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primarily through a public health lens and lens health apublic through primarily viewed been has crisis To emerging the date, chains. value on measures of mitigation impacts of the some identify already can we Thus, in countries. COVID-19reported of cases were confirmed first the before often 2020, March as early as taken were measures mitigation and most act to quick was Africa West businesses. and nonessential markets schools, closed and movement internal limited localities, down locked curfews, imposed borders, closed flights, international have suspended they COVID-19. country, the on Depending of spread the slow to measures restrictions and movement distancing of social mix a have enacted countries Africa, In West Introduction the loss of work could negatively affect the the affect negatively could of work loss the Africa, InWest impacts. security and food economic spillover emerging the on attention focusing policymakers are gradually only West in rights for labour and respect violence of gender free conditions working good livelihoods, secure to in regard and responsibilities leverage both bear companies and consumers and Dutch European chains, value African West in various involved of being virtue By interests. and geopolitical security economic, Dutch and European both threatens Africa in West Instability region. in the security food endangers also chain value food in the Disruptions downturn. economic of the brunt the take to likely and are risk at especially are and female workers migrant Informal, violence. and gender labour child and increasing rights labour and conditions working decent lowering risks It livelihoods. and threaten region in the chains value key impact already movement internal and limited closure market curfew, closure, of COVID-19. border spread But the stem to measures and mitigation prevention strong take to quick were Africa in West Countries Africa. Value Chains COVID-19 Impact on West African 2020 JUNE 1 chain, value COVID-19 agricultural the on of impact negative of the signs are There measures. and mitigation prevention to due working from restricted ill not may be are who and those work, to unable ill be will are who clear. Those immediately is livelihoods, COVID-19 extension and by chains, value on of impact The rare. very is an income and maintain home from work to ability The COVID-19. to vulnerable more generally are and workers informal exchanges, to-face face- on reliant heavily nature by is economy average) on percent (80 sector informal in the are region in the jobs most that given rapidly, and livelihoods economy Worldbank, 2012. Worldbank, informelles de l’Afrique de l’ouest francophone Benjamin, N., Aly Mbaye, A. “ A. Mbaye, Aly N., Benjamin, Les entreprises entreprises Les 1 . The informal informal . The ”. ”.

Loïc Bisson & Thea Hambleton CRU Policy Brief CRU Policy Brief

including difficulties in moving food from and the slowdown of economic activities rural to urban areas, closed markets, rising should not be overlooked. As such, the food prices, loss of livelihoods and increased best lens through which to measure the reliance on social safety nets.2 Because impact of COVID-19 in West Africa is by agriculture represents almost half of all jobs sector, encompassing both urban and rural in West Africa, we here focus predominantly populations as part of broader value chains. on cereal, pastoral, cacao and cashew nuts In West Africa, 70 percent of the workforce value chains. Overall, countries in which are employed in three sectors: agriculture the food value chain was already fragile are (40 percent), wholesale and retail trade facing further deteriorations (supply chain (20 percent), and manufacturing (9 percent).4 disruptions and price increases) as a result These sectors have a high proportion of of COVID-19.3 In countries like Gambia, vulnerable populations such as women, , , , and Sierra unprotected workers, daily wage workers Leone, nonseasonal price increases of 10 to and migrant workers. Here, we take a look 20 percent have already been recorded in at the food value chain which constitutes the monthly variations for food products. In some majority of jobs in West Africa. countries, these problems add to ongoing problems of conflict and political instability. Markets5 In many countries, COVID-19 will challenge In terms of impact on operations, one structurally weak value chains. must identify physical markets as crucial bottlenecks (see conceptual paper) for Overall, the scope of the negative impact both agriculture and retail/trade, the two will depend on the duration of mitigation main sectors of employment in West Africa. measures, the resilience of value chains, In West Africa, markets are well integrated and the role of unions in protecting labour due to historical trade habits, advanced rights, promoting good working conditions political and economic integration and and engaging in social dialogue to adapt improved infrastructure. Despite ongoing mitigation measures to the reality on the conflicts in Northern , the Lake ground. At the moment of writing, some region and Liptako-Gourma, commodities countries are rolling back market closures normally move from rural production zones and curfews because of popular protests and to the often-urban consumption zones the economic toll, while others maintain them with no major challenges. But because of for now. The situation is very dynamic and COVID-19, most countries in West Africa should be closely monitored. have closed markets in line with prohibitions on assembly of persons. Although no country closed more than 50 percent of its markets, Current impact of COVID-19 closures were often localised and some regions closed from 60 up to 100 percent Sub-Saharan Africa is the fastest urbanizing of their markets (e.g. , , region in the world. Close physical contact Nigeria, Senegal, Chad). In Burkina Faso’s facilitates the rapid spread of COVID-19. capital, all 40 markets were closed in March, High population density greatly increases before the government eventually reopened the frequency of contact, and urban settings some end-of-April after violent clashes are generally more vulnerable than rural between police and traders.6 areas. But while the vulnerability of urban areas to the disease is critical in the short term, the medium- to long-term impact on rural areas due to mitigation measures 4 Benjamin, N., Aly Mbaye, A. “Les entreprises informelles de l’Afrique de l’ouest francophone”. Worldbank, 2012. ; 5 For more data on market closure, see Food Crisis 2 World Food Programme (WFP). “Update on the Prevention Network (RPCA). “Note d’information impact of Covid-19 on food and nutrition security in et de veille Impact de la crise du COVID-19 sur la West and Central Africa”, 17 April 2020. sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel et en 3 WFP. “West and central Africa - WFP Regional Afrique de l’Ouest”. April 2020. Bureau Dakar Markets Update during COVID-19 6 Africanews. “Burkinabe traders demonstrate to pandemic” April 2020. demand reopening of markets”. 24 April 2020.

