South Angsi Field
Operations Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Case
February 2010
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Environmental Resources South Angsi Field Management (M) Sdn Bhd
(273684-T) Unit 19-06-01, 6th Floor Operations Health, Safety and Environment PNB Damansara (HSE) Case 19 Lorong Dungun Damansara Heights 50490 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Telephone (603) 2733 9830 Facsimile (603) 2733 9377 Email [email protected] Website: www.erm.com
Client Project No
Talisman Malaysia Limited (TML). 0042660_2
Summary Date 12 February 2010 Approved by
This document presents the Operations HSE Case for the South Angsi Field in Block PM-305 which comprises the Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) and Floating Storage & Offloading Christina Phang Vessel (FSO). Managing Partner
0 Draft Report KC CLC CP 12.02.10
Revision Description By Checked Approved Date This report has been prepared by Environmental Resources Management with all reasonable skill, care Distribution and diligence within the terms of the Contract with the client, incorporating our General Terms and Conditions of Business and taking account of the resources devoted to it by agreement with the client. Internal We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect or any matters outside the scope of the above. Public This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility of whatsoever nature to any third parties to whom this report, or any part thereof, is made known. Any such party relies upon the report at Confidential their own risk.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENTS
GLOSSARY
1 OPERATIONS HSE CASE 1-1
1.1 OVERVIEW 1-1 1.2 OBJECTIVES 1-1 1.3 SUMMARY OF HSE CASE CONTENTS 1-1 1.4 MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 1-4 1.5 HSE CASE ACCOUNTABILITY 1-7 1.6 ACCEPTANCE AND APPLICATION OF THE OPERATIONS HSE CASE 1-7 1.7 OPERATIONS HSE CASE REVIEW AND UPDATE 1-8
2 OPERATIONS HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 2-1
2.1 OVERVIEW OF TML’S HSEMS 2-1 2.2 SOUTH ANGSI OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KEY PROCESSES 2-3 2.3 POLICY AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 2-3 2.4 ORGANISATION 2-7 2.5 PLANNING & IMPLEMENTATION 2-14 2.6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 2-30 2.7 AUDIT AND MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 2-32 2.8 SECTION 2 REFERENCES 2-36
3 DESCRIPTION OF SAA 3-1
3.1 INTRODUCTION 3-1 3.2 HISTORY 3-1 3.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND ORIENTATION 3-1 3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 3-2 3.5 OVERVIEW OF SAA FACILITIES 3-4 3.5 SECTION 3 REFERENCES 3-6
3A OVERVIEW OF SAA MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB) 3A-1
3A.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 3A-1 3A.2 WELL, FLOWLINES AND MANIFOLDS 3A-1 3A.3 PIPING AND VESSELS 3A-3 3A.4 SOUTH ANGSI MOAB PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3A-3 3A.5 SOUTH ANGSI MOAB UTILITIES 3A-6 3A.6 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY 3A-16
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
3A.7 MAIN HSE FEATURES 3A-17 3A.8 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM 3A-18 3A.9 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS 3A-20 3A.10 SAFETY FACILITIES 3A-28 3A.11 PERSONNEL AWARENESS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 3A-30 3A.12 SECTION 3A REFERENCES 3A-32
3B OVERVIEW OF SAA FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO) 3B-1
3B.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 3B-1 3B.2 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT 3B-2 3B.3 FSO PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3B-3 3B.4 SHIP’S CARGO HANDLING SYSTEM 3B-4 3B.5 FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS 3B-7 3B.6 FSO UTILITIES 3B-8 3B.7 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY 3B-12 3B.8 HSE FEATURES 3B-13 3B.9 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM 3B-14 3B.10 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS 3B-15 3B.11 SAFETY FACILITIES 3B-19 3B.12 PERSONNEL AWARENESS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 3B-21 3B.13 SECTION 3B REFERENCES 3B-24
4 HAZARD ANALYSIS 4-1
4.1 INTRODUCTION 4-1 4.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS APPROACH 4-1 4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDS AND HAZARDOUS EVENTS 4-5 4.4 HSE ASSESSMENTS 4-21 4.5 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 4-23 4.6 DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP 4-27 4.7 SECTION 4 REFERENCES 4-30
APPENDIX 4-1 HEALTH & SAFETY (H&S) HAZARDS REGISTER APPENDIX 4-2 ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS REGISTER APPENDIX 4-3 HAZARDS MANAGEMENT REGISTER AND BOW TIE DIAGRAMS
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4A MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB) HAZARD ANALYSIS 4A-1
4A.1 SUMMARY OF HSE STUDIES 4A-1 4A.2 FIRE AND EXPLOSION ANALYSIS (FEA) 4A-1 4A.3 MOAB NOISE STUDY 4A-4 4A.4 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS (ESSA) 4A-5 4A.5 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA) 4A-8 4A.6 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 4A-10 4A.7 SECTION 4A REFERENCES 4A-13
4B FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO) HAZARD ANALYSIS 4B-1
4B.1 SUMMARY OF HSE STUDIES CONDUCTED 4B-1 4B.2 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS (ESSA) 4B-1 4B.3 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA) 4B-4 4B.4 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 4B-6 4B.5 SECTION 4B REFERENCES 4B-8
5 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN 5-1
5.1 OVERVIEW 5-1 5.2 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN (RWP) 5-1 5.3 SECTION 5 REFERENCES 5-10
6 CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF FITNESS 6-1
6.1 HSE CASE MAIN FINDINGS 6-1 6.2 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN 6-2 6.3 STATEMENT OF FITNESS FOR OPERATION 6-3
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GLOSSARY Page 1
Abbreviation Description ABS American Bureau Shipping ACG Communication Gateway AELB Atomic Energy Licensing Board AFFF Aqueous Film Foaming Foam ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable AMP Alternate Muster Point ANSI American National Standards Institute AOL Aeronautical Obstruction Light API American Petroleum Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CCR Cargo Control Room CCR Central Control Room CHRA Chemical Health Risk Assessment CMP Crisis Management Plan CMT Crisis Management Team CPP Central Processing Platform DCP Dry Chemical Powder DCS Distributed Control System DCT Damage Control Team DO Diesel Oil DPIC Designated Person In-Charge DWT Deadweight Tonnage EAG Emergency Action Group ECT Emergency Control Team EEBD Emergency Escape Breathing Device EEMUA Engineering Equipment & Materials Users Association EERA Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EMP Environmental Management Plan ENVID Environmental Hazard Identification EPI Environmental Performance Indicator ERA Environmental Risk Assessment ESB Emergency Switchboard ESD Emergency Shutdown ESSA Emergency Safety Systems Analysis EWS Engineering Workstation FEA Fire and Explosion FGS Fire & Gas System FSA Formal Safety Assessment FSO Floating Storage & Offloading Vessel FVSB FPSO Venture Sdn Bhd FWS Full Wellstream GHG Greenhouse Gases GPA General Platform Alarm GTG Gas Turbine Generator HAZID Hazid Identification HAZOP Hazard and Operability HIS Human Interface Station HP High Pressure
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GLOSSARY Page 2
Abbreviation Description HR Human Resource HRA Health Risk Assessment HSE Health, Safety and Environment HSEMS Health, Safety and Environment Management System HVAC Heating, Venting and Air Conditioning ICR Instrument Control Room ICSS Integrated Control and Safety System IG Inert Gas IGP Inert Gas Plant IR Individual Risk IR Infra-red IRCD Injection Rate Control Device ITCZ Inter Tropical Convergence Zone JSA Job Safety Analysis KO Knock Out KSB Kemaman Supply Base LAN Local Area Network LCR Local Control Room LEL Lower Explosive Limit LP Low Pressure MAC Manual Alarm Callpoint MAE Major Accident Event MER Medical Emergency Response MFM Multi-phase Flow Meter MISC Malaysian International Shipping Company MOAB Mobile Offshore Application Barge MOB Man Overboard MOC Management of Change MOGP Managing Operations with General Procedures MSB Main Switchboard NDB Non Directional Beacon NORM Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials OCIMF Oil Companies International Marine Forum OCM Oil Content Monitoring OIM Offshore Installation Manager OIS Operator Interface Station OSC On-Scene Commander OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Act OWS Oily Water Separator PA Public Address PABX Private Automatic Branch Exchange PAGA Public Address and General Alarm PAPA Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm PCS Process Control System PEL Permissive Exposure Limit PESD Post Emergency Shutdown PETRONAS Petroliam Nasional Berhad PFP Passive Fire Protection PLL Potential Loss of Life
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GLOSSARY Page 3
Abbreviation Description POB Personnel on Board PPD Pour Point Depressant PPE Personnel Protection Equipment PRM Plant Resources Management PS Portside PSD Process Shutdown PSV PTB Personnel Transfer Bridge PTW Permit to Work QCDC Quick Connect Disconnect Connection QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment RASR Risk Assessment Summary Report RCA Root Cause Analysis RIA Radiological Impact Assessment RMSR Risk Management Safety Report RPO Radioactive Protection Officer RRM Risk Reduction Measure RWP Remedial Work Plan SAA South Angsi A SB Starboard SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SCPC Single Channel per Carrier SCSSV Surface Controlled Sub-surface Safety Valve SDS Shutdown System SDV Shutdown Valve SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations SIPROD Simultaneous Production SIS Safety Instrumented System SPI Safety Performance Indicator SSD Safety Shutdown SSV Surface Safety Valve STS Ship to Ship TENORM Technically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials TML Talisman Malaysia Limited TR Temporary Refuge TSR Temporary Safe Refuge UHF Ultra High Frequency UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply USD Unit Shutdown UTM Universal Transverse Mercator VESDA Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus VHF Very High Frequency WHCP Wellhead Control Panel WV Wing Valve
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Section 1 INTRODUCTION & MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
CONTENTS
1 OPERATIONS HSE CASE 1-1
1.1 OVERVIEW 1-1
1.2 OBJECTIVES 1-1
1.3 SUMMARY OF HSE CASE CONTENTS 1-1
1.4 MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 1-4
1.5 HSE CASE ACCOUNTABILITY 1-7
1.6 ACCEPTANCE AND APPLICATION OF THE OPERATIONS HSE CASE 1-7
1.7 OPERATIONS HSE CASE REVIEW AND UPDATE 1-8
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1 OPERATIONS HSE CASE
1.1 OVERVIEW
This Operations HSE Case demonstrates how hazards and environmental effects associated with the South Angsi A (hereafter referred to as “SAA”) facilities operations have been identified, assessed and managed. The HSE Case necessarily encompasses the policies, objectives, responsibilities, standards, procedures, processes, control systems and resources which are in place to manage health, safety and the environmental aspects of the operation.
The SAA facilities include:
Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB); and
Floating Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO).
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The main objectives of the SAA Operations HSE Case are to ensure that:
All potential operational Major Accident Events (MAEs) arising from the SAA operations have been systematically identified and assessed;
Arrangements are in place to control the identified hazards and to mitigate the consequences should the need arise;
Risks have been evaluated and measures taken to reduce the risks, as necessary; and
Recovery is possible should any controls be lost.
1.3 SUMMARY OF HSE CASE CONTENTS
The SAA Operations HSE Case contains information on how all identified hazards associated with the operations are addressed and controlled during normal operations.
Findings from various safety related assessments that have been carried out are summarised such that TML is assured that the risks of operating the installations are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The overall
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structure of the Operations HSE Case is presented in Figure 1.3a. The contents of the SAA Operations HSE Case are briefly described below.
1.3.1 Section 1 – Introduction and Management Summary
This section presents an introduction, objectives, contents and a management summary of the Operations HSE Case. The management summary provides a summary of the HSE management system as applied to the SAA operations, the hazard assessments and the main findings conducted for SAA facilities and the remedial work programme found necessary as a result of the hazard analyses and HSE Case conclusions.
1.3.2 Section 2 –Operations HSE Management System (HSEMS)
This section describes the HSEMS for the SAA facilities. It summarises the corporate policies, organisational structures, responsibilities, standards, procedures, processes, controls and resources in place to manage HSE on the facilities.
TML’s HSEMS has been established as a management framework with the aim of ensuring the following:
Clear assignment of responsibilities; Legislative compliance; Comprehensive risk assessment and management throughout the lifecycle of operational activities; Goal setting approach with respect to HSE issues; Support from all concerned for the HSE effort; Motivation, education and training so that personnel may recognise and eliminate or minimise hazards; and Continuous improvement in HSE performance.
1.3.3 Section 3 – Description of Facility/Operations
Section 3 includes the description of the SAA facilities in operation. Descriptions of the essential features of the facility relevant to safety and emergency management are also detailed in this section. The description is provided based on platform layout drawings, process flow diagrams and hazardous area classification drawings.
The essence of this section is not to give a detailed physical description of the facilities but to explain how the various systems relate to the safety aspects of the installations and how their use prevent and/or mitigate against adverse loss control incidents.
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SAASAA Field Field OperationsOperations HSEHSE CaseCase
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6
Hazard Introduction Operations Description Hazard Introduction Operations Description Analysis Remedial ConclusionConclusion and HSE of the Analysis Remedial and HSE of the and Work Plan && Management Management Field and Work Plan Management Management Field Hazards & StatementStatement Summary System Operations Hazards & Summary System Operations Effects ofof Effects Fitness RegisterRegister Fitness
Figure 1.3a Structure of SAA Operations HSE Case
Section 1 INTRODUCTION & MANAGEMENT SUMMARY Page 1-3
Descriptions of the SAA facilities are presented in sub-sections as follow:
Section 3: An introduction and history of SAA Field, geographical location, environmental conditions and overview of the SAA facilities;
Section 3A: Description of the process, utilities, operations and maintenance philosophy, main HSE features and emergency systems on MOAB; and
Section 3B: Description of the process, utilities, operations and maintenance philosophy, main HSE features and emergency systems on FSO.
1.3.4 Section 4 – Hazard Analysis
Section 4 provides a description of the approach for hazard identification and risk assessment. All potentially significant hazards and effects, both to people and the environment around the asset, have been identified and translated into a Hazards Management Register and illustrated in Bow-Tie diagrams. This is to ensure that the risks are evaluated and understood and that measures to manage and control the risks are in place.
Section 4 of the HSE Case contains the following sections:
Hazards Analysis; Hazards & Effects Register; and Hazards Management Register for Major Accident Events (MAEs), which Bow-Tie diagrams for MAEs associated with the SAA facilities were developed.
Hazard analysis processes conducted to determine the risks associated with the SAA facilities operations are provided in following sub-sections:
Section 4: General description of hazard analysis approach, risk criteria, hazards identification, summary of HSE assessments and demonstration of ALARP for the SAA facilities;
Section 4A: Summary of HSE assessments for MOAB; and
Section 4B: Summary of HSE assessments for the FSO.
The hazard analyses used both qualitative and quantitative methods to consider the potential effects of hazards and the ways in which hazards are controlled. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) have been used to demonstrate that the risk lies within the risk acceptability criteria and that reasonable effort has been taken to reduce the risk to a level that is tolerable and ALARP.
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1.3.5 Section 5 – Remedial Work Plan (RWP)
Section 5 records any shortfalls/ areas of improvement identified from the various studies of the facilities during the development of the Operations HSE Case.
This RWP will be used as the basis for the SAA facilities improvement plan, and as such the plan will be regularly reviewed and updated.
1.3.6 Section 6 - Conclusion and Statement of Fitness
Section 6 concludes the Operations HSE Case with reference to findings of hazards assessment, risk assessment of the SAA facilities and risk management of the facilities in demonstration of ALARP.
A “Statement of Fitness” is provided which is the Asset Owner’s statement that he understands the hazards posed by the facility’s operation and considers that based on the Operations HSE Case findings and RWPs proposed, sufficient hazard control mechanisms are in place for activities at the SAA operations to be carried out in a safe manner.
1.4 MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
1.4.1 Facility Overview
The South Angsi Field is located in block PM-305 offshore Terengganu about 150 km from the shore in a water depth of approximately 68m. The field comprises a Floating Storage & Offloading (FSO) and a Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB), which is an oil and gas separation unit.
The South Angsi Field has been developed using a Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) as the basis for the installation of the wellhead and oil processing facilities. The MOAB is a standalone integrated wellhead and production unit. The MOAB production facilities are connected to the FSO via a flowing oil delivery line. The produced and processed oil will be routed to a Floating Storage Offloading (FSO) facility, which is moored adjacent to the MOAB, approximately 50m away. The FSO have a temporary storage of approximately 350,000 bbls stabilised crude and to be offloaded to shuttle tank every week.
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1.4.2 Hazard Assessment
The hazard and effects management process, as applied to the SAA facilities, encompasses the following principles for hazard identification, assessment, control and recovery:
Identify the hazard; Assess the possible consequences of hazard release or exposure; Control the hazard; and Recover from a failure to control the hazard.
Various safety studies have been carried out for the SAA facilities, which include the following:
Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Study; Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study; Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA); Noise Study; and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).
Key findings of each of the above studies are summarised in Section 4 (Hazard Analysis) of the Operations HSE Case.
1.4.3 Assessment and Control Major Hazards
The SAA Operations HSE Case demonstrates that all hazards with the potential of causing major accidents at the SAA facilities have been identified, assessed, controlled and where necessary recovery measures introduced. Section 6 of the HSE Case draws some general conclusions from details presented in other parts of this report. Given the findings of the hazard analysis as recorded in Section 4 of the HSE Case, and the measures already taken, or in hand, to lower the risk associated with the SAA facilities, it is concluded that to the extent reasonably practicable, the SAA Operations HSE Case demonstrates that:
A Management System is in place for the operations, which is adequate to enable the Company to comply with all relevant statutory and Company provisions in relation to SAA Field and any activity in connection with it;
There are adequate arrangements in place for the audit and reviews of the Management System at appropriate intervals;
Hazards with the potential to cause major accidents at these installations have been identified, assessed, controlled and where necessary recovery
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measures introduced in the event control is lost through development of Hazards Register and Bow-Tie diagrams;
Risks to exposed personnel have been evaluated to reflect those expected for the SAA normal operations and maintenance activities;
The overall potential loss of life (PLL) for the MOAB has been estimated to be 5.3 x 10-3 per year. The main contributor is from the topsides process hydrocarbon events, accounting for 41% of the overall risk. The highest Individual Risk (IR) for the most exposed worker group on MOAB of 4.5 x 10-4 per year is experience by the Maintenance Technician, as they are exposed to process releases and occupational risks. Based on TML’s Risk Criteria, the IR per year of this worker group lies within the ALARP region;
The total PLL for the FSO is estimated to be 1.0 x 10-2 per year. Helicopter transportation risk was identifies as the main risk contributor, accounting for 32% of the total PLL. The second highest contributor is from the topside process hydrocarbon event (accounting for 28% of the total PLL), due to immediate fatalities contributed by the hydrocarbon release events. The most exposed worker group on the FSO is the Engine Room Crew with an estimated individual risk of 3.1 x 10-4 per year. However, the IR per year of this worker group lies within the ALARP region of TML’s Risk Criteria;
Environmental aspects and the potential for impacts to the environment have been identified, assessed, controlled and the plans are in place for recovery in the event control is lost. The environmental aspects for SAA Field have been assessed; and
The SAA risk levels are tolerable, within the ALARP region of TML’s Risk Criteria. It remains the responsibility of the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and his team to continually look for improvements that will further reduce risks levels in line with the ALARP approach to risk management, which advocates the assessment of the practicability of proposed measures in terms of cost as well as on other grounds. The Remedial Work Plan (RWP) is the tool that will be used for this improvement process.
Based on the results of the hazard analyses and the HSE management system to be implemented on SAA facilities, it is concluded that the risk to TML personnel is tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable and is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained.
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Continuous review and update of the SAA Operations HSE Case will ensure that the safe operations of SAA facilities are maintained and that the risks are always maintained at a level that is ALARP.
1.5 HSE CASE ACCOUNTABILITY
The Custodian of the SAA Operations HSE Case is the Production Manager. He will provide the resources and guidelines for the development and updating of the HSE Case. The Custodian is the Signatory in Section 6 of SAA Operations HSE Case. By signing the “Statement of Fitness” he confirms that there are adequate HSE measures to allow the SAA facilities to continue in operation.
The Operations Manager of the SAA Field is responsible for the operations installations within the field. He approves the SAA Operations HSE Case in Section 6 "Statement of Fitness" as the "Endorsement Signatory", indicating that he understands the hazards of the operations and considers that sufficient hazard control mechanisms are in place to manage residual risk.
The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) is responsible for the operations for the SAA facilities and serves as the driver for follow up of the Remedial Work Plan (RWP) raised from the Operations HSE Case. He signs the document as the Acceptance Signatory, thus stating that the SAA facilities are as safe as is reasonably practicable.
1.6 ACCEPTANCE AND APPLICATION OF THE OPERATIONS HSE CASE
This Operations HSE Case demonstrates that potential Major Accident Events (MAEs) associated with operations of SAA facilities have been identified, assessed, controlled and where necessary recovery measures introduced, such that the risk on SAA Field is reduced to ALARP.
The Operations HSE Case can be referred to by SAA Field personnel for the following:
Definition of responsibilities for HSE in all activities on the installation;
Functions of the HSEMS and their applications on the installation; and
Comprehensive list of MAEs identified and assessed on the installation, how they are controlled and the recovery measures in place.
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1.7 OPERATIONS HSE CASE REVIEW AND UPDATE
The Operations HSE Case is to be updated when any major change occurs to the SAA facilities, mode of operation, organisation and resources, legislation and the Company HSE Policy.
To ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of Operations HSE Case, implementation reviews are required to be initiated by the case custodian. The frequency of these reviews may vary, depending on the changes to the assets, operations and activities. As a minimum, each case should be reviewed and updated every five (5) years or when there are significant changes affecting the risk to the operations.
Section 5 Remedial Work Plan shall be updated periodically and forms the basis for the SAA Operations HSE improvement plan.
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Section 2 OPERATIONS HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
CONTENTS
2 OPERATIONS HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 2-1
2.1 OVERVIEW OF TML’S HSEMS 2-1
2.2 SOUTH ANGSI OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KEY PROCESSES 2-3
2.3 POLICY AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 2-3
2.4 ORGANISATION 2-7
2.5 PLANNING & IMPLEMENTATION 2-14
2.6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 2-30
2.7 AUDIT AND MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 2-32
2.8 SECTION 2 REFERENCES 2-36
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2 OPERATIONS HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2.1 OVERVIEW OF TML’S HSEMS
The management of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) related to Talisman Malaysia Limited’s (TML) business activities is defined in the TML’s Health, Safety & Environment Management System (HSEMS) Manual [R2.1]. The manual addresses the Company’s HSE policy, strategies, organisation and the necessary arrangements for ensuring the management of HSE within its business activities is effective to deliver the desired HSE results. The HSEMS has been developed with references to the following:
Talisman Energy UK; Laws of Malaysia; Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS) requirements; and Other voluntary management system standards such as OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health and Safety Management System); ISO 14001 (Environmental Management System) and HS (G) 65 (Successful Health and Safety Management).
2.1.1 Objectives
TML’s HSEMS has been established as a management framework with the aim of ensuring the following:
Clear assignment of responsibilities; Compliance to local legislative requirements; Demonstrate reduction of HSE risks through comprehensive risk assessment and management throughout the lifecycle of operational activities; Establish clear and unambiguous HSE goals; Full and unequivocal support from all employees of HSE efforts; Continuous and constant HSE communication through motivation, education and training to enhance employees’ HSE practice at the workplace; and Continuous improvement in HSE performance.
2.1.2 Scope and Structure
The HSEMS is an integral part of the TML’s business management system and is applied equally to all business activities, as well as for activities carried out by
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Contractors and other Third Parties engaged in work for or on behalf of TML or associated with the Company activities. The South Angsi operations are required to fully comply with TML’s HSEMS requirements.
TML’s HSEMS utilizes various types of techniques systematically throughout the lifecycle of operational activities to
Identify hazards and risks associated with the hazards; Place control to minimise/eliminate risks associated with the hazards in accordance to the principles of hierarchy of control; Anticipate events and put in mitigative measures to minimize its impact; and Develop and implement HSE activities to influence behavioural changes and foster safe attitude.
It is built on a four-tiered hierarchy that documents the core elements of the HSEMS, their relationship and interaction and provides direction to related procedures (see Figure 2.1a). The hierarchy provides a visible link between policy and its implementation through operational activity control. The TML’s HSE policy is at the top of the hierarchy, which cascades down to ten (10) HSE principles followed by the general procedures and the specific site procedures. The overall functions and associated parties responsible for the implementation of the four hierarchies are provided below:
HSE Policy – A statement by TML’s General Manager which provides focus and direction to TML’s HSE efforts;
HSE Principles – Principles that expand on and provides guidance to achieve the Policy objectives expectations established by TML under the purview of the HSE Manager;
General Procedures – Description of how the Principles are implemented on a company wide basis by the Department Managers; and
Site Procedures – Specific instructions that are adapted from the General Procedures for use at the site by the OIM’s.
The following sections detail the management process at SAA in achieving the requirements outlined in TML’s HSEMS.
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H y S& lic E Po
HS les &E cip Prin
Ge es ner ur al ced Pro
S ite ures ced Pro
Figure 2.1a TML’s HS&EMS Structure
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2.2 SOUTH ANGSI OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM KEY PROCESSES
The following key processes are applied for ensuring effective implementation of the TML’s HSEMS for the South Angsi operations:
Policy; Organisation; Planning and Implementation; Performance Measurement; Performance Review; and Audit.
The above are also in line with the requirements set by OHSAS 18001 Standard. An overview of the above is illustrated in Figure 2.2a.
2.3 POLICY AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
2.3.1 TML’s Statement on HSE Policy and Principles
TML’s HSE policy states the company’s commitments in HSE issues and how these objectives can be achieved. A copy of the policy is shown in Figure 2.3a.
TML’s HSE policy is applied equally to all personnel engaged in work for or on behalf of TML and third parties associated with the South Angsi activities.
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Policy Policy Development
Organisational Organise Development
Plan & Audit Implementation
Develop Measure Techniques of Planning, Performance Measuring & Reviewing
Review Feedback Loop to improve Performance Performance
Information Link Control Link
Figure 2.2a Management System Flowchart
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Figure 2.3a TML’s HSE Policy
TML believes that the Company’s HSE objectives can be achieved by the implementation of ten (10) HSE Principles. The following ten principles are also implemented at the South Angsi facilities and the associated procedures are summarised in the respective subsections (in brackets):
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1. Management Leadership and Commitment (Section 2.4) – Management is required to set objectives for effective HSE performance, provide leadership and engage the workforce in achieving effective HSE performance. Managers are accountable for effective HSE performance at all levels and management’s commitment to HSE must be visible to the organisation. The Operations Manager is responsible for setting the HSE performance with the consensus from the TML Management Team for the South Angsi operations.
2. Communication, Information and Documentation (Section 2.4) – Communications must be effective, maintain confidence in the integrity of operations and continue the commitment to HSE performance. Accurate information on operations and activities will be maintained and the data held securely, yet readily available. Company documentation must be up to date and appropriately controlled.
3. Personnel and Training (Sections 2.4 & 2.6) – Competent personnel, achieved through careful selection, training and ongoing assessment, ensures that operations are HSE-compliant and sound.
4. Risk Assessment and Management (Section 2.5) – Hazards and the risks associated with Company activities must be identified, assessed with appropriate control measures implemented to safeguard the interests of the workforce, environment, property and the Company’s reputation.
5. Contractor HSE Management (Sections 2.5 & 2.7) – Contractors capabilities and competence must be assessed to ensure they are adequate to work in a manner that is consistent and compatible with the company policies and objectives. Management systems must be complementary and integrated.
6. Emergency Preparedness and Response (Section 2.5) – Emergency management plans must be developed, maintained and tested for all locations. These plans must identify the actions necessary to protect the workforce, public, environment, property and the Company reputation in the event of an incident.
7. Facilities Design and Construction (Section 2.5) – Risks associated with HSE must be minimised by using sound principles, procedures and management systems for the full life cycle of facilities.
8. Operation and Maintenance (Sections 2.5, 2.6 & 2.7) – Facilities must be operated and maintained to meet the expected HSE performance standards.
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9. Management of Change (Section 2.5) – Changes must be evaluated and managed to ensure that risks associated with HSE remain at an acceptable level.
10. Assessment and Improvement (Sections 2.6 and 2.7) – Performance will be periodically assessed against expectations in order to improve performance.
The HSEMS key processes applied for realising the above ten principles are illustrated in Figure 2.3b.
2.3.2 HSE Targets
The HSE programme for South Angsi operations is in line with the Yearly HSE Plan. The HSE targets listed in the HSE Plan is established by the HSEMS Management Team. The annual HSE plan defines objectives and measurable goals for the following nine (9) categories:
Health; Safety; Environment; Management System; Audit; Communication & Feedback; Legal Compliance; and Community.
The overall implementation of the HSE plans is monitored by the HSEMS Management Team.
2.3.3 TML Established Policies and Procedures
The following policies and procedures are also established for the South Angsi facilities to ensure a safe and healthy workplace for all employees:
Alcohol and Substance Abuse Procedure; Non-Smoking Procedure (within HSE Handbook); and HS&E Induction Procedure.
The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) has the overall responsibility to ensure that all personnel working on South Angsi facilities are fit to perform their work without any adverse effect from drugs or alcohol. No person is allowed to take or attempt to consume drugs, alcohol or prohibited substances on the South Angsi facilities.
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Organisation Planning & Implementation
•Risk Assessment & Management •Management, Leadership, Commitment & Accountability •Facilities Design & Construction
•Communication, Information & •Contractor HS&E Management Documentation •Emergency Preparedness & Response •Personnel & Training
•Management of Change •Operations & Maintenance
•Assessment & Improvement •Management of Change
•Assessment & Improvement
Performance Assessment & Improvement
Figure 2.3b Key Processes Applied for HSE Principles
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Smoking is strictly prohibited at the South Angsi facilities except for the designated smoking areas since it gives rise to increase of ignition sources.
No work is allowed to begin without prior HSE induction briefing. The policy is applied to all personnel upon their arrival at the South Angsi facilities.
2.3.4 HSE Legislation, International Conventions and Protocols
The development of the HSEMS including all procedures is in accordance with Malaysia’s HSE legislation and international conventions and protocols ratified by Malaysia. The applicable HSE legal and other requirements are incorporated in all procedures or manuals within the HSEMS for the implementation by the respective Department Managers. It is then the responsibility of the Department Managers to ensure implementation and compliance with applicable HSE legal and other requirements.
The HSE Legal Register is reviewed and updated on an annual basis when there are:
Legislation and regulatory changes; Changes to corporate or industrial standards; and Process or facility/ installation changes/ modifications that could affect compliance with legal and other requirements.
Changes to HSE legal and other requirements will be identified and tracked periodically to ensure that they are current. The HSE Legal (Doc. No.: TML-HSE- GEN-PR-L-103) detail the procedures on tracking of legal requirements and how changes are incorporated in TML’s HSEMS.
2.4 ORGANISATION
2.4.1 Leadership and Commitment
TML employees at all levels are required to demonstrate commitment towards HSE excellence, in particular, the demonstration of visible leadership and commitment for creating and sustaining a culture that supports the effective functioning of the company’s HSEMS.
Employees at all levels are expected to demonstrate their HSE commitment within TML’s business activities by ensuring HSE issues are given priority and not compromised in anyway. TML’s HSE commitment requirements from the various levels of leadership are given in Section 4.2 Management, Leadership and Accountability of the HSEMS Description.
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2.4.2 HSE Roles, Responsibilities and Accountabilities
All management personnel and employees have clearly defined roles and responsibilities for HSE. Two (2) distinctive organisations are set up to manage HSE issues at different operational levels:
TML Management Structure – the General Manager heads the Senior Management Team that includes all Departmental Managers, in the Kuala Lumpur office. The General Manager reports on operational issues including HSE to Talisman Energy Inc.; and
Offshore Organisational Structure – the OIM has overall HSE responsibilities at South Angsi offshore facilities and its associated TML assets. He is supported by the Medic/ Safety Coordinator who has an organisational interface with TML HSE Manager in Kuala Lumpur. The FSO (Floating Storage and Offloading) Master reports to the OIM regarding any HSE issues onboard of FSO.
The TML Management and Offshore Organisational structures are illustrated in Figures 2.4a and 2.4b respectively. The organisation structure for the HSE Department is provided in Figure 2.4c. Key HSEMS responsibilities and accountabilities for the implementation of the HSE policy and management system are stipulated within HSE Management System Principle (Doc. No.: TML- HSE-PCP-01) of the HSEMS Manual. HSE responsibilities and accountabilities of the management and personnel associated with to the South Angsi operations are summarised below.
General Manager
The General Manager for TML reports to Talisman Energy Inc headquartered in Calgary, Canada and is responsible for the overall HSE management within TML’s operations. His key HSE responsibilities include the following:
Endorsing TML’s HSE Policy;
Chairing HSE Management Committee meetings;
Reviewing all proposed company or industrial standards prior to implementation;
Approving proposed HSE objectives and targets and management programmes; and
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General Manager
Executive Secretary
Drilling Operations Planning Projects HS&E Procurement Manager Manager Manager Director Manager Manager
Finance & Commercial & Administration Manager Legal Manager
Figure 2.4a TML’s Senior Management Team Organisation SAA OIM
Medic / Safety Production Maintenance Medic / Safety FSO Master Advisor Supervisors Supervisors
Lead Lead FSO Safety Technicians Technicians Officer
Legend
Direct Report
Organisational Interface
Figure 2.4b TML’s Offshore Supervisory Organisation HS&E Manager
Projects Q&A Safety Manager Clerical / Admin
Offshore Operations Interface Ops Manager/OIM Project Consultants Medic/Safety Officer
HS&E MS Consultant HS&E Engineer HS&E Engineer Consultants
Legend
Direct Report
Organisational Interface
Figure 2.4c HSE Department and Organisational Interface
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Reviewing the overall HSE performance throughout the company.
Operations Manager
The Operations Manager is responsible for establishing specific HSE objectives and targets for the South Angsi operations. He is required to ensure that adequate assistance is provided to the SA-A OIM to effectively implement the HSEMS within the facilities. His main responsibilities include:
Conduct of HSE management review;
Ensuring that personnel are provided with adequate and appropriate training as well as identify of the needs for training; and
Reporting of any changes/ modifications related to the process/ facilities to the HSE Department.
HSE Manager
The HSE Manager is responsible for monitoring the HSE Management System to ensure that it continually delivers its intended performance, including compliance with legislation. He is supported by the HSE Site Coordinator and Department HSE Coordinators.
He is also responsible to coordinate all HSE related matters for the Malaysian Operations, including the South Angsi operations, with the Head Office in Calgary.
Offshore Installation Manager (OIM)
The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) is stationed offshore. The OIM has overall responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the SAA offshore facilities. The OIM is accountable for execution of TML’s HSE policy and implementation of the HSEMS at the SAA offshore facilities. The implementation of the above requires him to be responsible for:
Implementing HSE programmes including all practices and procedures (e.g. operating procedures, Management of Change (MOC), permit-to-work (PTW) system, control of contractors, inspections, EMP, etc.);
Conducting root cause analysis (RCA) of all HSE issues identified with the auditors;
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Ensuring that HSE requirements such as objectives and targets are communicated to employees and contractors through tool-box and pre-job meetings;
Assisting Programme Managers in implementing the HSE management programmes;
Implementing all recommendations and corrective/ preventive action plans identified during audit or management review; and
Endorsing Management of Change (MOC).
Employees and Contractors
The general duties of all employees and contractors include ensuring work that is being performed does not expose them and others to potential safety and health risks. In addition, each employee (including contractors) is required to co-operate with TML to implement all safe work practices and safety initiatives in line with the requirements of Malaysia’s Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA) 1994.
The operations of the FSO are managed by contractors from FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd (FVSB). The PM 305 South Angsi Development Project – Operations Interface Document between FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd and Talisman Malaysia Limited (TML) for South Angsi MOAB & FSO, an HSE interface document is established to address the HSE requirements that FVSB personnel on the South Angsi FSO need to comply with. The key personnel of FVSB that have direct contribution in ensuring effective implementation of the HSEMS at South Angsi facilities include:
FVSB Operations Manager; and FSO Master.
The FVSB Operations Manager is responsible for ensuring that all work performed by FVSB as well as that of their contractors are in accordance with the TML contractual HSE requirements. He is also responsible for preparing and maintaining the HSE Case of the FSO as well as to prepare and update a HSE Plan for the contract work scope. He has overall responsibilities for ensuring that a safe system of work is employed for all FSO activities.
The FSO Master has overall HSE responsibilities for managing the safe implementation of work activities on the FSO in accordance with the agreed procedures. His day-to-day duties include planning and co-ordinating safe
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operations for the FSO as well as the interfaces activities with South Angsi. He reports to the SAA OIM and is in charge of monitoring compliance with the HSEMS for the contract work scope.
2.4.3 Resources, Training and Competency
Adequate resources as well as competent personnel are required for effective implementation of TML’s HSEMS at the South Angsi operations. It is the responsibilities of the line managers to ensure all personnel under their supervision are provided with relevant HSE training in accordance with the TML requirements.
The following are TML’s directives in line with Principle #3 – Personnel and Training:
Only competent personnel that meet specified job requirements are selected;
Criteria to ensure that acceptable levels of competence exist and are maintained;
Initial and ongoing training is provided to meet job and legal requirements; refresher training is provided at appropriate intervals;
Periodic review to identify new or change training needs;
Perform evaluations to assess the effectiveness of training and identify improvement opportunities;
Incorporate HSE responsibilities in job descriptions of each personnel and use them to define individual performance targets;
System to assess, document and provide feedback on personnel performance; and
Conduct site orientation or induction training for new or transferred personnel.
Arrangements are in place to ensure that employees have the required training and competency to meet their job requirements. The HSE Training Procedure (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-042) defines the common training standards for all regular job titles and visitors for TML offshore operations. A HSE training matrix is also in place for specifying the type and level of HSE training requirements for various categories of offshore personnel.
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For TML, competency is continuously evaluated through the following:
Systematic analysis of requirements for tasks; Assessment of individuals’ performance against defined criteria; Documented evidence of individual competence; and Programmes for periodic reassessment.
Certain jobs and tasks defined for the South Angsi operations require personnel to have undergone a recognised course and passed the requisite tests/ examinations. Requirements for these jobs and tasks fall into two broad categories:
Safety Passport for all offshore workers (i.e. attendance on an approved offshore training course) on the SAA; and
Certificates or formal appointment to confirm their competency to perform the following jobs/ tasks;
- Gas Tester; - Medic; - Lifting Supervisor; - Scaffolder; - Welders; - Radiation Protection Officer; - Radiation Worker; - Helicopter Landing Officer; - Permits to Work Issuing Authority; - Anchor handling; - Crane Operator; - Electrician; - Riggers/ Slingers; - Scaffolding Supervisor; - Lifeboat Coxswain; - Radiation Protection Supervisors; - First Aider; and - Emergency Response Team Leader.
Records for all necessary certificate holders for South Angsi are kept and maintained by the Human Resource (HR) Department. In addition, the HSE Department is authorised to access the training records.
In general, the HSE Department has the overall responsibilities for ensuring that safety training requirements are complied with through periodic reviews and
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audits. Continuous communication is also established with the HR Department to develop and implement systems to identify and deliver effective HSE training and competency.
2.4.4 Communication Processes
TML HSE Manager is responsible for distributing all HSE related communication to all worksites and departments. The SAA OIM has the overall responsibilities for the HSE performance of the South Angsi operations.
The main internal means of communication for HSE issues include HSE Committees, written report and meetings. For the South Angsi facilities, the communication on HSE issues with external parties is handled by the OIM or his representatives.
The following internal communication tools are utilised within the South Angsi facilities:
Notice board – HSE performance data, successes and achievements, on the job and off the job HSE tips, etc. are posted on the Bulletin Board;
Station Bill – disseminates essential safety information about the offshore installations and are posted at strategic locations;
Daily Permits and Toolbox meetings – discusses work instructions and specific operations;
Bulletins – HSE bulletins on the website;
Contractor Manager Safety Meeting;
Shift Handovers meetings – ensure safe and efficient handovers by personnel between shifts during crew change;
Audits – audit team will highlight/ discuss key findings with key worksite personnel at the end of the visit;
Briefing – Managing Director in his annual briefing;
Quarterly Safety Meetings by the TML Management to ensure effective adherence to the HSE policy; and
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Visit/ Inspection by Senior Management, to brief on the HSE performance, etc.
HSE communication between TML and FVSB personnel on the FSO is conducted between the OIM and FSO Master. The FSO Master is required to report all activities conducted on the FSO on a daily basis.
As the OIM reports to the Operations Manager, communication between the South Angsi facilities and the TML Management will be via the Operations Manager. In addition, the Site HSE Coordinator, who is based offshore, is also responsible to maintain the communication between South Angsi operations and TML office.
2.5 PLANNING & IMPLEMENTATION
2.5.1 Risk Management
HSE Risk Management Process
The process of risk (hazards and effects) management is central to the effective implementation of the HSE Management System. The process ensures that the hazards and potential effects are fully evaluated and the mitigation and recovery preparedness measures put in place to reduce the consequences of any remaining risk to the installation.
The essential stages of HSE risk management are as follows:
Identification of HSE hazards; Risk analysis and assessment; Risk management; and Follow-up and stewardship.
Upon completion of the HSE identification and risk analysis, a Risk Assessment Summary Report (RASR) is required to be compiled. It is then the HSE Manager responsibility to incorporate Risk Assessment Summary Reports to the tracking system.
The line management is responsible to review the risk scenarios, risk prioritisation, justification, actions, responsibilities and schedule in the Risk Management Safety Report (RMSR). The system coordinator is required to issue periodic status reports which summarises risk management activities conducted over a maximum of six (6) months. Upon completion of all action items, a Close-Out Report is to be prepared by the HSE Manager.
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Risk Assessments Activities
The following techniques for identification of HSE hazards and effects are implemented on South Angsi facilities:
Qualitative scenario based assessments such as: - Hazid Identification (HAZID)/ Environmental Hazard Identification (ENVID); - Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study; - Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA); - Health Risk Assessment (HRA); - Job Safety Analysis (JSA)/Significance Assessment of Environmental Aspects; - Significance Assessment Matrix (for environmental issues only); and
Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA).
The findings and the associated recommendations for the above assessments conducted for the facilities are summarised in Section 4 of the HSE Case. Guidelines for conducting all the above assessments are also provided in HS&E Risk Management Procedure (Doc. No: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-108).
A list of the Major Accident Hazards (MAEs) has been identified as part of the risk management process for the South Angsi facilities. Bow-Tie diagrams have been developed as a hazard identification process, as an additional element to the current TML’s HSEMS. The hazards and effects including risk control and recovery measures are presented in Bow-Tie diagrams format provided in Section 4.
HSE Risk Screening Criteria
The HSE risk screening criteria provide values or standards against which the identified hazards or effects are assessed. Risks of the hazards identified from the HAZID exercise are qualitative evaluated based on the HSE Risk Matrix given in Figure 2.5a. .
Statutory HSE Risk Assessment Requirements
The applicability of any Acts and Regulations on South Angsi operations is determined based on the Continental Shelf Act 1996. The following relevant Malaysia statutes are applicable:
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994; Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984;
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Likelihood of occurrence with HIGH MODERATE LOW NEGLIGIBLE existing safeguards based 1 2 3 4 on exposure & probability. This incident This incident This incident Given current has occurred could occur hasn’t occurred practices and at this type of this type of at this type of procedures, Severity of facility. There facility. There facility. There this incident is is a likelihood consequences is a likelihood is a likelihood not likely to of repeated of single of a rare occur at this without safeguards. occurrence. occurrence. occurrence. facility.
CATASTROPHIC SAFETY: Fatalities or permanently disabling injuries. ENVIRONMENTAL: Significant release with serious A long-term impact. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. ASSET/OPERABILITY: Major or total destruction to facilities, downtime in excess of 30 days. 1 1 2 4 FINANCIAL: up to/ exceeding $10 million MAJOR SAFETY – Severe injury. Cat. ENVIRONMENTAL - Significant release with serious B environmental impact. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat ASSET/OPERABILITY – Major damage to facilities with up to 30 days plant downtime 1 2 3 5 FINANCIAL – up to $1 million
SERIOUS SAFETY: Single injury, not severe, possible lost time. ENVIRONMENTAL: Release that results in some C Agency notification or violation. Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. ASSET/OPERABILITY – Some equipment damage with possible downtime. 2 3 4 5 FINANCIAL – up to $100,000 MINOR SAFETY: Minor injury or no injury. D ENVIRONMENTAL: Environmental recordable event Cat. Cat. Cat. Cat. with no agency notification. 4 5 5 5 ASSET/OPERABILITY – Minimal equipment damage with negligible plant downtime. FINANCIAL – Less than $10,000
CATEGORIES – IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE
Cat 1 - Very High Risk: Work should not be started or continued until the risk has been reduced.
Cat 2 - High Risk: Work should not be started until the risk has been reduced. Work can only continue with extreme caution. Risk must be reduced immediately.
Cat 3 - Moderate Risk: Efforts should be made to reduce the risk, but the costs of prevention should be carefully measured and limited. Risk reduction measures should be implemented within a definite time period.
Cat 4 - Possible Risk: No additional controls are required. Consideration may be given to a more cost-effective solution or improvement that imposes no additional cost burden. Monitoring is required to ensure that the controls are maintained.
Cat 5 - Negligible Risk: Further consideration not required. Monitoring is required to ensure that the controls are maintained.
Figure 2.5a TML’s Risk Ranking Guidelines (Revised Version) – For SAA Hazard Analysis
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Environmental Quality Act 1974; Occupational Safety and Health (Use and Standards of Exposure of Chemicals Hazardous to Health) Regulations 2000; Radiation Protection (Licensing) Regulations 1986; Radiation Protection (Basic Safety Standards) Regulations 1986; Radiation Protection (Transport) Regulations 1989; Code of Practice on Radiation Protection Relating to TENORM in Oil and Gas Facilities; and Environmental Quality (Prescribed Activities) (Environmental Impact Assessment) Order 1987.
2.5.2 HSE Procedures
General HSE procedures are provided in TML’s HSEMS. They are communicated to the relevant employees and contractors via the TML Intranet. Dependent on the different operations of the facilities, site procedures are also developed for the respective installations.
The Supervisors have direct responsibilities for ensuring all related works at the South Angsi facilities are carried out in accordance with established procedures.
The Operations Department is responsible for preparing and controlling the operating procedures. Any change is required to follow the Management of Change procedure as per the HSEMS.
Specific procedures are also established for initial start-up and any subsequent start-up following a shutdown for topside process and all utilities systems as well for Simultaneous Operations.
The FSO Master is responsible for monitoring compliance of the operating procedures with TML’s HSEMS. He is also required to liaise with the SAA OIM to ensure that production and operational requirements are taken account of in the scheduling of the work.
Specific operating instructions are also given, as required. These instructions are site-specific and controlled documents that allow short-term variations to current Operating Procedures to be recorded, assessed and implemented in a controlled manner.
2.5.3 PTW System
The safety of personnel working on South Angsi facilities, including at the FSO, is critically dependent on the proper organisation and control of work practices, which require a disciplined approach to all operations with effective planning,
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control and in particular co-ordination of maintenance activities and modifications. With the exception of routine work activities, all work carried out on the South Angsi platforms require a PTW, a formal safety control system designed to prevent accidents including injury to employees, contractors and third parties as well as to property, and aims to ensure that proper planning and consideration is given to the risks of a particular task. TML-HSE-GEN-MG- L-008 Permit to Work System is the base procedure for the application of PTW.
