441: International

Northwestern University Fall 2019 Fridays 1-3:50pm Scott Hall 201 (Ripton Room)

Prof. Stephen Nelson Office: Scott Hall 238 Office hours: Wednesdays 2-4pm Email: [email protected] Phone: 847-491-2589 (office) Course website: accessed via canvas.northwestern.edu

Course Overview Political Science 441 surveys some of the major issue areas and debates in the fields of International and Comparative Political Economy. It is targeted to Ph.D. students in political science, though graduate students from other fields and ambitious and well- prepared undergraduates are welcome to join. Forewarned is forearmed: the reading load is heavy, and I expect that each member of the course will be prepared to discuss each of the readings.

Broadly, the subfields of International and Comparative Political Economy involve the study of how politics, emphasizing power, material interests, institutions, and non- material factors (like ideas, norms, and social conventions), shape and are shaped by market forces (transactions involving goods and services, money and financial assets, firms and factories, and workers). Because I do not regard the disciplinary distinction between IPE and CPE as particularly important, the course includes topics and readings from both subfields.

If there are readings/topics that you would like to cover that are not on this version of the syllabus, please bring them to my attention. I also reserve the right to make changes (with the caveat that you will have plenty of warning if I choose to shuffle readings around). The syllabus is an outline, not a contract, and it is subject to change.

Course Requirements and Grading Active and thoughtful engagement with the material is essential to success in this course. There are four ways in which I try to measure your engagement with and mastery of the course material:

(1) Participation in the course discussion will account for 25% of your final grade. The reading load is substantial and the course will be driven by discussions rather than lectures. For these reasons I strongly urge that you attend all meetings, arrive on time, and show up well prepared – you must keep up with the readings and be ready to contribute to the conversation to succeed in this seminar.

1 (2) All students are required to serve as the author’s defendant in one course meeting. During the week in which you have been assigned the role of author’s defendant, you will be stepping into the shoes of an author of one of the readings assigned for the seminar; you will be responsible for presenting the main arguments and evidence in the reading and will be expected to be prepared to respond to tough questions about the reading that are raised by me and the other members of the group. Your performance as author’s defendant will account for 5% of your grade. (3) There are two short writing assignments that you’ll complete for the seminar. Each student will write one critical memo that outlines the main argument(s) in one or several of that week’s readings and provides an incisive critique of the material. The critical memo should be submitted via email to me no later than 8 PM the evening before the meeting in which the reading(s) appear. The memo should be in the range of 3-5 pages (though you may go longer if need be). You can write your memo on the same reading(s) for which you are serving as author’s defendant. (Efficiency logic suggests that this in fact the best strategy.) The other short writing assignment is a referee report that you will produce for one article from the list of assigned readings that you’ve chosen to review. For the referee report you should approach the article as if it’s been submitted for publication at one of the top journals in the field. Your report should inform the journal’s editorial team about the key strengths and weaknesses of the piece and provide constructive feedback for the author(s). (I understand that reviewing already- published work that appears on a graduate seminar syllabus is a hard task, given that everything on this syllabus has already made it through the publication gauntlet, but nothing is flawless, some well-cited publications are riddled with holes, and all work can be improved through constructive critique.) You’ll pick an article from the reading list to review by the second meeting; the referee report can be submitted by 9AM on the day that we’ll be discussing the article you’ve chosen to review. I’ll say more about each of these brief writing assignments in our first meetings of the quarter. The critical memo and referee report together account for 30% of the final course grade. (4) For the remaining 40% of your course grade you have two options: (a) you may choose to submit a research proposal (likely in the 20-25 page range) that outlines a research puzzle that falls within the purview of I/CPE, situates the puzzle in the relevant literatures, develops a preliminary theoretical argument and observable implications, and sketches how you plan to conduct the research necessary to shed light on the puzzle (what kind of research design will allow you to answer the motivating question?); (b) alternatively, you may write essays based on two field exam-style questions. Like the qualifying field exam, you will get the questions and have a short time period in which to compose your responses. (We will work out a start day and time during finals week and you’ll submit your answers in the 36-hour period after you begin the exam.) Unlike the field exam you will have access to your readings and notes and will not be expected to go much beyond the assigned course readings in constructing your answers to the questions.

