RETUJRN TO R E S T R I C T E D REPORTS DESK WITHIN Report No.W.H. 82a ONE WEEK F:R 4-
.r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, Public Disclosure Authorized This report was prepared for use within the Bank. In making it available to others, the Bank assumes no responsibility to them for the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT Public Disclosure Authorized
RECENT ECONONIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA
February 25, 1959 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Department of Operations Western Hemisphere CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit - Peso (symbol m$n)
Par Value - None
Free Floating, Rate (around) - U.S. $1 - 70 Pesos TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
BASIC DATA i
SUMMARY AND CONCLIJSIONS ii
I. THE EMERGENCE OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS 1
II. THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT 3
A. Electric Power 3
B. Fuels 3
C. Stabilization Program
III. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROSPECTS 9
A. Immediate Prospects 9
B. Longer-run Prospects 10
IV. FOREIGN DEBT 13
Annex
Tables 1 to l:
Map BASIC DATA
AREA: 1,079,965 square miles
POPULATION: 20,255,600 (June 1958) Rate in last 4 years: 2F% yearly
GNP: (at constant In 1957 1950 prices) Pesos 70.7 billion Per capita: Pesos 3,558 (about U.S.$ 400)
BUDGET: (estimated billion pesos) 1958 1959
Expenditures 77.5 74.0 Income 53.5 67.0
Deficit 24.0 7.0
TRADE: (U.S.4 millior) 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Exports 1099.4 1027.0 928.6 943.8 975.o Imports 795.1 979.0 1172.4 1127.6 1310.0
/304.3 448.0 -243.8 -183.8 -335.0
Jan.-Sept. 1957 1958 Exports 738.2 720.9 Imports 967.8 917.9
-229.6 -217.9
INTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT: 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 (end of year) (billion pesos) 33.7 41.3 51.4 63.7 72.3
MONEY SUPPLY: (billion pesos) 37.7 43.8 51.6 60.2 67.6
COST OF LIVING: 1956 )957 Oct.1958 (1943 = 100) 773.8 965.1 1414.4
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT: Dec.31,1956 Oct.30,1958 (million U.S.$ equivalent) 686 1267 - ii -
SUNNARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. In the latter half of 1958 the economic situation of Argentina deteriorated rapidly. The Government, under the threat of a virtual exhaustion of exchange reserves, is now taking courageous steps to stop inflation and bring the balance of payments under control. The stabili- zation program is a comprehensive and logical set of anti-inflationary and exchange measures consisting in the reduction of the fiscal deficit, contraction of private credits, limitation of wage increases and the crea- tion of a new unified and more realistic exchange rate. The prospects for effective implementation of the program are supported by the Argen- tine stabilization credits (the "Package Deal"t) made available by IIF and other institutions. They amount to a total of U.S.$ 345 million of which U.S.$ 188 million will be available in 1959.
2. These fiscal, monetary and exchange measures were accompanied by important decisions taken to remedy the power and fuel shortage of the country. The difficulties which arose from the expropriation of the foreign power companies were eliminated and an entirely new policy was introduced in the field of petroleum production. So-called "production contracts" were concluded with foreign private companies and prospects are now favorable for greatly reducing if not eliminating the need for irmporting petroleum products.
3. In the immediate future Argentina's exports will not be sufficient to maintain import levels and debt service. The deficit will be paid partly from the package deal and partly from the equivalent of suppliers' and long-term credits already contracted. Assuming that the stabiliza- tion policy is successful, dependence on emergency external financing should be eliminated in the early sixties primarily as the result of increased exports and increased domestic production of fuels.
4. Argentina's total foreign indebtedness increased from U.S.$ 686 million equivalent on December 31, 1956 to U.S. 1,612 million equiva- lent at the end of 1958, this latter amount including U.S.) 345 million contracted under the package deal. A large part of the increase repre- sents the equivalent of short and medium-term suppliers' credits to be used in the exploration and transportation of oil and the production of power. In the near future Argentina may contract some additional for- eign loans to finance part of the petroleum program and the rehabilita- tion of the railroads. Service on existing contractual debt will increase to U.S.$ 237 million in 1960, about 23% of yearly exports. Thereafter it will gradually decline. The debt service will be a heavy burden on the economy. New short and even medium-term credits should be severely limited for the time being and external finance for increas- ing the productive capacity of the country should be obtained on a long-term basis with long grace periods.
5. If the stabilization program is successful, increasing exports and import substitution should enable the country to service a reasonable amount of new debts, gradually reducing its dependence on emergency foreign financing. Success or failure of the stabilization program will - iii - depend to a considerable extent on whether the Gavernment is able to hold wage increases within reasonable limits. The wage problem will be very difficult and there is a risk that the whole program will founder on this issue. Reassurance may be drawn, however, from the decisiveness which the Government has displayed in adopting the stabilization program, and from the fact that the external assistance has been made conditional on the effective implementation of the program. It is to be hoped that in- flation will be slowed down sufficiently to permit the play of market forces once more to bring about more balanced growth. RECENT ECONOMIIC DEVELOPIvENTS IN ARGENTINA
1. Despite its rich agricultural resources in cereals and livestock, the rate of Argentina's economic growth has slowed down considerably in the postwar period. While in the years from 1945-1957 GNP rose by a little over 40 per cent, population increased by 33 per cent so that the 1957 output per person was only slightly above that of 1945. Actually, per capita output has fluctuated at a Ps. 3,550 level (1950 prices) for the past three years which is well below the 1948 peak of Ps. 3,936 (Table 2). Argentina's poo:r economic performance over the last twelve years can be primarily attrlbuted to the stagnation, if not deteriora- tion, of her agriculture, largely as a result of poor governmental policies in this respect.
I. TIE EMERGENCE OF AN ECCNOHIC CRISIS
2. Since the presentation of our first report on the economy of Argentina (WJH-60a of August 30, 1957), inflation has continued unchecked and has reached, particularly in the last months of 1958, most serious proportions. In the period January-October 1958, cost of living in- creased by 33 per cent and it is likely that in the last two months of the year the rate of increase accelerated.
3. The rise in prices was fostered by rapid increases in wage pay- ments and a growing deficit in Government finances. The newly elected Frondizi Government in Play 1958 decreed that industrial workers should receive an increase in wages which, taking into account increases previously granted, would raise their wages 60 per cent over the level ruling in February 1956. This increase was intensified by new collec- tive bargaining contracts (some of them still in negotiation), which added another 20-30 per cent to wage costs. Government salaries have increased by about 40 per cent.
