The Expropriation OIA J Soeialis.t." Party The Prese ~ nt Sit~ u , ati ~ o ~ n · ·of th.e ocial.ist I. Mov, em~ ent In P~ oland
Reprints from "Robotnik Polski"-"The Polish Worker", Offi-cial · Organ of .the Polish Socialist· Alliance in the U.S.A .. New York, No. 36, 37, September 1946. Reprinted and Distributed by ·' "POLAND FIGHTS", Polish Labor Group, 29 East 7th Street. New York 3, N. Y. J>ubllshed by POLISH LaBOR cm.utJP, 50l3roacl·· Street, New York, :N. Y •• Whid:t has filed a registration statement und a <:opy ot this print-ed matter with the De Pal·tment of Justice, Washtngtr.n. D C., a:o an agf'nt oi the Committe" of the Pol;sh Socialist Party Abroad. the Re1_resentation of the Polish Trade Unlon Coun cil Abroad, both of' London, Engla.nd. This ;registration statement is available for public inspectiop: The fact of registr~&ion c;toes 9-ot: 1ndicat·e approval Of the '0'. s,. Government _Of the contents hereof. . · Adam CIOLKOSZ was a Member of the Polish Diet and s.Elcretary of the Polith Socialist Parliamentary Party. Member of the Central Executive Committee of the P.P.S. He Wlas one of .the opposition leaders im.prisoned by Pilsudski in the military fortress of Brest Litovsk.
The Polish Socialist Party ( PPS) prior to the war The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) vva.s founded in Novbinber l 892 and be.caJne, in the course of history, the undisputed Party of the Polis]) ·working class· Con1.ing into being as the · underground Party of Russian occupied Poland, it closely co-operated vvith the ·p ·olish .Social Democratic Party of former A1:1strian Poland (PPSD) and the Polish Socialist Party ··(PPS) of former Prussian· PQland. lin mediately after the rebirth of Poland · as an independent Re public in Noven1ber 191.8, all these thrpe Parties 1nerg·ed into one i'olish Socialist Party. In addition, there existed in Poland -J.e vvish, ~ German and TJkrain·ian· Socialist Parties, ,;vith ,;v h4ch the PPS closely co-opera ted. During the t\venty years of Poland's independence, the PPS stood in the forefront of . the struggle against any _reactio nary tendencies, fron1. ... whatever quarter they n1.ay have come. ln particula·r, it distingu}shed itself by the uncompromising fight against the regin1.e inaugurated by Pilsudski's coup a' etat. "!.n the course of this fight the PP.S· had to endure n1.any serious bl · ov\r. ~ amongst which the in1.-prisonn1.ent of SlX of it.s leaders in 1he n1.ilitary fortess of Brest Litowsk in 1930 was one of the most outstanding. An atten1.pt to , split the PP.S . from inside, 1aunched by Pilsudski's followers, resulted in the creation by the1n of an allegedly Socialist Party':') vvhich, however, vvas unable. to gain any serious influence within the Polish pro Jetariat. On the other hand, it increased the solidity within the· PPS, cleansed it of Pilsud.ski's friends and consequently ,made it stronger than before. With regard to Fascism and Hitleris1n, the PPS took from the very beginning __ an uncon1.pron1.ising attitude in "vhich there ' 'vas to be no ·w:a:vering or faltering. It resolutely opposed Colonei Deck~s policy. The constructive progra1nme of the PPS with regard to in ternal conditions, .jn pre-·war Poland consisted in: advocating I free and unfettered elections, based on universal, direct, -secret, £>qual and proportional suffrage· 'rhe Party had no doubts that the . t\VO strongest parties to e1nerge fro1n such elections '\"Vould be the PPS. itself .and the Peasant Party, and these tw-o, \Vith · a 'vorking 1najority in Parlianient, could together form a. demo eratic Government. There w·as the probability of smaller parties
