Risk and Resilience Assessment Niger 2016 Annex 2: Niger Risk and Resilience Assessment 1) Background Niger at a glance The republic of Niger is a landlocked country located where northern and sub-Saharan Africa meet. It is a vast territory of 1,3 million km2, with a low population density given its 19.1 million inhabitants (2014 census). Niger has the highest demographic growth rate in the world, at 3,9 percent per year, and a very young population, 50 percent of which is under the age of fifteen. It is home to several ethnic groups, including the Hausa (which compose around half the population, present in the South East), Djerma (South West), Tuareg (North), Fulani (South-West), Arab (South), and Kanuri (South East). Niger’s economy largely depends on the agriculture and livestock sectors. Extractive industries are also a major contributor to the economy, amounting to 10 percent of the GDP and 50 percent of exportation revenues. Niger is the fourth-largest uranium producer in the world and could become second if the Imouraren site is finally put in production.1 Gold mining has remained largely informal to date, but recently authorities have adopted measures to begin formalizing the sector. Niger is faced with a high incidence of poverty and low human development. In 2014, 44.5 percent of the population was poor,2 and Niger ranked second to last out of 188 countries on the 2016 Human Development Index. Although poverty dropped between 2005 and 2014, it was unable to outpace the rate of demographic growth, which was four times higher during the same period,3 and as a result the absolute number of poor continues to rise. Many poor are caught in a poverty trap, due to inadequate assets holding, low nutritional and health status, and lack of education (72 percent of the population has no formal education), maintaining them in a low productivity status. 4 Disparities between urban and rural areas are extremely strong, with poverty at only 8.7 percent in the capital city and in other urban areas in 2014, against 51.4 percent in rural areas during the same year.5 The lower poverty regions include the capital city of Niamey, Agadez in the north, and Diffa in the southeast. These three regions comprise 12 percent of the population and less than 5 percent of the poor. The high poverty regions are the remaining five regions in the southwest of the country (Tahoua, Dosso, Maradi, Tillabdri, and Zinder). Historic background Niger has a long history of political instability and contained violence, punctuated by military coups,6 rebel movement uprisings and terrorist incursions. The colonial era left a deep mark on the country’s social organization, promoting tense and violent social relations. In the 1960s, the Sawaba armed group, a political movement composed mainly of Hausa, led the first post-independence violent movement and attempted to assassinate President Diori. The nomadic populations of the North have also led rebellions against the authorities, including the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s. Since the early 2000s, Niger has also been affected by the onset of violent extremism emanating from terrorist groups based in neighboring countries. The most severe terrorist threat comes from Boko Haram, which began an insurgency in northeastern Nigeria in 2009, 1 Imouraren is a uranium mining site 160 km north of Agadez for which Areva obtained the exploitation permit in 2009. Activities were suspended in 2015, due to low uranium prices. 2 $1.90 a day, 2011 PPP, 2014. 3 Between 2005 and 2014, the annual population growth rate reached 3.9 percent, compared with a 1 percent poverty reduction rate. 4 World Bank, 2016b 5 Ibid 6 The country experienced 3 coups (1974, 1996, and 2010), two coup attempts (1976 and 2015), one presidential assignation (1999) and one solider mutiny (2002). 1 and pursued its territorial expansion towards the Nigerien border. Terrorist attacks have also been perpetrated in northwestern Niger on the border with Mali. Insurgent actors include the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS, the Islamic State’s local branch led by Abou Walid Al Sahraoui) and Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal- Mouslimin (JNIM, a group with al-Qaeda ties). Difficulties in addressing Niger’s fragility are compounded by pronounced structural weaknesses and strong regional and ethnic inequalities. Niger’s economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. Climate variability in particular is strongly correlated with economic performance, and climate shocks are the most important contributor to adverse changes in the depth and severity of poverty. The northern regions and populations are the most affected by droughts and food crises, while the southern regions benefit from higher rainfall and agricultural productivity. These disparities find resonance in Niger’s history of uneven development, as colonial and post-colonial authorities concentrated their investments in the country’s Southwest.7 As a consequence of this legacy, at the country’s independence elites from