Southeast Schools

Site Threat Assessment for the Goshen County School District #1 in Goshen County, Wyoming

Prepared by:

P.O. Box 1163

Fenton, MO 63026

(314) 813-0311

Proprietary material-confidential document-handle and store this document in a restricted manner Disclaimer

The findings of this assessment are general in nature and should be weighed against cost, practicality and reasonableness. 0311 Tactical Solutions, LLC assumes no responsibility or liability for any changes in security protocols that either fail or succeed during any sort of emergency or critical incident. Recommendations are based on common security protocols and aimed at enhancing Goshen County School District’s ability to better recognize, deter, prevent and respond to armed intruder type situations. Every situation is different and flexibility in any plan is crucial.

Preface

The purpose of this analysis is to provide an objective assessment regarding security measures currently in place at the facilities of the Goshen County School District located throughout Goshen County, Wyoming, measured against accepted standards for similar entities. Recommendations growing out of this assessment must be examined in light of the costs associated with their implementations well as the potential they may have on impacting the important day to day functions of the schools. Security enhancements must also be consistent with identified threats and concerns. In considering the range of potential threats to the safety and security of Goshen County schools, it can be concluded that many threats are possible but far fewer are probable. It should be those threats that are most probable that receive the most attention. The assessment encompasses all of GCSD buildings. Several common themes and issues existed and multiple, if not all, the schools. Thus, some of the assessment taken as a whole may seem repetitive.

Assessment Methodology

One method of threat assessment used in this assessment is the “HLS-CAM M/D SHARPP MATRIX”.

The HLS-CAM™ is a five-part continuous process consisting of the following:

• Threat Assessment - examines and defines a community, identifies critical facilities, infrastructures and events, identifies threat groups, determines the likelihood that, given the current intelligence or designated federal, state or local threat levels, a specific target will be subject to terrorist or hostile criminal attack. • Criticality Assessment - determines the overall impact of a terrorist attack on a given target and the adverse effect it has within a community. • M/D-SHARPP Matrix - used to analyze criminal and/or terrorist targets that have been identified through the Community Threat Assessment and Criticality Assessment. The M/D-SHARPP further analyzes the targets using information obtained in the Threat Assessment and looks at the target through the threat group's perspective. • Community Priority Assessment Plan - derived from the Criticality Assessment and the M/D-SHARPP Matrix and is used to determine the order of priority for the vulnerability assessment of critical facilities, infrastructure and events as identified during the Community Threat Assessment. • Vulnerability Assessment - a critical on-site physical examination and thorough inspection of an assets perimeter, property within the perimeter, and building exterior and interior spaces to include all operational systems and procedures along with the security of a facility.

The M/D SHARPP matrix assigns point values to factors to be considered during a risk assessment. These factors include but are not limited to:

• Economic Impact

• Environmental Impact

• Symbolic effect

• Mission of the entity

• History of the entity

• Accessibility

• Recognizibility

• Proximity to other assets

All seven Goshen County School District facilities along with the Central Administration building were placed in the matrix following walk-through assessments of each location. The total was compared against 39 other locations we have conducted assessments on including public and private buildings, landmarks and venues.

LAGRANGE ELEMENTARY SCHOOLLLLRANGE

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the LaGrange Elementary School campus bordered by E Street to the north, 2nd Avenue to the east, D Street to the south, and 1st Avenue to the west. The remote location reduces the possibility of a spill over event from another location having an impact on the school campus. However, the school is physically connected to another building housing other entities to include a pre-school and a restaurant. It should be noted though, access to the school cannot be gained from this building. The negative aspect of the location is that it sits approximately 35 miles from the Goshen County Sheriff’s office in Torrington. Also, according to staff, this area is not a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders.

Thus, we recommend establishing a Sheriff’s substation in conjunction with the Goshen County Sheriff. This only requires a small room or work space where Deputies can come to the school to do paperwork, use the restroom, etc., should they be given an assignment or be patrolling in the LaGrange area. Clearly and conspicuously post “Goshen County Sheriff’s Department Substation” on the front of the building. Send a message to anyone who may be looking that a law enforcement officer could come by at any time. Stocking the room with a small refrigerator with soda, water and light snacks always helps in getting Deputies to stop by.

Arial view of the LaGrange Elementary School campus

The assessment will begin by addressing the exterior perimeter of the property. With due respect to the desired atmosphere that an academic institution needs to maintain, there are cost effective, non-invasive measures that could be put in place along with minor improvements to existing security assets and procedures.

The main entrance will be any visitor’s first impression of your facility. As with most schools, the front entrance is comprised of a lot of glass. While it is cosmetically ideal, from a security standpoint it poses many challenges. While the procedure of requiring all visitors to be buzzed in is a very good policy, we recommend the purchase of some ballistic window tint for the main entrance doors and adjacent windows. Tint of this type can withstand multiple rounds from high caliber weapons. While, eventually, the tint can be defeated by multiple rounds, it buys time for the staff inside to alert authorities and either shelter in place or evacuate through another exit.

As mentioned earlier, the main entrance to your building is the face of your school and will be any visitor’s first impression. Anyone considering carrying out a criminal act at LaGrange Elementary will likely do a reconnaissance of it first. The security posture at your main entrance will be very important. One Active Shooter statistic of note is that 40% of these events are committed by a suspect with no connection to the facility what so ever. The presence of good visual deterrents at your main entrance will have influence on a potential attacker who is simply looking for a soft target and not necessarily looking to attack LaGrange Elementary specifically. Also, the presence of faculty and staff at the main entrance during high traffic times is important.

Main entrance and south side Principal’s office door

Starting with southside of the building, it was clear that a camera station was missing and in need of replacement. The staff on hand was unsure what happened to the camera or why it had been removed. This also serves as a visual indication to anyone looking to do harm at the school that security measures may not be what they should be. The south side entrance to the Principal’s office is another location where ballistic window tint could be an important security addition for the same reasons mentioned above.

The west side of the school has three entrances: double doors, gym access doors and storage room door that also has access to the gym. There is no camera coverage on the west side of the building and none of these doors are alarmed. The west side of the building also has a think tree line that runs along the western edge of campus along 1st Avenue. This tree line could provide concealment to a potential intruder giving him time to work on doors that are not alarmed or monitored by cameras. We recommend trimming back some of this foliage.

While we understand the costs associated with installing alarms and cameras, a low cost, cosmetic option could be installing shell cameras. These are camera mounts that look real but are not actual cameras and are not actually wired. They serve as nothing more than a visual deterrent. An armed intruder looking to attack a school, and not necessarily this school, will likely conducted a reconnaissance first. If he/she sees several cameras posted at key locations, he may move on to another location. Let us emphasize, the preferred solution is real cameras and active monitoring of them, but in the absence of that, fake shell cameras are an option and usually run between $20-$30.