Three (3) different work permits are utilised on the facilities:
Red Hot Work Permit; Hot Work Permit; and Cold Work Permit.
The permit applicant will be required to initiate the relevant work permit. Ordinary work site inspection will be conducted by the Production Technician and/or Equipment Owner prior to raising the work permit with additional inspection to be performed by the Supervisor if the permit (under Section 2 Work Site Communication) requires a more thorough safety inspection to be done. In addition a JSA, performed by a group of members of Line Supervisors and Technicians, need to be attached together with the permit for approval.
All permits need to be reviewed and approved by the OIM prior to work. Upon completion of work, the permit applicant will have to indicate that status of the work with verification from the permit applicant’s Supervisor before the permit is closed by the OIM.
Training on the PTW procedures is provided to all personnel and contractors. Co-ordination of the PTW system training is the responsibility of the HSE Department. In addition, the site supervisors are also required to provide continuous training to the PTW System users as part of the daily system check and administration.
Periodic audits on the PTW system are carried out for the following purposes:
Detection and correction of deficiencies in the PTW system and its application; and
Identification of the needs for refresher training.
Two levels of audit are conducted in the SAA facilities:
Monthly PTW Spot Checks; and
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PTW Quarterly Assessments.
The monthly spot checks are conducted internally and initiated by the OIM. Findings of the Monthly Spot Check are communicated to the all personnel via site meetings. The findings of the monthly PTW Spot Check will be filed and kept by the Production/ Satellite Supervisor and used in preparation of the Quarterly Assessment Summary reports. The OIM together with the respective supervisors are responsible for directing any corrective actions required to the PTW System Coordinator (from the HSE Team) for continuous improvement.
The PTW Manual (Doc. No.: PM3-HSE-GEN-MG-L-008) clearly defines the scope, responsibilities, maintenance of the PTW system at SAA facilities.
2.5.4 Job Safety Analysis (JSA)
Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is a basic approach to developing improved accident prevention procedures by documenting the first hand experience of workers and supervisors and at the same time instilling acceptance through worker participation.
The JSA is applicable to all work activities that are related to Managing Operations with General Procedures (MOGP) requirements and HSE critical activities undertaken at all offshore sites operated by TML.
On South Angsi platforms, a JSA is required to be developed for each job undertaken (routine and non-routine) and is to be conducted with participants from the field.
2.5.5 Management of Change
The HS&E Management of Change (MOC) procedure outlines the HSEMS performance system requirements for identification, evaluation, approval, implementation and close out of changes to TML operations.
The procedure applies to any modification that may result in potential integrity implications of previously approved documents, plans, procedures, etc. in any of the following areas:
HSE criteria compliance; and Actions taken to meet HSE legal or regulatory requirements.
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The process of managing change is divided into 5 stages:
Identification – determine whether the modification is subject to the MOC procedure and classify the type of change;
Evaluation – assess the potential (positive and negative) consequences associated with the proposed change and seek endorsement of all potentially impacted parties. A formal risk assessment is required to be conducted;
Approval – dependent on the level of risk, different levels of personnel will be responsible to authorize the change;
Implementation – ensure communication is done to all concerned parties and associated procedures, drawings, permits are upgraded to reflect the change; and
Close out – a Change Report is to be prepared by OIM/ Site Supervisor.
Essential training is provided for the OIM/ Site Supervisors to ensure their competency of implementing the requirements as specified. Training is also provided to the Risk Evaluation Team to ensure that they are capable of carrying out the HSE risk assessment.
Details of the procedure are found in HS&E Management of Change (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-032).
2.5.6 Contractor Management
At TML, substantial amount of the works including those considered as HSE critical are conducted by contractors. The risk associated is therefore significant. For ensuring effective management of HSE issues in contracted work, criteria for selecting the contractors are based on the performance of the contractor in achieving the required standard.
TML Procurement Department manages the selection and engagement of contractors through application of the Procurement Policy and Procedures. The HSE Department liaise closely with Procurement in the contracting process to guide whichever departments with responsibilities for managing contractors to achieve a desired balance. The overall strategy in managing contractors HSE conformance are summarised below:
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The contractors are required to conform with the requirements of TML’s HSEMS as well as the associated HSE procedures and guidelines; and
The contractors’ own HSE standards should be in line with Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) 1994 requirements. The contractors’ HSE management system should cover, as a minimum:
- Safety Policy; - Permit to Work system; - Training requirements; - Personal Protective Equipment; - Industrial Health and Hygiene; - Maintenance and Construction Safety; - Confined Space Entry; - Cranes and Lifting Equipment; and - Accident and Incident Reporting.
As such, TML expects that their contractors’ HSEMS would be similar and compatible with TML HSE Policy, strategy objectives and HSEMS elements. Generally an interface document is developed to address all the agreed arrangement. General requirements for safety are included as part of the TML’s conditions of contract.
The SAA OIM is responsible for ensuring that all specific HSE requirements are communicated to the contractors by following the procedures outlined in the HSE interface document established between TML and the respective contractor.
The Management of Contractor HSE (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-070) defines the systems in place to manage the TML’s contractors.
2.5.7 “U-See U-Act” Programme
The “U-See U-Act” programme encourages SAA personnel to report hazards that they recognise at their workplace. The aim is to provide a means of communication for various individuals to highlight hazards to management so that the unsafe condition can be rectified as soon as possible.
The reports are collated and submitted to the HSE Department. The OIM is responsible for ensuring that all remedial actions are closed out appropriately and status of uncompleted items are adequately followed-up.
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2.5.8 Management of Hazardous and Toxic Substances
On SAA facilities, all personnel who are likely to be exposed to hazardous substances are required to receive adequate training. They will be informed on the hazards of the chemicals, safety precautions required, the use of emergency equipment, labels and warning signals and all applicable laws and regulations. Training programmes are reviewed and conducted at least once in two years or if there is a change in the hazard information or each time employee is assigned to new tasks or new work place.
Control and use of hazardous and toxic substances are governed by the following HSE procedures:
Laboratory Management (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-L-049); Chemical Management (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-303); and
Hydrogen (H2S) and Pyrophoric Scale (Doc. No.: PM3-HSE-GEN-L-057).
A fundamental principle of these procedures is that prevention or control of exposure is preferable to the use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The following preventive or control measures hierarchy are followed to manage the risks of working with hazardous materials:
Elimination of the substance or procedure; Substitution of hazardous substance or procedures with those which are less hazardous or hazard free; Enclosed process and handling system; Sufficient general ventilation; Limit the number of people exposed or length of exposure; and Provision of PPE.
Control of Exposure
The limit of exposure is measured by competent personnel using approved method and analysis. The monitoring of exposure is repeated within not more than six months or as per the interval determined by the assessor. Records of exposure monitoring are kept and maintained for at least 3 years.
The Permissive Exposure Limits (PEL) as specified in the Occupational Safety and Health (Use and Standards of Exposure of Chemicals Hazardous to Health to Health) Regulations, 2000 are used as measurements for the exposure. These may include:
Ceiling limit; Eight-hour time-weighted average airborne concentration; or
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Maximum exposure limit.
Chemical Hazards
The OIM is responsible for ensuring suitable and appropriate type of emergency response media is provided when activities involving chemicals are in place, all toxic substances are labelled accordingly, clean water emergency washing facilities is made available and in good working order.
It is the responsibility of the HSE Department to ensure that the Chemical Health Risk Assessment (CHRA) is carried out periodically on SAA facilities for evaluating the risk to health associated with exposure to the chemicals used on the facilities against specified screening criteria as well as to assess the adequacy of the existing control measures.
Chemical Labelling/ Relabelling
The labelling of hazardous chemicals complies with the requirements stipulated in the Occupational Safety and Health (Classification, Packaging, and Labelling of Hazardous Chemicals) Regulations 1997 and Guidelines for Labelling of Hazardous Chemicals.
Chemical Disposal
Chemical wastes, containers contaminated with chemical residues and materials used for cleaning up chemical spills and leaks are managed in accordance with the Waste Management Procedure (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-PR- L-045).
2.5.9 Management of Radioactive Substances
The SAA operations will involve the use of the radioactive associated substances. The guidelines provided in HSE procedures Ionising Radiation (Doc. No.: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-304) and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) – Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (TENORM) Management (Doc. No.: TML-GEN-PR-L-306) outline the proper requirements and safe handling of atomic energy which includes:
Ionising radiation; Non-ionising radiation; Radioactive materials; Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (TENORM); and X-ray radiographic work.
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Management of NORM
Scales, sludge and equipment contaminated with NORM is managed in accordance with the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) Act and Regulations and Guidelines on Radiological Monitoring for Oil and Gas Facilities Operators Associated with Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (TENORM).
Radiological Monitoring
At SAA, the following radiological monitoring programmes are conducted by a Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) or AELB Approved Consultant:
External radiation monitoring; Surface contamination monitoring; and Airborne contamination monitoring.
Routine monitoring is conducted at a suitable frequency of at least once per year for normal operations including external radiation and surface contamination monitoring.
Disposal of NORM Contaminated Substances
Sludge and scales contaminated with NORM are disposed off at a site approved by the AELB.
A Radiological Impact Assessment (RIA) is conducted for the proposed disposal method by a RPO or AELB Approved Consultant prior to the disposal of scales and sludges contaminated with NORM to demonstrate that no member of the public will be exposed to more than 1 mSv/ year from all activities.
The RIA methodology and RIA report format is in accordance with the RIA for Oil and Gas Sludge provided in the Guidelines on Radiological Monitoring for Oil and Gas Facilities Operators Associated with Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (TENORM).
2.5.10 Personnel Safety
Personnel safety is prioritised in all TML’s operations. Every worker has the right to refuse a task if in his opinion the work is likely to endanger himself or other workers.
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TML HSE Handbooks contains specific HSE information associated with the operations of SAA are disseminated to all personnel working on the facilities (including contractors). The handbooks are prepared in both English and Bahasa Malaysia.
2.5.11 Contingency and Emergency Planning
Emergency Response Plan
The Emergency Response Manual defines emergency procedures for response to emergencies affecting the SAA platforms. Emergency Response Procedures for the SAA FSO are documented in another manual prepared by FVSB. These procedures have been formulated to comply with company requirements as well as to satisfy the moral obligations of the company in the event of any emergency situations.
TML’s emergency response manual provides details of the management philosophy utilised by TML when defining the organisation and resources mobilised to respond for an emergency and also specifies the overall responsibilities required to handle any emergency in an effective manner, should one occur. In addition, support from and interfaces with TML onshore personnel as well as external organisations are also included in the manual.
For the FSO, the emergency response procedures explain the responses of FVSB in the event of emergency on the FSO. Notification to the OIM is required if the event escalates to the outside boundary of the FSO.
The ownership and responsibility of the TML’s emergency response manual is specified below:
HSE Manager is the Manual Owner; and HSE Coordinator is the designated Manual Custodian.
The manual is reviewed regularly to ensure that any changes in the operations are reflected in the current emergency management and response plans. The review process is also to improve the response procedures involved in ensuring effective response in the event of emergency. The coordination for the manual revision is undertaken by the Manual Owner and Custodian. All TML personnel including contractors are required to be trained and competent with the emergency management and responses per the Emergency Response Manual. The HSE department is responsible in coordinating the training as well as ensuring their competency to carry out the associated emergency responsibilities/duties.
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Depending on the nature of the emergency, this Emergency Response Manual may be activated together with the following specific procedures:
Oil Spill Contingency Response Manual; Crisis Management Plan (Media/ Public Relations, Employee Relations); and Disaster Recovery Plan.
The manual also covers emergency associated with Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) phase. The roles and responsibilities of the SIMOPS personnel are defined in the manual.
Emergency Response Organisation
The following organisations are in place to respond to SAA platforms emergency:
Emergency Control Team (ECT) led by the OIM who assumes the role of the On-Scene Commander (OSC) responding to the offshore; and
Emergency Action Group (EAG) headed by the Duty Manager stationed at TML’s headquarters in Kuala Lumpur.
Emergency Control Team (ECT)
The OSC has the overall authority and responsibility for the emergency response actions taken to control and mitigate an emergency. He is supported by the emergency response personnel who are trained for their specific responsibilities in mitigating the emergency at site. They comprise the following:
Damage Control Team (DCT) Leader; DCT members; Designated Person In-Charge (DPIC); Satellite Platform Team members; Medic/ Safety Coordinator; Radio Operation; Lifeboat Commanders; Backup Team; and FSO Master (on-call basis).
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Upon initiation of the emergency alarm at the South Angsi Complex, the OSC and DCT Leader will proceed to the Central Processing Platform (CPP) Control Room while other ECT members proceed to their respective locations.
In the event of emergency at any of the satellite platforms, the DPIC and other personnel will proceed to designated emergency assembly area.
The organisation chart of the ECT is provided in Figure 2.5b.
Emergency Action Group (EAG)
The EAG team consists of TML personnel whose duties are to support the offshore ECT, respond to the emergency and manage the third party and external authorities communications. The team consists of a TML Duty Manager assisted by three members nominated on a weekly roster.
If required, the EAG is expanded to include technical support from various departments. These may include:
Operations Department Representative; Drilling Department Representative; Development Projects Representative; Contractor Representative(s); HSE Department Representative; Human Resource (Administration Department Representative);and Other Specialist (eg. legal, finance, insurance, etc.).
The organisation chart of the EAG is provided in Figure 2.5c.
Emergency Equipment
Emergency facilities and equipment available on the South Angsi Complex and FSO facilities are as follows:
Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) and facilities; Fire Fighting and Fire and Gas Detection Equipment; Lifesaving and Rescue Equipment; Alarm and Public Address; Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR); and Telecommunications Equipment.
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On-Scene Commander OIM or alternate Production Supervisor
Radio Medic Damage Control Backup Team Designated FSO Life Boat Operator (Medic/Safety Team Leader Leader Person In-Charge (FSO Master) Commanders Co-ordinator) (Maintenance (Is normally the (On Satellite Supervisor) Camp Boss) Platform)
Team Members Alternate Backup Team (Other Personnel DCT Leader Members on Satellite (Lead Technician) (Others) Platform)
DCT Members are normally made up of :
* Crane Operator (OSC Runner) * Material Coordinator * Mechanical Technician * Instrument/Electrical Technicians * Roustabouts * Turbine Maintenance Technicians * Off Duty Production Personnel
Figure 2.5b Emergency Control Team (ECT) Organisation Chart Figure 2.5c Emergency Action Group (EAG) Organisation Chart
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The emergency facilities provided on the satellite platforms are mainly required to ensure safe escape and evacuation of the facilities. They include fire detection system, portable fire extinguishers, ESD horn, lifesaving equipment and telecommunications equipment.
Details of the emergency equipment are provided in Section 3.
Specific Emergency Procedures
Specific procedures have been developed to respond to various types of emergencies that may occur at the SAA platforms. The procedures developed include:
Fire and Explosion – General Response; Fire in FSO Accommodation; Hydrocarbon Release – General Response; Potential/Actual Collision with South Angsi Installation; Helicopter Incidents; Export Tanker Incidents; Illegal Boarding; Bomb Threat; Man Overboard and Missing Person; Loss of Radioactive Source; Diving Emergency; Well Control Failure (Non-SIMOPS); SIMOP Drilling/Workover/Wireline; Personnel Transfer Bridge Out of Commission; and Flooding of FSO Engine Room.
Controlled copies of:
Talisman Emergency Response Manual (Doc No: PM3-HSE-GEN-MG-L-001); South Angsi Emergency Response Plan (Doc No: PM-305-OPS-SA-ML-L- 0001); and Oil Spill Contingency Response Manual (Doc No: PM3-HSE-GEN-MG-L- 003).
are held on the FSO and FVSB’s onshore emergency response room.
Drills and Exercises
Emergency drills are conducted monthly. These are scenario-based exercise to provide the hands-on training for TML’s emergency response organisation in
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implementing the response plans. Different types of drills are also conducted to test the communication links, mobilisation of the TML emergency teams and specialised technical teams as well as the cooperation between agencies and support services, both onshore and offshore.
Brief reports of the drills and exercises are prepared by the Safety Officer to facilitate follow-up discussion and identification of means of improving muster times.
The exercises or drills on FSO will not involve TML as the FSO is directly managed by the contractor. However, notification will be provided to the OIM that the drills and exercises are to be conducted.
Crisis Management Plan
A Crisis Management Plan (CMP) is in-place to deal with the specific emergency situation which may be declared for a major disaster situation. It is the responsibility of the EAG to inform TML’s General Manager if the CMP is required to be activated.
The Crisis Management Team (CMT) is headed by TML’s General Manager supported by a secretary. Other members within the team are representatives from the Legal, Human Resources and Media Handling units.
2.5.12 Industrial Health
Health surveillance
All TML personnel need to be the holders of a valid medical examination certificate after undergoing a medical examination by an approved medical practitioner prior to employment. Health surveillance programme for personnel who are likely to be exposed to hazardous substances is conducted at least once a year by an occupational health doctor. The records of health surveillance are maintained and kept for thirty years. The records will also be provided upon request by the General Director of DOSH.
Domestic Hygienic
The standard of hygiene in kitchen, food preparation and food store is in conformance to the standards laid down in the Food Act, 1983 (Act 281) and Regulations.
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Occupational Hygiene
Occupational hygiene surveys are implemented to detect and measure any workplace health hazards whether physical, chemical or biological including:
Hearing conservation programme; Promoting healthy lifestyle ; Substance abuse policy; Health counselling; and Smoking policy.
The programmes are organised by the HSE Department and Medical Advisor.
2.5.13 Waste Management
The management of hazardous and non-hazardous wastes generated by SAA activities is in accordance with applicable Malaysian and International legislation and TMLs HSEMS Principles and Expectations. The objective of is to reduce the quantities of wastes requiring disposal.
The waste management covers storage, handling, collection, transportation, treatment and disposal of the hazardous wastes classified as scheduled wastes under Malaysian legislation and the non-hazardous wastes ie. industrial and domestic wastes.
Scheduled wastes are disposed of at an offshore DOE licensed scheduled wastes disposal facility. Transportation from the Kemaman Supply Base (KSB) is carried out by a DOE licensed scheduled waste transporter.
Non-recyclable non-hazardous wastes are disposed off at a disposal site approved by the local authority. Recyclable non-hazardous wastes are recycled at a licensed recycling centre.
2.5.14 Environmental Aspects
A procedure is in place for establishing and maintaining a systematic way for identifying, assessing and updating the environmental aspects and impacts associated with TML’s activities. The following criteria have been included in assessing and prioritising significance of environmental aspects and impacts:
Potential legal and regulatory exposure; Compliance with corporate standards, industry/ sector codes of practices; International conventions or multilateral agreements;
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Actual/ potential risk and consequence to the environment; and Effects on public image/ company reputation.
The results of the significance assessment have been used as a basis for developing environmental objectives, targets and environmental management programmes.
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted to identify environmental issues associated with the SAA development. An Environmental Management Plan (EMP) has also been developed to:
Comply with the requirements stated in Environmental Impact Assessment Approval Conditions issued by the DOE; and
Demonstrate TML’s commitment in reducing the impact on the environmental as a result of their operations.
2.6 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
2.6.1 Objectives
TML believes that assessment and improvement programmes on the HSEMS can prevent the natural decline of the effectiveness of the HSEMS. In brief, the assessment and improvement programmes involve a continuous cycle consisting the following phases:
Set performance standards; Assess performance; and Identify and implement improvement actions.
2.6.2 Performance Standards
TML utilises the following pre-determined standards as minimum criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the HSEMS:
Company standards (policies, principles, procedures, etc.); Personnel standards (performance contracts, job description); Performance indicators; Industry standards or best practices; Legal standards; and International and government body standards.
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2.6.3 Performance Indicators
TML implements a system of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) and Environmental Performance Indicators (EPIs) involving a mixture of leading and lagging indicators.
The aim of the Performance Indicator system is to provide early feedback on HSE performance before an incident occurs. A HSE Programme is prepared each year for SAA facilities setting out all the initiatives and efforts that TML will devote to their health safety and environmental programme. The associated SPIs and EPIs for the SAA facilities are provided annually and are driven by the following procedure and requirement:
HSE Committee Procedure; and Petronas Reporting Requirement.
2.6.4 Monitoring
Performance is assessed using two different but equally important monitoring strategies:
Active monitoring; and Reactive monitoring.
Active monitoring programme (for monitoring leading indicators) monitors the achievement of objectives, plans and the extent of compliance with standards. It provides feedback on the effectiveness of HSE management arrangements to prevent incidents.
The reactive monitoring (for monitoring the lagging indicators) monitors accidents, ill health, incidents and other evidence of deficient health, safety and environmental performance. The specific elements under the reactive monitoring can be expanded to cover the following:
Chemical exposure; Noise exposure; Health surveillance; Incidents/ accidents; Air emissions; Produced water discharge; Seabed sediments and seawater column sampling; Waste generation; NORM generation; and Natural resource use (eg. water, fuel.)
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Monitoring of Contractor’s Performance
The Operations Department is authorised to determine the most appropriate arrangements for HSE performance monitoring of the contractor, according to the nature of work and the level of risk involved. TML utilises the following methods for reviewing the performance of the contractors:
Proactive Monitoring – regular periodic review, meetings with the contractors to highlight any improvements, comparison of the performance of the same contractors working at elsewhere; and
Reactive Monitoring – receiving reports, investigation and analysis of incidents, investigating the occurrence or presence of hazards.
Incident/ Accidents
All accidents occurring during work performed under the control of TML’s HSEMS are investigated so that immediate and underlying causes are identified, appropriate actions are taken to prevent recurrence and accurate data is maintained on TML’s HSE performance.
Performance standards for incident investigation and reporting are established to identify the need for accident reporting and investigation, to provide guidelines for incident investigation and to define the roles of the responsible personnel. The incident reporting requirements including reporting format is detailed in Incidents Notification, Investigation and Reporting (Doc. No.: TML-HSE- GEN-PR-L-112).
2.7 AUDIT AND MANAGEMENT REVIEWS
2.7.1 Objectives
TML conducts periodic audits with the aim of ensuring that:
Appropriate management arrangement and workplace precautions are in place;
Adequate risk control system exist are implemented and consistent with the hazard profile of the organisation; and
Legal requirements are compiled with.
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2.7.2 Internal HSEMS Audit
The following are the internal audits to be carried out for the SAA operations:
HSEMS Compliance Audit – conducted annually; HSEMS Management Audit – conducted quarterly; and HSE Walkabout Audit – conducted monthly.
The Audit Team generally comprises a maximum of five personnel who are representatives from HSE and other cross-functional departments. In addition, these auditors must not be selected from personnel directly accountable for the audited area. The team will be led by a Senior Engineer who is a qualified Lead Auditor. The formation of the team is coordinated by the HSE Department.
In general, the main elements of an internal audit cover the following tasks:
Review of relevant documentation; Interviews with selected personnel; and Observations of work practices and site inspections.
A formal audit report summary is produced which presents the findings and recommendations of the audit. The report will highlight the following:
Compliance with HSEMS manual; Implementation of HSE policies, objectives, plans and targets; Compliance with legislation; Identification of areas for improvement; and Compliance with the HSE Case requirements.
The OIM is responsible for the implementation of the audit recommendations until all action items are closed-out. The HSE Department is responsible to track all the action items are closed-out.
2.7.3 Independent HSEMS Audit
Independent auditing is conducted for the TML’s operations. The audit will be co-ordinated by the audit team from the Corporate level from Calgary. The scope of the audit covers a broad spectrum of TML’s operations in order to verify the integrity of interfaces between TML and its corporate office in Calgary.
The details of the audit are provided in HSE Procedure TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L- 107, HSE Audits.
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2.7.4 Other HSE Audits and Reviews
Other audits including the following are to be prepared and co-ordinated by the HSE Department:
Environmental audits; Task-based audit (eg. lifting operations, PTW, etc.); and Risk based audit.
2.7.5 Non-conformances
The audit team is required to clearly record any HSE non-conformance identified during the audit.
In this event, the auditor(s) and the OIM/ Base Supervisor will conduct a root cause analysis of all HSE issues identified, agree on the corrective/ preventive actions and expected completion date and complete the Non-Conformance Report.
The auditor will retain the Non-Conformance Report and give a copy to the OIM/ Base Supervisor during the de-briefing/ close-out meeting. The OIM/ Base Supervisor is responsible to implement the corrective/ preventive actions stated in the Non-Conformance Report.
2.7.6 Management Reviews
The management reviews are scheduled to be carried out by the HSEMS Management Team at least once every six (6) months to ensure the continuing stability, adequacy and effectiveness in implementing the HSEMS. The HSEMS and corresponding manual are reviewed based on, but not limited to, the following elements:
Overall direction of the TML’s HSE Policy; Adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of the HSEMS; Progress of HSE management programmes including performance in closing out improvement/ corrective actions; Legislation (new and proposed); Expectations from joint venture partners; Lessons learned from past incidents; Advances in science and technology; Organisational aspects and culture; Past audits records; and Performance against SPIs an EPIs.
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Ad hoc HSE management reviews will also be carried out in the event of the following:
Major facility changes and follow-up (eg. changes in operation activities); Major HSE incident/ accident or non-compliance/ non-conformance; and Major corrective and preventive actions and follow-up.
The findings and recommendations arising from the management reviews are recorded by HSE Department. These findings will be used as a guide for establishing future HSE strategies and initiatives to continuously improve the HSE performance across TML’s operations.
The audit approach and protocols are described in HSE Procedure HSE Management Review (Doc. No: TML-HSE-GEN-PR-L-039).
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2.8 SECTION 2 REFERENCES
[R2.1] Talisman Malaysia Limited, HSE Management System – CIMAGE System.
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Section 3 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS
CONTENTS
3 DESCRIPTION OF SAA 3-1
3.1 INTRODUCTION 3-1
3.2 HISTORY 3-1
3.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND ORIENTATION 3-1
3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 3-2
3.5 OVERVIEW OF SAA FACILITIES 3-4
3.6 SECTION 3 REFERENCES 3-6
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3 DESCRIPTION OF SAA
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Section 3 of the SAA Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Case focuses on the HSE controls aspect of the facilities:
Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB); and
Floating Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO).
It includes the essential features relevant to HSE and emergency management. The objective of this section is to demonstrate that systems and procedures are in place to control and reduce the likelihood of loss of control, mitigate and prepare for recovery from hazards and effects. It also demonstrates that systems in place are conforming to regulatory requirements and are functional for intended purposes.
3.2 HISTORY
Talisman Malaysia Limited (TML) operates the South Angsi Field in Block PM- 305, offshore Peninsular Malaysia in the South China Sea. The field comprises a Floating Storage & Offloading (FSO) and a Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB), which is an oil and gas separation unit.
The South Angsi Field has been developed using a Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) as the basis for the installation of the wellhead and oil processing facilities. The produced and processed oil will be routed to a Floating Storage Offloading (FSO) facility, which is moored adjacent to the MOAB, approximately 50 m away. The FSO has a temporary storage of approximately 350,000 bbls stabilised crude and is to be offloaded to a shuttle tanker every week.
Figures 3.2a shows the South Angsi Field PM-305 location and Figure 3.2b shows the South Angsi Field development concept.
3.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND ORIENTATION
The South Angsi Field is located in block PM-305 offshore Terengganu about 150 km from the shore. The field is located in a water depth of approximately
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PM 305
Figure 3.2a South Angsi Field PM-305 Location Shuttle Tanker (Crude Export) FSO (Crude Storage)
MOAB
Wellheads
Figure 3.2b South Angsi Development Concept
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68 m. The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Coordinate locations for the PM-305 are 104° 40’ 58.781” Easting and 5° 05’ 34.023” Northing.
3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
This section includes summary information on environmental conditions for SAA [R3.7].
3.4.1 Prevailing Climatic Conditions
Offshore east coast Peninsular Malaysia experiences an equatorial monsoon maritime climate, with warm, humid conditions throughout the year.
The climate in this region is influenced by the position of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), which moves north-south during the year in response to the position of the sun relative to the earth’s surface:
The Northeast (NE) Monsoon - Typically prevails from November through to February or early March, develops when there is high pressure over Asia (Siberian Anticyclone) and low pressure over Australia;
The Southwest (SW) Monsoon - Occurs from the end of May through to September when there is high pressure over Australia and low pressure over Asia; and
Transition Periods – April is the transition period between the NE and SW Monsoon. October is the second transition period which precedes the return of the NE Monsoon.
3.4.2 Wind Conditions
During the NE Monsoon, prevailing winds in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia are from a northeasterly direction; during the SW Monsoon, prevailing winds are from the south/ southwest. During the inter-monsoon periods (transitional periods) (~April and October), winds become light and changeable with a gradual shift towards the direction of the advancing monsoon.
Table 3.4a presents an annual wind direction summary for SAA. On the basis of this data, the prevailing wind directions are from the north (~17%), northeast (~22%), southeast (~12%) and south (~22%). The average wind speed in the South Angsi region is approximately 2.0 m/s.
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Table 3.4a SAA Wind Profile [R3.2]
Wind Speed Wind Direction (from) (%) (m/s) N NE E SE S SW W NW 0 – 1.0 1.2 3.5 1.2 1.2 4.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 – 1.5 1.8 2.9 1.2 1.8 3.0 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 – 2.0 2.4 4.6 2.4 2.4 5.4 2.4 0.5 1.0 2.0 – 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.6 0.4 0.1 3.0 – 4.0 3.6 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 0 0 4.0 – 5.0 3.6 4.1 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.1 0 0 5.0 – 6.0 1.2 0.6 0 0 0.6 0 0 0 Annual 17.0 22.0 9.0 12.0 22.0 12.0 3.0 3.0
3.4.3 Temperature
The annual average air temperature recorded offshore Terengganu lies in the range of 24 C – 32 C [R3.3].
3.4.4 Relative Humidity
Relative humidity offshore east coast Peninsular Malaysia is generally in the range 75% to 100% with a mean of about 85% [R3.3].
3.4.5 Tropical Storms
Tropical weather systems, which develop in the west of the Northern Pacific Ocean and South China Sea, can be classified by the Saffir-Simpson scale as given in Table 3.4b.
Table 3.4b Tropical Weather Systems in the West of the Northern Pacific Ocean and South China Sea
Type Category Pressure Wind Speed Note 1 Surge Line Colour (millibars) (knots) (mph) (ft) Depression TD - < 34 < 39 Green Tropical Storm TS - 34-63 39-73 Yellow Typhoon 1 > 980 64-82 74-95 4-5 Red Typhoon 2 965-980 83-95 96-110 6-8 Light Red Typhoon 3 945-965 96-112 111-130 9-12 Magenta Typhoon 4 920-945 113-134 131-155 13-18 Light Magenta Typhoon 5 < 920 >134 >155 >18 White Note 1: Wind speed is in knots where one (1) knot is equal to 1.15 mph
Historical storm trajectories indicate that tropical weather systems tend to develop in the Pacific Ocean off the southeast of the Philippine islands with a prevailing north to northwest direction of movement. These systems usually affect the Philippines and the southern cost of China; however, they
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occasionally move west towards the south of Vietnam and the Gulf of Thailand. Table 3.4c presents details of individual storms, which have affected the Exclusive Economic Zone off Peninsular Malaysia between 1965 and 2001.
Table 3.4c Severe Storms Affecting Offshore Peninsular Malaysia (UNISYS, 2006) [R3.4]
Name Month/ Year Max Wind Speed in Category knots (mph) Tropical Storm Sarah Feb, 1965 45 (52) TS Tropical Storm Gloria Dec, 1965 40 (46) TS Tropical Storm Nora Nov, 1970 50 (58) TS Typhoon Sally Nov/ Dec, 1972 80 (92) 1 Tropical Storm Irving Dec, 1985 60 (69) TS Super Typhoon Gay Nov, 1989 140 (161) 5 Typhoon Forrest Nov, 1992 125 (144) 4 Typhoon Manny Dec, 1993 120 (138) 4 Tropical Depression 31W Dec, 1999 30 (35) TD
All of the above storms occurred in the months of November and December, except for the Tropical Storm Sarah which occurred in February.
3.5 OVERVIEW OF SAA FACILITIES
3.5.1 Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB)
The MOAB is a four-legged self-erecting steel construction barge, bridge-linked (56 m) to the FSO. It is located at the East side of the FSO. It consists of a self- installing platform with a buoyant stacked template utilising suction piles for the foundation and a buoyant deck.
Fin Fan Deck (EL + 37000) – The pedestal crane, Lift Gas Train 1 and Train 2, Suction Cooler and Discharge Cooler are located at this deck;
Upper Deck (EL + 29500) – The Lift Gas Train 1 and Train 2, Compressor Package, Separators, Pumps, Chemical Tanks, Hydrocyclone, Fuel Gas Skid, Corrosion Inhibitor, Gas Turbine Generator, Wellhead Start-Up Heater and Multiphase Meter are provided on this deck;
Main Deck (EL + 21500) – The deck accommodates the HP and LP Knock Out Drum, Produced Water Degassing Vessel, Pumps, Stabilised Crude Cooler, Firewater System, Air Handling Unit, Utility and Instrument Air Receiver, Emergency Diesel Generator, Air Dryer Package, Air Compressor Package, Diesel System and Seawater System;
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Mezzanine Deck (EL + 17500) – This deck houses the Control Room, Switch Gear Room, Battery Room, Mess/Tea Room and Workshop. Wellhead bay is provided at the east of the deck. Other equipments provided on this deck including Seawater Lift Caisson, Open Drain Caisson and Transformer. The wellheads are located on the Mezzanine Deck of the Drilling Barge, which is installed next to the manifold area of the MOAB platform; and
Cellar Deck (EL + 14000) – The deck accommodates the Closed Drain Vessel, Closed Drain Pumps and Wellhead Panel.
3.5.2 Floating Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO)
The FSO is a Crude Oil Storage Tanker, spread moored and classed with American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). The FSO is owned by Malaysian International Shipping Company (MISC) as a Storage Tanker for the SAA Field. Table 3.5a summarises the ship’s general particulars for the FSO.
Table 3.5a FSO General Particulars [R3.5]
Parameters Description Length Overall (Forecast) 251.171 m Length Overall 235.780 m Length Perpendicular 224.0 m Breadth 32.2 m Depth 19.4 m Deadweight (Summer 65979 MT Light Ship Weight 13228 MT Draught (Summer) 12.827 m Draught (Tropical) 13.094 m
Detailed descriptions of the SAA facilities ie. MOAB and FSO are presented in the following sub-sections:
Section 3A: Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB); and
Section 3B: Floating Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO).
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3.6 SECTION 3 REFERENCES
[R3.1] Noble Denton Malaysia Sdn Bhd, Environmental Data Study, Report No. L17748b, 26 June 1996.
[R3.2] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn Bhd – Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi MOAB Design Safety Case, J8328, Rev. 0, 24 November 2004.
[R3.3] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn Bhd – Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi Facilities Design Safety Case, J8271, Rev. 1, 20 February 2004.
[R3.4] Unisys Corporation, Unisys Weather, Hurricane/ Tropical Data http://weather.unisys.com/hurricane/index.html.
[R3.5] IHC Gusto Engineering B.V - Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Design Basis Specification, Rev. A1, 27 December 2004.
[R3.6] Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad - Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Angsi General Arrangement, 95-HG-101001, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
[R3.7] Environmental Resources Management - Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi Development, PM-305, Exclusive Economic Zone, Offshore Peninsular Malaysia, South China Sea: Environmental Impact Assessment, J1930, Rev. 2, 28 July 2004.
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Section 3A DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS – MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
CONTENTS
3A OVERVIEW OF SAA MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB) 3A-1
3A.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 3A-1
3A.2 WELL, FLOWLINES AND MANIFOLDS 3A-1
3A.3 PIPING AND VESSELS 3A-3
3A.4 SOUTH ANGSI MOAB PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3A-3
3A.5 SOUTH ANGSI MOAB UTILITIES 3A-6
3A.6 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY 3A-16
3A.7 MAIN HSE FEATURES 3A-17
3A.8 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM 3A-18
3A.9 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS 3A-20
3A.10 SAFETY FACILITIES 3A-28
3A.11 PERSONNEL AWARENESS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 3A-30
3A.12 SECTION 3A REFERENCES 3A-32
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3A OVERVIEW OF SAA MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
3A.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The South Angsi Field has been developed using a Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) as the basis for the installation of the wellhead and oil processing facilities. The MOAB is a standalone integrated wellhead and production unit. The MOAB is floated to its location at the South Angsi Field and installed onto the submerged substructure, adjacent to the Floating Storage Offloading (FSO). The MOAB production facilities are connected to the FSO via a flowing oil delivery line. The produced and processed oil is routed to the FSO facility, which is moored adjacent to the MOAB, approximately 50 m away.
As no accommodation facilities are provided on the MOAB, the FSO extended Accommodation Block provides housing for MOAB service and operational personnel. However, a Temporary Refuge (TR) is provided for operators or maintenance staff caught on the platform by bad weather. A Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB) is installed at the bow of the FSO to allow safe passage of crew between the two (2) facilities.
Expected field life is 20 years after which the MOAB will be self-uninstalled and towed away.
3A.2 WELL, FLOWLINES AND MANIFOLDS
South Angsi MOAB wellhead facilities are designed for twelve (12) 24” well conductor slots capable of a combination of single gas or duel wells [R3A.2]. The dual completion well produces oil from one production string and gas from the second production string which is used for fuel gas [R3A.5]. Depending on reservoir development requirements the wells are used for gas production, oil production or water injection. The present well configuration on MOAB is contained in Table 3A.2a. The gas and oil production from the wells are routed into the 1st Stage Separator through a 12” production header for a three (3) phase separation process [R3A.6]. The wellheads are rated to API 5000.
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Table 3A.2a Well Details for South Angsi MOAB
Well No. Type [R3A.11] Status Slot No. CITHP (psig) 10-WH-1001 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-5 2100 Well 10-WH-1002 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-2 2100 Well 10-WH-1003 Oil/ Fuel Gas Production Dual Producing SAA-1 2100 Completion Wells 10-WH-1004 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-4 2100 Well 10-WH-1007 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-7 2100 Well 10-WH-1008 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-10 2100 Well 10-WH-1009 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-9 2100 Well 10-WH-1010 Oil Production Single Completion Producing SAA-11 2100 Well 10-WH-5101 Water Injection Single Completion Injecting SAA-8 - Well 10-WH-5102 Water Injection Dual Completion Injecting SAA-6 - Wells 10-WH-5103 Water Injection Single Completion Injecting SAA-3 - Well 10-WH-5104 Water Injection Single Completion Injecting SAA-12 - Well
Spare tie in points are provided for the future dual oil well and gas lift for water injection. Spare connections are fitted with a blind, double block and bleed isolation facility [R3A.2].
Corrosion inhibitor is continuously injected upstream of each choke valve to
reduce the corrosivity of the production fluids due to the presence of H2O, CO2 and water in the reservoir fluid [R3A.4].
An automated Surface Controlled Sub-surface Safety Valve (SCSSV) and a Surface Safety Valve (SSV) is installed on each well string. The wing valve (WV) and gas lift valve on the wellhead is manually operated. An actuated SDV is provided on the gas lift supply to each well string. All the actuated valves are hydraulically operated from the Wellhead Control Panel (WHCP). The Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) will safely shutdown the facilities when process or environmental parameters are beyond acceptable condition [R3A.3].
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The oil and gas flowlines are rated to ANSI 300# and are protected from overpressure by high and low pressure trips connected to the WHCP. Upon activation of pressure high or pressure low detection, master valve of the relevant well will be closed, whereas pressure high-high or pressure low-low detection shuts the SCSSV [R3A.4].
The Oil Production and Test Manifolds are rated at ANSI 300#. The oil and gas flowlines are each fitted with a manual choke valve will be aligned to either the Test or the Production Manifolds. The well on test will be routed through a Multi-phase Flow Meter (MFM) before flowing to the 1st Stage Separator [R3A.2].
3A.3 PIPING AND VESSELS
Colour coding and identification of pipework throughout the installations of MOAB is as accordance to Petronas Standards. Stickers are used as markings on the pipes.
3A.4 SOUTH ANGSI MOAB PROCESS DESCRIPTION
3A.4.1 Primary Separation (1st Stage Separator)
The Full Wellstream (FWS) oil separation and stabilisation system on MOAB platform comprises of two (2) stages of separation, 1st Stage Separator (10-V- 1110) and 2nd Stage Separator (10-V-1130). The separation system is required to achieve the specific oil quality by removing water and the associated gas from the well production prior to storage on the Floating Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) [R3A.5].
FWS fluid from the production header, inclusive of lift gas, is routed into the 1st Stage Separator for a three (3) phase separation [R3A.5]. It also receives recycled produced water from 2nd Stage Separator and recovered oil/ water from the Closed Drain Drums [R3A.1].
The 1st Stage Separator operates at pressure of 1,275 kPag and temperature of 79 C, by routing gas to the Gas Lift Compressors and venting excess associated gas to the HP Flare system [R3A.3]. If required, the 1st Stage Separator has the option of operating at pressure 2,700 kPag by routing gas directly to the fuel gas system using the compression system suction cooler to cool the gas. During this mode of operation, the Gas Lift Compressors are offline and the wells can deliver against the topsides pressure [R3A.5].
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Oils from the 1st Stage Separator flows to the 2nd Stage Separator under level control. An adjustable weir is installed in the 1st Stage Separator to control the level of oil and water, whereby the oil overflows the weir and the level control will adjust the outflow to the 2nd Stage Separator. High-high and low-low level trips are provided on the separator. High-high interface level will generate an alarm, thus allowing water to overflow to the oil section and the 2nd Stage Separator for a short period of time. Drain lines are provided to drain liquid into the Closed Drain System [R3A.5].
Produced water from the 2nd Stage Separator is pumped back to the water section of the 1st Stage Separator via Produced Water Booster Pumps (10-P- 1135A/B) [R3A.1]. The separated produced water from the 1st Stage Separator is then sent to the Produced Water Treatment (10-ME-3300) for residual oil in water recovery prior to overboard discharge [R3A.5].
The 1st Stage Separator is rated to ANSI 300# and protected against overpressure by means of primary (pressure trips) and secondary (PSV) pressure protection devices as per API-RP-14C. SDVs are also provided on the liquid inlet and outlet lines of the separator, which will close on process upsets and emergencies [R3A.4].
3A.4.2 2nd Stage Separator
The function of the 2nd Stage Separator (10-V-1130) is to stabilise the crude oil by flashing off volatile component at near atmospheric pressure conditions (55 kPag) and temperature of 75 C. This three (3) phase separator receives fluids from several sources [R3A.1]:
Oil (plus any entrained water) from the 1st Stage Separator; Liquids from compressor suction drums; Liquids from fuel gas system; and Recovered oil from hydrocyclones.
A fixed weir is installed in the 2nd Stage Separator to control the level of oil and water, whereby the oil overflows the weir and the level control will adjust the outflow for export to the FSO. High-high and low-low level trips are provided on the separator [R3A.4]. High-high interface level will generate an alarm, thus allowing water to overflow to the oil section and to the FSO for a short period of time [R3A.5].
The stabilised crude oil from the 2nd Stage Separator is pumped to the FSO through the Stabilised Crude Cooler (10-HX-1170) via Crude Transfer Pumps (10-P-1160A/B). Produced water from the 2nd Stage Separator is pumped back
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to the 1st Stage Separator using 2 x 100% Produced Water Booster Pumps (10-P- 1135A/B). The flash gas is pressure controlled to the LP Flare system. Drain lines are provided to drain liquid into the Closed Drain System [R3A.5]. The 2nd Stage Separator is rated to ANSI 150# and protected against overpressure by means of primary (pressure trips) and secondary (PSV) pressure protection devices as per API-RP-14C. SDVs are also provided on the liquid outlet lines of the separator, which will close on process upsets and emergencies [R3A.4].
3A.4.3 Oil Export
The oil export system transfers stabilised crude oil from MOAB to the FSO for storage prior to being exported via a shuttle tanker [R3A.5].
Oil from the 2nd Stage Separator is pumped out under level control to the FSO using 2 x 100% Crude Transfer Pumps (10-P-1160A/B), one in operating and one standby configuration. The pumps are protected against low flow by a minimum flow recycle back to the separator [R3A.1].
The oil is cooled to 45 C in the Stabilised Crude Cooler (10-HX-1170A/B) before exporting to FSO, using seawater as a cooling medium. Controlling the flow rate of seawater to the exchanger regulates the oil rundown temperature [R3A.1]. Sufficient cooling is required to ensure that vapour pressure of the oil is below the atmospheric pressure, thereby minimising the off-gassing on the FSO [R3A.3]. A temperature control valve in the seawater return line controls the flow of seawater for cooling of oil in the Stabilised Crude Cooler, with high and low temperature alarms provided [R3A.4].
The oil export line is heat traced due to the waxy nature of the crude oil. The transfer hose between the MOAB and FSO is slung between the two facilities, with provision of isolation valve at the edge of MOAB where the hose is connected [R3A.5].
3A.4.4 Gas Lift Compressors [R3A.5]
There are 2 x 50% Gas Lift Compressor trains (10-ME-2700/2750), each of which containing a two-stage electrically driven reciprocating compressor and its associated cooling system. The separated gas from the 1st Stage Separator is routed to the Gas Lift Compressor and compressed to a pressure of 10,450 kPag prior to supplying the gas lift manifold and fuel gas system. The gas lift compression system and gas lift manifold is designed for 12 MMSCFD, while each gas lift flowline is designed for 4 MMSCFD. Each compressor train is isolatable by ESDVs at the inlet and outlet of the train.
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The gas from the 1st Stage Separator splits to the two trains. The gas is cooled in the 1st Stage Suction Cooler (10-HX-2705/2755) to at least 48 C and the liquid condensation developed during the cooling process being removed by routing the gas into the 1st Stage Suction Scrubber (10-V-2710/2760). Condensed hydrocarbon liquid and water are drained under level control to the 2nd Stage Separator. The gas is compressed from approximately 1,200 kPag to an intermediate pressure of 3,463 kPag.
Hot gas discharged from the 1st Stage Compressor (10-C-2715/2765) is cooled in the 1st Stage Discharge Cooler (10-HX-2720/2770) to at least 48 C and then routed to the 2nd Stage Suction Scrubber (10-V-2725/2775) to remove liquid condensation developed during the cooling process. The hydrocarbon liquid and water are drained under level control to the 2nd Stage Separator. The gas is further compressed from the intermediate pressure to 10,350 kPag. Hot gas from the discharge of the 2nd Stage Compressor (10-C-2730/2780) is cooled in the 2nd Stage Discharge Cooler (10-HX-2735/2785) to 80 C prior being sent to the fuel gas and gas lift system.
The Gas Lift Compressors are provided with discharge pressure control to ensure a stable gas pressure to the gas lift wells and to bleed off gas to the fuel gas system by adjusting of the recycle rate. The suction pressure to the Gas Lift Compressors is regulated by either flaring excess gas or gas make-up from the fuel gas well.
3A.5 SOUTH ANGSI MOAB UTILITIES
A number of utility systems are provided on the MOAB for safe and efficient operation of the facilities. The main systems are described below.
3A.5.1 Electrical Power
3A.5.1.1 Power Generation and Distribution [R3A.5]
The MOAB main power generation system comprises a 1 x100% configuration of 3.3 kV Gas Turbine Generator (GTG) (TE-8010) rated at 7200 kW. Under normal operating condition, TE-8010 is capable in supplying all the platform electrical power requirements at the designed production capacity.