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Table 1 COVID-19 measures in selected West African countries7

Lockdown Movement Social Governance & Public Health restrictions distancing Economy No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Curfew (lifted) International flight Limit public Economic measures Health screening in suspension, Border gatherings, (­financial support airports and border closure, Curfews Public service package to the crossings, introduction 901 cases (lifted) closure, School economy), Emer- of isolation and quar- 53 deaths closure gency administrative antine policies, general structures activated or hygiene and social established distancing recommen- dations, Mandatory mask wearing No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Partial International flight Limit public Economic measures Health screening in lockdown suspension, Border gatherings, (cash transfer, payment airports and border (phase out) closure, Curfews School closure of electricity and water crossings, General Niger (phase out) (phase out), bills for the poorest, recommendations, 914 cases Changes in VTA suspended for introduction of isola- 55 deaths prison-related all COVID-19 related tion and quarantine policies importation), State of ­policies, Strenghtening emergency declared the public health sys- tem, Mandatory mask wearing No Yes Yes Yes Yes

International flight Limit public State of emergency Health screening in suspension, Curfews, ­gatherings, declared, Economic airports and border Guinea Domestic travel Schools closure measures (support of crossings, Isolation 2863 cases restrictions education and scien- and quarantine policy, 18 deaths tific research, Financial Mandatory mask support for low-income wearing, Awareness households, Economic campaign and financial plan) No Yes Yes Yes Yes

International Limit public Emergency admin- Awareness campaign, flights suspension, ­gatherings, istrative structures Health screening in Senegal Domestic travel Schools closure ­activated, State of airports and border 2617 cases restrictions, Visa emergency declared, crossings, Strenghten- 30 deaths restrictions, Border Economic measures ing the public health closure, Checkpoints (­Program for economic system, Mandatory within the country, and social recline, mask wearing, Other Surveillance and Tax measures in sup- public health measures monitoring port of business) No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Surveillance Limit public Economic measures Health screenings in and Monitoring, ­gatherings, (Price controle on airports and border Benin Border closure, Schools closure ­protective masks, crossings, Isolation 130 cases Visa ­restrictions, (phase out) Launch of ­national and quarantine policy, 2 deaths ­Domestic ­travel manufacturing of Mandatory mask ­restrictions masks), Military wearing, General (phase out) ­deployment ­recommendations, Testing policy, Other public health measures

7 Based on data from Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU), 2020, COVID-19 Dashboard and ACAPS, 2020, COVID-19 - Government measures (latest data available on 20 May, 2020). Cases are confirmed cases only and the Covid-19 caseload is likely much higher than reported.

