Class 7: Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618-80) works’ (ibid.). Today she is one of the best-known (from Women Philosophers of the Seven- early modern women philosophers—despite the fact that she left no systematic philosophical writings of her teenth Century by Jacqueline Broad) own, and that her key philosophical contributions are in the form of letters. Other than her correspondence Recent commentators have raised methodological with Descartes, there are only a handful of letters from questions about how women philosophers of the past Elisabeth to other male thinkers, such as Nicolas can be incorporated into the philosophical canon.1 Malebranche,3 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,4 and the One common and useful method of inclusion is to Quaker Robert Barclay (1648-90).5 show that these women participated in the great intellectual debates of their time, and that they were Nevertheless, historians of philosophy agree that perceptive critics of their famous male contempor- there is also something limiting about the ‘add women aries. This is the usual approach taken to the philo- and stir’ approach to women philosophers of the past. sophical writings of Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, In the case of Elisabeth, this ‘assimilation’ method has the friend and correspondent of René Descartes. On meant that until recently the study of her own the basis of her famous exchange of letters with philosophical themes remained incomplete. Commen- Descartes (from 1643 to 1649), Elisabeth is celebrated tators examined the philosophical import of Elisa- as one of the first writers to raise the problem of mind– beth’s objections to Descartes, and acknowledged the impact that her queries had on Descartes’ subsequent body interaction for Cartesian dualism. She is also 6 remembered as the intellectual inspiration behind writings; but their studies did not really proceed Descartes’ final treatise, The Passions of the Soul beyond the first year of the correspondence. As a (1649), a work that developed out of their correspond- consequence, there is the perception that Elisabeth’s dence. In the preface to another text, Descartes com- sole philosophical contribution is a particularly astute mends Elisabeth for ‘the outstanding and incompar- re-phrasing of the mind–body problem. able sharpness’ of her intellect.2 He describes her as More recently, scholars have started to draw out the ‘the only person I have so far found who has com- implicit arguments, themes, and lines of development pletely understood all my previously published in the bulk of Elisabeth’s letters.7 In ‘Princess

1 Here I am thinking of Sarah Hutton, ‘Damaris Elisabeth in the same year on the subject of the Cartesian Cudworth, Lady Masham: Between Platonism and ontological argument for the existence of God. He then Enlightenment’, British Journal for the History of visited Elisabeth on her sick bed at the Herford Abbey in Philosophy 1:1 (1993), 29-54; Sarah Hutton, ‘Like 1680. Father Like Daughter? The Moral Philosophy of 5 Colonel D. Barclay, Reliquiae Barclaianae: Correspon- Damaris Cudworth, Lady Masham’, presented at the dence of Colonel D. Barclay and Robert Barclay of Urie and Eastern meeting of the American Philosophical his son Robert, including Letters from Princess Elisabeth of Association in Atlanta, 28-30 December 1996; and the Rhine, the Earl of Perth, the Countess of Sutherland, O’Neill, ‘Disappearing Ink’, 39-43. William Penn, George Fox and others (London: Winter and 2 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in The Bailey, 1870). Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John 6 Daniel Garber, ‘Understanding Interaction: What Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 Descartes Should Have Told Elisabeth’, Southern Journal of vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985- Philosophy 21, Supplement (1983), 15-32; Ruth Mattern, 91), 1: 192. ‘Descartes’s Correspondence with Elizabeth: Concerning 3 Nicolas Malebranche,,Oeuvres complète, ed. A. Both the Union and Distinction of Mind and Body’, in Robinet (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958-84), vols. 18-19. Elisabeth Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael made contact with Malebranche through her sister, Hooker (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Louise, Abbess of Maubisson. R. C. Richardson, ‘The “Scandal” of Cartesian Interaction- 4 E. J. Aiton, Leibniz: A Biography (Bristol: Adam Hilger, ism’, Mind 91 (1982), 20-37; and Beatrice H. Zedler, ‘The 1985), 90-91; and Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz: Three Princesses’, Hypatia 4:1 (1989), 28-63. Determinist, Theist, Idealist (New York: Oxford University 7 Erica Harth, Cartesian Women: Versions and Sub- Press, 1994), 192-93. Elisabeth met Leibniz at her sister versions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime Sophie’s court in Hanover in Winter 1678. He wrote to (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 67-78; Albert 67

Elizabeth and Descartes: The Union of Soul and Body than mere handmaidens to the great philosophical and the Practice of Philosophy’, Lisa Shapiro traces masters. If we are to examine their philosophical the development of Elisabeth’s thought throughout contributions, and see these women as more than the correspondence, interpreting Elisabeth’s letters to surrogate men or ‘men in petticoats’,9 we must not lose Descartes in light of Elisabeth’s own independent sight of what is distinctive about women’s thought. For position on the relationship between the soul and this reason, I highlight the critical content of body. Shapiro’s point is that Elisabeth takes a unique Elisabeth’s letters, and especially those queries and approach to substances, one that lies somewhere in objections she raises from a woman’s point of view. between dualism and a strict monistic-materialism. On the basis of these letters, Elisabeth can be regarded Similarly, in her ‘Polity and Prudence: The Ethics of as a precursor to modern feminist philosophers who Elisabeth, Princess Palatine’, Andrea Nye argues that give an equal role to the body and the emotions in their Elisabeth adopts an original moral position of her moral and metaphysical writings. She also anticipates own. Then in her book, The Princess and the many of the metaphysical concerns of later Philosopher, Nye claims that this moral outlook stems seventeenth-century women philosophers in England. from Elisabeth’s ‘nondualist metaphysics of thinking body and material mind’.8 Both writers suggest that I Elisabeth’s famous objection can be seen as a symptom of her broader dissatisfaction with Elisabeth was born at Heidelberg Castle on 26 Descartes’ dualist metaphysics. December1618, the eldest daughter of Elisabeth Stuart (the only daughter of James I of England), and In this chapter, I examine Elisabeth’s criticisms of Frederick V of Palatine, the exiled ‘Winter King’ of soul–body dualism in her correspondence with Des- Bohemia. In 1620, Elisabeth’s family lost their cartes, also with the aim of highlighting Elisabeth’s fortunes and land, and was forced to live in exile in the independent concerns. First, I emphasize that Elisa- Netherlands. Elisabeth was educated by Royal tutors beth is a Cartesian in terms of her philosophical at the Prinsenhof in Leiden where her family resided method and her application of Descartes’ criterion of from 1623 to 1641. She also received some of her truth and certainty (clear and distinct ideas). In this training from professors at the University of Leiden. sense, Elisabeth can be regarded as one of the earliest Elisabeth had an extremely good education in Latin, female disciples of Cartesian reason, and a precursor logic, and mathematics, and demonstrated such an to feminists in her own time. I further demonstrate that aptitude for languages that her family nickname was this sympathy for Cartesianism extends to her broader ‘La Grecque’. Her youngest sister, Sophie (1630- metaphysics, and that many of Elisabeth’s suggestions 1714), later the Electress of Hanover, also expressed are not as anti-dualist, or as incompatible with an interest in philosophy: she was the patron and Cartesian metaphysics, as Shapiro and Nye suggest. correspondent of Leibniz, and her daughter, Sophie- Nevertheless, I agree with these writers that women Charlotte (1668-1705), was also philosophically thinkers such as Elisabeth should be regarded as more

