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Niger 2019 Crime & Safety Report

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Niger 2019 Crime & Safety Report Niger 2019 Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Niamey, Niger. The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Niger at Level 3, indicating travelers should reconsider travel to the country due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Overall Crime and Safety Situation The U.S. Embassy in Niamey does not assume responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms appearing in this report. The American Citizen Services (ACS) Unit cannot recommend a particular individual or location and assumes no responsibility for the quality of service provided. Review OSAC’s Niger-specific webpage for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. Crime Threats There is considerable risk from crime in Niamey. Crime occurs at all hours in Niger. Non-violent crimes (e.g. pickpocketing, purse snatching, and backpack/cell phone theft) are present in major cities, notably in/around places where Westerners gather. Within Niamey, avoid the Night Market; criminals loiter in the area, which is notorious for pickpocketing, purse snatching, mugging, and assaults. Other markets, the area around the Gaweye and Grand Hotels, the National Museum, and Kennedy Bridge are also high-risk areas. Violent crimes (e.g. muggings, assaults) are not as common as non-violent crimes, and typically occur after dark. Assailants may be aggressive and display a weapon during a robbery; knives are the most frequently employed weapon, as some Nigeriens carry knives or machetes as part of their normal dress. Vehicle thefts are prevalent in Niamey; however, incidents have decreased since the 2016 arrests of a Nigerien/Nigerian theft ring. Most carjackings reported to police occur along Niger’s southern border. There has been an overall decrease in residential robbery in Niamey. Home invasions and residential robberies occur primarily after dark and can be violent. There have been several incidents in which assailants attacked residential guards or occupants. Although thieves typically choose to rob homes that have no visible residential security measures, these measures have not stopped robbers in some cases, including those targeting diplomat and NGO residences. In addition, there have been numerous reports of commercial and NGO office robberies. 1 Cybersecurity Issues Due to the lack of cyber infrastructure and the relatively low rate of internet penetration, the prevalence of cybercrime is thought to be low. However, information on cybercrime trends in Niger may be lacking due to the limited abilities of Niger’s security forces and law enforcement officials to track, investigate, and prevent cybercrime. Other Areas of Concern Niger’s location between West and North Africa, vast open deserts, and lengthy porous borders make it a transit point for terrorists, criminals, migrants, weapons, contraband, and illegal drugs. Loosely organized criminal elements operate in Niger. The country has long been a transit route for smugglers. In northern Niger, within the Sahara Desert, the seminomadic, pastoral Tuareg ethnic group has long facilitated cross-border licit and illicit trade, including the smuggling of contraband (e.g. weapons, illegal drugs, fuel, vehicles, humans, cigarettes). Along the border with Nigeria, criminal elements smuggle everything from fuel to rice to automobiles. Smuggling is often done via caravans of trucks through the desert. The 2011 war in Libya prompted a rise in smuggling activity in Niger, and there have been clashes between smugglers and security forces. Smuggling activities have increased since 2016, as the government of Niger has cracked down on migrant transportation, which used to play an important role in the economy of central and northern Niger. The criminalization of migrant transport has driven the business underground, encouraging more violent practitioners willing and able to take greater risks and feeding the traffic of drugs and weapons. Niger is confronting a number of major security threats, including increasing criminal and terrorist activity in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions, which border Mali and Burkina Faso; spillover terrorist activity in the Diffa region from Nigeria due to Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS- WA); threats from ISIS elements from Libya; and growing regional instability in the Sahel. In addition, the Agadez region is a major corridor for the illicit trafficking of goods, weapons, and people between Europe, North Africa, and West Africa; criminal elements, armed groups, and terrorists operate in this area. The Government of Niger has regularly renewed the State of Emergency declaration first made in 2015 in the Diffa region, and in 2017, extended the State of Emergency to seven provinces in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions due to attacks emanating from Mali. A government statement noted it would enforce a state of emergency in the districts of Ouallam, Ayorou, Bankilare, Abala