West side of building in need of camera coverage

There are key pieces of the school’s infrastructure on the exterior of the building that have unobstructed access creating a potential security issue. Propane tanks on the northwest and northeast corners of the campus are very close to the school building and have no physical barriers around them to prevent someone from tampering with them. Fire and explosions have served as a precursor for multiple school attacks in the past. If moving the tanks further away from the school is not a feasible option, we suggest some sort of fencing around them. There are also two electric panels that are vulnerable to tampering as they have no physical barriers to prevent access. The same can be said for the school bus gas pumps.

Critical infrastructure needs to be contained or moved

The stairwell, pictured in the top center photograph above, also allows unobstructed access to the rooftop of the school. We recommend a locked gate at the bottom of the staircase. Roof access could be very advantageous to an armed attacker.

INTERIOR

The procedures in place in terms of allowing access to the building at the main entrance are pretty good. The protocol of visitors being required at ring the bell and be seen on video before entry is an excellent standard to keep.

It is of minor concern, however, that the secretary does not seem to have access to the video cameras. We also noted the secretary has no panic alarm. Staff also advised that both radios in the office normally stay there. We recommend placing one of the radios in the classroom at the other end of the building. With responding law enforcement being potentially 20-30 minutes away, the front office worker must have more tools at her disposal for recognition, prevention and reaction to a threat. The staff did seem unfamiliar with any emergence response plans or simply stated, “What if?” scenarios.

We were advised by the staff that the camera monitors in the office did not work.

Surveillance equipment needs repair and updating

We identified a good safe room for the Principal and Secretary. This room should be labeled as a shelter and all staff familiarized with its location. This room should be equipped with a telephone land line and computer monitors with camera access.

Office hard room

The secretary is equipped with a “shut down” button that shuts doors between the office and south classroom. It doesn’t, however, shut the main hallway door leading from the lobby. It is a great tool to have, but it should shut both doors, and much quicker. It takes the south door approximately four seconds to close completely after the button is pushed. That leaves enough time for unimpeded access through the doors.

We also noted the cut out in the wall between the two north classrooms. We would recommend sealing this off with a solid wall, with perhaps a door. In its current configuration, access to one classroom means easy access to both. One classroom’s problem easily becomes the other classroom’s problem. This would be a relatively inexpensive project that could be done over a weekend.

This area should be sealed off

The exterior gym doors should be alarmed in the event someone would leave them propped open. These doors lead to the concealed area on the west side of the building we previously mentioned. These doors being left propped open would be a significant security issue.

Alarm Gym doors

INTERIOR-CLASSROOMS Establishing “safe” or “hard” rooms in each area of the building is strongly suggested. Labeling and designating the hard rooms and ensuring the faculty and students are familiar with them could be an enormous difference maker in your emergency response. Rooms with only one entrance, no windows, inward opening doors, with heavy, but moveable, items capable of providing a barricade and a land line are your best options. The classrooms are set up pretty nicely, however we recommend the addition of door cables. The cable is funneled through a handle on the door then brought back and attached to the bolt on the wall.

Example of door cables

Given the low enrollment and secluded location, GCSD may want to consider the security factors in keeping the school active should enrollment dip any lower. We understand the desire of the community to keep its school and the quality of education that environment provides, but our assessment comes from a security standpoint alone and we recognize other factors also would weigh in on such a decision.

TORRINGTON MIDDLE SCHOOL

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

The area surveyed was the Torrington Middle School campus bordered by W 29th Avenue to the north, West E Street to the east, West 25th Avenue to the south, and a largely open field to the west. The close proximity to Torrington High School raises the possibility of a spill over event from that location having an impact on the school campus. The positive aspect of the location is that it sits approximately one mile from the Torrington Police Department.

As before, we recommend establishing a Torrington Police and Goshen County Sheriff’s substation in conjunction with the respective agencies. This only requires a small room or work space where Officers and Deputies can come to the school to do paperwork, use the restroom, etc., should they be given an assignment or be patrolling in the area. Clearly and conspicuously post “Goshen County Sheriff’s/Torrington Police Department Substation” on the front of the building. Send a message to anyone who may be looking that a law enforcement officer could come by at any time. Stocking the room with a small refrigerator with soda, water and light snacks always helps in getting Deputies and Officers to stop by.

EXTERIOR

Beginning with the front of the building, a row of concrete benches sits along the building side of the main entrance walkway. We would suggest putting similar concrete benches on the curbside of the walkway to provide protection against a vehicle coming up over the curb. These benches could be placed all along the curb, or perhaps a less expensive approach would be just placing one bench between each pillar of the walkway canopy.

White boxes represent suggested placement of additional concrete benches

Office staff we interviewed stated they sometimes have difficulty seeing who is hitting the front door buzzer. We recommend painting an “X” or foot prints on the ground where people can be viewed along with posting a sign that states “Please stand on the ‘X’ and face the camera”.

The district has done a very good job of labeling classrooms in all the schools by number with placards or signs in each window. Building on that, we recommend the labeling of all doors, exits and entrances. All doors on the north side of the building could be labeled “N-1, N-2” and so on. For the same reason the classrooms are labeled for first responders, the labeling of doors can also assist those responding to an emergency. For example, if an emergency is located in an interior portion of the school that doesn’t have an exterior window (the library of nurse’s office, etc.), responders can be given the nearest door to enter. This can facilitate a quicker response which can make all the difference.

Exterior doors in need of labeling

We noted during the assessment there is no surveillance camera coverage on the west side of the building. We found the out-building housing restrooms unlocked. With no camera coverage here, having this building unsecure could create a spot for middle school aged children to engage in behaviors that are less than desired.

Unsecured restrooms near track on west side The south side of the building presents some security concerns as well. We recommend the installation of ballistic window tint to the entrance to the cafeteria area. This is a solid wall of glass and very vulnerable to a forced entry. Window tint would only be needed on the ground floor windows, again to buy time for those inside to react to an armed attacker. We also recommend securing the gate on the west side of the building at the back of the school during school hours. Also, the southeast corner needs to be sealed off from potential vehicle traffic. Two concrete bollards placed here would prevent any vehicles from entering the playground while still freely allowing pedestrian traffic. That being said, running the fence all the way to the building would be ideal so as not to allow said pedestrian traffic.

Install ballistic window tint on ground level windows

Secure gate on west end during school hours and seal off gap on east end

Other observations made during the exterior assessment included a door near the science lab on the west side of the building did not completely shut on its own when opened. We also noted multiple doors had door stops placed near the door. We recommend removing these from the area as they promote security breaches. Any level of security can be easily defeated by human error. Allowing door stops to be placed at exterior doors just make sit that much easier for someone to leave a door unsecure as a matter of convenience. Posting signs reading “Do not Prop Open Door. Ensure Door Shuts Behind You” are good reminders and help to establish a culture of security.

Door near Science Lab that does not shut all the way on its own and door stops placed near exterior doors

We noted the presence of loud speakers on the exterior of the building. Staff was unable to tell us if they worked or the last time they were tested. We recommend the testing of these loud speakers on a regular basis and preparing them if needed. These speakers could be a great help in getting anyone outside back into the building to initiate a “lockout” should an issue happen at the nearby high school.