11*) "Polska Partja Socjalistyczna dawna Frakcja Rewolu· eyjna". 2 of the Left and the C'entre being included iri. such a coalition. In matters ·of, for .e~gn policy-· the PPS supported the League of Nations, stood for collective security, closest co-operation with the Western democracies and friendship w·ith the Soviet Union. r. The PPS ~lways den-ounced and ·Opposed any imperialist ag gressioii or threat· of aggression. The· ootern1.ined attitude of. the Polish nation towards German aggression and invasion in 1939 and the following years, .was, to a. very great extent, the result of years of work by and guidance fron1 the PPS. The decision to defend the encirc'led Poli.sh capital of Warsaw in September. 1939 was, in the first place, a decision of the PP8. The unciergr ~ound activities, 1939-1945 . ' Immediately after ·i he . c ;apitulatio~ of Warsaw and just before· the entry of the Gern1an troops. into the :Capital, the PPS, like ali the other Polish political parties, took the decision of dissolving the legally existing Party organization, and embark ing on a new cons-piratorial activity. No ·one could possibly en tertain the illusion that a legal political existence under the Nazi occupation and the rule of the Gestapo would be possi~le . This could perhaps have been achieved, but at the cost of far reaching cornpromises ..of which the PPS ·was: incapable. The Septe1uber can1.paign ·was over, but the ·war went on. The leaders of the PPS - all of then1. - considered resistance to the Ger man iny-aders to be the 1nain task ·of the Polish .workers· More .over, they sa,¥, already then, that in the final stage .of the war, invaded · and conquered nations would have to stand up and deliver the final blow to the German invaders. All this. involved tl1e nec'essity of the wl1.ole ·Movement going undergr~und, anq th~t from the very · out~et. Consequently, the fPolish Underground State. It was represented in the Secret Parliament 1vhose chairman, moreover, one of the outstandi;g Comrades ·. wa ~ \ Kazimierz Puzak (the Secretary General of the PaJ;>ty). ·It gave its· support to the Polish Government in Paris, Ang8,rs and later in London, which included · three Socialist Mip.isters. It was · 81$0 r epresented in the ~ o - called IIome Council o.f Ministers, which formed an integral ._part of the Polish Government in Lon don . .E ~ verywhere the PPS n.cted. in accordance with its Socia list and democratic principles and achieved great successes in ist work of ensuring to the ·Poland,. which was to emerge after the. ~German defeat, a bold and progressive political, .social arid economic policy. Notwithstanding the st rict · observance of all conspiratorial rules - in which the· PPS ~ ·awing to her old revolutionary tra- .. dition excelled a:nyone else - ·· heavy losses could not be avoided. Thre'e members of the :Central Ex~cutive ~ Committee of ·· :the Party (Niedzialkowski, Czapinski, Topine.k) ·and 2$ other me'm bers. of the Supreme ~council of the Pttrty, peri~hed at the hands . of the invaders.. Altogether about 700 prominent ·leaders:·:. of· the' Party met their death under· the occupation. From "tlies-e figures the losses. atnongst t he rank -and file can be imagined· But the Movement grew stronger · and stronger·, new people joining it ipcessantly; I n May 1941, in view of the approaching hour of the final and open rising against the· ·Germans, the :Mo ,,enie'nt could already afford t o revert to the name of the :PP'S.
Th. • ' Communist Party ·of Poland· (KPP)
'!~he Communis ~ Party of Poland (KPP), whose: forerunner· haq been the Social Dem.oeracy of the ICingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), never succeeded in gaining the suppor t of the P<;>lish workiilg class in any strength of for any consider able' period of time ~ This was due to their unforgettable political blunders, such as: a) their definitely negative- attitude to the question o£ Poland's independence prior to the Fir-st World War (a congress of the SDRPi ~L in 1905 declared that Poland's i n - . depe·nqence was detriment~! to .the international prol~tariat and the international social .revolution) ; b ) their boycott ··of .the el~ctions to the Constituent Assembly in 1919 and, in gel);eral, tb~ir .negative attitude t o the reborn Polish Republic; c') their attitude to the Russian invasion of Poland in the:. summer of 1·920 and. their ~role during ,t he Polish defence· of Warsaw ; d) their appeal in 1932 for the severance of Polish Pomerania and Upper Silesia from ·t he Poli.~h Republic in favour of Ger n1.any. Equally, the attitude of the Communists to the Polish- . I German war up to June 22nd, 1941 cannot be forgotten .. It is n~edless to say that in spite of this. Communist .record, the PPS always resolutely oppose-d. any persecutions of the ·Communists a;nd claimed for them the right of ~ree political exis.tence.