A. Johnstone, ‘The Bodily Nature of the Self or What Philosophy 7:3 (1999), 503-520; Deborah Tollefsen, Descartes Should have Conceded Princess Elizabeth of ‘Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind–Body Bohemia’, in Giving the Body Its Due, ed. Maxine Interaction’, Hypatia 14:3 (1999), 59-77; and Thomas Sheets-Johnstone (Albany: State University of New E. Wartenberg, ‘Descartes’s Mood: The Question of York Press, 1992), 16-47; Andrea Nye, ‘Polity and Feminism in the Correspondence with Elisabeth’, in Prudence: The Ethics of Elisabeth, Princess Palatine’, in Bordo (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of René Descartes, Hypatia’s Daughters: Fifteen Hundred Years of Women 190-212. See also Eileen O’Neill, ‘Elisabeth of Philosophers, ed. Linda Lopez McAlister (Blooming- Bohemia (1618-80)’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of ton: Indiana University Press, 1996); Andrea Nye, The Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London and New York: Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Routledge, 1998), 3: 267-69. Palatine to René Descartes (Lanham: Rowman and 8 Nye, Princess and the Philosopher, xii. Littlefield,1999); Lisa Shapiro, ‘Princess Elizabeth and 9 Mary Astell, The Christian Religion, As Profess’d by a Descartes: The Union of Soul and Body and the Practice Daughter of The Church of England. In a Letter to the Right of Philosophy’, British Journal for the History of Honourable, T.L. C.I. (London: R. Wilkin, 1705), 293. 68

minded. In their early life, Elisabeth and Sophie were to her in 1644, praising her great expertise in both fortunate to be part of a courtly circle that included metaphysics and mathematics. He says that ‘the several leading intellectuals of the day, such as outstanding and incomparable sharpness of your Constantijn Huygens (1596-1648), Henri Regius intelligence is obvious from the penetrating examina- (1598-1679), Francis Mercury van Helmont (1614- tion you have made of all the secrets of these sciences, 98), and Descartes. But the Palatine family was also and from the fact that you have acquired an exact beset with misfortune, and tragedies such as the 1649 knowledge of them in so short a time’.10 In a letter to beheading of Elisabeth’s uncle, King Charles I of Alphonse Pollot, dated 6 October 1642, Descartes says England. As a consequence of these family troubles, of Elisabeth that ‘I attach much more weight to her Elisabeth seems to have suffered from depression—a judgment than to those messieurs the Doctors, who common theme in her letters to Descartes. She take for a rule of truth the opinions of Aristotle rather remained single all her life, and once refused an offer than the evidence of reason.’11 of marriage because she would not convert to Although Elisabeth is chiefly remembered as a Catholicism. She was appointed coadjutrix of the critic of Descartes, there are in fact strong Cartesian Protestant Herford Abbey in 1661, and then abbess in elements in her thinking. Her general approach to 1667, remaining so until her death on 8 February philosophy is in stark contrast to that of her scholastic 1680. In her final years, she offered asylum to friend, Anna Maria van Schurman (1607-78).12 The members of the persecuted religious sects, the early relationship between these women can be seen as Labadists and the Quakers. a microcosm of the ‘ancient versus modern’ debate Elisabeth expressed admiration for Descartes’ that flourished in the seventeenth century. Elisabeth writings shortly after their first meeting at The Hague apparently first met Schurman at the University of in about 1642. She visited Descartes at his home in Leiden.13 At the time, Schurman was known as one of Endegeest near Leiden, and from 1643 they wrote to the most learned women in seventeenth-century one another for a period of seven years until Des- Europe. She was the first woman to study at the Uni- cartes’ death in 1650. Claude Clerselier first published versity of Utrecht, and the protégé of Descartes’ adver- Descartes’ letters to Elisabeth in 1657, but Elisabeth sary, the Aristotelian philosopher Gisbertus Voetius refused the publication of her letters to Descartes (she (1589-1676). Schurman and Elisabeth engaged in a also refused to have them shown to Queen Christina brief correspondence from around 1639, shortly after of Sweden). In the nineteenth century, her letters were the publication in Latin of Schurman’s Dissertatio discovered in a library near Arnheim, the Netherlands, (1638).14 In this work, Schurman appeals to Aristote- and published by Foucher de Careil in 1879. Among lian principles in defense of the view that ‘the study of the surviving correspondence, there are 26 letters letters is fitting for a Christian woman’. Like Voetius, from Elisabeth to Descartes, and 33 from Descartes to Schurman follows the path of scholasticism. Elisabeth. He dedicated his Principles of Philosophy

10 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in Philosophical Schurman’s Discussion of Women’s Aptitude for the Writings, vol. 1, 192. Study of Arts and Sciences’, and Angela Roothaan, ‘Anna 11 Descartes to Pollot, 6 October 1642; in Descartes: His Maria van Schurman’s “Reformation” of Philosophy’, Moral Philosophy and Psychology, translated with an intro- both in Choosing the Better Part: Anna Maria van duction by John J. Blom (New York: New York University Schurman (1607-1678), ed. Mirjam de Baar, et al., and Press, 1978), 105; and René Descartes, Oeuvres de translated by Lynne Richards (Dordrecht and London: Descartes, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, new Kluwer, 1996), 43-65, 103-16; and Eileen O’Neill, edition (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1996), 3: ‘Schurman, Anna Maria Van (1607-78)’, in Craig, ed., 577. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philo-sophy, 8: 556-59. 12 On Schurman’s feminism and philosophy, see Joyce 13 Elizabeth Godfrey, A Sister of Prince Rupert: Irwin, ‘Learned Woman of Utrecht: AnnaMaria van Elizabeth Princess Palatine and Abbess of Herford Schur-man’, in Women Writers of the Seventeenth (London and New York: John Lane, 1909), 58. Century, ed. Katharina Wilson and Frank Warnke (Athens: 14 This work was translated into English as The Learned University of Georgia Press, 1989), 164-85; Caroline van Maid or, Whether a Maid may be a Scholar (1659). Eck, ‘The First Dutch Feminist Tract? Anna Maria van 69