2 The due date for the final paper is Wednesday, December 11. I should have the paper in my hand by 7:00 PM on that day. Papers that are submitted after the deadline will be penalized by a half grade (from a B+ to a B, for example) for each 12-hour period that passes after the announced deadline. Barring unusual and challenging personal circumstances, I expect that all students in the course will complete the requirements on time.

Recommended Readings There is a lengthy list of additional, recommended readings following the assigned readings for each topic. The purpose of the recommendations is to help you (assuming that you are a PhD student in political science) assemble a reading list as you prepare for the qualifying exams in the comparative and IR subfields. You can, of course, dip into the recommended reading list for the seminar meeting but going beyond the assigned reading is not expected.

3 Course Schedule and Reading List Week 1 (September 27): rationalism and its alternatives in the study of IPE David Lake, “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,” Review of International Organizations 4 (2009): 219-44. Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1997): pp. 33-66. Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons, “Introduction: The Case for Constructivist Political Economy,” in Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons, eds., Constructing the International Economy (Cornell University Press, 2010): 1-19. Kathleen McNamara, “Of Intellectual Monocultures and the Study of IPE,” Review of International Political Economy 16, 1 (2009): 72-84. Thomas Oatley, “Toward a political economy of complex interdependence,” European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming, 2019): 1-22.

Additional, recommended reading related to this topic Benjamin J. Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History (Princeton University Press, 2008). Susan Strange, “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect,” International Affairs 46, 2 (1970): 304-15. Susan Strange, States and Markets (Pinter Publishers, 1988). Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 2001) (esp. chapter 4, “The Study of International Political Economy”). Mark Blyth, ed., Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation (Routledge, 2009). Jeffry Frieden and Lisa Martin, “International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions,” in and Helen Milner, eds. Political Science: The State of the Discipline (W.W. Norton, 2002). Jeffry A. Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1996): pp. 25-47. Jeffry A. Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” in David Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1999): pp. 39-76. , States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Joseph Stiglitz, “The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2000): 1441-78. Frank Dobbin, “The Sociological View of the Economy,” in Dobbin, ed. The New Economic Sociology (Princeton University Press, 2004): pp. 1-48. Nicola Phillips and Catherine Weaver, eds., International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present and Future (Routledge, 2011). Penny Griffin, “Refashioning IPE: What and how gender analysis teaches international (global) political economy,” Review of International Political Economy 14, 4 (2007): 719-36.

4 Week 2 (October 4): origins and durability of int’l economic orders Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon, 1957), pp. 68-76, 130-162. John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, 2 (1982): pp. 379-416. Eric Helleiner, “The life and times of embedded liberalism: legacies and innovations since Bretton Woods,” Review of International Political Economy (forthcoming, 2019): 1-24. Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” World Politics 61, 1 (2009): 121-54. Daniel W. Drezner and Kathleen McNamara, “International Political Economy, Global Financial Orders and the 2008 Financial Crisis,” Perspectives on Politics 11, 1 (2013): 155-66. Mark Blyth and Matthias Matthijs, “Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the mystery of IPE’s missing macroeconomy,” Review of International Political Economy 24, 2 (2017): 203-31.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1981). Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order (Columbia University Press, 1987). Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton University Press, 1994). Kenneth A. Oye, Economic Discrimination & Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s (Princeton University Press, 1992). Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919- 1939 (Oxford University Press, 1992). Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (University of California Press, 1986). Charles P. Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly 25, 2 (1981): pp. 242-54. Michael C. Webb, The Political Economy of Policy Coordination: International Adjustment since 1945 (Cornell University Press, 1995). Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window (Cornell University Press, 1984). Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (International Monetary Fund, 1996). Peter Temin and David Vines, The Leaderless Economy: Why the World Economic System Fell Apart and How to Fix It (Princeton University Press, 2013). Daniel Drezner, The System Worked: How the World Stopped another Great Depression (Oxford University Press, 2014). Henry Farrell and John Quiggin, “Consensus, Dissensus, and Economic Ideas: Economic Crisis and the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism,” International Studies Quarterly 61, 2 (2017): 269-283.

