By Emmaculate Asige Liaga and Cori Wielenga

SOCIAL COHESION FROM THE TOP-DOWN OR BOTTOM-UP?THE CASES OF SOUTH SUDAN AND BURUNDI by Emmaculate Asige Liaga and Cori Wielenga

Both Burundi and South Sudan experience intractable conﬂicts which national and international actors struggle to resolve. Efforts to consolidate the nation-state and foster social cohesion seem to be unsuccessful. As has been well documented in the literature, top-down efforts to facilitate social cohesion by international and national actors are not enough to foster sustainable peace. Yet the dynamics and actors involved in bottom-up interventions for social cohesion are less well understood than elite interventions. This article contributes to a deeper understanding of the bottom- up interventions and explores the vertical integration between top-down and bottom-up efforts at social cohesion that exist along the local, national, and international trajectory in the two cases. Particularly in contexts such as South Sudan and Burundi, which are characterized by societies that are held together through complex social and relational networks, and in which informal governance and conﬂict resolution mechanisms hold high levels of legitimacy, this under-researched aspect of social cohesion may hold critical insights in terms of consolidating nation- states. The article provides an argument for the consideration of bottom- up approaches for more integration of social cohesion mechanisms.

INTRODUCTION

In the context of increasing intrastate conﬂict in Africa, there have been questions around how people in a given political society cohere or “stick together.” Our discussion is situated in the growing concern with the limitations of statebuilding as a means of securing sustained peace and social cohesion.1 There is a growing interest in nationbuilding as an alternative way to approach rebuilding divided societies, but

389 390 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 questions remain as to whether nationbuilding can be engineered from the top-down, or emerges organically from the bottom-up. We argue that it is in the intersection of top-down and bottom-up interventions that sustainable social cohesion may occur. We discuss this in relation to the cases of Burundi and South Sudan which both have experiences of intractable conflict but are also characterized by societies that are held together through complex social and relational networks, and in which informal governance processes and conflict resolution mechanisms hold high levels of legitimacy. Many of these insights are based on interviews with members of international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in South Sudan and Burundi between 2011 and 2018. The interviews took part during a very unstable time in both countries. In Burundi, the instability was partly due to the impact of the previous civil wars that ended in 2005 while there was active civil war in South Sudan that started in 2013, three years after their secession from Sudan. This complicated traveling in South Sudan outside the capital of Juba; however, many organizations had their headquarters in the capital. The qualitative data we present here provide illustrative examples that draw out key insights about top-down and bottom-up approaches to facilitating social cohesion. We work from the assumption that sustained peace is not possible without a degree of social cohesion. Social cohesion, as with so many related terms, remains vague and ill-defined term that an array of actors have instrumentalized during peace processes. Some argue that social cohesion is at the level of trust and solidarity while theorists such as Ian Gough and Gunnar Olofsson2 have inclined toward social integration and system integration. This confusion in meaning let Ber- nard Paul3 to conclude that social cohesion is a “quasi concept” that is flexible enough to be used by anyone. Toward the definition used in this article, Joseph Chan, Ho-Pong To, and Elaine Chan argue that social cohesion is about how well people in a society “cohere” or stick together. Despite the vagueness, they call for a definition in which three components are simultaneously met. First, a cohering community is one in which there is trust. Second, a cohering community is one in which people are able to help one another and cooperate with one another. Third, a cohering community is one in which people share a common sense of belonging, which is manifested in their behavior.4 This examination of both top-down and bottom-up efforts toward social cohesion in South Sudan and Burundi helps to explain why elite Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 391 processes to date have failed to secure sustainable peace and to assess what resources are available at the level of communities that might facilitate social cohesion. We start by discussing what we mean by describing these societies as “relational” and what the concept of the “relational society” means in terms of social cohesion. We then describe top-down and bottom-up interventions that have been used in attempts to promote social cohesion in South Sudan and Burundi to date. Finally, we make the argument that social cohesion is most likely to occur in the vertical integration of top-down and bottom-up efforts that exist along the local, national, and international trajectory in the two cases. The qualitative data from these interviews clearly indicate that any understanding of how social cohesion is fostered depends upon a deep understanding of the relational nature of the societies in question.

RELATIONAL SOCIETIES

There is a growing literature that stresses the relational nature of many African societies and that these societies are composed of complex networks of relationships. Harri Englund5 argues that the relationships between people need to be the starting point of the politics of recognition in Africa. The social contract is not between people and the state, in this context, but between people with one another.6 Thus, rather than recognizing or acknowledging distinct communities of difference, one would acknowledge the relations that unite those groups, and to acknowledge these relations not only as something that is inserted between communities after they emerge, but as intrinsic to the very emergence of the communities. Of highest value in these communities is the well-being of the community as a whole. As Alcinda Manuel Honwana7 describes in the Mozambican context,

If the relationships between human beings and their ancestors, between them and the environment, and among themselves are balanced and harmonious, health ensues. However, if they are disrupted in any way, the wellbeing of the community is jeopar- dised. There is a complex set of rules and practices that govern the maintenance of well-being and fecundity in the community. 392 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

These networks or webs of relationships have been understood not only to be between people, but point to the cosmological, or metaphysical. They include the relationships between the living, the not yet living, and the living dead.8 The intrinsic importance of the intersection of the physical and metaphysical is most visible in the cleansing rituals that are practiced in many African societies.9 However, interventions in divided societies tend to take a state- centric approach, with a focus on statebuilding and nationbuilding, rather than a focus on rebuilding the relationships between people. We argue that for people to cohere or “stick together,” a more comprehensive approach is needed that brings together actors at the international, national, and local level. This fosters top-down nationbuilding and bottom-up organic relationship-building. Concepts within African philosophy such as “Ubuntu” give the idea that African societies may hold a specific way of being that allows for a particularly high level of social cohesion. The term “Ubuntu” was popularized during South Africa’s reconciliation process. In this context, Ubuntu was associated with the Nguni proverb Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, which Bishop Desmond Tutu in the mid-1990s translated to mean “a person is a person through other people.” Ubuntu stresses the way in which, within African philosophy, interdependency and community are emphasized over individualism.10 But the term has a much longer history, and terms with similar mean- ings can be found all over sub-Saharan Africa, such as Ujamaa in East Africa. There is some agreement, particularly among African scholars, that there is a shared African philosophy, or African humanism, across the continent. Richard H. Bell11 suggests this has to do with traditional values of mutual respect for one’s fellow kinsman and a sense of position and place in the larger order of things, including one’s social order, the natural order, and the cosmic order. African humanism is often understood in comparison with Western individualism, and as the South African writer Mphahlele Es’kia argues, in contrast to this, the African begins with the community and then determines what the individual’s place and role should be in relation to the community.12 Social cohesion is also a term that has often been referred to in the South African post-Apartheid context, and has found its way into many policy documents related to nationbuilding. Beyond South Africa, the term is often found in peace agreements and policy Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 393 documents in places such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya. It is a term that has increasingly been associated with political instrumentalization and attempts at enforced top-down unity by governments. In our analysis, we attempt to move beyond the binary between top-down and bottom-up approaches and begin to explore how these might be integrated. Bringing the terms “ubuntu” and “social cohesion” together in this study allows us to explore both facilitated top- down and organic bottom-up cohesion, by a variety of nonstate actors in Burundi and South Sudan. Its findings particularly contribute to a deeper understanding of the bottom-up interventions and explore the vertical integration between top-down and bottom-up efforts at social cohesion that exist along the local, national, and international trajectory in the two cases. Particularly in contexts such as South Sudan and Burundi, which are characterized by societies held together through complex social and relational networks, and in which informal governance and conflict resolution mechanisms hold high levels of legitimacy, this under-researched aspect of social cohesion may hold critical insights in terms of consolidating nation-states.