We recommend running a fence line along the north end of campus. This could assist with vehicle access control along the northeast access road that goes to the rear of the school. Better securing access to the school’s infrastructure is also recommended. An attack could certainly be initiated by tampering with the building’s utilities.

Running a fence line can secure the north perimeter and access road

Better school school’s utilities

Finally, again the school has done a good job of labeled its classroom on exterior windows. One classroom in particular however, room 502, cannot be viewed from the street. We recommend an additional sign for the classroom on the corner of the exterior that can be seen from the street.

Classroom 502 INTERIOR

As with all the schools, we recommend a panic alarm be installed for the office staff. If a threat appears at the front door, it is asking a lot for staff to do an “all-call” to alert the rest of the building, then call Central Administration and 911. A bank teller style panic alarm could alert the police, the central administration building and sound an audible pre-recorded message to the rest of the school. The pre-recorded message could be something along the lines of “This in an intruder alert at the front desk, lockdown all classrooms”. The office staff advised us they have 6 radios, however, at the time of the assessment those radios had not been assigned to anyone (we realize our assessment took place on the first day of school and such things were still being worked out).

We also recommend the placement of faculty members at the main doors during arrival and dismissal. We were advised these doors are unlocked during those times but no staff is posted there monitoring for issues. It appeared some of the office staff needed further familiarization with the camera system and how to access them on their desk tops. We recommend created an alternate “command post” at another location in the school should the office area not be accessible for safety reasons.

A potential safe room for the office staff was identified and should be marked and labeled as such. All members of the office staff should be familiar with its location and how to properly barricade and secure the room.

Office staff hard room Other potential hard rooms were identified near the nurse’s office in the 8th grade hallway, gym locker rooms and the health classroom. These along with any other locations deemed suitable by school staff should be labeled as shelters and the students familiarized with how and when they should be used.

Hard room options

As far as the individual classrooms are concerned, one issue is the windows by the doors are fairly large. Even if an attacker is denied entry to the room, he/she could break that window and still have a very decent field of view with lines of sight into the room. The good news is each room will have a “blind corner” the shooter will not be able to see from looking in the door window. We recommend conducting a survey of each individual room and marking these blind corners with very low-profile tape on the floor. Tape that matches the floor color and will go completely unnoticed by students, though they should be familiarized with the procedure. In the event of an armed intruder, teachers could secure the door then usher their students into this “safe zone” within the classroom. Given the cinder block interior walls, tucking everyone into these corners should be the safest option. Ballistic window tint would also be an option here.

Example: Classroom “Safe Zone”, that area that cannot be seen from door, marked accordingly

A great concern we see very commonly among schools is the location of the cafeteria just inside the main doors. The unique set up at Torrington Middle School results in the cafeteria being immediately inside both the main front doors and the main back doors. While this presents security concerns previously discussed due to all the windows, some procedural changes could be made to aid in creating a safer environment. Alarms should be installed on exterior doors that alert the office staff if any doors are propped open. There appeared to be no defined procedures for when children are outside at the playground and need to be brought back inside during a “lockout” situation. The staff advised us the back doors should be open while children are on the playground but we found them to be locked during our assessment while kids were outside. This would be an ideal place for a card reader so the doors could remain locked but easily opened by a staff member should the need to get the children back inside quickly arise.

Swipe card access is recommended for these doors

SOUTHEAST SCHOOLS

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the Southeast Schools campus bordered by 1st Avenue (Route 152) to the north and open fields to the east, south and west. The remote location reduces the possibility of a spill over event from another site having an impact on the school campus. The negative aspect of the location is that it sits approximately 22 miles from the Goshen County Sheriff’s office in Torrington. Also, according to staff, this area is not a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders.

Thus, we recommend established a Sheriff’s substation in conjunction with the Goshen County Sheriff. This only requires a small room or work space where Deputies can come to the school to do paperwork, use the restroom, etc., should they be given an assignment or be patrolling in the LaGrange area. Clearly and conspicuously post “Goshen County Sheriff’s Department Substation” on the front of the building. Send a message to anyone who may be looking that a law enforcement officer could come by at any time. Stocking the room with a small refrigerator with soda, water and light snacks always helps in getting Deputies to stop by.

Arial view of the Southeast Schools campus

The Southeast Schools present a unique security challenge due to the presence of detached modular classrooms. This requires movement of students in and out of the main building each hour during pass time. We were advised the exterior doors automatically unlock during pass time to allow students to go in and out to their next class. We were told staff does not monitor this, however. We highly recommend the teacher in the modular classrooms, or perhaps para-professionals be posted at the doors during pass time to ensure no unauthorized access is gained.

We also found the modular classroom doors are unlocked during class and these structures offer no protection for outside threats in terms of solid walls or the ability to barricade. We also recommend the placement of radios in each modular classroom. A parking lot is also located next to the modular classrooms. This presents a great place for a threat to linger and wait for pass time to enter the school. We recommend the school issue vehicle hang tags or parking permit stickers to be displayed in the vehicle at all times on campus. Regular rounds should be made on the parking to identify any unauthorized vehicles that may be parked here.

Doors unlocked during pass time should be monitored, cars parked on campus should have permits/tags

Modular classroom doors have card readers but were found unlocked during assessment

We recommend fencing in the area around the modular classrooms as well as the installation of a camera covering the buildings as well as the parking lot. With the open fields around campus, access to this area is too wide open, which makes the unlocking of the doors during pass time a big concern. As we saw at LaGrange, access to the school’s utilities and infrastructure is easily attained. Fencing in the area would assist with this also. There are large full-length windows on the exterior’s walls. These are merely additional doors if an armed intruder where to shoot out the glass. We recommend ballistic window tint on these windows. Installing alarms on all exterior doors that would sound if left propped open is also suggested.

Propane tank too close to school and has no barriers Window tint on full length windows

Place lock on utility box instead of cable Install camera coverage for modular classrooms here

We also recommend posting a more conspicuous sign at the elementary school access door. A larger sign placed closer to the curb advising that no access is allowed through this door will make people unfamiliar with this protocol aware of it before they reach the door. As it is currently, the small sign will likely go unnoticed until the person is standing at the door. This creates a situation where a well-meaning student or staff member may just open the door for a person out of politeness. A larger sign away from the door will alert visitors before reaching the door. While this may not deter a person bent on attacking the school, it does show a level of vigilance and could help prevent an unnecessary security breach.

More Conspicuous signage on Elementary school entrance INTERIOR

As with all the schools, we recommend panic alarm capabilities for the front office staff. While Southeast Schools do have a good buzz in camera protocol, as we saw at Torrington Middle, the staff has no line of sight to the front door and complained that on many occasions they cannot see who is pushing the button. Again, we recommend painting an “X” or a set of footprints on the ground with signage advising visitors to stand on the mark and face the camera for admission.