and Banibangou in Tillabéri, and in Tassara and Tillia districts of Tahoua. The decision followed a spate of deadly attacks that killed 16 soldiers in Ouallam and an attack that killed five gendarmes in Wanzarbe, Bankilare district. The State of Emergency grants security forces special powers, including the right to search homes. The U.S. Government has limited ability to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in remote and rural areas, as U.S. government employees must obtain special authorization to travel outside Niamey due to security concerns. Outside of Niamey, all U.S. Embassy personnel may travel only during daylight hours in a minimum two-vehicle convoy accompanied by armed Nigerien government security escorts. Nigerien authorities do reserve the right to restrict travel based on the security situation along any intended route. The security climate in Niger can change quickly, and Nigerien authorities may decide to take additional security measures. 2 Following the murder of a French tourist in Agadez in 2005, the Nigerien government began requiring NGOs to register and inform the government of each trip they plan to take. To avoid detention and/or expulsion by authorities, NGO workers should abide by the following standard operating procedures: • Make sure that your NGO has received official recognition from the government. Visit the Managing Office of Decentralized Cooperation and Non-Governmental Organizations (Direction de la Coopération Décentralisée et des Organisations Non Governementales) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et de la Coopération). • If your international NGO sponsor is without a permanent presence in Niger, verify that your NGO has informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation at least two weeks prior to the start of a mission. This notice should be in writing and should include the purpose of the mission, the dates of the mission, where the mission will take place, and the types and license plate numbers of the vehicles involved. Copy the Interior Ministry on this notice. • If your NGO is headquartered in Niger, verify that your group has informed the Ministry of Planning, Land Management, and Community Development (Ministère du Plan, de l’Aménagement du Territoire et du Développement Communautaire) at least two weeks prior to the start of a mission. This notice must be in writing and include the purpose of the mission, the names of the individuals who will be working for the NGO on the mission, the dates of the mission, where the mission will take place, and the types and license plate numbers of the vehicles involved. Copy the Interior Ministry on this notice. Ask for a receipt of any notification provided to a Ministry. • Carry a copy of the official recognition (Arrêté) of the right of your NGO to operate in Niger. • Prior to beginning a mission in Niger, NGO workers should present themselves at the regional governor’s office. NGO workers should ask for a receipt of the documents they present to the governor (or highest-ranking official available). Provide the governor with the same written notification you provided to the required ministries. Tourists are free to take pictures anywhere in Niger, except near military installations, radio and television stations, the Presidential Palace, airports, or diplomatic facilities. Tourists should not photograph military or police personnel, or political or student demonstrations, and should seek prior permission before taking a close-up “portrait” photo of an individual. For more information, review OSAC’s report, Picture This: Dos and Don’ts for Photography. Transportation Safety Situation For more information, review OSAC’s report, Security in Transit: Airplanes, Public Transport, and Overnights. Road Safety and Road Conditions Road conditions in major cities are hazardous. While there are some paved roads in Niamey, most residential streets are dirt or sand. Niamey has a number of roundabouts, which are often sources of congestion; different traffic circles have different rules of priority, which contribute to the high incidence of traffic accidents. Drivers can be aggressive and often disregard the rules of the road. 3 Motorcycles inundate the roads in Niamey. Motorcycle accidents occur frequently; many result in fatalities. The large number of motorcycles, bicycles, vendor carts, broken-down vehicles, beggars, and pedestrians on the streets makes driving a challenge. In addition, livestock (e.g. camels, cattle, goats) wander in the streets. Traffic police are present at large intersections, and conduct law enforcement checks at numerous points. Police are generally professional, but some traffic officers attempt to extort money from drivers. All tollbooths (péages) at city limits on major roads are official and should be respected. A driver will receive a receipt of toll payment; maintain your receipt for the return trip on the same road. Despite the overt presence of traffic police, there are frequent vehicle accidents and road hazards that pose a risk for motorist safety.
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