Top-Down And Bottom-Up Approaches

Manase Kudzai Chiweshe13 describes top-down approaches of social cohesion as state-centric, as they are carried out by state bureaucracies. He argues that,“[t]op-down approaches are thus top heavy, requiring enormous financial outlays that do not necessarily flow to the communities or meet any needs of the victims or sur- vivors.”14 Andrea Kathryn Talentino15 observes that the prevailing paradigm of conventional approaches toward peace is referred to as the transformation of war-shattered states into democratic market states and holding an immediate democratic election. In support of this view, Hoffmann16 adds market liberalism, humanitarian assistance, formal court systems, and the rule of law to the principles of the top-down approaches that attempt to end conflict and transform countries recovering from civil wars, violent conflicts, and natural disasters. Within this framework, one way international actors and governments have attempted to foster top-down social cohesion is through the peace agreement, which offers a roadmap for how a society should cohere.17 This has only had limited effects, though, as often what is 394 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 agreed upon around the negotiation table is not implemented or does not reach the people on the ground most affected by the conflict. For instance, Chiweshe18 questions the efficacy of top-down approaches to social cohesion by arguing that political expediency, mistrust, and polarization lead to the undermining of efforts at social cohesion. Crit- ics such as Roland Paris19 have gone so far as to describe this “top- down” approach toward peace as authoritarian. As an alternative to this, several scholar practitioners advanced arguments for an “elective” and “transformative” approaches “from below,” also known as “bottom-up” or community-based methods toward cohesion. Betts Fetherston20 argues that a bottom-up approach would be “counter-hegemonic.”21 This strategy involves a focus on the capacities toward building of trust and togetherness of communities that were intrinsic to communities in conflict situations.22 Advo- cates of this approach argue that “bottom-up” or “micro-level” community and grassroots approaches, in contrast to macrolevel “top- down” operations, involve providing support for those affected by armed conflict to allow them to more effectively develop and voice their own diagnoses of the problems they faced, and to challenge and transform the wider relations and structures in which violence is embedded. For instance, Alex Thomson and Niki Jazdowska point out that “...local communities hold the key to a more inclusive and sustainable restorative justice process.” This approach, therefore, begins with the premise that those who have borne the brunt of the violence, and must live with its effects, are in the best position to devise appro- priate solutions and responses to repair their communities.24 These bottom-up approaches refer to the process of identifying the structural cause of a conflict and using elements such as mediation, truth-saying, joint problem-solving, rituals, negotiation, people-to-people dialogue, the exchange of cattle, and marriage rituals to promote sustainable peace.25 David Udofia26 argues that bottom-up approach centers primarily on negotiation, mediation, conciliation, pacification, and appeasement. Supporting the same viewpoint, Kwadwo Asafo- Agyei Okrah27 opines that traditional societies resolved conflicts through internal social control mechanisms. Taking all these aspects together, Bamidele Ojo’s review of I. William Zartman28 emphasizes that the task of the bottom-up approach is to re-establish contact between individuals, families, and communities to rebuild social harmony. It is thus argued that this approach is set to promote sustainable peace for war-torn countries.29 Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 395

However, bottom-up approaches alone cannot achieve social cohesion. This is why there is an increasing awareness that social cohesion requires a coming together of top-down and bottom-up approaches and actors in order to bring about the kind of social coherence needed for sustained peace.30

South Sudan

The conflict in South Sudan is a culmination of the liberation war that took place between 1956 and 2005 between the Arabic-Muslim north and the Christian south and then the current intrastate civil war that erupted in 2013.31 This has successively led to the lack of trust in communities that have been pitted against each other. This is demonstrated in the first part of this section, which argues that not only has the civil war led to the breakdown of social cohesion between and within communities in South Sudan, but it also has exposed the fissures that existed in “southern” Sudan prior to the secession. The second part outlines the attempts at social cohesion in the newly established South Sudan through top-down and bottom-up approaches. The argument is made that the top-down elite approaches to social cohesion have resulted in very little progress. The polarizing effect of the war in South Sudan is markedly evident in the division between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups. However, low-level conflicts exist among almost all parts of society. There are nonetheless many ethnic groups who live peacefully with one another. We argue that understanding the resources within communities that allow people to live peacefully with one another is of critical importance for understanding how to build social cohesion, both vertically and horizontally, in a nation-state. This discussion is based on interviews that were held during two field visits in 2018. The visits included interviews with internally displaced persons, representatives of international nonprofit organizations, governmental bodies, opposition groups, local nongovernmental organizations, and traditional leaders based in Hai Malakal, Juba, South Sudan. In addition, interviews with refugees and members of nongovernmental organizations working on South Sudan and based in Nairobi, Kenya, were also held. Historical and Political Context. The Republic of South Sudan has been experiencing protracted civil war. Following Sudan’s independence from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (the joint British 396 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 and Egyptian government that administrated Sudan) on January 1, 1956, a civil war for greater autonomy for southern Sudan broke out.32 The first civil war started in 1955, ending with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Agitated by the “Islamic revolution” which abro- gated the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, the second civil war started in 1983 and ended in 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).33 The nature of historical progression of the civil wars since 1955 reveals a degree of unity and cohesion of the South Sudanese in their fight against “Arab” oppression and domination.34 It has been argued that apart from such a unifying force, the peoples of South Sudan remain “socially and politically disparate, divided by geography, ethnicity and localized subsistence economies and kin-based loyalties.”35 This became evident in the fissures between communities in August of 1991, where the Southerners grappled with a deepening regional and ethnicized violence. This caused a split within the liberation movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, an ethnic Nuer, broke away with several other discontented SPLA officers to form the SPLA-Nasir faction. John Garang, an ethnic Dinka from Bor, lead the SPLM/A- Torit, also known as the SPLM/A-Mainstream.36 Although the rift was initially ideological difference among the highest ranks of the southern military leadership, it quickly became a full-scale conflict between the Dinka (Jieng) and the Nuer (Nei Ti Naath), the two largest ethnic groups in the South who contributed most of the liberation fighters in the SPLA.37 This tragic leadership split caused the problematic ethnic group rift that has become more significant than the north– south conflicts previously dominating Sudanese politics.38 This ethnic division was a reference point that pivoted the “new war” that erupted on December 15, 2013, following a weekend meeting of the National Liberation Council (NLC), a party organ of the SPLM. The conflict was precipitated by internal power dynamics of the ruling party, SPLM, dividing it into SPLM-in Government and SPLM-in Opposition and their respective supporters.39 South Sudan was thus inevitably led to fragmentation of different supporters and communities along political lines. The factions, however, are by no means monolithic, and some factions remain uncommitted. The conflict has resulted in extraordinary acts of cruelty that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity where civilians were not only caught up in the violence but also directly targeted.40 Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 397

This has expanded the conflict to include other armed groups, mush- rooming into further outbursts of local level violence in the former Upper Nile, Equatoria, and Bahr El Ghazal.41 Human Rights Watch42 documented widespread killings of civilians based on ethnic lines, mass destruction, and looting of civilian properties. Both government and opposition forces have been responsible for widespread pillage.43 For instance, it is alleged that the Presidential Guards (Tiger Battalion) conducted quarter-to-quarter searches in areas inhabited by the Nuer ethnic group in the capital Juba. In retaliation, Nuer soldiers reportedly killed Dinka families in Bor, Malakal, and Bentiu.44 Consequentially, thousands of people fled their homes, making them more vulnerable to attacks from rival ethnic groups in addition to the refugee crisis. As a consequence of the absence of government security, new groups continue to emerge.45 This is seen with the Lou Nuer “White Army”46 who, like other nonstate armed groups in South Sudan, are purportedly set up to protect their communities against external threats and to defend property and livestock. Groups performing this role are very common among pastoralist communities. For example, among the Dinka, they are called Gulweng; and among the Otuho of former Eastern Equatoria State, they are known as the Monyimiji,a group known to mobilize at times for political purposes.47 Violence in South Sudan confirms the fragility of the nation. The conflict has also pitted the Nuer and the Dinka against other ethnic groups, such as those living in the former Equatoria region of South Sudan.48 The lack of cohesion between the communities has also fueled rampant hate speech in the country. As the director of Screen of Rights described,