4. In addition to the increase in direct wage payments, the Govern- ment had introduced legislation to increase substantially pensions paid from the social security funds, thus eliminating their current surpluses. Since the current surplus in these funds had provided the Government with non-inflationary financing equal to one-third of tax receipts, this increased the need to reduce budgetary deficits.
5. Fiscal year (1/) 1958 ended with a deficit of Ps. 24 billion (Table 3). As a consequence of heavy Central Bank financing of Govern- ment deficits, as well as rapid expansion of corimercial bank credits to the private sector, money supply increased in January-September 1958 by 19 per cent, from 67 to 80 billion pesos (Table 6).
1/ Fiscal 1957 ended on October 30, 1957. Since that date the fiscal year is being calculated from November 1 to October 30. 6. Under the impact of domestic inflation balance of payments difficulties continued, despite the tightening of a variety of control measures and a rapid loss in the effective foreign exchange value of the peso. Both ex- ports and imports have fallen slightly in comparison with the previous year and the trade deficit for the first nine months of the year remained at over U.S.$ 200 million, about 25 per cent of total export receipts (Table 9). Net reserves of the Central Bank were reduced sharply from $257 million in January 1958 to $7h million on December 15, 1958.
7. The exchange system, formally revised in August 1958, provided for a complicated multiple exchange rate system applicable to exports through a mixing of free and official rates. In addition, special surcharges were imposed on some exports and from time to time the "aforos" were altered. On the import side a mixing system was also employed. Access to the official market for exchange for imports was sharply reduced as the exchange losses continued in 1958. The resulting increase in the demand for exchange on the free market accelerated the depreciation of the free market rate in the latter part of 1958. The resulting depre- ciation in the effective exchange rates was, however, not sufficient to provide real incentives to exports and adequate deterrents to imports. In addition to the fact that inflation accelerated, there were two major reasons for the failure of the effective exchange rate to be adequately depreciated: first, the extent of the depreciation was limited by the continued use of an unrealistic official rate in the "mixing" rates applicable to exports; second, the system of import licensing did not permit the full force of risingprices and costs to be reflected in the free exchange rate. - 3 -
II. THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAI9i OF THE GOVERM1ENT
8. As pointed out in our last report, Argentina possesses a great poten- tial for future growth but there were important obstacles to overcome. The shortage of power had served as a brake to development and high petroleum imrports, more than 60 per cent of domestic consumption became a heavy charge on the baLance of payments. The transportation system, especially the rail- roads, was inadequate and provided poor and inefficient service. Most important, many production sectors in agriculture and industry lacked incen- tives to expand and even maintain production and the country's resulting failure to increase exports impeded the necessary growth of imports in raw materials, fuels and capital goods. As will be seen in the following paragraphs, considerable efforts are now being made to correct some of the most important shortcomings.
A. Electric Power
9. The Government has worked out a basis of resolving its difficulties with CADE (Sofina) and also with ANSEC (American & Foreign Power) which had arisen from the expropriat:ion of the assets of these twqo companies. Accord- ing to the new agreements SEGBA (successor of CADE owned 25 per cent by the Government and 75 per cent by Sofina) will build a new thermal unit of 125,000 kw. in Buenos Aires. ANSEC is planning to build a new unit of 300,000 kw. somewhere in the neighborhood of the capital. If the Government (Agua y Energia) is able to complete the construction of its 600,000 1kw. "Superusina" the electric power problem of the Buenos Aires area would be solved for the imrnediate future.
B., Fuels
10. Until last May when the Frondizi Government took over, Argentina's oil policy relied mainly on the direct exploitation of the Argentine oilfields by YPF (state oil monopoly). An exception to this policy were some conces- sions oimed by ASTRA, an Argentine Company and by the Argentine branches of ESSO and SHELL. However, these concessions were limited to oil fields where reserves had been practically depleted and it seemed to be impossible for political reasons for private cormpanies to obtain new and more iworkable concessions in Argentina.
11. Of late, however, there has been a new development in the Government's oil policy. YPF was allowed to conclude "production contracts" wTith private companies. According to the new procedure the private company agrees to carry out with its own resources drilling operations, extract the oil, transport it to the place of delivery and in return YPF agrees to pay the contracting company a fixed sum per ton of petroleum delivered. An essential feature of the contract isthat the risk is borne entirely by the private company.
12. All the contracts are based upon the idea of "profit sharing" at an approximately 50-501o basis. YPF pays about U.S.$ 11 equivalent for every m3 of petroleum delivered at the La Plata refinery, of which about '*6 is paid in foreign exchange. Oil of equivalent quality purchased abroad woiild nowT cost about U.S.$ 20. Therefore, there is an economy of about U.S.c 9, in - 4 - part representing savings in freight (h4), in part representing the value of previous explorations done by YPF in the zone ($1), and finally, the gain to the country from exploiting its own fields ($4). The company for its part will apply some $6 per m 3 to meet amortization and costs while the balance is considered profit.
13. Five production contracts have already been concluded (see map):
a) Carl M. Loeb Rhoades and Company, New York, works on the fields of Huincul, near Mendoza;
b) Pan American International Oil Company (Standard Oil, Indiana) and
c) Union Oil Company are around Comodoro Rivadavia in Southern Patagonia;
d) ESSO (Standard Oi:L New Jersey) received rights to develop the fields of Neuquen in Northern Patagonia near the site of the planned hydroelectric plant of El Chocon; ESSO will also build a pipeline for YPF from Neuquen to Bahia on a 30-year credit at 5 per cent interest;
e) SHEIL will work on an unexplored region on the frontier of Buenos Aires and Rio Negro provinces and also offshore. SHELL will also undertake to provide $50,000,000 worth of petroleum products to YPF on a three-year credit basis.
14. Some elements in the country reacted very strongly against the three contracts concluded with Loeb Rhoades, Pan American and Union Oil and instigated YPF workers to go on strike. However, the Government proved to be stronger than the strikers: on November 11 a state of siege was declared and soon afterwards the oil strike, which could have been fateful for the regime, was ended. Loeb Rhoades and Pan American have already begun to work, great quantities of drilling equipment have arrived on the fields and the companies are hopeful that they will be able to show results at the beginning of 1959.
15. "Works and service contracts", consisting in the drilling of wells and maintenance of equipment have been concluded with several Argentine and foreign companies. In these cases, the risk has to be borne by YPF because the companies are paid on a cash or short-term basis upon ccmple- tion of the works. The most important among these contracts was that concluded in 1957 with TIPSA, a consortium of European and Argentine firms, for U.S.$ 112 million equivalent. TIPSA builds the gas and oil pipelines from Yadrejones, near the Bolivian border, to San Lorenzo and Buenos Aires.