The front office itself needs a security upgrade of sorts. A hallway behind the receptionists’’ area is open where a door once existed. We recommend replacing that door, inward opening preferably. This area also serves as a waiting area for the Principal’s office. Though, office staff cannot observe anyone seated there because of the half way separating the hallway from the receptionists’ area. That entrance leads to what we hope will be an upgraded office hard room. We would also like to see the receptionists’ desks rearranged to allow a quicker escape from the front office. As it stands now, both receptionists are expected to do an “all-call”, call Central Admin and 911 and then vacate the area. If the threat is at the front door, their route to vacate would make them actually move toward the threat. Again, the presence of a panic button that alerts the police, central admin and sounds an audible alarm in the building consolidates three tasks into one push of a button.

Replace door and create ability for receptionists to view students awaiting the Principal

We would like to see the room with the copy machine (pictured above) fortified into a good office staff hard room. Adding a camera monitoring station and computer station to this room along with the aforementioned door replacement and a lock on the existing door coming from the receptionists’ desks. We found this door to be without a lock during the assessment. The office roll down barricade locks but this counter is where the visitor log in books are kept which, in a panicked hurry, will block the roll down from coming down all the way and being secured. With a threat at the main entrance, the receptionist will likely not have time to clear this area and secure the roll down. Again, a panic button could be wired to automatically shut that roll down.

Move mirror to the right to view of waiting area Keep counter clear of material in order to shut barricade

Ideal Hard room, in need of modifications

Simple changes to communications procedures could greatly enhance security with any cost. It is very good that the Southeast Schools radios can communicate with outside entities. There were also eight campus radios on hand. However, at the time of the assessment, none of these radios were issued out or being carried. Members of a designated emergency response team as well as teachers in the modular classrooms should have radios at all times, in our opinion. We also noted that on the day of our assessment, a radio was not utilized for outside recess either.

Identifying and labeling various hard rooms throughout the building is recommended, as it was previously in the other schools. We identified some viable options such as the gym locker room (which need a lock), and an elementary school hard room by the nurse’s office (also in need of a lock).

Potential hard rooms

The hallway that connects the elementary school to the high school is a good cut off point for a barrier. This barrier, either a roll down barricade or a set of double doors could be secured in the event of an issue at one school to prevent it from reaching the other. This also could be automatically activated by the push of the intruder/panic button by office staff.

Good location for a roll down gate or double doors to isolate one school from the other

As we’ve mentioned previously, a culture of security and vigilance in not allowing security breaches resulting from complacency and convenience is paramount and doesn’t cost a penny. During our assessment we noted the workout room exterior door was ajar. Simple things like assigned regular and routine rounds of the property could get such breaches of security noticed and addressed. Reminders posted on all doors to ensure they stay shut would be helpful as well.

Workout room door found ajar during assessment CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION BUILDING

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the Goshen County School District Central Administration Building campus bordered by Torrington Middle School to the north, West E street to the east, West 25th Avenue to the south and a track and football field to the west, adjacent to open fields. The close proximity to the middle school and high school increases the possibility of a spill over event from another site having an impact on the Central Administration property. The positive aspect of the location is that it sits just under a mile from the Torrington Police Department headquarters. Also, according to staff, this area is a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders.

Arial view of the Central Administration property

The exterior of the Central Administration building is fairly secure. Most gaps in security that we found were the result of human error, which we will discuss shortly. Camera coverage around the facility could be improved. Camera coverage on the southside of the building does not capture the main entrance. A camera should be installed closer to the main door and some foliage needs to be trimmed back. We also recommend installing a camera and lights facing toward the football field. A night during a sporting event, this area of the property will be very dark and potential be a location for unsavory behavior.

Install cameras closer to door and trim foliage. Cameras and lights should be installed on this corner.

Bollard placement recommended here

We recommend bollards to inhibit the ability of a vehicle to drive into the main entrance. Though it may seem extreme, we have seen an increase in vehicles being used as weapons and precursors to attacks. The same could be said on the parking lot side on the west of the building.

Again, we recommend painting an “X” or a set of footprints on the ground with signage advising visitors to stand on the mark and face the camera for admission.

We also recommend fencing in the building’s utilities and critical equipment.

Fencing at this location During our assessment of the exterior we found multiple exterior doors either unlocked or propped open. There was a girls’ volleyball practice taking place inside the gym at the time. Again, we cannot express enough that any level of security is defeated by human error. Any time security and complacency or security and convenience clash, security will always lose. Unless, a culture of security is established and encouraged. We did find one door with a posted reminder to keep doors shut. We recommend posting these reminders on every door, at least until it becomes common practice to ensure doors aren’t being left open. All exterior doors should be labeled (N-1, N-2, S-1, S-2, etc.) to assist responding law enforcement in choosing the best entry point.

Post these signs on all door

Doors found unsecure during the assessment

INTERIOR

Starting with the front desk, some common themes are present. Though we were advised that the practice of having someone sit at the front desk may be eliminated, we recommend against this. We understand it requires manpower and visitors can be screened through the door camera from other locations within the building, having a presence at that desk that can potentially see more than the camera is important. Having the desk manned, could allow for a threat to be recognized before it gets to the camera and front door.

In fact, we suggest making this a permanent receptionist position. One result of rotating people in and out of the front desk position is that it creates an unfamiliarity with the camera system and alert protocols. The staff we spoke with were unsure how to pull up cameras and where they would go to seek shelter while manning this position. Having a dedicated person to this position with solid knowledge of protocols is important.

This is also important because once entry is made to the lobby there are no physical barriers to accessing the hallway to the right of the front desk. Staff also advised us that when the Central Administration building calls 911, the address shown to law enforcement is the middle school address. This should be tested and addressed immediately. This could obviously cause a significant delay in police response time.

Place “X” on ground where visitors should stand for best view

Unobstructed access to portion of the building This position should be manned at all times

Hard rooms should be identified, labeled and made familiar to staff. The storage room near the front desk should be designated as the front desk hard room equipped with a telephone land line and computer station with surveillance camera access. The business office also has a safe room option along with the vault in the Superintendent’s office. The file office in the instructional facilitator’s office is an additional hard room option as well as the OSS office.

Hard room options

The conference room hallway and the OSS office are locations the district may want to consider installing cameras. It was explained to us that troubled students and students with special needs are sometimes working in these areas. Monitoring these areas makes sense from a safety and liability standpoint.

Also in regards to the OSS office, we recommend installing a door across from room 165 that would allow an additional avenue of escape for those workers in that area should an emergency arise.

Install cameras here

TRAIL ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the Trail Elementary School campus bordered by East 17th Avenue to the north, East P Street to the east, Jim Hageman Avenue to the south and East M Street to the west. The close proximity to Lincoln Elementary School increases the possibility of a spill over event from another site having an impact on the Trail Elementary. The positive aspect of the location is that it sits just one mile from the Torrington Police Department headquarters. Also, according to staff, this area is a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders.