5 Week 3 (October 11): the distributional politics of international trade James Alt et al., “The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry,” Comparative Political Studies 29, 6 (1996): 689-717. Edward Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety,” International Organization 63, 3 (2009): 425- 457. Benjamin Fordham and Katja Kleinberg, “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” International Organization 66 (2012): 311-328. Margaret Peters, “Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization,” World Politics 67, 1 (2015): 114-54. James Ashley Morrison, “Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization,” International Organization 66 (2012): 395-428. Cornelia Woll, Firm Interests: How Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade (Cornell University Press, 2008): pp. 1-38.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Michael Hiscox, “Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” International Organization, Vol. 55, 1 (2001): 1-46. Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59, 1 (2005): 107–43. Amaney Jamal and Helen V. Milner, “Economic self-interest, information, and trade policy preferences: evidence from an experiment in Tunisia,” Review of International Political Economy (forthcoming, 2019). Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Cornell University Press, 1993). Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions (Princeton University Press, 1989). Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” Journal of International Economics 54 (2001): 267-292. Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade,” International Organization 60 (2006): 469–98. Andy Baker, “Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs,” American Journal of Political Science 49, 4 (2006): 924-938. John S. Ahlquist, Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi, “Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle,” International Organization 68 (2014): 33-75. Adam Dean, From Conflict to Coalition (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Alexandra Guisinger, American Opinion on Trade (Oxford University Press, 2017). Timm Betz and Amy Pond, “The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy,” Journal of Politics 81, 2 (2019): 585-600.

6 Week 4 (October 18): power, law, and the “neoliberal” turn in the postwar international trade and monetary orders Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” American Economic Review 60, 2 (1970): 231-36. Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism ( Press, 2018): pp. 1-26, 182-217, 263-86. Nitsan Chorev, “The institutional project of neo-liberal globalism: The case of the WTO,” Theory and Society 34, 3 (2005): 317-55. David M. Andrews, “The Bretton Woods Agreement as an Invitation to Struggle,” in Christian Joerges, Bo Strath, and Peter Wagner, eds., The Economy as a Polity: The Political Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism (UCL Press, 2005): pp. 77-98. Beth A. Simmons, “The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs,” International Organization 54, 3 (2000): 573-602. David Andrews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 38, 2 (1994): 193-218. Ilene Grabel, “The Political Economy of ‘Policy Credibility’: The New-Classical Macroeconomics and the Remaking of Emerging Economies,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 24, 1 (2000): 1-19.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (University of California Press, 1985). Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton University Press, 2000). Judith L. Goldstein and Richard H. Steinberg, “Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics,” Law and Contemporary Problems 71, 1 (2008): 257-282. Moonhawk Kim, “Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the GATT/WTO,” World Politics 64, 3 (2012): 426-475. Kathleen McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Cornell University Press, 1998). Jacqueline Best, The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History of International Finance (Cornell University Press, 2005). Jeffrey M. Chwieroth and Timothy J. Sinclair, “How you stand depends on how we see: International capital mobility as a social fact,” Review of International Political Economy 20, 3 (2013): 457-485. Wesley W. Widmaier, Economic Ideas in Political Time (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Ilene Grabel, When Things Don’t Fall Apart: Global financial governance and developmental finance in an age of productive incoherence (MIT Press, 2017).