T"•: s·elf-Styled1 Lublin group· On July 22nd, 1 944· the so-called ·P.olish Committee of Na ... thllJal· Liberation (PKWN) was proclaim-ed in I Chehn~ < aft~r ·tlle eu,tl-;t into that town of ·the R,ed Army· Later, i~ founded ib ~ _Headquarters in Lublin. Its. chair.man was 1\f. Edward Osubka :Aforawski, who, prior to the war, had been a member of the PPS. Dtiring the war, however, he left the 'Party and joil:\ed a ~ewly arisen tiny group, constituted .. in 1943 and, bearin'g the . name .of the Polish Socialist Workets' l?arty (RPPS), the r .em nants. of which,. after a number: of splits, took on the character of an affiliate to the Polish Workers, Party (PPR), the new n.ame for the Communist Party of Poland. !liEn·e it must be stressed that the Polish c .ommunists are
~o. t onJy,afraid of using_their ,old 1 name (the :Communist Party vf P.oland-KPP) and prefer to e:n;1phasize a,gain and again that t4e . Polish Workers' Party _. cr~ated at the end of 1941, has .little in eomn1on "'rith the old KPP (dissolved in 1937), but, w:hat is more, they are anxious to .avQid the impression of a one!'" . pa:rty rule in Poland· To achieve this; i_t was necessary for them, .right from the beginning, to have. _at their ,disposal a .set of ps~udo-Parties, which, although beat·fng d~fferent names, wop.ld b~;.. ~ Communist-controlled. To this end, while creating their , ne~ puppet Parties, they gave them tne.names of old and gene ·J·a1ly known Polish political Pa.~ties .. Thus Mr. Osubka-Morawski suddenly emerged in his self-styled capacity of the Chair-w-an of the· · Ce1~tral Executive ~ Gomniittee of the PP.S, )Vhile the Lu- · blin Committee was supposed · to be based on the support of four parties bearing the names of the Polish Wor~ers', Polish Socialist, P~asant and \I)emocratic Parties. Of t~es .e, only tlle Poli~h Workers' Party (Communists) was real, although with '\·ery little support within the nation. The other three were usurpers, with real parties bearing ·the res.pectiV'e names still · Pngaged in the underground struggle in German-occupied Po land and helpless to combat the usurpation. :Contrary to all~ normal procedure, the organisat'ion of -the fake PPS was effected· in a curious "vay, beginning with the creation of the self-made .sup'reme authorities, and then proced ing ·downwards to local branches. In [Juhlin, controlled by the J~ed Army, the self.styled PPS. started the publication of a daily paper bearing the name of the "Robotnik" (the main organ of · t,he' real PPS), - 1vhile the authentic "Robotnik'' continued to appear in Warsa'v ri.ght up to the end of the Warsaw .Uprising.. On September lOth and 11th; 1944, 'tlie fake PPS organised an allegedly national conference in Lublin, which they called the Twen.ty-F1ifth Congress of the PPS. It must be emphasized that this allegedly "national" conference; was held at a , time when ·the whole of Poland to the West ·of-the Vistula was still under ·German occupation, and "\-Vith not one member of the ·authentic 1Central Executive Committee· of the Supr~me Council of the Party, and not one Socialist member of the former Polish Pal"lia;.. ments present, and in violation of all the statutory rules of the rf>al J:>arty. A conference, convened in such a way, .elected .the· ~1!-pteme autho~ities of the fake P 'a:t-ty,' which, anyhow, had ~eg~ - ~0 function, aS. SUCh ·On · th~ir OWn initiative ~nd long .be fore.,~ven that conference. It, ~ay perhaps be noted th ,~t ..tlle ,&e ~~p~eme ~utJ!~u~ities incl~ded ~ey~~~! people :whpm the Red I , . I .Army brought \Vith them £rom ·Russia and who . hau not taken any part in the undergro"ti.nd struggle in Pol~nd· The Supreme Council of th~ fake Party, appointed after such a fashion, re solved in P 'ebruary 1945 to exclude from the Party the "leaders and authors of the political and ideological fr~nt of the WRN". Thus, these people, so1ne of ·whom· ·were never in their life mem bers of the P:PS, had the effro.nte·ry to "exclude'' the most devoted and meritorious Socialist leaders of Poland. The Cri.mea verdict ·on Poland A new great So.viet offensive in January 1945 cleared the ·Gern1ans out of the rest of Poland. In most cases, local branches , of the authentic PPS spontane·ously ·welcomed the opportur,tity 0~ coming into the ·Open and resumipg their activities. - . The Lublin Co:o.ul;J.ittee having in the meantime. styled itself to Pro "\-_isional Government of Poland (December 31st, 1944), moved to Warsaw in the wake of the advancing Russian- armies. T}?.e history of the Russo-Polish relations in the course of 1l1e vvar is too welf known to require a repetition here. On Fe bruary 12th, 1~45, the heads of the governments of Great Bri tain, ..the U.S.A. and the U.:S.S·R., assembled at Yalta, issued the