The GTG is connected to the Medium Voltage (MV – 3.3 kV) Switchboard SB- 8030 where electrical power is distributed to 3.3 kV pump motor, two (2) 3.3 kV LP Gas Compressor motor and low voltage (LV – 415 V) loads through 3.3 kV/0.433 kV step-down power transformer (TF-8040) to the 415 V AC Motor Control Centre MCC-8120.
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The 415 V AC Motor Control Centre MCC-8120 is segregated into two small sections by bus-tie circuit breaker; Bus ‘A’ (normal) and Bus ‘B’ (essential). Smaller 415 V motor and feeder loads are supplied from Motor Control Centre MCC-8120 Bus ‘A’ while Bus ‘B’ are feeding GTG auxiliaries motors, emergency lighting DB-8650, heaters, air compressors, HVAC loads and Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).
3A.5.1.2 System Earthing – Lightning protection and Earthing
Provision is made to earth all equipment and supporting structures. The need for protection against lightning surges is essential, therefore requirements for protection of structures against lightning has been implemented.
3A.5.2 Diesel Fuel System [R3A.5]
Diesel fuel transferred from the supply boat or FSO will pass through Diesel Inlet Filter (10-F-4430) prior to storage. Diesel fuel is stored in the Crane Pedestal Diesel Tank (10-TK-4420) on the MOAB Main Deck, pumped by 2 x 100% Diesel Transfer Pump (10-P-4450A/B) to the Gas Turbine Generator, Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tank, Crane Day Tank and Firewater Pump Day Tank via the Diesel Filter Coalescers (10-F-4440A/B).
Diesel from the storage tank is circulated through the Diesel Treatment/ Water Removal Package (10-ME-4410), where the water content and the solids content are reduced, suitable for use at the generator turbine. A portion of the diesel is returned to the storage tank. Overflow from the Crane Pedestal Diesel Tank is routed to the non-hazardous Open Drain Header.
The Diesel Storage Tank is provided with level gauge and atmospheric vent fitted with a flame arrestor.
3A.5.3 Air System [R3A.5]
There is a dedicated instrument and utility air system located on the MOAB Main Deck. The instrument and utility air system comprises of two (2) Air Compressor Package (10-ME-5400A/B) associated with 2 x 75% Air Compressor (10-C-5410A/B), Utility Air Receiver (10-V-5410), Instrument Air Receiver (10- V-5350) and Air Dryer Package (10-ME-5300). The Air Compressor Package is operated on a “lead/lag” configuration whereby one (1) compressor runs continuously as a “lead” compressor supplying demands to the air system, whilst the other “lag” compressor is stopped.
Plant air is directly taken from the air compressors and stored in the Utility Air Receiver, where air is then distributed to the platform. Instrument air system
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produces dry and clean air supplied to all instrumentation on the platform and the air driven chemical injection pumps, whereas the utility air is provided to the air powered tools and closed drain transfer pumps.
The utility air supply header is equipped with a back pressure regulator to ensure adequate pressure supplied with priority given to the instrument air system. The instrument air receiver and utility air receiver are equipped with pressure gauge and level gauge. Low-low pressure in the instrument air system will generate an ESD and shutdown the platform. A continuous drainer is provided at the liquid outlet to drain the liquid collected in the receiver.
3A.5.4 Water Systems
3A.5.4.1 Potable Water System [R3A.5]
MOAB potable water is supplied either directly from supply boat on a weekly basis or from the FSO via a connecting hose. The potable water provides 65litres/man/day for personnel consumption. The system also feeds for emergency eye wash and safety showers system, emergency generator and gas turbine generator.
The potable water system is provided with two (2) Potable Water Storage Tanks (10-TK-4320A/B), to allow for cleaning and inspection without affecting the normal supply. Both tanks will be sparged with ozone via Ozone Generator (10-ME-4370) to prevent biological growth. Potable Water Filters (10-F- 4360A/B) are provided in the loading system as a precaution to catch small quantities of undetected contaminants generated during the loading process.
Potable water is distributed to various users by 2 x 100% Potable Water Pumps (10-P-4330A/B). The supply of potable water to personnel areas flows via a UV-Sterilisation unit (10-ME-4350) to neutralise bacteria.
A minimum flow recycle line from the Potable Water Pumps continually diverts water back into the Potable Water Storage Tanks, maintaining the water supply pressure to the safety showers. Standby pump will be started automatically on detection of low water pressure. Back pressure control valve in the distribution header ensures that priority is given to the safety showers and personnel amenities, by restricting flow to the industrial users whenever there is demand by the safety showers. The use of potable water is mainly to clean special materials and final rinse to remove seawater traces. The Potable Water Storage Tanks are provided with high and low level alarms.
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3A.5.4.2 Produced Water Treatment
Produced water from the separation process is treated to remove hydrocarbon oil and gas prior to overboard discharge. The free oil in the discharged water shall be less than 20 ppmv [R3A.2].
Water discharged from the 1st Stage Separator is routed to the Hydrocyclone (10-V-3310) in the Produced Water System. The water from the Hydrocyclone flows under level control from the 1st Stage Separator interface controller to the Produced Water Degassing Vessel (10-V-3320). The Produced Water Degassing Vessel is provided to disengage gas from the water before it is discharged overboard [R3A.5]. It also provides a skimming function for free oil that separates from the water and can be used for temporary produced water treatment with provision of double block isolation on the water inlet and outlet lines. Separated oil from the Hydrocyclone is routed to the 2nd Stage Separator under pressure control [R3A.6].
As gas rates from the Provided Water Degasser Vessel are expected to be low, the vessel is gas blanketed with fuel gas to maintain a stable positive operating pressure. The gas from Produced Water Degasser Vessel is pressure controlled to the LP Flare system and the water is discharged overboard under level control. Skimmed oil is drained intermittently to the Closed Drains Vessel [R3A.6].
3A.5.4.3 Hypo-chlorination System [R3A.5]
The Hypo-chlorination System on the MOAB produces hypochlorite from seawater, for injection into the 2 x 50% Seawater Lift Pumps (10-P-4810A/B) and Firewater Pump (10-P-5230) to protect against marine growth.
The hypochlorite supplied to each pump comprises of a continuous trickle feed line with a restriction orifice and a dosing line. The dosing line includes a non/off valve on the supply line, linked to the pump start logic ensuring that the valve is kept opened when pump is in operation.
3A.5.4.4 Seawater Treatment and Injection System
The Seawater Treatment and Injection System provide seawater for Water Injection System, Firewater System, Service Water System, Hypochlorite Generator, Crude Oil Cooler and Deaerator Tower Vacuum Pump. The seawater is supplied by a 2 x 50% Seawater Lift Pumps (10-P-4810A/B) and treated in a 2 x 100% Seawater Coarse Filters (10-ME-4810), followed by a 2 x 100% Seawater Fine Filters (10-ME-4830) [R3A.5].
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The Seawater Lift Pumps also serve as back-up firewater supply. When firewater is required, the Water Injection System will be shutdown making flow from Seawater Lift Pumps available for fire fighting, powered from the Auxiliary Board. The Seawater Coarse Filter Package is an intermittent backwash unit and the filtered water is distributed to users including cooling, electrochlorination and hose stations for wash-down [R3A.5].
Water Injection System is required to maintain pressure at the well reservoir. However, before seawater can be injected it has to be deaerated and filtered. Coagulant and polyelectrolyte chemicals are added to the Seawater Fine Filters to assist in filtration process. Foam and algae formation in the Deaerator Tower (10-V-5150) is controlled with addition of antifoam and biocide chemicals respectively [R3A.3].
The water is then routed to the injection water manifold, where the flow splits to the three (3) water injection wells [R3A.5].
3A.5.4.5 Firewater System
There is an active firewater system on the MOAB to supply fire water to monitors, hose reels and deluge systems in the process units by a Diesel Engine Driven Fire Water Pump (10-P-5230), installed in a Firewater Pump Caissson (10-ME-5240).
Two (2) main supplies of water are taken from 2 x 50% Seawater Lift Pumps (10-P-4810A/B) and the Firewater Pump (10-P-5230). The Seawater Lift Pumps are electric motor driven which can both be powered from the Emergency Board and the Firewater Pump is diesel engine driven. The firewater ring main is pressurised from the Seawater Lift Pumps [R3A.6].
The Firewater Pump Caisson is cladded with copper nickel at the bottom 1.0 m and dosed with hypochlorite to prevent marine growth in the system.
The deluge valves are located in the safe area behind the firewall and will be automatically operated on confirmed fire detection in an area. Fire monitors are located around the hazardous area providing coverage of the fire area. Hose reels are installed at areas so that all locations on the platform can be reached using a 20 m hose [R3A.6].
Two pressure transmitters with 1oo2 voting are provided to detect the low pressure at the firewater ring main. Each transmitter is set for three (3) levels of pressure, low (PIAL), low-low (PIALL) and low-low-low (PIALLL). PIAL detection will start the lead Seawater Lift Pump, whereas PIALL detection will
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start the lag Seawater Lift Pump. A higher firewater demand resulting in further drop of ring main pressure will trigger the PIALLL to start the Diesel Firewater Pump [R3A.3].
3A.5.5 Heating, Venting and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
A dedicated HVAC System is provided on MOAB to provide conditioned air to rooms on the Below MOAB Deck.
The HVAC system serves the following functions on the MOAB platform [R3A.5]:
Providing comfortable environment at working areas; Providing conditioned air (suitable temperature and humidity) for equipment rooms; Maintaining positive pressurization in all air conditioned areas to prevent ingress of gas or smoke; Allowing purging of air conditioned areas after contamination or during “black start”; and Safe shutdown and to provide air tight isolation during emergencies.
Supply air will not be returned to the system and is vented through a separate dedicated exhaust system. Fresh air for the air handling unit is drawn from a safe area.
In all areas, HVAC systems are designed to provide as a minimum, the air change rate necessary to maintain area pressurisation differentials to give the required segregation for area classification and for human comfort. The system however does not provide protection for overheating of electrical equipment or instrumentation during the egress period.
3A.5.6 Lighting
The MOAB platform is provided with lighting fed by lighting distribution panels. Some lighting units are provided with integral batteries for emergency lighting.
3A.5.7 Flaring and Venting Systems
3A.5.7.1 High Pressure (HP) Flare System [R3A.5]
The HP Flare System on MOAB is provided to dispose of the high pressure process releases during emergencies and process upsets by routing it to a safe location for combustion. The HP Flare System comprises of a HP Flare
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Knockout Drum with boot (10-V-5610) and an electrical heater (10-E-5620) and HP Flare Tip (10-ME-5630).
All relief from the high pressure sources collected in the HP Flare Header is routed to the HP Flare Knockout Drum where liquids are separated from the gas stream prior to routing to the sonic type HP Flare Tip located on the platform flare boom. Liquid collected in the drum is gravitationally routed to the Closed Drain System under level control.
Two (2) high level alarms are provided on the HP Flare Knockout Drum. A high level detection will initiate a production shutdown (PSD), whereas high- high level detection will initiate a platform shutdown (ESD) by ensuring that un-isolated wells are shut-in by their SCSSVs.
A continuous purge gas from the fuel gas system with backup purge gas by Nitrogen is provided to the HP Flare Header to maintain the flame at the flare tip to prevent air ingress.
The HP Flare System is designed for 25 MMSCFD for peak emergency flaring.
3A.5.7.2 Low Pressure (LP) Flare System [R3A.5]
The LP Flare System provides safe disposal of low pressure gas releases from the 2nd Stage Separator, Produced Water Degasser and Closed Drains Vessel. The LP Flare System consists of a LP Flare Knockout Drum with boot (10-V- 5510) and an electrical heater (10-E-5520), LP Flare Tip (10-ME-5530) and LP Flare Air Blower Unit (10-ME-5540).
All the relief and venting from the low pressure equipment will be routed to the LP Flare Header before flowing to the LP Flare Knockout Drum for liquid removal prior to combustion at the flare tips. Liquid collected in the drum is gravitational routed to the Closed Drain System under level control. Two (2) high level alarms are provided on the drum. A high level detection will initiate a PSD, whereas high-high level detection will initiate an ESD.
The LP Flare Header is purged with fuel gas to prevent air ingress, with backup purge gas by Nitrogen. Due to its low backpressure, the gas from the LP Flare Knockout Drum is routed to a pipe flare located on the platform flare boom. Blower Panel (10-PN-5540) is provided for the LP Flare Tip to achieve smokeless effect for continuous flaring at the LP Flare Tip.
The LP Flare System is designed for 13 MMSCFD for peak emergency flaring.
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3A.5.8 Drains
3A.5.8.1 Closed Drain System [R3A.5]
The Closed Drain System located at the lowest deck level between the MOAB Hull and Well Conductor platform, comprises a Closed Drain Vessel (10-V- 6010) with electric heater (10-E-6020) and Closed Drain Transfer Pumps (10-P- 6030A/B). This system provides drain connections for all equipment handling hazardous material at high pressure. It also receives recovered hydrocarbon from the Open Drains Caisson and rejected oil from the Produced Water Degassing Vessel. An on/ off electric heater provided will heat up the liquid to the above wax and pour point to prevent wax formation in the vessel.
The separated liquid is returned to the 2nd Stage Separator via 2 x 100% Closed Drain Transfer Pumps, operating on a lead-lag configuration. Gas from the Closed Drains Vessel is pressure controlled to the LP Flare system.
The Closed Drains Vessel has low-low level trips to protect the Closed Drain Transfer Pumps. High and low level alarms are also provided for the vessel. A high level detection will initiate a plant PSD while low level detection results in USD. A high-high level trip is provided to the liquid overflowing to the LP Flare Knockout Drum.
The Closed Drain Vessel is sized to accommodate the liquid inventory in the largest vessel drained from the low alarm level. Drain headers on the MOAB platform are provided with rodding points at each bend to facilitate removal of blockages.
3A.5.8.2 Open Drain System [R3A.5]
Open deck drains are provided for the disposal of rainwater, spillage (including spillage from hydrocarbon liquids) and water from maintenance operations. The Open Drain System on MOAB comprises of three main collection headers (Hazardous Open Drains Header, Low Level Hazardous Drain Header and Non-Hazardous Open Drains), Open Drain Caisson (10-ME-6110) and Open Drain Caisson Pump (10-P-6120).
The Open Drain System collects liquids from open area, both in hazardous and non-hazardous areas. Drainage from the hazardous areas and non-hazardous areas are segregated to prevent migration of hazardous material into the non- hazardous areas.
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The hazardous and non-hazardous collection headers are routed into the Open Drain Caisson. The separated hydrocarbon liquids are manually pumped to the Closed Drain Vessel via the Open Drain Caisson Pump. Water is discharged through the bottom of the caisson and gas is directly vented to atmospheric vent.
All the drain headers on the MOAB platform are provided with rodding points at each bend to facilitate removal of blockages.
3A.5.9 Fuel Gas System [R3A.5]
The Fuel Gas System conditions the gas used for the power generation system. It is also used for blanketing the Produced Water Degassing Vessel and purging of the HP Flare, LP Flare and Closed Drain Headers.
The Fuel Gas System comprises of a Fuel Gas Pre-heater (10-E-4010), Fuel Gas Knockout Drum (10-V-4020), Fuel Gas Scrubber (10-V-4030), Fuel Gas Superheater (10-E-4040) and 2 x 100% Fuel Gas Filters (10-F-4050A/B). The Fuel Gas Pre-heater is only required during cold start-up of the fuel gas well after a prolong shutdown.
There are three (3) possible sources of fuel gas:
Gas Lift Compressor discharge; Fuel gas well; and 1st Stage Separator (when operating at high pressure).
Gas from all sources is pressure controlled to the fuel gas pressure with liquid condensation removed. As one of the fuel gas sources is direct from a well, liquid removal is a two-stage process, a primary Fuel Gas Knockout Drum fitted with a vane pack to remove bulk liquids produced from the well, followed by a Fuel Gas Scrubber fitted with mist mat. The gas is then superheated to 28 C by a Fuel Gas Superheater and filtered before distributed to users. Liquids from the Fuel Gas Knockout Drum and Fuel Gas Scrubber are routed to the 2nd Stage Separator under level control.
The fuel gas well is provided with a Surface Controlled Sub-surface Safety Valve (SCSSV), Surface Safety Valve (SSV), a manual Wing Valve (WV) and a manual Choke Valve. The SCSSV and SSV are hydraulically operated from the Wellhead Control Panel (WHCP). The fuel gas flowline is protected by a high and low pressure alarm, which upon activation will close the SSV of the relevant well via WHCP. SCSSV and SSV will also be closed upon activation of MOAB and FSO ESD.
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A high and low level alarm is provided on the Fuel Gas Knockout Drum, whereas high and low pressure alarm is provided on the gas outlet. In the event of Fuel Gas Superheater is not available, provision of a bypass line allows the fuel gas to flow to FSO, Produced Water System and gas purging.
3A.5.10 Chemical Injection Facilities
Chemicals are stored in standard tote tanks of 1.5 m3 volume capacity on MOAB platform. Each tote tank consists of 2 x 100% Injection Pumps complete with calibration gauge, inlet strainer, outlet dampener and safety relief valve. Injection rate control devices (IRCD) are used to control the chemical dosing rates to various injection points [R3A.5].
The following Oil and Gas Chemical Injection Systems are available on MOAB [R3A.5],[R3A.6]:
Corrosion Inhibitor (oil/ gas) to minimise the corrosion rate in the Carbon Steel flowlines and piping; Demulsifier to facilitate oil and water separation in the 1st Stage Separator; Reverse Demulsifier to assist separation of oil from water in the Hydrocyclone; and Scale Inhibitor to control or prevent scaling in the Produced Water Treatment system.
Pour Point Depressant (PPD) is not recommended in the design stage but will be included in the future when required.
The following Seawater Chemical Injection Systems are available on MOAB [R3A.5], [R3A.6]:
Antifoam to prevent the formation of foam in the Deaerator Tower; Biocide to control bacteria growth in the Deaerator Tower and Closed Drain Vessel; Coagulant/ Polyelectrolyte to enhance filtration performance of seawater fine filters; Oxygen Scavenger to reduce the oxygen content in the injection water in the Deaerator Tower; and Scale Inhibitor to inhibit scale formation when injected seawater mixes with the produced water in the reservoir.
3A.5.11 Nitrogen System
Nitrogen cylinder racks (10-ME-6400A/B) on the MOAB Main Deck consists of two (2) bottle storage racks, each containing six (6) bottles. The nitrogen system
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available on MOAB is provided as a back-up to the fuel gas system for the purging of flare systems and blanketing of vessels. It is also used to pressurize the fuel gas well flow line during black start-up. The hose station is located around the platform for purging out small equipment items [R3A.6].
The nitrogen bottles are equipped with a pressure regulator on the outlet set at 8800kPag, which is letdown to 350kPag for use in the distribution system to the hose systems. High and low pressure alarm is provided on the nitrogen distribution header. Each outlet line from the nitrogen pack is equipped with a manual venting line to a safe location [R3A.5].
3A.6 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY
3A.6.1 General Operations [R3A.1]
The MOAB is a standalone integrated wellhead and production unit, manned by 15 personnel. These personnel work on a 12 hour shift system carrying out monitoring and maintenance activities. As no accommodation facilities are provided on the MOAB, the FSO extended Accommodation Block provides housing for MOAB service and operational personnel. A Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB) installed at the bow of the FSO allows safe passage of crew between the two (2) facilities.
The crew works on a standard two (2) weeks on and two (2) weeks off shift rotation, giving an average of 26 weeks per year offshore. All personnel are transported to FSO by helicopter and from FSO to the MOAB platform via the PTB.
3A.6.2 Control Philosophy [R3A.5]
The MOAB overall controls, safeguarding and monitoring is achieved by use of an Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS), supplied by Yokogawa. The ICSS comprises of Process Control System (ICSS-PCS), Safety Shutdown System (ICSS-SDS) and Fire and Gas System (ICSS-FGS). Each system is independent and failure of one system will not affect operation of the other system. The ICSS architecture and hardware is based on a conventional Distributed Control System (DCS).
The ICSS design ensures reliability of operation through the use of redundancy where necessary. The process shutdown functions are fail-safe and designed to a level of availability, integrity and reliability commensurate with the application and process requirements.
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The ICCS-PCS provides basic monitoring and regulatory control of the process and utility systems. ICSS-SDS monitors the process condition and initiates shutdown of process when an abnormal condition is detected. On the other hand, ICSS-FGS monitors the combustible gas levels and fire by initiating process shutdown via ICSS-SDS upon detection of an abnormal condition. Deluge system is activated when necessary.
The ICSS is provided with a Communication Gateway (ACG) to enable transmission of data to the FSO via redundant fibre optics network, and TML Office via VSAT network. The Operator Interface Stations (OIS), Plant Resources Management System (PRM) and Engineering Workstation (EWS) are linked via an independent dual redundant Ethernet network, which is also extended to the FSO, via redundant fibre optics network, linking the Human Interface Stations (HIS) and EWS in FSO.
3A.6.3 Maintenance Philosophy
The basic maintenance philosophy is to safeguard the technical integrity of facilities and pipelines whilst ensuring that the availability of the equipment and systems is met within the constraints of safety, environmental protection, production plans and statutory requirements.
3A.7 MAIN HSE FEATURES
3A.7.1 Mechanical and Piping Design
The SAA facilities have been designed in accordance with the relevant codes and related industry standards, such as American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), American National Standards Institute (ANSI), American Petroleum Institute (API), etc. For details on mechanical and piping design, refer to Codes and Standards in the Basis of Design.
3A.7.2 Hazardous Area Classification
Area classification is the division of a plant or installation into hazardous area and non-hazardous areas. A hazardous area is defined as a three-dimensional space in which a flammable atmosphere may be expected to be present at such frequencies as to require special precautions for the use of electrical apparatus, and for any other work that may introduce a source of ignition. All other areas are referred to as non-hazardous/safe.
The electrical equipments installed on the South Angsi Facilities are classified into hazardous and non-hazardous areas in accordance to IP Mode Code of Safe Practice Part 15 “Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations” [R3A.5].
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The hazardous areas on MOAB are as follows:
Zone 0 : An area where flammable atmosphere is continuously present or present for long periods of time;
Zone 1 : An area where a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur during normal operations; and
Zone 2 : An area where flammable atmosphere is unlikely to occur during normal operations; and if occurs, will only exist for a short period of time.
For more details on MOAB zoning, refer to the MOAB Hazardous Area Classification Layouts [R3A.9].
3A.8 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM
Fire and Gas Detection System aims to detect any release of process gas at an early stage in its development and to warn personnel on the platform and at a continuously manned control centre. The detectors are linked to a detection and alarm system, which will initiate alarm and executive actions throughout the MOAB in the event of confirmed fire and gas detection.
Sections below elaborate on the different types of detectors found on MOAB platform.
3A.8.1 Gas Detectors [R3A.5]
Infra-red (IR) gas detectors provided in MOAB comprises of the Point-Type gas detectors and Open Path gas detectors. Point-Type gas detectors are installed in the following areas on MOAB:
Hydrocarbon processing area; Wellhead area; Ventilation intakes; Air compressor area/ air intakes and Diesel Generator Area; Gas lift Compressor Area; Electrochlorination area; and MOAB Export area.
Open path detectors are provided around the process area and hazardous area on the MOAB Upper Deck and MOAB Main Deck to increase the detection coverage.
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Alarm levels for Point-Type gas detectors are set at 20% (high gas concentration) and 60% (high-high gas concentration) of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) with exception of the detectors at the Ventilation area where alarm levels are set at 15% and 40% respectively. For Open Path gas detectors, alarm levels are set at 1.0 (high gas concentration) and 2.0 (high-high gas concentration) of the Lower Explosive Limit meter (LELm).
No toxic gas (H2S, CO2, CO etc) detectors are provided on MOAB platform.
Gas detectors are IR type, except for the H2 gas detectors on the Battery Room which are of Catalytic Bead Type.
3A.8.2 Fire Detectors [R3A.5]
Flame detectors are used in areas where hydrocarbons or other flammables are possibly present in large quantities to ensure early indication of fire prior to actuation of installed fusible plugs loops.
IR type flame detectors are used for open areas due to their resistance to sunlight, vibrating and non-vibrating black body radiations.
3A.8.3 Smoke Detectors [R3A.5]
Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus (VESDA) is provided in the MOAB rooms (Instrument Control Room, Switchgear Room, workshops and 12-men Mess/ Meeting Room) with exception of the Battery Room, which is combined with the VESDA system in the Transformer Room.
The VESDA system comprises of an air sampling pipes network fitted with high efficiency aspirators, which monitors the airflow changes in the pipes employing Class 1 laser light sources and sensors to detect the presence of smoke in the air sample. Display panel fitted on the system provides status of the detector, and all alarm, service and fault events.
An early detection of smoke is provided by VESDA with a sensitivity range of 0.005 – 20% obscuration/m. The VESDA systems are programmed to two (2) alarm levels, low smoke and high smoke. On detection of low smoke, an alarm will be displayed at the Integrated Control and Safety System (ICSS) Operator Interface Stations (OIS). On detection of high smoke, General Platform Alarm (GPA) will be initiated and HVAC dampers will be closed.
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3A.8.4 Heat Detectors [R3A.5]
Heat detectors are provided in areas ie. Instrument Control Room, Switchgear Room, Battery Room and workshops on MOAB, where a rapid rise in temperature is expected or in areas which are not suitable for smoke detectors.
3A.8.4.1 Pneumatic/ Fusible Plug Fire Detection [R3A.5]
Pneumatic fusible plug loops are provided with temperature set point at 71 C except those for the fin fan coolers, which are rated for 124 C. For details on fusible plug loops coverage, refer to the Fusible Plug Loop Layout for MOAB. Fusible plugs are located on the MOAB platform as per API 14C [R3A.10]. The fusible plug loop on the Upper Deck, Main Deck and Below MOAB Deck/ Wellbay area activates the deluge systems, whereas the fusible plug loop on the firewater pump acts only as an alarm.
3A.8.5 Hydrogen Gas Detectors [R3A.5]
Hydrogen gas detectors, which are of Catalytic Bead Type, are installed to continually monitor the air inside the Battery Room on MOAB for any hydrogen build up, which could be potentially explosive.
3A.9 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS
3A.9.1 Manual Alarm Callpoint (MAC)
MACs are located strategically throughout the MOAB along the escape routes and adjacent to exits from an area. MAC stations are painted in red. Actuation of this results in an alarm given at the fire alarm panel. Personnel have to break the glass on MAC in order to initiate alarm [R3A.5].
3A.9.2 Emergency Shutdown System
The MOAB Emergency Shutdown System, which is part of the ICSS (ICSS-SDS), is provided to protect personnel, the facilities and the environment in the event a hazardous situation develops on the MOAB. The level of shutdown will depend on the nature and severity of the events and are controlled in a sequential manner to enable a safe and effective shutdown [R3A.5].
Shutdowns on MOAB platform is classified into four (4) categories:
Level 4 : Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA) – Manual activation of PAPA, which triggers an abandon platform audible alarm specific on the platform where it has been initiated;
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Level 3 : Emergency Shutdown (ESD) – Activation of an ESD causes stoppage of all production activities from the wellhead platforms, closure of all platform shutdown valves (SDV), followed by automatic blowdown of inventory within all the isolated systems. Blowdown occurs after a time delay of five (5) minutes. An ESD is activated in events of confirmed gas detection, confirmed fire detection, high-high level in the flare knockout drum system or low-low level in the instrumentation air pressure;
Level 2 : Process Shutdown (PSD) – Activation of a PSD causes closure of all production wellheads surface safety valve (SSV) via wellhead control panel (WHCP) except for the fuel gas well, and also causes closure of all platform SDVs. A PSD does not activate automatic blowdown of the platform production systems and stoppage of all production activities; and
Level 1 : Unit Shutdown (USD) – Activation of a USD causes closure of all appropriate unit SDV's resulting in isolation of the affected unit from the rest of the platform facilities without affecting the production due to localised upset in the system.
The Emergency Shutdown System has initiators for shutdown and the logics are based on the process cause and effect matrices. For a list of cause and effects, refer to the MOAB Cause and Effects Matrices [R3A.7]. The logic circuits are grouped on the MOAB Instrument Control Room (ICR) and FSO Local Control Room (LCR) for local and remote shutdown respectively [R3A.1].
3A.9.3 Alarms and Annunciation
The MOAB is provided with means whereby personnel at any part of the platform will be made aware of the existence of an emergency, the location of the emergency and any special instructions for escape and mustering. The MOAB alarms are annunciated through the Public Address and General Alarm (PAGA) system and work on a priority structure as below:
1st : Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA); and 2nd : General Platform Alarm (GPA).
3A.9.3.1 General Platform Alarm (GPA)
The GPA can be initiated from the following sources [R3A.5]:
Manually from the Prepare to Abandon Platform (PAPA) access station; and
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Automatically from the Shutdown System (ICSS-SDS) and the Fire and Gas Detection System (ICSS-FGS) including the MAC.
Initiation of the GPA will represent a confirmed fire and gas detection on the platform. This will then initiate actions such as red flashing lights, audible alarm of minimum 105 dBA lasting for 30 seconds, ESD trips or valve shutdown. Upon initiation of GPA, personnel will be required to stop work and report to designated assembly points and awaits instructions for further action via the PA system.
3A.9.3.2 Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA)
The PAPA alarm is broadcast through the PA system, and provides an audible instruction to personnel to prepare for facility abandonment. The PAPA is manually activated from either the MOAB or FSO Control Room by the OIM.
3A.9.4 Blowdown & Pressure Relief System
Blowdown and pressure relief systems are provided to protect personnel and equipment. Relief systems would prevent a potentially dangerous build-up of pressure in the process equipment. The blowdown systems reduce the quantity of gas and condensate that would contribute to an escalated fire or explosion. Blowdown also rapidly reduces the pressure in the systems, which helps to protect against rupture due to loss in material strengths as systems are heated in a fire. During an occurrence of a rupture, blowdown will minimise the quantity of hydrocarbons being released.
Two (2) flare systems on MOAB, the HP and LP Flare, are provided to cater for the high pressure and low pressure relief/ venting loads from MOAB. Vapour from the HP and LP Flare Knockout Drum flows to the HP and LP Flare Tip through the respective flare stack.
3A.9.5 Wellhead Control System
The wellhead control system on MOAB comprises of the wellhead control panel (WHCP) and the shutdown system. The WHCP is required to control both sequence and individual operation of the surface safety valve (SSV) and surface control subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) on each well. In the event of potentially hazardous situations, the WHCP, provided on the MOAB ICR, ensures a safe shutdown of the wellheads by shutting the SCSSVs and SSVs in an orderly manner.
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The wellhead control system receives signals from the Fire and Gas Detection System (FGS) or the Safety Shutdown System (SDS) to initiate USD, PSD and ESD.
An ESD shutdown initiates the closure of the SCSSV and SSV of all slots.
Kill knobs are provided at strategic locations around MOAB. They are connected to the instrument control panels. On manual activation, they initiate a Process Shutdown (PSD) for isolation and shutdown of the complete process system, without blowdown. Well isolation is at the SSV only.
3A.9.6 Active Fire Protection System
The main objective of the active fire protection system on MOAB is to provide both personnel protection and equipment/ structure integrity.
The types of active fire protection system installed on MOAB include:
Firewater and Foam System; and CO2 Suppression System.
3A.9.6.1 Firewater and Foam System [R3A.5]
The firewater systems on MOAB are designed to provide sufficient water for the prime purpose to provide cooling to equipment and structures and thereby ensuring their integrity is maintained.
Two (2) Seawater Lift Pumps are provided at MOAB to supply and maintain water pressure at firewater main ring header, and one (1) Diesel Engine Driven Pump as a back-up for the firewater pump. Fire water monitors are located on the Upper Deck, Main Deck and the Cellar Deck of the Below MOAB Deck.
The deluge system is provided for exposure protection of process areas equipment, flammable liquid, pumping and storage areas. This system mainly covers the wellheads, 1st and 2nd Stage Separators, HP and LP Knockout Drums and the Crude Oil Pumps. The deluge valve on each deck is automatically actuated by the Fire and Gas System (FGS) on confirmed detection of fire.
The type of foam used on MOAB is the Aqueous Film Foaming Foam (AFFF), which is a combination of fluorocarbon surfactants and synthetic foaming agents, and because of its high fluidity, allowing rapid reduction of fire. AFFF is provided to enable extinction of flammable liquid pool fires on the platform process areas, by way of Foam Hose Reels.
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3A.9.6.2 CO2 Suppression System
CO2 suppression system is provided in the Emergency Generator Room and Turbo Generator. The system is activated by confirmed fire detection.
3A.9.7 Portable Fire Fighting Equipment [R3A.5]
The purpose of portable fire extinguisher equipment is to enable immediate response to extinguish or control a small fire by persons in the vicinity of the incident. Manual systems are not intended to be used on escalating fires near to process equipment, since the risk to the fire-fighters arising from escalation of the fire outweighs the benefits from using the manual systems.
The manual fire fighting system on MOAB includes portable and wheeled fire fighting equipment. They are fitted at strategic locations around the installation to enable first responder intervention. The types of extinguishers provided are suited to the hazards in the immediate vicinity, eg. CO2 extinguishers are for electrical rooms and dry chemical powder for general fire fighting. (Note: Gas fires should never be extinguished by a fire fighting medium but by isolation of the fuel source.)
For details on locations of the portable fire extinguishers, refer to Section 3A.10.1.
3A.9.8 Passive Fire Protection
Passive Fire Protection (PFP) in the form of firewall is provided on MOAB to maintain structural integrity of escape routes, and to prevent escalation. The aim of PFP is to minimise spread of fire, duration and damage caused and more specifically, to guard the safety of life and to act as a mitigation measure.
3A.9.8.1 Firewalls
Firewalls are provided on the platform to prevent passage of heat, flame, smoke and gas for a period.
A firewall of rating H0 (facing north of the platform) is installed on MOAB Upper Deck to prevent any potential direct jet fires towards the Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB) to enables safe escape of personnel to the FSO. The firewall also prevents liquid spillage from the 1st and 2nd Stage Separators on the Upper Deck from overflowing onto the non process area on the Main Deck [R3A.1].
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On the Main Deck, a firewall rated as H0 (facing north of the platform) is provided to segregate the hydrocarbon process and non process (utilities) areas. Similarly it also helps prevent any jet fire scenarios towards the PTB. The main facilities located on the process area are the HP and LP Flare Knockout Drums, Crude Transfer Pumps and Diesel System, whereby potential fire from these systems are liquid pool fire [R3A.1].
3A.9.9 Emergency Lighting
3A.9.9.1 Emergency Lighting [R3A.5]
Emergency lighting is installed throughout the facility to ensure all escape routes are sufficiently illuminated during AC supply failure. The essential loads are fed from a distribution board, DB-8650.
Each emergency lighting fixture is provided with dual tube fluorescent lights with built-in hermetically sealed Ni-Cd battery set. During emergency one (1) tube in each fitting will be illuminated by the battery for 1.5 hour.
3A.9.9.2 Navigational Aids [R3A.5]
Navigational aid system located in the switchgear room Below MOAB Deck consists of the following:
Solar powered navigational aids lanterns; Solar panel; and Structure support for lanterns, solar panel and power supply units.
The navigational aids lanterns are provided with independent back-up power capable of operating for at least 8 days on failure on the main system.
3A.9.10 Emergency Power
3A.9.10.1 Emergency Diesel Generator [R3A.5]
A 1450 kW Diesel Generator set (DE-8110) is provided on MOAB to supply emergency power to equipment, providing vital services on MOAB and power for black start of the dual-fuelled Gas Turbine Generator.
The Diesel Generator set will automatically start up on detection of ‘dead bus’ or under-voltage in the event that power is unavailable from the GTG. It is designed to supply power to vital platform loads and at the same time have sufficient capacity to re-start the GTG with its auxiliary drives. It is not designed for used as a back up to the GTG.
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The Diesel Generator supplies power to the 415 V essential Bus ‘B’ of 415 V AC Motor Control Centre MCC-8120.
3A.9.10.2 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
Electricity supplies of enhanced reliability and having duplicate energy sources are provided to energise loads forming part of vital services. Such supplies will, if required by load, be uninterrupted on failure of one energy source. Loads which can tolerate an interruption in the power supply but require restoration of the supply within a relatively short period of time are energised from an interruptible, maintained power source backed-up by the auxiliary power generator.
The following UPS panels are available on MOAB to support various critical consumers [R3A.5]:
UPS-8410 - 240V AC UPS unit (1 x 100% charger/ inverter, bypass & battery) for telecommunication;
UPS-8420 (back-up) - 240V AC UPS unit (1 x 100% charger/ inverter, bypass & battery) for telecommunication;
UPS-8430 – 415/ 240V AC UPS unit (1 x 100% charger/ inverter, bypass & battery) for instrumentation;
UPS-8440 (back-up) – 415/ 240V AC UPS unit (1 x 100% charger/ inverter, bypass & battery) for instrumentation;
UPS-8210/20 - 125V DC Supply unit (2 x 100% charger & 2 x 50% battery) for MV Switchboard; GTG control panel, DC Back Up Lube Oil Pump motor and main gas fuel metering valve;
UPS-8230/40 - 24V DC Supply unit (2 x 100% charger & 2 x 50% battery) for electrical/ instrumentation supply; and
RC-8510 - 24V DC Supply unit (1 x 100% charger & 1 x 100% battery) for Navigational Aids.
Each of the dual rated (2 x 100%) chargers is sized for charging both of the battery banks, if any one (1) of the charger fails.
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Section 3A DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS –MOBILE OFFSHORE Page 3A-27 APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
3A.9.11 Emergency Communications
An integrated telecommunication system is provided within MOAB platform and between MOAB platform, FSO vessel and TML HQ via submarine composite cables. Emergency communications facilities on MOAB are achieved by the following systems [R3A.5]:
VSAT Satellite Communication System; Telephone (PABX) System; Public Address & General Alarm (PAGA) System; and VHF FM Marine Radio System.
3A.9.11.1 VSAT Satellite Communication System
MOAB is the hub station for the VSAT system, which co-ordinates communications between the onshore hub (TML HQ in Kuala Lumpur) and offshore terminal (MOAB), interconnected via geo-stationary satellite. VSAT is provided with 256 kbps link capacity, using Single Channel per Carrier (SCPC) configuration.
All the indoor equipment is housed in Instrument Control Room (ICR), whereas the outdoor equipment such as antenna and ODU is installed in the MOAB Main Deck service platform. A fixed satellite phone is provided as a voice communication back up in the event of failure of the primary satellite link.
3A.9.11.2 Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) Telephone System
The (PABX) Telephone System is provided on MOAB to facilitate voice communication within MOAB platform, between MOAB platform, FSO vessel as well as TML HQ.
Outdoor telephones are equipped with acoustic hood and auxiliary flashing beacon suitable for Zone 1 hazardous area and distributed throughout the MOAB platform. Indoor telephones are distributed throughout the Safe Area on MOAB platform ie. Instrument Control Room (ICR), Meeting Room, Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) Room, Supervisor Room, Switchgear Room and on FSO Local Control Room (LCR).
3A.9.11.3 Public Address & General Alarm (PAGA) System
The overall PAGA system on MOAB operates as a single functional system and to perform the following main functions:
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To generate PAPA, GPA and process audible and visual alarms; and To broadcast routine and emergency voice messages/ announcements.
Loudspeakers are distributed around the platform, whereas flashing beacons are provided in areas of high ambient noise to supplement the loudspeakers. All outdoor equipment complies with Zone 1 hazardous area requirements.
The PAGA system is configured to have zones as follows:
Zone A : MOAB Production Hull (All Decks); Zone B : MOAB Hull; and Zone C : FSO
3A.9.11.4 VHF FM Marine Radio System
A VHF FM Marine base radio station is provided on MOAB to enable voice communication with nearby vessels and emergency voice communication on the marine distress frequency of 156.8 MHz. All channels in the range of 153 – 166 MHz are covered by the VHF FM Marine base station. A one high-gain Omni-directional antenna is installed on the MOAB Main Deck area, with coverage exceeding 30 nautical miles in all directions when communicating with a typical VHF ship radio.
Handheld VHF FM Marine radios are also provided for personnel on MOAB, programmed to operate on a minimum of six (6) marine band channels in the 156 – 174 MHz range for VHF.
3A.10 SAFETY FACILITIES
3A.10.1 Safety Equipment
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is also provided to ensure personnel safety while at work. Emergency eyewash and shower station and fire fighting equipment such as portable fire extinguishers, fire blankets, etc. are provided at strategic locations on the platform.
Escape and evacuation equipment is provided on MOAB for safe escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel during an emergency situation. The equipment is placed in areas that can be easily accessible for the personnel.
The quantity and location of the safety equipment on MOAB are provided in Table 3A.10a while the escape and evacuation equipment based on the Escape Route and Safety Layout Plan [R3A.8] is summarised in Table 3A.10b.
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Table 3A.10a Safety Equipment Available on MOAB
Description Location Quantity Eyewash Station Below MOAB Deck 2 Emergency Eyewash Station with Safety Shower Upper Deck 3 Main Deck 2 Firemen Equipment Cabinet Below MOAB Deck 1 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Below MOAB Deck 4 First Aid Kit Below MOAB Deck 4 Fire Blanket Below MOAB Deck 4 Electrician Hand Glove Container Below MOAB Deck 1 Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) Fire Extinguisher Fin Fan Deck 32 Upper Deck Main Deck Below MOAB Deck
CO2 Fire Extinguisher Fin Fan Deck 15 Upper Deck Main Deck Below MOAB Deck
Table 3A.10b Escape and Evacuation Equipment Provisions on MOAB
Description Location Quantity 12-men Life Raft (with first aid equipment) Main Deck 5 Life Jacket Storage Container Main Deck 4 Ring Life Buoys with Life Line Upper Deck 4 Main Deck 6 Smoke Hood Container Below MOAB Deck 2 Rope Ladder Main Deck 4 Stretcher Below MOAB Deck 1
3A.10.2 Escape and Evacuation Route
The escape routes on MOAB are defined with yellow tramline and arrows on the deck and together with fire exit signs, all leading towards the bridge to FSO on Main Deck.
3A.10.3 Safety Signs
MOAB is provided with UV and saline resistant plastic safety signs. They are prominently mounted at strategic locations throughout the installations. All safety signs that must be viewed in an emergency under reduced illumination level conditions are photo luminescent. The text on signs is in both Bahasa Malaysia and English. Fire and safety equipment is identified with photo luminescent painted self-explanatory pictures (pictograms).
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3A.11 PERSONNEL AWARENESS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Personnel who will be present on MOAB are made aware of the existence, location and use of escape routes and life saving appliances. The information is provided on safety equipment and escape routes layouts exhibited throughout the facility. Station bill is also highlighted to all persons arriving at the location during the safety briefing.
Emergency response personnel assigned to special emergency response duties ie. fire fighting, search and rescue, mustering point marshal, etc., are given specific briefings to familiarise themselves with their duties and responsibilities.
3A.11.1 Muster Area
The primary muster area is at the FSO, where the Temporary Refuge (TR) is located. Personnel on MOAB are to make their way to the FSO via the Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB) located at the West side of the MOAB Main Deck in the event of an emergency [R3A.1].
3A.11.1.1 Escape Routes
All areas on MOAB where personnel are likely to be present have at least two independent and separate escape routes leading to the muster area. The specifications for the minimum width and height of primary escape routes are 1.2 m and 2.1 m respectively. These escape routes are maintained to be obstacle free at all times [R3A.1].
For more details on MOAB safety escape routes, refer to the Escape Route and Safety Layout Plan [R3A.8].
3A.11.1.2 Evacuation Plan
The decision whether or not to abandon the platform would be based on an assessment of the risks associated with remaining on board against the risks of evacuation. A number of variables can influence the successful outcome of an offshore evacuation, including the weather conditions prevalent at the time. The three options are [R3A.1]:
Primary Option – Evacuation via Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB); Secondary Option – Evacuation by life rafts; and Tertiary Option – Evacuation to sea.
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3A.11.2 Evacuation Provisions
The primary means of evacuation for MOAB is via the Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB) located at the West side of the MOAB Main Deck. In a situation where primary means of evacuation is not available or when the muster point is not reachable, then the life rafts provided on the North and South side of the MOAB Main Deck will be used as the secondary means of evacuation. The tertiary means of evacuation is by directly entering the sea. There are rope ladders located adjacent to the life rafts to aid personnel entering into the sea [R3A.1].
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3A.12 SECTION 3A REFERENCES
[R3A.1] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn Bhd – Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi MOAB Design Safety Case, J8328, Rev. 0, 24 November 2004.
[R3A.2] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Process Basis of Design, SAA-DB-F-10- 0001, Rev. A, 31 March 2005.
[R3A.3] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Operations and Control Philosophy, SAA- PH-F-10-0003, Rev. A, 31 March 2005.
[R3A.4] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Process Functional Description, SAA-RP- F-10-0001, Rev. A, 31 March 2005.
[R3A.5] Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi-A Platform Start-up & Operating Manual (Volume 6), SAA-RP-F-10-0007, Rev. A, 13 May 2005.
[R3A.6] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Utility Functional Description, SAA-RP-F- 10-0002, Rev. A, 31 March 2005.
[R3A.7] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Cause and Effect Diagram, SAA-DR-F-10- 0501, Rev. Z1, 25 August 2005.
[R3A.8] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Escape Route & Safety Layout Plan, SAA- DR-P-10-0008/09/10/11/12, Rev. Z1, 13 September 2005.
[R3A.9] Talisman Malaysia Limited, MOAB Hazardous Area Classification Layout, SAA-DR-E-10-0101/02/03/04/05, Rev. Z1, 25 August 2005.
[R3A.10] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Fusible Plug Loop Layout, SAA-DR-I-10- 0661/62/63/64/65, Rev. Z1, 25 August 2005.
[R3A.11] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, SAA-DR-F-10-0096/97/98/99/100/101/102/103/106/107/108, Rev. Z1, 25 August 2005.
[R3A.12] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Equipment Arrangement Plan, SAA-DR-P- 10-0001/02/03/04/05, Rev. Z1, 13 September 2005.
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Section 3B DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS – FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
CONTENTS
3B OVERVIEW OF SAA FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO) 3B-1
3B.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 3B-1
3B.2 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT 3B-2
3B.3 FSO PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3B-3
3B.4 SHIP’S CARGO HANDLING SYSTEM 3B-4
3B.5 FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS 3B-7
3B.6 FSO UTILITIES 3B-8
3B.7 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY 3B-12
3B.8 HSE FEATURES 3B-13
3B.9 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM 3B-14
3B.10 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS 3B-15
3B.11 SAFETY FACILITIES 3B-19
3B.12 PERSONNEL AWARENESS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 3B-21
3B.13 SECTION 3B REFERENCES 3B-24
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3B OVERVIEW OF SAA FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
3B.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The South Angsi FSO is a converted 65,000 dwt Panamax m.t. “Bertina” tanker built in 1982. The vessel is permanently spread moored at a distance of approximately 50 m from the Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) in the PM-305 South Angsi Field offshore Malaysia in a water depth of 72 m. Oil and gas are transferred to FSO from the MOAB via the suspended flexible hoses from the facilities and a future 10” riser. The FSO have a temporary storage of approximately 350,000 bbls stabilised crude and to be offloaded to the Shuttle Tanker every week [R3B.1].
The FSO is owned by Malaysian International Shipping Company (MISC) as a Storage Tanker for the SAA platform but is managed and operated by the FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd (FVSB).
A Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB), with a nominal length of 56 m, is installed at the bow of the FSO to allow safe passage of personnel between the two (2) facilities and as a primary escape route for personnel working on the MOAB. All personnel working on the FSO and MOAB stay on board the FSO where accommodation is provided [R3B.1].
The FSO is designed with minimum facilities onboard and supports cargo handling and storage systems, cargo metering and offloading system, tandem mooring system, utility systems, living quarters, control systems and emergency systems. The FSO provides oil storage, metering and offloading to the Shuttle Tanker. The FSO vessel and facilities are designed for 15 years of continuous production life [R3B.1].
The FSO spread mooring system is designed in such a way that it can survive 100-year storm conditions (with no bunker in tandem), from fully loaded to minimum loaded condition [R3B.3].
An overview of the FSO layout is given in Figure 3B.1a.
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Figure 3B.1a South Angsi FSO Layout
Section 3B DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS – FLOATING STORAGE & Page 3B-2 OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
3B.2 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
3B.2.1 Overview
The FSO consists of the following:
Accommodation and Facilities Decks; Helicopter Facilities; Turret; and Hull System (receiving, storing and exporting crude oil).
3B.2.2 Accommodation and Facilities Decks
Accommodation Decks are located at the aft of the FSO. Table 3B.2a presents the decks and the associated general facilities available on the FSO.
Table 3B.2a FSO Decks and the Associated General Facilities [R3B.1]
Decks Elevation + Facilities Navigation Bridge EL +30600 Communication Room, Heli-Briefing/ Waiting Deck Room, Prayer Room, Battery Room, Deck Store. C-Deck EL +27800 Office, Accommodation Rooms for FSO’s and MOAB’s crew and Talisman personnel, etc. B-Deck EL +25000 Accommodation Rooms for FSO’s and MOAB’s crew and Talisman personnel, etc. A-Deck EL +22200 Accommodation Rooms for FSO’s and MOAB’s crew and Talisman personnel, Emergency Control Room, Cargo Control Room (CCR), Mess Room, Lobby, Provision Store, Galley, Recreation Room, Dry Room, Smoking Room. Upper Deck EL +19400 Metering Skid, Air Conditioning Unit, Oil Water Separator, Deck Crane, UPS Room, Hospital, Dispensary, Laundry, Electrical Room, Aft Equipment Room, Gymnasium, Laydown Area, Inert Gas Room. 2nd Deck Engine EL +14560 HSD Tanks, HFO Tanks, Hydraulic Pumps, Fresh Room Water Pump, Air Compressor, Transformer, Switchboard Extension, Chiller Unit, Chiller Pump, Sewage Treatment Unit, E.R Light Distribution Board. 3rd Deck Engine EL +9700 Main Generators, Main Air Reservoir, Auxiliary Room Air Compressor, Fuel Oil Pump Skid, F.O. Burning Pump, Purifier, Emergency Fire Pump, Auxiliary Boiler, Steam Turbine Generator, Mechanical Workshop, Store.
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Decks Elevation + Facilities Boiler/ Turbine EL +8000 Cargo Oil Pumps, Auxiliary Feed Pumps, Fresh Flat Water Generator, Hot Water Loop Pump, Ballast Pump Turbine, Auxiliary Condenser. Double Bottom EL +2400 HFO Transfer Pump, HSD Transfer Pumps, Ejector Pumps, Oily Water Feed Pump, Condensate Pump, Bilge/ Ballast Pump, Condenser Seawater Cooling Pump, Seawater Service Pumps.
3B.2.3 Helicopter Facilities
A Helideck is installed at the aft of the accommodation block to provide helicopter landing facilities on the FSO. Helicopters will facilitate personnel transfer to and from the FSO [R3B.2].
3B.2.4 Spread Mooring System
The Spread Mooring system is able to withstand loads of Export Tankers of maximum 150,000 Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) moored in Tandem. It provides a permanent mooring for the FSO up to the environmental conditions as specified in the FSO/ Export Tanker Disconnect Criteria [R3B.4].
The FSO is moored by a 12-leg spread mooring system. Two (2) forward chain box structures are integrated in the connection for the upper deck and side shell. Besides that, two (2) aft mooring boxes are positioned below the ballast water line and integrated in the aft peak structure between frame 10 and 15. An I-tube, which runs through the aft peak structure, guides the mooring wires from the upper deck towards the aft mooring boxes [R3B.1].
3B.3 FSO PROCESS DESCRIPTION
Stabilised crude oil flows into the FSO to a designated production tank, where any free water that settles out is drawn from the bottom of the tank to a slops tank for further settling. The water will ultimately be discharged overboard via an online oil-water analyser and clean, anhydrous oil is transferred into the cargo tanks [R3B.1].
3B.3.1 Production Loading and Preparation of Crude Oil for Export
Crude oil is transported from MOAB via a single 6” import line to the FSO. The maximum loading rate is approximately 40,000 bbls/ day including crude oil, water and sediments. The designated tanks (ie. 3C and 5C) are provided with direct drop line for loading. The incoming cargo in the production loading
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Section 3B DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS – FLOATING STORAGE & Page 3B-4 OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
tanks is heated to 60 C in order to segregate the water and hard emulsion, and maintained at least 3 C above the cloud pour point temperature [R3B.5].
The free water settles out in the production tank is drawn off the bottom of the tank via a dedicated striping line and routed to the slop tanks where further settling will occur. The water will ultimately be discharged overboard via an online oil-water analyser. The design specification for the system is to achieve an effluent with a maximum oil content of 40 ppm. Clean, dry oil is then decanted from the production tank into the cargo tanks [R3B.1].
All tanks are fitted with high level alarms complete with audio and visual indicators in the Cargo Control Room (CCR). ESD ball valve is located at the MOAB, which will be initiated in event of emergencies [R3B.1].
The UTI tape determines the oil-water interface, where free water in the slop tank is transferred to Starboard Slop Tank (Primary Slop Tank) for de-sloping. The accumulated free water in the tank is subsequently routed to Port Slop Tank via gravity. At least three (3) days prior to offloading all tanks are checked for water, whereby tanks with water will be further de-bottomed [R3B.5].
3B.4 SHIP’S CARGO HANDLING SYSTEM
3B.4.1 Overview
This section describes the operation of the cargo handling system to receive and handle produced liquids, ie. crude oil and produced water.
3B.4.2 Crude Oil System
Cargo loading from the riser is a continuous operation except when interrupted by external factors, such as field shutdown, accidents or adverse weather.
The cargo operations are controlled from the CCR located on A-Deck. The CCR is able to remotely control certain critical valves of the cargo operations with the remainder being locally operated from the Engine Room.
3B.4.3 Cargo Tanks and Slop Tanks
Two (2) cargo tanks, ie. 3C and 5C, are designated as the reception tanks for receiving produced crude oil from the MOAB [R3B.5]. These two (2) cargo reception tanks as well as two (2) slop tanks are fully blasted and coated. For other cargo tanks, only the tank top and bottom is fully blasted and coated [R3B.8].
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Section 3B DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS – FLOATING STORAGE & Page 3B-5 OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
3B.4.4 Cargo Pumping Operations during Tandem Lifting [R3B.14]
The cargo tanks are supplied with inert gas with < 5% oxygen content throughout the cargo pumping operations to maintain a positive pressure between 300 – 800 mm/Aq with oxygen content of ≤ 8% by volume. The Marine Technician is required to be in the CCR at all times during the cargo pumping operations.
The Duty Maintenance Technician in the Engine Room is responsible to throttle the pumps required for the discharge operation until it reaches the ideal rpm, after that the control will be from the CCR by the Marine Technician. On completion of the pumping operations, the cargo pumps are stopped from the Engine Room when informed by the CCR. In the event of emergency, the cargo pumps can be tripped locally or from the CCR. When the final cargo volume is achieved, the cargo discharge is stopped and closes the export valve on FSO.
3B.4.5 Cargo Heating
All tanks are equipped with heating coils to heat up the incoming crude oil in the production loading tanks to a temperature of 60 C for 96 hours prior to export [R3B.15]. The cargo in the export tanks are maintained at least 3 C above the cloud pour point temperature [R3B.5].
3B.4.6 Cargo Gauging [R3B.12]
The cargo tanks on FSO are fitted with a MUSASINO (Intrinsically Safe Type Level Master) Tank Level Gauge and Temperature Gauge equipped with High Level alarm switch. The fixed gauging system allows monitoring of oil levels inside the cargo tanks while maintaining a positive pressure of inert gas in the tanks, thus reduces fire risk. The ullages from the tanks are transmitted electrically in ‘real-time’ and subsequently converted into digital mode and displayed on the CCR monitor on a continuous basis. This remote gauge reading reduces personnel risk compared to local reading of the oil levels.
3B.4.7 Offloading System
Stabilised crude oil is offloaded to the shuttle tankers by the FSO cargo pumps. The oil is metered in the custody metering system and routed via the deck cargo piping system to the FSO rail, terminating at a gooseneck. The gooseneck is provided for the connection of the tandem floating hose [R3B.1]. The gooseneck is fitted with an emergency isolation valve and disconnection device, which can be actuated locally or remotely (from the CCR). Activation of the isolation valve will automatically stop the cargo transfer pumps [R3B.1].
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Section 3B DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS – FLOATING STORAGE & Page 3B-6 OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
A pour point depressant (PPD) injection system is provided where the PPD is injected in the floating hose via the chemical injection pump located at the offloading station in the last 300 – 400 barrels of crude oil [R3B.13],[R3B.14]. This reduces the pour point temperature of the export crude oil in the cargo hose string to be below the minimum ambient sea surface temperature, which allows the crude to remain as fluid after flow has stopped. PPD is injected during the final stages of offloading to prevent wax deposition in the offloading line [R3B.4].
3B.4.8 Cargo Tank Venting and Inert Gas System
3B.4.8.1 Inert Gas System [R3B.6]
The Inert Gas System is provided to reduce the oxygen content in the cargo oil tanks below the flammable range, thus reducing the risk of explosion and to control corrosion in the water ballast and cargo tanks. All cargo and water ballast tanks are kept in an inert condition with oxygen content of < 8% and at positive pressure at all times. The cargo tanks are maintained in an inert condition throughout the crude oil washing process to avoid potential ignition.
3B.4.8.2 Venting System [R3B.7]
The FSO is fitted with two (2) high velocity pressure relief valves for automatic venting and two (2) high velocity pressure relief calves for manual venting. The Inert Gas (IG) distribution system and tank venting system are designed to prevent venting of hydrocarbon gases from every cargo tank directly onto the deck.
Venting is only carried out at wind speeds above 5 m/s to prevent inhibition of gas dispersion. During cargo tanks purging operation, gas-freeing chutes may be used and led overboard to avoid accumulation of hydrocarbon gases and
H2S on the FSO deck. In addition, marine craft presence is prohibited within 200 m from the FSO during purging operation.
The cargo tank pressure is monitored at the CCR and the Inert Gas Plant (IGP) main pressure is recorded every two (2) hours in the Deck Log Book. The cargo tank pressures are maintained between 300 mm/WG and 800 mm/WG to prevent structural damage to the FSO.
Venting of tank atmosphere during purging/ gas freeing is ensured to be at least 2 m from the deck.
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3B.4.9 Cargo Tank Washing [R3B.10]
The FSO cargo tanks are fitted with programmable fixed type Butterworth P-60 Tank cleaning machines in all tanks, except for No. 1 Port and 1 Starboard COT where bottom machines are duel nozzle type non-programmable fixed type MBT-305S. Three (3) steam driven cargo pumps with 2000 m3/hr each are installed and used to deliver water for tank cleaning and driving the two (2) eductors with 400 m3/hr each during washing operation. One (1) tank cleaning heater with 180 m3/hr capacity is provided for heating up the wash water prior to tank washing and one (1) steam reciprocating cargo stripper pump with 200 m3/hr provided for stripping the tank. Accumulated and settled production water from Port Slop Tank is normally used for water washing of cargo tank.
3B.4.10 Ballast System
The ballast system is required to maintain the FSO in a seaworthy state in terms of strength, trim and stability. The existing ship ballast system is retained and refurbished. Ballast water is used during FSO loading and where weather conditions dictate that this is the only option available to ensure the integrity of the FSO. The ballast tanks can be ballasted and de-ballasted using the ballast pump located in the Pump Room. The aft peak tank can be ballasted and de- ballasted using the Fire/ Deluge Pump located in the Engine Room.
The FSO has segregated ballast tanks, ie. FPK, APK, 3 Wings and 6 Wings Tank [R3B.8].
3B.5 FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS
3B.5.1 Tandem Mooring [R3B.9]
Tandem mooring is an operation where the Export Vessel is moored to the stern of the FSO by a single mooring buoy, which consists of a rope hawser with chafe chains and floatation buoy at the end of the Export Vessel to allow offloading to be undertaken via the offloading system. Offloading takes place while the FSO continues loading crude oil from the MOAB. The floating export hose comprises of 16” and 12” hose sections, whereby one (1) end of the hose string is connected to the Quick Connect Disconnect Connection (QCDC) at aft discharge manifold of the FSO and remains connected to the FSO when an Export Vessel is not present. The opposite end is connected to the Export Tanker or to the port side No.2 port Water Ballast Tank of the FSO when there is no Export Tanker.
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3B.5.2 Tanks [R3B.8]
There are three (3) groups of tanks on the FSO as detailed in Table 3B.5a.
Table 3B.5a Tanks on FSO
Tank Group Tanks Tank Capacity (m3) Tank Capacity without Slops (m3) 1- Green 1w’s, 2w’s, 4C, 6C, 7w’s, Slop (S) 46,226 45,093 2- Blue 2C, 4w’s, 5w’s, 7C 42,988 42,988 3- Red 1C, 3CF, 3CA, 5C, Slop (P) 48,504 47,371
All ballast tanks, (ie. FPK, APK, 3 wings and 6 wings), dedicated loading tanks (ie. 2C and 5C) as well as both the slop tanks are fully blasted and coated. For other cargo tanks, only the tank top and bottom are fully blasted and coated.
3B.5.3 Produced Water / Oily Water Discharges/ Dirty Ballast [R3B.17]
The oil content of the produced water is discharged overboard at a maximum of 40 ppm. Oily water bilges, tank washing, slops and free water are settled in designated slop tanks prior to overboard discharge.
There are two (2) types of discharges involving the FSO operations:
Machinery Space Bilge Drainage – Bilge water can be discharged to the sea using the Oily Water Separators (OWS), through Oil Content Monitoring (OCM) using class approved proper arrangement to enable oily water generated in machinery spaces to be pumped into designated slop tank; and
Produced Water Discharge – The produced water is drawn from the bottom of the slop production tanks via a dedicated stripping line to the designated slop port tanks. After further settling and draining to the Starboard Slop Tank, clean water is discharged overboard at a maximum of 40 ppm oil in water.
3B.5.4 Tank Stripping
Residual contents of the tanks are removed using the Stripping Pump located in the Cargo Pump Room. Stripping is undertaken when the Main Cargo pumps cannot maintain suction, but residual contents are required to be removed for operational or maintenance requirements.
3B.6 FSO UTILITIES
There are a number of utility systems on FSO, which are required for safe and efficient operation of the facility. The main ones are listed below.
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3B.6.1 Electrical Power
3B.6.1.1 Power Generation
The main power generation system on the FSO comprises of one (1) steam turbine generator and three (3) 640 kW existing diesel engine driven generators, located in the engine room. The steam turbine generator is the primary source of power supply. The diesel engine driven generators are provided for powering essential loads in the event of temporary shutdown of the steam turbine generator [R3B.1].
3B.6.1.2 Ship System Switchboard [R3B.2]
The Main Switchboard (MSB) of the ship system is located in the Engine Room on the 2nd deck, and distributes power from the main generators to electric loads of the ship, including the Emergency Switchboard during normal operating conditions.
The Main Switchboard is an integrated assembly of switching and regulating controls, measuring instruments, indicators and protective devices designed for the efficient centralised control of electric power systems and equipment.
The Emergency Switchboard (ESB) is located in the Emergency Generator Room on the main deck. Under normal operating conditions, the ESB is supplied with power from the Main Switchboard (MSB).
3B.6.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator
The emergency power supply on the FSO is by the 120 kW emergency diesel generator set, located in the Emergency Generator Room on the FSO Upper Deck. The emergency generator supplies power to the complete FSO emergency consumers as per Classification Society requirements. Emergency generator monitoring is provided in the CCR [R3B.2].
3B.6.1.4 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) units are installed to provide no-break, clean power to the essential services and also to sensitive instrumentation and telecommunication equipment where close tolerance voltage and frequency conditions are required and supply disturbances are minimised. A 2 x 100% Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) is provided on the FSO to maintain and power critical systems during failure of main power supply. The UPS is backed-up by a battery bank and can last up to 2 hours for 100% of the total anticipated back-up UPS power demand [R3B.2].
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3B.6.2 Lighting
The FSO is provided with normal tube lighting fed by normal supply distribution system. It powers lighting of the escape way (aft), power generation module, metering skid, laydown area, Upper Deck and the turret, etc.
Floodlights are provided at the Helideck and are controlled from the Heli Lounge. Aeronautical Obstruction Lights (AOL) is also provided and typically at the crane boom tip and top of A-frame, vents stacks and funnel [R3B.2].
3B.6.3 Navigational Aids
The navigation aids system provided on the FSO comprises of one lantern located at the aft of the vessel. The lantern is certified and complies with the IALA regulations. The lantern on FSO is to be synchronised with the MOAB lanterns.
3B.6.4 Fuel System [R3B.16]
Fuel gas is supplied from MOAB via a 6” hose line to FSO. The fuel gas passing through an ESD valve will then be routed to the engine room boiler and deck boiler via a Knock Out (KO) Pot, which has two (2) manual drain system and the drain lines are connected to both slop tanks. The KO Pit is fitted with a PSV valve and the pressure can also be vented to atmosphere through the relief valve if required.
All the gas lines to the Engine Room are double skinned. The outer skin is pressurised with Nitrogen and maintained at least 6 bar which is above the gas supply pressure of about 3.5 bar. Pressure drops in the outer skin will indicate fuel gas leak and alarms will be activated in the CCR. Any substantial amount of liquid collected in the KO Pot will initiate an alarm in the CCR and visual indication on the drum magnetic level indicator.
3B.6.5 Ship Steam System
The provision of fuel gas supplied from the platform is used to fire boilers for steam generation. The FSO steam generating system comprises of two (2) boilers, 55T Deck Boiler and 45T Engine Room boiler capacity operating on duty and standby mode. The boilers can be fired on fuel gas, diesel oil or fuel oil. In the event of low gas pressure supply or shutdown, an automatic change over for the boilers from fuel gas to diesel oil and then from diesel oil to the fuel oil mode will take place without flame out or pre-purge requirement [R3B.16].
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The steam distribution system supplies steam to the cargo pumps, vessel users and heating coils within the tanks. An automatic boiler treatment system is provided to prevent the corrosion within the boilers and steam system [R3B.1].
3B.6.6 Diesel Oil (DO) System [R3B.11]
All Bunker Ship to Ship (STS) operations is conducted in compliance with Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) STS Transfer Guide. A watch keeper is posted on the landing manifold and at the tank vent. The Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the bunkering operation. Marine diesel oil is not allowed to be transferred between FSO tanks during bunkering.
The FSO is fitted with a high speed diesel transfer pump of a capacity 50 m3/hr, to supply diesel oil to the field support vessels (de-bunkering operations). The field support vessels may be required to be bunkered on a timely basis. The diesel oil is supplied to the emergency diesel generator, deck crane, MOAB and support vessels.
3B.6.7 Fresh Water System [R3B.1]
Fresh water is supplied to the engine room systems and for accommodation purposes from the fresh water system. Hot water is provided to the accommodation via a ring line system. The water is heated up using an electric calorifier and a steam booster heater is also provided for additional heating capacity during high hot water consumption period.
The fresh water generators are also capable to generate distilled water, where it is distributed into two (2) distilled water tanks prior being distributed to the boilers.
3B.6.8 Seawater System
The seawater service system is provided to supply seawater to the engine room cooling systems, fresh water generating systems and vessel consumers for FSO service. The seawater pumps take direct suction from the engine room sea chests [R3B.1].
3B.6.9 Cooling Freshwater System
The cooling freshwater systems of the FSO provide cooling for the main engine and boiler water system as well as heating for the accommodation air conditioning and hot water heaters and freshwater generator.
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3B.6.10 Compressed Air System
The compressed air system comprises a starting air make-up system, general service air and control air systems. The compressed air used for general services such as for air horn, pump room service, etc. The control air system includes services for the pneumatic instrumentation.
3B.6.11 Heating, Venting and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
The HVAC system maintains positive pressure above the atmospheric pressure to prevent ingress of hydrocarbons and other hazardous gases in enclosed areas, ie. accommodation area and Engine Room.
3B.6.12 Chemical Injection
Pour Point Depressant (PPD) is injected into the export system prior to stop loading to reduce the pour point temperature of the export crude oil in the cargo hose string to below that of the minimum ambient sea surface temperature. This allows the crude to remain in the fluid condition even after the flow has stopped and the crude has cooled to ambient [R3B.4].
3B.7 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY
3B.7.1 General Operations [R3B.1]
The total number of personnel on board (POB) on the FSO during normal operation is 42. The accommodation block is designed to cater for 75 personnel. The additional accommodations are for contractors and visitors, which range from 17 to 33 personnel at one time.
When personnel visit the FSO, they deposit their POB cards with the Person-in- Charge on the accommodation unit and are briefed on the Temporary Refuge (TR) and the Alternate Muster Point (AMP) on the FSO.
All personnel on the FSO are on a standard two (2) weeks on and two (2) weeks off work rotation, giving an average of 26 weeks per year offshore. The personnel are transported from the shore to the FSO by helicopter.
3B.7.2 Control Philosophy
The FSO control system comprises of Process Control System (PCS), Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and Fire and Gas System (FGS). These systems provides process control and monitoring, as well as providing process alarm
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and shutdown facilities for the FSO, and it can be monitored and accessed from both the MOAB and FSO.
The process monitoring, control system and shutdown system equipment provided on the FSO is simplified and minimized as far as reasonable practicable to ensure reliability and safety with minimum components and complexity. It is designed for automatic operation, with minimum intervention by operation personnel. The control and shutdown requirement for FSO is operated from the dedicated panels, which are located within the Central Control Room (CCR).
3B.7.3 Maintenance Philosophy
The basic maintenance philosophy is to safeguard the technical integrity of facilities and pipelines whilst ensuring that the availability of the equipment and systems is met within the constraints of safety, environmental protection, production plans and statutory requirements.
3B.8 HSE FEATURES
3B.8.1 Hazardous Area Classification
Area classification is the division of a plant or installation into hazardous area and non-hazardous areas. A hazardous area is defined as a three-dimensional space in which a flammable atmosphere may be expected to be present at such frequencies as to require special precautions for the use of electrical apparatus, and for any other work that may introduce a source of ignition. All other areas are referred to as non-hazardous.
The electrical equipments installed on the South Angsi facilities are classified into hazardous and non-hazardous areas in accordance to IP Mode Code of Safe Practice Part 15 “Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations”. The hazardous areas on FSO are as follows:
Zone 0 : An area where flammable atmosphere is continuously present or present for long periods of time;
Zone 1 : An area where a flammable atmosphere is likely to occur during normal operations; and
Zone 2 : An area where flammable atmosphere is unlikely to occur during normal operations; and if occurs, will only exist for a short period of time.
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For more details on FSO zoning, refer to the FSO Hazardous Zone Layouts [R3B.22].
3B.9 FIRE AND GAS DETECTION SYSTEM
Fire and Gas Detection System will detect any releases of process gas at an early stage in its development and to warn personnel on the platform and at a continuously manned control centre. The detectors are linked to detection and alarm, which will initiate alarm and executive actions throughout the FSO facilities in the event of confirmed fire and gas detection.
3B.9.1 Gas Detectors
Infra-red (IR) point gas detectors are installed in the ventilation intakes and air locks areas for monitoring of combustible gas. The gas detectors are provided in the following areas on FSO:
Accommodation Upper Deck; Accommodation A-Deck; Accommodation C-Deck; and Engine Room Boiler Flat.
3B.9.2 Fire Detectors
Flame detectors are used in areas where hydrocarbons or other flammables are possibly present in large quantities to ensure early indication of fire. The flame detectors on FSO are provided on the Upper Deck.
3B.9.3 Smoke Detectors
Ionization and optical type smoke detectors are provided in confined areas ie. accommodation areas and Control Room, for fire detection. The smoke detectors are provided with a red coloured LED to indicate the alarm situation.
3B.9.4 Heat Detectors
Heat detectors are provided on the A Deck accommodation block, Upper Deck and Engine Room.
3B.9.5 Hydrogen Sulphide Gas Detectors
Watch keepers are required to carry H2S and portable gas detectors (Micropacs) for continuous monitoring and detection of any gas pockets on deck [R3B.8].
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3B.10 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS
3B.10.1 Manual Alarm Callpoints (MAC)
MACs are located strategically on all decks of the FSO [R3B.1]. MAC stations are painted red. Personnel have to break the glass in order to initiate alarm [R3B.2]. Actuation of this results in an alarm given at the fire alarm panel.
3B.10.2 Emergency Shutdown System
The FSO Emergency Shutdown System, which is part of the SIS and FGS, are provided to protect personnel, the facilities and the environment in the event a hazardous situation develops on the FSO. The level of shutdown will depend on the nature and severity of the events and are controlled in a sequential manner to enable a safe and effective shutdown.
There are five (5) levels of shutdown in the shutdown hierarchy representing a staged response to increasing levels of hazards. The following are the five (5) levels of shutdown, in ascending order of severity [R3B.1]:
Level 4 : Safety Shutdown (SSD) – This is the lowest level and is initiated by an undesirable state occurring within a utility system or piece of equipment, which does not directly affect the crude production. It will shutdown part of the process, and not the entire process;
Level 3 : Safety Shutdown (SSD) – This will initiate shutdown of the import valve(s) which causes interruption to the crude import process. It will cause shutdown of the entire process;
Level 2B : Emergency Shutdown (ESD) – This is initiated by confirmed fire (pneumatic fusible loop detector) and gas (two out of ’N’) detection in the hazardous area forward of the Accommodation Block;
Level 2A : Emergency Shutdown (ESD) – This is initiated by confirmed gas detection at the Offloading platform and in safe areas (the ventilation inlets of the Engine Room and selected Machinery Spaces); and
Level 1 : Post Emergency Shutdown (PESD) – This is the highest level. It is manually activated in the event of extreme emergency with imminent life- safety danger.
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3B.10.3 Alarms and Annunciation
The FSO is provided with means whereby personnel at any part of the vessel will be made aware of the existence of an emergency, the location of the emergency and any special instructions for escape and mustering. The FSO alarms are annunciated through the Public Address/ General Alarm (PAGA) system.
The PAGA system interfaces with the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and Fire and Gas System (FGS) such that alarms and shutdown conditions can be broadcast via loudspeakers located throughout the vessel. High noise areas will be supplemented with visual beacons. Different tones are used for different events, ie. Prepare to Abandon Platform Alarm (PAPA) and Fire and Gas General Alarm.
Upon initiation of alarm, personnel will be required to stop work and report to designated assembly points and awaits instructions for further action via the PA system.
3B.10.4 Active Fire Protection System
The main objective of the active fire protection system on FSO is to provide personnel protection.
The types of active fire protection system installed on the FSO include:
Firewater System; Foam System; and CO2 Suppression System.
3B.10.4.1 Firewater System [R3B.1]
The firewater systems on the FSO are designed to provide sufficient water to control and possibly extinguish fire at the desired pressure in the required area. The seawater service pumps are used as water jockey pumps to maintain the firewater system in a pressurised condition.
Two (2) firewater monitors with spray nozzle are located on the Forecastle Deck, an elevated deck above the Upper Deck, to provide protection for FSO in the event of fire on MOAB. The emergency firewater pump is connected to the firewater system with the main purpose to extinguish fires in the Engine Room.
The deluge system is to provide cooling of the process equipment containing a hydrocarbon inventory to mitigate against the effect of heat caused by fire and
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subsequently reduce the risk of escalation. Two (2) deluge pumps are provided to cater for the new deluge system covering the Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB), crude metering skid, stern discharge manifold, and accommodation front and accommodation front bulkhead. The capacity of the deluge pumps is also sufficient to supply water to the Helideck. The deluge valve is automatically actuated by the Fire and Gas System (FGS) on confirmed detection of fire. Suitable drainage arrangements are provided to dissipate the deluge water directly overboard.
3B.10.4.2 Helideck Fire Fighting Equipment
The fire fighting equipment provided on the Helideck consists of the following:
Two (2) foam monitor; Two (2) dry powder extinguisher wheeled type with 50 kg each; and
Two (2) CO2 extinguisher wheeled type with 22.5 kg each.
3B.10.4.3 Foam System [R3B.1]
The foam system is provided to protect the Upper Deck, Helideck and production area. The foam system on FSO uses concentrated Aqueous Film Foaming Foam (AFFF) as its medium. In the event of a pool fire on the Upper Deck, foam is supplied to cover the entire Upper Deck section. A new foam liquid system is installed to store and transfer synthetic AFFF to the Upper Deck.
The existing deck foam monitors are maintained. 2 x 100% new foam monitors and two (2) new hydrants are fitted on the Helideck, while 1 x 100% new foam monitor and one (1) pressure hydrant is installed on the offloading area.
3B.10.4.4 CO2 Suppression System
CO2 is used to reduce oxygen content in the compartment to be protected to
levels that do not support combustion. The CO2 suppression system is provided in the Engine Room and Pump Room. The system is activated by confirmed fire detection.
3B.10.5 Portable Fire Fighting Equipment
The purpose of portable fire-fighting equipment is to enable immediate response to extinguish or control a small fire. Manual systems are not intended to be used on growing fires near to process equipment, since the risk to the fire- fighters arising from escalation of the fire outweighs the benefits from using the manual systems.
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The manual fire fighting system on the FSO includes portable and wheeled fire fighting equipment. They are fitted at strategic locations around the installation to enable first responder intervention. The types of extinguishers provided are
suited to the hazards in the immediate vicinity, eg. CO2 extinguishers are for electrical rooms and dry chemical powder for gas fires.
The following are types of portable fire fighting equipments available on FSO:
12 kg Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) Portable Fire Extinguisher;
6.8 kg CO2 Portable Fire Extinguisher; 9L Water Portable Fire Extinguisher; 9L AFFF Foam Portable Fire Extinguisher 9L Foam Portable Fire Extinguisher; 50 kg Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) Wheeled Fire Extinguisher;
22.5 kg CO2 Wheeled Fire Extinguisher 45L AFFF Foam Wheeled Fire Extinguisher; and 135L Wheeled Foam Fire Extinguisher.
3B.10.6 Fire Walls
Most of the fire and explosion protection measures are centred at the accommodation units where personnel are present most of the time. Fire walls are provided on the FSO to minimise spread of fire, duration and damage caused and more specifically, to guard the safety of life and to act as a mitigation measure of the protected area. All the walls on the Upper Deck, A- Deck, B-Deck and C-Deck at the accommodation block are A-60 firewall rated, and for essential premises, the floor decks are rated as well [R3B.1]. Fire walls provided on the FSO as follow:
A-0 Structural Bulkhead; A-60 Structural Bulkhead; B-15 Structural Bulkhead; and C Class Division.
For more details on locations for the firewalls, refer to the FSO Fire Protection Plan [R3B.24].
3B.10.7 Emergency Communications
The main objective of the communication systems provided on the FSO is to facilitate communications between the platform and surrounding installations, infield vessels and helicopters to ensure safe execution of routine/ maintenance operations as well as for emergencies.
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The communication systems provided to enable internal communication on the facility and external communication between FSO and external facilities are listed as follows [R3B.2]:
Public Address/ General Alarm (PAGA) system for emergency announcement and broadcast of platform alarms;
Private Automatic Branch Exchange (PABX) system connected to INMARSAT-F77 to facilitate external telephone communication;
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) FM radios for on-board communications between personnel and also communication to MOAB via dedicated channel;
Very High Frequency (VHF) FM Marine radios for communication between the FSO and supply boats and other nearby marine vessels in the field;
VHF AM airband radios for communication between vessel and helicopter when approaching or operating in the area;
Non Directional Beacon (NDB) for helicopter navigation to locate the FSO in conditions of poor visibility;
CCTV system for viewing at various areas on the FSO facilities; and
Local Area Network (LAN) system for electronic data transfers and email facilities between computer terminals on the FSO.
Facilities are provided such that at least one means of communication are available at all times. Radios are provided for personnel working on the FSO, to allow internal communications. Radio communications to MOAB, nautical vessels, shuttle tankers and helicopters are provided.
3B.11 SAFETY FACILITIES
3B.11.1 Safety Equipment
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is provided to ensure personnel safety while at work as well as during rescue. Eyewash station and fire fighting equipment such as portable fire extinguishers, fire blankets, etc. are provided at strategic locations on the platform.
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Escape and evacuation equipment is provided on FSO for safe escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel during an emergency situation. The safety equipment is placed in areas that can be easily accessible for the personnel.
The quantity and location of the safety equipment on FSO are provided in Table 3B.11a while the escape and evacuation equipment based on the FSO Safety Plan [R3B.20] is summarised in Table 3B.11b.
Table 3B.11a Safety Equipment Available on FSO
Description Location Quantity Portable Eyewash Station Upper Deck 3 Fire Station Upper Deck 3 Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD) Nav Bridge Deck 17 Note: 5 units (50% spare) are provided C Deck B Deck A Deck Upper Deck 2nd Deck 3rd Deck Double Bottom
O2 Resuscitator Upper Deck 1 First Aid Kit A Deck 4 Upper Deck 3rd Deck Fire Blanket A Deck 1
Table 3B.11b Escape and Evacuation Equipment Provisions on the FSO
Lifesaving Equipment Location and the associated quantity Total Life raft (25 person) A Deck (4) 6 Upper Deck (2) Life raft (6 person) Upper Deck (6) 6 Life Boat (75 person) A Deck (2) 2 Rescue Boat (6 person) Upper Deck (1) 1 Life Jackets C Deck (30) 77 B Deck (45) Upper Deck (2) 6 Life Jackets in Box Navigation Bridge Deck ( 1) 2 A Deck (1) 18 Life Jackets in Box Upper Deck (1) 1 40 Life Jackets in Box A Deck (4) 4 Life Buoys (2.5kg) Upper Deck (2) 2 Life Buoys (2.5kg) with Lifeline Upper Deck (2) 2 Life Buoys (2.5kg) with Self-Igniting A Deck (2) 12 Lights Upper Deck (10)
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Lifesaving Equipment Location and the associated quantity Total Life Buoys (4kg) with Self-Igniting Navigation Bridge Deck (2) 2 Lights & Self Activated Smoke Signals Line Throwing Apparatus with 230 m Navigation Bridge Deck (4) 4 Lifeline Parachute Flares Navigation Bridge Deck (12) 12 Embarkation Ladders A Deck (2) 4 Upper Deck (2) Smoke Hood with Safety Torch Navigation Bridge Deck (6) 89 C Deck (30) B Deck (45) A Deck (6) Upper Deck (2) Stretcher Upper Deck (1) 1
3B.11.2 Escape and Evacuation Route
The main escape routes on the FSO Upper Deck are painted yellow and applied with non-skid aggregate on the surface. IMO safety stickers are used as markings for escape routes within the accommodation facility. All escape routes are clearly marked with unambiguous, photo luminescent exit signs indicating direction of escape routes, provided along the walkway and enclosed areas on the FSO [R3B.1].
3B.11.3 Safety Signs
FSO is provided with UV and saline resistant plastic safety signs. They are prominently mounted at strategic locations throughout the installations. All safety signs that must be viewed in an emergency under reduced illumination level conditions are photo luminescent. The text on signs is in both Bahasa Malaysia and English. Fire and safety equipment is identified with photo luminescent painted self-explanatory pictures.
3B.12 PERSONNEL AWARENESS AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Personnel who will be present on the FSO are made aware of the existence, location and use of escape routes and life saving appliances. The information is provided on safety equipment and escape routes layouts exhibited throughout the facility. Station bill is also highlighted to all persons arriving at the location during the safety briefing.
Emergency response personnel assigned to special emergency response duties ie. fire fighting, search and rescue, mustering point marshal, etc., are given specific briefings to familiarise themselves with their duties and responsibilities.
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The CCR in the accommodation unit is equipped with command and control facilities, which also functions as an Emergency Control Centre in the event of an emergency.
3B.12.1 Mustering
The primary muster area is at the Temporary Refuge (TR) on the A-Deck accommodation unit, located adjacent to the Central Control Room (CCR). In the event of an emergency, personnel are required to proceed immediately to the muster area and await evacuation instruction from the safety co-ordinators (OIM or OIM designate). From the TR, personnel are able to access the boat landing areas, lifeboats and other life saving equipment if evacuation is required [R3B.1].
3B.12.1.1 Escape Routes
All areas on the FSO where personnel are likely to be present have at least two (2) independent and separate escape routes leading to the muster area. The specifications for the minimum width and height of primary escape routes are 1.2 m and 2.4 m respectively. These escape routes are maintained to be obstacles free at all times [R3B.1].
For more details on FSO safety escape routes, refer to the Escape Route Plan [R3B.21].
3B.12.1.2 Evacuation Plan
The decision to abandon the FSO would be based on an assessment of the risks associated with remaining on board against the risks of evacuation. The ultimate decision for ship abandonment or evacuation lies upon the discretion of the FSO Master/ OIM after various possibilities are considered.
The evacuation options available are [R3B.1]:
Primary Option – Evacuation by lifeboats; Secondary Option – Evacuation by life rafts; and Tertiary Option – Evacuation to sea.
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3B.12.2 Evacuation Provisions
The FSO has two (2) totally enclosed self-propelled survival craft (TEMPSC) lifeboats, installed in a suitable type davits. The lifeboats are located adjacent to the muster point on the A Deck, at the starboard (SB) and portside (PS) of the FSO. Each lifeboat has a capacity of 75 persons. The starboard (SB) lifeboat also functions as a rescue boat [R3B.1].
In a situation where primary means of evacuation is not available, then the life rafts provided at various locations will be used as secondary means of evacuation. A total of twelve (12) life rafts are provided at the FSO at the following locations [R3B.20]:
2 x 25-person life rafts near the aft of the Upper deck (1 on each side); 4 x 25-person life rafts at the accommodation block on A Deck (2 on each side); and 6 x 6-person life rafts at the fore of the Upper deck (3 on each side).
Lifebuoys are also provided at various locations around the FSO to be used during unforeseen events such as man overboard. The tertiary means of evacuation is by directly entering the sea. There is embarkation ladders provided adjacent to the life rafts to assist personnel entering into the sea.
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3B.13 SECTION 3B REFERENCES
[R3B.1] Trident Consultant Far East (M) Sdn Bhd – Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi FSO Design Safety Case, J8361, Rev. 0, 24 May 2005.
[R3B.2] IHC Gusto Engineering B.V, FSO Design Basis Specification, GT0237- SV-F-92-001-A1, Rev. A1, 27 December 2004.
[R3B.3] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual - Typhoon Contingency, PM-305-0415, Rev. 1
[R3B.4] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual - FSO/ Export Tanker Disconnect Criteria, PM-305-0304, Rev. 1
[R3B.5] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual - Cargo Loading & Preparation of Crude Oil for Export, PM-305-0311, Rev 1
[R3B.6] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual - Inert Gas System, PM-305-0316, Rev. 1
[R3B.7] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Venting Procedures, PM-305-0317, Rev. 1
[R3B.8] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Tank Inspection and Survey, PM-305-0324, Rev. 1
[R3B.9] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Tandem Lifting Operational Procedure, PM-305-0312, Rev. 1
[R3B.10] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Cargo Tank Water Washing and Handling of Tank Washings, PM-305-0407, Rev. 1
[R3B.11] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Bunker Transfer Operations – Receive & Supply, PM-305-0310, Rev. 1
[R3B.12] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Tank Gauging System - Fixed, PM-305-0315, Rev. 1
[R3B.13] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Duties of Personnel During Tandem Lifting, PM-305-0302, Rev. 1
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[R3B.14] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Cargo Pumping/ Metering Skid Operations During Tandem Lifting, PM-305- 0313, Rev. 1
[R3B.15] IHC Gusto Engineering B.V, FSO Tank Heating Calculation Report, GT0237-CK-F-15-002-A1, Rev. A1, 23 December 2004.
[R3B.16] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Gas Reception for Boilers, PM-305-0323, Rev. 1
[R3B.17] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – OCM/ OWS Procedures and Policy, PM-305-0321, Rev. 1
[R3B.18] FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd, FSO PM-305 Operation Manual – Produced Water/ Oily Water Discharges, PM-305-0322, Rev. 1
[R3B.19] Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO General Arrangement, 95-HG- 101001, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
[R3B.20] Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Safety Plan, 95-HL-500000, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
[R3B.21] Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Escape Route Plan, 95-HL-500002, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
[R3B.22] Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Hazardous Plan, 95-HL-500003, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
[R3B.23] Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Fire Fighting Plan, 95-HL-505000, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
[R3B.24] Talisman Malaysia Limited, FSO Fire Protection Plan, 95-HL-505002, Rev. X1, 25 July 2005.
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Section 4 HAZARD ANALYSIS
CONTENTS
4 SAA FACILITIES HAZARD ANALYSIS 4-1
4.1 INTRODUCTION 4-1
4.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS APPROACH 4-1
4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDS AND HAZARDOUS EVENTS 4-5
4.4 HSE ASSESSMENTS 4-21
4.5 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 4-23
4.6 DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP 4-27
4.7 SECTION 4 REFERENCES 4-30
APPENDIX 4-1 HEALTH & SAFETY (H&S) HAZARDS REGISTER
APPENDIX 4-2 ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS REGISTER
APPENDIX 4-3 HAZARDS MANAGEMENT REGISTER AND BOW TIE DIAGRAMS
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4 SAA FACILITIES HAZARD ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Section 4 describes the hazard analysis processes conducted to determine the risks associated with the SAA facilities operations. It provides an account of how the significant hazards were identified and the risks evaluated. The controls to manage the causes and consequences of the hazardous events are also described.
The objectives of this part of the HSE Case are to demonstrate that:
All hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified;
The risks from major accident events arising from the facilities have been assessed;
Performance standards of the following are evaluated with respected to impact from major accident events:
- Means and facilities for Escape, Evacuation and Rescue; and - Emergency Systems.
Mitigation measures have been or will be taken to reduce the risks to personnel on SAA facilities to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been employed to assess hazards and the ways in which they are controlled.
The various analyses have revealed some potential deficiencies in the design, management or control measures of the SAA facilities operations. Remedial measures to rectify these deficiencies and to reduce the level of their associated risks are presented in Section 5 of the HSE Case.
4.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS APPROACH
TML’s HS&E HAZID and Risk Assessment Procedure provides for a systematic approach for hazard identification on existing facilities, acquired facilities and/or new facilities.
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The approach taken for the hazard analysis of SAA facilities was to conduct a series of inter-related assessments to achieve the following objectives:
Identify and assess the sources of significant hazards from the SAA facilities;
Evaluate the risks from each of the hazard considered;
Assess the adequacy of controls provided for management of the hazards and their potential consequences;
Identify any deficiencies in the HSE management, procedures, design and operation of the facilities;
Propose remedial measures to address identified deficiencies or to further reduce the risks; and
Present the major conclusions of the assessment so that TML personnel and external contractors involved in the SAA facilities activities are aware of the hazards, hazard management controls and risk management objectives.
The assessments that were undertaken, their objectives and how they relate to each other are described in the following sections.
4.2.1 Basis of Hazard Analysis
The process of “Identify – Assess – Control – Recover” from the crux of SAA hazard analyses.
The four key principles are summarised as follows:
Identify – Systematically cataloguing of the hazards, threats and potential hazardous events and effects, which may affect, or arise from SAA facilities ie. Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) and Floating Storage & Offloading (FSO) throughout the lifecycle of the operations;
Assess - Evaluate or assess the risks from the identified hazards against accepted screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of any consequences to employees, assets, the environment and the public. This includes the risks associated with deviation from limits set for environmental and occupational health hazards;
Control - Select, evaluate and implement appropriate measures to reduce or eliminate significant risks. Risk reduction measures include those to
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prevent or control incidence (ie. reducing the probability of occurrence) and to mitigate effects (ie. reducing the consequence). Preventive measures such as ensuring asset or technical integrity is emphasised wherever practicable. Mitigation measures include steps to prevent escalation of developing abnormal situations and to lessen adverse effects on health, safety and the environment; and
Recover - Ultimately in an emergency situation, ensure recovery preparedness measures are in place to minimise escalation of a hazardous incident (ie. emergency response procedures for medical, oil spill, fire and etc).
4.2.2 Risk Criteria
The aim of defining risk criteria is to provide guidance for deciding whether the levels of risk in terms of HSE are acceptable. The acceptance criteria used in the SAA HSE Case are based on established industry practice and TML policy on Risk Criteria.
Acceptance criteria of two (2) distinct types have been considered:
Qualitative; and Quantitative.
4.2.2.1 Qualitative Criteria
Qualitative criteria are used in the initial screening hazard assessment and hazard register. These take the form of a risk matrix for general application as shown in Figure 2.5a. It is a combination of the hazardous event potential matrix (ie. possible severity of consequences to safety, environmental, assets/operability and financial) and the frequency of an event.
The overall risk is then determined by combining the frequency of occurrence with the hazardous event potential using the matrix. The various different levels of risk are defined in Table 4.2a.
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Table 4.2a Definition of Risk Levels in Risk Matrix
Risk Levels Implementation Guideline Very High Risk Work should not be started or continued until the risk has been reduced. If it is not possible to reduce risk even with unlimited resources, work has to remain prohibited. High Risk Work should not be started until the risk has been reduced. Considerable resources may have to be allocated to reduce the risk. Where the risk involves work in progress, urgent action should be taken. Moderate Risk Efforts should be made to reduce the risk, but the costs of prevention should be carefully measured and limited. Risk reduction measures should be implemented with a definite time period. Possible Risk No additional controls are required. Consideration may be given to a more cost-effective solution or improvement that imposes no additional cost burden. Monitoring is required to endure that the controls are maintained. Negligible Risk Further consideration not required. Monitoring is required to ensure that the controls are maintained.
4.2.2.2 Quantitative Criteria
Quantitative criteria were used to assess the risks examined in the QRA. The criteria used here are primarily individual risk to a person working on the SAA facilities as summarised in Figure 4.2a. Individual Risk (IR) may be defined as the frequency of fatality per individual per year due to the realisation of specified hazards. TML’s IR criteria are given in the Company Risk Policy and Criteria in line with the UK HSE Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, which states: “It is for the duty holder to set their tolerability criteria. An individual risk of death of 10-3 has been typically been used within the offshore industry as the maximum tolerable risk.”
When comparing the evaluated risks with risk criteria, the UK HSE’s assessment principle was adopted, which states: "Where the duty holder adopts this approach, total individual risk should include all sources of risk; contributors such as transport and occupational risk will need to be taken into account, as well as major accident hazards."
In this case, the total risks to which an individual is being exposed on SAA facilities are derived from several sources including hydrocarbon releases as well as non-hydrocarbon incidents such as transportation, occupational, ship collision risks, etc.