7 Week 5 (October 25): governing globalized finance Eric Helleiner, “Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing States Back In,” Review of International Political Economy 2, 2 (1995): 315-42. Stephen C. Nelson and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Uncertainty, Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2008,” International Organization 68, 2 (2014): 361-92. Philip Y. Lipscy, “Democracy and Financial Crisis,” International Organization 72, 4 (2018): 937-68. Sarah Bauerle Danzman, W. Kindred Winecoff, and Thomas Oatley, “All Crises Are Global: Capital Cycles in an Imbalanced International Political Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 61, 4 (2017): 907-23. Stephen C. Nelson, The Currency of Confidence: How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF’s Relationship with Its Borrowers (Cornell University Press, 2017): pp. 1-49. Aditi Sahasrabuddhe, “Drawing the line: the politics of federal currency swaps in the global financial crisis,” Review of International Political Economy (forthcoming, 2019).

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes (Basic Books, 1996). Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, 2009). Martin Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned – and Have Still to Learn – from the Financial Crisis (Penguin Press, 2014). Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital (Princeton University Press, 1996). Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Harvard University Press, 2007). Jeffrey Chwieroth, Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization (Princeton University Press, 2010). David Andrew Singer, Regulating Capital: Setting Standards for the International Financial System (Cornell University Press, 2007). Pierre-Hugues Verdier, “The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation,” Indiana Law Journal 88 (2011): 1405-1474. Abraham L. Newman and Elliot Posner, Voluntary Disruptions: International Soft Law, Finance, and Power (Oxford University Press, 2018). Geoffrey Garrett, “The Causes of Globalization,” Comparative Political Studies 33, 6/7 (2000): 941-70. Dennis P. Quinn and Carla Inclán, “The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization,” American Journal of Political Science 41, 3 (1997): 771-813. Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz, “Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform,” American Journal of Political Science 51, 4 (2007): 703-720. Jeffry Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization 45, 4 (1991): 425- 52. David A. Steinberg and Stephen C. Nelson, “The Mass Political Economy of Capital Controls,” Comparative Political Studies 52, 11 (2019): 1575-1609.

8 Week 6 (November 1): sovereign borrowing and creditworthiness Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries (Princeton University Press, 2007): pp. 3-9; 14-28; 86-113. Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Cornell University Press, 2003): pp. 1-51. Bruce G. Carruthers and Erin Lockwood, “Beyond Conditionality: How Contracts, Credit Ratings, and Credit Default Swaps Influence State Sovereignty,” in Eric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Glachant, and Jérôme Sgard, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Institutions of International Economic Governance and Regulation (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2020): pp. 1-29. Rawi Abdelal and Mark Blyth, “Just who put you in charge? We did: CRAs and the Politics of Ratings,” in Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, eds. Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2015): pp. 39-59. Natascha van der Zwan, “Making sense of financialization,” Socio-Economic Review 12 (2014): 99-129. Marieke De Goede, Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance (University of Minnesota Press, 2005): pp. 1-46.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Kenneth Schultz and Barry Weingast, “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition,” International Organization 57 (2003): pp. 3-42. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England,” Journal of Economic History 49 (1989): pp. 803-32. David Stasavage, States of Credit: Size, Power, and Development of European Polities (Princeton University Press, 2011). Fiona McGillivray and Alistair Smith, Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change (Princeton University Press, 2008). Timothy Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Cornell University Press, 2005). Marc Flandreau and Juan Flores, “The Peaceful Conspiracy: Bond Markets and International Relations during the Pax Britannica,” International Organization 66 (2012): 211-41. Vinod Aggarwal, Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling (Cambridge University Press, 1996). Julia Gray, The Company States Keep: International Organizations and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Stephen C. Nelson and David A. Steinberg, “Default Positions: What Shapes Public Attitudes about International Debt Disputes?” International Studies Quarterly 62, 3 (2018): 520-33.