11The Provisional Government of National Unity0 Simultaneously with the trial of the Polish delegates, there Btarted in Moscow negotiations on the formation of the "Provi sional Polish Government of National Unity", to vvhieh the Commission of· Three also invited Zygmunt Ztdawski, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the authentic PPS, who took part in the neg,otiations, without, however, ontering the new ·Govern- . u1ent, which 'vas fornied 011. Jun~ 28th, 1945. Thus, no repre- sentative o'f the authentic PPS "'\iVas included in the new Govern nlent. As a matter of fact ,this ne\V provisional Government con sisted ,mainly of the old Lublin ·Government, w·ith the addition of a few .ne--vv Ministers. Three of then~ led by Mr. ~ikolajczyk, 'vere represep.tatives of the Peasant Party, vvhile Mr. ·Stanczyk, "'\vent immediately over to the Party of Mr. Osubka-Morawski. On June 29th and 30th and July 1st, 1945, this Party held H.s next conference in Warsavv, ~ described as the-XX\Tith Con ferenc~ o£ the· PP'S, and again elected the national authorities, wit.h M~. Bzwalbe (who never before the Lublin episode -had teen known as 1nember of the PPS) as the Chairn~an of ·the S~pren{e Council and with Mr· Osubka-Mora~rski as the Chair rna~ o'.f the Central Executive ConDnittee. ·a£ the me;nberiS of the newly-elected 'Central E ·;xecutive Committee, only Mr. Stanczyk .had been a member o~ the pre---vvar Central Executive Committee cf the authentic PPS. He --vvas elected for the first time at the · Jast pre---vvar conference of the Party and. his name was at the bottom of ~he poll. - T~e recognition of the ne--vv Provisional -Government by the Great Powers once again created a new situation, which beca1ne the-subject of deliberations on the part of the Supreme Council of the a"L1thentic PPS, \Vhen it met again in secret under the chair!llanship of Zula-vY.ski, on July 5th, 1945 . .Approaching the situation reaHstically, they decided that all efforts should be made to .secu,re 'a possibility of- a constructive Socialist work in the new and hard conditions pr~vailing in Poland. In parti cular, the Supre;me Council deci.ded not to reject the possibility of a merger between the authentic PPS and the Party led by Mr. Osubka- ·Mora~ski, particularly; as the· ' latte~ Party ha·d alre.ady iJi{pos'ed its control on the local branches of the PPS which had co~e· int~ the open, and because the authentic PPS was denied ari~ right to a legal poljtical existence and did not wish to carry on its underground work under the nevv conditions. Ac cordingly, delegations of the two' parties met and set d"own con ditions for a merger. These conditio~~s, although imposing heavy .sacrifices on the authentic PP.S, were ratified by it, while ¥r~ Osubka-Morawski's Committee first temporised and then de finitely refused to ratify them. ·
Attempts to form the· Polish Soci~I-Democratic Party
In the n~eantime, l\!Ir. lVIikolajczyk together with other lea ders of the genuine Peasant Party, managed -ro recreate their in
"l\1:r. Boleslaw Bierut, President of the National Council of the Hon1eland. I did not conceal for a n1on1ent that the Polish Socialist Party which I have represented for years is an entirely different organizations from the one represent~d by Comrade Stanislaw Szwalbe and Comrade Pre1nier Osubka-Morawski. Fron1 , the very beginning I considered it necessary to unite these two or ganisations and \Ve have laid do·wn conditions of such a unifica tion. ·which \Vere to be ratified b y both bodies. Up , till now I 1Jave had no official notification as to this problem of unifica tion and co-operation, and, at the sa1ue ti1ne~ the date of Sep tenlber 21st is approaching, vvhich date has been·' set for ali or ganizations to "come into the open" and to adapt their acti ,·ities, to the existing rules. ':l"herefore, in view of the tin1e lin1it, I notify you for £orn1al i~ea s ons of the existence of our organisation and I declare that it· intends to avail its~lf to, the full of the political rights ·which have been granted it at Yalta aE one of t'he "anti-Nazi" ,parties, - obviously depen~ing on the ,ratification or non-ratification of the agreement between !he two parties in question, of July 1945. (-) Zygn1unt zulawski Chairman, Polish Socialist Party· 1\Iyslenice, September 18th, 1945 ' '. ,. The Prilne lVIinister of the Govern1nent of National Unity, l\1r. Ed,vard Osubka-JVIora\vski, 'Viars a \V. Follo·wing n1y letter to the President of the National Council _ of the Homeland of September 18th, 1945, 1 here·with inforn1 you that ilt view of 1ny having been notified of the repudiation by the ·Central Executive Con1n1ittee of the Polish Socialist Party tJr: the ratification of.., the agreen1ent between our tw·o organisa tt ions concerning t_heir unificatjon, '\Ve have decided to under- take political activities of our O\Vn. nuder the nanl.e of Po-lish Social-Democratic Party. . 