Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans Universities

Report of an AAUP Special Committee Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans Universities CONTENTS I. Introduction . 61 II. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center . 66 III. University of New Orleans . 74 IV. Southern University at New Orleans . 81 V. Loyola University New Orleans . 88 VI. Tulane University . 101 VII. Overall Observations . 119 VIII. Overall Conclusions . 120 IX. Addendum . .. 124 59 WWW.AAUP.ORG MAY–JUNE 2007 Special Report Special Committee on Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans Universities ROBERT M. O’NEIL, chair (Law), University of Virginia NORMA C. COOK (Speech Communication), University of Tennessee MATTHEW W. FINKIN (Law), University of Illinois MYRON S. HENRY (Mathematics), University of Southern Mississippi HIRSCHEL KASPER (Economics), Oberlin College LORENZO MORRIS (Political Science), Howard University LAWRENCE S. POSTON (English), University of Illinois, Chicago PETER O. STEINER (Economics and Law), University of Michigan JORDAN E. KURLAND Principal Staff Officer NANETTE R. CRISOLOGO Staff Associate 60 MAY–JUNE 2007 WWW.AAUP.ORG I. Introduction The devastation that Hurricane Katrina inflicted on the storm’s landfall, and some had even begun to evacuate universities of New Orleans in late August 2005 is un- students to higher ground, the worst that seemed likely doubtedly the most serious disruption of American higher was a brief period of disruption. Tulane University, for education in the nation’s history.1 This was hardly the first example, announced the weekend before the hurricane time that collegiate facilities had been destroyed and aca- that it would be closed through the following Thursday, demic programs halted; one need only recall the savage apparently planning a return to normal operations with- tornadoes that leveled buildings at Central State University in the week. Even the day after the storm had hit and (Ohio) and Gustavus Adolphus College (Minnesota), or severe initial damage was manifest, Tulane continued to the earthquake that destroyed much of California State express publicly the hope that classes could resume by University, Northridge, or the effect of the September 11, September 7. 2001, attacks on lower Manhattan campuses such as Pace What actually befell New Orleans higher education on University and Borough of Manhattan Community College. August 29 far exceeded even the worst fears. While facili- Yet Hurricane Katrina was different in far more than ties at the two “uptown” private institutions (Tulane sheer magnitude of damage, although that measure University and Loyola University New Orleans) suffered alone would distinguish it from any previous calamities. less physical damage than did the inundated buildings No earlier disaster destroyed virtually an entire commu- at Southern University at New Orleans, the Louisiana nity, not only depriving affected institutions of usable State University Health Sciences Center, the University of facilities, but also depleting severely the student popula- New Orleans, Xavier University, and Dillard University, tion, leaving faculty and staff without homes, teaching electricity and communications were down throughout hospitals without patients, and so on through an the city. Although most of the universities had made unprecedented litany of woes. One could not in good some provision for remote backup of electronic data sys- conscience undertake such an inquiry as this one with- tems, gaining access to those records and files proved a out acknowledging the uniqueness of the experience daunting task well after the water had subsided. from which New Orleans’s universities are only now Gradually it became clear that the affected campuses beginning to recover. would have great difficulty reopening in the near future. Part of what made Katrina so disruptive to higher By the end of the first week of September, both Tulane education was the impossibility of anticipating its force and Loyola (the two most nearly intact campuses) and effect. Since intense storms are all too familiar announced that they would not reopen for any part of along the Gulf Coast, the community was theoretically the fall semester. Students were encouraged to enroll prepared even for a Category Five hurricane, including elsewhere, if possible; dozens of campuses in adjacent water that might breach the levees—but not for the states and much farther afield did find places for New complete destruction of critical sections of those levees. Orleans students—though usually on the understand- Although most New Orleans universities had adopted ing that when their home institutions reopened they and disseminated plans for closure by the eve of the would return. Roughly a month after Katrina, the Gulf Coast prepared for another disaster as Hurricane Rita neared shore, but this time the New Orleans area was 1. The text of this report was written in the first instance by mercifully spared; major damage was confined to the members of the Special Committee and approved by that coastal region of western Louisiana and east Texas, body for submission to Committee A on Academic Freedom notably the several campuses of Lamar University. and Tenure. With the approval of Committee A, the report The impact and cost of Katrina can be quantified, in draft form was subsequently sent to the chief adminis- although numbers fail to capture the many other trative officers of the universities at which investigations dimensions of devastation. Louisiana’s Commissioner had been authorized, to the chief officers of the AAUP of Higher Education, Dr. E. Joseph Savoie, reports that chapters and of the senates and other relevant faculty bod- 84,000 students and 15,000 faculty members were ini- ies, to faculty members who sought the Association’s assis- tially displaced by the hurricane. The state’s public tance, and to other persons directly concerned in the institutions of higher learning suffered between $500 and report. In light of the responses received, and with the edi- $600 million in damage, lost more than $150 million torial assistance of the Association’s staff (which assisted in revenue and tuition, and suffered $75 million in the Special Committee throughout the process), this final immediate budget cuts. Another assessment reported a report has been prepared for publication. 61 total direct revenue loss of $229 million by Louisiana’s WWW.AAUP.ORG MAY–JUNE 2007 Special Report public colleges and universities, virtually all of it in of the governing board, senior administrators, and fac- the immediate New Orleans area. Although the mone- ulty and student leaders. tary losses of the private institutions are harder to Second, the development of such plans should pro- quantify, comparable estimates emerged in the ensu- vide an occasion for renewal of the institution’s, the ing months. board’s, and the administration’s commitment to aca- The far deeper harm defies quantification or physical demic freedom and due process, including a recogni- description. For faculty and staff who lacked not only tion of the stresses and pressures upon those abiding telephone and Internet access but also places to live values that may result from a major disaster or emer- after their homes had been destroyed, the measure of gency. Thus the reaffirmation should include a loss seems incalculable. For scientists who eventually “notwithstanding” or “no matter what” corollary. returned to their flooded laboratories only to find that Third, the disaster plan should specify the steps that years—even decades—of research had been destroyed, might become prudent or unavoidable in the event of a the impact of the storm is well beyond even the most prolonged inability of the institution to function. The sympathetic conjecture. Throughout the first year fol- circumstances that might occasion major changes in lowing the hurricane, a brave hope that as many as 60 programs or personnel should be anticipated and poten- percent of former residents of the city had remained or tial changes should be examined in the context of exist- returned eventually yielded to the grim reality that only ing university policies—thus reducing the need that, as two-fifths were present. And for those who had remained will be seen, some of the New Orleans administrations or returned, much of the city still lacked electricity and apparently felt to abandon preexisting policies without even water, making survival a challenge and postponing indicating why they could not adhere to emergency pro- indefinitely any prospect of a return to normal, pre- cedures that were already on the books. Wherever the storm conditions. existing policy fails to provide adequate guidance to Nothing approaching the magnitude of Hurricane address a major crisis, revision should be undertaken in Katrina may ever have affected American higher educa- more tranquil times. tion, and the Special Committee fervently hopes there Fourth, simulated previews of emergency conditions will never again be a comparable challenge. Still, disas- might be undertaken, perhaps on an annual basis. The ter and devastation can hardly be dismissed from the governing board should participate in reviewing and planning process. Whether it is tornadoes in Ohio and responding to plausible case studies of such eventuali- Minnesota, earthquakes and fires in California, hijacked ties, thus preparing for the real challenge they would aircraft destroying buildings in New York, or floods very much hope to avoid. The administration and the along the Gulf Coast and in Florida, the threat is inex- essential

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