We have developed a lexicon of words that are offensive and inﬂammatory, including the term ‘MTN’, which has been linked to incidents in 2017 when buses travelling along the road from Uganda were stopped by armed gunmen asking if any MTNs were on board. Dinkas were then pulled out and killed. At the time, the term MTN (a large mobile phone provider that uses the slogan “everywhere you go”) was being widely used on social media to refer to Dinkas. Additionally, “Nyagat” or traitor is another common social media insult aimed at the armed opposi- tions, and “Nuer Wew” (Nuer of money) refers to those 398 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

politicians, regarded as sell-outs, who have opted to work for the government. This kind of language is used to catalyze violence.49

These kinds of challenges have led Kate Almquist Knopf50 to point out the negligible investment by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in the South Sudanese people and infrastructure, which speaks to the degree of the breakdown of social cohesion. Top-Down Social Cohesion. Attempts at social cohesion from the top-down have been problematic and reduced to an exercise of asser- tion of power by the international community and a platform to address self-interest by the GoSS and its opposition rather than result- ing in unity, both vertically between the government and the society and horizontally, between the conflicting parties. The intervention of international actors has also been known to reverse the positive cohesion in South Sudan. For instance, the government of Uganda has come under scrutiny for their deployment of the Uganda Defence Force (UDF) during the first three years of the conflict and only began withdrawal in 2015 when the mediated peace agreement was signed.51 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli argues that the motivation for Uganda’s interventions was clearly economic; however, the ones advanced were legal. Either way, their intervention further divided the societies under ethnic lines through the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government, which was an illegal intervention. Despite this, members of the international community remain key players, in supporting South Sudanese communities in building cohesion. The role of the international community in building social cohesion remains multidimensional, as stated by a member of the USAID:

There is great material need in South Sudan. The international community has provided great humanitarian assistance, and they are also currently involved in training and capacity building of various institutions that promote instruments of national cohesion.53

The international presence has been actualized through multiple channels. These include donations and monetary aid through Official Development Aid; peacekeeping and mediation; and continued focus on humanitarian and developmental projects. This has been Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 399 prominently led by organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) under the auspice of the African Union (AU). The United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) monitors human rights abuses and violations and the creation of a conducive environment for humanitarian work, complimented by the TROIKA Group, consisting of nations such as Norway, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Other international actors include the governmental and nongovernmental organizations and United Nation (UN) agencies who are involved mainly through strategic capacity initiatives to enhance stability as well as material and moral support to the GoSS and local organizations. From the South Sudanese leadership, cohesion has also been promoted from the top through peace negotiations.54 Following the unfolding of the 2013 conflict, peace negotiations were yet again on the table, mainly between the SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO.55 The SPLM- IG, led by Salva Kiir, a Dinka and the SPLM-IO led by Riek Machar, a Nuer, were the conflicting parties that emerged from the violent clashes between military factions in December 2013. This influenced the distinct ethnic element to power and politics in South Sudan. Although the power struggle is not an ethnic one per se, the ethnic issue continually emerges. The high-level conflict between leaders has affected relations between the Dinka and Nuer communities and the breakage of cohesion between the two communities.56 This IGAD-led process culminated in the signing of the agreement to cease all military action that might undermine the peace process. The agreement was broken after only two days, setting the premise for peace agreements in the future. Between 2013 and 2015, at least eight peace deals have collapsed before taking effect, and clashes between the warring factions were reported around the country even as the accords were being completed.57 Subsequent mediation fell into a cycle of ceasefires and power- sharing agreements. Notably, in August 2015, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed between the SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO, represented by President Salva Kiir Mayardit and by the first Vice President Riek Machar consecutively.58 ARCSS called for a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), returning Machar, who had fled to Juba following the outbreak of the civil war, and the formation of the monitoring and evaluation body, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (JMEC), currently known as the Reconstituted Joint 400 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

Monitoring and Evaluation Commission is constituted under Chapter VII of the R-ARCSS.59 However, just two days before the marking of South Sudan’s fifth anniversary of independence, on July 7, 2016, violent confrontations broke out in Juba between the SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO.60 This further demonstrated that the peace agreements fell short of not only bringing the conflicting parties together, but of bringing cohesion between the Dinka and the Nuer. An officer of the well-known Com- munity Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), South Sudan, mentioned that

Eruption of ﬁghting obliterated any little progress that was seem- ingly made towards implementation of the 2015 compromise peace agreement. This quick return to violence collapsed all efforts that were made towards the achievement of peace and restoration of social cohesion within communities.”61

The failure of the ARCSS to take hold frustrated the international community involved in the mediation process, as well as local communities. On June 12, 2017, the High Level Revitalisation Forum was formed by IGAD to revitalize the ARCSS. This was a joint action by major stakeholders on South Sudan including IGAD, the AU, the UN, and TROIKA. Their endorsement focused on strategies to bolster the defunct 2015 ARCSS through restoring the ceasefire as the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) and to revise the ARCSS implementation schedule in order to hold elections at the conclusion of the agreement’s timetable.62 While the GoSS has suffered considerable setbacks in the past peace agreement, it is taking further steps to move toward positive cohesion. This is seen in the call for inclusivity in the new revitalized peace negotiations that took place in Addis Ababa between 2017 and 2018. Further, both Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have continued to pur- sue a new peace deal of the revitalized ACRSS, signed at Khartoum in July 2018 and subsequently in August 2018 with the presence of both the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, and the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, which provided cautionary hope. As Kiir and Machar both admit, the peace deal will most likely succeed as it was a Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 401 voluntary initiative rather than a result of pressure from the international community.63 In addition to the peace deals, the government has made provision for the creation of commissions that can propel it toward cohesion. For instance, the National Constitutional Review Commission of the Republic of South Sudan (NCRC) is a 45-member commission formu- lating the constitution of the Republic of South Sudan. The committee was supposed to finish its work and submit the draft constitution to the President by January 9, 2013, but it missed this deadline due to logistical challenges and a lack of funding.64 The government has also made provision for the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Com- mission (SSPRC), a leading national institution with a mandate on peacebuilding. It is being called upon to promote peace and contribute to the establishment of positive momentum on the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The government has also engaged in protecting the space for inde- pendent voices through a national dialogue. On May 22, 2017, Presi- dent Salva Kiir officially launched the National Dialogue in South Sudan. This is a space where the citizens can take part in the national reconciliation process, in hopes of achieving some tangible development progress to demonstrate the government’s responsiveness to citizen expectations. This National Dialogue process aims to address the complexities of South Sudan’s conflict through linking the national, regional, and grassroots levels in an effort to curb the civil war. It is envisaged to be an inclusive process that utilizes both bottom-up and top-down processes, and multileveled consultations.65 Generally, national dialogues have been an effective tool for not only highlight- ing the weaknesses of a narrow, top-down approach, but also under- lining the consequences of excluding bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding.66 Bottom-Up Social Cohesion. Since 2011, South Sudan has been consumed in multiple resource, power, and identity-based conflicts.67 The failure of the GoSS to manage this has led scholars and practitioners to call for a special focus on bottom-up engagements that have in the past—and can in the future—support social cohesion and peaceful coexistence.68 The emphasis here is that neglecting local realities poses serious implications for the prospects of community cohesion and peace. As expressed by a representative from a local NGO in Juba, the South Sudan Network for Democracy and Elections (SSUNDE), 402 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

The common understanding is often that elite-based methods deli- ver national-level and national wide stability. This is true, but also misguided. Local approaches to community building at the sub-national level is not new in South Sudan, and there are decades of experience of working to support peaceful coexistence to learn from. Thus mobilization of communities can be achieved by alternative processes.69

Outcomes of the bottom-up approaches to social cohesion are more difficult to trace but are evident in the different kinds of unity. In bottom-up, social cohesion emphasizes informal conflict resolution mechanisms and approaches to reconciliation, which are not often well understood by outsiders. As John Young argued, “community-led processes of dialogue, truth, justice and restitution can potentially tackle outstanding issues including how to re-establish law and order at the grassroots; disarming and rehabilitation of armed youths.”70 Customary and traditional leaders are a long-standing institution in South Sudan and have had a high level of social–cultural influence by, for example, presiding over cases of divorce, land issues, and water point conflicts. An internally displaced elderly man living in Juba recounts how traditional leaders would solve cases:

