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The Expropriation OIA J Soeialis.t." Party The Prese ~ nt Sit~ u , ati ~ o ~ n · ·of th.e ocial.ist I. Mov, em~ ent In P~ oland Reprints from "Robotnik Polski"-"The Polish Worker", Offi-cial · Organ of .the Polish Socialist· Alliance in the U.S.A .. New York, No. 36, 37, September 1946. Reprinted and Distributed by ·' "POLAND FIGHTS", Polish Labor Group, 29 East 7th Street. New York 3, N. Y. J>ubllshed by POLISH LaBOR cm.utJP, 50l3roacl·· Street, New York, :N. Y •• Whid:t has filed a registration statement und a <:opy ot this print-ed matter with the De­ Pal·tment of Justice, Washtngtr.n. D C., a:o an agf'nt oi the Committe" of the Pol;sh Socialist Party Abroad. the Re1_resentation of the Polish Trade Unlon Coun­ cil Abroad, both of' London, Engla.nd. This ;registration statement is available for public inspectiop: The fact of registr~&ion c;toes 9-ot: 1ndicat·e approval Of the '0'. s,. Government _Of the contents hereof. · Adam CIOLKOSZ was a Member of the Polish Diet and s.Elcretary of the Polith Socialist Parliamentary Party. Member of the Central Executive Committee of the P.P.S. He Wlas one of .the opposition leaders im.prisoned by Pilsudski in the military fortress of Brest Litovsk. The Polish Socialist Party ( PPS) prior to the war The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) vva.s founded in Novbinber l 892 and be.caJne, in the course of history, the undisputed Party of the Polis]) ·working class· Con1.ing into being as the · underground Party of Russian­ occupied Poland, it closely co-operated vvith the ·p ·olish .Social­ Democratic Party of former A1:1strian Poland (PPSD) and the Polish Socialist Party ··(PPS) of former Prussian· PQland. lin­ mediately after the rebirth of Poland · as an independent Re­ public in Noven1ber 191.8, all these thrpe Parties 1nerg·ed into one i'olish Socialist Party. In addition, there existed in Poland -J.e­ vvish, ~ German and TJkrain·ian· Socialist Parties, ,;vith ,;v h4ch the PPS closely co-opera ted. During the t\venty years of Poland's independence, the PPS stood in the forefront of . the struggle against any _reactio­ nary tendencies, fron1. ... whatever quarter they n1.ay have come. ln particula·r, it distingu}shed itself by the uncompromising fight against the regin1.e inaugurated by Pilsudski's coup a' etat. "!.n the course of this fight the PP.S· had to endure n1.any serious bl · ov\r. ~ amongst which the in1.-prisonn1.ent of SlX of it.s leaders in 1he n1.ilitary fortess of Brest Litowsk in 1930 was one of the most outstanding. An atten1.pt to , split the PP.S . from inside, 1aunched by Pilsudski's followers, resulted in the creation by the1n of an allegedly Socialist Party':') vvhich, however, vvas unable. to gain any serious influence within the Polish pro­ Jetariat. On the other hand, it increased the solidity within the· PPS, cleansed it of Pilsud.ski's friends and consequently ,made it stronger than before. With regard to Fascism and Hitleris1n, the PPS took from the very beginning __ an uncon1.pron1.ising attitude in "vhich there ' 'vas to be no ·w:a:vering or faltering. It resolutely opposed Colonei Deck~s policy. The constructive progra1nme of the PPS with regard to in­ ternal conditions, .jn pre-·war Poland consisted in: advocating I free and unfettered elections, based on universal, direct, -secret, £>qual and proportional suffrage· 'rhe Party had no doubts that the . t\VO strongest parties to e1nerge fro1n such elections '\"Vould be the PPS. itself .and the Peasant Party, and these tw-o, \Vith · a 'vorking 1najority in Parlianient, could together form a. demo­ eratic Government. There w·as the probability of smaller parties 11*) "Polska Partja Socjalistyczna dawna Frakcja Rewolu· eyjna". 2 of the Left and the C'entre being included iri. such a coalition. In matters ·of, for .e~gn policy-· the PPS supported the League of Nations, stood for collective security, closest co-operation with the Western democracies and friendship w·ith the Soviet Union. r. The PPS ~lways den-ounced and ·Opposed any imperialist ag­ gressioii or threat· of aggression. The· ootern1.ined attitude of. the Polish nation towards German aggression and invasion in 1939 and the following years, .was, to a. very great extent, the result of years of work by and guidance fron1 the PPS. The decision to defend the encirc'led Poli.sh capital of Warsaw in September. 