Elisabeth, on the other hand, shares Descartes’ I do not wish to deny that they sometimes go astray mistrust of ancient authority and book learning. In one through vain and dangerous speculations, which letter to Descartes, Elisabeth emphasizes that she does have brought upon them the censure of a number of not follow his views ‘out of prejudice or indolent learned people of our time. Nevertheless, that ought imitation’, but because his way of reasoning ‘is the not to prejudice either the solidity or the excellence most natural I have encountered and seems to teach of their ideas, which we are accustomed to admire me nothing new, save that I can extract from my mind in their works, when it is a question either of knowledge I have not yet noticed’.15 This attitude is clarifying the secrets of philosophy or of sustaining distinctively Cartesian in its respect for the self- the highest points of the Christian religion against reliance of the individual, and faith in the natural secular skeptics and atheists. It would be hard to tell abilities of the mind to attain truth. In his Discourse whether they have been more ingenious in con- on the Method, Descartes asserts that all human juring up doubts and objections or more adept in beings, however dull or slow, possess a natural capa- resolving them; whether they have been more rash city for reasoning. He emphasizes that those indivi- in undertaking lofty and difficult matters or more duals who are uneducated in traditional scholastic fortunate and capable in clearing them up . . . it is philosophy are the best fitted for the apprehension of not strange that they have arrived at such a high truth, since their minds are the least clouded by degree of perfection, inasmuch as they have not prejudices. He claims that anybody can attain scorned the legacy of their predecessors or the knowledge, so long as he or she begins with self- heritage of all past centuries (ibid, 67). evident ideas in the mind, and proceeds from simple to complex ideas in an orderly, rigorous manner. Schurman’s remarks are obviously directed against Cartesianism, a philosophy that does scorn the legacy Schurman, however, appreciates the value of of its predecessors. While Descartes’ method of doubt studying historical texts and the methods of the an- is specifically designed to overthrow Aristotelian cients. In one letter to Elisabeth (7 September 1639), metaphysics, Schurman criticizes those who set Schurman eulogizes ‘the livelier way the examples [of ‘chaotic muddles of errors’ against ‘the brilliant light’ Tacitus] strike the senses and the imagination than do of Aristotle (ibid.). Her remarks about ‘secular the precepts of philosophy’.16 Elisabeth, on the other skeptics and atheists’ also echo Voetius’s claim that hand, believes that human knowledge is limited Descartes’ writings controvert traditional theology.19 because ‘the greater part use their thought only with Schurman herself had a difficult personal relationship reference to the senses’: ‘Even among those who with Descartes, whom she first met in Utrecht in 1635. apply themselves to study, few use anything but their Descartes suspected that Schurman was too much memory, and few take truth as the goal of their under the influence of Voetius;20 he once referred to labor.’17 Like Descartes, Elisabeth believes that only her as ‘the greatest pedant in the world’;21 and she was the overthrow of preconceived opinions and detach- apparently insulted by Descartes’ remark that reading ment from the senses can lead to certainty. Perhaps in the Bible in Hebrew was a waste of time. Possibly an effort to convert Elisabeth, in another letter, dated because of these differences, Elisabeth and Schurman 26 January 1644, Schurman says ‘It is true that I have lost touch after their brief correspondence. But in their high regard for the Scholastic Doctors’:18 later years, the two women shared a common interest

in religious mysticism, and were reconciled in around

15 Elisabeth to Descartes, 16 August 1645; in Blom 17 Elisabeth to Descartes, 28 October 1645; in Blom (tr.), Descartes, 135; and Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 4: 269. (tr.), Descartes, 165; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 321. There is no unabridged edition of the Descartes–Elisabeth 18 Schurman, Whether a Christian Woman, 66-67. correspondence in English. I give references to the English 19 Around this time (1643 to 1644), Voetius publicly translation first, and then to the original language. accused Descartes of slander. 16 Anna Maria van Schurman, Whether a Christian 20 Descartes to Marin Mersenne, 11 November 1640; Woman Should be Educated and Other Writings from in Descartes, Oeuvres, 8: 388. Her Intellectual Circle, ed. and trans. Joyce L. Irwin 21 Godfrey, A Sister of Prince Rupert, 116. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 58. 70

1670, when Elisabeth offered asylum to Schurman soul and body are distinct substances, and the claim and her Labadist friends at the Herford Abbey. that nevertheless the soul and body are ‘intermingled’ in human beings. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes Elisabeth’s attitude toward Cartesian reason and argues that we can clearly and distinctly conceive of the Cartesian approach to philosophy is not unusual the unextended soul existing apart from the extended for a woman of her time—it is Schurman who is the body, and therefore the soul and body are distinct. exception. Descartes’ works taught women that a poor Nevertheless, he also emphasizes that ‘I am not merely formal education need not prevent them from enga- present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship’,24 ging in philosophy: his new method can be practiced but I am closely joined and connected to this body such without an extensive library and a scholastic training; that I feel pain when it is hurt, thirst when it is dehy- the only prerequisite is one’s natural reasoning ability. drated, and so on. In the Descartes–Elisabeth corres- From 1640 to 1660, this aspect of Cartesian philos- pondence, we are reminded that Descartes is also ophy had a notable impact on the celebrated French concerned with explaining the nature of the soul–body ‘salons’, those informal, female–led circles of intel- union in light of their real distinction. In her early lectual discussion. In their day, the salon women— letters, Elisabeth highlights perceived inadequacies in including Anne de la Vigne ((1634-84), Marie Dupré his explanations of this union. (dates unknown), and Catherine Descartes (1637- 1706), the philosopher’s niece—were known as ‘I beseech you,’ Elisabeth writes to Descartes on ‘Cartésiennes’, or followers of Descartes. Today, 6/16 May 1643, ‘tell me how the soul of man (since it however, scholars emphasize that the salon women is but a thinking substance) can determine the spirits are also highly critical of Descartes’ doctrines. In of the body to produce voluntary actions’.25 How can Cartesian Women, Erica Harth observes that their an essentially thinking thing move or have an impact admiration of Descartes is always qualified: ‘their on an extended substance? If every movement writings display a critical attitude toward those involves an impact between the mover and the moved, features of Descartes’s philosophy that were to have then it seems impossible for the mind to have any the greatest impact on the development of modern effect on the body: ‘For it seems every determination rational discourse: his dualism, mechanism, and of movement happens from an impulsion of the thing objectivity’.22 But while they might be critical of moved, according to the manner in which it is pushed ‘broad trends of the new rationality’, they do not raise by that which moves it, or else, depends on the specific or detailed philosophical objections to Carte- qualification and figure of the superficies of this latter’ sian metaphysics.23 Their writings are often in the (ibid). Because the soul is neither extended nor capable form of poems, and their criticisms are couched in the of contact, it cannot meet the necessary con-ditions for language of metaphor, analogy, and allusion. impact. Elisabeth proposes that a solution might be Elisabeth, on the other hand, raises precise queries found in a more precise definition of the soul, ‘a from a distinctive philosophical position. In this definition of the substance separate from its action, respect, she is much closer to her English counterparts thought’ (ibid.). Anticipating Locke, she suggests that Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Mary Astell, it is difficult to show that the ‘soul’ and ‘thought’ are Damaris Masham, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. always inseparable, especially in the case of ‘infants in their mother’s womb and deep faints’ (ibid.). II In his first reply of 21 May 1643, Descartes appeals Elisabeth’s letters raise queries about two principal to certain ‘primitive notions’ that provide the founda- claims in Descartes’ Meditations: the claim that the