We had a chief and seven traditional leaders back in our village in Yei. Once a young man had stolen from the neighbouring village and the leaders decided to place him in the centre of the village, where the sun hit hard, surrounded by the largest and most painful thorns. He had to stand there for about 12 hours. When the neighbouring village, from which he stole from, saw that he was being punished, they were appeased and later agreed on a compensation for the goods stolen. These are not methods found in the formal system, and sometimes without them, there is still tensions between communities, long after the offender goes to jail.71

These elected, appointed, or hereditary community leaders can be argued to have a strong claim in representing the majority of South Sudan’s largely rural population.72 The role customary authorities have occupied in community life has undoubtedly had positive effect in the past few decades. Where the formal justice is not available to Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 403 everyone, traditional justice mechanisms are available to address legacies of conﬂict and promote reconciliation and sustainable peace.73 A practice known in many communities involves the compensation of the aggrieved by offering a payment of a number of cattle. For instance, killings in intra- or intertribal conﬂict, stealing and even dis- agreements may be compensated by payment of cattle. A representative of a local NGO known as Africa Committee for Rehabilitation of South Sudan (ACROSS)74 during an interview mentioned that

This is a longstanding practice among pastoralists in South Sudan. It was cows and cattle heads that would settle disputes between communities. If a man killed from another community, this was seen as an injustice not only to the victim but the whole community. Thus, heads of cattle will have to be exchanged for appeasement between the communities and forgiveness. Apart from this, communities would intermarry so they see the other community not as an enemy, but as family. Also, during cattle raiding, once a community has raided another community, they are not allowed to do it again. Thus, as long as there is no retaliation, the communities remain peaceful.75

The practice of exchange of cattle and cattle raiding has ordinar- ily brought conflicting communities together. However, due to the various conflicts that have taken place in South Sudan and the ease at which arms have been flowing in the country, raiders are now heavily armed. It is also well known that political leaders’ systematic exploitation of customary raiding practices gravely inflames the current conflict. Additionally, this has led to the proliferation of informal armed groups, whose motivations are often distinct from the agenda of the state or opposition forces on whose behalf they once fought. This is evident with groups such as Mathiang Anyoor and the White Army, which were closely involved in the December 2013 outbreak of fighting in Juba.76 Other nonstate actors that have played a significant role in social cohesion include the church and religious leaders. Before the independence of South Sudan, religious bodies played an instrumental role in bringing the conflicting parties together in the former Sudan leading up to the CPA agreement. The church provides a deeply historical 404 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 legacy of the conflict itself, the resolution of the conflict and of peacebuilding in South Sudan. In the current conflict, the country’s bishops continue to speak against the violence and war crimes, pointing out the negative impacts of violence on economic and social development.77 Thus, the steps taken by the church to promote peace and cohesion have aimed to directly impact the society. This is seen in the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC), who implemented an Action Plan for Peace involv- ing a series of community-level dialogues aimed at facilitating mutual understanding and respect among various groups, including religious groups. Churches are also often used as shelters for those seeking to escape violence.78 In a significant addition, through Bishop Paride Taban in 2000, social cohesion has been promoted through the building of the Kuron Peace Village. Also referred to as the Holy Trinity Peace Village, Kuron Peace Village is situated in the southeastern part of former Eastern Equatoria State and was founded with the sole purpose of uniting the population in the area and setting an example of peaceful cohabitation in war-torn South Sudan.79 In the peace village, different ethnic groups live and work together. This is unique in a country caught up in civil war that is emphasizing ethnic divisions. It is also unlike the setup of refugee camps and Protection of Civilians’ (PoC) sites within UNMISS bases where the Nuers are separated from the Dinka in different camps, with the exception of PoC sites in Malakal, with a mixed population of Shilluk (80%), Nuer, Dinka, and Darfuri IDPs.80 In Kuron, the communities live together with constant encouragement of peaceful living together and a highly effective facilitation of dialogues on a higher level, for example, the 2014 peace agreement between the rebel faction of David Yau Yau in Jonglei Province and the South Sudanese government.81 One of the memorable contributions of the church in resolving a rift between two communities is during the Wunlit Conference, also known as the Wunlit people-to-people dialogue. The Wunlit Confer- ence is one of the most comprehensively documented of all the local peace conferences held in South Sudan during the civil war.82 The conference convened on February 17 and ended on March 8, 1999. This was set up by the coalition of churches who formed the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in Wunlit Village, in Bahr el Ghazal, near the border between the Dinka of the Lakes region, and Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 405 the Nuer of Western Upper Nile.83 The reconciliation between these communities that had been fighting for eight years was overdue. In the conference, thirty-five Dinka and Nuer chiefs, together with two thousand participants, gathered together to discuss ways to promote cohesion for the people of the Dinka and the Nuer.84 The dialogue involved religious and traditional leaders. The broad participation also allowed many actors to engaged and participate in the conference. The conference closed with the signing of the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant with its included resolutions. Each person placed their thumbprint on the paper, and some chose to sign the final document. This showed the level of inclusivity of all two thousand participants that attended. In addition, political leaders at the time were involved and played an instrumental role. As an individual participant recalled,

In the Wunlit, the political leaders had to be involved; if they were not, the conference would have not been a success because they would have not supported in the implementation of the agreement. These are what we call the godfathers. These godfathers control immaterial and material resources, can offer incen- tives and impose sanctions.85

Political leader “godfathers,” particularly in the SPLM, had large influence over their various communities as they could cause or end wars. The conflict has been described as the “war of the doctors,” referring to top leaders of the liberation movement, Drs. John Garang from the Dinka and Riek Machar of the Nuer, whose participation encouraged their community members to be open to the engagement. These political leaders were respected by their communities. This showed the vertical participation of the Wunlit conference through inclusive participation of the political elite, the middle-level organizations (mainly represented by the church), and the bottom-level community members. Thus, there was an integration of the top level (government representatives/leaders) working together with the bottom-level communities and local organizations through the facilitation of the middle-level actors (represented here by the church), who had access to both the top and bottom level. In addition, during the Wunlit conference, members of each community aired their respective grievances openly and forcefully. This enabled the communities from all parties to reach an agreement on 406 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 what went wrong and to arrive at least a partial reconciliation. Although not all issues were exhausted, a working arrangement over issues such as shared pastures was agreed.87 Although the initiative involved national players, its scope was to address a very important subnational conflict. In addition, the cultural practice to sacrifice a white bull (“Mabior”), a feature of Nuer and Dinka practice, set the tone for the ritual component of peace meetings:

Mabior is the Bull of Peace that will be sacriﬁced for reconciliation and peace... Anyone who breaks this commitment to peace will follow the way of Mabior... The elders are making a peace and are taking an oath not to repeat atrocities previously commit- ted. A curse is placed on any who partake of the Mabior sacriﬁce and later break the oath...It is a very serious curse; it is a curse of death.88

The rituals and restitution procedures processes addressed both the emotional and material needs of the communities. It is in these strategies that makes the Wunlit process a “bottom-up process.”

In the areas where traditional and religious authorities are absent, civil society has been active through various activities including facilitation of dialogue between conflicting communities in different states. These activities are not only by local organizations but also by international organizations, often done through activities of capacity building and development. This highlights the vertical integration that is present in bottom-up approaches. An example of this is the UNDP’s Peace and Community Cohesion (PaCC) project, which works in partnership with Jonglei State government and Upper Nile Youth for Mobilization for Peace and Development Agency (UNYMPDA). They have conducted community mediation conferences in Panyagor to resolve contentious issues that led to clashes, in the Riic community. Top-down approaches to social cohesion have proven to be limited in South Sudan. However, many resources can be found at the community level that facilitates social cohesion between people. There is also evidence of strong vertical integration between the international Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 407 actors and involvement of the government and national elites, as seen in the Wunlit process. In the case of South Sudan, the intercommunity aspect of the conflict has often been ignored in the light of the political conflict. How- ever, deep-seated conflicts between ethnic groups that are far older than the South Sudanese state may have as much of an effect on social cohesion than the conflicts between political elites. Understanding the network of relationships that characterize South Sudan, and the informal systems of conflict resolution and governance that are practiced, becomes central to fostering social cohesion. This brings to light the importance of actors from the top political sphere, religious bodies from the middle-level sphere, and the bottom-level sphere represented by traditional authorities and community members.