16. If the Gavernment's plans were to be realized, the country would become self-sufficient in petroleum products by 1962. By 1964, the country would produce about 6 million m3 of exportable surplus in petro- leum products (Table 15). According to YPF, this rather ambitious plan - 5 - can only be realized if thousands of new wells are drilled on hitherto unexplored fields all over t;he country. Accordingly, YPF has indicated its intention to ask for bids to drill over 4,000 wells in the coming 10 years in different regions the Petroleum Authority will indicate. YPF has expressed the hope that numerous private companies from Argentina and abroad would participate in these works.
17. The coal mines of Rio Turbio (Southern Patagonia) have reserves estimated at 400 million tons. At present their yearly production is only 250,000 tons. A development program being carried out with the technical and financial assistance of a French consortium (CIAVE, Sofre- mines), which has provided a loan of U.S.$ 42 million equivalent, is designed to increase production to 1 million tons by 1961 and 2 million tons by 1963 (Table 15). This would also help to reduce Argentina's dependence on imported fuels.
C. Stabilization Program
18. Cn December 29 the Government of Argentina instituted a comprehen- sive stabilization program including a reform of the exchange system. The program is designed to end the inflation by reducing the total deficit of the Government sector to an amount which can be financed from the peso counterpart of certain foreign loans, by limiting the expansion of credit by private banks, and by preventing excessive wage increases. A new unified and more realistic exchange rate subject to the play of market forces is designed to create a system of price incentives for exports and price deterrents for imports which will help reduce, and eventually eliminate, the dependence on emergency external assistance while con- tributing to balanced economic growth.
19. The government deficit in recent years has been greatly enlarged by subsidies, losses of government enterprises, and by considerable increases in government employment. Under the program the 1959 deficit of the government sector would be reduced from the originally estimated Ps. 36 billion (over 100 per cent of ordinary income) to Ps. 7 billion. This requires a number of drastic measures to be taken. Government is to reduce its labor force by 15 per cent during 1959. All new public works are to be postponed. Additional measures will be the increase in the price of petroleum products by 200 per cent, of railroad tariffs and Buenos Aires public transportation fares by about 100 per cent. New revenue measures are expected to double certain tax receipts, particularly those derived from the foreign trade sector.
20. All consumer and producer subsidies are to be eliminated. There are to be no price controls except for a list of about ten commodities whose prices will be fixed at economic levels. Severe credit restric- tions are to be imposed upon the public and private sector. Government financing through bank credit is to be forbidden. Central Bank loans and rediscounts to commercial banks are to be held at the level existing on December 31, 1958, and bank reserve requirements are to be increased considerably. These restrictions will create financing problems for - 6 - business and should contribute, in cambination with a more or less balanced government sector, to a slowing down if not stopping the price-wage spiral.
21. However, even if we assume that credit restrictions will be vigor- ously applied, it is likely that prices and the cost of living will increase as a consequence of other elements of the program. Pressures for further wage increases will be strong (in spite of the fact that most of the wage contracts have been signed already and should be valid until the end of 1960). A temporary reduction in the standard of living of the urban workers and other sacrifices will probably be necessary if the stabilization program as now conceived is to succeed. This will impose severe strains on the country, not so much because the reduction in standard of living and the other sacrifices will be severe, but because the Argentine population has not been accustomed to make such sacrifices for many years.
22. These fiscal, monetary and wage measures are only part of the sta- bilization program. Equally important are the measures tending to reform the foreign exchange system of the country. They include simplification of the exchange rate structure and removal of controls on trade and pay- ments 0 All exchange transactions are to take place in a single exchange market where the exchange rate will be determined by the free play of market forces. This will mean a substantial devaluation of the peso, which is expected to move from about 30 to about 70 to the dollar. Ad valorem export taxes of 10 and 2,0 per cent are to be applied to live- stock and agricultural exportsYf. Imports are to be subject to taxes of 20, 40Q, 10D and 300 per cent. These taxes are to be collected at customs and to be used as fiscal receipts.
23. Although part of the export sector's gains will be offset by expected increases in domestic costs and also by the new export taxes, there will still remain a substantial increase in favor of the export sector as can be seen from the following figures:
Pesos per dollar to be received Export Before Product Devaluation After Devaluation (assuming m$n7O = $1 & 10 & 20% export taxes)
Cereals 32 56 Meat 38 63 Wool 41 63
2/ An additional tax of 15 per cent is to be imposed on exports of grain (except corn), forage, peanut oil and linseed oil; this tax is to be applied temporarily to existing exportable stocks, and will be in force until these stocks are liquidated. Its purpose is to forestall speculation and prevent windfall profits on the part of intermediaries who have already purchased crops from farmers and who would be able to export at the free rate when the market reopened. - 7 -
Moreover, the application of the uniform rate to exports even with the export taxes of 10 and 20 per cent will help to reduce the distortions which developed from the multiple exchange rate system. The unified exchange rate will also give more certainty to exporters who will not have to fear arbitrary rate modifications as they have happened so often in the past.
24. The cost of imports will increase greatly. Essential raw materials like crude oil, rubber, coal, iron ore and other minerals are to be imported at the free market rate of 70 without payment of any surcharges. All other imports are to be subject to surcharges from 20 to 300 per cent and prior deposits for 180 days running from 150 to 500 per cent. Imports essential to agriculture ancd livestock as well as raw materials for industry are to be subject t;o 20 per cent surcharge. For semi-manufactured goods the surcharge rises to 40 per cent. less essential and luxury goods are to be subject to the 100 and 300 per cent surcharges respectively and a 300 per cent prior deposit. Automobiles are to be subject to a special advance deposit of 500 per cent. Thus the import of, for instance, a Chevrolet or Ford would tie up, temporarily, as much as $25,000 of the importer's funds0
25. Direct controls on trade and payments were removed. Cn the export side export quotas and other controls were eliminated, a measure particu- larly advantageous for exporters of meat. On the import side the Govern- ment eliminated the present system of irnport licensing; thus, importers are to be allowed to import freely from any available sources of supply-- a measure which was strongly resisted until the last moment by the members of the Paris Club. These rules apply to imports financed by cash payments or by long-term credits, but not to other imports. Imports with the use of suppliers' credits are to be subject to Central Bank approval and the Bank's policy is expected to be extremely restrictive in this respect,
26, The exchange rate is to be determined by supply and demand. In con- sequence, any increase in costs should automatically be reflected in a corresponding modification of the exchange rate. The problem will be to maintain a system under which the exchange rate is responsive to market forces. Exchange rate movements which are too pronounced can create economic and political pressures which might lead once more to the fixing of the exchange rate at an unrealistic level and to the imposition of direct controls. Thus, the success of the exchange reform is dependent on the implementation of the fiscal, monetary and wage measures.