22 Harth, Cartesian Women, 66. See also Erica Harth, even a ‘critical attitude’ toward Cartesian dualism. See ‘Cartesian Women’, and Eileen O’Neill, ‘Women O’Neill, ‘Women Cartesians’, 239-45. Cartesians, “Feminine Philosophy”, and Historical Ex- 24 Descartes, Meditations, in Philosophical Writings, clusion’, both in Bordo (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of 2: 56. René Descartes, 213-31, and 232-57. 25 Elisabeth to Descartes, 6/16 May 1643; in Blom 23 Harth, Cartesian Women, 66. More recently, (tr.), Descartes, 106; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 661. Eileen O’Neill argues that these women do not have 71

tions or the ‘models’ for all our other knowledge.26 in a non-mechanical way, it is extended or diffused These three notions can be recognized by three differ- throughout the whole body, and yet it is a quality ent operations of the soul. Our notion of the soul is distinct from the body (capable of being separated grasped only by the pure intellect, completely devoid from it). In this way, as Ruth Mattern observes, the of any sensory or imaginative input. The notion of the gravity analogy gives us some way of conceiving how body as extension, figure, and movement, is under- the soul and body are united, and how the soul can stood through the intellect and the imagination; and have a causal influence on the body, while still those things that pertain to the soul–body union can be allowing that the two substances are distinct.29 known clearly only by the senses. ‘All human know- In her 10/20 June 1643 response, Elisabeth says that ledge’, Descartes says, ‘consists only in carefully Descartes’ gravity analogy does not solve the problem distinguishing these notions, and attributing each of of soul–body interaction. Even if the old scholastic them only to the things to which they pertain. For conception of gravity were correct, she says, this does when we wish to explain some difficulty by means of not explain exactly how an immaterial thing moves a a notion that does not pertain to it, we cannot fail to material thing. Four years later, Descartes sent Elisa- make a mistake.’27 Elisabeth, according to Descartes, beth a work by his friend, the Dutch physician Cornelis goes wrong in thinking of soul–body interaction in van Hogelande (1590-1662). In reply, Elisabeth says terms of the second primitive notion, rather than the that she cannot support Hogelande’s analogy for the third. The prejudices of our senses often lead us to soul–body relationship either. While Descartes uses think of soul–body interaction along the same lines as the gravity analogy to explain the soul’s influence on body–body interaction because ‘the use of the senses the body (soul–body causation), Hogelande attempts to has rendered the notions of extension, figures, and account for the body acting on the soul (body–soul movements very much more familiar to us than the causation). He draws on a comparison of ‘gross others’.28 People get confused about the soul–body matter’ enveloping a more subtle kind of matter by relationship, according to Descartes, because they ‘fire or fermentation’, to explain the fact that the soul think of causal interaction on the mechanical model of is constrained to suffer along with the body. Elisabeth impact and resistance. says that this theory still does not solve the difficulty: Instead Descartes demonstrates how the soul might the ‘subtle matter’ is corporeal, and is therefore moved move the body, without extension or contact, through in the same way that any material thing is moved—by the illustrative analogy of gravity. When we think of the pressure of parts on parts.30 gravity, he says, we have no difficulty in conceiving The intuition behind Elisabeth’s rejection of these how it moves the body or is united to it—even though two analogies is the same: she adheres to the old there is no impact between extended surfaces. When scholastic concept of ‘causal likeness’, or the notion weight or heaviness moves a corporeal being—for that the cause must be essentially similar to the effect example, by pulling it to the ground—this action does (and vice versa).31 This notion, that ‘like causes like’ not involve touching. Gravity causes the body to move

26 Descartes to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643; in Blom (tr.), 30 Elisabeth to Descartes, May 1647; in Nye, The Descartes, 108; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 661. Princess and the Philosopher, 122; and Descartes, 27 Descartes to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643, in Blom (tr.), Oeuvres, 5: 48. Descartes, 108; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 665-66. 31 On the causal likeness principle, see Richard 28 Descartes to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643; in Blom (tr.), Watson, The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics Descartes, 108; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 666. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press Interna- 29 Mattern, ‘Descartes’s Correspondence with tional, 1987), especially 50-52; Lois Frankel, ‘The Elizabeth’, 215. While Descartes does not uphold this Value of Harmony’, in Causation in Early Modern conception of gravity, Mattern believes that Descartes’ Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism and Preesta- gravity analogy is useful because it enables him to blished Harmony, ed. Steven Nadler (University Park, maintain that the soul is both distinct from and united PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 197- with the body. 216; and Eileen O’Neill, ‘Mind--Body Interaction and Metaphysical Consistency: A Defence of Descartes’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1987), 227-45. 72