8 A delegation consisting of comrade~: Al~k.sy Bien, Stani slaw Garlicki and Antoni Zdanowski, has been empowered to .. conduct ~ with the proper State authorities - negotiations . and talks ai1ning- at the necessary co-ordination in conne~tion ,dth our under~aking of open political activities. Zyg1nunt Zulawsk·i, Chairman? Cracow, October 2nd, 1945." The above-quoted letter to Mr. Osubka·-Morawski was de .livered to him by a delegation of sp_on.sor~ of the PP,SD, com-· posed of the three comrades named in Zulawski's letter. Below are the minutes of the conversation 'vhich took place between · the delegation and Mr. Osubka-Morawsld. "The Premier received the delegation on October 6th, 1945, at 9·30 a. m. The spokesman of the delegation declared at the outset: . "We have come to you, esteemed ·comrade Premier, in o:rder to inform you that in view of the failure of the negatiations aiming' at unification ·which had been conducted in July, and on the strength of the' article·s 104 and 105 of the 1921 Constitution, as ·well as of the decisions of the Yalta Co;nference, later confirmed at Moscow consultations and at Potsdam - the Underground Group of the Polish Socialist Party has decided to ·come into the 0pen and to start legal activit~es under the name of the Polish Social-:D·emocratic Party and u~der the · leadership of Comrade Zyg1nunt Zula-wski fron'l 'vho1n 've have the hono-q_r to deliver you a letter." Premier: "Does the letter concern this matter?" The spokesn1an of the delegation: "Yes." Pren1ier: "I. a1n not going to accept it. I declare that you vYill be treated on a par with the National Armed Forces." · The meaning of thi~ further utterances was as follows: The · activities of the WRN ·were harmful which is borne out by th~ abundant underground literature edited by the WRN during the war. In reply to the delegation's statement that it does not re present the \VRN but the Polish Social-Democratic Party just t~nnounced by zula-wski ... that it is unthinkable to treat a man 1~ke .Zulawski as a ·Fascist -the Premier declared that .Zulawski 1nay be whatever he likes but the whole group is the WRN ahd- the Governrp.ent ·will never allo·w its activitie,s. · In reply to the delegation's statement that this sort of po licy is a blo'v aimed at · a group including - as the Premier is aware - honest Socialists, - the Premier ansvvered that honest Socialists are 1nemb~rs of the Polish Socialist Party and as to those who still do .not .belong to it, they can even. noV\r _apply for m f'nlbership. Replying to the objection that the -Premier qualifies th(' entire group in a one-sided way and .denies its right to political existence, that this is contrary to the princ.iples of political fre~dom and democracy, "V:hich - aJter all - involve respect . Q I , for the convictions :Qf o,pponent ~ s -·- the ~remie r ou~e n1o1 , re - peated that the WRN will be tr~ated exactly as the National Arn1ed F ·orces. In the course of -his further decl~ra tions the Premier said, among other thi~gs: ''Do you want to s·ink into ·the abyss~ You can do so. Y·ou vvill get vvhat you des.erve. There vvill be no second_ amnes_ty" · When the .delegation remarked that, after all, ·political activity has now been restarted by po litical groups who, during the war, had been violently combatt ed by the Premierys camp. The Premier asked: '' )Vhich .groups~'' ·yvhen the delegation explained that it m~ant the Polish ~easant Party, the Premier declared that the Polish Peasant Party is so~ething quite' di~fe~ent from the W ~RN. . __In t;he course"of this whole talk with the delegation the Pre mier rather shouted t_han talked. In leav1ng, the delegation left ~ . . ' .ZulaWlski 's letter on the Premierys desk.'' A f~· rthe~ consequen'ce. of .Zuhi'wskiys attempt to re-create an }ndepenLleJ;lt Socialist Party, and the determination of ·the authorities to . prevent this from h~ppening, was a resolution pas~ed b.y the Praesidium of the National Council of the Hoine la~d (:K~~j'owa Rada Narodovva). It ·must be explained that this Council is i body pr-etending to act as a: provisional P ·a~liament .of P~l~rid. :its members, ho,vever, are. nominated and not elected, a~id th,ei.r m~.ndats 1nay be ·arbhrarily vvithdrawn by the Prae si
Very soon1 however, it be.came ervitdent that while- zulawski was f~ithfulJy carryj.ng out the- pr-ovisions of the agreement, the other ~arty did not . consider themselv~ s in the least bound by it. zu- 1 Jav\ski vvas refused the possibility of .publishing an article in the official "Robotnik" and ·wa.s eventually able to publish it only . in a provincial .vveekly: In this article zula vvski, 'Y hile stres.sing that . ~olidarity and unity are the greatest assets of the ·working class, declared: . "But just as I did not alter n1.y conviction about the need of sol{darity, .so I did not alter it with regard to the need of de- . :m. o~racy and freedom either. Just ~s I fought for them du:dng the period of Poland's partitions, as. I .claimed .them when th~ ·were being jeopardised during the regime of Pilsud.ski and the Camp of National Unity,. s~ to-day I consider the1n to be one of ~he funda1nental conditions of life in the liberated State. It ·would be a grave mistake for anyone to believe that, after more :han forty years (spedt in public life), I could change my ·opin ions on this problem, - and it ·would be a graver mistake still for · anyone to try to impose .such a change on me, contrary to ·what has. ahvays been my creed·" · Indeed, Zuja w.ski never concealed the differences