4.2.2.3 Demonstration of ALARP
For operations that have risk levels below the maximum tolerable level, ie. those falling within the "ALARP or tolerable” region it is necessary to ensure that risk
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UNACCEPTABLE RISK Risk intolerable except in 1 x 10-3/ year exceptional circumstances
Risks tolerable, only if risk reduction is not practicable ALARP REGION or costs grossly disproportionate to benefit gained
Risks tolerable if cost of 1 x 10-6/ year reduction exceeds benefits
NEGLIGIBLE RISK Risks broadly acceptable No risk reduction necessary
Figure 4.2a Talisman’s Individual Risk Criteria
Section 4 HAZARD ANALYSIS Page 4-5
levels associated with that facility or activity has indeed been reduced to ALARP. It is imperative to note that the IR risk level evaluated for a single option in the tolerable or ALARP range does not automatically provide for the achievement of ALARP.
Reducing risks to a level that is ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ involves balancing reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it. This level represents the point, objectivity assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.
The statement of ALARP achievement is only correct when all practical alternatives and options have been compared and the final decision made for the selection of the lowest risk cost effective option. In other words, all reasonable risk reduction and mitigation measures should be examined to determine their benefit and practicality. Where these measures have been exhausted and the effective alternatives to operate more safely cannot be established, the risk will be considered tolerable to ALARP levels.
The application of ALARP should be made continuously throughout the lifecycle of a facility or operation to achieve continuous performance improvement. The ALARP of yesterday or previous years may no longer be currently applicable as the advance in technology, modes of operations or society expectation and etc. may dictate TML to conduct the business of today differently.
The outcomes of examination of all reasonable risk reduction measures SAA facilities have been documented to demonstrate the assessment of ALARP in the context of the facility’s risk management.
4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDS AND HAZARDOUS EVENTS
4.3.1 Overview and History
The hazards and effects management process for the SAA facilities involved several stages and implemented over a number of years since the initial development phase, followed by further development phases of the SAA facilities and progressive upgrades/modification works of the operating facilities.
The hazard identification and assessment studies conducted for the SAA facilities fall under three (3) categories:
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Design safety studies; Operations safety studies; and Simultaneous Operations safety studies.
A summary of the hazard identification and assessment studies conducted for the SAA facilities since the initial development phase is summarised in Table 4.3a.
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Table 4.3a HSE Studies Conducted for the SAA Facilities
Studies Activity/ Scope/ Objective Facilities Date Reference Hazards and Operability Reviews led by a third party facilitator whereby the safety related MOAB Sept. 2004 [R4.8] (HAZOP) hazards and operability problems related to the process that FSO Dec. 2004 [R4.9], could directly threaten the safety of platform personnel or cause June 2006 [R4.10] operational problems were systematically assessed.
Quantitative Risk The overall risk levels for various development phases during MOAB Oct 2004 [R4.1] Assessment (QRA) normal operations (MOAB and FSO) and Simultaneous FSO May 2005 [R4.6] Production (SIPROD) were estimated; and Recommendations were raised to reduce risk.
Design Safety Case Developed to demonstrate that all hazards arising from the MOAB Nov. 2004 [R4.2] design development of the platform/ FSO have been identified FSO May 2005 [R4.6] and their risks managed adequately during design stage; Included summary findings from Formal Safety Assessments (FSAs) conducted during detailed design stage; Documented TML’s Health, Safety and Environment Management System (HSEMS) application to the hazards management throughout the execution of the design development and demonstrate compliance with TML’s HSE requirements for design.
Note: Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA) and Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) have been conducted as part of the Design Safety Case.
Noise Study Noise predictions to identify and eliminate of potential problems MOAB Oct. 2004 [R4.4] at the design stage of the development.
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Studies Activity/ Scope/ Objective Facilities Date Reference Environmental Impact Assessment of environmental impacts arising from the MOAB July 2004 [R4.5] Assessment (EIA) development of the platforms/ FSO to identify/ recommend FSO additional control measures that are required to manage the environmental aspects of the development.
Fire and Explosion Analysis on the consequences of credible fire and explosion MOAB Oct. 2004 [R4.3] Analysis (FEA) scenarios whereby escalation to other facilities or equipment within the platform.
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4.3.2 Identification of Hazards and Major Accident Events
Hazard identification is a significant step in the analysis. If a hazard is not identified, its contribution to the risk cannot be estimated and may be omitted from the overall risk estimate.
A comprehensive identification of hazards associated with the SAA facilities’ operations was conducted. These are compiled within the HSE Hazards & Effects Register (lists of all hazards) and the Hazard Management Register in the form of ‘Bow-Tie’ Diagrams (for Major Accident Events only).
4.3.3 HSE Hazard & Effects Register
HSE hazards have been identified and evaluated for the SAA development as part of the HSE Case and are compiled within the HSE Hazards & Effects Register.
4.3.3.1 Health and Safety Hazards Register
The Health and Safety Hazards Register contains a summary of all the hazards that could give rise to personnel injury or asset damage to the SAA facilities. The list of hazards is given in Table 4.3b.
Table 4.3b Health and Safety Hazards List for SAA Facilities
Ref. No Hazard Top Event Location
H1 Hydrocarbons H1.1 Process gas Loss of containment Process Area H1.2 Condensate Loss of containment Process Area H1.3 Hydrocarbons in formation Workover/ Intervention Wellheads Blowout H2 Refined Hydrocarbons H2.1 Lube and Seal Oil Loss of containment Process Area H2.2 Hydraulic Oil Loss of containment Process Area H2.3 Diesel fuel Loss of containment Utility Area
H3 Pressure Hazards H3.1 Hyperbaric Operations (diving) Loss of control All H3.2 Decompression (diving) Exposure To All H3.3 Bottled gas under pressure Loss of containment All
H4 Hazards associated with differences in height H4.1 Personnel at height > 2m Falls to Lower Level All H4.2 Overhead equipment Dropped Objects All
H5 Objects under induced stress H5.1 Objects under tension Loss of control All
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Ref. No Hazard Top Event Location
H6 Dynamic situation hazards H6.1 On water transport (boating) Loss of control/severe sea SAA Field condition H6.2 In air transport (flying - Loss of control SAA Field Aircraft associated with SAA Field) H6.3 Boat collision hazard to Impact with platform SAA Field offshore structure (Boats associated and non-associated with SAA Field) H6.4 Transfer from boat to offshore Impact with platform SAA Field platform H6.5 Moving equipment Loss of control Process/ Utility Area H6.6 Rotating equipment Loss of control All (except LQ)
H7 Environmental Hazards H7.1 Weather (winds) Exceed Exposure Limit All H7.2 Sea state (waves) High waves/ currents Sea deck
H8 Hot surfaces H8.1 Process piping & equipment Exposure To/ In contact All over 150C H9 Electricity H9.1 Voltage > 50 to 440 V in Electrical Shock All cables/ equipment H9.2 Lightning discharge Lighting strike All
H10 Smoke H10.1 Insufficient oxygen atmosphere Personnel asphyxiation due Process/ Utility Area to exceed exposure limits H10.2 Smoke Exceed Exposure Limit Process/ Utility Area
H11 Toxic liquid H11.1 Mercury Exceed Exposure Limit Process Area H11.2 Glycols Loss of containment Process Area H11.3 Corrosion inhibitors Loss of containment Process Area
H12 Ergonomic Hazard H12.1 Manual lifting and handling Stress to Human Body All H12.2 Loud (steady) noise Exceed Exposure Limit All H12.3 Heat stress (high ambient Stress to Human Body All temperature) H12.4 Awkward location of Stress to Human Body All workplaces and machinery H13 Security Related Hazards H13.1 Piracy Exposure To SAA Field
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Ref. No Hazard Top Event Location
H14 Biological Hazards H14.1 Food Borne Bacteria (eg. E. Food borne illness/ Incursion Living Quarters Coli) - contaminated food H14.2 Water Borne Bacteria (eg. Food borne illness/ Incursion Living Quarters Legionella Bacteria) H15 Ionizing Radiation H15.1 Ionising Radiation from open/ Exceed exposure limit Process area closed course eg. alpha, beta, gamma rays H16 Hot Fluids H16.1 Waste Heat Recovery Units/ Loss of containment Process area Hot Oil Heating Systems H17 General Chemicals H17.1 General chemicals Loss of containment of Process area chemical storage
4.3.3.2 Environmental Hazards Register
All identified environmental hazards associated with the development of the SAA have been found to be managed to a level of risk that is tolerable. The majority of environmental risks are classified as either Minor or Negligible. A summary of residual environmental impacts is provided in Table 4.3c.
Table 4.3c Summary of Residual Environmental Impacts [R4.5]
Residual Main Findings Environmental Impacts Air Emissions Air Quality No significant adverse impacts on local air quality as a result of air emissions from the production facilities are anticipated. Due to the offshore location of the SAA facilities (150 km from land), air emissions will be well dispersed prior to arrival over land.
Acidic Precipitation
Negligible contribution of total estimated NOX and SO2 emissions for Malaysia.
Global Warming Phenomenon
The principal sources of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions are the CO2 and hydrocarbons in vessel engine/ power generation exhausts. The significance of residual impacts from GHG emissions generated during installation activities are considered to be negligible.
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Residual Main Findings Environmental Impacts Aqueous The discharge materials from the SAA facilities are sanitary effluents, Discharges – bilge water, deck drainage and cooling water. These discharges can Water Quality potentially result in adverse impacts on water quality as well as secondary effects on marine life. However, no long-term deterioration in water quality as a result of aqueous effluent discharges will be expected and the residual impacts are considered to be minor.
Hazardous & SAA production operations will generate both non-hazardous and Non-Hazardous hazardous wastes. The generated wastes are managed in accordance to Wastes TML HS&E management procedure and legal requirements, therefore it is considered to have a minor effect on the environment surrounding the facilities.
Interference With Residual impacts in terms of interference with resource users (eg. vessel Resource Users navigation/ shipping and fishing) are considered as negligible to minor.
Impacts on The Effects arising as a result of the presence of the SAA facilities on the Seabed seabed including altered seabed profile, land take effects and localised disturbance of seabed sediments are considered as negligible to minor.
Ecological The SAA facilities (hard substrate and vertical structures) provide a Impacts habitat for encrusting epibiota and a source of food and shelter for fish and crustacea. The resulting aggregation of marine life (reef effect) is generally viewed as beneficial due to the localised increase in biodiversity and provision of new habitats.
Noise & Light Operational noise and light are considered to have a negligible effect on Pollution the environment surrounding the SAA due to the remote location of the facilities.
Socio-Economics SAA production operations are considered to have a small, positive socio-economic impact in terms of both provision of employment (both direct and indirect in the services, support and supply sectors) as well as generation of revenue for the State of Terengganu/ Malaysia.
Accidental Spills The potential for accidental spills and release of hydrocarbon liquids and & Leaks gas is an inherent risk in oil and gas production operations. This assessment has concluded that environmental risks associated with the accidental releases of chemicals, oils, diesel and condensate are managed to within a level that is tolerable.
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Residual Main Findings Environmental Impacts Decommissioning The SAA facilities will only be decommissioned/ abandoned once the petroleum reserves have been exhausted or when it is no longer economic to recover them. The facilities are currently being installed/ fabricated and as such, detailed decommissioning and abandonment plans have not yet been formulated.
Decommissioning plans will only be developed during the latter stages of the production life of the facilities. However, TML has included decommissioning considerations into the field development plan. The facilities design will be flexible to allow total removal of the facilities if so required.
A detailed decommissioning plan will be developed in the future, taking account of the most cost effective and best practicable methods and legal requirements at the time of abandonment.
The findings of the EIA have also been used to develop an outline Environmental Management Plan (EMP) for SAA Field, which highlights the environmental issues and constraints pertinent to the development and operation of the facilities, sets out the specific environmental protection measures that are in place, and identifies required actions to ensure continuous improvement in environmental performance.
4.3.4 Major Accident Events (MAE)
The potential hazards which may lead to a MAE has been identified for the SAA facilities. These major hazards, together with the top events, consequences and associated risks to personnel, environment, asset and operability and financial based on TML’s risk matrix are presented in Table 4.3d and Table 4.3e, respectively for the MOAB and FSO facilities.
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Table 4.3d List of Major Hazards on MOAB and the Associated Risk Evaluation for Each Consequence
Hazard Group Top Event Consequence Safety (S) Environmental (E) Asset/ Financial (F) Operability (A) H1.1 Hydrocarbon H1.1.1 Loss of Release of gas to the atmosphere, if D2 (Negligible D2 (Negligible D2 (Negligible B2 (High Risk) gas (process) containment unignited Risk) Risk) Risk) Personnel injury (N5) A3 (High Risk) - - - Fire and explosion, if ignited (N6) A3 (High Risk) B3 (Moderate Risk) A3 (High Risk) A3 (High Risk) Helicopter entering gas cloud resulting A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible in ditching/ crashing (N32) Risk) Risk) Risk) In-field vessels entering gas cloud A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible resulting in potential collision Risk) Risk) Risk) H1.2 Hydrocarbon H1.2.1 Loss of Environmental pollution, if unignited - D3 (Negligible D3 (Negligible B3 (Moderate liquid (process) containment Risk) Risk) Risk) Fire and explosion, if ignited (N6) A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible Risk) Risk) Risk) Personnel injury (N5) A4 (Possible Risk) - - - H1.4 Hydrocarbon in H1.4.1 Loss of Blowout/ explosion A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible formations containment Risk) Risk) Risk) (wellheads)
H1.6 Transfer from H1.6.1 Personnel Falling into sea causing man overboard A3 (High Risk) - - - boat to offshore transfer accident and possible fatality (N18) platform Personnel injury when dropped onto the C3 (Possible Risk) - - - deck (N19)
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Hazard Group Top Event Consequence Safety (S) Environmental (E) Asset/ Financial (F) Operability (A) H1.7 Elevated object H1.7.1 Dropped Damage to process equip. leading to A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible object release of HC Risk) Risk) Risk) Personnel injury (N5) A4 (Possible Risk) - - - Damage to process equip. leading to A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible fire/ explosion (N6) Risk) Risk) Risk) Platform structure/ crane damage (non - - C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) process) Vessel damage, potential sinking (N38) C4 (Negligible C4 (Negligible - - Risk) Risk) H1.8 Vessel H1.8.1 Vessel Impact to facilities leading to loss of C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) movements (on- collision to platform containment (N6) water) transport Personnel injury due to vessel collision C3 (Possible Risk) - - - impact on platform (N5) Damage to platform structures (during A4 (Possible Risk) C4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible normal ops) leading to potential Risk) Risk) Risk) collapse Vessel damage, potential sinking C3 (Possible Risk) D3 (Negligible C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) Risk) Damage to platform structures A4 (Possible Risk) C4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible (drilling/ workover) leading to potential Risk) Risk) Risk) collapse/ blowout Damage to platform structures (rig A4 (Possible Risk) D4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible approach) leading to potential collapse Risk) Risk) Risk) H1.10 Mercury H1.10.1 Loss of Chronic/ acute effects on personnel C3 (Possible Risk) - - - containment (N27) Release of mercury to environment - D3 (Negligible - - leading to pollution (N41) Risk)
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Table 4.3e List of Major Hazards on FSO and the Associated Risk Evaluation for Each Consequence
Hazard Group Top Event Consequence Safety (S) Environmental (E) Asset/ Financial (F) Operability (A) H2.1 Hydrocarbon H2.1.1 Loss of Release of gas (fuel gas system) to the C4 (Negligible D4 (Negligible C4 (Negligible D4 (Negligible gas (process) containment atmosphere, if unignited Risk) Risk) Risk) Risk) Personnel injury (N9) A4 (Possible Risk) - - -
Fire and explosion, if ignited (N10) A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible Risk) Risk) Risk) Helicopter entering gas cloud resulting A4 (Possible Risk) D4 (Negligible B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible in ditching/ crashing Risk) Risk) Risk) Infield vessels entering gas cloud A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible resulting in potential collision Risk) Risk) Risk) H2.2 Hydrocarbon H2.2.1 Loss of Environmental pollution, if unignited - C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) A3 (High Risk)
liquid (process) containment Fire and explosion, if ignited (N10) A4 (Possible Risk) C4 (Negligible B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible Risk) Risk) Risk) Personnel injury (N9) A4 (Possible Risk) - - -
H2.4 Mooring line H2.4.1 Loss of Spillage of HC from loading hose - C3 (Possible Risk) B3 (Moderate B3 (Moderate under tension control leading to env. pollution, if unignited Risk) Risk) Sea pool fire if ignited - loading hose D4 (Negligible D4 (Negligible B4 (Negligible B4 (Negligible breaks (N22) Risk) Risk) Risk) Risk) Whiplash of mooring line leading to A4 (Possible Risk) - - - personnel injury Potential collision of Shuttle Tanker A4 (Possible Risk) A4 (Possible Risk) A4 (Possible A4 (Possible with FSO Risk) Risk)
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Hazard Group Top Event Consequence Safety (S) Environmental (E) Asset/ Financial (F) Operability (A) H2.5 Helicopter H2.5.1 Loss of Crash/ incident of helicopter to the A3 (High Risk) D3 (Negligible B3 (Moderate B3 (Moderate movements (in-air control helideck causing fire and personnel Risk) Risk) Risk) transport injury/fatality Crash/ incident of helicopter to other A3 (High Risk) D3 (Negligible A3 (High Risk) A3 (High Risk) locations (N25) Risk) H2.6 Personnel H2.6.1 Personnel Falling into sea causing man overboard A3 (High Risk) - - transfer between boat transfer accident and possible fatality (N32) and FSO Potential personnel injury when C3 (Possible Risk) - - dropped onto the deck (N33) H2.7 Elevated object H2.7.1 Dropped Damage to equipment leading to release D3 (Negligible C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) object of HC Risk) Damage to equipment leading to fire/ A3 (High Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) B3 (Moderate B3 (Moderate explosion (N10) Risk) Risk) Personnel injury due to load impact A4 (Possible Risk) - - - (crushed between loads) FSO structure/ crane damage (non - - C3 (Possible Risk) C3 (Possible Risk) process) Supply vessel/ barge damage, potential C4 (Negligible C4 (Negligible - - sinking Risk) Risk) H2.8 Vessel H2.8.1 Vessel Impact to facilities leading to loss of A3 (High Risk) B3 (Moderate Risk) A3 (High Risk) A3 (High Risk) movements (on- collision containment and fire and explosion water) transport (N10) Personnel injury due to collision impact A3 (High Risk) - - -
Vessel damage or sinking - supply A3 (High Risk) D3 (Negligible D3 (Negligible D3 (Negligible vessel Risk) Risk) Risk) Vessel damage or sinking - FSO A4 (Possible Risk) B4 (Negligible A4 (Possible A4 (Possible Risk) Risk) Risk)
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Hazard Group Top Event Consequence Safety (S) Environmental (E) Asset/ Financial (F) Operability (A) H2.10 Mercury H2.10.1 Loss of Chronic/ acute effects on personnel C3 (Possible Risk) - - - (N37) containment Release of mercury to environment - D3 (Negligible - - leading to pollution Risk)
H2.11 H2S Hazards H2.11.1 Exceed Personnel asphyxiation A3 (High Risk) - - -
exposure limits Release of H2S to environment - D3 (Negligible - - Risk)
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“Bow Tie” Diagrams which present how potential MAE are managed, have been compiled into a Major Hazard Management Register. The Active Bow Tie software licensed by Risk Support was used to generate “Bow Tie” diagrams as well as provide outputs in tabular formats. The tool links the hazard barriers and the existing operational systems and procedures in place to eliminate the hazard or reduce its frequency of occurrence or mitigate its potential consequences. A schematic “Bow Tie” diagram is presented in Figure 4.3a.
Figure 4.3a Schematic “Bow Tie” Diagram
Hazard Analysis
C Thr ea t 1 O Consequence n N Thr ea t 2 H S A E Thr ea t 3 Consequence 3 Q Z Recovery Barriers Top Event Preparedness U A Measures Thr ea t 4 Consequence 2 E R N D C Consequence 1 E Thr ea t n S
Causa tion Consequence
The individual sections that together form the Major Hazard Management Register are described below. Each section contains a brief explanation of its function and description of its content.
4.3.4.1 Hazard Categories and Reference
The Hazard Management Register provides one record per identified hazard. The hazards are classified for the installation into hazard categories. However, it should be noted that only the hazards that were found to have a significant risk to personnel, the environment or the asset were examined in greater detail.
4.3.4.2 Top Events
Each hazard category is mapped into a number of representative accidental events, also known as top events. A “Top Event” is usually defined as the loss of the control point, i.e. how a particular hazard is released (eg. loss of containment, dropped load, etc). When several hazardous events apply to the
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hazard, only the top event, i.e. the most severe events in terms of health, safety or environment is taken into account.
4.3.4.3 Threats
This describes the initiating event(s) that could release a hazard in any given location (eg. rupture/ leakage of loading hose, corrosion/ erosion, vessel collision, etc).
4.3.4.4 Barriers
Barriers are features that are in place to reduce or control each of the identified threats. For each threat control a clear definition of the type of control is given:
Hardware control; Software (procedural control); and “Liveware” (human) control.
This is then compared against the acceptance criteria to demonstrate that the barriers are adequate or deficient.
4.3.4.5 Consequence
This describes all possible effects that could occur if the barriers are breached and the hazard is released.
4.3.4.6 Recovery Measures
For each consequence all the technical and operational measures which can mitigate or recover control of the event are described. For each method of mitigation or control a clear definition of the type of recovery is given (eg. design, fire protection system, emergency response procedures, etc.). A cross reference to the critical activities, which identify and control each recovery measure, is also given.
4.3.4.7 Escalation Factors
This element describes all conditions or actions of increased risk, ie. those preventing the mitigation and recovery measures from being effective and which could result in further escalation (eg. shutdown system fails on demand, lack of maintenance, etc). This can be treated as a barrier failure mode.
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4.3.4.8 Escalation Factors Controls
Escalation factors can be controlled by one or several measures, which can be considered as the barrier for preventing the condition of increased risk. Each method of control has a clear definition of its type (eg. preventive maintenance, inspection and testing, personnel training in safety awareness and HSE communication, etc.).
4.3.4.9 Risk Analysis
Risk evaluation is carried out by assigning severity and the likelihood category to each consequence based on credible scenario and not the worst case scenario.
Hazards Management Register Workshops for PM-305 facilities were conducted to analyse in detail on the Major Accident Events (MAEs) with input from the operations team. In line with ALARP principle, shortfalls and area of improvements identified during the development of the ‘Bow-Tie’ Diagrams were highlighted and listed in the Technical Note [R4.7].
4.4 HSE ASSESSMENTS
The main aim of the HSE assessments is to evaluate the risks presented by the major hazards identified. These assessments are applied to identify any deficiencies in the safeguards provided and to demonstrate the acceptability of the levels of HSE achieved on SAA facilities. In particular, these studies have been completed for the SAA facilities and FSO to ensure that the performance standards of the following critical systems are met:
Escape Evacuation and Rescue (EER); and Emergency Safety Systems (ESS).
4.4.1 HSE Assessments for SAA MOAB
The HSE assessments completed for the MOAB, which provide supporting documentation to this HSE Case and are as follows:
QRA Study for the South Angsi MOAB [R4.1]; Design Safety Case for South Angsi MOAB [R4.2]; Fire and Explosion Study South Angsi MOAB [R4.3]; and Noise Study for South Angsi MOAB [R4.4].
Key findings of the above studies have been extracted from the references and detailed in Section 4A.
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In general, the following conclusions were made with respective to adequacy of performance standards of the EER and ESS.
4.4.1.1 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
The Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analyses (EERA) for MOAB were conducted as part of the Design Safety Case [R4.2]. The studies concluded that the EER systems on these platforms were adequate and conformed to the HSE requirements with minor deficiencies identified.
The most vital EER systems for this platform were identified as the General Platform Alarm (GPA), the Public Address (PA) system, escape routes and survival equipment. It was highlighted that these EER systems are to be maintained periodically and in the event that any of these equipment was removed for maintenance, temporary back-up must be in place.
The maximum time required for personnel to evacuate the MOAB was estimated to be 6.2 minutes, which is considered reasonable for a platform [R4.2].
4.4.1.2 Emergency Safety Systems Analysis (ESSA)
The following emergency systems on MOAB were assessed as part of the Design Safety Case [R4.2] and were found to meet the required acceptance criteria:
Fire and Gas Detection System; Fire Suppression System; Emergency Shutdown System; Platform Alarm; Emergency Power; Emergency Lighting; Emergency Communication System; and Wellhead Control System.
4.4.2 HSE Assessments for SAA FSO
The HSE assessments completed for the SAA FSO provide supporting documentation to this HSE Case.
Key findings of the Design Safety Case have been extracted from the references and detailed in Section 4B.
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In general, the following conclusions were made with respective to adequacy of performance standards of the EER and ESS.
4.4.2.1 Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
The Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analyses (EERA) for SAA FSO were conducted as part of the Design Safety Case [R4.6]. It was concluded that the EER systems on these platforms were adequate and conformed to the HSE requirements with minor deficiencies identified.
The most vital EER systems for these platforms were identified as the Public Address (PA) system, escape routes and survival equipment. Hence, it was highlighted that these EER systems to be maintained periodically and in the event that any of this equipment was removed for maintenance, temporary back-up must be in place.
The maximum time required for personnel to evacuate the SAA FSO was estimated to be 50 minutes, which is considered reasonable for a manned facility [R4.6].
4.4.2.2 Emergency Safety Systems Analysis (ESSA)
The following emergency systems on SAA FSO were assessed and were found to meet the defined acceptability criteria:
Fire and Gas Detection System; Fire Suppression System; Emergency Shutdown System; Platform Alarm; Emergency Power; Emergency Lighting; and Emergency Communication Systems.
4.5 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
QRA studies for the SAA facilities have been conducted during the detailed design stages to determine the societal and individual risks of the installation personnel based on consequence modelling and historical frequency databases. The primary aim of these studies was to determine the general risk profile for each facility, focus attention on targeted risk reduction and confirm that the personnel risks are ALARP.
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The principle objectives of the QRA studies were to:
Quantify the risks in terms of Potential Loss of Life (PLL) and Individual Risk (IR) for personnel working on SAA during normal operations;
Compare the personnel risk with TML’s Risk Acceptance Criteria; and
Provide recommendations aimed at reducing the risk, in accordance with to the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle.
Information pertaining to the QRA results presented in this section has been extracted from the various supporting documents as listed in Section 4.3.
4.5.1 Hazard Categories
The following hazard categories have been considered in the QRA study:
Release of Topside Process Hydrocarbon: This refers to leaks of hydrocarbon from the topside ie. process vessels, compressors, pumps, pipework, valves, flange, etc;
Blowouts: This category refers to the uncontrolled release of well fluids from the wellhead and wellbay areas as well as subsea or sub-platform well fluid releases, whatever the cause;
Non Process Fires: This category encompasses fires that are not initiated by production gas or hydrocarbons and includes electrical fires, maintenance fires, etc., but only in so far as there may exist some potential for escalation to cause loss of life;
Ship Collision: Ship collisions refer to impacts between marine vessels, including merchant ships and supply vessels, with the facilities. The potential consequences of a collision include structural collapse and leg damage;
Transport Accidents: Helicopters are used to transport personnel to and from onshore. These personnel are exposed to risk from helicopter accidents including in-flight, take-off and landing accidents;
Dropped Objects: This relates to dropped crane loads that may initiate a hydrocarbon release from the process systems and/or cause fatalities through direct impact on personnel;
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Structural Failure: The possible causes of platform structural failure are due to fatigue, foundation failure, mal-operation, defective maintenance, design fault or extreme weather. These events are related to the primary structure and also to secondary structures such as cranes; and
Occupational Accidents: Accidents with no potential to cause fatalities outside the immediate area of the incident, including general risks such as slips, falling overboard, burns, electrocution.
The first two hazardous categories involve releases of flammable gas or hydrocarbons and may give rise to major damage to installations structures and personnel fatalities.
Non process fires generally are expected to result in localised damage, but if uncontrolled, can have serious consequences on the integrity of the platform/ FSO due to escalation to a major fire or failure of safety systems.
Ship collision and structural failure events may cause failure of the platform/ FSO structure, however fatalities among personnel are expected to be low with the assumption that enough time will be available for warning of an imminent collision and evacuation of personnel from the platform/ FSO can be initiated.
Transportation risks can potentially result in further fatalities if a helicopter crashes or boat capsizes due to severe weather. On the other hand, occupational accidents usually do not result in a large number of fatalities and in the majority of the cases will cause no more than a single fatality.
4.5.2 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
The overall SAA facilities Potential Loss of Life (PLL) during normal operations are summarised in Table 4.5a.
Table 4.5a Summary of Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
SAA Facilities Overall PLL (per year) Reference MOAB 5.3E-03 [R4.1] FSO 1.0E-02 [R4.6]
Topsides process releases and transportation accidents are the two (2) main risk contributors on the MOAB, which account for 67% of the overall PLL.
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The main contributors to the overall risk on FSO have been identified to be transportation accidents and topside process releases, representing approximately 60% of total PLL.
Details of the risk results for the MOAB and FSO are given in Sections 4A-B of the HSE Case.
4.5.3 Individual Risk (IR)
There are two (2) categories of dedicated crew working on SAA facilities, which the IR per year has been extracted in the respective QRAs [R4.1], [R4.6]:
MOAB crew- these personnel travel and work on the MOAB;
FSO crew- these personnel works and accommodate on the FSO.
4.5.3.1 Individual Risk of MOAB Crew
The average IR estimated for the various worker groups of the MOAB crew is presented in Table 4.5b.
Table 4.5b Individual Risk for the MOAB Crew [R4.1]
Worker Group Average IR (per year) Production Technician 3.7E-04 Maintenance Technician 4.5E-04 OIM/ Supervisory Staff 3.2E-04
The annual individual risk levels of all worker groups from the MOAB lies within the ALARP region of TML’s Risk Criteria (see Figure 4.5a showing IR of most exposed worker group). Worker groups which experience the highest individual risks are the Maintenance Technician as they are exposed to process releases and occupational risks.
4.5.3.2 Individual Risk of FSO Crew
The average IR estimated for the various worker groups of the FSO crew is presented in Table 4.5c.
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Intolerable
1 10-3
4.5 x 10-4 per year
ALARP region Individual Risk (per year) Risk (per Individual
1 10-6
Negligible
Legend Maintenance Technician on SAA MOAB
Figure 4.5a Talisman’s Individual Risk Criteria and IR of Most Exposed Group for MOAB Crew
Section 4 HAZARD ANALYSIS Page 4-27
Table 4.5c Individual Risk for the FSO Crew [R4.6]
Worker Group Average IR (per year) MOAB Crew/ Talisman Crew 2.7E-05 Master and Deck Officers 2.5E-04 Engineers 2.8E-04 Contractor/ Visitor 2.5E-04 Engine Room Crew 3.1E-04 Deck Crew 2.8E-04 Catering Staff and Medic cum Radio Operator 2.5E-04
The annual individual risk levels of all worker groups from the FSO lies within the ALARP region of TML’s Risk Criteria (see Figure 4.5b showing IR of most exposed worker group). Worker groups which experience the highest individual risk is the Engine Room Crew, as they are mainly exposed to process releases and helicopter transportation risks.
4.6 DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP
4.6.1 Overview
For operations, that have risk levels less than the intolerable level, it is necessary to ensure that risk levels have been reduced to ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable). The main approach to gain significant reductions in risks is through a structured process of identifying the hazards, determining the possible risk mitigation measures and then determining what measures are reasonable and practicable.
Reducing risks to a level that is ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’ involves balancing reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it. This level represents the point, objectivity assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.
This section summarises the efforts by TML to address the hazards and effects and associated risks. It demonstrates that for all foreseeable hazards all that is reasonably practicable to reduce risks has been incorporated into the design and so produce a residual level of risk that satisfies TML’s risk acceptability criteria.
An ALARP design and operations for the SAA facilities has been achieved by considering safety aspects throughout the design process, and striving to continually improve safety at each stage. In summary this has involved the following:
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Intolerable
1 10-3
3.1 x 10-4 per year
ALARP region Individual Risk (per year) Risk (per Individual
1 10-6
Negligible
Legend Engine Room Crew on SAA FSO
Figure 4.5b Talisman’s Individual Risk Criteria and IR of Most Exposed Group for FSO Crew
Section 4 HAZARD ANALYSIS Page 4-28
Developing the base case design with reference to internationally accepted design codes and standards, eg. American Petroleum Institute (API), Institute of Petroleum Model Code for Safety (IP Part 15), Safety of Life at Sea (IMO-SOLAS-1983), etc.;
Adherence to TML HSEMS which provides systematic identification of hazards and management of their potential effects;
Incorporating into the design best engineering practice based on significant design and operating experience within the TML teams through a series of design reviews involving various engineering disciplines; and
Conducting HSE studies (qualitative and quantitative) to assess the hazards on the facilities, to explore if further risk reduction measures are available and if such measures are reasonable and practical and to confirm that residual risk levels are ALARP.
Table 4.6a summarises the risk management process involved.
Table 4.6a Summary of Risk Management Process
Risk Description Management Process The SAA facilities were developed based on internationally accepted design Design Based on Design Codes codes and standards. Through the application of internal and external and Standards standards (eg. American Petroleum Institute), the recognition of best practice in design codes and standards is achieved. The specification of best practice design codes and standards is recorded in documents such as the Basis of Design, which has been extensively reviewed by design contractors and TML teams.
The focus of HSEMS was to attain an ALARP level of safety to personnel, TML’s HSEMS and compliance with TML’s HSE policy.
Various HSE studies were conducted to assess the hazards on the SAA HSE Studies facilities, to explore if further risk reduction measures are available, and if such measures are reasonable and practical and to confirm that residual risk levels are ALARP.
4.6.2 Risk Reduction Measures (RRMs)
The IR levels evaluated for the most exposed worker group lie in the upper part of the tolerable region based on TML’s risk acceptance criteria. Therefore, effort is required to reduce the risk to demonstrate ALARP eg. by investigating and
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closing out the recommendations raised from the various safety studies (see Section 5 – Remedial Work Plan of SAA Operations HSE Case).
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4.7 SECTION 4 REFERENCES
[R4.1] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for the South Angsi MOAB, J8328, Rev. 0, October 2004.
[R4.2] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi MOAB Design Safety Case, J8328, Rev. 0, November 2004.
[R4.3] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA) for the South Angsi MOAB, J8328, Rev. 0, October 2004.
[R4.4] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Noise Study for South Angsi MOAB, J8328, Rev. 0, October 2004.
[R4.5] Environmental Resources Management - Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi Development, PM-305, Exclusive Economic Zone, Offshore Peninsular Malaysia, South China Sea: Environmental Impact Assessment, J1930, Rev. 2, 28 July 2004.
[R4.6] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. – MISC Bhd. & Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi FSO Design Safety Case, J8361, Rev. 0, May 2005.
[R4.7] Environmental Resources Management – Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi (SAA) Operations HSE Case - Hazard Management Register Workshops, 0042660TML_tn_001, Rev. 0, 10 August 2007.
[R4.8] Environmental Resources Management – Talisman Malaysia Limited, HAZOP Study, J2110, Rev. 0, 8 September 2004.
[R4.9] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. – MISC Bhd. & Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi FSO Facilities HAZOP Study, J8361, Rev. 0, 24 December 2004.
[R4.10] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. – MISC Bhd. & Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi FSO Fuel Gas Systems HAZOP Study, J8343, Rev. 0, 6 June 2006.
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Appendix 4-1
Health & Safety (H&S) Hazards Register
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H1 Hydrocarbons H1.1 Process gas Yes Process area Loss of containment Toxic atmosphere in confined spaces due to unignited Health release Jet fires due to ignited releases and/ or unconfined/semi- Safety confined explosion leading to personnel injury/ fatalities and damage to equipment Asset damage due to flame impingement ie. structure or Safety other process and non-process equipment resulting in structural collapse Damage to sensitive equipment eg. electronics and Safety impairment of escape routes due to smoke H1.2 Condensate Yes Process area Loss of containment Jet or pool fires due to ignited releases leading to personnel Safety injury/ fatalities and damage to equipment
Asset damage due to flame impingement ie. structure or Safety other process and non-process equipment resulting in structural collapse Damage to sensitive equipment eg. electronics and Safety impairment of escape routes due to smoke H1.3 Hydrocarbons in Yes Wellheads Workover/Intervention Blowout Multiple jet fires from uncontrolled release/ blowout Safety formation leading to personnel injury/ fatalities, damage to equipment and impairment of escape routes
Toxic atmosphere in confined spaces due to unignited Health release
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H2 Refined Hydrocarbons H2.1 Lube and Seal Oil No Process area Loss of containment Fires resulting from ignition of a pool of lube/ seal oil Safety leading to personnel injury/ fatalities and damage to equipment Smoke generation causing exposure of personnel to smoke Safety asphyxiation H2.2 Hydraulic Oil No Process area Loss of containment Fires resulting from ignition of hydraulic oil release leading Safety to personnel injury Personnel contact with substance resulting in irritation to Health eyes, skin, respiratory tract, etc H2.3 Diesel fuel No Utility Area Loss of containment Diesel spill on decks leading to personnel exposure to toxic Safety/ Health chemical H3 Pressure Hazards H3.1 Hyperbaric No All Loss of control Divers hit by boat leading to personnel injury/ fatalities Safety Operations (diving) Injury/convulsions or consciousness during or after dive Safety leading to potential fatality due to fluctuation in pressure
Potential personnel injury/ fatalities due to attack from Safety aquatic life H3.2 Decompression No All Exposure To Repeated occurrence of decompression sickness leading to Health (diving) potential death of cells in long-bones and brittled bones
H3.3 Bottled gas under No All Loss of containment High pressure release leading to personnel injury/ fatalities Safety pressure and/ or damage to equipment
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H4 Hazards associated with differences in height H4.1 Personnel at height No All Falls to Lower Level Fall from height resulting in injuries to the person Safety > 2m including possible fatality H4.2 Overhead Yes All Dropped Objects Object fall from height resulting in injuries to the person Safety equipment including possible fatality Damage to platform equipment Safety Release of hydrocarbons (See H1) Safety H5 Objects under induced stress H5.1 Objects under No All Loss of control Whiplash of crane cable Safety tension Asset damage Safety Injury to personnel in the vicinity, potential fatality Safety Dropped object which will lead to equipment damage or Safety personnel injury/fatality H6 Dynamic situation hazards H6.1 On water transport Yes SAA Field Loss of control/severe sea Drowning of personnel Safety (boating) condition
Personnel crushed between boat and platform Safety Injury to personnel by aquatic life Safety
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H6.2 In air transport Yes SAA Field Loss of control Helicopter crash into land/sea causing injury and Safety (flying - Aircraft drowning of personnel and loss of helicopter associated with SAA Field) Helicopter crash onto helideck causing fire/injury/fatality Safety to personnel Helicopter crash into process equipment causing injury to Safety passengers and operators and release of hydrocarbon (See H1.1 and H1.2) Rotor impacts personnel causing injury Safety Rotor downdraft throws up debris causing injury to Safety personnel Mid-air Collision causing loss of two aircraft and Safety injury/fatality to personnel H6.3 Boat collision Yes SAA Field Impact with platform Injury to personnel in the vicinity of the impact Safety hazard to offshore structure (Boats associated and non- associated with SAA Field)
Asset damage, with potential for hydrocarbon release (See Safety H1.1 and H1.2) Platform deflection or collapse Safety Sinking of ships (See H6.1), possibly with impact on subsea Safety pipelines
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H6.4 Transfer from boat Yes SAA Field Impact with platform Personnel falling overboard and possible fatality Safety to offshore platform Personnel dropped on the open deck of the boat during Safety basker transfer H6.5 Moving equipment No Process/ Utility Area Loss of control Crush injuries to personnel Safety
Personnel injured by moving machinery Safety Diver hit by firewater pump Safety Impacts on other machinery and equipment resulting in Safety release of hydrocarbon (See H1.1 and H1.2)
H6.6 Rotating No All (except LQ) Loss of control High speed projectile released into occupied area Safety equipment Injury personnel Safety Rupture of equipment in vicinity resulting in release of Safety hydrocarbon (See H1.1 and H1.2) H7 Environmental Hazards H7.1 Weather (winds) No All Exceed Exposure Limit Personnel blown overboard or injured by windblown Safety debris Damage to process equipment resulting in hydrocarbon Safety release (See H1.1 and H1.2) Damage to superstructures Safety Damage to radio mass/loss of communications Safety Damage to cranes causing dropped loads (See H4.2) Safety Well services operations caught by sudden surge of storm Safety
Standby boat caught in severe storm Safety
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H7.2 Sea state (waves) No Sea deck High waves/ currents Damage to equipment at low level, eg. Cellar Deck and Safety below Personnel swept overboard Safety Platform deflection Safety H8 Hot surfaces H8.1 Process piping & No All Exposure To/ In contact Injuries to personnel eg. burns Safety equipment over 150C H9 Electricity H9.1 Voltage > 50 to 440 No All Electrical Shock Electric shock resulting in injuries, possibly fatal injuries. Safety V in cables/ Possible loss of production equipment Loss of respiratory function or heart attack Safety H9.2 Lightning No All Lighting strike Lightning strike on structure, equipment, crane, flare & Safety discharge telecom tower. Helicopter or personnel will cause localised high temperature burn to metal, paint, flesh, potentially resulting in fire or death Loss of communication Safety Shock/burns to personnel Safety Puncture and ignition of elevated hydrocarbon bearing Safety equipment H10 Smoke H10.1 Insufficient oxygen No Process/ Utility Area Personnel asphyxiation due to Personnel injury and potential loss of life due to toxic gas Safety/ Health atmosphere exceed exposure limits or oxygen deficiency
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H10.2 Smoke No Process/ Utility Area Exceed Exposure Limit Loss of respiratory function at high concentrations which Safety/ Health can lead to death Smoke generation causing exposure of personnel to Safety/ Health thermal radiation or smoke asphyxiation Toxic or irritant effects on personnel Safety/ Health
H11 Toxic liquid H11.1 Mercury Yes Process area Exceed Exposure Limit Severe respiratory tract damage; irritation and burns to Health skin and eyes; reproductive hazard H11.2 Glycols No Process area Loss of containment Potential personnel injury due to skin irritation Health H11.3 Corrosion No Process area Loss of containment Potential personnel injury due to skin irritation Health inhibitors H12 Ergonomic Hazard H12.1 Manual lifting and No Process area Stress to Human Body Impact of object on subsea pipelines, or boat below deck Safety handling handling Rupture of subsea pipelines and hydrocarbon release Safety
Impact of object on diver or boat crew, potential fatality Safety
Loss of use/function of facilities, with potentially adverse Safety impact for harm to people, environment, asset and reputation, particularly if loss occurs during emergency situation Muscular strain resulting in minor injury affecting work Health performance, such as restriction or a need to take a few calendar days to recover fully
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H12.2 Loud (steady) No Process area Exceed Exposure Limit Damage inner ear and loss of hearing due to excessive Health noise noise environement. Permanent threshold shift, Noise Induce Hearing Loss Health (NIHL) H12.3 Heat stress (high No Process area Stress to Human Body Heat exhaustion/heat stroke or possible death Safety ambient temperature) H12.4 Awkward location No Process area Stress to Human Body Possible development of Muscolo-skeletal Disorders (MSD) Health of workplaces and machinery
Work stress for affected personnel which affects work Health performance with a need to take few calendar days to fully recover H13 Security related H13.1 Piracy No SAA Field Exposure To Damage to property and assets Safety Injury/fatality Safety H14 Biological Hazards H14.1 Food Borne No Living Quarters Food borne illness/ Incursion Food borne illness will cause minor illness with limited Health Bacteria (eg. E. health effects (food poisoning), which affects work Coli) - performance, such as restriction to activities or a need to contaminated food take few calendar days to fully recover
H14.2 Water Borne No Living Quarters Water borne illness/ Incursion Abdominal discomfort, nausea, and in severe cases, Health Bacteria (eg. diarrhea and vomiting , which affects work performance Legionella with a need to take few calendar days to fully recover Bacteria)
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SAA Operations HSE Case - Health and Safety Hazards Register ID Hazard Potential Location Hazards Description Consequence Hazard Major Category Accident Event
H15 Ionizing Radiation H15.1 Ionising Radiation No Process area Exceed exposure limit Repetitive exposure above Threshold Limit Value (TLV) Health from open/ closed can cause permanent partial disability or affecting work course eg. alpha, performance in the longer term, such as prolonged absence beta, gamma rays from work.