or that ‘like can only be caused by like’, has its origin Elisabeth’s point about the vapors is regarded as in the intuition that ‘something cannot come from crucial for understanding the development of her own nothing’.32 In challenging Descartes thus, Elisabeth independent position on the soul–body relationship.35 probably believes that Descartes holds this principle Two years later, the ‘vapors’ re-emerge in Elisabeth’s himself.33 For Elisabeth, the problem is that if the rejection of Descartes’ neo-Stoic advice about over- unextended mind bears no essential similarity to the coming depression. In the seventeenth century, the extended body (as Descartes claims), then it seems vapors were a medical condition where ‘exhalations’ impossible for there to be causal interaction between in the stomach or spleen were supposed to rise up into them. Descartes’ gravity analogy is unhelpful because the brain and produce a mental imbalance. More Elisabeth can conceive of the immaterial only as ‘the generally, the vapors are a ‘depression of spirits, hypo- negation of matter’, and therefore incapable of enga- chondria, hysteria, or other nervous disorder’ (OED). ging with the body. Likewise, the Hogelande analogy Those who are afflicted ‘struggle, cry out, make odd is unhelpful because the soul–body problem is about and inarticulate Sounds or Mutterings, they perceive a explaining how two utterly dissimilar entities can Swimming in their Heads, a Dimness come over their interact, not two like substances. Eyes, they turn Pale, are scarce able to stand, their Pulse is weak, they shut their Eyes, cry, shriek out, Hence Elisabeth goes from questioning soul–body groan, foam at the mouth, and remain senseless for interaction, to challenging Descartes’ dualism: some time’.36 In the First Meditation, Descartes speaks I admit it would be easier for me to concede matter of madmen whose brains ‘are so damaged by the and extension to the soul, than the capacity of persistent vapors of melancholia that they firmly moving a body, and being moved, to an immaterial maintain that they are kings when they are paupers’.37 being. If the soul’s moving the body occurred The vapors are also a typically female ailment. In through ‘information’, the spirits that perform the the literature of the time, they are known as ‘Fits of the movement would have to be intelligent, which you Mother’, or ‘Hysterick fits’.38 The condition was once accord to nothing corporeal. And although in your connected with the phenomenon of the ‘wandering metaphysical meditations you show the possibility womb’ (ibid, 34), a theory that derives from the ancient of the second, it is, however, very difficult to com- Platonic view that the uterus has the power of self- prehend that a soul, as you have described it, after movement. This ‘wandering’ was meant to explain having had the faculty and habit of reasoning well, why women were prone to be hysterical (the word can lose all of it on account of some vapors, and ‘hysteria’ has its origin in the Greek word for uterus).39 that, although it can subsist without the body and Although the theory was in decline in the seventeenth has nothing in common with it, is yet so ruled by century,40 and men were also thought to suffer from the it.34 vapors, stereotypical associations between women and the vapors persisted. Margaret Cavendish, in her

32 Watson, Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics, 37 Descartes, Meditations, in Philosophical Writings, 50-51. 2: 13. 33 A few modern commentators maintain that 38 Anonymous, Account of the causes, 33. Descartes does in fact hold the causal likeness principle. 39 On this topic and the ancient Aristotelian--Galenic But recently this view has been challenged by O’Neill, theory of women’s temperament, see Londa Schie- ‘Mind--Body Interaction’. binger, The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of 34 Elisabeth to Descartes, 10/20 June 1643; in Blom Modern Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University (tr.), Descartes, 112; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 685. Press, 1989), 160-88; and Merry E. Wiesner, Women 35 Shapiro ‘Princess Elizabeth and Descartes’, 505. and Gender in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cam- 36 Anonymous, An Account of the causes of some bridge University Press, 1993), 26-27.. particular rebellious distempers: viz. the scurvey, 40 See John P. Wright, ‘Hysteria and Mechanical cancers in women’s breasts, &c. vapours, and Man’, Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1980), 233- melancholy, &c. weaknesses in women, &c. . . . by an 47. eminent practitioner in physick, surgery and chymistry (London: 1670), 34. 73

Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), writes that to find a way of respecting the autonomy of thought ‘those Diseases that are named the Fits of the Muther, without denying that this faculty of reason is in some the Spleen, the Scurvy’ are common ‘especially essential way dependent on our bodily condition’.45 amongst the Females’.41 Then in 1728, in an ironic Shapiro inter-prets Elisabeth as saying that ‘in order to verse on sexual temperament, Edward Young writes be auto-nomous . . . the mind depends upon the good that ‘Sometimes, thro’ pride, the Sexes change their health of the body’ (Ibid, 516). airs, My lord has vapors, and my lady swears.’42 It is not obvious, however, that this ‘dependence’ In her 10/20 June 1643 letter, Elisabeth points out that Elisabeth identifies between the intellect and body that the vapors prevent the soul from engaging in is incompatible with, or ‘an alternative to’, Descartes’ purely intellectual thought. She highlights the fact that own conception of the soul–body relationship. Here when the soul and body intermingle, this is not just a we must distinguish between different senses of the dis-interested exercise on the part of the soul: the soul word ‘dependence’.46 On the one hand, there might be can be so affected by the body that the soul radically a metaphysical dependence between the soul and body, changes its character—it can become incapable of such that the existence of the pure intellect absolutely pure intellection. This phenomenon is seemingly diffi- requires the existence of the body; and the soul could cult to square with Descartes’ real distinction between not exist unless the body does.47 On the other hand, the unextended soul and the extended body. Why is there might be a causal dependence, where in order to the soul so enslaved by the body, when it could subsist have clear and distinct ideas, the soul depends upon the separately and ‘has nothing in common with it’? proper functioning of the body. But in the second case, my clear and distinct ideas do not depend for their Here, at first glance, Elisabeth appears to challenge existence on something distinct from me; I could still what Margaret Wilson calls Descartes’ ‘robust’ form have them even if I had no body at all. Elisabeth, I of dualism, according to which there are no corporeal believe, points to a causal dependence between the correlates of the operations of the pure intellect.43 For soul and body, rather than a metaphysical one. In that the robust dualist, the understanding can operate inde- case, her remarks are entirely consistent with Des- pendently of the brain, and the brain ‘cannot in cartes’ own view in the Meditations that the soul is anyway be employed in pure understanding, but only susceptible to the causal influence of the body. ‘If this in imagining or perceiving by the senses’.44 were not so,’ he says, ‘I, who am nothing but a thinking Presumably, if this type of dualism is plausible, then thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but we ought to be able to detach ourselves from the would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just senses and the imagination, even when we are as a sailor perceives by sight if anything is broken in hysterical or deluded; yet we cannot. Hence some his ship.’48 But the soul’s being susceptible to bodily scholars interpret Elisa-beth as tentatively suggesting distempers is very different to being ‘in some essential that the intellect is contingent, or somehow depends way dependent on the body’. upon, the body. Lisa Shapiro notes that, throughout her letters, Elisabeth ‘defends neither a reductionist In keeping with this interpretation, Descartes materialism nor a sub-stance dualism, but rather wants regards Elisabeth’s comments as perfectly compatible

41 Margaret Cavendish, Grounds of Natural 44 Descartes, ‘Fifth Set of Replies’, in Philosophical Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: With an Writings, 2: 248. Appendix containing Five Parts, with an introduction by 45 Shapiro, ‘Princess Elizabeth and Descartes’, 505; Colette V. Michael, facsimile reprint of 1668 edition my italics. (West Cornwall, CT: Locust Hill Press, 1996), 151. 46 I am indebted to Rae Langton for raising this point 42 Edward Young, ‘Satire III’ in Love of Fame, The about ‘dependence’. Universal Passion. In Seven Characteristical Satires, 47 On the distinction between metaphysical and 3rd ed. (London: J. Jonson, 1730), 51. causal dependence, see John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: 43 On Descartes’ ‘robust dualism’, see Margaret A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, Dauler Wilson, Descartes (New York: Routledge, 1998), 42. 1993), 181. 48 Descartes, Meditations, in Philosophical Writings, 2: 56. 74