existing betvveen him and ·Messrs . .Szw·albe and Osubka-lVIoravvski, p~r ticur ly on the q"L~estion of democracy, freedom of . expression, free elections;ee·tc· etc. The problem was vv hether he would be n Hovved to voice and advocate these opinions. vv{thin the "of ficial" PP.S, which vva~ to be the test of that Party's internal de1nocracy. The agreement between him ·and Mr. Sz,valbe was eonch~ded on the assumption that he would. The course of· eve.nts proved the contrary. .Soon after the conclusion of the ag~eement, Mr. Szwalbe published three articles in the W ~r.sa w "Robotnik", violently attacking the PPS for its activities both before· and during the ·war. Contrary to any spirit of understanding and· good will, Mr. Sz,valbe declared that ''the activities of the WR.N during the occupation must be considered politically mistaken and,' more over, extremely harmful." '~The re-born PPS ·_ 'vrote M~. Szwalbe - repudiates absolutely and completely the· WRN" .. '~The reborn PPS is not a continuation, but a negation of the VlRN". The mo.~t striking proof of· the -real intentions of the ''of ficial' 'Party came during the last session of the Suprenl~ c~)uncil of t~e ''official" PPS (a body including about 120 per.sons)_, held on March 31st an_d April 1st, 1946. Contrary. to the p,rovisiol_ls of t.he agreement, the .Supreme Council of the "official" Party c;o-opted only half .of the agreed member of Zulavvskl. 's p~litical · friends. Moreover, during the same !Session the true purpose of .the agreement, as far as the lead.ership of the "official" Party -was concerned, vvas bluntly revealed by Mr. QpSubka-Morawski ""hen he .declared: ·"We have lat_ely admitted into the Party a group of· cpm rades, because vve wanted to ;put an end to. the rumours that there are ·other Socialists, members of the PPS, that there is ~1nother .Socialist Party in Poland. We vvanted to put an end to 1:his legend, so that our friends in the West could not say any longer that there i~ a second Polish Socialist Party." ll These words speak for themselves. The new ag:!ree·ment :was intended to ~eceive SociaHst parties in the West' as to the real sittiatibn of the .Socialist Movement in Poland. Under those cir cumstances, zulawski and his friends*) resigned f~om . the Su-· prein~ Oounc'il of the "official" P ·a:r-ty to which they had been co opted ,during that very· sa_me session of the Supreme .CounciL Tb,us, owing to the attitude of the leadership · of the "officialu Party, the short-lived agreement with Zulawski was bro~en · Leaving aside for the ·moment the fact, that .some of our cou1rades had been p~rsonally denied the possibility of joining th~ ' "official" Pa.rty, as. ·well as the fact that inany pr-eferred not to join it .- it must be categorically stated, ·that in vie\V of the foregoing, the leadership of the "officj;l,l" PPS is in no way e~titled to represent the genuine democratic Socialists of Poland. -..The ra'!k and·file versus the leadership There is little doubt that the bulk of the working class of Poland, including the rank and file of th~ ~"official" PP.S,. re mains ·faithful to the ideals of democratic Bocialism and loyal to 'the authentic PPS. The question, how' it came about that th~ genuine Socialist rank and file found itself within the "official" Prs· easily explained under the peculiar circumstances pre- vailing !in Poland. . · . As has aiready been mentioned, :most of the local organiza- . tions of the genuine PPS came spontaneously into· the open and resumed t·heir activities immediately after the, expulsion of the Ge~mans. The suprenle authorities of 'the .authentic PPS beinl{ denied the opportunity of resuming their normal· functions, the Lublin group was able to impose their control over these local organizations,·- a fact, which did not prevent these organi sations. from remaining in touch with .their real leaders. Thus, a large part of the organised 1Socialist working class of Poland found itself in the ranks of the "official" Party. Furthermore, strong pressure is ex~rted on employees and people dependent on public bodies to join one of the 'four original Lublin parties. Having to ·choose between the Communist PPR and the "of ficial'' PPS, the P :olish workers still preferred to. join the latter. Not only does membership -of one ·of . the _parties. confer eertain privileges on the members, but certain posts are unob tainable for non-party people, especially in the civil service. A. telling illustration of this .situation may be found in, a speech made by Mr. Osubka~Morawski, the Prime Minister ·of the War saw Government, in Wro'claw, on D·ecember 26th, 1945, in which he' reyealed th'e existenc~ of a circula.r of th~ Minister o~ Public Security, !Jir·· Radkie"vicz, to the effect ,that members of ru poli fica1 party must not be arrested without their party being pre ·viously notified of the charges profer~ed against them, unless caught red-handed -committhig a crhne. Unless this. is a. case, the chatges against such pet'sons have to be .submitted to . their pelitical Pa.rty and only after the Party Oo1irt has dismissed