Arial view of the Trail Elementary campus

As with the other schools, bollards are concrete planters or benches should be places in strategic placed to prevent a vehicle from being used to damage or gain entry to the building.

Place bollards here

There is no camera located in the receiving area and we were told by staff that there is no way to verify other than a peep hole when a delivery is legitimate other than answering the door. We suggest a door buzzer with a camera, like the one at the main entrance, be installed so deliveries can be verified without opening a door.

Keeping bushes and tree trimmed near entrances is an important way to avoid giving a potential threat a position of concealment. An intruder could hide in the bushes and simply follow someone entering the building through the door.

Trim foliage near entrances and label all doors

Trim foliage around ground floor windows as well

Repair broken items for both physical security reasons and for the purposes of avoiding the sending of the message that security isn’t what it should be. We observed one such broken window near an exterior door.

As with the other facilities, the staff advised they cannot always see who is ringing the buzzer at the main entrance. Again, we recommend painting an “X” or a set of footprints on the ground with signage advising visitors to stand on the mark and face the camera for admission.

All exterior doors should be labeled (N-1, N-2, S-1, S-2, etc.) to assist responding law enforcement in choosing the best entry point. We also recommend adding camera position on the northeast corner of the building. This would eliminate a coverage gap as well as the area pictured earlier with the foliage along the ground floor windows.

NE Corner camera position INTERIOR

As with all the schools, we recommend panic alarm capabilities for the front office staff. While Trail Elementary does have a good buzz in camera protocol, as we saw at Torrington Middle, the staff has no line of sight to the front door and complained that on many occasions they cannot see who is pushing the button. Again, we recommend painting an “X” or a set of footprints on the ground with signage advising visitors to stand on the mark and face the camera for admission.

Just inside the front door at Trail, as well as some of the other schools, is a fire alarm pull station. Fire codes vary from state to state and county to county. We encourage the GCSD administration to consult with the Goshen County Fire Marshal and inquire if the pull stations in this location are required per the fire code. If it is not required, we suggest removal of these pull stations. All an intruder needs to do is gain entry through that first door, either by force or deception, and they are presented with a tool to flush out victims.

Fire alarm pull station just inside main door

The front desk does have an emergency button that automatically shuts the first set of fire doors. This button should be wired to also trigger a pre-recorded intruder alarm to the entire school. It should be wired to the roll down barrier. The automatic closing of the fire doors is a great asset, but it takes 4-6 seconds. And even if the intruder doesn’t get through it, he can still access the rest of the school through the office hallway. Installing a second set of fire doors in the main hallway just after the Special Education and Faculty Corridor doors would cut off access to the rest of the school even if the intruder was able to access the office area. Also, the monitor just outside the main office should be moved into the office and the front door camera should be on at all times since the receptionists have no line of sight to the door.

Second set of fire doors here

Place monitors inside office with front door camera on

Emergency button should alert school and authorities as well as securing fire doors

The nurse’s station at Trail Elementary creates some security issues of concern. It is our opinion the nurse’s door to the school should remain closed with a “Knock for Nurse” sign posted. The staff advised us this door is always open. During a crisis, the nurse will be pre-occupied with finding a safe spot for herself and potential any children currently under her care. It is unlikely she will have time to shut, secure and barricade this door. Magnetic locks should be put on the door that automatically locks when the panic button is hit. This would give time for the nurse and any patients to get to the office staff hard room, to be discussed next.

Keep nurse’s door secured

The office staff crisis room at Trail has a very good set up. It contains a telephone land line and would just need a computer station with surveillance camera access. The staff has a very good response plan in place with clearly defined roles and expectations. Trail Elementary probably has the best plan, and grasp and understanding of that plan, in the district.

Office Crisis Room

We recommend all classroom have the magnetic window covers we observed in some of the rooms. As discussed with other schools, classroom rooms with larger windows allow a line of sight into the room even if the door cannot be opened. The door windows at Trail are fairly narrow, so establishing classroom safe zones should be very simple. That along with fire hose sleeves for the door “elbows” would be good safety practices.

Fire hose sleeves for elbow hinges Magnetic window covers for door windows

Identifying and labeling of hard rooms throughout the school is an important part of the crisis planning process. The storage closets located in multiple locations in the school are good safe room options. Inside each closet, a fire hose sleeve and small step stool so shorter students can apply the sleeve to the elbow hinge. Students should be made aware of these locations and allowed to practice putting on the fire hose sleeve.

The library interior windows and the exterior windows in the cafeteria are good candidates for ballistic window tint. Again, this tint can buy faculty and staff valuable time to respond and react to a threat.

Locations for ballistic window tint As mentioned multiple times earlier, any level of security can be defeated by human error. During our assessment we located one of the cafeteria doors was unsecure and not completely shut. A member of the staff should be tasked with making regular rounds of the school building and grounds looking for such things.

Unsecure cafeteria door

Finally, we recommend revising the Trail Elementary visitor’s passes. Currently, the passes are very generic in nature and a pass received for legitimate reasons one day could worn for nefarious reasons the next. We suggest transitioning to a pass that bears the visitor’s name, date and location in the school they are there to visit.

LINCOLN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the Lincoln Elementary School campus bordered by Jim Hageman Avenue and a bus roundabout to the north, East P Street to the east, 13th Avenue East to the south and East N Street to the west. The close proximity to Trail Elementary increases the possibility of a spill over event from another site having an impact on the Trail Elementary. The positive aspect of the location is that it sits just one mile from the Torrington Police Department headquarters. Also, according to staff, this area is a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders.

Arial view of the Lincoln Elementary campus The assessment will begin by addressing the exterior perimeter of the property. With due respect to the desired atmosphere that an academic institution needs to maintain, there are cost effective, non-invasive measures that could be put in place along with minor improvements to existing security assets and procedures.

Lincoln Elementary has a very good exterior design and very few security related issues. As with the other schools, exterior doors should be labeled to assist first responders in choosing which entrance best facilitates a quick response.

Label exterior doors

An area of concern is the protocols for deliveries brought to the back door of the school. Staff advised that not all deliveries are scheduled for specific dates and times. Currently, the only way to verify if a delivery is legitimate is to look through the door’s peep hole then open the door. We highly recommend either installing a door bell with camera like exists for the main entrance or require delivery drivers to check in at the main office first. In its current state, all an intruder needs is someone to just open the back door. By the time the staff member realizes it is not a legitimate delivery, access to the building has already been obtained. Anyone accepting a delivery should also have a radio so they can initiate an alarm if anything arises during the delivery. Any doors that remain open during a delivery should be monitored by a member of the school staff until completion of the delivery.

A better system for accepting deliveries should be implemented

INTERIOR

As with all the schools, we recommend panic alarm capabilities for the front office staff. While Lincoln Elementary does have a good buzz in camera protocol, as we saw at Torrington Middle, the staff has no line of sight to the front door and complained that on many occasions they cannot see who is pushing the button. Again, we recommend painting an “X” or a set of footprints on the ground with signage advising visitors to stand on the mark and face the camera for admission.