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In Guinea, 100 percent of livestock markets prevent seasonal workers from migrating were closed in April to respect mitigation home to farm. Internal movement restrictions, measures. In Nigeria and Chad, various areas lockdowns and curfews might also limit entirely closed livestock markets.8 In Senegal, access to land to cultivate. This comes at and Mauritania, weekly rural worst possible moment as in both the Sahel markets were closed while opening hours and coastal states, the peak in labour for were revised for urban markets. Only Mali agricultural work (weeding and harvesting) and Benin deviated somewhat from this starts now (respectively, mid-June and May). general observation, and although a curfew was imposed in Mali, markets remained COVID-19 mitigation measures could also open in both countries. But social distancing disrupt food distribution. In coastal states, measures disrupts normal operations, and the 2020 off-season harvests should be in Niger, Mali and , between 60 percent reaching markets and providing substantial and 80 percent of opened agricultural and incomes to farmers. However, market pastoral markets, respectively, were not closure, limited transport options and functioning properly. Containment measures restrictions on internal and cross-borders have boosted clandestine activities, such movement limit markets access (especially as the fraudulent transport of persons markets at borders). Important waste and and goods. This is currently observed in loss of revenue is already being reported. Senegal, where people use backdoor routes Consequently, farmers’ incomes are shrinking or clandestine transports to circumvent and purchasing power decreasing. The region restrictions on intercity travel.9 is also highly dependent on food imports like rice. Overall, West Africa must import 9.9 Staple cereals million metric tons of rice to meet domestic COVID-19 mitigation measures could disrupt demand – generally coming from Vietnam, agricultural production. With market closures China and India. Asia is heavily affected by and drop in transport supply to/from markets COVID-19 and slow maritime transport due to in many countries in the regions, farmers will health inspections in ports and cumbersome not have access to buy good quality seeds, sanitary procedures like the disinfection tools and agricultural inputs (e.g., pesticides, of vessels is already creating hiccup in the fertilizers). In the Sahel, the planting period supply chain.10 According to the World Food starts in May/June for the main agricultural Program’s corporate impact risk analysis season, and access to such products is key. exercises, West Africa is especially vulnerable Border closures and in-country movement to disruptions in the supply chain because restrictions could also disrupt seasonal of the reliance on food being imported into migration and agriculture production. various landlocked countries through a few In West Africa, most seasonal workers ports (Douala in , Lomé in Togo, alternate between farming in rural areas and Cotonou in Benin, Dakar in Senegal, Abidjan nonagricultural work in urban areas, often in Côte d’Ivoire).11 In general, West African across national borders. In the Sahel, peak countries have an average of 3 months labour demand for nonagricultural work has of stock reserve for staple cereals held at ended (March) and workers should migrate national levels, which may be insufficient if back to their land for the farming season current mitigation measures and additional (starting mid-June). Border closure could reactionary measures by exporting countries increase.

8 In Nigeria, six localities in the Kano states have reported between 95 and 100 percent of livestock markets have been closed, and between 60 and 10 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 100 percent of agricultural markets were closed Development ”COVID-19 and Africa: Socio-economic in three localities in the Gombe state. In Chad, implications and policy responses”. 7 May 2020. 29 regions entirely closed livestock markets, of 11 Trade for Development. “COVID-19 in Africa – which five closed more than 60 percent of their some reflections on trade matters”. 9 April 2020”. agricultural markets. 9 April 2020. ; WFP. “Economic and Market Impact 9 Le Point. “Covid-19 : l'Afrique de l'Ouest à l'assaut analysis of COVID-19 on West and Central Africa”. de l'économie informelle”. 8 May 2020. 30 March 2020.

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Livestock12 in certain areas is causing overgrazing and Pastoralism in the region heavily relies puts unprecedented pressure on the limited on transhumance, a system by which available resources (grazing areas, water). pastoralists and their livestock operate It also limits access to veterinary care and regular seasonal movements between leads to increased zoo-sanitary diseases. complementary ecological zones following CILSS reports the situation is especially a north-south axis. It generally takes place critical in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, during the dry season from January to May, Nigeria and Senegal.15 The pressure on and pastoralists should be heading back pastures has led to difficulties in feeding from the coastal states to the Sahel mid- animals, resulting in weight loss, slimming May.13 Transhumance is necessary to the of livestock and high animal mortality, survival of the livestock and pastoralists’ especially in areas where transhumant livelihoods. The Food and Agriculture animals are concentrated (e.g. the Mali- Organization estimates around two million Mauritanian border). In the absence of cattle are moved across borders each year. enough feed for their animals, pastoralists are forced to sell their livestock for very Prior to COVID-19, pastoralism was already low prices. For example, in Mali, the cost of under pressure by conflict in West Africa. fodder has risen from 140,000 FCFA per ton It is the main economic activity in two of the to 250,000 FCFA per ton since March 2020. world’s predominant clusters of conflict, the In Senegal and Burkina Faso, the Association Liptako-Gourma and the Lake Chad basin. for the Promotion of the Livestock in the Many grazing areas or livestock markets Sahel and the Savanna (APESS) observed are made inaccessible by conflict.14 Market fire sales of famished animals. The short- closure, border closure and movement term impact is an immediate loss of income restrictions made a bad situation worse, and for pastoralists.16 In the medium to long term, have put additional pressure on pastoralists APESS predicts the disappearance of the in the region, disrupting the entire pastoral reproductive nucleus and thus the depletion value chain. Current COVID-19 mitigation of herds. This would mean total loss of measures limit both internal and cross- employment for some pastoralists. border transhumant pastoralism. There has been a considerable drop in cross-border Market closure, especially near borders, flows of animals as well as the number of limits the possibility of pastoralists to sell animals in livestock markets. The Comité their animals. Where markets operate Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la during limited hours (because of curfews), Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS) reports pastoralists and buyers find it difficult to some transhumant pastoralists are stuck travel to markets either for fear of being in host countries (Togo, Benin) and cannot contaminated or because of the high travel back to the Sahel. cost/lack of transport due to restrictive measures. Indeed, movement restrictions Pastoralists are allowed to travel only short have resulted in increased travel costs and distances, but even internal movements are difficulties related to the transport of people limited and some can no longer exit their and animals, limiting movement between home regions. The concentration of livestock