*) -Grzec·znarowski Cohii. and Rzezuik.. . . ~. --~- ' ' . . - ·Ia
•. them from the Party, can the.· .case -be hande.d ·over to the ·Secu rity Police. (;viz. "Naprz6d Doln9slaski" of. January 4th-10th, 1946). The le~dership of the '.'official'' · Party does, not e;q.joy the confid~nce of the rank and file, who-·, time and again- niade themselves heard at Party · meetings and conferences, taking · a decisive line against the .policy. of the leader1ship. The recent re gional conferences at Cracow and Katowice constituted crush ing defeats for ,the leadership. Th,ese conferences unanimously opposed the idea of an electoral bloc in which the PPS would ·eoml,>ine ·with the Communists (PPR,) against -the Polish Peasant :Party. These recent .conferences be~me virile manifestations . in· favour of the oid leaders from the gen11ine· PPS and violent··ma U'ifestations against the official leadership. ' Another striking example · of the lack of confidence of the .1·ank and file in. the leadership · i,s provided by -the results;· of ·elections to the .Shop 1Co:rp.mittees. Instructions emanating froin t~e leadership or ~uring these e1ecti~ns to be conducted jojntly "f\·ith the ·Communists on the basis of 50--50 representation, were il.isregarded by the rank and file, who put forward ·separate. So cialist list. In the 63 such recent ~lections in the .largest indu strial district of Poland, out of a total of 92.8 geat.s, _the ·PPR gained only 193 (21%), while'Socialists gained 55·6 (64%), t;he De·inoc.r)atic P:arty--14, C!b.ristian Labour Party-10, ~olish Peasant Party- 2, the rest being shared by non-party and, Trade ·unions lists, including many Socialist sympathisers. " '. In this·· connection, the fact that membership ~ of a Party alone very often. does not prove political allegiance to the lea dership of the given Party, may ,be illustrated by a complaint ntade on December 8th, 1945, by the Communist leader . and Vice-Premier of the vVarsaw ·Government, ·Gomulka, wh-o said_; "There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "F'ablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250-270 people· And in these elections we have not gained. a . ~ingle .seat". The leadership of the ''official'' PPS are not content ·with attacking th~ir- o"rn rank and file .in the Party Press, with. ac cusing them of not understanding the ne'v Party line, with op posing co-operation with the Cominunists, with not being po-: litically conscious enough, etc. etq., (viz. o.g. "Robotniku/ of·.No vember 3rd, 1945) ; they also try to counteract·, as far as. pos-sible, the expression of the mood of the masses. Thus; for instance, '\Vhen Regional Conferences elected new Regional Committees according to the wishes and conviction~ of the delegates, -:such elections were declared wholly or partly invalid by the Centra-l Executive Committee and new officers were appointed . to·. re place the previously elected ones.. ~his happened,.. o.g., -in· the regions. of Dabrowa-Silesia and the. city of. Warsaw. · In present circumstances, no .free .Socialist Pr~ss can exist. The official leadership have· monopolized for .thep!$elyes .'all m~aris · of expression. Individual a.ttempts to create. a Socl~lift Press· (a daily -or a weekly, or even a monthly)_~hich would,nc;.t ;1,3 be controlled by the official leadership, have been frustrated. Not· even an individual Socialist pa1nphlet was allowed to he published. : 1\Ioreover, there is no personal safety for a number of pro J(Jinent comrades, who had been in the forefront of the Party's underground struggle against the German invaders. Assiduous ·searches to get hold of these cOinrades were itensified in Feb- 1·uary, March and April of this year, when their homes were se ver:al tiri1'es visited by the Security Police. · The di~iding ·line · · ' ''The n1ost ser~ious original n1istakes. of the old PPS are : the hostile attitude to the Soviet Union and to the united working class front" .- . wrote Mr ..sz~albe, ' a~\er having already ' COn cluded the '' agreen1ent'' w1th Zulawsk1, as a leader and repre senta-tive of that "old'' PPS. The- attitude of the PPIS to the Soviet Union was first and fc,.remos:t the result of Soviet Russia's. attitude. to the problem of Poland ·independence .. In the period of the Nazi-:Soviet Treaty of a1nity, the attitude of the PPS to the USSR was the only one possible for a n1pvement worthy tp.e name of Socialists, deino ·crats and Poles. Beside.s, in this res.pect there was no .difference l.wtween the PPS and the den1ocratic Socialists of the whole