The receptionist should also have the ability to remotely lock the second set of entry doors. In the event an intruder is mistakenly allowed access, or once he is allowed access a weapon is observed, the ability to hit a panic button which sounds an audible intruder alarm, alerts the proper authorities and automatically locks down the second set of entry doors would be ideal.

The office staff has an option for a hard room. A hard room should be equipped with a computer station with surveillance camera access and a telephone land line. The Principal’s office was identified to us by staff as the current “fall back point” which would serve as a command center and hard room. This is a poor choice as the Principal could be an initial target and there is a large glass window in the room. Preferably, the storage room near the Principal’s office would be ideal.

Storage room is a better hard room option than Principal’s office

We also recommend ballistic window tint for the main office windows. There is a roll down security door but it is surrounded by windows on both sides. The monitor above the roll down door should be on with surveillance cameras posted.

Two of the hallways leading off of the main lobby area have fire doors in place. We recommend the third hallway have a set of doors installed as well. Preferably, all doors would shut and lock automatically in the event of a front office panic alarm being pushed. The existing doors on the two hallways (below left) should be given ballistic window tint or replaced with solid doors.

Many of the individual classroom doors have very large windows allowing a line of sight into the whole room. While we understand the experience to replacing all these doors, there are some options to mitigate the gap in security without spending a large amount of money. Previously discussed door cables in each room would be a good start. Also, simply rearranging some furniture and setting the room up to provide cover and concealment for the class is a no-cost procedure. The K-6 classrooms that have their own restrooms are in very good shape. While one classroom has the other classroom’s restroom between theirs and the hallway, those rooms where the bathroom lies closest to the door just need to ensure they are reinforcing that wall facing the door.

Large windows allow full view into room Placing a bookcase here provides blind spot in room and safe zone

Rooms with bathroom wall closest to hall should place book shelves or other thick items here

Identifying and labeling hard rooms throughout the building is a district wide recommendation. Within Lincoln Elementary, there are several options that only need minor upgrades, such as door cables, to make a good safe room. Classroom SPED 123, a kindergarten hallway storage room, the cafeteria storage room, among others are viable options.

Hard room options

Rooms 158 and 159 are adjoining rooms. The door is kept open with a cabinet pushed up against it. We recommend removing the cabinet to allow that door to be shut and barricaded. We don’t take issue with the door being open, but locking down that individual room would be very difficult with the book case pinned up against the door.

Door Cables in each room with outward opening doors would be a significant upgrade in security.

LINGLE-FT. LARAMIE SCHOOLS

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the Lingle-Ft. Laramie Schools campus bordered by Old US Highway 85 just beyond an open field to the north, open fields to the east, East 3rd Street to the south and Leiter Avenue to the west. The two schools sharing a campus increases the possibility of a spill over event from one school having an impact on the other. The town of Lingle does have sufficient law enforcement response capabilities for a large-scale event, thus a negative aspect of the location is that it sits 10 miles away from the Goshen County Sheriff’s office. Also, according to staff, this area is not a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders.

Thus, we recommend establishing a Sheriff’s substation in conjunction with the Goshen County Sheriff. This only requires a small room or work space where Deputies can come to the school to do paperwork, use the restroom, etc., should they be given an assignment or be patrolling in the Lingle area. Clearly and conspicuously post “Goshen County Sheriff’s Department Substation” on the front of the building. Send a message to anyone who may be looking that a law enforcement officer could come by at any time. Stocking the room with a small refrigerator with soda, water and light snacks always helps in getting Deputies to stop by.

Arial view of the Lingle-Ft. Laramie Schools campus

We observed many of the same exterior issues with the high school that we’ve seen district wide. We recommend fencing in utility areas to protect the school’s infrastructure. We also noted a situation similar to the Southeast campus wherein the out buildings housing the shop classes require students to move from building to building during pass time. We recommend the placement of a camera at this location is well as a member of the staff monitoring during the time the main building doors are unlocked. We also observed an unsecure garage door in the wood shop.

Fence in utilities

Post signage as a reminder to keep doors closed, place a camera between main building and shop building, monitor during pass time

As before, we recommend labeling all exterior doors to assist first responders with identifying the best entry point, especially for issues in the schools that may be on the interior and not in a classroom with an exterior window or exit. We also recommend fencing off the portion of the playground that extends around the school and along the rear access road. This area is too difficult to monitor and staff can lose sight of the children around the corner of the building.

Proposed fence line in yellow

Keep this gate locked Install gate to seal off access road from unauthorized traffic

Bollards should be placed at entrances HIGH SCHOOL INTERIOR

A consistent observation district wide has been the front office employees having no direct line of sight to the front door along with complaints that they can’t always see who’s standing at the camera and buzzing in.

As with all the schools, we recommend panic alarm capabilities for the front office staff. Again, we recommend painting an “X” or a set of footprints on the ground with signage advising visitors to stand on the mark and face the camera for admission.

At the time of the assessment, the front office had no established sign in procedures for visitors. This is an obvious security concern, but easily corrected. Printed visitor passes with the visitor’s name, date of visit, and destination is preferred, so the pass cannot be used again. Once again, the front office staff is responsible for recognizing threats at the main entrance. This requires them to make an all call, contact central administration, call 911, then get themselves to a safe location. We were also advised by staff that an all call at the high school does not automatically go to the grade school.

With both schools sharing a campus, we feel its imperative one school be alerted if the other school experiences an issue. This could be accomplished by installing an aforementioned panic alarm that initiates a pre-recorded intruder alert and notifies the proper authorities. This time saving tool is especially important in areas like Lingle where law enforcement response may be delayed.

Front desk view of main entrance The office staff does have a good hard room option. It is in need of a telephone land line, a computer station with camera access and an interior lock.

Office hard room

During the assessment, we also found that the key to lock the inner door at the receptionist’s desk does not function. All mechanical assets should be tested and repaired if necessary. This should include the radio system. Some of the office staff seemed unsure of how many radios are used and how to use them.

Inoperable key Identifying and labeling intruder shelter rooms is needed, just as with the other school. Several good options exist and school administrators should survey the building any determine which options work best. Some rooms need simply an upgraded lock and secondary barricade devices such as a fire hose sleeve. We suggest looking at the office conference room, room 102, room MS109, 108 B library room, and a shelter room in the science lab.

Hard room options

Multiple locations within the school are in need of ballistic window tint. The glass design of the library, front office and other locations do not allow a safe space for the occupants of those areas. The bookshelves in the library could also be rearranged to allow for hiding spots and protection.

We also noted the presence of door stops at some of the exterior doors. We recommend posting signage warning against propping doors open. If that does not have the desire effect, installing alarms that sound when doors are propped open may be necessary.