H16 Hot Fluids H16.1 Waste Heat No Process area Loss of containment Potential personnel injury due to burns or fire events Safety Recovery Units/ Hot Oil Heating Systems Fire resulting from ignition Safety H17 General Chemicals H17.1 General chemicals No Process area Loss of containment of chemical Inhalation of fumes or chemical burns to personnel Safety storage Corrosion of deck surfaces Safety
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Section 4 HAZARD ANALYSIS
Appendix 4-2
Environmental Hazards Register
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Appendix 4-2 Environmental Hazards Register Page 4-2 :1
PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 1 Installation Installation, Power generation/ Routine Air Emission Vessel exhaust systems Combustion products (CO2, Chronic Intermittent supply & propulsion for supply/ (propulsion & power SOX, SOX, CO, PM) & support vessels support vessels generation) hydrocarbons 2 Installation Helicopters Personnel & freight Routine Air Emission Helicopter turbine engine Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent mobilisation (helicopter) exhausts NOX, PM) & hydrocarbons 3 Installation All Installation, transport Routine Air Emission Primarily vessel exhaust GHG (CO2 & hydrocarbons) Chronic Continuous operations systems (propulsion & power generation) 4 Installation Installation, Discharge of bilge, ballast Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Bilge, ballast, cooling water Water with entrained low level Chronic Intermittent supply & and cooling water from Sea systems on vessels oil content; biocide for cooling/ support vessels supply/ support vessel service water systems; heat from operations cooling systems 5 Installation Installation, Dischargel of sewage from Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Sanitary systems (toilets, Black & grey water with Chronic Intermittent supply & installation, supply/ Sea showers etc.) entrained solids, oil/grease, support vessels support vessel operations pathogens, detergents, organics 6 Installation MOAB MOAB subsea template Routine Physical Impact Template base placed on Jacket and piles Chronic Intermittent installation seabed/ anchored to seabed using suction anchors 7 Installation FSO Vessel anchoring Routine Physical Impact Anchors deployed on the Up to 12 anchors Chronic Intermittent seabed 8 Installation MOAB/ FSO Installation/ anchoring of Routine Physical Impact Template/ anchors Up to 12 anchors for FSO/ Chronic Intermittent new facilities (template, FSO MOAB template footprint - 1500 etc.) m2 9 Installation All Facilities installation at Routine Landtake (Temporary) MOAB subsea template and Seabed area of ~ 1500 m2 Chronic Continuous South Angsi lightweight platform installed occupied by installed facilities on seabed; FSO and anchor system (impact footprint) 10 Installation All Disposal of non-hazardous Routine Non-hazardous Waste Vessel operations and Garbage and industrial type Chronic Intermittent waste from construction/ construction / installation wastes (paper, plastic, wood, installation, supply/ activities containers, drums) - general support vessel operations wastes 11 Installation All Disposal of hazardous waste Routine Hazardous & Vessel operations and Hazardous wastes (lube oil, slop Chronic Intermittent from construction/ Scheduled Waste construction / installation oil, chemicals, cleaning products, installation, supply/ activities paints etc.) support vessel operations
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 12 Installation All South Angsi Field Routine Physical Interaction Installed facilities/ supply & 500 m navigational exclusion Chronic Continuous development activities support vessels transiting to zone around facilities and from facilities 13 Installation All South Angsi Field Routine Physical Interaction Installed facilities/ supply & 500 m fisheries exclusion zone Chronic Continuous development activities support vessels transiting to around facilities and from facilities 14 Drilling MODU Power generation for rig Routine Air Emission Rig power generation exhaust Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Continuous operation systems NOX, SO2, PM) & unburned hydrocarbons 15 Drilling MODU Bulk materials storage & Routine Air Emission Bulk materials storage system Dust emission (bulk drill fluid Chronic Intermittent handling vent systems (venting during materials: bentonite/ barite etc.) loading) (small quantities) 16 Drilling MODU Casing venting Routine Air Emission Casing vent system Hydrocarbon gas from well Chronic Intermittent casing (small quantities) 17 Drilling MODU Diesel fuel bunkering, Routine Air Emission Diesel fuel storage and Non-methane hydrocarbon Chronic Intermittent storage and handling handling systems (NMHC) fugitive emissions 18 Drilling MODU Drill mud degassing Routine Air Emission Mud degassing system local Hydrocarbon gas (small Chronic Continuous vent on drill rigs quantities) 19 Drilling MODU Burning of combustible Routine Air Emission Burn basket Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent waste NOX), PM & smoke 20 Drilling MODU Refrigeration for HVAC Routine Air Emission Refrigerant systems (HVAC, Fugitive emissions of refrigerant Chronic Intermittent systems etc. refrigerators, chillers etc.) (potential ODS) 21 Drilling Supply & Power generation/ Routine Air Emission Vessel exhaust systems Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent support vessels propulsion for supply/ (propulsion & power NOX, SO2, PM) & unburned support vessels generation) hydrocarbons 22 Drilling MODU Well testing/ evaluation/ Routine Air Emission Wellfluids flowed to burner Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent clean-up flaring boom on rig during NOX) smoke & HC evaluation/ clean-up flaring 23 Drilling MODU Drill cuttings disposal (SBF Routine Drilling Discharges Shale shakers (overboard SBF generated cuttings with Chronic Continuous drilling) discharge of drill cuttings & adherent base oil adherent drilling fluid) 24 Drilling MODU Drill cuttings disposal (WBF Routine Drilling Discharges Shale shakers (overboard WBF generated drill cuttings Chronic Continuous drilling) discharge of drill cuttings & with adherent WBF/ whole WBF adherent drilling fluid) discharges 25 Drilling MODU Mud system maintenance/ Routine Drilling Discharges Mud tanks (bulk overboard Discharged whole WBF (1 - Chronic Intermittent changeover disposal of whole WBF) 1000+ bbls)
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 26 Drilling MODU Drilling waste (drill Routine Drilling Discharges Overboard drilling waste Drill cuttings with adherent Chronic Intermittent cuttings) disposal disposal chute (solids control WBF/ SBF and bulk WBF system etc.) discharges 27 Drilling MODU Disposal of surplus cement Routine Drilling Discharges MODU overboard discharge Surplus cement with entrained Chronic Intermittent from casing & cementing line chemicals wells 28 Drilling MODU Discharge of rig bilge, Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Bilge, ballast, cooling water Water with entrained low level Chronic Intermittent ballasting and cooling water Sea systems oil content; biocide for cooling/ service water systems; heat from cooling systems 29 Drilling MODU Rig deck drainage/ Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Rig drainage system (rainfall/ Water with entrained solids, Chronic Intermittent washdown Sea washdown) oil/grease, detergents, organics 30 Drilling MODU Disposal of sewage from rig Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Sanitary systems (toilets, Black & grey water with Chronic Intermittent operations Sea showers etc.) entrained solids, oil/grease, pathogens, detergents, organics 31 Drilling Supply & Disposal of sewage from Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Sanitary systems (toilets, Black & grey water with Chronic Intermittent support vessels supply/ support vessel Sea showers etc.) entrained solids, oil/grease, operations pathogens, detergents, organics 32 Drilling Supply & Discharge of bilge, ballast Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Bilge, ballast, cooling water Water with entrained low level Chronic Intermittent support vessels and cooling water from Sea systems on vessels oil content; biocide for cooling/ supply/ support vessel service water systems; heat from operations cooling systems 33 Drilling MODU Rig positioning/ jacking Routine Physical Impact Rig jack-up legs/ spud cans Jack-up legs may penetrate Chronic Intermittent up/ jacking down penetrate/ retracted from seabed to considerable depth; seabed jack-up foot prints are expected to remain as visible scars for a long period of time 34 Drilling MODU Materials transfer & Emergency Dropped Objects Crane transfer systems Dropped objects may include Acute Intermittent handling (dropped objects) drums, containers, equipment, garbage, wastes etc. 35 Drilling MODU Rig general operations Routine Non-hazardous Waste Offices, accommodation, Non-hazardous wastes (wood, Chronic Intermittent galley, drill floor etc ferrous & non-ferrous metal, containers, paper, glass, packaging etc) 36 Drilling MODU Rig domestic operations Routine Non-hazardous Waste Galley on rig Organic wastes (~50 - 60 Chronic Intermittent
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 37 Drilling MODU Maintenance of rig Routine Hazardous & Rig operational systems Hazardous wastes (lube oil, Chronic Intermittent operational systems Scheduled Waste hydraulic oil, grease, solvents, paint, chemicals) 38 Drilling MODU Rig movements/ presence Routine Physical Interaction Drill rig at well site/ supply Drill rigs on-station for about 7 Chronic Continuous on station/ supply vessel vessels transiting to and from months/ 500 m exclusive zone operations site 39 Drilling MODU Rig movements/ presence Routine Physical Interaction Drill rig at well site/ supply 500 m fisheries exclusion zone Chronic Continuous on station/ supply vessel vessels transiting to and from around facilities operations site 40 Drilling MODU Rig operation Routine Noise & Vibration Engines, rotating equipment Low and high frequency noise Chronic Continuous and operational systems 41 Drilling Helicopters Personnel & freight Routine Noise & Vibration Turbine engines/ rotors Low and high frequency noise Chronic Intermittent mobilisation (helicopter) 42 Drilling Supply & Supply/ support vessel Routine Noise & Vibration Propulsion system; engines Low and high frequency noise Chronic Intermittent support vessels operations 43 Drilling MODU Lighting for night-time Routine Light Lighting system on drill rig, Area lighting and navigational Chronic Intermittent working & navigational support vessels, platform etc. warning lights warning systems 44 Drilling MODU Well flow testing/ clean-up Emergency Loss of Containment Burner Boom on Drill Rig Liquid drop-out to the sea (well Acute Incidental (flame-out/ liquid release) (Spills) fluids/ diesel) 45 Drilling MODU Base oil transfer, storage, Emergency Loss of Containment Base oil transfer, storage & Base oil (SARAPAR 147 Acute Incidental handling & use (spills) (Spills) handling systems (spill) synthetic base oil); quantity released dependent on event <1 - 1,000+ bbls 46 Drilling MODU Drilling fluid storage, Emergency Loss of Containment Mud system Water-based fluid (WBF); Acute Incidental handling & use (WBF spills) (Spills) quantity dependent on event <1 - 5,000+ bbls 47 Drilling MODU Drilling fluid storage, Emergency Loss of Containment Mud system SBF; quantity dependent on Acute Incidental handling & use (SBF spills) (Spills) event <1 - 5,000 bbls 48 Drilling MODU Materials transfer & Emergency Loss of Containment Bulk & containerised materials Hazardous materials will Acute Incidental handling (spills/ releases) (Spills) handling systems (eg. include caustic, specialty pneumatic conveyance chemicals and drill fluid systems) & crane loads (drums, additives sacks, containers/ pallets) 49 Drilling MODU Lube oil storage, handling & Emergency Loss of Containment Lube oil systems Lube oil; quantity dependent on Acute Incidental use (spills) (Spills) event <1 - 500 bbls
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 50 Drilling MODU Hydraulic oil storage, Emergency Loss of Containment Hydraulic systems Hydraulic oil; quantity Acute Incidental handling & use (spills) (Spills) dependent on event <1 - 15 bbls 51 Drilling MODU Diesel fuel transfer, storage, Emergency Loss of Containment Diesel fuel transfer, storage & Diesel fuel <1 - 10 bbls Acute Incidental handling & use (small spills) (Spills) handling systems (spill) 52 Drilling MODU Diesel fuel transfer, storage, Emergency Loss of Containment Diesel fuel transfer, storage & Diesel fuel; quantity released Acute Incidental handling & use (large spills) (Spills) handling systems (spill) dependent on event 10 - 3,000+ bbls 53 Drilling MODU Blowout (uncontrolled) Emergency Loss of Containment Well system (sub-sea to drill Uncontrolled release of Acute Incidental (Spills) floor) wellfluids (crude oil/ condensate, water, gas) to sea 54 Production MOAB Power generation on MOAB Routine Air Emission Gas turbine driven generator Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Continuous exhaust stack NOX & PM) and unburned hydrocarbons 55 Production MOAB LP flare system normal Routine Air Emission LP Flare Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Continuous flaring (purge & pilot, NOX & PM) and unburned continuous vent gas from hydrocarbons & smoke low pressure sources) 56 Production MOAB MP flare system normal Routine Air Emission MP Flare Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Continuous flaring (flash gas disposal) NOX & PM) and unburned hydrocarbons & smoke 57 Production FSO Power generation Routine Air Emission Boiler exhaust stacks Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Continuous NOX & PM) and unburned hydrocarbons & smoke 58 Production MOAB Crane operation/ Routine Air Emission Diesel engine driven Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent emergency generator / equipment exhausts NOX, SO2 & PM) and unburned firewater pump test/ hydrocarbons operational running (diesel engine driven equipment) 59 Production MOAB Venting gas from Routine Air Emission Local vent systems for drain Small quantities of hydrocarbon Chronic Continuous atmospheric vent systems caissons, tanks, gas turbines, gas compressor seals etc. 60 Production FSO Cargo tank venting Routine Air Emission Tank vent system Inert gas (N2) with entrained Chronic Continuous hydrocarbons 61 Production MOAB Oil and gas production & Routine Air Emission Process equipment leaks, Fugitive releases - methane & Chronic Continuous processing flanges, valve seals, pump NMHC seals, local equipment vents, compressor seals etc.
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 62 Production FSO Oil storage and offloading Routine Air Emission Process equipment leaks, Fugitive releases - methane & Chronic Continuous flanges, valve seals, pump NMHC seals, local equipment vents etc. 63 Production Supply & Power generation/ Routine Air Emission Vessel exhaust systems Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent support vessels propulsion for supply/ (propulsion & power NOX, SO2 & PM), smoke and support vessels generation) unburned hydrocarbons 64 Installation Helicopters Personnel & freight Routine Air Emission Helicopter turbine engine Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent mobilisation (helicopter) exhausts NOX, PM) & hydrocarbons 65 Production MOAB Air conditioning Routine Air Emission Refrigerant systems (HVAC, Fugitive emissions of refrigerant Chronic Intermittent refrigerators, chillers etc.) (potential ODS) 66 Production FSO Air conditioning Routine Air Emission Refrigerant systems (HVAC, Fugitive emissions of refrigerant Chronic Intermittent refrigerators, chillers etc.) (potential ODS) 67 Production MOAB Emergency flaring (MP Emergency Air Emission Hydrocarbon gas released to Combustion products (CO2, CO, Acute Incidental systems blowdown/ relief) MP Flare NOX & SO2) and unburned hydrocarbons & smoke 68 Production MOAB Emergency flaring (LP Emergency Air Emission Hydrocarbon gas released to Combustion products (CO2, CO, Chronic Intermittent systems blowdown/ relief) LP Flare NOX & SO2) and unburned hydrocarbons & smoke 69 Production MOAB/ FSO Materials transfer & Emergency Dropped Objects Crane transfer systems Dropped objects may include Acute Incidental handling (dropped objects) drums, containers, equipment, garbage, wastes etc. 70 Production MOAB Wellfluids extraction Routine Subsidence Extraction of wellfluids from Potential very gradual Chronic Continuous subterranian reservoirs subsidence of seabed above produced reservoirs 71 Production FSO Disposal of galley waste Routine Non-hazardous Waste Food disposal chute Organic wastes (~25 kg/day) Chronic Continuous 72 Production MOAB/ FSO Non-hazardous waste Routine Non-hazardous Waste General facilities (office, Industrial waste (paper, Chronic Continuous management & disposal control room, accommodation cardboard, packaging, wood, (industrial type waste) etc.) plastic, sacks, glass, tin cans) 73 Production MOAB/ FSO Non-hazardous waste Routine Non-hazardous Waste Maintenance activities/ LQs Ferrous & non-ferrous metal Chronic Continuous management & disposal items (ferrous & non-ferrous metal) 74 Production MOAB/ FSO Facilities operations/ Routine Hazardous & Platforms/ FSO/ supply & Hazardous wastes including Chronic Intermittent maintenance Scheduled Waste support facilities slop oils, grease, waste oil, spent lube oil, paints, off-spec
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 75 Production MOAB/ FSO Platform/ facility presence Routine Physical Interaction Facilities presence on seabed Localised increased biodiversity Chronic Continuous (artificial reefs) (reef effect) 76 Production MOAB Water Injection System Routine Water Use Water injection system Inhibited seawater injected Chronic Continuous operation underground 77 Production MOAB/ FSO Service and cooling water Routine Water Use Uplift via intake systems Seawater uplift Chronic Continuous supply 78 Production All Oil & gas production, Routine Resource Use South Angsi production Production and export of up to Chronic Continuous processing & export facilities 30,000 bbls/ crude oil 79 Production MOAB Non-associated gas flaring Routine Resource Use South Angsi production Flaring of up to 2.5 MMscfd for Chronic Continuous facilities initial few years of production operations 80 Production MOAB/ FSO Diesel engine driven Routine Energy Use (Fuel/ Diesel engine driven (#) Diesel usage ~ 400 tonnes/ Chronic Intermittent equipment operation Electrical) equipment includes cranes, month firepump engines, emergency (#) Diesel engine driven generator engines equipment thermal efficiency ~25% 81 Production MOAB/ FSO Fuel gas supply to gas Routine Energy Use (Fuel/ Gas from process stream (#) Fuel gas usage 3.5 MMscfd Chronic Continuous turbines, FSO and flare Electrical) (#) Typically turbines have a system thermal efficiency of 25 - 35% 82 Production MOAB/ FSO Oil & gas production, Routine Labour (Human Offshore oil & gas production Max oil production will be Chronic Continuous processing & export Resources) activities 30,000 bbls/d 83 Production MOAB/ FSO Oil & gas production, Routine Noise & Vibration Rotating equipment, flow Low and high frequency noise Chronic Continuous processing & export control devices, alarm/ PA system etc. 84 Production Helicopters Personnel & freight Routine Noise & Vibration Turbine engines/ rotors Low and high frequency noise Chronic Intermittent mobilisation (helicopter) 85 Production Supply & Supply/ support vessel Routine Noise & Vibration Propulsion system; engines Low and high frequency noise Chronic Intermittent support vessels operations 86 Production MOAB/ FSO Lighting for night-time Routine Light Lighting system on vessels, Area lighting and navigational Chronic Intermittent working & navigational platforms and FSO etc. warning lights warning systems 87 Production MOAB Produced water disposal Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Produced water treatment Treated produced water with Chronic Continuous Sea system discharge to sea via entrained oil (20 ppm max.) (~ Drains Caisson up to 133 m3/hr) 88 Production FSO Crude dewatering, oily Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Overboard discharge line Produced water with max 40 Chronic Intermittent bilges, tank washings and Sea ppm oil content slop disposal
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 89 Production MOAB/ FSO Produced water/ cooling Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Cooling water system (FSO) Produced water (70 - 80 C) and Chronic Continuous water disposal Sea and produced water system cooling water (~ 40 - 50 C) (MOAB) 90 Production FSO Sewage Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Overboard discharge line Treated sewage (maceration/ Chronic Continuous Sea disinfection/ aeration) 91 Production FSO Grey water disposal Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Overboard discharge line Grey water Chronic Continuous Sea 92 Production MOAB Platform drainage (Open Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Drains caisson Water with entrained Chronic Intermittent Drains) Sea hydrocarbons (< 100 ppm) 93 Production Supply & Discharge of bilge, ballast Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Bilge, ballast, cooling water Water with entrained low level Chronic Intermittent support vessels and cooling water from Sea systems oil content; biocide for cooling/ supply/ support vessel service water systems; heat from operations cooling systems 94 Production Supply & Disposal of sewage from Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Sanitary systems (toilets, Black & grey water with Chronic Intermittent support vessels supply/ support vessel Sea showers etc.) entrained solids, oil/grease, operations pathogens, detergents, organics 95 Production FSO Portable water production Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Discharge line from water Concentrated brine Chronic Continuous Sea makers to overboard 96 Production MOAB/ FSO Disposal of surplus Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Seawater dosed with 1 - 2 ppm Seawater with 1 - 2 ppm chlorine Chronic Continuous seawater/ service water Sea chlorine discharged overboard 97 Production FSO FSO de-ballasting Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Overboard discharge line Seawater (oil free) Chronic Intermittent Sea 98 Production Shuttle Tanker Shuttle tanker de-ballasting Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Overboard discharge line Seawater with possible entrained Chronic Intermittent Sea oil 99 Production Jacket/ FSO Corrosion protection Routine Effluent/ Discharge to Sacrificial anodes on jacket/ Slow release of aluminium/ zinc Chronic Continuous (sacrificial anodes) Sea FSO hull and trace metals into the sea 100 Production MOAB Production & utility Routine Loss of Containment Chemical injection system 1 - 2 m3 tote tanks of antifoam, Acute Incidental chemicals storage, handling (Spills) polyelectrolytes, oxygen & use scavenger, scale inhibitor, corrosion inhibitor, biocides etc. 101 Production MOAB/ FSO Lube oil storage, handling & Emergency Loss of Containment Lube oil systems Lube oil; quantity dependent on Acute Incidental use (spills) (Spills) event < 1 - 200 bbls 102 Production MOAB/ FSO Diesel storage & handling Emergency Loss of Containment Diesel storage tanks/ Spill size dependent on event Acute Incidental (Spills) distribution system (tank capacities (MOAB diesel storage tank 200 bbls in crane pedestal))
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PM-305 Operations HSE Case - Environmental Hazard Register ID Phase Facility/ Activity Activity Hazard Source of Impact Hazard Features Hazard Hazard Location Type (Characteristics) Nature Duration 103 Production MOAB/ FSO Diesel transfer from supply Emergency Loss of Containment Diesel transfer system, diesel Diesel fuel; spill size unlikely to Acute Incidental vessel (Spills) storage tanks exceed 10 bbls 104 Production Platforms Oil and gas processing Emergency Loss of Containment Topsides process equipment Oil and hydrocarbon gas; oil size Acute Incidental (Spills) dependent on event (max ~ 500 bbls) 105 Production MOAB Well blowout Emergency Loss of Containment Production wells Major uncontrolled release of Acute Incidental (Spills) wellstream fluids (gas and oil) 106 Production FSO Crude storage (cargo Emergency Loss of Containment Oil spills from overfilling of Crude oil; spill size unlikely to Acute Incidental systems spills) (Spills) cargo tanks exceed 1,000 bbls 107 Production FSO Crude transfer (transfer Emergency Loss of Containment Failure of tandem transfer hose Crude oil; spill size unlikely to Acute Incidental system spills) (Spills) system exceed 1,000 bbls 108 Production FSO FSO foundering (major Emergency Loss of Containment Crude storage tanks/ fuel oil Major release of crude oil Acute Incidental maritime casualty) (Spills) storage tanks (inventory up to 800,000 bbls).
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Section 4 HAZARD ANALYSIS
Appendix 4-3
Hazards Management Register and Bow Tie Diagrams
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4-3 BOW TIE DIAGRAMS FOR SAA FACILITIES
4-3.1 BOW TIE DIAGRAMS FOR MOAB AND FSO
The main objective of the Hazard Management Register is to review the SAA facilities and associated operations to predict the effects of a major hazard and associated hazardous events on personnel, the environment and resources. This has been achieved by following the methodology:
Identifying the hazards; Examining the threats or initiating events that could release a hazard; Describing the possible consequences; and Reviewing the potential escalating events.
Safeguards and barriers that could prevent initiating events and the provisions for limiting the consequences of a hazardous event were also verified in terms of the safety management.
Sixteen (16) Bow Tie diagrams for MOAB and FSO are appended in this section. Note that some of the sections require further verification by the relevant party from TML. These are denoted by ** in the respective Bow Tie diagrams.
The notes and abbreviations presented in Tables 4-3.1a and 4-3.1b are to be read in conjunction with the bow tie diagrams.
Table 4-3.1a Bow Tie Diagrams Notes
Note No. Note description MOAB N1 1. Procedure defines minimum requirement for selection of contractors 2. Periodic audit and review of competence of the contractors N2 Contractor administrator/ supervisor to conduct periodic checks on contractor for contract violation N3 Vibration of piping due to lack of poor piping support and vibration of equipment (eg. compressor, pump, etc) N4 Badly corroded surfaces to be checked by Inspector for piping thickness integrity prior to blasting work N5 Personnel injury due to thermal/ explosion impact/ pressure impact/ load impact or asphyxiation N6 Fire may cause damage to the assets and loss of production N7 Fire fighting training/ Management of Major Emergency (MOME) training for the Incident Management Team (IMT)
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Note No. Note description N8 Fire suppression system comprises: 1. Firewater system 2. Portable fire extinguishers 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors/ hose reels
5. CO2 suppression system (enclosed area) N9 Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment: 1. Weekly testing of firewater pumps 2. Monthly checking of hose reel 3. Monthly checking of portable fire extinguishers N10 1. PTW for hot work 2. Hazardous area classification for certification of electrical equipment 3. Insulation of hot surface 4. Static electricity N11 Fire suppression system comprises: 1. Firewater system 2. Portable fire extinguishers 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors/ hose reels N12 Specific anchoring/ mooring procedures available, includes checking of anchoring and de-anchoring calculations, procedures and layout N13 Waived personnel as a minimum requirement must be medically fit N14 as per Adverse Weather Procedures N15 Captain and basket transfer supervisor ensure that the landing decks on platform and boat are always clear of obstruction and safe for personnel transfer N16 Poor condition of gangway eg. poor/ insecure installation, damaged rigging gears, etc. N17 Standby personnel to visually inspect and monitor personnel movement and gangway condition, suspend gangway usage if found unfit and carry out with repair work N18 Falling into sea causing man overboard and possible fatality during personnel transfer via basket/ gangway/ swing rope N19 Potential personnel injury when dropped onto the deck of platform or boat during personnel transfer via basket/ gangway N20 Dynamic Positioning System only available in some vessels N21 Anchored handling tugs (including rigs move in/ move out during drilling phase)/ mooring alongside platform N22 PM on crane/ monorail/ davit, lifting lugs including lifting equipment according to TML’s PM schedule N23 ECR to be approved and modification procedures require safety reviews to be conducted N24 Mercury Decontamination Management includes the Decontamination at strategic locations throughout the platform N25 The practical training will be listed in TML’s HSE training record N26 Mercury awareness training can be conducted by Computer Based Training (CBT) or classroom based training and covers the PPE includes respirator with mercury cartridges, nitrile gloves, Tychem C type disposable coverall and rubber boots
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Note No. Note description N27 1. Chronic effects: Peripheral neuropathy and neuro-psychiatric disorders, damage to re-productive system, etc. 2. Acute (short-term) exposure to high levels of elemental mercury in humans results in central nervous system effects such as tremors, mood changes, and slowed sensory and motor nerve function, also throat irritations, etc. N28 Helicopter requests landing clearance before approaching platform and well clear of any potential gas cloud N29 Sand probe to be fitted and erosion monitoring system to be established upon confirmation of reservoir analysis N30 Stress analysis/ dynamic simulation of piping conducted during design phase or as and when required during operation N31 Integrity of pipework comprised after high pressure water jet/ grit blasting. This scenario is not considered credible to result in hydrocarbon release for SAA. High pressure water jet/ grit blasting will not be conducted over live HC pipeworks N32 Helicopter entering gas cloud resulting in ditching/ crashing. Consequences assessed based on crashing on MOAB N33 Visual inspection of condition before use, replace with new if found guilty N34 Preventive Maintenance (PM) on ODC pump (10-P-6120) is considered as critical as no redundancy is provided N35 Dissemination of procedures, and work control under PTW N36 BOP is not considered a mitigation measure in the event of vessel collision N37 TML manage and audit the QA/QC system, which include third party involvement in certification and inspection on equipment N38 Vessel damage, potential sinking and has been assessed to have insignificant asset and financial impact on credible scenarios N39 Lifting procedures and Adverse Weather procedure, etc N40 Mercury protection PPE eg. skin/ respiratory protection N41 Mercury concentration in SAA wellstreams is at a level that may cause environmental pollution N42 Monitoring of mercury concentration on process area via portable mercury analyser prior to operation activities FSO N1 Corrosion and erosion monitoring programme includes periodic testing by third party, acceptance done by ABS as part of annual, 2.5 years and 5 years surveys ie. for boilers and tubes (part of the fuel gas system) N2 Pressure/ leak test after reinstatement/ reassembly of equipment or pipework N3 Competency training programmes as per IMO requirements - Standard of Training Certification and Watch keeping (STCW) 1978 as amended in 1995 N4 Proper screening of the competency of contractor supervisor/ personnel by FVSB/ MISC prior to mobilisation to offshore N5 Marine/ Maintenance Supervisor to monitor and check on the modification works N6 1. Procedure defines minimum requirement for selection of contractors 2. Periodic audit and review of competence of the contractors N7 Marine/ Maintenance Supervisor to conduct periodic checks on contractor for contract violation N8 Vibration of piping due to lack of/ poor piping support and vibration of equipment (eg. pump) due to misalignment of equipment/ piping, etc. N9 Potential personnel injury due to thermal/ explosion impact/ pressure impact/
load impact or excessive smoke/ CO2 inhalation N10 Fire/ explosion may cause damage to the asset and loss of production
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Note No. Note description N11 Fire fighting training/ Management of Major Emergency (MOME) training for the Incident Management Team (IMT) N12 Fire suppression system comprises: 1. Firewater system 2. Portable fire extinguishers 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors/ hose reels 5. Foam system (Helideck and Machinery space/ pump room)
6. CO2 system (Paint store) N13 Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment: 1. Weekly testing of firewater pumps 2. Monthly checking of hose reel 3. Monthly checking of portable fire extinguishers N14 1. PTW for hot work 2. Hazardous area classification for certification of electrical equipment 3. Insulation of hot surface 4. Static electricity 5. Inerting of cargo/slop tank N15 Level instrument and two (2) alarm provided on each cargo/ slop tank ie. high and high high N16 Specific anchoring/ mooring procedures available, includes checking of anchoring and de-anchoring calculations, procedures and layout N17 Contractor management programme/ internal procedures to ensure condition of marine crew N18 Causes: 1. Defective/ failure offloading hose/ connection 2. Mooring failure 3. Extreme weather causing Shuttle Tanker to lose its position 4. Offloading hose damage due to poor boat handling N19 Inspection/ checklist prior to operations ie. on communication equipment & tools and visual inspection on offloading hose N20 Communication between tanker, tug boat and FSO is maintained throughout offloading process N21 Offshore test Hydro test including elongation test, strain test, etc. every 2 years N22 Sea pool fire is anticipated to be unlikely as the presence of ignition source is not expected N23 Dedicated competent and experienced Mooring/ Loading Master for every operation N24 Interference of electromagnetic equipment/ device N25 Crash/ incident of helicopter to other locations apart from the Helideck on the FSO causing fire and personnel injury N26 MOC to be approved and modification procedures require safety reviews to be conducted N27 as per Adverse Weather Procedures N28 Boat captain, officer on deck and crane operator's judgment based on experience N29 Permission from captain/ FSO Master with the advice of crane operator and agreement from passenger to proceed with transfer operations N30 Captain to ensure the vessel deck and basket transfer supervisor to ensure the FSO deck to be always clear of obstruction and safe for personnel transfer N31 Waived personnel as a minimum requirement must be medically fit
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Note No. Note description N32 Falling into sea causing man overboard and possible fatality during personnel transfer via basket N33 Potential personnel injury when dropped onto the deck during personnel transfer via basket N34 Failure of derrick/ crane/ monorail/ davit controls, structure/ hooks including lifting equipment N35 Fire suppression system comprises: 1. Firewater system 2. Portable fire extinguishers 3. Deluge system 4. Fire monitors/ hose reels 5. Foam system N36 Dynamic Positioning System only available in some vessels N37 1. Chronic effects: Peripheral neuropathy and neuro-psychiatric disorders, damage to re-productive system, etc. 2. Acute (short-term) exposure to high levels of elemental mercury in humans results in central nervous system effects such as tremors, mood changes, and slowed sensory and motor nerve function, also throat irritations, etc. N38 Periodic laboratory test to detect mercury level in produced water, cargo, boiler and potable water. The laboratory test reports are kept by TML. N39 Helicopter requests landing clearance before approaching platform and well clear of any potential gas cloud N40 Lifting procedures and Adverse Weather procedure, etc N41 Integrity of pipework comprised after high pressure water jet/ grit blasting. This scenario is not considered credible to result in hydrocarbon release for SAA. High pressure water jet/ grit blasting will not be conducted over live HC pipeworks N42 Dissemination of procedures, and work control under PTW N43 Monitoring of mercury concentration on process area via portable mercury analyser prior to operation activities N44 Mercury awareness training can be conducted by Computer Based Training (CBT) or classroom based training and covers the following: 1. PPE includes respirator with mercury cartridges, nitrile gloves, Tychem C type disposable coverall and rubber boots 2. Health hazards of mercury, decontamination, medical surveillance, monitoring, etc. N45 The practical training will be listed in TML’s HSE training record N46 Mercury protection PPE eg. skin/ respiratory protection N47 For Shuttle Tanker N48 Weather/ condition assessment by Mooring/ FSO/ Shuttle Tanker Master in accordance with Marine Terminal Handbook
N49 Requirement to minimise H2S release during offloading is communicated to Shuttle Tanker by FSO per Marine Terminal Handbook. Release rate is depending on the wind direction
N50 Frequent monitoring of H2S by portable H2S analyser on Shuttle Tanker - responsibility of Mooring Master N51 Visual inspection of condition before use, replace with new if found faulty
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Table 4-3.1b Bow Tie Diagrams Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description MOAB BOP Blowout Preventer BOSET Basic Offshore Safety Emergency Training CBT Computer Based Training CDV Closed Drain Vessel CMMS Computerised Maintenance Management System DPS Dynamic Positioning System ECR Engineering Change Request EER Escape, Evacuation and Rescue ERP Emergency Response Plan ERT Emergency Response Team ESD Emergency Shutdown HAZMAT Hazards Material Handling HC Hydrocarbon HLO Helicopter Landing Officer IMT Incident Management Team JSA Job Safety Analysis MOC Management of Change MOME Management of Major Emergency ODC Open Drain Caisson OIM Offshore Installation Manager PFP Passive Fire Protection PIMMAG Petroleum Industry of Malaysia Mutual Aid Group PM Preventive Maintenance PPE Personal Protective Equipment PTW Permit to Work QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SSB Single Side Band SOP Standard Operating Procedures SSV Surface Safety Valve WHRP Wellhead Riser Platform FSO BOSET Basic Offshore Safety Emergency Training CBT Computer Based Training CMMS Computerised Maintenance Management System DPS Dynamic Positioning System ECR Engineering Change Request EER Escape, Evacuation and Rescue ERP Emergency Response Plan ERT Emergency Response Team ESD Emergency Shutdown FOM Fleet Operating Manual FVSB FPSO Ventures Sdn Bhd HAZMAT Hazards Material Handling HC Hydrocarbon
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Abbreviation Description HLO Helicopter Landing Officer IMT Incident Management Team IMO International Maritime Organisation JSA Job Safety Analysis KSB Kemaman Supply Base MBC Marine Breakaway Coupling MOC Management of Change MOME Management of Major Emergency MHS Malaysia Helicopter Service MTH Marine Terminal Handbook OIM Offshore Installation Manager PIMMAG Petroleum Industry of Malaysia Mutual Aid Group PLEM Pipeline End Manifold PM Preventive Maintenance PMS Planned Maintenance Schedule PPE Personal Protective Equipment PTW Permit to Work QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QCDC Quick Connecting Disconnecting Coupling SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus STCW Standard of Training Certification and Watchkeeping SOP Standard Operating Procedures SSB Single Side Band ST Shuttle Tanker
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source Process gas Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Internal corrosion/ erosion Corrosion and erosion monitoring Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventive programme due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
Corrosion/ erosion due to presence Sand probe provided (N29) of sand from the wells in the process Corrosion coupons/ probes Corrosion inhibitor injection Failure of injection eg. pump Preventive Maintenance (PM) on failure, insufficient chemicals injection pump Inventory control of chemicals Selection of the right type of chemical by Operations Determination of right dosage of chem. by Ops on regular basis
Daily operational check by operators/ chemists 2 Dropped Objects Control procedures in lifting Crane operator error Daily crane checklist prior operations operation by crane operator Certified crane operator and helper and periodic recertification
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, riggers and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie on dedicated channel Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex lifting Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct inspection the inspection Inspection checklists used Faulty/ defective equipment/ lifting gear from KSB Overload alarm and slewing limit Failure of overload alarm/ slewing PM on slewing limit switch and switch limit switch calibration of oveload alarm
No complex/heavy lifting over live Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor process equipment without PTW lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts
Competent crane operator/ signal Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane and helper and man/ crane helper in handling lifting periodic recertification Lifting plan and associated procedure (N39)
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 3 Leakage from flanges/ valves due Pressure/ leak test after Violation of pressure/ leak test Supervision and JSA for pressure/ to poor installation reinstatement/ reassembly of procedures leak test & endorsed by competent equip. or pipework person PTW for pressure/ leak test Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue PM on valves and pumps Maintenance (PM) schedule equipment Inspection prior to operation Routine observation QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Third party QA/ QC on critical associated materials supplied material not meeting equipment during project phase spec./ poor workmanship Poor workmanship in installation Competent person to perform the of pipework and associated installation/ assembly work materials 4 Human error during operational/ Training and coaching of new Inaccurate assessment of the Competency training programmes maintenance/ construction recruits competency of the personnel activities Impartial judgement/ feedback from supervisors Safe working procedures for Non-compliance with procedures Supervision during operation/ operation/ maintenance maintenance activities Dissemination and training of personnel on procedures WP/ JSA/ toolbox meeting Miscommunication and/or non- PTW dictates that WP/JSA required for construction/ compliance available prior to the activity maintenance activities
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 5 External corrosion due to salt laden Routine observation environment/ damaged paintwork
Painting of piping Defective paint work Inspection, repair and repainting work Routine inspection of unexposed pipework by observation & NDT
6 Poor modification work not ECR to be approved and safety Violation of MOC/ ECR Constr. & Platform Supv. to meeting company's standards reviews to be conducted (N23) procedures monitor and check on the modification works Discipline engineer to ensure conceptual approval and authorisation for the modification
QA/QC of pipeworks and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Constr. & Platform Supv. to associated materials after supplied material not meeting monitor and check on the modification spec./ poor workmanship modification works Contractor management procedure Agreed procedures not fully Contractor admin./ Supervisor to (N1) adhered to by contractor conduct periodic checks (N2) 7 Failure to comply with TML's QA/ QC system during design Failure of QA/ QC system TML manage and audit the QA/ specifications and standards within procurement and commissioning QC system (N37)
8 Vibration of piping/ equipment Piping support Inadequate support (ie. poor Stress analysis/ dynamic (N3) design/ thermal expansion) simulation of piping conducted (N30) Vibration monitoring probes on Failure of monitoring instrument Preventive Maintenance (PM) on critical rotating equipment instrument Misinterpretation of vibration Contractor management procedure readings by third party contractor (N1)
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Vibration survey conducted Failure to detect equipment CMSS to prompt Preventive periodically vibration exceeding limits Maintenance (PM) Routine observation 9 Integrity of pipework compromised aft. high press. water jet/ grit blasting (N31)
No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Release of gas to the atmosphere, if Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown unignited minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N35) 2 Personnel injury (N5) PPE/ escape apparatus to reduce Defective PPE/ escape apparatus Visual inspection prior to use severity of injury Preventive Maintenance (PM) on PPE/ escape apparatus Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality First aid facilities available Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 3 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N6) Ignition source control (N10)
Fire suppresion system (N8) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N9) Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N7) Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N35) Fire and gas (FGS) detection Failure of Fire and gas (FGS) Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system Fire and gas (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N35)
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 4 Helicopter entering gas cloud Control Room report on abnormal Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel resulting in ditching/ crashing condition in process areas on gas release (N32) Helicopter requests landing Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel clearance before approaching on gas release platform (N28) 5 In-field vessels entering gas cloud Control Room report on abnormal Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel resulting in potential collision condition in process areas on gas release
In-field vessel requests to be Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel alongside MOAB on gas release
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MAE Reference No. H1.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Release of gas to the atmosphere, if D2 D2 D2 B2 unignited 2 Personnel injury (N5) A3 - - - 3 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N6) A3 B3 A3 A3
4 Helicopter entering gas cloud A4 B4 A4 A4 resulting in ditching/ crashing (N32) 5 In-field vessels entering gas cloud A4 B4 A4 A4 resulting in potential collision
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source Process liquid (oil and condensate) Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Internal corrosion/ erosion Corrosion and erosion monitoring Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventive programme due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
Corrosion/ erosion due to presence Sand probe provided (N29) of sand from the wells in the process Corrosion coupons/ probes 2 Dropped Objects Control procedures in lifting Crane operator error Daily crane checklist prior operations operation by crane operator Certified crane operator and helper and periodic recertification
Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, riggers and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie on dedicated channel Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex lifting Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct inspection the inspection
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Inspection checklists used Faulty/ defective equipment/ lifting gear from KSB Overload alarm and slewing limit Failure of overload alarm/ slewing PM on slewing limit switch and switch limit switch calibration of overload alarm
No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Competent crane operator/ signal Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane and helper and man/ crane helper in handling lifting periodic recertification Lifting plan and associated procedure (N39) 3 Leakage from flanges/ valves due Pressure/ leak test after Violation of pressure/ leak test Supervision and JSA for pressure/ to poor installation reinstatement/ reassembly of procedures leak test & endorsed by competent equip. or pipework person PTW for pressure/ leak test Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue PM on valves and pumps Maintenance (PM) schedule equipment Inspection prior to operation Routine observation
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Third party QA/ QC on critical associated materials supplied material not meeting equipment during project phase specification/ poor workmanship
Poor workmanship in installation Competent person to perform the of pipework and associated installation/ assembly work materials 4 Liquid carry over to flare system High level trips provided on Flare Failure of level instrument Preventive Maintenance (PM) of due to process upset/ operator KO Drums and Closed Drains level instrument error Vessel Process control/ operating Systems override during Inhibit log required for each procedures maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N35) 5 Human error during operational/ Training and coaching of new Inaccurate assessment of the Competency training programmes maintenance/ construction recruits competency of the personnel activities Impartial judgement/ feedback from supervisors Safe working procedures for Non-compliance with procedures Supervision during operation/ operation/ maintenance maintenance activities Dissemination and training of personnel on procedures WP/ JSA/ Toolbox Meeting Miscommunication and/ or non- PTW dictates that WP/ JSA required for construction/ compliance available prior to the activity maintenance activities 6 External corrosion due to salt laden Routine observation environment/ damaged paintwork
Painting of piping Defective paint work Inspection, repair and repainting work
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Routine inspection of unexposed pipework by observation & NDT
7 Poor modification work not ECR to be approved and safety Violation of MOC/ ECR Const. & Platform Supv to monitor meeting company's standards reviews to be conducted (N23) procedures and check on the modification works Discipline engineer to ensure conceptual approval and authorisation for the modification
QA/ QC of pipeworks and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Constr & Platform Supv to monitor associated materials after supplied material not meeting and check on the modification modification spec./ poor workmanship works Contractor management procedure Agreed procedures not fully Contractor admin./ Supervisor to (N1) adhered to by contractor conduct periodic checks (N2) 8 Failure to comply with TML's QA/ QC system during design Failure of QA/ QC system TML manage and audit the QA/ specifications and standards within procurement and commissioning QC system (N37)
9 Integrity of pipework compromised aft. high press. water jet/ grit blasting (N31) 10 Excessive drain to Open Drain Level instrument provided on the Failure of level instrument Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Caisson ODC level instrument Daily operational checks by operators Daily operations to pump out Failure of ODC pump Preventive Maintenance (PM) on liquid HC from ODC to CDV pump (N34) Daily operational checks by operators
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Environmental pollution, if Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on unignited support vessels the oil spill facilities Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Plated decks and drip pans on some process areas to limit spillage to sea PIMMAG (external party) to Delay in communication btw Emergency drill for oil spill to respond to major environmental PIMMAG and TML involve PIMMAG situations Shutdown system to minimise HC Shutdown system fails on demand PM to test shutdown system inventory released Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) 2 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N6) Ignition source control (N10)
Fire suppresion system (N11) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N9) Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N7)
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) Fire and gas (FGS) detection Failure of Fire and gas (FGS) Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system Fire and gas (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) 3 Personnel injury (N5) PPE/ escape apparatus to reduce Defective PPE/ escape apparatus Visual inspection prior to use severity of injury Preventive Maintenance (PM) on PPE/ escape apparatus Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality First aid facilities available Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response
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MAE Reference No. H1.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid (process) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Environmental pollution, if -D3D3B3 unignited 2 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N6) A4 B4 A4 A4
3 Personnel injury (N5) A4 - - -
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MAE Reference No. H1.4 MAE Hydrocarbon in formations (wellheads) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source All wellheads including manifolds, pipings, receivers Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment (Blowout situation) Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Unexpected high wellhead SSV & SCSSV to provide Failure of SSV & SCSSV Regular well integrity test pressure emergency closure of wells Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) Pressure monitoring and trip Failure of pressure monitoring Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system for wells transmitter pressure monitoring device Failure of trip system Testing of trip system is part of well integrity test 2 Well intervention activities Control of Portable and Temporary Equipment failure PM on the portable and temporary Equipment Procedure equipment
Pre-inspection prior to mobilisation and repeated inspection offshore
Proper specification of equipment
Failure to comply with the Portable JSA and supervision at work and Temporary Equipment Procedure Dissemination of procedures (N35)
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MAE Reference No. H1.4 MAE Hydrocarbon in formations (wellheads) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Work group mobilisation checklist Failure to comply with Dissemination of procedures (N35) mobilisation checklist Well Intervention Plan and its Failure to comply with Well Dissemination of procedures (N35) associated procedures Intervention Plan Competent & qualified personnel for well intervention activities
3 Integrity of well annulus & casing QA/ QC during installation and Poor material & components Qualified engineering contractors compromised completion phase selection during design phase Proper certification of all components Poor workmanship during Selection of competent and completion phase qualified personnel by TML Proper selection of service providers Pressure testing of wells & associated components during completion 4 Vessel Collision (Refer H1.8.1)
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MAE Reference No. H1.4 MAE Hydrocarbon in formations (wellheads) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Blowout/ explosion Ignition source control (N10) Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N7) SSV & SCSSV to provide Failure of SSV & SCSSV Regular well integrity test emergency closure of wells System override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) BOP during well intervention BOP fails on demand Pressure testing of BOP & activities (N36) associated components following installation Pre-inspection prior to mobilisation and repeated inspection offshore
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MAE Reference No. H1.4 MAE Hydrocarbon in formations (wellheads) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Blowout/ explosion A4 B4 A4 A4
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MAE Reference No. H1.6 MAE Transfers from boat to offshore platform Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source Basket transfer/ gangway to boat landing Location MOAB Top Event Personnel Transfer Accident Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Breakdown of vessel. eg. failure of Compliance with class Failure to perform Preventive Marine audit by TML's marine engine, steering gear, etc. requirements and PM by Maintenance (PM) by contractors superintendant contractors In-field vessels provided with min. 2 engines/ power thrusters
Vessel contractor's selection criteria as per class Vessel recertification by third party annually 2 Deterioration of transfer basket Visual inspection of condition and tag lines due to wear and before use (N33) tear/corrosion 3 Failure to adhere to basket transfer Basket transfer briefing/ video No practical experience Training to first timer & refresher procedures induction to first timer & refresher prior to actual basket transfer
Basket transfer supervisor onsite to ensure correct practise
4 Severe weather Basket transfer not allowed during severe weather (N14) Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Boat captain/ crane operator's boat capt & crane op prior to way of marine operation judgement based on experience basket transfer
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MAE Reference No. H1.6 MAE Transfers from boat to offshore platform Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 5 Human error in vessel control/ Competency of captain/ marine Poor judgement of captain/ marine TML policy on alcohol/ drug manoeuvering officers based on defined req. officers (stress, influence of alcohol/ drugs, etc.)