27. The prospects for effective implementation of the program are greatly supported by the financial assistance made available by the INF and other institutions (see Annex for more details): Total amount Cash available allotted in 1959 IDF $ 75.00 $ 42.50 U.S. Treasury 50.00 25.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 17.00 17.00 Private banks 54.00 5S.00 Eximbank (balance of payments) 24.75 24.75 Eximbank (project financing) 100.00 (unknown) Total $ 345.50 $ 188.00 minimum - 8 -
28. The financial assistance available in 1959 under this "package deal" and under other credits already contracted permit Argentina to make heavy debt payments in 1959 without any substantial reduction in the level of imports. Thus, these credits give support to the stabilization effort during a critical period. ]MIoreover, drawings on the IMF and U.S. Treasury credits for 1959 under the package deal are spaced over a full year and are contingent on compliance with the stabilization program.
29. To summarize, in the 'Latter half of 1958 the economic situation of Argentina had deteriorated rapidly. The Government, under the threat of a virtual exhaustion of exchange reserves, is now taking courageous steps to stop inflation, to bring the balance of payments under control, and create favorable conditions for a more balanced growth in the future. The program which has been elaborated is a comprehensive and logical set of anti-inflationary and exchange measures. Success or failure of the program will depend to a considerable extent on whether the Government is able to hold wage increases within reasonable limits. The wage problem will be very difficult and there is a risk that the whole program will flounder on this issue. Reassurance may be drawn, however, from the decisiveness which the Government has displayed in adopting the stabilization program and from the fact that the external assistance has been made conditional on the effective implementation of the program. It is to be hoped that inflation will be slowed down sufficiently to permit the play of market forces once more to bring about more balanced growth. -9 -
III. BALANCE OF PAYMPENTS PROSPECTS
30. Argentina's main export products can be divided into two categories, first the oroducts of "agriculture" -- mainly cereals -- and second, the products of livestock.
A. Immediate prospects
31. While agricultural production has increased somewhat in the course of the last few years, thanks to some incentives granted in 1955 by the Pro- visional Government, the increase was much slower than originally expected. Although a more favorable exchange rate had been provided for agricultural exports, domestic costs had made the increase inadequate to provide real incentives to producers. Other reasons were lack of agricultural machinery, an unsatisfactory land tenure system and lack of security in ownership. One of the most important objectives of the recent devaluation and of the elimination of export controls is to improve the relative position of the agricultural producer. It is expected that investments in agriculture, mainly corn, fruits, wine and dairy products, will increase considerably in the near future. An immediate, but probably small, increase in agri- cultural exports can also be expected because stocks built up in expec- tation of a devaluation will now be sold abroad. As far as market prospects for crops are concerned, the existence of U.S. agricultural surpluses is certainly a somewhat disturbing element. However, until now such sur- pluses have not seriously impeded Argentina in placing her products on the world market (Table 12).
32. The livestock industry provides four main export commodities, namely frozen beef, chilled beef, canned beef and wool. The main outlets for frozen beef are WAiestern Europe and the United Kingdom, while that for chilled beef is mainly the United Kingdom. Canned beef is exported on a world-wide basis among others to the United States. Wool exports are also world-wide and, due to a large carryover, present export surpluses are much higher than in previous years (Tables 13 and 14).
33. Livestock exports increased by 25 per cent between 1954 and l958. HosJever, due to excessive k:illings and also a rapid increase in domestic consumption cattle herds declined in the course of the last few years. In 1958 the Government began to take measures to increase herds and as it takes from 18 to 24 months to bring up a young animal there is little hope that they will be normal again before 1961. At present, foreign markets not only absorb easily Argentina's export surpluses but there would be large additional demand in the United Kingdom for Argentine chilled beef and in the United States for canned beef.
34. Therefore, for both crop and livestock products, but particularly for livestock products, Argentina's short-run problem is not so much whether there is a market, but whether exportable output can be increased. Export- able output must be increased in 1960 and the following years if Argentina - 10 - is to reduce her dependence on emergency balance of payments financing while meeting the scheduled increase in debt service. This follows from the fact that Argentina's imports are not easily compressible in the very short-run and in the scmewhat longer-run should, with the exception of fuels, increase if real income is to continue to grow. Cnly 5 per cent of total imports are in the form of finished consumer goods. While there are still good opportunities for substitution of domestic production for imported fuels (which represent about 20 per cent of total imports), it is extremely doubtful that imports other than fuels can be compressed below current levels over a sustained period without reducing employment and income.
35. In the immediate future Argentina's exports will not be sufficient to maintain present import levels. Exports in 1959 are unlikely to exceed $1,000 million while imports of $1,300 million represent a minimum level under present conditions. The difference would be paid partly from the proceeds of the package deal which has recently been concluded in Washing- ton (see Annex) and partly from the equivalent of suppliers' and long-term credits already contracted. It would appear that a deficit will also occur in 1960 and perhaps on a much smaller scale in 1961. Part of the 1960 deficit will be financed by the unused part of the package deal but some additional emergency assistance may be sought. Dependence on emer- gency external financing should be eliminated as soon as possible through increased exports and increased domestic production of fuels. Otherwise the burden of debt inherited from the stabilization period will prove very onerous,
B. Longer-run prospects
36. As far as crops are concerned, the incentives contained in the stabilization program would certainly contribute to increase the produc- tion of agricultural products. Since market prospects over the next 4 or 5 years are on the whole not favorable for any significant increase in Argentine crop exports, maintaining exports of crops at about $500 million level can be considered a feasible target. On the long run, as world population expands, income grows and Argentina's comparative advantage in crop production is allowed to exercise its influence, prospects are better.