this part of Niger, mainly from the Djerma community, were in a privileged position to access education and civil service positions, while other communities, such as the Tuareg and Hausa, continued to suffer from marginalization.8 Despite Niger’s fitful political history, the country has maintained a fragile stability sustained by a limited access order system. In this system, a political settlement is established by an elite coalition comprising elements from various political, economic, defense and religious networks, which also reflects regional and communitarian affiliations. The elite group is built around a consensus to share political power and economic resources, and provides stability to the country. The army is a key actor9 and a de facto arbitrator within this political sphere. It has played an ambiguous role, orchestrating coups which have been motivated in part by corporatist interests, and in part by the will to restore an equilibrium when the ruling party has become too powerful or unresponsive and unpopular. The 2010 coup, for example, followed accusations that President Tandja was inefficiently addressing the severe consequences of that year’s drought. Current context In March 2016, President Mahamadou Issoufou was re-elected by a landslide10 for a second term, partly as a result of the opposition’s boycott of the poll’s second round. The elections took place amid a tense context of political tensions. This includes the arrest and imprisonment in November 2015 of Hama Amadou, a former Prime Minister and President of the National Assembly and a serious contender in the presidential race. Dissensions had already been growing during President Issoufou’s previous mandate, prompting the appointment of major opposition figures in a new Government in September 2013, including civil society members and prominent businessmen. Nevertheless, this strategy is built on very fragile and reversible alliances. The country is facing a rapidly escalating scale and frequency of jihadist attacks on the border with Mali since early 2017. In March 2017, the authorities declared a state of emergency in seven departments of the regions of Tillaberi and Tahoua11. The latest attack took place on October 21, 2017, when the 7 ICG 2013. 8 Ibid. 9 The army has occupied positions in forty out of forty-nine governments between 1974 and 2002 10 President Mahamadou Issoufou won 92.4 percent of votes, while his contender Hama Amadou, who was flown to France the week prior to the election for emergency medical treatment, took close 7.4 percent. 11 Ouallam, Ayorou, Bankilare, Abala and Banibangou in Tillaberi and Tassara and Tilia in Tahoua 2 gendarmerie camp of Ayorou, 180km north of Niamey, was attacked, killing at least 13 gendarmes. This assault comes only two weeks after the attack on a Malian refugee camp in Tazalit (Tahoua region), during which 22 Nigerien soldiers were executed. In addition, for the first time in the region, four American forces were killed in a jihadist ambush on October 4, alongside five Nigerien soldiers, during a mixed patrol near Tongo Tongo in the Tillabery region (approximately 120 km north of Niamey). The number of fatalities from attacks on civilians of the Tillabery and Tahoua regions, especially nomadic communities, could surpass those against security forces, but often go unreported.12 A regional force aimed at tackling terrorism and transnational crime was created by the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) in February 2017. However, they lack funds and resources, and their effectiveness remains to be seen as they are faced with a huge area to place under surveillance.13 Jihadist attacks, poor health conditions and climatic shocks have led to a humanitarian crisis in Niger. As of mid-September 2017, there were 2.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase by 300,000 people compared with initial estimated for 2017, due to rising insecurity, the increase in cereal prices and a Hepatitis E epidemic in Diffa.14 20 percent of agricultural villages monitored by OCHA have been unable to sow during the 2017 crop year, due to insecurity, lack of access to seeds and locust. As a result, 2.7 million people risk food insecurity in the near future.15 The security crisis has displaced 250.000 people in the Diffa region, including IDPs and Nigerian refugees, which currently rely on foreign aid for survival. Niger accounts globally for nine percent of the people displaced by Boko Haram. At least 450 civilians have been killed, wounded or kidnapped between February 2015 and August 2017, including the kidnapping of 33 children and 6 women in the Ngalewa village (Bosso) in July of this year. 408.000 people, i.e. 50 percent of the Diffa population, require at least one form of humanitarian assistance as a result of insecurity and the loss of livelihoods.16 In addition, Niger has been affected by heavy rainfall and floods, impacting 194,000 people and claiming 54 lives throughout the territory, with 80 percent of displaced people living in the regions of Dosso, Niamey, Maradi and Agadez.