with the soul–body distinction. In his reply to Elisa- it will be able to belong to some other function of the beth, dated 28 June 1643, he suggests that Elisabeth soul.’52 She accepts that the soul could exist without go ahead and attribute matter and extension to the the body. But for her, that does not imply that soul, ‘for that is nothing but to conceive it united to extension is contrary to, or incompatible with, thought; the body’.49 When affected by the vapors, the soul is it is possible that extension is a property of the soul. incapable of pure intellection. But this does not show In this respect, Elisabeth anticipates the views of that the soul is incapable of attaining pure under- the English Platonist, Henry More. Elisabeth later standing full stop; only that when the soul is so developed an interest in More’s writings through her affected by the body, it is difficult to have access to associate, Francis Mercury van Helmont, son of the the intellect. chemist and physician Jan Baptiste.53 Sometime Nevertheless, Elisabeth does diverge from Des- between 1644 and 1648, van Helmont the younger cartes in expanding on her suggestion that ‘it is easier’ entered the circle surrounding the Palatine family, and to ascribe extension and materiality to the soul. In her became particularly close to Elisabeth and Sophie. He third letter, dated 1 July 1643, Elisabeth points out that was instrumental in helping Elisabeth to become the we can doubt the ‘inextension’ of the soul according abbess at Herford, and went to England in 1670 on her to Descartes’ own rule about truth and falsity in the behalf, to petition the English government for a Fourth Meditation: ‘namely that all our errors occur promised pension. During this visit, van Helmont from forming judgments about what we do not brought commendations to Henry More from Elisa- sufficiently perceive’.50 Descartes believes that errors beth.54 Earlier, in a letter to Descartes, More writes that arise when my intellect has a confused rather than ‘the first moment I read your works, I at once decided clear and distinct idea about something, and my will in my own mind that your illustrious disciple, the jumps to a hasty conclusion about it. But if ‘I simply Princess Elizabeth, must—in order to have entered so refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do perfectly into the comprehension of your philosophy— not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and dis- be infinitely wiser than all the sages and philosophers tinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly of Europe put together’.55 In 1671, More’s friend Anne and avoiding error.’51 Elisabeth points out that by the Conway sent Elisabeth a copy of his most anti- light of this theory, and the difficulty in explaining Cartesian work, Enchiridion Metaphysicum (1671).56 how two utterly distinct entities can interact, In his correspondence with Descartes (from 1648 to Descartes ought to have refrained from affirming that 1649), More—like Elisabeth—suggests that exten- the soul is unextended. He should have allowed that sion is a property of both material and spiritual there might be certain ‘unknown properties’ in the substances. The notion of extended spirits, according soul. Elisabeth says that ‘Although extension is not to More, provides a better explanation of how God acts necessary to thought, yet not being contradictory to it,

49 Descartes to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; in Blom (tr.), and Richard Dunn (Philadelphia: University of Descartes, 115; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 694. Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 1: 323. Elisabeth shared a 50 Elisabeth to Descartes, 1 July 1643; in Blom (tr.), correspondence with More’s close friend, Anne Conway Descartes, 117; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 2. in the 1670s. Their exchange was probably initiated (or 51 Descartes, Meditations, in Philosophical Writings, mediated) by van Helmont, who was physician to both 2: 41. Conway and Elisabeth. Elisabeth discusses Conway’s 52 Elisabeth to Descartes, 1 July 1643; in Blom (tr.), conversion to Quakerism with her English corres- Descartes, 117; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 2. pondent, Robert Barclay. 53 For details on Francis Mercury van Helmont, one 55 Quoted in Marie Blaze de Bury, Memoirs of the of the most widely travelled and best-known characters Princess Palatine, Princess of Bohemia (London: of the seventeenth century, see Allison P. Coudert, The Richard Bentley, 1853), 202. Impact of the Kabbalah in the Seventeenth Century: The 56 Marjorie Hope Nicolson, The Conway Letters: The Life and Thought of Francis Mercury van Helmont Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry (1614-1698) (Leiden: Brill, 1999). More and Their Friends,1642-1684, revised with an 54 Henry More to William Penn, 22 May 1675; in introduction and new material, ed. Sarah Hutton William Penn, The Papers of William Penn, ed. Mary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 337. 75

on the created world, and of how souls influence the soul–body hybrid, presumably it is capable of bodies (and vice versa). This notion also has greater overcoming the passions and attaining a purely religious merit than the concept of unextended souls; intellectual state. to affirm that souls and spirits are nowhere is Most of Elisabeth’s suggestions, then, are consis- dangerously close to atheism. In the Immortality of the tent with the basic tenets of Cartesian dualism, Soul (1659), More claims that ‘it is plain that if a thing especially the notion that the soul is capable of existing be at all it must be extended’ because ‘to take away all in separation from the body. But for Elisabeth, to Extension is to reduce a thing onely to a Mathematical explain how the two substances interact, we cannot point, which is nothing else but pure Negation or Non- rule out the possibility that the soul has certain entity’.57 For More, the distinction between spirit and affinities with the body, such as extension. According matter is that spirit is essentially active, indivisible (or to her, this view is more plausible, because if the soul ‘indiscerpible’) and penetrable, whereas matter is is an essentially unextended, thinking thing, then soul– passive, divisible and impenetrable.58 Despite body interaction is unintelligible; but it is absurd to rejecting the Cartesian viewpoint, More is still very suggest that the soul and body do not interact. In this much a dualist. sense, at least, Shapiro is right to regard Elisabeth as Likewise, despite her claim that the soul is offering a distinctive alternative to Cartesian dualism. extended, it is not obvious that Elisabeth advocates a This alternative, moreover (or something approaching completely non-dualist philosophy, in which the soul it), is one that later women philosophers in England, is dependent on the body for its existence. Her later such as Cavendish and Conway, would regard as a first objections to the philosophy of another Englishman, step toward a monistic theory of substance. Kenelm Digby (1603–65), confirm this picture. In 1645, Elisabeth read Digby’s book on the immortality III of the soul: Two Treatises: in the one of which, the Descartes’ response to Elisabeth’s suggestion about nature of bodies, in the other, the nature of mans soule extended souls is now lost. The subject of soul–body is looked into, in way of discovery of the immortality relations is not raised in their letters again until two of reasonable souls (1644).59 In a letter to Descartes years later, in the context of a discussion on Elisa- on 28 October 1645, Elisabeth challenges Digby’s beth’s depression and Seneca’s De Vita Beata (‘The claim that the soul is ‘tormented’ by passions after the Happy Life’). One of Elisabeth’s early objections to body’s death. She believes that the soul will be much Cartesian dualism hinges on the striking and dis- happier following its separation from the body, given turbing effects that bodily distempers have on clear that the body is the cause of all human suffering. thought in the soul. The feminine significance of ‘the Digby, on the other hand, believes that the passions vapors’ is confirmed in a 24 May 1645 letter from ‘leave some traces in the soul’, even after the soul and Elisabeth to Descartes. body are separated. In purgatory, the soul is tortured by vestiges of repressed passions, and frustrated by its In this letter, Elisabeth confesses that she herself inability to satisfy them. These views, according to suffers from the vagaries of her sexual temperament. Elisabeth, are inconsistent with the soul’s ‘Know then,’ she says, ‘that I have a body filled with immateriality. If the immortal soul is a purely a great many of the weaknesses of my sex; it very incorporeal substance, completely disconnected from easily feels the afflictions of the soul and does not have the body, then the body cannot continue to exert its confusing influence. Once the self is no longer part of