9 Week 7 (November 8): varieties of capitalism Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Cornell University Press, 1985): pp. 17-79. Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Why Doesn’t the Have a European-Style Welfare State?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (2001): pp. 1-69. Peter Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” in Hall and Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-68. Ben Ross Schneider, Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America: Business, Labor, and the Challenges of Equitable Development (Cambridge University Press, 2014): pp. 1- 40; 139-59. Christopher A. McNally, “Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political Economy,” World Politics 64, 4 (2012): pp. 741–776.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Peter A. Hall, Governing the Economy: the Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (Oxford University Press, 1986). Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, 1990). Alexander Hicks and Lane Kenworthy, “Varieties of Welfare Capitalism,” Socio- Economic Review 1 (2003): 27-62. Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, eds. The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison (Cornell University Press, 2005). Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds. National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 1996). Orfeo Fioretos, Creative Reconstructions: Multilateralism and European Varieties of Capitalism after 1950 (Cornell University Press, 2011). , “Varieties of Capitalism: Trajectories of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity,” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 137- 59. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich, “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 39, 3 (2009): pp. 449-482. Mark Thatcher, “Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World,” Comparative Political Studies 37, 7 (2004): pp. 751-780. Mark Zachary Taylor, “Empirical Evidence Against Varieties of Capitalism’s Theory of Technological Innovation,” International Organization 58 (2004), 601-631 John L. Campbell, “The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons for Theories of Institutional Complementarity,” Socio-Economic Review 9 (2011): pp. 211-34. Andreas Nolke and Arjan Vliegenthart, “Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent Market Economies in East Central Europe,” World Politics 61, 4 (2009): pp. 670-702. Magnus Feldmann, “Global Varieties of Capitalism,” World Politics 71, 1 (2019): 162-96

10 Week 8 (November 15): old and new perspectives on economic development Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, 3 (1993): 51-69. Daron Acemoglu et al., “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Economy 127, 1 (2019): 47-99. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review 91, 5 (2001): 1369-1401. Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater, “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective,” International Organization 59 (2005): 327-61. Lant Pritchett, “The Cliff at the Border,” in Ravi Kanbur and Michael Spence, eds. Equity and Growth in a Globalizing World (World Bank, 2010): pp. 263-86.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (MIT Press, 2002). Albert O. Hirschman, “The Rise and Decline of Development Economics,” in Essays in Trespassing (Cambridge University Press, 1981): pp. 1-24. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press, 1982). Herman Schwartz, “Dependency or Institutions? Economic Geography, Causal Mechanisms, and Logic in the Understanding of Development,” Studies in Comparative International Development 42 (2007): 115-35. Carles Boix, “Democracy, Development, and the International System,” American Political Science Review 105, 4 (2011): 809-28. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Harvard University Press, 1962). Anne O. Krueger, “ Failures in Development,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, 3 (1990): 9-23. Nicolas van de Walle, Africa and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 (Cambridge University Press, 1997). Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrialized Countries (Cornell University Press, 1990). Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed. The Developmental State (Cornell University Press, 1999). Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development (Cambridge University Press, 2004). Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton University Press, 1990). Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton University Press, 1995). Vivek Chhibber, Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton University Press, 2003). John Williamson, “Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus,’” World Development 21, 8 (1993): 1329-36. Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?” Journal of Economic Literature XLIV (2006): 973-87.

11 Week 9 (Nov. 22): international economic relations and political conflict Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (University of California Press, 1945 [1980]): pp. 3-40. Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political Science Review 87, 2 (1993): pp. 408-420. Dale Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton University Press, 2014): pp. 1-51. Stephen G. Brooks, “Economic Actors’ Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace,” International Organization 66, 4 (2013): 863-88. Emily Meierding, “Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth,” Security Studies 25, 2 (2016): 258- 288. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape Coercion,” International Security 44, 1 (2019): 42-79.

Additional, recommended reading on this topic Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security (Princeton University Press, 2005). Peter Liberman, “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Gains,” International Security 21:1 (1996): 147-75. Peter Liberman, “The Spoils of Conquest,” International Security 18, 2 (1993): 125-53. Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War,” International Security 20, 4 (1996): 5-41. Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,” International Organization 55, 2 (2001): 391-438. Patrick J. McDonald and Kevin Sweeney, “The Achilles’ Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era,” World Politics 59, 3 (2007): 370-403. David M. Rowe, “World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," International Organization, 53, 2 (1999): 195-232. Michael Mousseau, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security 33, 4 (2009): 52-86. Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton University Press, 1995). Jonathan Kirshner, Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War (Princeton University Press, 2007). Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press, 2007).

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