Durham E-Theses
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Durham E-Theses German public opinion and Hitler's policies, 1933-1939. Wells, Anthony Roland How to cite: Wells, Anthony Roland (1968) German public opinion and Hitler's policies, 1933-1939., Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3441/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk A.R. Wells "German Public Opinion and Hitleris Policies, 1933-1939". A Thasis submitted for the Degree of PI.A. of the University of Durham* ' รeptember,ไ ՉշՑ, The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. A«R» ฬelle мGerman Public Opinion and Hitlerbe Policies» 1933-1939w. A Thesis eubmittød for the degree of n»A« of the University of Durham* Septembør» 1968· Abstract This thesis ie an analysis of the nature and mechanice of public opinion in Nazi peacetime society. Its aiffl has been to break doran the society of the Third Raich into ite essential componente9 and through an investigation of its inetitutions9 and more particularly of the individuals who composed էhem9 to gain an ineight into the action and interaction of the forces that created public opinion* Special attention has been paid to the German Army9 the Church9 and the Diplomatic Service* Through representative cases of these three bodies an attempt has been made to create an informed picture of three important sections of the public mind* Creat stress hae been laid on the contingency between Nazi controls espeeielly Hitler's propaganda techniques» and opinion«forming· The basic questions of հօա all ssctions of German eociaty reacted to 9 Hitler 8 policies» why9 and »Ith »het coneaquences are aกsœered* A detailed interpretation has been Rtede of the relationship betœeen ριώϋο opinion in the period and the mainstream of history in the Nazi era« and also to set thie particular facet of Nazi history against the Фоіе bsol^rcmnd of møderค Sârmaก hlôtory* In that interpretation several fundamental philosophical questions of historical interpretation have been raised and a standpoint established* The шогк Is divided into nine main parte - beginning œith a definition of the probleme іกvoIved9 including interpretive опее9 folloœed by a preluda9 dealing with the relevant aspects of the period leading up to the Nazi take-0V8r іก 1933· Then come five central chapters on the period 1933-1939» organised chronologically; the Epilogue makes a final analysis of public opinioคէ and the шогк І8 concluded ttith an index of the references น8ad* A.R. ฬ6แ8. CONTENTS Page The idea of inscrutable Continuity and a definition of the ргоЫөт* 1 Prelude θ Chapter 1 - The first years of Р0Ш8Г» 1933-1935· 28 Chapter 2 - Watershed - 1936· 82 Chapter 3 - The Pace Quicken89 1937-193Θ. 93 Chapter 4 - The Сөгтап People and the Shadoพ of Шаг» 1939· 122 Chapter 5 - The German People and Na2i Social Controls« 1 35 Epilogue* 150 References* ACKNOULEDGMENTS The oiriter œould like to thank the Director and staff of the Institute for Contemporary Historyf Munich9 fOP the very valuabls assistance they have rendered* աւէհօսէ access to the Instituted superb records» eepecielly its photostats and catalogues» this thesis could not have been properly envisaged* It шаг during the 8Ш1төг of 1967, in IQunich9 that many of the edssntial leads end references ШӨГӨ acquired» and9 աՍհօսէ the facilities øf the British Museum» the folloœ-up in London røuld not have besn possible either* To individuals in those two places the mriter 0พ89 particular էhanks» Q8 also in other libraries9 notably the Шіепег Library in London* To several friende in Germany9 шһо stimulated and encouraged the mriting of this theèis» go especially thanks too - to Herr Werner blegetein of Wurzburg University» Herr Artur Schødel» formerly of Munich University9 and Herr Klaue Schlüter« of munich บทivsraityţ also to friends in London» and oolleagu88 at Emanuel School9 шһо took an active interest in it* Lastly^ but by no means least9 the tørlter шоиісі like to express his gratitude to Professor Կ¡9у 9 Wallace» шһо has exerted an ubiquitous influence upoก this шогк from the beginn!กgý since it was һә шһо first introduced and tutored the พriter in the serious study of modern European History» and particularly Сөгтаก history; to him І8 owed a lasting debt. A.R.