Burundi

Burundi has seen decades of violent conflict, caused by a complex interplay of ethnic and political factors. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians have died and as many have fled to other countries.89 Although there are significant periods of violence that can be identified, such as what is sometimes referred to as the 1972 genocide, and the civil war from 1993 until 2005,90 there has been low-lying conflict in Burundi for most of its history. This history of conflict has almost never been addressed at the national level and has eroded social cohesion in Burundi. In spite of this, there are resources at the community level that point to possibili- ties for social cohesion from the bottom-up, as well as instances where international, national, and local actors are able to act together. Although this is largely a desktop study, this chapter also draws from the fieldwork the author has undertaken in Burundi between 2011 and 2015. This fieldwork has mainly consisted of formal and informal interviews with leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Burundian academics and thought leaders, and members of the local society, as well as Burundians living in the diaspora. Historical and Political Context. Although the conflict in Burundi has often been described as being ethnic in nature, between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, a closer scrutiny of the context reveals that Bur- undi has a long history of intricate political intrigue that dates back to the precolonial era. Rule in its monarchic kingdom, dating back to at least the sixteenth century, was decentralized through royal princes 408 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

(the ganwa) who were neither Hutu or Tutsi, and on the communal level, both Hutu and Tutsi held power. There were also countless other distinctions in Burundian identity politics, significantly along clan or patrilineal lines. At independence in the late 1950s, the two political parties that emerged, the Union Pour le Progres National (Uprona) and the Parti Democratique Chretien (PDC), were ethnically mixed and the princes leading these parties believed in a unified Burundi. The Belgians, who wanted to divide Burundi further, implemented a third Hutu-only party, the Parti du Peuple.92 Uprona won the first election in 1962, but shortly after, the prime minister was assassinated, and the party became radically Tutsi, partly as a result of the Hutu revolution taking place in neighboring Rwanda. This started a pattern of assassinations and attempted coups, which would lead to killings and reprisal killings throughout the country for the next four decades. During this period, power was in the hands of the Tutsi elite from the Hima clan in Bururi and ethnic tensions were manipulated to mobilize the general population behind one politician or another.93 Violent conflicts in 1965, 1972, and the late 1980s erupted in relation to Hutu insurrections followed by large-scale reprisal killings. Hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled Burundi with each wave of violence. Those that fled launched occasional raids from refugee camps, and from this, in 1980, the political party, Palipehutu, was started.94 Following the violence of the late 1980s, in the early 1990s some reforms were implemented which would allow Hutu more political power. A charter of national unity was drafted and a multiparty system was introduced.95 The first presidential election under this new constitution was won by Melchoir Ndadaye of the Front pour la democratie au Bur- undi (Frodebu) in June 1993. He was the first Hutu president of Bur- undi, bringing an end to the four decades of Tutsi rule. He was assassinated, but Frodebu managed to maintain power under another Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira. During this time, things started to look hopeful in Burundi. This changed when Ntaryamira was killed in the airplane that was also carrying the Rwanda president; the inci- dent that sparked the genocide in Rwanda. Political power fell again into the hands of Uprona, and the more radical Hutu members of Frodebu broke away to form the Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD), with its military Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 409 wing, the Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (FDD). Violence broke out between the FDD and the government army and the country entered into a civil war that would last twelve years. While the civil war was raging, peace talks began in Arusha in 1998 between Uprona, Frodebu, and Palipehutu. Violence continued between the government army, the FDD and the military wing of Pali- pehutu, the Forces Nationales pour la Liberation (FNL). These military wings split from their political counterparts and the FDD and FNL were left out of the peace talks. The Arusha agreement was signed in August 2000. The FNL and FDD denounced the agreement and increased their commitment to the civil war. After further negotiations, the CNDD-FDD signed the ceasefire, but FNL continued fighting. In 2005, general elections were held and Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD became president, with an easy majority. The peace negotiation only came to an end in 2009, when the FNL finally gave up its arms and became an official political party. This was in the hope that they might win the upcoming 2010 elections. But when the CNDD-FDD won the local elections by a large margin, the FNL, together with many of the other opposition parties, including UPRONA, rejected the results and boycotted the presidential and legislative election. At the last minute, Uprona joined the election process again, securing seventeen seats in the National Assembly.96 The CNDD-FDD won the presidential election and, due to the actions of the opposition parties, have ruled Burundi more or less as a single- party state.97 Although the history of Burundi reveals that the conflict was not so much ethnic as political, during the civil war, between 1993 and 2005, the conflict did become one of Hutu against Tutsi. However, there has been a shift occurring in the conflict in Burundi over the past decade arguably in part due to the ethnic quota system that Burundi implemented as a result of the negotiated agreement and in part due to the fact that conditions for Hutu in Burundi have not significantly improved with the Hutu party in power.98 The conflict that emerged was particularly between the CNDD-FDD and FNL, which are both described as being Hutu parties. The post-2010 electoral situation continued to deteriorate, including an increase in politically and criminally motivated violence. Some opposition leaders fled the country, others were arrested, and media and civil society groups were harassed.99 The government ascribed this violence to criminal activities, but tension between the government 410 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 and opposition parties, particularly the FNL, was mounting. The CNDD-FDD’s military youth league, the Imbonerakure, became increasingly active in “policing and controlling the countryside.”100 The current conflict in Burundi erupted with the decision by Presi- dent Pierre Nkurunziza to stand for a third term. Technically, propo- nents of the president argue it was not a third term as in his first term he was elected by the two houses of parliament, and not through a presidential election. Opponents, however, took to the street in protest in May 2015, when the third term was announced, and conflict erupted between opposition leaders and the government. Since then, leaders of the opposition parties have been systemati- cally killed or have fled into exile. The conflict, though, seems to be centered at the level of the political elite, more than that of the largely rural population that characterizes Burundi. In the “up-country”101 in Burundi, the greatest concern is around land disputes. The conflict in Burundi resulted in people fleeing to neighboring countries, and in particular, Tanzania. In 1972, somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 people fled, and in 1993, approximately 400,000 people fled.102 Apart from this, there were some 80,000 internally displaced people. Since the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2000, both spon- taneous and UNHCR facilitated repatriation took place. The UNHCR reported repatriating over half a million Burundians. With Burundi being a densely populated country with a high dependency on agricul- ture and livestock, the greatest challenge facing returnees has been the issue of land.103 Top-Down Social Cohesion. Social cohesion from “the top” reflects the complex dynamic between international and national actors. It finds its defining moments in the negotiation process in Arusha which culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in 2000, the implementation of the ethnic quota system, the interventions by South Africa, the United Nations missions, and the debate around transitional justice mechanisms that have been ongoing ever since the agreement was signed. Other defining moments with regard to social cohesion reflect the approach of national actors to social cohesion rather than the relationship between national and international actors. These include the development of the Vision 2025 document by the newly formed government, the ways in which the government has dealt with the land disputes, and other government institutions designed to facilitate democracy (and, directly and indirectly, social cohesion). Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 411