37. As for livestock products (paragraph 33), the temporary decline in cattle herds can probably be overcome by 1961 when cattle stock will be reconstituted from the present low of 42 million to at least 45 million head. However, there are measures which could make possible a consider- able increase of beef exports even before herds have been completely rebuilt. For instance, if the average yield of dressed Teat per head of cattle on the hoof could be raised from the present 50 kg. to 57 kg. (a figure attained already in previous years), production would rise by nearly 300,000 tons. Furthermore, since the relation of domestic con- sumption to exports is 5:1, every unit of decline in domestic consumption would increase exportable surpluses by its multiple; thus, if domestic per capita consumption could be reduced from the present 94 kg. to 80 kg. (which would only be a little less than it was in 1955), an additional quantity of 290,000 tons of meat, equal to well over U.S.$ 150 million - 11 - could be added to exportable surpluses. The stabilization program of the Government, which is now permitting meat prices to increase, should help to reduce domestic consumption thereby increasing exportable surpluses. Thus, assuming (a) an early reconstitution of cattle herds, (b) a rise in the average yield of dressed meat per head of cattle, and Cc) some reduc- ticon of domestic consumption, exportable surpluses of livestock products in the early 60's might welL exceed $600 million as compared to about $500 million in 1957. It should not be difficult to market this addi- tional volume at good prices, particularly since European demand for meat is expected to continue to grow at a fairly high rate and Argentina should be able to capture an expanding share of the European market.
38. Among the most important elements of the foreign trade picture is the problem of fuels, particularly petroleum. According to the Petroleum Development Plan of the Government, petroleum imports would decline gradually and would disappear altogether in 1962. After that there would be a surplus for export (Table 15). The Government's optimism is based on the existence of big oil and gas reserves in the newly discovered fields of Madrejones and Campo Duran and on the hope that thanks to the conclusion of the "production contracts" (see paragraphs 10 to 16), the extraction of petroleum and gas from known fields will be accelerated and new fields will soon be discovered.
39. It seems reasonable to expect that YPF's own production will increase considerably in 1960 when the TIPSA pipelines from H4adrejones and Campo Duran are to be ready permitting the use of the rich wells of northern Argentina, which until now have had to be capped for lack of transporta- tion. Experts generally agree that the possibilities for increasing the country's production are good and the "production contracts" already con- cluded with foreign companies are an important step toward realizing these possibilities. If the necessary investments are made and work can progress without interruption, Argentina should make rapid strides in the direction of self-sufficiency in fuels. It remains to be seen how soon this objec- tive will actually be achieved.
40. In the following projection we assume that, instead of an export surplus in 1962 as envisagecl by the Argentine Government, petroleum products valued at $60 to $80 million will still have to be imported in 1962-64. No increase from contracts yet to be negotiated is assumed for this period and no allowance is made for an increase in production from new fields which may be discovered by Esso, Shell or Union Oil on the areas they have recently been assigned to (see paragraph 13). Adding to the 60-80 million dollars the payments which will have to be made to foreign petroleum companies for deliveries of domestically-produced oil (paragraph 12), a total of 75 to 100 million dollars will still be required in 1962-64. From 1964 on, savings in fuels would amount to U.S.$ 150-200 million. This amount added to some increase in agricul- tural and livestock exports would give a total gain of about U.S.$ 400 million. Under these assumptions, the balance of trade would show the following picture: - 12 -
(million dollars) Exports Imports Year Live- Agri- Others Total Fuels Others Total Balance stock culture 1957 501 h28 46 975 317 993 1,310 _335 1959 450 500 50 1,000 250 1, 000 1,250 -250 196 2-64 650 500 80 1,230 100 1,o000 1,100 +130
For all practical purposes, the trade balance can 'oe taken as equivalent to the balance on current account. The emergence of a trade surplus in the early sixties would permit a net reduction in external debt. It should be noted that the above projection of non-fuel imports ($1,000 million) implies a level about 10 per cent higher than the average of the past 10 years. Such a level of imports would permit a modest growth in aggregate output. - 13 -
IV. FOREIGN DEBT
41. According to provisional data prepared by the Central Bank of Argentina, total foreign indebtedness increased from U.S.$ 686 million equivalent on December 31, 1956 to U.S.$ 1,612 million equivalent at the end of 1958, this latter amount including U.S.$ 345 million contracted under the "package deal" (Table la). A large part of the increase repre- sents the equivalent of short and medium-term suppliers' credits to be used in the exploration and transportation of oil and the production of power ("Superusina" of Buenos Aires). In the near future Argentina may contract some additional foreign loans to finance part of the petroleum program and the rehabilitation of the railroads.
42. Annual service obligation on the existing contractual debt (Table lb) will amount to U.S.$ 178 million equivalent in 1959; service obligations will reach their highest point in 1960 with U.S.$ 237 million equivalent or about 23% of yearly exports. Thereafter, they will gradually decline to U.S.$ 115 million equivalent in 1965. In 1966 they will abruptly fall to U.S.$ 54.4 million equivalent and will continue to decline thereafter. (1With the exception of two small provincial issues, Argentina does not hiave any publicly held external bonds.)
43. Thus, the present Argentine foreign debt structure is composed largely of short-term indebtedness, mainly suppliers' credits. The foreign debt service burden will be very high in the coming years and trade deficits are not likely to be eliminated before 1961 or 1962. Hence Argentina will have to seek additional balance of payments financ- ing in the coming years. New short and even medium-term credits should be limited for the time being because they simply perpetuate the heavy debt service burden. External finance for increasing the productive capacity of the country should be obtained on a long-term basis and with long grace periods.
44. The ability of Argentina to service such credits will depend on the implementation of the stabilization measures, whose ultimate purpose is to assure the balanced growth of the economy. This growth will only be attained if agricultural and livestock exports rise satisfactorily and if the country's oil resources are fully developed. Annex
THE ARGENTINE STABILISATION CREDITS
('IIillicn US$)
Total Amounts Cash Repavment Sche Allotted to Available eamn Schedule Argentina in 1959 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
1. IMF 75.0 42.5 X X X X X
2. U.S. Treasury 50.0 25.0 - 5.0 12.0 8.o -
3. Federal Reserve New York 17.0 17.0 17.0 - - -
4. Private Banks 54.0 54.0 - 21.6 25.92 6.48 - 5. Eximbank (bal. of payments) 24.75 24.75 - - 4.94 xx
6. D.L.F. 24.75 24.75 - _ _ _ 4.94 xx
7. Eximbank (Line of Credit) 100.0 According to X X X X X project
TOTAL 345.50 188.0 17.0 26.6 37.92 14.48 9.88
x Not yet established xx In 10 semi-annual instalments Annex (contfd) Page 2
Notes
1. I.M.F. Fund drawings up to $42-5 million in 1959 are conditional on compliance with the stabilization program as set forth in the letters dated December 4 and 19, 1958 addressed by the Argentine Minister of Econonbr to I.M.F. The $h2.5 million will be used as follows: $12-5 million in the first 60 days and the $3 million in each subsequent month.