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL INTERIOR

We’ll begin the assessment of the elementary school interior with the kitchen and cafeteria area. There is a hard room option in the kitchen that should be labeled and made familiar to the faculty and student body. Room C10 (Dry Storage) may be the only option for kids on that side of the cafeteria during the initial moments of an attack. Sheltering in place in this room should be practiced as a part of any intruder drill or exercise.

One issue of concern we noted was the door to the kitchen from the cafeteria was unlocked and open. This was observed late in the school day after lunch was well over. The problem this presents is it gives a potential student or intruder access to an array of kitchen utensils to include large knives. The cafeteria, as is the case in most modern schools, sits just inside a largely glass exterior wall. We highly recommend ground level ballistic window tint in this area. Many examples can be cited wherein a school shooting attacked commenced in the cafeteria at lunch time. The importance of cost- effective security measures in the cafeteria cannot be over stated.

Kitchen should be secured during non-lunch hours and monitored during lunch

Cafeteria hard room Ballistic window tint on first two levels of glass

We noted throughout the elementary school that several doors had magnets placed on the metal door jambs which prevented doors from locking when they shut. This is clearly a convenience matter and as we’ve previously mentioned, security should not lose when it clashes with convenience. Nowhere is this issue more prominent than with the C14 stairwell. We were told this stairwell is often used after school by the wrestling team as a conditioning area. We do not object to that but the door must be secured during school hours and closely monitored when open.

This stairwell, and its access to the upper level, is both a security asset and a security concern. This would be a great place to usher a large group of students during an emergency. The second floor at the top of this stairwell offers great ballistic protection with the thick concrete floors. It is a large hard room that could secure a large number of people if need be.

The concern rises when this area ifs left unsecure and a student or intruder bent on an assault gains access to the roof. The roof access door on the second level has no lock on it and provides unimpeded access to the roof of the elementary school. From this position, an attack armed with a long gun could wreak havoc on the entire campus and would pose an immense challenge for responding law enforcement. As they say in old war movies, advantage goes to those who have the high ground.

Again, this stairwell door must remain secured and a dead bolt must be put on the roof access door. We would like to see both doors alarmed so they alert office staff when left propped open.

Roof access door needs a dead bolt lock Access to roof means access to entire campus

The most important stairwell in the GCSD, remove magnets throughout the school The elementary school and the high school need to integrate their fire alarms, all-calls and intruder alarms. Lingle-Ft. Laramie schools should be viewed as one campus and one entity. One’s problems are shared by the other.

The office staff has a pretty good plan in place. However, they do need to relocate what they’ve identified as their officer hard room and equip it accordingly with a telephone land line and computer station with surveillance camera access. We recommend Storage room B11 be set up as the front office hard room.

Better option than the Principal’s office for an office hard room

We also recommend repositioning the receptionist’s desk so she has a line of sight to the front door. As we’ve seen before, issues with people not standing in a spot that they can be easily viewed on the front door camera exist here. Also, someone could be viewed at the front door through the camera, but the small lens on the front door camera may not show that they are holding a weapon. Before allowing access, it would be ideal if the visitor could be seen through the camera, but also their entire body observed via a direct line of sight from the receptionist’s desk.

The emergency lock down button is in a good position. Staff advised us that it used to activate a pre-recorded message but that feature was removed. We recommend reactivating that feature along with a panic alarm to alert law enforcement and central administration. As previously mentioned, this consolidated three jobs into the push of one button and allows staff to seek shelter quicker.

Position desk to allow best field of view on the main entrance

The library and computer lab offer some security challenges in their current set up. The Library Comm room (B26) is the only option for a hard room in the library, however the librarian doesn’t not have a key for it. We understand there is critical technological assets in this room, however the librarian should have access to it in the event of an emergency.

The computer lab is a large glass fish bowl complicated by its close proximity to the main entrance. There are very few options for escape or having the ability to hide children in this room. The only option is to conceal the room from view and install a lock on the door. We recommend keeping all the blinds closed. This denies the ability to see into the room and may also even assist in keeping the kids from being distracted during class. The best hope is to make an intruder believe the room is empty and the best way to do that is to keep the blinds closed. A fire hose sleeve would be a good option for this room as well.

Keep blinds closed and install a lock on this door

Concepts applied to the other schools can also be applied here in terms of identifying, labeling and familiarizing staff and students with hard room options. The same can be said for upgrading the safety of the individual classrooms. Door cables for outward opening doors, safe zones designated by tape on the floor for those blind corners for rooms with large windows in or near the door, and barricaded the interior walls with heavy bookcases, shelving, etc.

TORRINGTON HIGH SCHOOL

Assessment Findings and Recommendations

EXTERIOR

The area surveyed was the Torrington High School campus bordered by West 25th Avenue to the north, West C Street to the east, West 23rd Avenue to the south, and West E Street to the west. The proximity to the Central Administration middle and middle school increases the possibility of a spill over event from another location having an impact on the school campus. The positive aspect of the location is that it sits approximately one-half mile from the Torrington Police Department headquarters. Also, according to staff, this area is a highly traveled area by law enforcement and other first responders. The school also has a Torrington Police SRO.

Arial view of the Torrington High School campus The assessment will begin by addressing the exterior perimeter of the property. With due respect to the desired atmosphere that an academic institution needs to maintain, there are cost effective, non-invasive measures that could be put in place along with minor improvements to existing security assets and procedures.

As a whole, the exterior of Torrington Elementary is in very good shape from a security standpoint. Some minor changes, some of which come at no cost, would make the exterior security posture even better.

As with most of the schools assessed, some barrier or fencing should be placed around the school’s utilities and critical infrastructure.

Regular rounds off the property should be made and this responsibility should be assigned to specific members of the staff and faculty. One thing to look for is obvious security breaches such as propped open doors and so on. Other things to look for include items that could be used as weapons or as tools to gain entry, things that could break an exterior window for example. Remove these items and keep a log book documenting when such items are found. This log book can track suspicious circumstances and allow the staff to possibly recognize precursors and red flags.

Remove potential window breakers

The foliage near door 16 should be trimmed back. Avoid large bushes or trees near entrances as they can provide a position of concealment for an intruder looking to sneak in behind someone entering the building.

It is our understanding the faculty and student body share the parking lot. We would recommend separating the lot into a student lot and a faculty lot. Issuing hang tags for each vehicle designating which lot they are allowed access to is a good idea. Regular rounds of the lot should be conducted too ensure vehicles are parked in the proper lot and no unauthorized vehicles are on the property.

As with the utilities at the main building, better barriers around the waist oil tanks at the auto shop and the woods building utilities should be put in place. A camera should also be placed on the exterior and interior of the woods building.

The Special Education and Life Skills building seems very vulnerable the way it sits away from the main campus. The all glass door could be easily defeated and we recommend ballistic window tint be installed. The walls of the structure likely would not prevent rounds from being fired into the building from the outside. If space is available, we would recommend moving these programs into the main school building.