15 Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought 12 For the latest data on the effects of COVID-19 on Control in the Sahel (CILSS). “Bulletin pastoralism see: Action contre la Faim. “Pastoral mensuel d’information sur le pastoralisme et la Monitoring – COVID-19”. 21 May 2020. transhumance au Sahel et en Afrique de l’Ouest- 13 The Food Crisis Prevention Network. “Pastoral N°07 avril-mai 2020”. May 2020; CILSS. “Du situation in the context of COVID-19”. Pastoralisme et de la Transhumance au Sahel et en 14 In Burkina Faso, for example, and particularly in the Afrique de l ’Ouest”. April 2020. Northern and Sahel regions, virtually all livestock 16 Association Pour la Promotion De L´Elevage au markets have ceased to function on a regular basis, Sahel et en Savane ”Note d’analyse des premiers especially in the Soum Province, once a major impacts de la pandémie du COVID 19 sur les livestock hub. Exploitations Familiales”. 21 April 2020.

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regions or countries.17 As a result, foreign Cacao traders and buyers are largely absent from In the case of cacao, Côte d’Ivoire and livestock markets. APESS has noted the produce more than 60 percent of suspension of exports of live cattle from the global supply of cocoa. As of April Chad to Nigeria, which constitutes a major 2020, cacao imports in Côte d’Ivoire were loss of income for Chadians. In the long down 1.7 percent from the same period last term, this could have grave consequences season, at around 1,645 thousand metric on the country’s economy, as livestock tons. Cacao production is already facing export taxes are one of the main sources of structural constraints that are expected to income.18 worsen with COVID-19, likely leading to a decline in exports. This comes at the worst COVID-19 is also having a negative impact moment as land preparation and planting on the production, transformation and require an intensive workforce from April to distribution of milk. Because of movement June. Current restrictions on public gathering restrictions and the increased costs of and internal movement may reduce farmers’ transport, family-run farms can deliver less participation in mutual aid activities, lead milk to local milk collection and processing to reduced planting surface and declining units; these units can collect, transform and production. Expected decreased demand deliver less milk to markets; and demand from America, Europe and to some extent has dropped with market closures as well China will also affect the commercialisation as the closure of dairy bars because of of cacao in June-July and December 2020 curfews. As a result, some transformation and significantly reduce the revenues of units have closed. Significant quantities of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Prices in April were milk are being lost because they cannot down to USD$2235 per metric ton, USD$425 be processed and/or brought to market. less than early March, and USD$90 less than This threatens the livelihoods of those the same period in 2019.19 involved in the milk value chain and has left many transformation units workers Cashew unemployed (Chad, Benin, Cameroon). West Africa (principally Côte d’Ivoire, Benin The milk value chain is dominated by and Guinea-Bissau) is the largest regional women and young people, especially the producer of cashew nuts in the world, and transformation of milk (as opposed to Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s single largest herding, dominated by men). exporter. It represents an important industry for countries like Benin and Guinea- Because both meat and milk are processed Bissau.20 Officially, more than 80 percent of domestically, and herders cannot deliver the population in Guinea-Bissau depends to processing facilities, butchers and directly on the cultivation of cashews for restaurants are also losing money down their subsistence. In Benin, cashew farmers the line. This knock-on effect is exemplified are facing multiple challenges trying to adapt with increased prices of meat in markets, to COVID-19. Cashew is the second-most with costs being passed on to the valuable export from Benin, with annual consumers. production reaching nearly 140,000 tons. Foreign buyers purchase 80 percent of the country’s raw cashew nuts, while the other 20 percent is processed locally.21 In the last few months, the government has closed

17 The Regional Security and Nutrition Working Group (West Africa). “Note de Plaidoyer sur les impacts immédiats de la crise du COVID-19 sur la 19 World Food Programme. “Update on the impact of sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les pays Covid-19 on food and nutrition security in West and d’Afrique de l’Ouestet du Sahel”. April 2020. Central Africa”, 17 April 2020. 18 Association Pour la Promotion De L’Elevage au 20 Africa Cashew Alliance. “CASHEWS - highlights of Sahel et en Savane ”Note d’analyse des premiers the cashew industry”. June 2011. impacts de la pandémie du COVID 19 sur les 21 Techno Serve. “COVID-19 and the Cashew Industry Exploitations Familiales”. 21 April 2020. in Benin“. 6 May 2020.