According to present schedule, repayments will start in the third year after drawings were made, arid sooner if international reserves increase during -the ID4i fiscal year (April 30).
2. U.S. Treasury. Actual cash to be used in 1959 is $25 million after Argentina has drawn $37-5 million under the IMF stand-by (October, 1959). Drawvings are expected then to be:
October 19559 5 million November 1959 7.5 1t December 1959 12.5 t"
Repayable at the rate of 4 per cent per month for 25 months beginning August 1960.
Me. Federal Reserve New York. The $17 million are a 90-day advance against gold collateral, subject to one renewal for an additional 90 days (roughly end of June 1959). This is to pay off $i16.8 million outstanding from a loan that Coll Benegas obtained from a group of New York banks in October, 1957.
4. Private New York Banks Bank of America U.S.$ 10 million Chase Manhattan Bank 10 " First National City Bank of New York 10 I First National City Eank of Boston 5 Guarantee Trust 4 Hanover Bank 4 H Manufacturers' Trust 4 It J.P. Morgan and Company 3 Royal Bank of Canada 2 " Grace National Bank 1 I Philadelphia National Bank 1 "
U.S.$ 54 million
Repayments: Grace period of 18 months, followed by payment of 20 per cent of amount outstanding in July 1960. Then 20 monthly paymen-ts of 4 per cent of outstanding principal. ALnex (cont'd) Page 3
5. Eximbank will make disbursements in the following way: First 60 days of 1959: $15 million. In JiLme-October inel. $1.94 million monthly. Proceeds of loan to be used for the payment of U.S. goods only.
Repayment: In 10 semi-annual instalments, beginning June 1963.
6. D.L.F. Similar to Eximbank.
7. Line of credit for project financing of Eximbank. One of the projects to be financed will probably be the new American and Foreign Power plant near Buenos Aires. Table la
ARGENTINA
EXTERNAL PUBLIC I)EBT OUTSTANDING OCTOBER 31, 1958 WITH MAJOR REPORTEI) CHANGES THROUGH DECEIMBER 31, 1958
National and Government Guaranteed Debt and Debt of Political Subsidivions
(In millions of U.S. dollar equivalents)
Debt Major Item outstanding reported Oct.31 1/ changes 1958 - Nov.l - Dec.31,1958 e
TOTAL EXTERlAL PUBLIC DEBT 1,267.1 187.1
NATIONAL AND GOVERNM,ENT GUARANTEED DEBT 1,262.9 228.5
U.S. DOLLAR DEBT 451.6 228.5
Privately-placed debt 161.7 54.0
U.S. suppliers' (participating with Export- Import Bank) credits to:
Sociedad Nixta Siderurgia Argentina 33.3 Ministerio de Transporte 15.8 Celulosa Argentina, S.IA. 1.7 Brander & Cia., S.A. 0.4
Esso Isaura credit, 1957 17.6 Int'l. Telegraph & Telephone 3.0 YPF - TIPSA agreement 30.8 YPF - Kellog 8.5 Other suppliers' credits 34.4
Credit line from N.Y. Banks to Banco Central 31 16.2 Loans from U.S. banks, 1958 54.0
U.S. Government loans 289.9 174.6 U.S. Treasury 25.0 Export-Import Bank 287.6 124.8
$96,469,873 loan to Ar etine Banks 31% 1950-1963 ! 58.7 $5,000,000 loan to Soc, Minera Argentina 4% 1951-1958 27 1.3 $60,000,000 loan to So.7 Plixta Sid. Argentina 5% 1955-1977 2- 98.8 Table la (cont'd) Page 2
Debt Major outstanding reported Item Oct.31 / changes 1958 Nov.l - 2 Dec.31,1958 _
Export-Import Bank (cont'd)
$85,ooo,ooo loan to Govt. of Argentina 5% 1956-1978 115.8 $ 6,500,000 loan to Ce Plosa Argentina 5-3/4% 1957-1965 8.1 $ 2,061,600 loan tg Brander & Cia., S.A.
Qther loans outstanding October 31, 1958 8/ 3:6 2/ >24,750,000 loan to Govt. of Argentina 512% 1958-1967 24.8 $100,000,000 loan to Govt. of Argentina, 1958 10/ 100.0
Other 2.3 24.8
$ 2,300,000 ICA loan to Govt. of Argentina 3% 1958-1988 2.3 P24,750,000 Development Loan Fund loan to Govt. of Arw7ntina 52-% 1958-1967 _1 2h.8
DEBT IN VARIOUS CURRENCIES 811.3
Privately-placed debt 432.9
European and Japanese suppliers' credits to Soc. Mixta Siderurgia Argentina 65.3 Baring Bros. credit to Ministerio de Transporte 13.2 Cia. de Gas compensation 5.2 YPF - TIPSA agreement 80.7 Usina Electrica Dock Sud credit 86.4 Aerolineas Argentinas (COMET) credit 28.4 Fiat-Materfer credit 30.5 YPF - Kellog 8.5 YCF - CIAVE SOFREMINES 52.4 Other suppliers' credits 62.3
Intergovernment debt
$441,635,845 consolidated debt to "Paris Club" and Japan 378.4
DEBT OF POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS 4.2 Table la (cont'd) Page 3
Debt Major outstanding reported Item Oct.31 / changes 1958 1/ Nov. 1 - 2 Dec.31,1958 -
POUNTD STERLING DEBT 4.2
Publicly-issued bonds
13,982,775 City of Rosario 4,h-4h-%, 1887 12/ 2.7
300,000 City of Santa Fe 6t6, 18 9 1.5
1/ Debt outstanding includes estimated interest payments unless otherlise noted. j Debt outstanding consists of principal only.
3/ Does not include the folloidng:
a) 'i?C5,00,OOO credit from U.S. Treasury Department which may not be drawn down, (Tbh first half of thn 50 million dollar Treasury crodit will probably be drawn in 1959.) b) 4i?,17,000,000 advance from the Federal Reserve, N.Y. against gold collateral. LTlis 90-day advance (subject to one 90-day renewal) is to be used to repay the outstanding balance of the credit line from N.Y. banks to Banco Central. c) IIg purchases and stand-by credit. d) Bilateral Agreement for '115,000,000 between Y.F and Soviet Russia. e) i 7,700,000 ICA loan to Argentina repayable either in pesos or in US i.
4/ See footnote 3-a.
5/ Guaranteed by the Central Bank of Argentina.
6/ Guaranteed by Banco Industrial de la Republica Argentina.