1939 was, in the first place, a decision of the PP8. The unciergr ~ound activities, 1939-1945 . ' Immediately after ·i he . c ;apitulatio~ of Warsaw and just before· the entry of the Gern1an troops. into the :Capital, the PPS, like ali the other Polish political parties, took the decision of dissolving the legally existing Party organization, and embark­ ing on a new cons-piratorial activity. No ·one could possibly en­ tertain the illusion that a legal political existence under the Nazi occupation and the rule of the Gestapo would be possi~le . This could perhaps have been achieved, but at the cost of far­ reaching cornpromises ..of which the PPS ·was: incapable. The Septe1uber can1.paign ·was over, but the ·war went on. The leaders of the PPS - all of then1. - considered resistance to the Ger­ man iny-aders to be the 1nain task ·of the Polish .workers· More­ .over, they sa,¥, already then, that in the final stage .of the war, invaded · and conquered nations would have to stand up and deliver the final blow to the German invaders. All this. involved tl1e nec'essity of the wl1.ole ·Movement going undergr~und, anq th~t from the very · out~et. Consequently, the f<?rmation o£ th~ 8ecre~ Party organisation was embarked upon immediately. For eonspirational purposes the Party. adopted: the. name "The Mo- .:veln.ent of the Working Masses of Poland", generally called th_e ,V.R.N. from the initial letters of its ·slogan: Freedom (Wol­ nosc}, E ·quality (R6wnosc), Independenc~ (Niepodleglosc). · f}nly a . few wo-rds can be said here about the heroic and unique 1vork pei~formed by the WRN under the ·German . oc­ cupa .tio~l.. 1,h1;1s, · for instance, .a large se cret organisational net­ 'Yor.k of the WRN comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2~000 units. 'rrhe underground Socialist Pre.ss. and painphlets reached, in the . course o! the war, the amazing figure of 2 mil­ lion copies . ....L\.. Socialist military organisation was created under the na1ne of OWPPS (Socialist insur gent. ·Military ' betache­ nl.ents)', '\Vhich 'VaS :included, as a separat~ and distinci organi­ ~atio :n, ~n the national .s che1ne .of the Underground Hoine Army (.~IC). There 1vas, _besides, a Socialist l\1ilitia,_organised both on a 'territorial and on a factory basis· All thes e organi sations played an outstanding role, inter alia in the vVarsa-w Uprising of 1944. · The PPS played a prominent part in· the work of the Polish Underground State. It was represented in the Secret Parliament 1vhose chairman, moreover, one of the outstandi;g Comrades ·. wa ~ \ Kazimierz Puzak (the Secretary General of the PaJ;>ty). ·It gave its· support to the Polish Government in Paris, Ang8,rs and later in London, which included · three Socialist Mip.isters. It was · 81$0 r epresented in the ~ o - called IIome Council o.f Ministers, which formed an integral ._part of the Polish Government in Lon­ don . .E ~ verywhere the PPS n.cted. in accordance with its Socia­ list and democratic principles and achieved great successes in ist work of ensuring to the ·Poland,. which was to emerge after the. ~German defeat, a bold and progressive political, .social arid economic policy. Notwithstanding the st rict · observance of all conspiratorial rules - in which the· PPS ~ ·awing to her old revolutionary tra- .. dition excelled a:nyone else - ·· heavy losses could not be avoided. Thre'e members of the :Central Ex~cutive ~ Committee of ·· :the Party (Niedzialkowski, Czapinski, Topine.k) ·and 2$ other me'm­ bers. of the Supreme ~council of the Pttrty, peri~hed at the hands . of the invaders.. Altogether about 700 prominent ·leaders:·:. of· the' Party met their death under· the occupation. From "tlies-e figures the losses. atnongst t he rank -and file can be imagined· But the Movement grew stronger · and stronger·, new people joining it ipcessantly; I n May 1941, in view of the approaching hour of the final and open rising against the· ·Germans, the :Mo­ ,,enie'nt could already afford t o revert to the name of the :PP'S. Th. • ' Communist Party ·of Poland· (KPP) '!~he Communis ~ Party of Poland (KPP), whose: forerunner· haq been the Social Dem.oeracy of the ICingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), never succeeded in gaining the suppor t of the P<;>lish workiilg class in any strength of for any consider­ able' period of time ~ This was due to their unforgettable political blunders, such as: a) their definitely negative- attitude to the question o£ Poland's independence prior to the Fir-st World War (a congress of the SDRPi ~L in 1905 declared that Poland's i n - . depe·nqence was detriment~! to .the international prol~tariat and the international social .revolution) ; b ) their boycott ··of .the el~ctions to the Constituent Assembly in 1919 and, in gel);eral, tb~ir .negative attitude t o the reborn Polish Republic; c') their attitude to the Russian invasion of Poland in the:. summer of 1·920 and. their ~role during ,t he Polish defence· of Warsaw ; d) their appeal in 1932 for the severance of Polish Pomerania and Upper Silesia from ·t he Poli.~h Republic in favour of Ger­ n1.any.
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