In Burundi, the complex relationship between international actors and national actors is particularly evident.104 Stef Vandeginste105 lists the following as the primary actors in Burundi: the African Union, East African Community, European Union, United Nations, Belgium, and the United States. He suggests that particularly in the current crises, the position of these international actors seems to be that of maintaining stability at whatever cost. Although some106 suggest a more oppositional relationship between the Burundian government and international actors (particularly those from the global north), others107 argue that here is more nuance in the dynamic relationships between multiple actors in what is a very volatile region, where the government is heavily dependent on aid. African regional actors have been actively involved in Burundi, as is evidenced by the fact that the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region and the African Union (which was still the Orga- nization of African Unity at the start of the process) initiated the Arusha negotiations with the political and financial support of the international community.108 Involved in mediation were former Tan- zanian president Julius Nyerere, South African president Nelson Man- dela, deputy president of South Africa Jacob Zuma, and African Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula South. At the time the agreement was signed, there was a hopefulness about the direction Burundi was moving in, under the guidance of South Africa. The Arusha agreement addressed social relationships and inequality through power sharing, an ethnic quota system, security sector reform, the proposal of various transitional justice mechanisms, mechanisms for dealing with land disputes, and the prioritization of poverty reduction, all of which was believed to be able to bring about stability, democracy, and social cohesion (perhaps more broadly described as “peaceful coexistence” or “national unity” in the agreement). Apart from their central role in the mediation process, the South African Defence Force deployed troops in Burundi in 2001, and two years later, the AU established the AU Mission in Burundi. But after a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2004, the UN took over. By 2009, all of South Africa’s troops had been recalled, and as Cheryl Hen- dricks and Amanda Lucey discuss, South African involvement in Bur- undi decreased significantly. The reasons for the decrease of interest on the part of the AU and South African government remain unclear. 412 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

The UN had several missions in Burundi between 2004 and 2015. Its operations came to an end with the UN Electoral Observation Mis- sion in Burundi in 2015. In 2005, the UN Secretary General conducted a round of negotiations with the Burundi Government in order to analyze the implementation of the transitional justice mechanism under the UNSC Resolution 1606.110 According to P. Hajayandi, these negotiations had little result. They did, however, lead to conducting a National Consultation with local society in order to fully understand its perceptions with relation to the transitional justice mechanisms. The work was conducted under the supervision of the Tripartite Steer- ing Committee led by Hon. Festus Ntanyungu, a former member of Burundi’s Parliament. The National Consultations ran from July to December 2009 and covered all the provinces of Burundi. Some members of the diaspora in East Africa and Europe were also part of the process. The results of this National Consultation, and the extent to which their findings were taken seriously by the UN, other international actors, and the Burundian government are difficult to unra- vel.111 The Burundian government, and particularly its president, Nku- runziza, had a high level of popular support when the transitional government was first instated in 2005. Nkurunziza was seen to be a man “of the people.” Like many Burundians “up-country,” the president declared himself a Christian, enjoyed soccer, and, having come from a rural background himself, communicated a sense of understanding the reality of those “up-country” rather than being a product of the capital city or the Burundian elite. From the beginning, the Burundian government developed frameworks and policies that resonated with people “up-country.” This is perhaps evident in the Vision 2025 document released by the transitional government. It stressed the importance of social cohesion and national unity as a foundation for growth and development. A “spirit of equity,” social justice, and an end to lawlessness are all mentioned as guiding principles, as is a commitment to the support of the work by civil society and religious organizations. Further, the document includes support for traditional mechanisms for the resolution of conflict and societal management. Interestingly, Vision 2025 makes particular reference to the importance of promoting cultural identity as a means of bringing about social cohesion, drawing from “fundamental values of Burundian society” such as Ubuntu, tolerance, respect for Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 413 the other, sharing, Burundian dance, folktales, literature, poetry, and drama. As will be evident in the next section, long-held values within rural communities, and cultural practices, from dispute resolution to dance, drama, folktales, (oral) literature, and poetry all hold a high level of importance “up-country.” However, although these cultural practices have had resonance with efforts to bring about social cohesion at the level of the local society, they seem have little relevance for the complex multitude of conflicts at the political level. Bottom-Up Social Cohesion. In some ways, the governments’ Vision 2025 reflects the kinds of themes that are prevalent in the narratives that shape Burundian society and identity. There is a strong emphasis in Burundian society on the maintenance of cultural values, which are often reiterated through Burundian dance, folktales, literature, poetry, and drama. There is also a heavy reliance on informal conflict resolution mechanisms, particularly through the institution of the bashingantahe, which historically consisted of wise elders who would play a central role in maintaining the values of a community and facilitating community-level dispute resolution. Although in some communities, this council has become corrupted, they continue to play a central role in the vast rural communities of Burundi.112 As is perhaps the case in many African societies, there seems to be a disconnect between what happens in Burundi’s urban centers, which are relatively small, and the remainder of the country, which remains underdeveloped and rural.113 Thus, different narratives about Burundi and what it means to be Burundian have developed between those who hold economic and political power in the capital, Bujumbura, and the rest of the country. This is perhaps most evident in the ways in which the current conflict seems to be unfolding in Bujumbura, and within diasporic communities, with very little involvement from Burundians “up-country.” In his discussion of micropolitics in Burundi, Van Acker114 alludes to the distinctly different narratives that have emerged among different groups in Burundi, along political lines. One of the narrative strands has emerged around the CNDD-FDD, which largely seems to have popular support “up-country.” Another narrative strand, Tomas Van Acker focuses on, is around the FNL, which has popular support in Bujumbura Rural. Van Acker describes how during the war, the FNL played a critical administrative role in communities, even mediating conflicts within communities in order to maintain a level of social 414 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 harmony. In part, this was to show communities that they were “ca- pable of doing better than the government and army.”115 The third strand Van Acker mentions is the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy which he describes as being “rooted in Bujumbura’s vibrant civil society and media scene and which, upon its formation in 2009, incarnated the aspirations of the postwar urban cosmopolitan generation.” In the urban context, Burundi’s contemporary “civil society,” in the common understanding of the term, began to emerge only in the early 1990s and as such is a relatively new phenomenon there. According to Peter Uvin,116 in 1991 Burundi had only one organization that could be described as being part of civil society. By 1993, at least five organizations had emerged, and throughout the civil war, the number of organizations exploded, led by several human rights-based organizations.117 The literature describes how Burundi has an active civil society, but at the same time, is sometimes seen as elitist (particularly associated with the Tutsi elite) and limited in its reach beyond the capital city.118 This is slowly changing but it remains difficult for small and often under-resourced NGOs to have an impact “up country,” in the more rural parts of Burundi. Many of the NGOs have been working in the area of reconciliation and social cohesion, bringing together Burundians on different sides of the conflict to resolve their differences and bring about healing. For example, The Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS) is one of the oldest local organizations that has been working in the field of reconciliation in Burundi. THARS was initiated with the belief that reconciliation cannot take place until trauma has been addressed. Director of the organization, David Niyonzima describes how he observed that people were wounded and unable to reconcile because of these wounds.119 THARS has adapted the Western clinical approach of one-on-one therapy to a group therapy approach, which has been very effective in the Burundian context. Other prominent Burundian organizations working in the area of peace and reconciliation include the Burundian League for Human Rights, Burundian Women for Peace and Development, and Harvest for Christ, which has worked primarily on the campus of the Univer- sity of Burundi and has trained university students in peacebuilding and reconciliation for the past ten years. Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 415

