epistemic enquiry, deduced the possibility of knowing the universe rationally and being able to describe all of its proprieties. Liang char- acterized this view as entailing the belief that, The essence of the universe is such and such; its foundation is like this or like that; it is one, two or many; it is material or spiritual; it is true, good or divine; it is eternal, all-encompassing, unmovable, very different from phenomena, and other strange things—they know it all.2 In such a way, reason exceeded its own capacity. Liang felt this tradi- tion of dogmatism ran very deep in Western thought. Liang therefore
1 See Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 166. 2 Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 272. 82 chapter FIve praised the rise of modern epistemology in the West, and its aban- donment of the dogmatic tradition. Modern epistemology flourished in the West with empiricism and philosophers such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626), David Hume (1711–1776), William James (1842–1910), Karl Pearson (1857–1936), John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. For Liang, these philosophers had successfully disengaged themselves from dogmatism by returning to experience. Liang praised such efforts since, in principle, they agreed with Buddhism, which also emphasized experience. However, Western empiricism only went half-way, and often went to another extreme: skepticism. For Liang, empiricism only made a limited use of reason—its calculative aspect—and therefore could not build a sound metaphysics. This was Liang’s main point of contention with Western empiricism and the Chinese rationalists of the New Cul- ture Movement. Liang spent his life attempting to build a metaphysics which would be non-dogmatic. Thus, he went against the rationalism of his time which was confining reason within narrow boundaries. He explained that, You have to acknowledge that the universe cannot be known. It can only be said to be mysterious, and similar to this or to that. There are people who say that the universe follows reason; other people say that the uni- verse follows sincerity. In fact, what cannot be known is unknown. This is the limit of the cosmos [for us].3 Indeed, throughout his work, and contrary to the spirit of the rational- ists, Liang faced the mysteries of life, the cosmos, and humanity itself with humility. Therefore, among the many Western authors he read, one of them especially caught his attention—Bergson. Like the empiricists, Bergson started from human experience, but unlike them, however, he did not reject metaphysics. For Liang, Bergson could do this because he did not limit human reason to its empirical dimension; he was therefore able to accommodate extra-rational perception, or intuition (zhijue 直覺). Liang stated that, The whole universe is an absolute. As we have said, sensation is made of something perceived and of someone perceiving. It is, of course, impos- sible to sense the whole universe. When Bergson discusses his concept of
3 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 166.