57 Henry More, The Immortality of the Soul; So farre particles that have indeed real extension but so little, that forth as it is demonstrable from the Knowledge of they cannot have less and be anything at all, and Nature and the Light of Reason, facsimile reprint of therefore cannot actually be divided’ (Ibid., ‘The 1659 edition (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997), ‘The Preface’, sig. a4v) Preface’, sig. a5v. 59 As befitting the granddaughter of James I of 58 To complicate matters further, More holds that England, Elisabeth was proficient in both written and matter is made up of parts ‘indiscerpible’, or ‘of spoken English. 76

the force to bring itself into harmony with the soul.’60 of De l’Égalité des Deux Sexes (1673). Poulain de la The natural condition of her female body, and a Barre recommends to women that ‘there is nothing general lack of exercise, according to Elisabeth, mean more proper to depress the Vapours’ than the learning that ‘it is not necessary for sadness to oppress the heart of true knowledge.64 He points out that ‘what for a long time before the spleen becomes obstructed temperament soever Women have, they are no less and infects the rest of the body by its vapors’ (ibid.). capable than we, of truth and studies’;65 they are capable of overcoming their bodily distempers and In his response, dated May/June 1645, Descartes attaining knowledge.66 Descartes accords with this suggests a remedy for Elisabeth’s malady: diverting viewpoint; but Elisabeth, surprisingly, has difficulty in one’s imagination and senses from subjects of accepting it. displeasure, and using the understanding alone (more accurately, the intellect and the will) to focus on According to Elisabeth, there is something obsti- subjects of contentment and joy. In the seventeenth nate about the body that makes it impervious to the century, the imagination was believed to play a vital influence of the soul, and vice versa. In reply to causal role in cases of hysteria.61 In keeping with this, Descartes (22 June 1645), Elisabeth says that ‘I find Descartes tells Elisabeth that the imagination and the difficulty in separating from my senses and senses tend to make us melancholy; they occupy the imagination the topics continually represented there by mind with objects of sadness and pity; they ‘accustom the conversation and the letters I could not avoid [the] heart to contract and send out sighs; and in a without sinning against my obligations.’67 She says consequence of this, the circulation of the blood being that ‘there is something that overtakes one in the retarded and slowed, and the largest parts of the blood passions’, such that one is incapable of thinking clearly attaching themselves to one another, they would till the passions have subsided.68 Instead, the easily obstruct [the] spleen’.62 Descartes ignores friendship expressed in his letters is a far better Elisabeth’s claim that her body ‘does not have the ‘antidote to melancholy’.69 force to bring itself into harmony with the soul’. He The same themes are elaborated in Descartes and prescribes detachment from the senses and the Elisabeth’s letters on Seneca’s De Vita Beata. imagination, in favor of the pure understanding. Descartes recommends this work int he hope that it Descartes’ advice on this topic is in direct contrast will provide Elisabeth with a further means of attaining to that of Malebranche, who says that the ‘delicacy of happiness. But he is disappointed with Seneca’s lack the brain fibers’ make women best suited to of philosophical rigor, and decides to modify the Stoic understanding the senses rather than seeking truth.63 viewpoint with his own precepts.70 In his Malebranche believes that women are incapable of ‘modernizing’ of Seneca (4 August 1645), Descartes overcoming their sexual temperament, and pursuing suggests that beatitude or ‘the happy life’ can be clear and distinct ideas. Descartes’ attitude is more attained by (i) using the intellect to determine what it faithfully represented in the feminist views of is best to do; (ii) overcoming the passions by regulating François Poulain de la Barre (1647-1723), the author the will according to reason; and (iii) ridding oneself

60 Elisabeth to Descartes, 24 May 1645; in Blom (tr.), suited to the search for truth because ‘the softness of Descartes, 121; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 208. their constitution . . . is much more suitable to the actions 61 Wright, ‘Hysteria and Mechanical Man’, 244. of the mind than the dryness and hardness of ours’ 62 Descartes to Elisabeth, May/June 1645; in Blom (quoted in Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex?, 167). (tr.), Descartes, 124; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 219. 67 Elisabeth to Descartes, 22 June 1645; in Blom (tr.), 63 Malebranche, The Search After Truth, 130-31. Descartes, 127; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 233. 64 François Poulain de la Barre, The Woman as Good 68 Elisabeth to Descartes, 22 June 1645; in Blom (tr.), as the Man; Or, the Equality of Both Sexes, edited with Descartes, 127; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 234. an introduction by Gerald M. MacLean (Detroit: Wayne 69 Ibid. State University Press, 1988), 117. 70 For a recent analysis of Descartes’ account of the 65 Ibid., 137. passions, see Susan James, Passion and Action: The 66 In a twist on this theme, in 1660 the courtier Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Samuel Sorbière tells Elisabeth that women are well Clarendon Press, 1997). 77