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borders and restricted movement, making it Vulnerable livelihoods difficult for smallholder cashew farmers to In urban settings, the most vulnerable continue to earn a living and support their populations to COVID-19 mitigation families. The travel and health requirements measures are the low income informal (see table 1) have put a major damper on workers. They are engaged in low-skill economic activity. Markets are closed, labour with no job security, depend on food sales are down, and people are not able markets to eat and live hand-to-mouth with to generate enough income to cover their little ability to store and save food or money. basic needs. Prior to COVID-19, local cashew They also have little access to diversified processors transformed only 20 percent of nutritious diets or health care and live in all raw cashew nuts grown in Benin. Foreign crowded, unsanitary conditions. Many of buyers, especially from Asia, purchased them may also have comorbidities such as the rest. The cashew-buying season was tuberculosis. launched in late March, and generally lasts till mid-June in West Africa. This disruption In rural settings, subsistence farmers comes at the worst time for farmers trying and pastoralists are the most vulnerable to sell their product. Travel restrictions are populations. They represent more than disrupting the commercialisation of cashew 80 percent of the rural population. Movement nuts because thousands of middleman restrictions largely affect the movement of collectors have no access to farms, and farmers and pastoralists living in localities foreign buyers cannot travel to Benin. As a close to large urban centres, who often come result, and despite the government setting to urban markets to sell part of their crops a farm-gate floor price of about $0.55/kg, and return to the village with manufactured prices have dropped as low as $0.17/kg due goods. The movement restrictions and to farmers being desperate to find buyers. the closure of rural markets thus affect This has had a negative impact on farmers, traditional mechanisms of destocking of who per average produce one or two tons of local agricultural products and livestock by cashews per year. For now, raw cashew nut farmers and pastoralists. Since the beginning prices seem to have rebounded, and farm- of the crisis, there has also been a rise in gate prices are holding at around $0.67/kg.22 police harassment, informal tax levies and bribes at borders and checkpoints that are passed on in prices to consumers. Effect on livelihoods and In countries that had a below-average labour rights agricultural season, rural households engaged in subsistence agriculture might become increasingly dependent on COVID-19 directly impacts on the Sustainable buying their food from markets – all while Development Goals (SDGs), notably SDG 8 some markets are closed. For example, (sustained, inclusive and sustainable Mauritania, Gambia, Senegal, Cabo Verde economic growth, full and productive and (and somewhat Niger and employment and decent work) as well as Côte d’Ivoire) had below-average cereal SDG 5 (gender equality and empowering production compared to the five-year women and girls). COVID-19 risks wiping out average. As stocks in these countries are progress made on a range of SDG targets, running low earlier than usual, they will rely and aggravates existing negative coping on food markets for food. They are already strategies (e.g., child marriages, sex work experiencing early rising prices of dry cereals and child labour to deal with poverty). as stocks decline. But even in countries like Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali that had been recording prices below the five-year average prior to the pandemic, trends are rising. It is important to note that this situation is further compounded by the usual increase in demand and speculation by traders during 22 Techno Serve. “COVID-19 and the Cashew Industry Ramadan (April-May 2020), and the lean in Benin”. 6 May 2020. season in coastal states which lasts from

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May to July. Predictions say these price rises due to COVID-19. These two West African may exceed 25% in June 2020. This means countries together produce about 60 percent high food prices and a reduction of the of the world’s cocoa and child labour has purchasing capacity of the most vulnerable been a longstanding problem in the sector, households. In addition, some traders are despite pledges from chocolate companies. taking advantage of this opportunity to raise Estimates say around 1.2 million child the price of imported rice. In Senegal, rice labourers are working in cocoa production price per 50 kg bag has increased from in Côte d’Ivoire, and 900,000 in Ghana.26 21,500 XOF to 25,000 XOF (more than 16%).23 Fairtrade Africa said it has received reports In West Africa, households already spend of possible cases in Côte d’Ivoire’s eastern 80 percent of their income on food. If farmers and western regions in recent weeks and go bankrupt, they could be forced to sell flagged them to the government.27 As the their land to large landholders, producing a pandemic continues, there will be increased major increase in inequality. economic pressures on farming families, and ongoing school closures mean children Furthermore, border closure and movement are more likely to accompany their parents restrictions in the region have not only to their farms and be exposed to hazardous impacted the flow of goods, but have also activities. Previous studies have shown hampered the ability of informal workers a 10 percent drop in farmers’ incomes is to engage in seasonal cross-border labour usually followed by a 5 percent increase migration.24 This affects both values chains in child labour.28 Child labour also tends to which are dependent on seasonal labour increase when children are on term breaks (predominantly cereal, livestock, cacao, from school, as teachers are often the first fishing and mining) and undermines the to spot and report it. Between school and livelihoods of workers and the families shelter closures, the absence of international dependent on their remittances. As a result investigators on the ground and the ongoing of COVID-19, many migrants are returning cocoa harvest season, the lack of control to their countries or villages of origin, and oversight makes children even more constituting additional burdens for families vulnerable than before. for which they were previously the main resource providers. The expected reduction Women and girls are also experiencing of remittances – both from interregional unique challenges. They are facing increased migrants and migrants working in Europe – is risk of gender-based violence because they therefore likely to weaken an already weak are staying at home with their partners economy, in which remittances usually more often and are isolated from their usual account for up to 10% of gross national support networks. Women and girls are often product, as well as put additional strain responsible for the majority of household on the livelihood of both urban and rural duties (e.g. cooking, collecting water, households.25 cleaning). These tasks have only become more difficult and dangerous as governments Impact on women and youth have issued strict restrictions on movement Women and youth will be especially and markets are closed. Widespread school impacted by COVID-19. In Côte d’Ivoire closures have also contributed to an increase and Ghana, child labour is likely increasing in women’s childcare responsibilities.