TML Contractors' Assessment to ensure competency of marine crew
Limited hours of work for captain/ marine officers as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise 6 Obstruction/ space restriction on Captain/ basket transfer the open deck of the boat/ supervisor to ensure deck is safe platform (N15) 7 Poor condition of gangway (N16) Visual inspection of condition before use (N17) Monitoring by standby personnel (N17) Preventive Maintenance (PM) on lifting gears 8 Incompetent crane operator Certified crane operator and Poor judgement of crane operators TML policy on alcohol/ drug periodic recertification (stress, influence of alcohol/ drugs, etc.) Limited hours of work for crane operators as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise
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MAE Reference No. H1.6 MAE Transfers from boat to offshore platform Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Falling into sea causing man Personnel trained in BOSET/ Restricted waiver for non-regular All waivers must be approved by overboard and possible fatality offshore orientation and refresher personnel OIM (N13) (N18) course Life saving equipment Defective life saving equipment Inspection and preventive maintenance on safety equipment
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Inefficient emergency response Man overboard drill
Life jackets mandatory for Incorrect doning of life jackets Basket transfer supv onsite to personnel during transfer ensure proper doning of life jackets
Training to first timer & refresher prior to actual basket transfer
Malfunction of life jackets (eg. Preventive Maintenance (PM) of strap snapped) life jackets Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality 2 Personnel injury when dropped First aid kit and first aiders/ medic onto the deck (N19) available Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Inefficient emergency response Periodic drills
Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality Personal Protective Equipment Defective Personal Protective Visual inspection prior to use (PPE) to reduce severity of injury Equipment (PPE)
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MAE Reference No. H1.6 MAE Transfers from boat to offshore platform Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Falling into sea causing man A3--- overboard and possible fatality (N18) 2 Personnel injury when dropped C3--- onto the deck (N19)
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MAE Reference No. H1.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source Objects at higher level Location All location Top Event Dropped Object Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Failure of crane/ monorail/ davit, Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct lifting lugs incl. lifting equipment inspection the inspection
Inspection checklists used Preventive Maintenance (PM) by Failure to perform Preventive CMMS to prompt PM to be contractors & TML (N22) Maintenance (PM) conducted as per scheduled Competent/ qualified personnel to conduct the PM No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Use of certified equipment Faulty/ defective equipment/ Certification database from KSB to lifting gear from KSB prompt recertification of equip./ lifting gear Quayside inspection of equip./ lifting gear before transit offshore
Competent/ qualified personnel to conduct the certification
2 Severe weather Lifting not allowed during severe weather (N14) Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Crane operator/ boat captain's boat capt. & crane op. prior to way of marine operation judgement based on experience lifting
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 25
MAE Reference No. H1.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 3 Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, riggers and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie Frequency interruption from other Inform other parties involved to on dedicated channel party switch to alternative channel
Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex Violation of lifting permit PTW co-ordination meeting/ lifting morning meeting/ toolbox meeting
4 Failure of overload alarm and PM on slewing limit switch and Failure to perform Preventive CMMS to prompt PM to be slewing limit switch calibration of overload alarm Maintenance (PM) conducted as per scheduled
Competent/ qualified personnel to conduct the PM 5 Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane operator and helper in handling lifting and periodic recertification
Lifting plan and associated Violation of lifting procedures / Load inspected by trained/ procedures lack of supervision for critical lifts experienced op. before lifting
Work site inspection by supervisor on critical lifts
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 26
MAE Reference No. H1.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Damage to process equip. leading Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on to release of HC support vessels the oil spill facilities Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Plated decks and drip pans on some process areas to limit spillage to sea Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemincation of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) 2 Personnel injury (N5) Personal Protective Equipment Defective Personal Protective Visual inspection prior to use (PPE) to reduce severity of injury Equipment (PPE)
Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality First aid facilities available Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response 3 Damage to process equip. leading Ignition source control (N10) to fire/ explosion (N6) Fire suppresion system (N11) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N9) Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 27
MAE Reference No. H1.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N7) Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N) Fire and gas (F&G) detection Failure of Fire and Gas System Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system (FGS) Fire and Gas System (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) Awareness of lifting activities via warning signs on lifting path
4 Platform structure/ crane damage Platform structure designed with (non process) safety margin to absorb some impact energy from dropped loads
5 Vessel damage, potential sinking Vessel Emergency Response Ineffective vessel emergency Weekly emergency drills involving (N38) Procedure(ERP) response in-field vessels In-field standby vessels available for assistance
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 28
MAE Reference No. H1.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Damage to process equip. leading A4 B4 B4 A4 to release of HC 2 Personnel injury (N5) A4 - - - 3 Damage to process equip. leading A4 B4 A4 A4 to fire/ explosion (N6) 4 Platform structure/ crane damage --C3C3 (non process) 5 Vessel damage, potential sinking C4 C4 - - (N38)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 29
MAE Reference No. H1.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source Standby boat, supply vessel, crew boat, tug-boat, tanker vessels, fishing boats Location PM-305 Field Top Event Vessel Collision to Platform Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Breakdown of vessel. eg. failure of Compliance with class Failure to perform PM by vessel Audit by TML and vessel owner engine, steering gear, DPS, etc. requirements and PM by owner (N20) contractors Vessel contractor's selection criteria as per class Vessel recertification by third party annually In-field vessels with min.2 engines/DPS/power thrusters (N20) 2 Failure of navigational aid Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue navigational aid Maintenance (PM) schedule Preventive Maintenance (PM) Routine inspection on the bridge
Battery backup & emergency Failure of support system Preventive Maintenance (PM) on generator provided for support system navigational aid 3 Vessel on auto pilot and brigde Bridge officers on back to back Long working hours of bridge Limited hours of work for bridge unattended basis (manned 24 hours) officers officers as per STCW 1995
Communication between platform Breakdown of communication due Communication equipment and vessel via radio to failure of radio, etc. redundancy, eg. SSB, walkie-talkies etc Standing order to stop marine operations in case of comm. failure
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 30
MAE Reference No. H1.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 4 Severe weather Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Boat captain's judgement based on boat captain way of marine operation experience 5 Passing vessels eg. tankers, PM-305 Field is indicated in the merchant, etc. Admiralty Chart (marine map)
In-field vessels to alert platform Failure of in-field vessels to help in Detection of unauthorised passing control & external vessel which are preventing unauthorised vessels in vessels by radar on platform entering the 500m zone the field
6 Human error in vessel navigation/ Competency of captain/ marine Poor judgement of captain/ marine TML policy on alcohol/ drug control/ manoeuvering officers based on req. officers (stress, influence of alcohol/ drugs, etc.)
TML Contractors' Assessment to ensure competency of marine crew
Limited hours of work for captain/ marine officers as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise 7 Anchor handling operation (rig) Specific anchoring/ mooring Plan fails Specific anchoring procedures (N21) procedures/ plan (N12) dictates stopping of ops & conducting reassess. Communication between platform Breakdown of communication due Communication equipment and vessel via radio to failure of radio, etc. redundancy, eg. SSB, walkie-talkies etc Standing order to stop marine operations in case of comm. failure
Regular monitoring of anchor wires under tension by captain
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 31
MAE Reference No. H1.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Abort marine operations during Insufficient response time due to Mooring Master/ vessel captain's severe weather sudden changes in weather judgement 8 Rig approach SIMOPS procedures Procedure fails TML supervisor on the rig Checklists by Platform & Drilling Supervisors, approved by OIM
Communication between platform Breakdown of communication due Communication equipment and rig via radio to failure of radio, etc. redundancy, eg. SSB, walkie-talkies etc Standing order to stop rig approach in case of comm. failure
Regular monitoring of anchor wires under tension by Rig Barge Master Abort operations during severe Insufficient response time due to Rig Barge Master's judgement weather sudden changes in weather
No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Impact to facilities leading to loss Ignition source control (N10) of containment (N6) Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on support vessels the oil spill facilities Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Fire suppresion system (N11) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 32
MAE Reference No. H1.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N9) Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N7) Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) Fire and gas (FGS) detection Failure of Fire and gas (FGS) Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system Fire and gas (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) 2 Personnel injury due to vessel First aid kit and first aiders/ medic Injury beyond first aiders Medivac via helicopter/ boat collision impact on platform (N5) capabilities
PPE/ escape apparatus to reduce Defective PPE/ escape apparatus Visual inspection prior to use severity of injury Preventive Maintenance (PM) on PPE/ escape apparatus Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 33
MAE Reference No. H1.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 3 Damage to platform structures Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly emergency drills for (during normal ops) leading to evacuation potential collapse Shutdown system Shutdown system fails on demand Preventive Maintenance (PM) to test all shutdown systems Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N35) Platform structure designed with safety margin to absorb some impact energy from glancing collisions 4 Vessel damage, potential sinking Vessel Emergency Response Plan Ineffective vessel emergency Weekly emergency drills for (ERP) response vessels In-field standby vessels available for assistance 5 Damage to platform structures Provision of BOP (drilling/ workover) leading to potential collapse/ blowout Well control procedures/ overbalanced well conditions (drilling/ workover) Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response for Weekly emergency drills for drilling rigs drilling rigs 6 Damage to platform structures (rig Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response for Weekly emergency drills approach) leading to potential for drilling rigs/ platform drilling rigs/ platform collapse Procedures dictate that platform is shutdown during rig approach
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 34
MAE Reference No. H1.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Impact to facilities leading to loss C3 C3 C3 C3 of containment (N6) 2 Personnel injury due to vessel C3--- collision impact on platform (N5)
3 Damage to platform structures A4 C4 A4 A4 (during normal ops) leading to potential collapse 4 Vessel damage, potential sinking C3 D3 C3 C3
5 Damage to platform structures A4 C4 A4 A4 (drilling/ workover) leading to potential collapse/ blowout 6 Damage to platform structures (rig A4 D4 A4 A4 approach) leading to potential collapse
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 35
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Source Wellheads / process pipework and vessels Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Internal corrosion/ erosion Corrosion and erosion monitoring Inadequate monitoring programme CMSS to prompt Preventive programme due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
Corrosion/ erosion due to presence Sand probe provided (N29) of sand from the wells in the process Corrosion coupons/ probes 2 Dropped Objects Control procedures in lifting Crane operator error Daily crane checklist prior operations operation by crane operator Certified crane operator and helper and periodic recertification
Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, riggers and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie on dedicated channel Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex lifting Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct inspection the inspection
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 36
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Inspection checklists used Faulty/ defective equipment/ lifting gear from KSB Overload alarm and slewing limit Failure of overload alarm/ slewing PM on slewing limit switch and switch limit switch calibration of overload alarm
No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Competent crane operator/ signal Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane and helper and man/ crane helper in handling lifting periodic recertification Lifting plan and associated procedure (N39) 3 Leakage from flanges/ valves due Pressure/ leak test after Violation of pressure/ leak test Supervision and JSA for pressure/ to poor installation reinstatement/ reassembly of procedures leak test & endorsed by competent equip. or pipework person PTW for pressure/ leak test Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue PM on valves and pumps Maintenance (PM) schedule equipment Inspection prior to operation Routine observation
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 37
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Third party QA/ QC on critical associated materials supplied material not meeting equipment during project phase specification/ poor workmanship
Poor workmanship in installation Competent person to perform the of pipework and associated installation/ assembly work materials Monitoring of mercury Defective/ faulty portable mercury Regular calibration/ maintenance concentration on process areas analyser by third party (N42) Spare portable mercury analysers
Operations Manual Inaccurate readings Regular calibration/ maintenance by third party Spare portable mercury analysers for cross checking readings
Training of personnel 4 Human error during operational/ Training and coaching of new Inaccurate assessment of the Competency training programmes maintenance/ construction recruits competency of the personnel activities Impartial judgement/ feedback from supervisors Safe working procedures for Non-compliance with procedures Supervision during operation/ operation/ maintenance maintenance activities Dissemination and training of personnel on procedures
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 38
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control WP/ JSA/ toolbox meeting Miscommunication and/ or non- PTW dictates that WP/ JSA required for construction/ compliance available prior to the activity maintenance activities 5 External corrosion due to salt laden Routine observation environment/ damaged paintwork
Painting of piping Defective paint work Inspection, repair and repainting work Routine inspection of unexposed pipework by observation & NDT
6 Poor modification work not ECR to be approved and safety Violation of MOC/ ECR Constr. & Platform Supv to meeting company's standards reviews to be conducted (N23) procedures monitor and check on the modification works Displine engineer to ensure conceptual approval and authorisation for the modification
QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Constr. & Platform Suprv. to associated materials after supplied material not meeting monitor and check on the modification spec./ poor workmanship modification works Contractor management procedure Agreed procedures not fully Contractor admin./ Supervisor to (N1) adhered to by contractor conduct periodic checks (N2) 7 Failure to comply with TML's QA/ QC system during design Failure of QA/ QC system TML manage and audit the QA/ specifications and standards within procurement and commissioning QC system (N37)
8 Integrity of pipework compromised aft. high press. water jet/ grit blasting (N31) 9 Mercury contamination of Mercury Management Plan (MMP) Incompetent/ inexperienced Training and awareness in mercury personnel personnel handling
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 39
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Certified contractors for disposal work onshore & offshore
Non-compliance of MMP and Training and awareness in mercury associated procedures handling Supervision during mercury handling activity Lack of awareness Mercury awareness training for TML's personnel and contractors (N26) Onshore practical training conducted by HAZMAT personnel (N25) Area mapping using colour codings based on exposure level of mercury Personnel mercury monitoring badges (future plan) 10 Presence of mercury in wellstreams Material selection during design phase to minimise mercury erosion
No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Chronic/ acute effects on Mercury protection PPE (N40) Defective mercury protection PPE Visual inspection prior to use personnel (N27) Periodic maintenance and replacement of PPE Unsuitable mercury protection PPE Checklists used for specific ops that expose personnel to mercury
Medical surveillance ie. medical check-up
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 40
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 2 Release of mercury to environment Mercury collection using waste Ineffective spill control response Supervised spill control/ disposal leading to pollution (N41) mgmt & decontamination work procedures/ kits Waste management & PM of waste management and decontamination equipment failure decontamination equipment
Visual inspection on waste mgmt & decontamination equip.
Perodic lab. test to detect mercury in produced and potable water
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 41
MAE Reference No. H1.10 MAE Mercury Facility Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Chronic/ acute effects on C3--- personnel (N27) 2 Release of mercury to environment -D3-- leading to pollution (N41)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 42
MAE Reference No. H2.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Fuel gas Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Internal corrosion Corrosion monitoring programme Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventive (N1) due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
2 Dropped Objects Control procedure in lifting Crane operator error Daily crane checklist prior operations operation by crane operator Certified crane operator and helper and periodic recertification
Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, rigger and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie on dedicated channel Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct inspection the inspection Inspection using checklists is carried out on FSO Faulty/ defective equipment/ Inspection using checklists is lifting gear from KSB carried out on FSO Overload alarm and slewing limit Failure of overload alarm/ slewing PM on slewing limit switch and switch limit switch calibration of overload alarm
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 43
MAE Reference No. H2.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Competent crane operator/ signal Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane operator and helper man/ crane helper in handling lifting and periodic recertification
Lifting plan and associated procedures (N40) 3 Leakage from flanges/ valves due Pressure/ leak test after Violation of pressure/ leak test Supervision & JSA for pressure/ to poor installation reinstatement/ reassembly (N2) procedures leak test & supervised by competent personnel
PTW for pressure/ leak test Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue PM on valves and pumps Maintenance (PM) schedule equipment Inspection prior to operation Routine observation QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Third party QA/ QC on critical associated materials supplied material not meeting equipment during project phase spec./ poor workmanship Poor workmanship in installation Competent person to perform the of pipework and associated installation/ assembly work materials 4 Human error during operational/ Training and coaching of new Inaccurate assessment of the Competency training programmes maintenance/ construction recruits competency of the personnel as per IMO req. (N3) activities
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 44
MAE Reference No. H2.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Impartial judgement/ feedback from supervisors Safe working procedures for Non-compliance with procedures Supervision during operation/ operation/ maintenance maintenance activities Dissemination and training of personnel on procedures WP/ JSA/ Toolbox Meeting Miscommunication and/or non- PTW dictates that WP/ JSA required for construction/ compliance available prior to the activity maintenance activities 5 External corrosion due to salt laden Routine observation environment/ damaged paintwork
Painting of piping Defective paint work Inspection, repair and repainting work 6 Poor modification work not MOC to be approved & safety Violation of MOC procedures Const. & FSO Supv to monitor & meeting company's standards reviews to be conducted (N26) check on the modification works (N5) Superintendent to ensure conceptual approval and authorisation for the modification
QA/ QC of pipeworks and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Const. & FSO Supv to monitor & associated materials aft. supplied materials not meeting check on the modification works modification spec./ poor workmanship (N10)
Contractor management procedure Agreed procedures not fully Marine/ Maintenance Supervisor (N6) adhered to by contractor to conduct periodic checks (N7)
7 Vibration of piping/ equipment Piping support Inadequate support (ie. poor Stress analysis/ dynamic (N8) design/ thermal expansion) simulation of piping Vibration monitoring on critical Failure of monitoring instrument Preventive Maintenance (PM) on rotating equipment instrument
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 45
MAE Reference No. H2.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Misinterpretation of vibration Competent personnel readings by personnel Vibration survey conducted Failure to detect vibration CMMS to prompt Preventive periodically exceeding limit Maintenance (PM) Routine observation 8 Integrity of pipework compromised aft high press. water jet/ grit blasting (N41)
No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Release of gas (fuel gas system) to Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowout system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown the atmosphere, if unignited minimise HC inventory released on demand system
2 Personnel injury (N9) PPE/ escape apparatus to reduce Defective PPE/ escape apparatus Visual inspection prior to use severity of injury Preventive Maintenance (PM) on PPE/ escape apparatus Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response First aid and medical facilities available 3 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N10) Ignition source control (N14)
Fire suppresion system (N12) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 46
MAE Reference No. H2.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N13)
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11) Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Fire and gas (FGS) detection Failure of Fire and gas (FGS) Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system Fire and gas (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meeting (N42) 4 Helicopter entering gas cloud Control Room report on abnormal Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel resulting in ditching/ crashing condition on fuel gas system on gas release
Helicoper requests landing Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel clearance before approaching on gas release platform (N39) 5 Infield vessels entering gas cloud Control Room report on abnormal Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel resulting in potential collision condition on fuel gas system on gas release
In-field vessel request to be Miscommunication Control Center to notify personnel alongside FSO on gas release
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 47
MAE Reference No. H2.1 MAE Hydrocarbon gas (process) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Release of gas (fuel gas system) to C4 D4 C4 D4 the atmosphere, if unignited
2 Personnel injury (N9) A4 - - - 3 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N10) A4 B4 A4 A4
4 Helicopter entering gas cloud A4 D4 B4 A4 resulting in ditching/ crashing 5 Infield vessels entering gas cloud A4 B4 A4 A4 resulting in potential collision
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 48
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Crude oil, gas, diesel and cargo offloading hose Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment Note Hydrocarbon transfer (in-field pipelines/ risers/ offloading hose/ internal transfer between tanks) is considered in this section
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Internal corrosion Corrosion monitoring programme Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventive (N1) due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
2 Dropped Objects Contol procedures in lifting Crane operator error Daily crane checklist prior operations operation by crane operator Certified crane operator and helper and periodic recertification
Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, rigger and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie on dedicated channel Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex lifting Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct inspection the inspection Inspection using checklists is carried out on FSO Faulty/ defective equipment/ Inspection using checklists is lifting gear from KSB carried out on FSO
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 49
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Overload alarm and slewing limit Failure of overload alarm/ slewing PM on slewing limit switch and switch limit switch calibration of overload alarm
No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Competent crane operator/ signal Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane operator and helper man/ crane helper in handling lifting and periodic recertification
Lifting plan and associated procedure (N40) 3 Leakage from flanges/ valves due Pressure/ leak test after Violation of pressure/ leak test Supervision and JSA for pressure/ to poor installation reinstatement/ reassembly (N2) procedures leak test & supervised by competent personnel
PTW for pressure/ leak test Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue PM on valves and pumps Maintenance (PM) schedule equipment Inspection prior to operation Routine observation QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Third party QA/ QC on critical associated materials supplied material not meeting equipment during project phase spec./ poor workmanship Poor workmanship in installation Competent person to perform the of pipework and associated installation/ assembly work materials
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 50
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 4 Overflow from tanks due to Level instrument and two (2) level Failure of level instrument Preventive Maintenance (PM) of operator error alarm provided for each cargo/ level instrument slop tank (N15) Operation is supervised Loading Plan Miscommunication and/ or non- Dissemination of Loading Plan via compliance Toolbox Meeting/ morning meeting Loading Computer simulation Competent personnel for error (eg. human/ software error) simulation input
Checked by supervisor 5 Human error during operational/ Training and coaching of new Inaccurate assessment of the Competency training programmes maintenance/ construction recruits competency of the personnel as per IMO req. (N3) activities Impartial judgement/ feedback from supervisors Safe working procedures for Non-compliance with procedures Supervision during operation/ operation/ maintenance maintenance activities Dissemination and training of personnel on procedures WP/ JSA/ Toolbox Meeting Miscommunication and/or non- PTW dictates that WP/ JSA required for construction/ compliance available prior to the activity maintenance activities 6 External corrosion due to salt laden Routine observation environment/ damaged paintwork
Painting of piping Defective paint work Inspection, repair and repainting work
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 51
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 7 Poor modification work not MOC to be approved & safety Violation of MOC procedures Const. & FSO Supv to monitor & meeting company's standards reviews to be conducted (N40) check on the modification works (N5) Superintendent to ensure conceptual approval and authorisation for the modification
QA/ QC of pipeworks and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Const. & FSO Supv to monitor & associated materials aft. supplied materials not meeting check on the modification works modification spec./ poor workmanship (N5)
Contractor management procedure Agreed procedures not fully Marine/ Maintenance Supervisor (N6) adhered to by contractor to conduct periodic checks (N7)
8 Rupture/ leakage from offloading Inspection/ checklist prior to Non-compliance on inspection Competent/ qualified personnel hoses (N18) operations (N19) procedures Supervision at Shuttle Tanker and FSO Communication between tanker, Miscommunication Dissemination of procedures via tug boat and FSO (N20) Toolbox Meetings (N42) Standing order to stop offtake operations in case of comm. failure
Hydro test of hose for leak Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventive detection (N21) due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 52
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Environmental pollution, if Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on unignited support vessels the oil spill facilities Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Bunded decks/ fish plate & drip pans on deck areas to limit spillage to sea PIMMAG (external party) to Delay in communication btw Emergency drill for oil spill to respond to major env. pollutions PIMMAG and TML involve PIMMAG
Shutdown system to minimise HC Shutdown system fails on demand PM to test shutdown system inventory released Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) 2 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N10) Ignition source control (N14)
Fire suppresion system (N12) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N13)
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 53
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Shutdown system to minimise HC Shutdown system fails on demand PM to test shutdown system inventory released Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) Fire and gas (FGS) detection Failure of Fire and gas (FGS) Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system Fire and gas (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) 3 Personnel injury (N9) PPE/ escape apparatus to reduce Defective PPE/ escape apparatus Visual inspection prior to use severity of injury Preventive Maintenance (PM) on PPE/ escape apparatus Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response First aid and medical facilities available
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 54
MAE Reference No. H2.2 MAE Hydrocarbon liquid Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Environmental pollution, if -C3C3A3 unignited 2 Fire and explosion, if ignited (N10) A4 C4 B4 A4
3 Personnel injury (N9) A4 - - -
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 55
MAE Reference No. H2.4 MAE Mooring line under tension Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Bunkering Location PM-305 Field Top Event Loss of control Note Mooring for Shuttle Tanker
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Severe weather Weather/ condition assess. by Sudden change of weather in a Mooring/ FSO/ Shuttle Tanker Mooring/ FSO/ Shuttle Tanker way of marine operation Master judgement based on Master (N48) experience 2 Error of mooring operation Communication between FSO and Breakdown of communication due Communication equipment vessel alongside via radio to failure of radio, etc. redundancy; spare walkie-talkies
Standing order to abort operation in case failure of comm. as per Marine Terminal Handbook
Frequency interruption from other Inform other parties involved to party switch to alternative channel
SOP and checklist for mooring Inexperienced personnel Dedicated competent and experienced personnel (N23) Competency of captain/ marine Poor judgement of captain/ marine TML policy on alcohol/ drug officers based on defined req. officers (stress, influence of alcohol/ drugs, etc.)
Contractor Management Programme (N17) Limited hours of work for captain/ marine officers as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 56
MAE Reference No. H2.4 MAE Mooring line under tension Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Minimise personnel presence at the work area/ restricted zone for mechanical tension unit
Activation of QCDC at the Failure on demand Annual testing of QCDC discretion of FSO Master 3 Mooring failure due to Visual inspection Oversight Change over of mooring deterioration/ malfunction of equipment as per the FOM mooring equipment (wear/ tear/ requirements fatigue PM on mooring equipment ie. load test, etc. Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue mooring equipment Maintenance (PM) schedule Preventive Maintenance (PM)
No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Spillage of HC from loading hose Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on leading to env. pollution, if support vessels the oil spill facilities unignited Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Automatic/ manual sealing of MBC/ QCDC fails on demand Recertification as per manufacturer offloading hose in the event of full recommendation (part of CMMS) parting situation (MBC/ QCDC)
CMMS to prompt Preventive Maintenance (PM) PIMMAG (external party) to Delay in communication btw Emergency drill for oil spill to respond to major environmental PIMMAG and TML involve PIMMAG situations
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 57
MAE Reference No. H2.4 MAE Mooring line under tension Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Automatic/ manual tripped of Testing of trip system prior to Pumps fail to stop export pump every offloading operation 2 Sea pool fire if ignited - loading Emergency Response Plan Weekly drills on emergency Ineffective emergency response hose breaks (N22) (ERP) response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11) Automatic/ manual sealing of Recertification as per offloading hose in the event of MBC/ QCDC fails on demand manufacturer recommendation full parting situation (MBC/ (part of CMMS) QCDC) CMMS to prompt Preventive Maintenance (PM) 3 Whiplash of mooring line leading Medivac in case of serious injury/ to personnel injury fatality First aid and medical facilities available Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response 4 Potential collision of Shuttle Experienced Mooring Master to Tanker with FSO manoeuvre away from FSO Tug boats (min. 2) to pull away Shuttle Tanker from FSO
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 58
MAE Reference No. H2.4 MAE Mooring line under tension Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Spillage of HC from loading hose -C3B3B3 leading to env. pollution, if unignited 2 Sea pool fire if ignited - loading D4 D4 B4 B4 hose breaks (N22) 3 Whiplash of mooring line leading A4--- to personnel injury 4 Potential collision of Shuttle A4 A4 A4 A4 Tanker with FSO
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 59
MAE Reference No. H2.5 MAE Helicopter movement (in-air transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Helicopter Location PM-305 Field Top Event Loss of Control Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Hardware and control systems Routine inspection of helicopter as Oversight in inspection by ground Annual audit by external party failure eg. rotor, engine per MHS aviation procedures crew/ pilot
PM of helicopter parts per Overdue maintenance plan/ Annual audit by external party manufacturer's requirements schedule **Internal TML aviation advisor to ensure maint. is carried out
2 Severe weather Ilumination, landing lights and Equipment breakdown PM on ilumination, landing lights Non-Directional Radio Beacon and NDB (NPD) on Helideck Restriction procedures for helicopter opt. during bad weather
Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Pilot/ radio office's judgement pilot/ radio officer on FSO way of aviation operation based on experience
Competency of pilot Weather radar provided on Failure of weather radar Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Helicopter weather radar Weather reporting from destination to the pilot Wind socks at the most consipicious point
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 60
MAE Reference No. H2.5 MAE Helicopter movement (in-air transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 3 Overload Forms for weight record and control Onshore boarding staff/ offshore Faulty measuring equipment Radio Officer assessment (manual calculation) on load
4 Pilot error in navigation/ control/ Competency of pilot based on Poor judgement of pilots/ aviation TML policy on alcohol/ drug manoeuvering defined requirements officers (stress, influence of alcohol/ drugs, etc)
Contractor management programme (N17) Limited hours of work for pilots/ aviation officers as per MHS aviation procedures Co-pilot to assist and complement navigation 5 Unsafe cargo equipment (N24) Safety induct. & regul. to switch off Failure to adhere to procedures Baggage/ freight check prior to electromagnetic device flight
Handphone to be switched off and sealed by officer prior to flight
6 Passengers under the influence of TML policy on alcohol/ drug alcohol/ drugs Random alcohol and drug tests 7 Lack of safety awareness Safety induction for personnel Absence from safety induction Logistic/ Safety Officer to ensure prior boarding the helicopter mandatory attendance
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 61
MAE Reference No. H2.5 MAE Helicopter movement (in-air transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Crash/ incident of helicopter to the Fire fighting systems and Heli- Failure to activate fire fighting Inspection and testing of the fire helideck causing fire and personnel crash equip. near Helideck systems at the perimeter of fighting systems injury/fatality Helideck Damage of fire fighting systems on Redundancy provided for fire Helideck fighting system and crash kit Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality ERP for helicopter crash/ incident Inefficient response Periodic drills conducted for responding to helicopter crash Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11) First aid and medical facilities available HLO standby during landing & Poor emergency response Periodic drills conducted for take-off responding to helicopter crash Training provided to HLO for helicopter crash/ incident Two (2) supply/ support vessel with fire fighting facilities available
2 Crash/ incident of helicopter to Fire fighting systems Failure to activate fire fighting Inspection and testing of the fire other locations (N25) systems fighting systems Damage of fire fighting systems Redundancy provided for fire fighting system Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality ERP for helicopter crash/ incident Inefficient response Periodic drills conducted for responding to helicopter crash
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 62
MAE Reference No. H2.5 MAE Helicopter movement (in-air transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11) First aid and medical facilities available HLO standby during landing & Poor emergency response Periodic drills conducted for take-off responding to helicopter crash Training provided to HLO for helicopter crash/ incident Two (2) supply/ support vessel with fire fighting facilities available
Fast rescue boat available for man overboard
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 63
MAE Reference No. H2.5 MAE Helicopter movement (in-air transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Crash/ incident of helicopter to the A3 D3 B3 B3 helideck causing fire and personnel injury/fatality 2 Crash/ incident of helicopter to A3 D3 A3 A3 other locations (N25)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 64
MAE Reference No. H2.6 MAE Personnel transfers between boat and FSO Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Basket transfer Location FSO Top Event Personnel Transfer Accident Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Breakdown of in-field vessel. eg. Compliance with class Failure to perform Preventive Audit by TML and inspection by failure of engine, steering gear, requirements and PM by Maintenance (PM) by in-field TML/ FVSB DPS, etc. (N36) contractors vessel owner In-field vessels with min. 2 engines/ DPS/ power thrusters (N36) In-field vessel contractor's selection criteria as per class In-field vessel recertification by third party annually 2 Deterioration of transfer basket Visual inspection of condition and tag lines due to wear and before use (N51) tear/corrosion Spare transfer basket 3 Failure to adhere to basket transfer Basket transfer briefing/ video No practical experience Training to first timer & refresher procedures induction to first timer & refresher prior to actual basket transfer
Basket transfer supervisor onsite to ensure correct practise
4 Severe weather Boat transfer not allowed during severe weather (N27) Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Boat captain, officer on deck and boat capt & crane op. prior to way of marine operation crane operator's judgement (N28) basket transfer
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 65
MAE Reference No. H2.6 MAE Personnel transfers between boat and FSO Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Permission from captain/ FSO Master (N29) 5 Human error in in-field vessel Competency of captain/ marine Poor judgement of captain/ marine TML policy on alcohol/ drug navigation/ control/ officers based on defined req. officers (stress, influence of manoeuvering alcohol/ drugs, etc.)
Contractor Management Programme (N17) Limited hours of work for captain/ marine officers as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise 6 Obstruction/ space restriction on Captain/ basket transfer the open deck of the boat/ FSO supervisor to ensure deck is safe (N30) 7 Incompetent crane operator Certified crane operator and Poor judgement of crane operators TML policy on alcohol/ drug periodic recertification (stress, influence of alcohol/ drugs, etc.) Contractor Management Programme (N17) Limited hours of work for crane operators as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 66
MAE Reference No. H2.6 MAE Personnel transfers between boat and FSO Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Falling into sea causing man Personnel trained in BOSET/ Restricted waiver for non-regular All waivers must be approved by overboard and possible fatality offshore orientation and refresher personnel OIM (N31) (N32) course Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality Life saving equipment Defective life saving equipment Inspection and preventive maintenance on safety equipment
First aid and medical facilities available Emergency Response Plan(ERP) Inefficient emergency response Man overboard drill
Life jackets mandatory for Incorrect doning of life jackets Basket transfer supv onsite to personnel during transfer ensure proper doning of life jackets
Training to first timer & refresher prior to actual basket transfer
Malfunction of life jackets (eg. Preventive Maintenance (PM) of strap snapped) life jackets 2 Potential personnel injury when Personal Protective Equipment Defective Personal Protective Visual inspection prior to use dropped onto the deck (N33) (PPE) to reduce severity of injury Equipment (PPE)
Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Inefficient emergency response Periodic drills
First aid and medical facilities available
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 67
MAE Reference No. H2.6 MAE Personnel transfers between boat and FSO Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Falling into sea causing man A3--- overboard and possible fatality (N32) 2 Potential personnel injury when C3--- dropped onto the deck (N33)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 68
MAE Reference No. H2.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Objects at higher level Location All location Top Event Dropped Object Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Failure of derrick/ crane/ Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct monorail/ davit controls, inspection the inspection structure/ hooks (N34) Inspection checklists used Faulty/ defective equipment/ Inspection using checklists is lifting gears from KSB carried out on FSO Preventive Maintenance (PM) by Failure to perform Preventive CMMS to prompt Preventive contractors & FVSB Maintenance (PM) Maintenance (PM) Competent/ qualified personnel to conduct the PM No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Used of certified equipment Faulty/ defective equipment/ Certification database from KSB to lifting gear from KSB prompt recertification of equip./ lifting gear Quayside inspection of equip./ lifting gear before transit offshore
Competent/ qualified personnel to conduct the certification
Personnel trained to handle abnormal crane operation
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 69
MAE Reference No. H2.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 2 Severe weather Lifting is not allowed during severe weather (N27) Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Crane operator/ boat captain's boat capt & crane op. prior to way of marine operation judgement based on experience lifting 3 Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, riggers and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie Frequency interruption from other Inform other parties involved to on dedicated channel party switch to alternative channel
Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex Violation of lifting permit PTW co-ordination meeting/ lifting morning meeting/ toolbox meeting
4 Failure of overload alarm and PM on slewing limit switch and Failure to perform Preventive CMMS to prompt PM to be slewing limit switch calibration of overload alarm Maintenance (PM) conducted as per scheduled
Competent/ qualified personnel to conduct the PM 5 Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane operator and helper in handling lifting and periodic recertification
Lifting plan and associated Violation of lifting procedures / Load inspected by trained/ procedures lack of supervision for critical lifts experienced op. before lifting
Work site inspection by supervisor on critical lifts
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 70
MAE Reference No. H2.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Damage to equipment leading to Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on release of HC support vessels the oil spill facilities Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Fish plate on deck areas to limit spillage to sea Shutdown system to minimise fuel Shutdown system fails on demand PM to test shutdown system gas inventory released Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N65) 2 Damage to equipment leading to Ignition source control (N14) fire/ explosion (N10) Fire suppresion system (N35) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N13)
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11) Shutdown/ blowdown system to Failure of shutdown/ blowdown PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise fuel gas inventory system system released
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 71
MAE Reference No. H2.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) Fire and gas (F&G) detection Failure of Fire and Gas System Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system (FGS) Fire and Gas System (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) 3 Personnel injury due to load PPE to reduce severity of injury Defective Personal Protective Visual inspection and checking impact (crushed between loads) Equipment (PPE) prior to use
Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response First aid and medical facilities available Awareness of lifting activities via warning signs on lifting path
4 FSO structure/ crane damage (non Crane laydown area are designed process) to absorb load impact
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 72
MAE Reference No. H2.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control NDT on FSO structure per CMMS
5 Supply vessel/ barge damage, Vessel Emergency Response Plan Ineffective vessel emergency Weekly emergency drills for potential sinking (ERP) response vessels In-field standby vessels available for assistance
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 73
MAE Reference No. H2.7 MAE Elevated object Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Damage to equipment leading to D3 C3 C3 C3 release of HC 2 Damage to equipment leading to A3 C3 B3 B3 fire/ explosion (N10) 3 Personnel injury due to load A4--- impact (crushed between loads)
4 FSO structure/ crane damage (non --C3C3 process) 5 Supply vessel/ barge damage, C4 C4 - - potential sinking
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 74
MAE Reference No. H2.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Standby boat, supply vessel, crew boat, tug-boat, tanker vessels, fishing boats, bunker vessel Location PM-305 Field Top Event Vessel Collision to FSO Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Breakdown of in-field vessel. eg. Compliance with class requirement Failure to perform PM by in-field Audit by TML and inspected by failure of engine, steering gear, and PM by contractors vessel owner TML/ FVSB DPS, etc. (N36) In-field vessels with min. 2 engines/ DPS/ power thrusters (N36) In-field vessel contractor's selection criteria as per class In-field vessel recertification by third party annually 2 Vessel on auto pilot and bridge Bridge officers on back to back Long working hours of bridge Limited hours of work for bridge unattended basis (manned 24 hours) officers officers as per STCW 1995
Communication between FSO and Breakdown of communication due Communication equipment vessel via radio to failure of radio, etc. redundancy, eg. SSB, walkie-talkies etc Standing order to stop marine operations in case of comm. failure
3 Severe weather Weather/ condition assessment by Sudden change of weather in a Vessel masters's judgement based vessel masters way of marine operation on experience 4 Passing vessels eg. tankers, PM-305 Field is indicated in the merchant, etc. Admiralty Chart (marine map)
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 75
MAE Reference No. H2.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control In-field vessels to alert FSO control Failure of in-field vessels to help in Detection of unauthorised passing & external vessel which are preventing unauthorised vessels in vessels by radar on FSO entering the 500m zone the field
5 Human error in in-field vessel Competency of captain/ marine Poor judgement of captain/ marine TML policy on alcohol/ drug navigation/ control/ officers based on req. officers (stress, influence of manoeuvering alcohol/ drugs, etc)
Contractor management programme (N17) Limited hours of work for captain/ marine officers as per STCW 1995
Good seamanship practise 6 Mooring alongside FSO Specific anchoring/ mooring Plan fails Specific anchoring procedures procedures/ plan (N16) dictates stopping of ops & conducting reassess. Communication between FSO and Breakdown of communication due Communication equipment vessel via radio to failure of radio, etc. redundancy, eg. SSB, walkie-talkies etc Standing order to stop marine operations in case of comm. failure
Abort marine operations during Insufficient response time due to FSO Master/ Mooring Master/ severe weather sudden changes in weather vessel captain's judgement 7 Failure of Navigational Aid Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Oversight of Preventive CMMS to prompt overdue navigational aid Maintenance (PM) schedule Preventive Maintenance (PM) Battery backup & emergency Failure of support system Preventive Maintenance (PM) on generator provided for support system navigational aid
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 76
MAE Reference No. H2.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Routine inspection on the bridge
No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Impact to facilities leading to loss Ignition source control (N14) of containment and fire and explosion (N10) Spill Contingency Plan Failure of oil spill facilities on the Preventive Maintenance (PM) on support vessels the oil spill facilities Incompetent personnel Training personnel on using oil spill facilities Emergency drill for oil spill Fire suppresion system (N12) Firewater pumps fail to start Preventive Maintenance (PM) of firewater pumps Defective fire fighting equipment Preventive Maintenance (PM) of fire fighting equipment (N13)
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response Fire fighting training/ MOME training for the IMT (N11) PIMMAG (external party) to Delay in communication btw Emergency drill for oil spill to respond to major env. pollutions PIMMAG and TML involve PIMMAG
Shutdown/ blowdown system to Shutdown/ blowdown system fails PM to test shutdown/ blowdown minimise HC inventory released on demand system
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 77
MAE Reference No. H2.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Systems override during Inhibit log required for each maintenance activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) Fire and gas (FGS) detection Failure of Fire and gas (FGS) Preventive Maintenance (PM) of system Fire and gas (FGS) Override FGS during maintenance Inhibit log required for each activities override Dissemination of information via Toolbox Meetings (N42) 2 Personnel injury due to collision PPE/ escape apparatus to reduce Defective PPE/ escape apparatus Visual inspection prior to use impact severity of injury Preventive Maintenance (PM) on PPE/ escape apparatus Medivac in case of serious injury/ fatality via available means
First aid and medical facilities available Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Ineffective emergency response Weekly drills on emergency response 3 Vessel damage or sinking - supply Vessel Emergency Response Plan Ineffective emergency response Weekly emergency drills involving vessel (ERP) in-field vessels
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 78
MAE Reference No. H2.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control In-field standby vessels available for assistance 4 Vessel damage or sinking - FSO FSO Emergency Response Plan Ineffective emergency response Weekly emergency drills (ERP) In-field standby vessels available for assistance
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 79
MAE Reference No. H2.8 MAE Vessel movements (on-water transport) Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Impact to facilities leading to loss A3 B3 A3 A3 of containment and fire and explosion (N10) 2 Personnel injury due to collision A3--- impact 3 Vessel damage or sinking - supply A3 D3 D3 D3 vessel 4 Vessel damage or sinking - FSO A4 B4 A4 A4
Prepared by: Revision: 0 Environmental Resources Management Date: February, 10 SAA Operations HSE Case Appendix 4-3 Hazard Management Register Page 4-3 : 80
MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Process, cargo, produced water system and fuel gas system Location All process areas Top Event Loss of Containment Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Internal corrosion/ erosion Corrosion and erosion monitoring Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventive programme (N1) due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
2 Dropped Objects Control procedures in lifting Crane operator error Daily crane checklist prior operations operation by crane operator Certified crane operator and helper and periodic recertification
Miscommunication - crane Refresher and training for signal operator, riggers & signal man/ man, riggers and crane operator crane helper Communication via walkie-talkie on dedicated channel Dedicated crane signal man to communicate to the crane operator
Permit issued for heavy or complex lifting Pre-inspection Failure to identify faults during Competent personnel to conduct inspection the inspection Inspection checklists used Faulty/ defective equipment/ lifting gear from KSB
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MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Overload alarm and slewing limit Failure of overload alarm/ slewing PM on slewing limit switch and switch limit switch calibration of overload alarm
No complex/ heavy lifting over Violation of PTW requirements/ Work site inspection by supervisor live process equipment without lack of inspection and supervision prior to lifts PTW Competent crane operator/ signal Crane operator/ crane helper error Certified crane operator and helper man/ crane helper in handling lifting and periodic recertification
Lifting plan and associated procedure (N40) 3 Leakage from flanges/ valves due Pressure/ leak test after Violation of pressure/ leak test Supervision and JSA for pressure/ to poor installation reinstatement/ reassembly (N2) procedures leak test and certified by third party PTW for pressure/ leak test Preventive Maintenance (PM) on Inadequate monitoring programme CMMS to prompt Preventative valves and pumps due to oversight of schedule Maintenance (PM)
Inspection prior to operation Routine observation QA/ QC of pipework and Failure of QA system ie. supplied Third party QA/ QC on critical associated materials material not meeting spec./ poor equipment during project phase workmanship Poor workmanship in installation Competent person to perform the of pipework and associated installation/ assembly work materials
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MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Monitoring of mercury Defective/ faulty portable mercury Regular calibration/ maintenance concentration on process area analyser by third party (N43) Spare portable mercury analysers
Operations Manual Inaccurate readings Regular calibration/ maintenance by third party Spare portable mercury analysers for cross checking readings
Training of personnel 4 Human error during operational/ Training and coaching of new Inaccurate assessment of the Competency training programmes maintenance/ construction recruits competency of the personnel as per IMO req. (N3) activities Impartial judgement/ feedback from officers Safe working procedures for Non-compliance with procedures Supervision during operation/ operation/ maintenance maintenance activities Dissemination and training of personnel on procedures WP/ JSA/ toolbox meeting Miscommunication and/ or non- PTW system dictates that WP/ JSA required for construction/ compliance available prior to the activity maintenance activities 5 External corrosion due to salt laden Routine observation environment/ damaged paintwork
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MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Painting of piping Defective paint work Inspection, repair and repainting work Routine inspection of unexposed pipework by observation & NDT
6 Poor modification work not MOC to be approved & safety Violation of MOC procedures Const. & FSO Supv to monitor & meeting company's standards reviews to be conducted (N26) check on the modification works (N5) Superintendent to ensure conceptual approval and authorisation for the modification
QA/ QC of pipeworks and Failure of QA/ QC system ie. Constr. & FSO Supv. to monitor associated materials after supplied material not meeting and check on the modification modification spec./ poor workmanship works Contractor management procedure Agreed procedures not fully Marine/ Maintenance Supervisor (N6) adhered to by contractor to conduct periodic checks (N7)
7 Integrity of pipework compromised aft. high press. water jet/ grit blasting (N41) 8 Mercury contamination of Mercury Management Plan (MMP) Incompetent/ inexperience Training and awareness in mercury personnel personnel handling Certified contractors for disposal work onshore & offshore
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MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control Non-compliance of MMP and Training and awareness in mercury associated procedures handling Supervision during mercury handling activity Lack of awareness Mercury awareness training for TML's personnel and contractors (N44) Onshore practical training conducted by HAZMAT personnel (N45) Area mapping using colour codings based on exposure level of mercury Personnel mercury monitoring badges (future plan) 9 Presence of mercury in wellstreams Periodic NDT test for all tanks for early detection of erosion
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MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Chronic/ acute effects on Mercury protection PPE (N46) Defective mercury protection PPE Visual inspection prior to use personnel (N37) Periodic maintenance and replacement of PPE Unsuitable mercury protection PPE Checklists used for specific ops that expose personnel to mercury
Medical surveillance ie. medical check-up 2 Release of mercury to environment Perodic laboratory test to detect leading to pollution mercury (N38)
Mercury collectiom using waste Ineffective spill control response Supervised spill control/ disposal mgmt & decontamination work procedures/ kits
Waste management & PM on waste management and decontamination equipment failure decontamination equipment
Visual inspection on waste mgmt & decontamination equip.
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MAE Reference No. H2.10 MAE Mercury Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Chronic/ acute effects on C3--- personnel (N37) 2 Release of mercury to environment -D3-- leading to pollution
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MAE Reference No. H2.11 MAE H2S Hazard Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Source Shuttle Tanker Location PM-305 Field Top Event Exceed Exposure Limits Note -
No. Threat Description Barrier Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 H2S release from Shuttle Tanker Pre-mobilisation checklists to during mooring operation inform H2S content in cargo tanks per MTH Req. to minimise H2S release during offloading is comm. to ST (N49) Frequent monitoring of H2S by portable H2S analyser on ST (N50)
Req. to restrict H2S release during mooring ops by Mooring Master
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MAE Reference No. H2.11 MAE H2S Hazard Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) No. Consequence Description Recovery Measure Escalation Factor Escalation Factor Control 1 Personnel asphyxiation Tug boat will move away upon advise from Mooring Master
First aid and medical facilities available Medivac in case of asphyxiation/serious injury/ fatality Abort operation and mustering of personnel required (Rec.1 for FSO)
2 Release of H2S to environment
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MAE Reference No. H2.11 MAE H2S Hazard Facility Floating, Storage & Offloading Vessel (FSO) Consequence Risk Assessment No. Consequence Safety Environment Asset/ Operability Financial 1 Personnel asphyxiation A3 - - - 2 Release of H2S to environment - D3 - -
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Section 4A HAZARD ANALYSIS – MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
CONTENTS
4A MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB) HAZARD ANALYSIS 4A-1
4A.1 SUMMARY OF HSE STUDIES 4A-1
4A.2 FIRE AND EXPLOSION ANALYSIS (FEA) 4A-1
4A.3 MOAB NOISE STUDY 4A-4
4A.4 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS (ESSA) 4A-5
4A.5 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA) 4A-8
4A.6 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 4A-10
4A.7 SECTION 4A REFERENCES 4A-13
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4A MOBILE OFFSHORE APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB) HAZARD ANALYSIS
4A.1 SUMMARY OF HSE STUDIES
A number of studies were conducted at various stages of the Mobile Offshore Application Barge (MOAB) development which included the following:
Design Safety Case for South Angsi MOAB [R4A.1]; Fire and Explosion Study South Angsi MOAB [R4A.2]; Noise Study for South Angsi MOAB [R4A.3]; and QRA Study for the South Angsi MOAB [R4A.4].
4A.2 FIRE AND EXPLOSION ANALYSIS (FEA)
The objectives of the FEA study conducted for the MOAB were as follows:
Identification of fire and explosion hazards with MOAB that may result in escalation to other facilities or equipment within the platform; and
Estimation of the consequences of fire and explosion for the credible fire scenarios as well as examination on the coverage of fire protection system provided on MOAB.
4A.2.1 FEA for MOAB
The FEA study [R4A.2] for the MOAB was conducted during the detailed design stage, as part of the QRA study [R4A.4] to identify all significant fire and explosion hazards. These fire and explosion hazards have the potential to result in fatalities, asset loss and environmental damage.
4A.2.1.1 Failure Frequency Estimation
The primary sources of flammable hydrocarbon inventory on the MOAB are the pipe work transporting the hydrocarbon fluids produced from the wells to the flexible hoses before routed to the FSO storage tanks. The release frequencies, taking into account three (3) hole sizes for each isolatable section is as presented in Table 4A.2a.