of insatiable desires and pointless regrets. For trial and experience, not just by exercising one’s Descartes, the happy life is ideally one of detachment reason.74 In moral dilemmas in everyday life, prompt from those functions of the soul associated with the decisions must be made based on relationships soul–body composite, rather than the soul alone. He between yourself and others; this, in turn, requires an admits that there are pleasures that depend upon the honest perspective on your self as an embodied, social body, but true and lasting content-ment comes from creature—a substantial union of both soul and body. the mind alone. While disassociation from the senses and the imagination is necessary for attaining clear and certain In response (16 August 1645), Elisabeth doubts knowledge, it is just not practical in our lives with that Descartes’ precepts are a practical means for others. attaining the happy life. This is because ‘there are maladies that completely deprive one of the power of Elisabeth’s views on the happy life are, moreover, reasoning, and consequently of enjoying a reasonable consistent with Descartes’ threefold theory of the satisfaction; others diminish the force of reasoning ‘primitive notions’. Two years earlier, Descartes tells and prevent one from following those maxims that Elisabeth that the way in which we understand the good sense would institute’.71 Here, as in her earlier soul–body union is very different to the way in which letters on soul–body interaction, Elisabeth’s point is we understand things that involve the soul and the that bodily indispositions can ‘render the most moder- body taken in isolation. He says that one learns to ate man subject to allowing himself to be carried away conceive of the soul–body union, not through the by his passions’.72 The will alone cannot help such a intellect, but ‘by availing oneself only of life and man achieve happiness: attaining the blessed life also ordinary conversations, and by abstaining from depends upon the body and its fortunes. In the context meditating and studying things that exercise the of a discussion on the soul–body relationship, imagination’.75 In his neo-Stoic advice on how to live Elisabeth’s point about the vapors does not constitute in accordance with one’s human nature, Descartes a formidable objection to Descartes’ philosophy. But ought to have advised Elisabeth, as he did before, to in the context of a discussion on moral theory, or ‘how look to common sense. we should live’, she offers a much stronger criticism. Queen Christina of Sweden (1626-89) also For Elisabeth, the body cannot be ignored when criticizes the neo-Stoic viewpoint in her Maxims (c. discussing the conduct of human beings. To live 1670-80). Christina was first introduced to Descartes amongst others, she suggests (30 September 1645), as someone with ‘a disposition marvellously detached we must follow the dictates of the society in which we from servitude toward popular opinions’.76 Elisabeth live, unreasonable though they might be.73 She also says of Christina that she is pleased to have an idea that says (28 October 1645) that avoiding repentance for ‘acquits our sex of the imputation of imbecility and our faults, and suppressing the emotions, are not weakness pressed on it by Messieurs the pedants’.77 viable methods for achieving a balance between our Most famous for her association with Descartes (he own interests and those of others. Instead, it is much moved to Sweden in 1650 at her invitation, and died wiser to learn from our faults, and to be aware of our there soon afterwards), Christina was never in fact a emotions, so that we can improve the moral character Cartesian.78 In her youth, Christina was trained in the accordingly. This ‘moral balancing’, as Nye calls it, is Stoic writings of Tacitus, Epictetus, and Seneca; and an ongoing project throughout life, developed through in her later years, she seems to have held a Stoic

71 Elisabeth to Descartes, 16 August 1645; in Blom 75 Descartes to Elisabeth, 28 June 1643; in Blom (tr.), (tr.), Descartes, 135; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 269. Descartes, 113-14; and Descartes, Oeuvres, 3: 692. 72 Ibid. 76 Chanut to Descartes, 1 December 1646; in Blom 73 For this exegesis on Elisabeth’s ‘ethics of polity’, (tr.), Descartes, 200; Descartes, Oeuvres, 4: 582. I am indebted to Nye, ‘Polity and Prudence’, 81-87. 77 Elisabeth to Descartes, 4 December 1649; in Nye, Elisabeth’s moral views are also explored in Princess and the Philosopher, 167; Descartes, Oeuvres, Wartenberg, ‘Descartes’s Mood’; and Johnstone, ‘The 5: 451-52. Bodily Nature of the Self’. 78 See O’Neill, ‘Women Cartesians’, 235-36. 74 Nye, ‘Polity and Prudence’, 84. 78

conception of the soul and body. In 1647, Christina individuals, but on relations between individuals, corresponded with Descartes (via Hector-Pierre governed by care and concern. In constructing a moral Chanut) on the subject of the passions and the outlook that emphasizes human embodiment, sovereign good. But like Elisabeth, she regards the Elisabeth’s ideas both reflect and anticipate such neo-Stoic moral approach as inapplicable in everyday modern-day theories. life. One of Christina’s maxims is that ‘The passions Princess Elisabeth is remembered as one of are the salt of life; which without them would be Descartes’ favorite students, and as someone whose insipid. That undisturbable tranquillity, so much criticisms prompted him to give serious and boasted by philosophers, is dull and insipid; it is a fine considered responses. She is a faithful disciple to chimera.’79 With the same realism, she says ‘Passions Descartes to the extent that she embraces his are only triumphed over when they are weak.’80 egalitarian concept of reason, and extols the virtues of Descartes’ neo-Stoicism seems to be particularly a natural logic, free from the shackles of a scholastic unpalatable for women thinkers. On the one hand, education. She also embraces his criterion of truth and Descartes’ rational philosophy is extremely liberating certainty, and is a dualist to the extent that she affirms for women. If we can all reason clearly by training that the soul and body are distinct. But in other ourselves to overcome the confusing influence of the respects, her reputation as a critic of Descartes is well body, then women can also participate in the search deserved. First, Elisabeth maintains that interaction for truth; if they learn to follow their reason, they can between extended and nonextended substances is also endeavor to attain the blessed life. But, at the inconceivable, and, as a solution to this problem, she same time, prevalent social attitudes about ‘the weak- suggests that extension is an attribute of the soul. ness of the female sex’, and the natural temperament Second, in her discussion of Descartes’ moral theory of the female body, impose certain limitations on the in their letters, she emphasizes the impracticality of philosophical enterprise for women. These attitudes recommending that the soul must strive to be detached are reflected in Elisabeth’s remarks about the clouding from the body. Many of Elisabeth’s objections are, and distorting effects that the body has on clear moreover, developed from a woman’s point of view. thought. A plausible and practical philosophy, she The vapors, a stereotypical female complaint, figure in suggests, whether it be a method of thought or a way one of her earliest objections to Cartesian dualism, and of attaining happiness, must take into account the also provide the basis for her later rejection of soul–body union, or human embodiment, and not just Descartes’ neo-Stoic advice. Today’s feminist theo- the soul taken separately. rists share Elisabeth’s concerns about the soul–body dichotomy, and the practicality of a moral outlook Recent feminist theorists, most notably Carol based on impartiality and detachment. I now show that Gilligan, also stress the usefulness of a ‘different’ Elisabeth’s English female contemporaries also raise moral outlook, one that is based primarily on these concerns in their critiques of dualism. relationships with others, rather than an impartial and detached viewpoint. Gilligan’s empirical research suggests that this moral orientation is distinctive of women’s reasoning in moral situations.81 They take a contextualist approach that recognizes the needs of others, and the individual’s responsibility to meet those needs. Their focus is not on isolated

79 Christina, Queen of Sweden, The Works of E. J. Brill); and Susanna Åkerman, ‘Kristina Wasa, Christina Queen of Sweden. Containing Maxims and Queen of Sweden’, in A History of Women Philo- Sentences, In Twelve Centuries; and Reflections on the sophers, ed. Mary Ellen Waithe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Life and Actions of Alexander the Great (London: Academic, 1991), 3: 21-40. Wilson and Durham, 1753), 35. On Christina’s 80 Christina, The Works of Christina, 39. philosophy, see Susanna Åkerman, ˚ Queen Christina of 81 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psycho- Sweden and Her Circle: The Transformation of a logical Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, Seventeenth-Century Philosophical Libertine (Leiden: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 79