7/ Guaranteed by Banco de la Nacion Argentina.
8/ Some of these credits are guaranteed by Banco Industrial de la Republica Argen- tiria and the others by Banco de la Nacion Argentina. Repayment terms for these credits are not available at this time.
9/ Debt outstanding consists of principal only. All undisbursed as of October 31, 1958. Page 4
10/ Repayment terms for this line of credit are not available at this time.
11/ It has been assumed that this loan will be repayable in U.S. dollars and will bear interest at the ra-te of 52% p.a.,
12/ Guaranteed by the Province of Santa Fe.
13/ These bonds went into default in 1891. Under the settlement of 1905 principal remained payable in pounds cterl1ng at the contractual rate of ; = 4.8o65 and interest became payable in Argentine pesos at 45 p.a. from 1905 through 191ht and at 6,' thereafter.
Source: IBRD - Economic Staff Table lb
ARGENTINA: ESTIMATED CONTRACTUAL SERVICE ON THE EXTERIIAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING OCTOBER 31, 1958 TITH MIAJOR REP9RTED CHANGES THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 19581-
(in millions of U.S. dollar equivalents)
Service on Service Debt outstanding October 31, 1958 on Grand Total U.S.Govt. Suppliers' "Paris "Package Total loans & bank club" deal" & bonds credits debt debt 2J
1959 17.1o 153.7 15.8 112.2 25.7 24.3 1960 237.7 200.6 15.5 130.1 55.0 37.1 1961 211.9 165.0 22.0 83.0 60.0 46.9 1962 17i.2 151.8 22.2 69.6 60.0 22.4 1963 1r4.8 151.5 26.4 65.1 60.0 23.3 1964 136,7 114W.2 16.1 38.1 60.0 22.5 1965 3150o 93.3 15.6 28.3 49.4 21.7 1966 54.4 33.6 14.4 18.0 1.2 20.8 1967 39,9 19.8 11.1 5.7 20.1 1968 24.2 14.7 13.8 0.9 9.5 1969 23.3 1l4.o 13.5 0.5 9.3 1970 22.1 13.2 13.2 8.9 1971 21.5 12.8 12.8 8.7 1972 20.8 12.5 12.5 8.3 1973 20.2 12.1 12.1 8.1
1/ Does not include the followring package deal debts, repayment of which is not considered fixed contractual service in foreign exchange: 1) $75.o m. Iv' stand-by credit, of which only $42.5 m. can be drawn in 1959; 2) '25.o m. portion of $50.0 m. U.S. Treasury credit. This portion cannot be drawn according to present agreement.
2/ The "Package deal" debt consists of the following credits authorized in December 1958: Item (in millions of U.S. dollars) Total 345.50 IMF 75.00 U.S. Treasury 50.00 Federal Reserve, N.Y. 17.00 Private N.Y. banks 54.00 Export-Import Bank (balance of payments) 24.75 Development Loan Fund 24.75 Export-Import Bank (project financing) 100.00
Source: IBRD Economic Staff Table 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(1950 Prices)
Period Population GNP Per Capita (Average) (Thousands) (Million Pesos) Product
10oo - o4 4,797 10,756 2,242 1940 - 44 1h,6h3 45,908 3,135
1945 15,390 48,836 3,173 19h8 16,306 62,353 3,971 1950 17,188 62,291 3,624
1955 19,110 68,769 3,598
1956 19,h92 68,677 3,523 1-957 19,882 70,749 3,558
Source: ECLA and Central Bank Table 3
ESTI[M.ATED BUDGET 1957-58 2!
(billion pesos)
I. Expenditures (original estimate) 89.0
II. Income ( " " ) 51.*
III. Deficit ( " " ) 38.0
IV. Estimated adjustment for changes made during year
a. Savings on ordinary expenditures 4.0
b. Savings on public works 1.5
c. Higher inc orne of Government enterprises 2.5
d. Government enterprises investments postponed 6.o I4.0
V. Estimated deficit 24 .O
1/ Ending October 31, 1958
Source: Ministry of Economy Table 4
ESTIMATED BUDGET 1958-59
(billion pesos)
Original Estimate Agreed with TMF
1. Ordinary expenditures 42.4 44.0 2. Aid of National Governrent to Provinces 3.0 3.0 3. Deficit Government Enterprises 6.8 7.0 4. Public WIorks 10.6 11.0
I. Total expenditures 62.8 65.o
II. Ordinary income 34.0 34.0
III. Deficit 28.8 31.0
5. Salary Adjustment (Government employees and railroad workers) 16.4 9.0
IV. Gross Deficit 45.2 40.0
6. Minus: New income 9.0 33.0
from:
a) Higher taxes 4.0 7.0 b) Retention and Surcharges 5.0 14.o * c) Higher income of Govern- ment enterprises - 12.0
i) Higher price of food - 6.o ii) Higher RR tariffs - 6.0
V. Net Deficit 36.2 7.0
* Over and above the amount of Ps. 5 billion to be used to offset losses of Central Bank arising out of exchange guarantees.
Source: Ministry of Economy and IMF. Table 5
INTERiNAL PUBLIC DEBT OUTSTANDING
(iMillion pesos)
End of Consolidated Floating Total
1954 39,449 1,857 41,3o6
1955 47,012 4,456 51,468
1956 56,126 7,577 63,703
1957 64,244 8,099 72,343 1/
1/ Total Debt of National Government 72,343
Additional debt (mostly from the consolidation if IAPI debts) 28,165
100,508
Source: Secretariat of Finance Table 6
MONEY SUPPLY
(billion pesos)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Sept.'58 I. Internal Factors: Private Credit (Commercial & Mortg.) 37.9 45.8 55.1 68.7 81.0 95.o Loans to Government 24.7 30.0 35.9 38.4 46.8 59.6 Total 62.6 75.8 91.0 107.1 127.8 154.6 II. External Factors:
(Peso value of gold & Foreign Exchange held by Central Bank & Private Banks) 3.0 2.9 2.3 4.4 4.2 1-.2 III. Total (I and II) 65.6 78.7 93.3 111.5 132.0 155.8 IV. Minus: Items of deferred liquidity (savings, etc.) 21.8 26.0 30.0 34.6 45.5 54.9 Government deposits 6.1 8.9 11.7 16.7 18.9 20.6 Total 27.9 34.9 41.7 51.3 64.4 75.5 V. Money Supply: (III minus IV) 37.7 43.8 51.6 60.2 67.6 80.3
(Money in Circulation 26.5 31.6 37.5 42.8 50.5 57.2)
YEARLY INCREASE IN MONEY SUPPLY % over From: Billions previous year End of 1953 to end of 1954 6.1 11 End of 1954 to end of 1955 7.8 17 End of 1955 to end of 1956 8.4 11 End of 1956 to end of 1957 7.4 11 End of 1957 to September 1958 12.7 12 Source: Central Bank Table 7
RESERVES OF GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANCE
Net Total Gold End of 1955 143.7 371.5
1956 355.8 224.1
1957 277.1 125.7
1958 January 257.4 125.7
June 229.4 125.3
November 102.5 74.3
December 15 74.0 n.a.