พ. "German Public Opinion and HItier's Policies» 1933—1939·" The idea of inscrutable continuity and a definition of the probleme A great deal that has bean արՍէտո on modern German hietory hae in the final analyais Ьөэп pervaded by Aeschylean fatalism9 and พithout exaggeration; an interpretation that 8ΘΘ8 the periodf 1919-1939 in Germany as one of pre-destined evolution* This may stem from the 8ГГ0Г the historian may make in confusing or failing to delineate his method of interpretat ion 9 between one based on 8 concept of inscrutable continuity and that which evaluates from 8 viewpoint of an accomplished end or process in time9 denying ultimately the basic idee of cause and effect» and a process of detailed analysis9 merely fitting fact9 as supporting matter into an already detailed Ғгатеиюгк of events* Inter-шаг Germany has been subjected to this latter treatment9 appearing as it does to move along the straight road from Versailles to September, 1939· Causation plays but a minor role in the overall caet and although the intention may have been different ťhe result ІБ nonetheless an unbalanced appraisal« Empiricism as such seems to disappear in method* Fern աօս1ժ accept a concept of historical truth in the interpretation of the past. Each historian ШІІ1 inevitably give his picture» emphasising factors he considers important. The essence» or totality of any one event or period can never be recaptured in full, though each will try to recapture it9 and as objectively as possible* This İ8 true of much that has been шгіііеп оก Weimar and Nazi history, and in general most conclusions поша0ау8 run on the same lìก8Ց9 ա!էհ a fտա exceptions9 but in terms of a complete interpretive picture of the phenomenon of the Third Reich verdicts vary, especially in terms of the ահօ1տ complex of modern German history since 1870f into พhich the Na2i era has been appropriately slotted. "Inevitability*1 Ì8 a false image» and unhistorical though the methods พhich have led several historians to adopt this stand-* point have been quite conventional* One of the outstanding features of any detailed study of twentieth century Cerman history and indeed of all history is its inscrutability9 and that it is far from being a clear-cut picture9 despite the fact that some historians make it appear a simple process9 some with overtones of "inevitability," There is วbvlouely continuity in history9 but it І8 not a predictable one* History І8 a much better guide to the present than it ever can be to the future. History is itself the best proof of this* It can be a guidey giving a broad vision of հօա the future might evolve* In 1919 there พas nothing predictable or inevitable about the course German history raould follow in the next trøenty years* In fact the danger of acting in thB future on the basis of past events « з - Ì8 apparent* Appeasement itself was in part a reaction to pre-1919 policy9 though nothing would have been more appropriate in the 1930s for Britain and her eventual allies than a system of collective security ա!էհ rigid military obligations. Similarly in our ОШП day it would be folly to make long-term decisions in the west vis»a-vÌ8 the communist พогId in south-east Asia on Հհe basis of past and present developments there. This is not to deny that a İ68S0ก can be learnt from history; far from it* Perhaps what it does teach І8 the need for an attitude of humility and prudence in а ШОГІСІ situation шһегө eveกէտ» which cannot be foreseen9 can rapidly transform the total 3Ìtuation0 Herein lies the danger of drastic decisions of mhatever nature* Moreover it can indicate the general direction in which eveกts9 (of rahatever dimension) ЮІ11 be moving in the ШОГІСІ» and it Ì8 ա!էհ this in mind that 8 private individual or statesman will act9 but having in mind a knorøledge of the "possible11 within this impression of the drift of events* In 1919 and even 1933 the future drift of events шаร in no шау perceptible9 though by 1945 end later many hav8 Ьөөп prepared to say that the course of German history шаө foreseeable long before Adolf Hitler came to рошөг* This І8 the advantage the perspective of history gives to ail» but to abuse it Ì8 pointless* It І8 then ա!էհ1ռ the ambit of this concept of a continuous but inscrutable process of historical change that any analysis of German public opinion in the 193Ū8 should be made* - 4 - Part of the problem is to disentangle the particular from the general and to look at the evidence of opinion not Olithiก the concept of a (> Ger man problem^ but solely within the terms of cause and effect* Is it true to say for example that the Gsrman people decided on revenge in 1930 as 800ก as prosperity ended9 or9 "the implacable logic of circumstances doomed to failure any attempt to arrest the advance of National Socialist totalitarianism11? These are but էաօ random examples of thousands of comments written and uttered which are รшееріпд generalisations on a complex and important issuef one not to be answered lightly by such rhetorical generalİBatione.