23 World Food Programme. “Update on the impact of Covid-19 on food and nutrition security in West and 26 Voice of America. “Cash Transfer Program Aims to Central Africa”, 17 April 2020. Combat Child Labor in Ghana”. 10 May 2020. 24 Italian Institute for International Political Studies. 27 Thomson Reuters Foundation. “West African “Covid-19 Is Paralyzing One of West Africa’s Main Countries on Alert for Child Labor Spike Due to Resources: Migrants”. 9 April 2020. Coronavirus”. 30 April 2020. 25 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. “The Double Punishment 28 International Cocoa Initiative. “The effects of of Migrant Workers in West Africa in Times of income changes on child labour - A review of COVID-19”. 14 May 2020. evidence from smallholder agriculture” April 2020.

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Labour rights they would lead most small- to medium- In West Africa, mitigation measures have led size businesses to cease all activities in the to a drastic decline in economic activities. absence of cash flow. Similar measures are This has led companies to reduce their in the pipeline in Côte d’Ivoire, where the workforces, and as a result, thousands of government announced four support funds employees have been placed on technical or would be set up to support workers whose partial unemployment. In Niger for example, contracts were terminated or suspended nearly 70% of people have been placed on as a result of COVID-19, especially in the technical unemployment. Sensitive sectors agricultural sector.31 In Nigeria, commercial such as education and transport have not banks are now banned from laying off staff. escaped the dramatic effects of COVID- This measure comes after Access Bank, the 19 on the economy. At the level of Niger’s country’s leading bank, launched a series of employers, it is claimed that overall, 50% of layoffs against the backdrop of the COVID-19 private sector employees have temporarily crisis. The bank had already begun to reduce stopped working. But employers did not salaries or enact layoffs in order to reduce its always take measures in line with the operating costs, and 70 percent of its 30,000 country’s labour code. In this regard, several employees could have been be affected. employees claim that they have not received The express approval of the Central Bank any compensation provided for by the of Nigeria is required in the event that it regulations in force.29 becomes absolutely necessary to lay off staff. According to analysts, this trend of layoffs Some protections measures have been put that the Central Bank of Nigeria has just in place or announced in West Africa, but interrupted was dangerous as it could have these are very few. The most comprehensive been quickly exported across the countries effort is from Senegal, where the president of the region (Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia.32 issued an ordinance to prohibit layoffs and guarantee income to workers laid off Such support measures only apply to formal during the COVID-19 pandemic (70 percent workers, however, and thus don’t help most of the wages of employees laid off during of the population. Without corresponding this period). The new decree prohibits the support measures for informal workers, this use of dismissal other than that motivated could lead to a further push towards the by gross misconduct (termination for informal economy, as companies become cause).30 The measure obliges employers to afraid to hire people on a formal contract, seek with staff representatives and unions thus worsening employment conditions. alternative solutions such as reducing As such, several countries have announced working hours, shift work, anticipating general support packages which are likely paid holidays, redeployment of staff and to benefit workers in the informal economy. part-time work. In the case of short-time For example, Burkina Faso announced a work, the pay cannot be lower than the 394 CFA emergency plan which includes guaranteed minimum 70 percent wage of the creation of a solidarity fund for informal the employee net salary of the last three traders of fruits and vegetables, as well as months of activity. To help companies the acquisition of agricultural output and comply with these measures, the state animal fodder to support pastoralists.33 announced tax reductions and exemptions for companies. While labour unions celebrated the measures, employers denounced them as out of touch, and said 31 Afrique Sud 7. “Covid-19: Chômage technique, licenciement, les bonnes nouvelles de Ouattara”. 22 May 2020. 32 La Afrique Tribune. “Covid-19 : les banques 29 Niamey et les 2 Jours “Explosion du chômage au interdites de tout licenciement au Nigeria”. Niger : Des milliers d’emplois perdus à cause du 5 May 2020. coronavirus” 19 May 2020. 33 Sidwaya. ”COVID 19: Le président du Faso annonce 30 Agence Afrique. “Le Sénégal interdit tout 394 milliards pour accompagner les populations licenciement sauf pour faute grave”. 13 April 2020. vulnérables et relancer l’économie” 2 April 2020.