One of the widest reaching local efforts is the Organization for Reconciliation and Forgiveness, which was started by an uneducated Burundian, Isaac Kubwimana, in 1995, and officially registered in 1999. This is a grassroots organization with very few resources but over 80,000 members across the country. The members meet in small groups that discuss peace, forgiveness, and unity. Some of the groups have formed choirs, others football teams, and still others host workshops and training events. With funding from the UNDP, this organization has been involved with the reintegration of rebels into the community.120 These local organizations have had a role to play in shaping the narratives prevalent in Burundian society, particularly in the ways in which they have challenged the ethnic stereotyping and rhetoric politicians used during the civil war to garner support for their various agendas. Interviews with leaders and members of these NGOs over the past few years have revealed that in their engagement with groups in the local society, people have been able to see the ways in which ethnic difference was instrumentalized by politicians for their own purposes, but that beyond this, there are far more commonalities between Burundians, both in terms of their shared traditions, culture and values, as well as their shared suffering as victims of violence and the extreme poverty. The prevalence of deeply held cultural values and the importance of interdependent social relationships for the purpose of survival may be most evident in the ways in which local society has responded to the proposed transitional justice mechanisms put forward by members of the international community and the Burundian government. Although more research needs to be undertaken in this area, significantly, Bert Ingelaere and Dominik Kohlhagen121 found that those they interviewed in local society were not interested in truth-seeking (in the form of a truth commission) or perpetrators being held accountable for their crimes (in the form of a tribunal), with several saying that they should “not dig up what has been buried.” Instead what they found their respondents expressing was a desire for dialogue (which they describe as substantially different from truth-telling) and that dealing with the past would involve the facilitation of “a change of heart.” In Kirundi, respondents explained how violence had changed the heart (umutima—which Ingelaere and Kohlhagen describe as encapsulating more than the translation “heart” allows for, and includes reason, will, virtue and emotions; it is related to what makes 416 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 us “essentially” human). This “heart” may be changed through dialogue and a reintegration of those whose “hearts” have been affected back into the “humanity” of the community. There was a sense that this “change of heart” was necessary to restoring the humanity of the offender. The whole community had resonance with the concept of “ubuntu.” Ingelaere and Kholhagen suggest that the facilitator of this kind of process was identified by members of the community as not the bashingantahe council but the principle of bushingantahe.. The institution of the bashingantahe historically consisted of wise elders who would play a central role in maintaining the values of a community and facilitating community-level dispute resolution. Before the colonial era, the bashingantahe was seen as a key institution whose main function was to settle disputes, and mediate between and advise members of a given community.122 Ingelaere and Kholhagen see the integration of the bashingantahe as a potential way forward in terms of rehabilitating this controversial institution. During the Arusha negotiations and the period following, there have been attempts to reinstate the bashingantahe as a formal institution, particularly by key international stakeholders.123 However, as of 2010, they have been formally excluded from Burundian legislation by the government.124 The current government has resisted this institution, primarily because it had become so strongly associated with first the monarchy and then the post-independence, Tutsi-domi- nated, one-party state. Several scholars have written about the ways in which the bashingantahe have become corrupt.125 Patrick Hajayandi126 describes how the selection of these community mediators became, in some communities in Burundi, less about the moral integrity of the individual and more about giving positions for political expediency. However, in his study in two distinctly different regions of Burundi, Hajayandi found that the practice of bashingantahe has developed in very different ways in different parts of the country. In Nyanza-Lac, in the southeast of Burundi, Hajayandi found that the bashingantahe had lost credibil- ity amidst allegations of corruption and their problematic role in resolving land-related disputes. But in Rugombo, in the west of the country, the bashingantahe were experienced very positively, and the institution had been integrated with the broader judicial system and is working closely with local and international NGOs. In this district, Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 417 the bashingantahe plays a central role in peacebuilding at the level of the local community. In Burundi, although the conflict has often been framed as ethnic, in reality more complex social relationships exist. This is perhaps counter to the literature which emphasizes the prevalence of deep ethnic divisions in Burundi127 but in line with other emerging research which suggests that these ethnic divisions may not be as deep as is sometimes imagined. Other factors, such as a culture of violence, the manipulations by political elites, Burundi’s complex history, and extreme poverty may have more explanatory value in terms of the high prevalence of violence than ethnicity per se. What seems to hold Burundians together includes threads of deep cultural values expressed through dance, folktales, literature, poetry, and drama. Further, the necessity for interdependence in order to survive has continuously led Burundians to overcome their differences and seek out ways in which to restore the harmony and “ubuntu” of their communities.

CONCLUSION

In the cases of South Sudan and Burundi, attention, both in terms of interventions, and discussions in the literature, tends to focus on elite, top-down approaches to social cohesion. But what is evident in both cases is that there are many resources within communities that can foster bottom-up social cohesion. In both contexts, societies are characterized by communities that are held together through complex social and relational networks, and in which informal governance and conflict resolution mechanisms continue to function. Although political elites are engaged in conflict, in both Burundi and South Sudan, a war-weariness is evident and communities seem to be interested in simply getting on with rebuilding their lives. This, along with the resources available at the community level, seems to be the impetus for social cohesion from below. However, as the past has shown, this fragile cohesion in very difficult circumstances can easily be threatened by politicians who manipulate differences and inequalities among the local populations in order to garner support for their various agendas. For this reason, a vertical integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches to social cohesion is necessary to ensure that political communities “stick together.” 418 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

NOTES

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52. Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, "Explaining the (il) legality of Uganda’s Interven- tion in the Current South Sudan Conflict." African Security Review 23:4 (2014): 352–369. 53. Author interview with USAID officer in Juba, South Sudan, April 15, 2018. 54. Cale Salih & Stephen Gray, “Group Cohesion and Peace Processes,” September 12, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/group-cohesion- and-peace-processes, Accessed March 25, 2019. 55. An East African regional integration, which provides for regional initiatives in conflict mediation and resolution. 56. Carlo Koos and Thea Gutschke, "South Sudan’s Newest War: When Two Old Men Divide a Nation." GIGA Focus International Edition English 02 (2014). 57. Marc Santora, “Salva Kiir, South Sudan’s President, Signs Peace Deal with Rebels,” NewYork Times, August 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 08/27/world/africa/south-sudan-peace-deal-rebels-president.html. Accessed June 15, 2019. 58. Authority, Intergovernmental, and Autorite Intergouvernementale. "Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan," August 17, 2015. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/final_proposed_c ompromise_agreement_for_south_sudan_conflict.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2019. 59. Ibid: Intergovernmental Authority on Development, “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict,” September 12, 2018. 60. Vhumbunu Clayton Hazvinei, “Conflict Resurgence and the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan,” October19, 2016. https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-resurgence-agreement-resolu tion-conflict-republic-south-sudan/, accessed March 4, 2019. 61. 62. United States Institute of Peace, “South Sudan’s High Level Revital- ization Forum. Identifying Conditions for Success” https://www.usip.org/sites/defa ult/files/PB228-South-Sudan-s-High-Level-Revitalization-Forum.pdf. 63. Mbah Fidelis. What Next for South Sudan’s Peace Agreement? Agreement Provides a Transitional Unity Government within Four Months, Which Will Govern the Country for 36 Months,” June 28, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/ 06/south-sudan-peace-agreement-180627194714644.html, accessed April 2, 2019. 64. “South Sudanese civil society calls for one year extension of National Constitution Review Commission,” Sudan Tribune, February 26, 2013 http:// www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45649. 65. Francis Deng, "National Dialogue: A Critical Perspective," (2017). 66. E. A. Liaga, “The South Sudan National Dialogue: Hope through Inclu- sive Processes” (2017) https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/the-south-sudan-na tional-dialogue-hope-through-inclusive-processes/ accessed February 2, 2018. 67. Wassara, Samson Samuel, and Al-Tayib Zain Al-Abdin, eds. Post-Referen- dum Sudan National and Regional Questions. CODESRIA, 2015. 68. Ibid. Knopf, Fragility and State-Society Relations in South Sudan. 69. Author interview with officer from SSuNDE, a local NGO, Juba, April 14,2018. 70. John Young," Sudan IGAD peace process: an evaluation." Sudan Tribune 30 (2007). 422 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020