vvdrld. · 1 The defehce of the Eastern half of Poland against its an nexati,on by the USSR was the duty of the :PPS. They do not deny this fact and they are not asham~d of it. They did not ask for an inch of Soviet territory .. The:0, asked that the will of the Jo.cal population, international treaties ap.d obligations. and the · A_tlantic Charter .should be respected· The present situation, in which, after the a1nputation of the Eastern part of Poland, her territorial gaints in the West up to theRivers Ode:r: and Western Neisse are still being questioned (although they compensate only half of the losses in the East) is another proof .o£ how badly needed wa.s this defence. · The' accusation of refusal to form a united front with the Communists in the past is equally -unjustified. Is it suggested, for .exa·mple,· that the PP.S should have created such a united front with the Communists in 1932, at the n1oment when they were Eiskl.ng for Polish Pomerania and Upper Silesia to be given to ·Gerr11any o? How was the PPS to for1n a united front with the~n, when, in 1937, the ·Qomintern 'its~l'£ was .· compelled to dis selve the · Con1n1u'lri~t l?ttr'ty·'-O'f 'Poiand, as not worth a continued existence~ -In fact, the differences, althongh not openly expressed, lie else·where. ·· The .authentic PPS is and will remain faithful to the prin· I.Ciples of dem&cracy. Repudiating any compromise w·ith Fascism, Hem:l-Fascism and totalitarianisn1 of any sort-, the PPS believes in democratic institutions and abhors terrorism, police rule over workers and peasants, 'Gleichschaltung' '' etc. as a means to achieve Socialism. 14 The auth~ntic PPS recognises. the necessity of a .deinocratie "Nation~il Unity" fn· this difficult period of reconstruction of Poland after ruin and destruc;tion. The authentic PPS; however, i!oes not see any ·reason why democratic parties shquld- have to bo "licensed" or why general erections rshouid be turned into a · tarce on the pattern of the elections to the Nazi 1R~ichstag. The authentic PPS · recog11ises tliat the ConHhui1ists shoula have equal rights ·with ail ·the other parties in Poland. But they do not·recognise the I1ecessiiy either of a merger "'With the ·Com· D1Uriists ·or of SUCh , a close COllaboration with th:em as·, is beihg advocated: to-day by the ''official" PPS, under th'e tlii~eat of c.x pulsi<;>ri from the Party of tliese who ertdanger the "purity of the Party" ('8zwalbe~s a~ti · cJe in the "Rbb0tnik" of F'ebruary Gth, 1946). It" must Be added, that. this. ·"collaboration" pra'c t.ically means the subordi'natioh of the "official" PPS ·to the PPR an'd an arrangement under which the PPS would hav·e to puH all the · PPR chf?stnuts. out of the fire. ·The authentic P:PS 'vi.shes. to base great economic, social a.nd political changes in Poland - in accordance with its pro gra-mme passed by the Congress of R~dom . on F 'ebruary 2nd, 1937: - on the only lasting foundation: the will of the majority · (;l the nation, the will of the ··working ·masses in towl'l and coun try~ This foundation e.annot i)e replaced by a .. ruie of .terror by · an insignificant n1inority, - on the contrary, such a rule threa tens for the future only violent · shocks and pa·roxysn1s of re action. Two moih demands of the authentic PPS - What th~ a:uthentic' PPS ask~ for, is: - a) holding of free and unfettered parliamentary elections, based on universal, .secret, equal, direct and proportional'- suf frage; ·no single electoral bloc, transforming elections into mere voting, b) to this end liquidation of ·the ·police system, and, above ~Ul, the securing for the politicial, ind-hstrial, co-op-erative and educatio.nal branches of the Labour Movement., freedom of as sociation, meetingsJ speech and Press, without which any elec tions would be just a mockery; freedom of exi'stence and activity for the authentic Movement of democratic Socialism; internal ilemocracy within the Trade Union, Co-operative and other like rn oven1en ts. These are bvo demands- in - ~- - ~iatt;.he~PS counts un the support of the whole Interna-~_nal ~t' Movement. It n1ust be mnphatically stressed that the attitude of the ::~nthentic PPIS to the present Polish regiine has nothing in cmn mon 'vith the opposition of the Right \Ving groupings. Already under the . Ger1nan occupation .the PPS (WRN) put forward the bold, and by no means vague program1ne o£ extensive i...:hanges in the social and economic structure, p.ro·c,laimed as the ''Programme for a People's Poland'' in Spring 1941. Its essen tjal demands becan1e part of th~ com1non declaration of -the Polish ·war-time underground )alition, published on August 15 15th, 1943, later confirmed and elaborated several t'imes, long before the Lublin Committee (published His manifesto tin Jn1y 1944. The authentic PPS soleninly declares that it' stands for "'! friendly relation~ between Poland and· the Soviet Union, but it does not wish to be isolated f1~01n the Western Demo_cracies and fhe democratic Socialism of which the PPS is the traditional ex-. pression in Poland, and firmly dmn.ands for the Polish Nation the freedom of sha.ping its way of 'life according to its own will and needs. Standing firmly for a genuine independen!3e of Po land, the authentic PP.S demanqs such political and territorial conditions as to secure the free development of the Polish pro letariat and the whole Polish Nation, whose unimpeachable c<>n tdbution to the war against Fascism and Hit}erism and to the -rictot:y over the' Axis· Power~ is wid~y known and recognise.d.
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