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Similar support packages, including food Perspectives for post-COVID-19 distribution and conditional cash transfers, recovery have been introduced in Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria.34 However, there is widespread concern that the packages risk being Disruptions in value chains in West Africa distributed to government supporters or could lead to increased inequality and circles close to it, rather than reaching major financial vulnerability in the future. vulnerable pastoralists, traders and farmers. If farmers and pastoralists go broke and lose or sell their assets (herds or lands), this will Additionally, informal workers are also create longlasting and irremediable poverty exposed to being infected by the virus, for households, thus creating a much larger owing to squalid living conditions, group of dissatisfied people. As such, beyond inadequate workplace health and safety the health impact in mainly urban settings, protection.35 This poses a significant risk the effects of mitigation measures could for informal workers who generally lack ripple down to rural regions. access to adequate health services and sick pay. Domestic workers in particular, In a region prone to political violence face a higher level of exposure do the and home to two clusters of conflict contagion. In light of this, several countries – Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin – have introduced measures to avoid infection, the disruptions could lead to much more including obligatory wearing of face masks dramatic long-term security and rule and provision of handwashing facilities; of law trajectories. Governments with however, even with these measures, authoritarian proclivities are also exploiting significant risk remains, particularly for COVID-19 to settle political disputes. Data urban informal workers. shows an increase of COVID-19-related violence against civilians by state forces.37 The welfare of migrant workers – most Multiple governments (e.g., Guinea, Sierra often also informal workers – is extremely Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin) have worrying, as they are caught in the cross- used COVID-19 to alter the role of the fire of this current global health crisis. opposition and manipulate upcoming Thousands of vulnerable labour migrants elections. With multiple elections in 2020, have become stranded in their different this comes at a crucial time for political countries of work.36 Some are likely to fall stability and democracy. In Nigeria, more victim to hardship, exploitation and extortion people died from excessive policing than as they try to travel back to their homes from COVID-19 during the month of April. and families. For example, in early April, four traders died at a market after a brutal police crackdown. COVID-19-related incidents make up nearly 20% of all political violence and protests in Nigeria and have led to 32 reported fatalities. Police brutality is also rampant in Togo, Benin and Liberia, where video clips circulate on social media of security forces targeting civilians. In Sierra Leone, opposition protests have been banned under the pretext of a health response. As protests erupt 34 Africa Portal. ”COVID-19: A race against time to throughout the region against stringent avert disaster in West Africa”. 22 April 2020. mitigation measures, governments are 35 ILO, “COVID-19 crisis and the informal economy forced to do tradeoffs between economy, Immediate responses and policy challenges”. health and political stability. May 2020. 36 African Union. “Statement of the African Union (AU) Labour Migration Advisory Committee (LMAC) on the novel Coronavirus Disease COVID- 37 de Bruijne, K., Bisson, L. “States, not Jihadis, 19 and the condition of African Migrant Workers”. Exploiting Corona Crisis in West Africa”. 14 April 2020. Clingendael Spectator, 27 May 2020.

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Role for local unions38 and workers are identified as essential and qualify for exemption, providing them with In a democracy like Senegal, unions have the corresponding safety and security.40 been instrumental in government measures protecting workers from layoffs and salary But this will be meaningful only if suspension. It is important for unions to governments manage to make markets start social dialogue with employers and the Corona-proof, including informal markets. government on topics such as avoidance of Rapid emergency investments to keep layoffs and wages. So far, there has been domestic markets functioning can work, as no major sign that the state is using the they reduce the burden on social protection pandemic to push antiworker legislation budgets. These measures would enable in West Africa. Rather, the focus has been urban markets to continue operations to secure political gains. However, as the in compliance with COVID-19 health situation unfolds, unions should stay alert, measures.41 Their development would require especially since social protests have been working in strong coordination with the limited by social distancing measures. private sector involved in the supply chain, awareness raising of market operators on As described above, mitigation good practices and sanitary guidelines, measures have had dramatic unintended training in health safety and product handling consequences. Market closure especially market actors. Some markets such as those has put enormous pressure on already in Abidjan continue to function, following vulnerable traders, farmers and pastoralists. cooperation between health authorities, COVID-19 is not the only crisis, and probably food, market and commerce officials and not the biggest crisis, in West Africa. But poorly designed and unadapted mitigation measures will make a bad situation worse.39 As seen in Burkina Faso, market closure 40 They could develop appropriate identification has led to significant and violent protest, measures (e-passes, stickers) and agree to exemptions to certain movement measures (e.g., forcing the government to scale back on priority lanes, driving at night, access to retail the restrictive measures. Unions’ main role markets and normally restricted residential areas should be in identifying deficiencies and for direct sales, indications of persons allowed on shortcomings in top-down initiatives that food trucks, free movement of transport workers). are not adapted to the reality on the ground, 41 Lessons learned from other countries include and engaging in social dialogue with both marking trading floors to maintain physical spacing; government and employers to develop more extending trading times; organizing workers in attuned responses. Unions could contribute shifts to minimize risks; issuing e-passes to market to concrete actions by the government on traders, workers and transporters; controlling truck occupational safety and health, and draw deliveries and vehicle traffic; using drones and attention to the overall needs of workers. GPS-enabled delivery vans for real-time monitoring and traffic congestion; conducting temperature readings and health checks of all workers and The first priority for West African drivers; establishing strict protocol for ill workers; governments will be to keep food coming restricting access through one entrance with and essential workers moving. Traditional health controls or limiting the number of people urban retail food markets represent around at a given time; temporarily relocating to larger 80 to 90 percent of all food sales in West spaces; enforcing strict sanitary measures for Africa. One perspective for recovery is to market workers such as mandating compulsory ensure that agricultural products, services masks, hand washing and sanitisation stations and daily market disinfectant sprays; activating smaller markets on the outskirts of cities to avoid overcrowding of larger urban markets; allowing 38 For more examples on the role of unions in Sub- sales in front of homes; and supporting the Saharan Africa see: The International Trade Union development of e-commerce operations through Confederation. “African responses to the covid-19 one-stop online web sites. ; See more: Food and health crisis: the role of unions”. 17 April 2020. Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, 39 Bisson, L., Schmauder, A., Claes, J.”The politics African Union. “Measures for supporting domestic of COVID-19 in the Sahel”. Clingendael Institute, markets during the COVID-19 outbreak in Africa”. May 2020. 12 April 2020.