71. Author interview with an elderly man at an Internally displaced camp in Hai Malakal, Juba. 11.04.2018 72. Khabure, Louise. "Societies Caught in the Conflict Trap Regional Research Findings Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan and South Sudan," November 1, 2013. https://www.africaportal.org/publications/societies-caught-in- the-conflict-trap-regional-research-findings-chad-central-african-republic-sudan-and- south-sudan/ . 73. Relief Web, “Traditional leaders resolve to set up committee for traditional justice as a vehicle for peace and reconciliation in South Sudan,” December 12, 2016, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/traditional-leaders-resolve-set-com mittee-traditional-justice-vehicle-peace-and accessed April 2, 2018. 74. See Africa Committee for Rehabilitation of South Sudan. http://www.ac ross-ssd.org/1/, accessed March 27, 2018. 75. Author interview with a representative from Across, Juba, April 12, 2018. 76. Naomi Pendle, "“They Are Now Community Police”: Negotiating the Boundaries and Nature of the Government in South Sudan through the Identity of Militarised Cattle-Keepers." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 22:3 (2015): 410–434. 77. Rift Valley Institute, “Now We Are Zero. South Sudanese Chiefs and Elders Discuss Their Roles in Peace and Conflict,” Rift Valley Institute, 2016. 78. South Sudan 2016 International Religious Freedom Report. https://www. state.gov/documents/organization/268942.pdf. accessed July 5,2018 79. See Pax Christi International. https://www.paxchristi.net/ 80. Michael J. Arensen, "If We Leave We are Killed," (2016), https://doc.re ro.ch/record/306072/files/08-If_We_Leave_We_Are_Killed.pdf 81. PAX, PAX supports peace agreement Jonglei in South Sudan, May 9, 2014. https://www.paxforpeace.nl/stay-informed/press/pax-supports-peace-agreeme nt-jonglei-in-south-sudan 82. Jenner, Hadley. "’When Truth Is Denied, Peace Will Not Come’: The People-to-People Peace Process of the New Sudan Council of Churches." Cam- bridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action (2000). 83. Ashworth, John, and Maura Ryan. "“One Nation from Every Tribe, Ton- gue, and People”: The Church and Strategic Peacebuilding in South Sudan." Journal of Catholic Social Thought 10, no. 1 (2013): 47–67. 84. Ibid: Mark Bradbury, John Ryle, Michael Medley, and Kwesi Sansculotte- Greenidge. (2006), 47 85. Interview with a member of the public, Juba, August 17, 2017.86 86. Ibid: Young, "Sudan IGAD Peace Process: an Evaluation," 30. 87. Ibid: Hilde F. Johnson, “South Sudan” 2016. 88. Ibid: John Ashworth, and Maura Ryan. "One Nation from Every Tribe" (2013): 60. 89. Agnes Nindorera, "Ubushingantahe as a base for political transformation in Burundi," Boston Consortium Working Paper 102, Boston Consortium on Gen- der, Security and Human Rights, University of Massachusetts, Boston (2003), 4. 90. The exact dates of the civil war differ in the literature, as some consider the end of the war as being when the first peace agreement was signed in 2000, Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 423 whereas others describe the war ending with the implementation of the transitional government in 2005.91 91. Gerard Prunier and Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (London: Pall Mall Press 1970). 92. Gerard Prunier, “Burundi: Descent into Chaos or a Manageable Crisis?” Report Writenet, 1995, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c00.html. 93. Ibid: Nindorera, "Ubushingantahe as a base for political transformation in Burundi," 6. 94. Institute for Security Studies. Burundi: Political System and History, 2005, http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/burundi/politics.html, accessed August 16, 2011. 95. Filip Reyntjens, "Briefing: Burundi: a Peaceful Transition After a Decade of War?" African Affairs 105:418 (2005): 117–135. 96. Stef Vandeginste, "Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: the Costs and Benefits of Burundi’s 2010 Elections." The Journal of Modern African Studies 49:2 (2011): 315–335. 97. Tomas Van Acker, "Exploring the Legacies of Armed Rebellion in Burun- di’s Maquis par Excellence." Africa Spectrum 51:2 (2016): 15–37. 98. Ibid: Stef Vandeginste, "Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis- sion,” 355–365. Reyntjens (2016), although optimistic about the positive effects of ‘ethnic engineering’ does suggest a caution that the ‘disappearance of the ethnic fac- tor’ was more due to constitutional constraints than social and political factors. However, as I discuss later in this chapter, the division on the basis of ethnicity ‘up- country’ in Burundi may be less deep and prevalent than we think. Filip Reyntjens, "Institutional engineering, management of ethnicity, and democratic failure in Burundi." Africa Spectrum 51.2 (2016): 65–78. 99. Ibid: Vandeginste, "Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” 355–365. 100. Ibid: Van Acker, “Exploring the Legacies,” 18. 101. ‘Up-country’ in Burundi refers to the rural villages that characterize most of Burundi. In fact, ‘up-country’ refers to more or less every geographical location other than Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura.11 102. UNHCR/WFP (2007) ‘Report of the Joint Assessment Mission of Burun- dian Returnees, May 7–11, 2007,’ available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c 056.html. 103. Jenny Theron, "Resolving Land Disputes in Burundi." Conflict Trends 2009:1 (2009): 3–10. 104. Julia Grauvogel, "Burundi After the 2015 Elections: a Conference Report," Africa Spectrum 51.2 (2016): 3–14. 105. Stef Vandeginste, "Legal Loopholes and the Politics of Executive Term Limits: Insights from Burundi," Africa Spectrum 51:2 (2016): 39–63. 106. Sandra Rubli, "(Re) making the Social World: the Politics of Transi- tional Justice in Burundi," Africa Spectrum 48:1 (2013): 3–24. 107. David Taylor, "“We Have No Influence”: International Discourse and the Instrumentalisation of Transitional Justice in Burundi," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2:3 (2013). 108. Adonia Ayebare, Peacemaking in Burundi–A Case Study of Regional Diplomacy Backed by International Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, paper 424 PEACE & CHANGE / July 2020 presented at 39th International Peace Institute Seminar, UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process and Practice, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, 2010. Published as International Peace Institute Favorita Paper (1), (2010) 81–6; Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi. Vol. 25. Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2005; Devon Curtis, "The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African intervention," Global Insight 24:1 (2003).109 109. Cheryl Hendricks, and Amanda Lucey, "Burundi Missed Opportunities for South African Post-conflict Development and Peacebuilding?" (2013), Institute For Security Studies, Policy Brief 48, https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/bur undi-missed-opportunities-for-south-african-post-conflict-development-and-peaceb uilding, 3. 110. UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1606. [BURUNDI] Adopted by the Security Council at its 5207th meeting, June 29, 2005, S/RES/1606 (2005), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1606. 111. Hajayandi, P. (Forthcoming). Transitional justice and tradition-based approaches to resolving conflict: The case of Burundi. In C. Wielenga and C. Nshimbi (eds). Transitional justice, regionalism and policy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. 112. Ibid: Hajayandi,” The case of Burundi,” 145. 113. Ibid: Hendricks and Lucey, "Burundi Missed Opportunities for South African Post-Conflict Development and Peacebuilding?" 114. Ibid: Tomas Van Acker, “Exploring the Legacies,” 20. 115. Ibid: 29. 116. Peter Uvin, "Human Security in Burundi: The View from Below (by Youth)," African Security Studies 16.2 (2007): 38–52. 117. Elizabeth McClintock and Terence Nahimana, "Managing the Tension between Inclusionary and Exclusionary Processes: Building Peace in Burundi," International Negotiation 13.1 (2008): 73–91. 118. Jos Havermans, "Peace-Initiatives Help Stem the Violence," (2000). Doctors Without Borders, the Netherlands; Uvin, "Human Security in Burundi,” 38–52. 119. Interview, Bujumbura, September 14, 2011. 120. Interview, Bujumbura, September 15, 2011. 121. Bert Ingelaere and Dominik Kohlhagen. "Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bushingantahe in Burundi," International Journal of Tran- sitional Justice 6 no. 1 (2012): 40–59. 122. Ibid: Patrick Hajayandi, “Transitional Justice and Tradition-Based approaches to Resolving Conflict: The Case of Burundi,” in Transitional Justice, Regionalism and Policy in Africa ed. C. Wielenga and C. Nshimbi (Dakar: CODES- RIA, forthcoming). 123. Ibid: Nindorera, "Ubushingantahe as a base for political transformation in Burundi," 8. 124. Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, "Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice,” 40-59. 125. Ibid: Nindorera, "Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi," 9. Social Cohesion From the Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 425

126. Ibid: Hajayandi, “The Case of Burundi,” 148. 127. See for example Leonce Ndikumana, "Distributional Conﬂict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi," The Round Table 94 no. 381 (2005): 413-427.