1/ Great debts on Bilateral Accounts.
Source: Central Bank Table 8
FREE MARKET RATE OF US $
Average Selling
1955 34.25
1956 35.78
1957 4o.20
1958 June 42.12
July 42.71
August 45.16
September 49.56
October 61.21
November 71.77
December 20 64.50
Source: Central Bank Table 9
FOREIGN TRADE AID TERI-IS OF TRADE
(Millions LI)US
Year Exports Imports Balance Terms of Trade (1950 = 100)
1945 725.7 300.1 , 425.6 87.7
1946 1,160.7 589.7 / 571.0 120.3
1947 1,614.3 1,342.2 , 272.1 143. 8
1948 1,577.0 1,572.8 44.2 141.7
1949 1,011.1 1,171.1 - 160.0 117.8
1950 1,144.9 964.2 , 80.7 100.0
1951 1,169.4 1,4,77.0 - 307.6 109.5
1952 677.6 1,181.0 - 503.4 75.2
1953 1,099.4 795.1 / 34.3 100.0 1954 1,027.0 979.0 148.04 90.0
1955 928.6 1,172.4 - 243.8 88.0
1956 943.8 1,127.6 - 183.8 76.6
1957 975.0 1,310.0 - 335.0 72.5
Jan-Sept.1957 738.2 967.8 - 229.6 n.a.
Jan-Sept.1958 720.9 917.9 - 217.0 n.a.
Total net deficit 1951-1957 1,221.3
Source! Direccion General de Estadistica and ECLA Table 10
MAIJN EEPORTS
(Million dollars)
Livestock Agriculture Meat Hides Wool Dairy Total Per Cereals Oth3rq Tot.al Per Other Total Year and Cent and Cent Esqorts Exports Other Flaxseed
1954 165 62 121 59 407 39.6 445 131 576 56.1 44 1,027
1955 215 55 124 58 452 48.7 343 78 421 45.4 55 928
1956 253 66 124 63 506 53.3 294 115 409 43.3 29 944
1957 268 60 117 56 501 51.5 276 152 428 44.0 46 975
Jan-Sept. 1957 198 46 104 46 394 53.3 201 108 309 41.8 35 738
1958 229 41 59 34 363 50.3 203 134 337 46.7 21 721
Source: Direccion General de Estadistica Table 11
MAIN IMPORTS
(Million dollars)
Year Fuel and Iron and Machinery Textiles Chemicals Timber Others Total Petro- Other Imports leum Metals
1954 181 203 172 63 87 90 181 979
1955 203 264 215 48 91 139 212 1,172
1956 251 226 262 26 78 82 202 1,127
1957 317 241 309 49 95 101 198 1,310
Jan-Sept. 1957 245 163 239 3h 69 72 146 968
1958 188 206 229 23 61 58 153 918
Source: Direccion General de Estadistica Table 12
PRODUCTION AND EXPORlTS OF PRINCIPAL AGRIC TJLTtRAL PRODUCTS
(Thousands of metric tons)
W~heat Corn Others Year Production Exports Production Fzxots (Oats, Barley & Rye) Production iExports
195o-54 5,325 2,151 2,709 1,002 2,092 936
1955 5,25o 2,600 3,870 1,100 2,328 1,270
1956 7,100 3,000 2,698 900 3,384 1,700
1957 5,810 2,000 4,806 2,400 2,635 900
1958 6,6oo 2,700 5,185 3,085 2,990 1,320
Source: Secretariat of Commerce Table 13
MEAT; PRODUCTIOll, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS
(Beef, Lamb, Pork)
Total Domestic Individual Year Production Consumption Consumption Exports (1,000 tons) (1000 tons) (kg. per capita) (1000 tons)
Total Beef 1954 2,176 1,,847 98.5 84 329
1955 2.,501 1,993 lo4.3 90 508
1956 2,856 2.,153 110.5 95 703
1957 2,881 2,178 109.6 94 703
Source: Junta Nacional de Carnes Table 14
'WOOL: PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS
(Thousand metric tons)
Wool Year Estimated Beginning Estion Exportable Exports Carry over October 1 Production Surplus End of Season
1953 184 179 113 66
1954 175 186 126 6o
1955 179 184 139 45
1956 180 170 124 46
1957 180 171 87 84
1958 184 213
Source: The First National Bank of Boston Table 15
FUELS: PRODUCTION, CONSUHPTION AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE SAVINGS
(Petroleum and Gas expressed in cubic meters of P?etroleum)
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Conswuption (estimated in 1000 mn3 ) l7,-0 19,000 20,400 2I,SC0 23,200 2 A600
Production (estimated in 1000 m3) 7,709 11,125 15,778 24,030 28,378 31,012
To be imported (1000 m3) 10,091 7,875 4,622
Exportable surplus (1000 m3) 2,230 5,178 6,412
Value of Imports (1 m 3 = US520 in millions) 201.8 157.5 92.4
Export Surplus (1 m3 = US$13) 29.0 67.3 83.4
Average Value of petroleum imports in 1956-57 (million US$) 220.0 220.0 220.0 220.0 220.0 220.0
Savings in foreign exchange and/or exports of petroleum products (million US$) 18.2 62.5 127.6 249.0 287.3 303.4
Increase of coal production (savirgs in million US$) 5.9 10.3 16.6 20.8 25.7 31.6
Total savings in petroleum and coal 24.1 72.8 144.2 269.8 313.0 335.0
Source: YPF (Argentine Petroleum Authority) F.\ frcN 7j\-no:\Duron-Madrejones
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OILFIELDS and PIPELINES NEW PROJECTS SHOWN IN RED OIL REFINERIES U EXISTiNG GAS LINES PROJECTED GAS LINE EXISTING OIL LINE PROJECTED OIL LINES Tierro del OIL AREAS 3 lGa100 3NO00C 400 500 KM LAUGHLIN B PORTER (TO DRILL 40 WELLS) JANUARY 159 lRRO-552