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Table 4A.2a Breakdown of MOAB Leak Frequencies by Isolatable Sections [R4A.2]
Isolatable Sections Leak Frequency (per year) Small Medium Large Total Wellheads to Production Header 1.97E-02 1.59E-03 6.85E-04 2.19E-02 Test Header 6.94E-03 3.00E-04 1.73E-04 7.41E-03 Test Header to 1st Separator 1.29E-02 9.98E-04 3.53E-04 1.43E-02 1st Stage Separator (Liquid Section) 2.60E-03 5.39E-04 1.75E-04 3.32E-03 1st Stage Separator – Gas section (10- 5.51E-03 6.69E-04 2.51E-04 6.43E-03 V-1110) 1st Stage Separator to 2nd Stage 1.23E-02 1.59E-03 7.79E-04 1.46E-02 Separator 2nd Stage Separator to Crude Transfer 2.11E-02 5.49E-03 1.66E-03 2.83E-02 Pumps (10-P-1160A/B) 2nd Stage Separator (Gas Section) 3.22E-03 4.68E-04 1.80E-04 3.87E-03 Crude Transfer Pumps to Stabiliser 2.48E-03 5.05E-04 1.77E-04 3.17E-03 Crude (10-P-1160A/B & 10-HX-1170) Train 1 – 1st Stage Suction Cooler/ 1.51E-02 1.85E-02 7.51E-04 3.43E-02 Scrubber/ Comp (10-HX-2705/ 10-V- 2710/ 10-C-2720) Gaslift 2.73E-02 5.24E-03 2.08E-03 3.46E-02 Train 2 – 1st Stage Suction Cooler/ 1.61E-02 1.86E-02 7.87E-04 3.54E-02 Scrubber/ Comp (10-HX-2720/ 10-V- 2775/ 10-C-2780) Gas Well and Fuel Gas Pre-Heater 1.09E-02 1.02E-03 3.61E-04 1.22E-02 Fuel Knock Out Drum, Fuel Gas 2.97E-02 2.17E-03 9.50E-04 3.28E-02 Scrubber, Fuel Gas Filter and Fuel Gas Superheater HP Flare (V-5610) 2.36E-02 1.49E-03 7.58E-04 2.58E-02 LP Flare (V-5510) 6.56E-03 5.94E-04 2.41E-04 7.39E-03 Flexible Hose (Fuel Gas) 1.52E-02 1.27E-02 2.05E-03 2.99E-02 Flexible Hose (Stabilised Crude) 1.52E-02 1.27E-02 2.05E-03 2.99E-02 Total 2.46E-01 8.51E-02 1.45E-02 3.46E-01
The overall leak frequency for the topsides hydrocarbon process equipment on the MOAB is estimated to be 3.5 x 10-1 per year. A release from the Gaslift Compression Trains 1 and 2 section comprising 1st Stage Suction Cooler to Suction Scrubber and Compressor (10-HX-2720/10-V-2775/10-C-2780) section with a leak frequency of 7.0 x 10-2 per year is noted to be the most frequent topsides process hydrocarbon release event, contributing to approximately 20.2% of the total leak frequency. The associated release frequency is dominated by the high leak frequency of the compressor and the numerous valves and flanges connected with it. The second highest contributor is the Gaslift section with a leak frequency of 3.5 x 10-2 per year, accounting for 10% of the total leak frequency.
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4A.2.1.2 Hazardous Event Outcome Frequency
For hydrocarbon releases from the MOAB facilities topside process, the estimated frequencies of the various event outcomes are summarised in Table 4A.2b.
Table 4A.2b Topside Process Event Outcome Frequencies [R4A.2]
Event Outcome Outcome Frequency (per year) Small Medium Large Total % Fire, Wall/Structural 3.7E-04 4.8E-05 - 4.2E-04 < 1 failure Fire, BLEVE - - - - - Fire 3.7E-04 6.3E-03 1.5E-03 7.5E-03 2 Explosion, Fire, - - - - - Wall/Structural failure Explosion, Fire, BLEVE - - - - - Explosion, Fire - 2.4E-03 7.6E-04 3.2E-03 1 Explosion, Immediate - - - - - Collapse No Ignition 2.5E-01 7.6E-02 1.2E-02 3.3E-01 97 Total 2.5E-01 8.5E-02 1.5E-02 3.5E-01 100
The results show that the ignited topside process release is dominated by fire events, with a total frequency of 7.5 x 10-3 per year. The next highest contributor is explosion events with ensuing fire due to delayed ignition which was estimated to occur at a frequency of 3.2 x 10-3 per year. However, the probability for an explosion to generate significant overpressure to cause structural collapse is deemed to be low due to the relatively open design of the MOAB platform. The next most likely escalation outcome due to an ignited release is wall/ structural failure, with an estimated occurrence frequency of 4.2 x 10-4 per year. The likelihood of fire/ explosion event escalation is expected to be low due to effective process sectionalisation, which minimises the inventory available for release.
4A.2.2 FEA Study Conclusions
It was assessed that the most frequent topsides process hydrocarbon release event is anticipated from the Gaslift Compression Trains 1 and 2 due to the high leak frequency of the compressor and the numerous valves and flanges contained within this isolatable section. Adequate coverage of the fire and gas detectors and appropriate fire fighting facilities will be able to minimise the effects of ignited hydrocarbon releases.
The air intake points for the HVAC system on the MOAB are located in the utility area of the MOAB Main Deck away from the hydrocarbon process
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areas, which will minimise the potential for ingress of flammable gas into the system. Deluge coverage provided for hydrocarbon containing equipment on the MOAB are detailed in the Fusible Plug Loop Layout [R4A.7]. The fusible plugs on the Upper Deck, Main Deck and Below MOAB Deck/ Wellbay area will activate the deluge systems, whereas the fusible plugs on the firewater pump will only initiate an alarm. The deluge system will be activated automatically upon confirmed fire and heat detection.
4A.3 MOAB NOISE STUDY
A noise study was conducted for MOAB [R4A.3] in accordance with the Engineering Equipment & Materials Users Association (EEMUA) Noise Procedure Specification No. 140 for noise prediction and assessment. The study was conducted to examine the noise levels on process areas of MOAB with respect to personnel.
4A.3.1 Main Findings
The main findings from the MOAB Noise Study are summarised in Table 4A.3a.
Table 4A.3a MOAB Noise Study Main Findings [R4A.3]
Deck Compliance Margin of Conclusions with Exceedance Prescribed Noise Criteria Normal Operations Fin Fan Deck No > 90 dBA Noise levels exceed the noise criteria due to the numerous coolers in close proximity to one another, which also propagate and contribute to high noise on the Upper Deck.
Upper Deck No > 90 dBA Noise levels exceed the noise criteria due to the Compression Packages, Gas Turbine Generator (GTG) and the pumps within the Chemical Injection Skid.
Main Deck No > 90 dBA Noise levels exceed the noise criteria due to the cumulative noise impacts from miscellaneous equipment.
Below MOAB Marginally not ~ 85- 90 dBA Small noise impacts identified with only noise Deck EL (+) sources from the closed drain transfer pumps 14000 and control valves. Noise attenuation measures are not considered for this deck.
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Deck Compliance Margin of Conclusions with Exceedance Prescribed Noise Criteria SIPROD Operation Lower Deck No > 90 dBA Noise levels exceed the noise criteria during SIPROD activities at the drill floor, but this noise does not contribute to higher background noise levels on the MOAB. Noise attenuation measures were not considered as the SIPROD activities vary and will occur over limited period of time.
Emergency Case - No > 90 dBA Noise levels exceed the noise criteria during emergency case due to the firewater pumps and emergency diesel generator, which only operates during an emergency or periodic testing.
Flaring Case - No > 90 dBA Noise levels exceed the noise criteria during HP emergency maximum flaring mainly due to the pressure relief valves and connecting piping.
All personnel are required to use ear protection on high noise areas, irrespective of the duration of exposure to the noise. The recommendations raised for deficiencies and improvements in the design and management of the equipment to be in compliance with the prescribed noise criteria are detailed in Section 5.
4A.4 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS (ESSA)
The emergency safety systems are provided on the MOAB to help control and limit the extent of an accident scenario and to aid the escape and evacuation and rescue of personnel from the platform.
An Emergency Systems Survivability Assessment (ESSA) for the MOAB was conducted as part of the Design Safety Case [R4A.1]. The objective of the ESSA was to assess the vulnerability of the emergency systems on the MOAB and determine whether these systems will perform their intended functions during an emergency.
The systems addressed were those required to safeguard life on the MOAB during an emergency situation. These systems have been assessed with
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respect to their ability to meet any one of the following criteria in emergency events:
Prevention of event escalation; Protection of the muster area; and Provision of safe escape and evacuation from the boat landing side.
4A.4.1 Main Findings and Conclusion
The following emergency systems were assessed and findings are summarised in Table 4A.4a.
Fire & Gas Detection System (FGS); Fire Suppression System; Emergency Shutdown System; Platform Alarm; Emergency Power; Emergency Lighting; and Emergency Communication System.
Table 4A.4a ESSA Summary for MOAB [R4A.1]
Component Summary of Coarse Assessment Fire & Gas Detection FGS is considered to be critical as the system provides early detection of System (FGS) fire and gas to enable corrective actions to be taken following a gas release or a fire to prevent escalation and ensure early escape and evacuation from the MOAB.
The FGS is vulnerable to fire and explosion events particularly in the process areas and the wellhead areas. However, gas detectors are considered not vulnerable to fire and explosion events as destruction of detectors is expected only after the detection of a gas release and therefore the performance of the gas detectors will not be affected by the fire and explosion events.
On the other hand, the vulnerability of the FGS detection cables to fire and explosion events is considered to be limited as the cables are specified to be fire resistant to IEC 60 331. The FGS is not designed to be fail-safe.
In conclusion, the FGS is critical and vulnerable but has adequate redundancy for initial detection of a hazardous event. Acceptance criteria for the FGS system is considered met.
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Component Summary of Coarse Assessment Fire Suppression Fire suppression systems are considered critical as they are required to Systems prevent escalation of localised fire events to enable safe escape and evacuation of personnel in the event of an emergency. The firewater pump package is located on the Main Deck adjacent to the bridge. Potential fire events originating from the Main Deck and Upper Deck process areas are unlikely to reach and impair the firewater pump package due to the presence of the firewall. The vulnerability of this system is considered to be low as adequate redundancy is provided.
Portable fire fighting equipment is strategically located throughout each deck on the MOAB, mainly for dealing with small and controlled fires. Therefore, failure of one of the equipment will not render the system ineffective. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
Emergency The Shutdown System (SDS) is critical for prevention of escalation Shutdown System being essential for the isolation of process inventories. The SDS valves are vulnerable to direct jet flame impingement, resulting in valves damage. However, the probability of impingement is considered to be low as the exposure area of the SDS valves is small. The SDS is designed to fail-safe with a high standard of reliability and availability. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
Platform Alarm Platform alarm on MOAB is critical for ensuring safe escape and evacuation from the vessel. The system cables are considered to be vulnerable to fire and explosion events. However, it is unlikely that the entire system will fail simultaneously.
Audible alarms are strategically distributed throughout the MOAB covering all area where personnel are expected to have access. Different alarm tones are used for indicating different events. In high noise areas, visual alarms are provided in addition to the audible alarm. Platform alarm is not designed to be fail-safe. However, verbal instructions can still be communicated to personnel in the event of system failure. Personnel are always equipped with walkie-talkies and so means of communication are expected to be available throughout an emergency. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
Emergency Power The emergency power system on MOAB is critical for ensuring safe escape and evacuation of personnel via the PTB. The Emergency Diesel Generator is located on the west side of Main Deck adjacent to the bridge and is protected by the firewall. This system is not designed to be fail-safe. The vulnerability of the emergency power system is considered to be low as it is supplied with adequate redundancy. Acceptance criteria for the emergency power is considered met.
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Component Summary of Coarse Assessment Emergency Lighting The emergency lighting on MOAB is critical in assisting the safe escape to the Muster Area and evacuation from the facility, particularly during the night and when smoke concentrations are high. The emergency lighting cable trays and the local light fittings will be vulnerable to fire and explosion events. The damage due to a fire event is limited as the cables are specified to be fire retardant. Emergency lighting is not designed to be fail-safe. Emergency lighting is not designed to be fail- safe. The vulnerability of this system is considered to be low as it is supplied with adequate redundancy. Acceptance criteria for the emergency lighting is considered met.
Emergency Communication systems on the MOAB are considered to be critical for Communications safe escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel during an emergency. System The system cables for communication are considered vulnerable to fire and explosion events but the system has adequate redundancy as various means of communications are provided for in-field communication between MOAB and FSO. In addition, personnel are also equipped with walkie-talkies and so means of communication are expected to be available throughout an emergency. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
The ESSA concluded that all emergency systems assessed on the MOAB meet with the specified acceptance criteria.
4A.5 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA)
EERA for the MOAB was conducted as part of the Design Safety Case [R4A.1]. The assessment of the provision of EER systems on the platform were based on the respective Escape Route and Safety Layout Drawings [R4A.5] and Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA) [R4A.2].
4A.5.1 EER Strategy for MOAB
The Escape and Evacuation philosophy for the MOAB is to enable all personnel to escape to the designated Muster Area located on the A-Deck accommodation unit on the FSO. Personnel on MOAB are to make their way to the FSO via the Personnel Transfer Bridge (PTB) located at the West side of the MOAB Main Deck in the event of an emergency. For more details on MOAB safety escape routes, refer to the Escape Route and Safety Layout [R4A.5].
In a situation where primary means of evacuation is not available or when the muster point is not reachable, then the life rafts provided on the North and South side of the MOAB Main Deck will be used as the secondary means of evacuation. The tertiary means of evacuation is by directly entering the sea.
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There are rope ladders located adjacent to the life rafts to aid personnel entering into the sea.
Rescue will be principally by the standby vessel which will be available within the vicinity of the South Angsi facilities. Rescued personnel will then be transported to shore or to the FSO for first aid treatment.
4A.5.2 Endurance Time
The maximum endurance time for personnel to escape safely from their work place on the MOAB was estimated to be 6.2 minutes, which is considered reasonable for a platform [R4A.1].
4A.5.3 EER Main Findings and Conclusion
The following EER system and facilities were assessed and the findings are summarised in Table 4A.5a.
Table 4A.5a Summary of EER System Performance for MOAB [R4A.1]
EER Systems/ Summary of Coarse Assessment Facilities Alarm System The alarm system is considered to be adequate such that personnel will be alerted of an emergency by means of audible alarms and where necessary, visual alarms via a network of speakers and strobe lights distributed around the MOAB. The goal is considered met.
Escape Route There are at least two (2) independent escape routes available on all Provisions decks on the MOAB leading to the Temporary Refuge (TR) on FSO via the PTB. The escape routes are of sufficient height of 2.1m and width of 1.2m to facilitate the escape process, including personnel on a stretcher and personnel wearing breathing apparatus. The escape routes on the MOAB are clearly defined with yellow tramline and arrows on the deck together with unambiguous, photo-luminescent signs, leading towards the PTB on the MOAB Main Deck. The goal is considered met.
Temporary Refuge The designated TR on the SAA is located on the FSO which is (TR) connected to the MOAB via the PTB on the West side of the MOAB’s Main Deck. Therefore, assessments on the TR are detailed in Section 4B.
Alternate Muster In the event that escape to the TR is impaired or inaccessible, the area Point (AMP) located at the North and South side of the MOAB Main Deck beside the liferafts will function as the AMP for MOAB personnel to muster and seek refuge. The goal is considered met.
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EER Systems/ Summary of Coarse Assessment Facilities Evacuation The primary means of evacuation is via the PTB located on the West side of the MOAB Main Deck. In the event that escape to the PTB is impaired, personnel will evacuate via the 12-man liferafts located on the North and South side of the MOAB Main Deck. Lifejackets are provided and located adjacent to the liferafts. Rope ladders are also provided to aid personnel entering into the sea. The goal is considered met.
Rescue Personnel in the sea will be rescued and brought to a safe location by the standby vessel. A standby vessel will be permanently present within the vicinity of SAA safety zone during manned operation. Personnel who are mustered on the MOAB will be rescued by the standby vessel from the boat landing area. The goal is considered met.
In general, the conditions of the EER systems and facilities on the MOAB have been found to be satisfactory with all EER objectives met.
4A.6 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
The objectives of the QRA study conducted for the MOAB were as follows:
Establishment of the risk levels at the installation and their contributors based on the detailed design of the platform during normal operations; and
Evaluation of the acceptability of the personnel individual risk with respect to the adopted risk acceptance criteria based on the UK HSE/ UK North Sea Operators.
4A.6.1 QRA for MOAB
The QRA study was conducted for MOAB during the detailed design stage, and also covered the wellhead facilities. Results from the QRA are summarised in terms of Potential Loss of Life (PLL) and Individual Risk (IR) results.
4A.6.1.1 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
The overall PLL associated with the major hazards evaluated are summarised in Table 4A.6a and the contributions of the different major hazards categories are presented in Figure 4A.6a.
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Occupational Accidents 14%
Collisions Topside Process 12% 40%
Structural Failures 3% Dropped Objects < 1% Helicopter Accidents Blowouts 26% 5%
Figure 4A.6a Breakdown of PLL by Hazard Categories for SAA MOAB during Normal Operations
Section 4A HAZARD ANALYSIS – MOBILE OFFSHORE Page 4A-11 APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
Table 4A.6a Overall PLL on MOAB based on Hazard Categories [R4A.4]
Hazard Category PLL (per year) % Contribution Topside Process 2.2E-03 41 Blowouts 2.5E-04 5 Helicopter Accidents 1.4E-03 26 Dropped Objects 2.7E-05 < 1 Structural Failures 1.6E-04 3 Collisions 6.1E-04 12 Occupational Accidents 7.3E-04 14 Total 5.3E-03 100
The overall PLL for the MOAB has been estimated to be 5.3 x 10-3 per year. The main risk contributor is from the topsides process hydrocarbon events (accounting for 41% of the total risk). The high thermal loads from the jet flame length (> 46 m) from a medium or large release are anticipated to cover a large area of the MOAB. This could potentially lead to high probability of personnel fatalities, from the immediate effects of the fire as well as from the impairment of escape routes and access to evacuation means by high thermal radiations.
The second highest contributor is helicopter transportation risk, accounting for 26% of the total PLL. This is due to the high accidental rates associated with the helicopter transfer and the long duration of travel between the onshore base and the FSO (ie. 2 hours per return trip).
4A.6.1.2 Individual Risk (IR) per year
The breakdown of the IR per year for MOAB personnel according to hazard categories is presented in Table 4A.6b.
Table 4A.6b Individual Risk for MOAB Personnel based on Hazard Categories [R4A.4]
Hazard Category IR (per year) % Contribution Topside Process 1.8E-04 48 Blowouts 1.0E-05 3 Helicopter Accidents 9.0E-05 24 Dropped Objects 1.1E-07 < 1 Structural Failures 3.3E-06 < 1 Collisions 3.9E-05 11 Occupational Accidents 4.8E-05 13 Total 3.7E-04 100
The IR for personnel on the MOAB was estimated to be 3.7 x 10-4 per year and is dominated by topsides process hydrocarbon events (48%) and helicopter transportation risks (24%).
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Section 4A HAZARD ANALYSIS – MOBILE OFFSHORE Page 4A-12 APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
The overall IR per year for various personnel categories on MOAB is given in Table 4A.6c.
Table 4A.6c Individual Risk of MOAB Based on Personnel Category [R4A.4]
Personnel Category IR (per year) Production Technician 3.7E-04 Maintenance Technician 4.5E-04 OIM/ Supervisory Staff 3.2E-04
The QRA results indicate that Maintenance Technician personnel experience the highest individual risk, followed by the Production Technician. The risk experienced by the Maintenance Technician personnel is mainly dominated by the process releases and occupational risks. The Maintenance Technician occupational related FAR is high accounting for 24% of their overall risk exposure which in turn contribute to the high individual risk. The fatality risk level on MOAB lies within the TOLERABLE region of the company’s risk acceptance criteria.
4A.6.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the effectiveness of a shutdown valve (SDV) against a check valve on the gas lift flowlines. The Base Case design of the gas lift flowlines comprises two check valves instead of one SDV and one check valve arrangement on the gas lift flowlines. The typical Failure rate for an SDV is 2.3 x 10-4 per year, [R4A.4]. The SDV is viewed to have a higher reliability for tight closure compared to a check valve and hence is anticipated to reduce the potential of release of inventory to the atmosphere. Based the data from OREDA, failure rate for check valve was estimated to be 7.1 x 10-3 per year due to significant internal leakage.
The analysis concluded that the installation of an SDV on each of the gas lift lines will reduce the PLL by approximately 94% from the Base Case. However, the risk reduction was anticipated to be insignificant as the risk contribution from the gas lift flowlines is very small when compared to the total PLL.
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Section 4A HAZARD ANALYSIS – MOBILE OFFSHORE Page 4A-13 APPLICATION BARGE (MOAB)
4A.7 SECTION 4A REFERENCES
[R4A.1] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi MOAB Design Safety Case, Rev. 0, J8328, November 2004.
[R4A.2] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA) for the South Angsi MOAB, Rev. 0, J8328, October 2004.
[R4A.3] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Noise Study for South Angsi MOAB, J8328, Rev. 0, October 2004.
[R4A.4] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for the South Angsi MOAB, J8328, Rev. 0, October 2004.
[R4A.5] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Escape Route & Safety Layout Plan, SAA-DR-P-10-0008/09/10/11/12, Rev. Z1, 13 September 2005.
[R4A.6] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Equipment Arrangement Plan, SAA-DR- P-10-0001/02/03/04/05, Rev. Z1, 13 September 2005.
[R4A.7] Talisman Malaysia Limited, Fusible Plug Loop Layout, SAA-DR-I-10- 0661/62/63/64/65, Rev. Z1, 25 August 2005.
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Section 4B HAZARD ANALYSIS – FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
CONTENTS
4B FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING (FSO) VESSEL HAZARD ANALYSIS 4B-1
4B.1 SUMMARY OF HSE STUDIES CONDUCTED 4B-1
4B.2 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS (ESSA) 4B-1
4B.3 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA) 4B-4
4B.4 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) 4B-6
4B.5 SECTION 4B REFERENCES 4B-8
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4B FLOATING STORAGE & OFFLOADING (FSO) VESSEL HAZARD ANALYSIS
4B.1 SUMMARY OF HSE STUDIES CONDUCTED
A Safety Case was completed for the FSO during detailed design stage [R4B.1], which included QRA, ESSA and EERA studies as part of the Formal Safety Assessments (FSAs). The following sections summarises the key findings and conclusions of the FSAs.
4B.2 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS (ESSA)
ESSA for the FSO was conducted as part of the Design Safety Case [R4B.1]. The emergency systems addressed were those required to safeguard life on the FSO during an emergency situation.
4B.2.1 Main Findings and Conclusion
The following emergency systems were assessed and the findings are summarised in Table 4B.2a.
Fire & Gas (FGS) Detection System; Fire Suppression System; Emergency Shutdown System; Platform Alarm; Emergency Power; Emergency Lighting; and Emergency Communication Systems.
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Table 4B.2a ESSA Summary for FSO [R4B.1]
Component Summary of Coarse Assessment Fire & Gas The FGS is considered to be critical as the system provides early detection Detection of fire and gas to enable corrective actions to be taken following a gas System (FGS) release or a fire event to prevent escalation and ensure early escape and evacuation from the FSO.
The FGS is vulnerable to fire and explosion events particularly for system related to the fuel gas system. However, the gas detectors are considered not vulnerable to fire and explosion events as destruction of detectors is expected only after the detection of a gas release and therefore the performance of the gas detectors will not be affected by the fire and explosion events.
On the other hand, the vulnerability of the FGS detection cables to fire and explosion events is considered to be limited as the cables are specified to be fire resistant to IEC 331. The FGS is not designed to be fail-safe.
In conclusion, the FGS is critical and vulnerable but has adequate redundancy for initial detection of a hazardous event. Acceptance criteria for the FGS system is considered met.
Fire Suppression Fire suppression systems are considered critical as they are required to Systems prevent escalation of localised fire events to enable safe escape and evacuation of personnel in the event of an emergency. Fire suppression systems located on the Double Deck of the engine room is vulnerable to fire events. The only source of hydrocarbon in the engine room is the diesel generators, which are not normally in use. Besides that, the emergency firewater pump located in the emergency fire pump room gives an extra barrier in the event of fire events. It is unlikely that both the firewater pumps will be simultaneously impaired. The vulnerability of this system is considered to be low as adequate redundancy is provided.
Portable fire fighting equipment is strategically located throughout each deck on the FSO, mainly for dealing with small and controlled fires. Therefore, failure of one of the equipment will not render the system ineffective. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
Emergency The Shutdown System (SDS) is critical for prevention of escalation being Shutdown essential for the isolation of process inventories. The SDS valves are System vulnerable to direct jet flame impingement, resulting in valves damage. However, the probability of impingement is considered to be low as the exposure area of the SDS valves is small. The SDS is designed to fail-safe with a high standard of reliability and availability. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
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Component Summary of Coarse Assessment Platform Alarm Platform alarm on FSO is critical for ensuring safe escape and evacuation from the vessel. The system cables are considered to be vulnerable to fire and explosion events. However, it is unlikely that the entire system will fail simultaneously.
Audible alarms are strategically distributed throughout the FSO covering all area where personnel are expected to have access. Different alarm tones are used for indicating different events. In high noise areas, visual alarms are provided in addition to the audible alarm. Platform alarm is not designed to be fail-safe. However, verbal instructions can still be communicated to personnel in the event of system failure. Personnel are always equipped with walkie-talkies and so means of communication are expected to be available throughout an emergency. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
Emergency The emergency power system on FSO is critical to ensure safe escape and Power evacuation from the vessel. The Emergency Diesel Generator is located on the FSO Upper Deck beside the accommodation block on the starboard side, away from the process areas. The Emergency Generator Room are
provided with fire detectors and portable CO2 fire extinguishers. This system is not designed to be fail-safe. The vulnerability of the emergency power system is considered to be low as it is supplied with adequate redundancy. Acceptance criteria for the emergency power is considered met.
Emergency The emergency lighting on FSO is critical in assisting the safe escape to the Lighting Muster Area and evacuation from the vessel, particularly during the night and when smoke concentrations are high. The emergency lighting cable trays and the local light fittings will be vulnerable to fire and explosion events from the FSO. However, the damage due to a fire event is judged to be limited as the cables are specified to be fire retardant. Emergency lighting is not designed to be fail-safe. The vulnerability of this system is considered to be low as it is supplied with adequate redundancy. Acceptance criteria for the emergency lighting is considered met.
Emergency Communication systems on the FSO are considered to be critical for safe Communication escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel during an emergency. The Systems system cables for communication are considered vulnerable to fire and explosion events but the system has adequate redundancy as various means of communications are provided for in-field communication between MOAB and FSO. In addition, personnel are also equipped with walkie-talkies and so means of communication are expected to be available throughout an emergency. Acceptance criteria is considered met.
The EESA confirmed that all emergency systems assessed on FSO meet with the facility’s acceptance criteria.
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4B.3 ESCAPE, EVACUATION AND RESCUE ANALYSIS (EERA)
Based on the qualitative assessment of the escape, muster, evacuation and rescue equipment and facilities, the provisions of EER facilities on FSO are generally adequate for the EER requirements to be achieved.
4B.3.1 EER Strategy for FSO
The Escape and Evacuation philosophy for the FSO is for personnel working on the vessel to escape to the designated Muster Area located adjacent to the Central Control Room (CCR) on the A-Deck. In the event of an emergency, personnel are required to proceed immediately to the muster area and await evacuation instruction from the safety co-ordinators (OIM or OIM designate). From the Temporary Refuge (TR), personnel are able to access the boat landing areas, lifeboats and other life saving equipment if evacuation is required.
Two (2) 75-men totally enclosed self-propelled survival craft (TEMPSC) are located adjacent to the muster point on the A Deck, at the starboard (SB) and portside (PS) of the FSO. In a situation where primary means of evacuation is not available, then the life rafts provided at various locations will be used as secondary means of evacuation. Lifebuoys are also provided at various locations around the FSO to be used during unforeseen events such as man overboard. The tertiary means of evacuation is by directly entering the sea.
The primary means of rescue will be by the standby vessel. The standby vessel will always be within the facility safety zone during operations in case of any emergency and/ or evacuation, including man overboard (MOB) rescue, medical emergency response (MER). Rescued personnel will then be transported to shore or to the MOAB for first aid treatment.
4B.3.2 Endurance Time
The minimum endurance time required for personnel to escape safely from the FSO facilities was estimated to be 50 minutes. This is considered reasonable for a manned facility as the UK HSE states that an endurance time of at least 1 hour is likely to be necessary for a manned facility [R4B.1].
4B.3.3 EER Facilities Findings and Conclusion
The following EER facilities were assessed and the study findings are summarised in Table 4B.3a.
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Table 4B.3a Summary of EER Systems Performance for FSO [R4B.1]
EER Systems/ Summary of Coarse Assessment Facilities Alarm System The alarm system is considered to be adequate such that personnel will be alerted of an emergency by means of audible alarms and where necessary, visual alarms via a network of speakers and strobe lights distributed around the FSO. The goal is considered met.
Escape Route There are at least two (2) independent escape routes available on all Provisions decks on the FSO leading to the Temporary Refuge (TR) on the accommodation unit at the aft of the FSO. The escape routes are of sufficient height of 2.4m and width of 1.2m to facilitate the escape process, including personnel on a stretcher and personnel wearing breathing apparatus. The escape routes on the FSO are painted yellow and applied with non-slip surface. Unambiguous, photo-luminescent signs indicating direction of escape routes are provided along the walkway and enclosed areas on the FSO. The goal is considered met.
Temporary Refuge The designated TR on the SAA is on the A-Deck accommodation unit, (TR) located adjacent to the Central Control Room (CCR). Adequate internal and external communications facilities are provided in the CCR for communications with external parties during an emergency situation. From the TR, personnel are able to access the boat landing areas, lifeboats and other life saving equipment if evacuation is required. This goal is considered met.
Jet fire due to leaks from the fuel gas flowline could potentially impair the integrity of the accommodation block within the time required for safe evacuation as the fire duration is anticipated to last longer than the A60 firewall failure duration. Therefore the goal for TR against the fire or explosion events is considered to be limited.
Alternate Muster In the event that escape to the TR is impaired or inaccessible, the area Point (AMP) besides the liferafts, located towards the bow of the FSO will function as the AMP for FSO personnel to muster and seek refuge. The goal is considered met.
Evacuation Two (2) Davit Launch TEMPSCs are located adjacent to the muster point on the A Deck, at the starboard (SB) and portside (PS) of the FSO, with a capacity of 75 persons each. Premature launching of the TEMPSC is possible, however redundancy in the number of TEMPSCs will enable personnel to evacuate the FSO using the second TEMPSC.
The second means of evacuation is via liferafts. A total of twelve (12) liferafts are provided at various locations on the FSO. Lifejackets are provided and located adjacent to the liferafts. Embarkation ladders are also provided to aid personnel entering into the sea. The goal is considered met.
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EER Systems/ Summary of Coarse Assessment Facilities Rescue Personnel in the sea will be rescued and brought to a safe location by the standby vessel. A standby vessel will be permanently present within the vicinity of SAA safety zone during manned operation. Personnel who are mustered on the FSO will be rescued by the standby vessel from the boat landing area. The goal is considered met.
Majority of the EER systems and facilities on the FSO were found to meet the set goal objectives, except for the TR, where there are certain fire or explosion events, where the TR was found to provide limited protection with respect to achieving the associated goals. It was recommended in the FSO Safety Design Case [R4B.1], that the accommodation block wall facing to the FSO bow to be upgraded from an A60 rated wall to an H60 rated wall. As the likelihood of a release from the fuel gas flowline is expected to be low due to the double wall piping and pressurised nitrogen-annulus which will initiate ESD upon low nitrogen pressure detection, this recommendation was found to be not justifiable based on the risk reduction that can be achieved when compared against investment cost.
4B.4 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)
The QRA [R4B.1] was conducted on the basis that the FSO is continuously manned by a total of 75 personnel as presented in Table 4B.4a.
Table 4B.4a POB on FSO
Worker Group POB MOAB Crew/ Talisman Crew 18 Master and Deck Officers 4 Engineers 6 Contractor/ Visitor 32 Engine Room Crew 2 Deck Crew 5 Catering Staff and Medic cum Radio Operator 8 Total 75
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4B.4.1 Potential Loss of Life (PLL)
The overall Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for the FSO during normal operations was estimated to be 1.0 x 10-2 per year [R4B.1]. The contributions of the different hazard categories are presented in Table 4B.4b. The PLL according to different hazard categories is graphically presented in Figure 4B.4a.
Table 4B.4b Overall PLL on FSO based on Hazard Categories [R4B.1]
Hazard Category PLL (per year) % Cont. Topsides Process 2.9E-03 28 Helicopter Accidents 3.2E-03 32 Dropped Objects 9.2E-06 < 1 Structural Failures 8.8E-04 9 Ship Collisions 1.8E-03 18 Occupational Accidents 1.3E-03 13 Total 1.0E-02 100
Helicopter transportation risk was identified as the main risk contributor, accounting for 32% of the total PLL. The second highest contributor is from the topside process hydrocarbon event (accounting for 28% of the total PLL), due to immediate fatalities contributed by the hydrocarbon release events.
4B.4.2 Individual Risk (IR) per year
The overall IR per year for the FSO personnel during normal operations is given in Table 4B.4c. The IR per year for the most exposed worker group, ie. Engine Room Crew on the FSO, were found to be 3.1 x 10-4 per year, which lies within the tolerable/ ALARP region of the Risk Criteria.
Table 4B.4c Overall IR for FSO Personnel [R4B.1]
Worker Group IR (per year) MOAB Crew(1)/ Talisman Crew 2.7E-05 Master and Deck Officers 2.5E-04 Engineers 2.8E-04 Contractor/ Visitor 2.5E-04 Engine Room Crew 3.1E-04 Deck Crew 2.8E-04 Catering Staff and Medic cum Radio Operator 2.5E-04 Note: 1. The risk exposure for this worker group was based only on the hours spend while being accommodated on the FSO.
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Occupational Accidents 13% Topsides Process 28%
Ship Collisions 18%
Structural Failures 9% Dropped Objects Helicopter Accidents < 1% 32%
Figure 4B.4a Breakdown of PLL by Hazard Categories for SAA FSO during Normal Operations
Section 4B HAZARD ANALYSIS – FLOATING STORAGE & Page 4B-8 OFFLOADING VESSEL (FSO)
4B.5 SECTION 4B REFERENCES
[R4B.1] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. – MISC Bhd. & Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi FSO Design Safety Case, J8361, Rev. 0, May 2005.
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Section 5 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN Page 5-11
CONTENTS
5 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN 5-1
5.1 OVERVIEW 5-1
5.2 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN (RWP) 5-1
5.3 SECTION 5 REFERENCES 5-10
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Section 5 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN (RWP) Page 5-1
5 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN
5.1 OVERVIEW
During the development of the SAA Operations HSE Case, several shortfalls and improvement relating to SAA HSE management system and operations have been identified. These issues require further actions by Talisman Malaysia Limited (TML) Operations Management team to enhance health, safety and environment performance of the installations and to ensure that the risks within the fields are reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable in line with TML’s HSE policy.
A number of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) studies have been conducted for the SAA facilities during the detailed design stage. In addition, Bow-Tie reviews were also conducted as part of the development of the Operations Hazards Management Register. Each stage has identified some shortfalls/ areas for improvement, where performance standards are found to have deviated from what is normally acceptable or practicable. These are documented and compiled as part of a Remedial Work Plan (RWP) of the HSE Case.
The remedial actions to address the shortfalls are identified mainly from the following sections:
The analysis of the cascade process of the Corporate HSE Management System to the SAA Operations in Section 2;
The hazard and effects analysis process (ie. HSE studies/ formal safety assessments, etc) in Section 4.
All outstanding action items pertaining to operation issues arising from the development of this Operations HSE Case are the responsibilities of the respective operations teams and are to be tracked and closed out progressively.
5.2 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN (RWP)
Table 5.2a presents the RWP for the SAA facilities developed during Operations HSE Case preparation. The identified shortfalls/ areas for improvement describe the remedial actions, identify action parties, and track the actions until their ultimate closure.
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Note that the remedial actions presented in the table should be considered as proposed actions only. There is usually more than one potential solution to any problem and it is recommended that personnel directly involved in the SAA operations decide on the most appropriate solution for each of the identified issue.
The remedial actions are categorised as follows:
Implementation issues/ shortfalls (IS); and HSE improvement for medium or long term (ML).
Target dates should be identified for closing out the recommendations outlined in Table 5.2a by the HSE Management/ Operations Teams.
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Section 5 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN Page 5-3
Table 5.2a Remedial Work Plan (RWP) – HOLD (To be completed by TML Operations)
Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 1. HSE Case The NADOOPOD Regulations and August TML to incorporate NADOOPOD IS Section 2.3.4 Scheduled Waste Regulations 2006 2007 Regulations 2004 and Scheduled are not incorporated in TML’s Wastes Regulations 2006 into the HSE HSEMS. Legal procedure.
2. HSE Case No clarification on who is the August TML to identify the person-in-charge IS Section 2.4.2 person-in-charge for HSE at FPSO 2007 for HSE at FVSB that the FSO Master Ventures Sdn Bhd (FVSB). can liaise with as the FSO is operated by FVSB, and also to clarify their working relationship.
3. HSE Case The interface between TML’s HSE August TML to identify the interface between IS Section 2.4.2 Department and FVSB is not 2007 TML’s HSE Department and FVSB. clearly defined or identified.
4. HSE Case The roles and responsibilities for August Details of the roles and IS Section 2.4.2 the TML’s HSE Manager in terms 2007 responsibilities of the HSE Manager of interfacing with other are to include interfacing with other departments are found to be Departmental Managers. limited based on a review of TML’s existing Health, Safety and Environment Management System (HSEMS).
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Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 5. HSE Case The Risk Assessment Summary August TML to ensure that the RASR and ML Section 2.5.1 Report (RASR) and Risk 2007 RMSR are initiated and completed for Management Safety Report (RMSR) any future risk assessment studies for were not prepared during initial the SAA operations. design stage of the SAA facilities in accordance with TML’s HSEMS requirements.
6. HSE Case A Chemical Health Risk August The results of the completed IS Section 2.5.1 Assessment (CHRA) is yet to be 2007 assessment are to be incorporated performed by TML for the SAA into the Operations HSE Case upon facilities. Currently TML is completion. processing the bid with the assessment to begin tentatively in September 2007.
7. HSE Case Bow-Tie diagrams have been August TML to incorporate the Bow-Tie ML Section 2.5.1 developed as a hazard 2007 diagram approach and methodology identification process, as an into the HS&E Risk Management additional element to the current Procedure (Doc. No: TML-HSE-GEN- TML’s HSEMS. PR-L-108).
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Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 8. HSE Case During the course of the HSE Case August The TML’s Risk Policy and Criteria to ML Section 2.5.1 development, the TML’s Risk 2007 be formally updated with approval Matrix has been modified during from the responsible parties. the review of Major Accident Events (MAEs) to ensure that the frequency and consequence categories are more specific and quantifiable. This is based on feedback from various parties within TML. The change may result in inconsistencies with future hazard assessments for the SAA facilities or other TML’s operations.
9. HSE Case The general procedures developed August TML to develop an operating manual ML Section 2.5.2 for South Angsi platform during 2007 covering the FSO operations that are normal operations do not include distinctly different from activities the FSO operations which are performed at South Angsi facilities different from the activities (eg. mooring, cargo transfer and deck performed at the platform. operations).
10. HSE Case The Job Safety Analysis (JSA) August TML to relate to the Line Supervisors IS Section 2.5.3 during work inspection is 2007 and Technicians the usage of a JSA performed by the Production during work inspection to update Technician and/ or Equipment new conditions/ situation that Owner. necessitate changes to JSA.
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Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 11. HSE Case The emergency response procedure August To develop an emergency response IS Section 2.5.11 for addressing Flooding of FSO 2007 procedure for Flooding of FSO Engine Room is currently not in Engine Room. place.
12. HSE Case TML’s emergency response August Review on existing TML’s emergency IS Section 2.5.11 documents which are kept on the 2007 response documents to ensure that all FSO and FVSB’s onshore foreseeable emergency situations are emergency response room to also incorporated and develop emergency include all foreseeable emergency procedures, if necessary, for specific situations at FSO. emergency situations at FSO.
13. HSE Case High noise levels from the Fin Fan August It was recommended that low-noise IS Section 4A.4 Deck are contributed by the 2007 fans and motors to be used for all the numerous coolers, which also cooler units and enclosing the motor- propagate and contribute to high drive belt. noise on the Upper Deck.
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Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 14. HSE Case High noise levels from the Upper August It was recommended that silencers IS Section 4A.4 Deck are predicted from the 2007 for the air intakes and exhausts as Compression Packages, Gas well as attenuators and cladding of Turbine Generator (GTG) and the the ducting are applied for the pumps within the Chemical Compression Packages and GTG. It Injection Skid. was also recommended to install an acoustic enclosure around the pumps in the Chemical Injection Skid and for the GTG components.
15. HSE Case The noise levels on the Main Deck August It was recommended that the IS Section 4A.4 exceed the noise criteria due to the 2007 operating pumps on the Main Deck cumulative noise impacts from be of low-noise types with a noise miscellaneous equipment. rating of between 80-83dBA.
16. HSE Case The noise levels around the August It was recommended to provide IS Section 4A.4 emergency diesel generator and 2007 acoustic enclosures for the emergency firewater pumps, which operate diesel generator and firewater pump only during an emergency or house to minimise the noise impacts. periodic testing, are found to be significantly high.
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Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 17. HSE Case The noise levels during HP August It was recommended that pressure IS Section 4A.4 emergency maximum flaring are 2007 relief valves be fitted with low-noise expected to impact personnel trims and the downstream valves working on the MOAB. piping be acoustic insulated. In addition, standard operating procedures for adopting the “cease- work, secure work area and seek refuge” action plan is to be implemented.
18. HSE Case The designated “Restricted Areas” August Based on identified high noise from IS Section 4A.4 has not been identified. 2007 various sources, the following areas are designated as “Restricted Areas”:
Coolers on the Fin Fan Deck; Area around the compression skids and GTG skid on the northern end of the Upper Deck; Area around the Air Handling Unit, Exhaust discharge opening and Air Chiller Unit on the Main Deck; and Area around the Utility Packages (ie. air dryer package and diesel centrifugal package) on Main Deck.
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Ref. Source/ study Identified Shortfalls/ HSE Critical Date Proposed Remedial Action(s) TML Cat. Date Status/ Remark No. at which the Issues Raised Action Hazard/ Party Shortfall was Identified 19. HSE Case The minimum noise level alarm August Based on the predicted maximum IS Section 4A.4 setting for the MOAB has not been 2007 noise levels, it is recommended that identified. the alarm for the MOAB to be set at a minimum of 120 dBA.
20. HSE Case It appears that the Talisman Crew August TML to confirm that the total risk IS Section 4A.6 & were not accounted for in the 2009 exposure of Talisman Crew was Section 4B.4 manning distribution, but the accounted for while they are offshore individual risk exposure was at the field. assessed to be similar to the MOAB Crew. Based on MOAB QRA, Ref. [R5.1], there are 15 MOAB Crew whereas the MOAB Crew/ Talisman Crew is 18 based on FSO Design Safety Case, Ref. [R5.2].
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5.3 SECTION 5 REFERENCES
[R5.1] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. –Talisman Malaysia Limited, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for the South Angsi MOAB, J8328, Rev. 0, October 2004.
[R5.2] Trident Consultants Far East (M) Sdn. Bhd. – MISC Bhd. & Talisman Malaysia Limited, South Angsi FSO Design Safety Case, J8361, Rev. 0, May 2005.
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Section 6 CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF FITNESS
CONTENTS
6 CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF FITNESS 6-1
6.1 HSE CASE MAIN FINDINGS 6-1
6.2 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN 6-2
6.3 STATEMENT OF FITNESS FOR OPERATION 6-3
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6 CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF FITNESS
6.1 HSE CASE MAIN FINDINGS
The SAA Field Operations Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) Case has been developed based on the principle that all hazards and effects associated with its operations are fully understood and adequately controlled. Talisman Malaysia Limited’s (TML’s) intent is to ensure that the risks due to the installations’ operations are reduced to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The establishment and implementation of TML’s HSE Policy and HSE Management System (HSEMS) reflect the company’s commitment to achieving high HSE standards for its business operations. The Operations HSE Case illustrates the function of the HSEMS and how it is applied to the management of hazards in the SAA Field.
Given the findings of the hazard analyses summarised in Section 4 of the HSE Case, the risk mitigation measures already implemented and those proposed in Section 5 (Remedial Work Plan), to lower the risk associated with the SAA Field, it is concluded that the risks due to SAA’s operations are reduced to the extent reasonably practicable. The SAA Operations HSE Case demonstrates that:
A Management System is in place for the operations, which is adequate to enable the Company to comply with all relevant statutory and Company provisions in relation to SAA Field and any activity in connection with it;
There are adequate arrangements in place for the audit and reviews of the Management System at appropriate intervals;
Hazards with the potential to cause major accidents at these installations have been identified, assessed, controlled and where necessary recovery measures introduced in the event control is lost through development of Hazards Register and Bow-Tie diagrams;
Risks to exposed personnel have been evaluated to reflect those expected for the SAA normal operations and maintenance activities;
The overall potential loss of life (PLL) for the MOAB has been estimated to be 5.3 x 10-3 per year. The main contributor is from the topsides process hydrocarbon events, accounting for 41% of the overall risk. The highest
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Individual Risk (IR) for the most exposed worker group on MOAB of 4.5 x 10-4 per year is experience by the Maintenance Technician, as they are exposed to process releases and occupational risks. Based on TML’s Risk Criteria, the IR per year of this worker group lies within the ALARP region;
The total PLL for the FSO is estimated to be 1.0 x 10-2 per year. Helicopter transportation risk was identifies as the main risk contributor, accounting for 32% of the total PLL. The second highest contributor is from the topside process hydrocarbon event (accounting for 28% of the total PLL), due to immediate fatalities contributed by the hydrocarbon release events. The most exposed worker group on the FSO is the Engine Room Crew with an estimated individual risk of 3.1 x 10-4 per year. However, the IR per year of this worker group lies within the ALARP region of TML’s Risk Criteria;
Environmental aspects and the potential for impacts to the environment have been identified, assessed, controlled and the plans are in place for recovery in the event control is lost. The environmental aspects for SAA Field have been assessed; and
The SAA risk levels are tolerable, within the ALARP region of TML’s Risk Criteria. It remains the responsibility of the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) and his team to continually look for improvements that will further reduce risks levels in line with the ALARP approach to risk management, which advocates the assessment of the practicability of proposed measures in terms of cost as well as on other grounds. The Remedial Work Plan (RWP) is the tool that will be used for this improvement process.
Continuous review and update of the Operations HSE Case will ensure that the safe operation of SAA facilities is maintained and that the risks are always maintained at a level that is ALARP.
6.2 REMEDIAL WORK PLAN
Certain operations HSE critical issues and shortfalls identified during the course of the development of the Operations HSE Case have been highlighted and remedial actions proposed.
The RWP in Section 5 will be used as the basis for the SAA Operations HSE improvement plan, and as such the plan will be regularly reviewed and updated.
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6.3 STATEMENT OF FITNESS FOR OPERATION
This is to certify that the objectives set out in the Operations HSE Case have been successfully met and that relevant systems and risk reduction measures are in place for the safe operation of the SAA facilities. The relevant parties shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that activities identified in the remedial action plans are implemented and statuses of action items are monitored to meet the set target completion dates.
Accepted by Offshore Installation Manager, SAA: Date :
Authorised by Production Manager (Custodian): Date :
Approved by Operations Manager, SAA: Date :
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