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having enacted some of these guidelines. Risks and responsibilities for Trade unions are here instrumental in the Netherlands working with their members and engaging in social dialogue to ensure compliance as well as design and implement additional West Africa is the EU’s largest trading partner measures tailored to local contexts. in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Netherlands is tied to the region through a number of COVID-19 also highlights the role of unions value chains. For example, the Netherlands is around nonwage matters. Indeed, they have the largest importer of cacao in the world.43 a role in working with both governments and The Netherlands benefits from free and open employers to deal with the health impact trade, political stability, respect for security of COVID-19 and mitigation measures. and the rule of law. Disruption in value chains They need to be involved in a responsible in West Africa threatens European economic, resumption of operations, where possible security and geopolitical interests. COVID-19 (e.g., set up special funds to provide face may worsen fault lines which Jihadi groups masks and hand sanitiser to those in need). have become accustomed to exploit in West Because of their status and operational Africa; reduced livelihoods could increase capabilities, unions can deliver credible migratory pressures and allow actors like information to employees on personal China, Russia and Turkey to further expand hygiene and the importance of sick leave. into the region. Disruptions in West Africa They can share valuable advice and best will also affect the resilience of wider value practice guidance on how to travel to and chains of which the Netherlands is a part, from work. Logistical cooperation with and have direct consequences on growth employers can even be achieved on that potential and ethical sourcing considerations. front. As such, concerns for secure livelihoods, good working conditions free of gender Considering most workers in West Africa are violence and respect for labour rights informal workers, unions will have to develop cannot be seen as issues separate from the an approach that includes the interests of Netherlands. This is all the more important nonunionized informal workers to avoid as global aid budgets will be reduced along further fragmentation and inequalities in the with gross domestic products. This highlights COVID-19 response. The pandemic is also an the importance of how the Netherlands opportunity for unions to ensure gender- and will manage its own economic footprint. youth-inclusive responses. In order to reach By virtue of being involved in the cocoa value informal workers, indirect measures such chain, the Netherlands bears both leverage as reducing water and electricity bills and and responsibilities in regard to child labour introducing subsidies on mobile calls and and labour rights being upheld. As such, internet access can be important in order Dutch companies could step up to create to reduce operating costs. Furthermore, the awareness and monitor any exploitation International Labour Organization highlights within the value chain caused by COVID-19 the importance of measures which identify measures. Civil society organisations will and reach out to informal enterprises to be key in underlining the importance for enable direct cash transfers. For informal companies to respect their engagements. enterprises, such payments, if combined Overall, the crisis highlights the importance with an “entry level” registration system of decent work and human rights in value and awareness-raising activities, could chains, as well as inclusive development. potentially facilitate a future transition to This crisis should not go to waste and be used formality. To prevent child labour and a as an opportunity to highlight the vulnerability gender “double burden” of sorts, reopening of informal and migrant workers and the schools as is being done in Benin is a very direct role Dutch consumers and companies practical first measure.42 can play in positive change.

42 Deutsche Welle. “Covid-19 : réouverture des écoles 43 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Dutch en Afrique, l’exception béninoise”. 11 May 2020. market potential for cocoa”. 30 January 2020.

12 About the Clingendael Institute Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world.

www.clingendael.org/cru  @clingendaelorg [email protected]  The Clingendael Institute +31 70 324 53 84  The Clingendael Institute  clingendael_institute  Newsletter

This policy brief was written at the request of and in consultation with CNV Internationaal.

About the authors

Loïc Bisson is a Junior Research Fellow at the Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael (CRU). His work focuses on organised crime, governance, political economy and peacebuilding in the Sahel region.

Thea Hambleton is an intern at the Conflict Research Unit of Clingendael (CRU).