INTERIOR

Some improvements to front office procedures would greatly enhance security. Camera monitors should be turned on at all times. We also observed two receptionists have the ability to lock the second set of doors in the main entrance, however one key was missing and the other was stowed in a desk drawer. We Recommend keeping these keys inserted at all times. As before, a front desk panic alarm that both alerts authorities and initiates a pre-recorded intruder alert to the entire school is recommended. This allows the office staff to make notifications with one push of a button and get to a safe location in a quicker manner.

Keep monitors on Keep keys to secondary interior doors inserted at all times

It was noted that the lobby door to the school doesn’t fully close every time. The school’s visitor entry procedures need to be adjusted in multiple aspects. We noted at the time of the assessment there was no visitor’s log sign in procedures or passes issued. Again, we recommend passes that are name, date, time and location specific. During our assessment, a gentleman approached the front door and before he could even hit the camera button to state his business, one of the office staff members buzzed him in. We inquired as to why he was allowed access without being required to hit the button. The staff member replied, “Oh, we know him”. 40% of active shooters are known to the location they attack. When a person, known or otherwise, requests entry to the building, they should be required to hit the button, identify themselves and state their business. Even if the person is recognized as Mr. Jones, over the intercom office staff should inquire before allowing entry, “Good morning Mr. Jones, what can we do for you today?” If for example, Mr. Jones is there to pick his child up early for a doctor’s appointment, it should be verified before entry is allowed and the child brought to the main office ahead of time.

An office hard room and command post should be set up in the vault complete with a telephone land line and computer station with surveillance camera access. These room could be quickly accessed by office personnel after they initiate a response by hitting a panic button.

Office hard room

There are sets off fire doors just off the main lobby. If these doors could be wired to a panic button, such as the ones at Trail Elementary, to automatically shut, access to most of the school could be cut off. There is some unused space near the stairwell that would need to be sealed off (and perhaps turned into a police substation) to completely seal off access to the second floor. Wiring the library doors to lock when this alarm is activated would then deny access to an intruder to most of the school.

Seal off this unused space to control access to second floor, dry wall area to a make a room for a police substation

Wire these doors to automatically shut and lock

Potential hard rooms throughout the school should be identified, labeled and made familiar to students and staff. Individual classrooms should undergo individual assessments to evaluate how each room can be set up to provide the optimal safety and security posture. The classroom doors have relatively large windows in them. Blind spots, or safe zones, in each room should be marked by low profile tape on the floor and the interior walls in those areas fortified by bookshelves, desks, etc. We recommend window covers and fire hose door sleeves for each room where it would be appropriate.

Window covers and mark blind spots

The boiler room was found to be unlocked on the interior with the exterior door left open. We recommend installing a lock on the interior door and posting signage on the exterior door reminding staff to keep it shut and locked when not in use.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Accountability during an armed intruder incident will be an enormous challenge. Students, and even perhaps faculty members, will flee the campus in all directions possibly even in their vehicles. It is asking a lot to expect everyone to adhere to any coordinated evacuation procedure when gunshots are being fired. We recommend each school compile a list of each student and faculty member’s cell phone. With 300+ students and 50 staff members, it may be a long list but easily maintained on an excel spreadsheet. This way, any unaccounted-for students can be reached directly and much quicker. It may help avoid an instance where the school must contact a parent and tell them that their child’s whereabouts are unknown.

Annual or semi-annual drills for armed intruders should be conducted. No school students have died from a fire in the last 60+ plus years, yet fire drills are commonplace. Intruder drills should be commonplace as well. Especially with high school age students, they understand the threat and such drills will not place them in unnecessary fear of their environment. Invite law enforcement and Fire Department units to take part in and even help coordinate the drills. Students and faculty should know what to expect from the first responders and what it will look like.

Once granted access, a person can step inside the door and immediately have access to the entire building. There is not much there in terms of barriers to prevent someone from going anywhere other than the office to sign in. It is assumed that the office worker who granted access would immediately sound an alarm if a guest granted access took off in another direction rather than going to the office to sign in. Perhaps once classes have been commenced, the placement of low-profile stanchions funneling traffic to the office would be an option. Anyone who deviates from the stanchions results in a sounding of an alarm.

Sign in procedures are important and should be tracked. The “visitor” stickers are a good thing to have and students and staff should be encouraged to challenge those who do not have one. GCSD should consider investing in a system that prints visitor stickers with the person’s name, date of visit and reason for visit. Currently, nothing could stop a visitor from coming to the school for legitimate reasons, then just keeping their visitor sticker and wearing it again the next day to get entry and carry out an act of violence. See the example from another school below. This sticker has the visitor’s name, date of visit and why they are at the school. This way, if a person’s pass says they are there to see the registrar, but they are roaming aimlessly on the other end of the building, or it has yesterday’s date on it, staff can challenge and address the individual. Currently, each school has its own system for tracking visitors or no system at all. A uniform, district wide system and protocols should be established for each school to follow.

A panic alarm located at the front desk would allow the receptionist the ability to alert not only police, but the rest of the school that an incident is occurring in the main lobby or he or she has observed a security concern on one of the surveillance cameras monitored at that post. We recommend installing an alarm that not only notifies the police but initiates an audible alarm throughout the school. The sound of the alarm should be very distinct and different from the sound of a fire, tornado, or other emergency alarm. Your faculty should be trained to know the different alarm sounds so as to be able to distinguish between the nature of the events. Fire alarm protocols should not be the same as intruder protocols. This should be used in conjunction with any audible intruder alarm with a system in place to alert the rest of the facility the exact location of the problem. We recommend the use of code words to spread the alarm. “Mr. Brown, you are needed in the main lobby” or “Mr. Brown you are needed in the front parking lot”. This notifies everyone in the school where the problem is located so they can best judge whether to shelter in place or use the proper escape route that does not steer them toward the problem.

SUMMARY

While these attackers are often summarily dismissed as “crazed” and “out of their mind”, it is our opinion they are often very methodical. The history of active shooters has shown most events are the result of timely and meticulous planning.

Preventing an active shooter from carrying out an attack on your school is very difficult. The people who engage in these acts are not rational thinkers and are most often accepting of the fact that they themselves will not survive the day. They have more than likely planned, conducted reconnaissance, probed, and even rehearsed the mission. One key advantage the shooter does not have is time. Placing barriers between your faculty and students and the shooter is crucial to preventing an isolated incident from becoming a full-scale tragedy.

Addressing most of the issues discussed in this assessment can be done in a relatively cost-effective manner. Faculty and student awareness is paramount. Any amount of technology or state of the art security measures can be defeated by simple human error. The plan you have to educate your staff is an excellent first step. All your faculty members should consider themselves threat assessors, constantly maintaining a reasonable level of vigilance. The key, however, is an established culture of security that comes from the administration.

A financial investment in the physical security of your schools protects the district both in terms of life, property and civil liability. Having the peace of mind knowing you have done all that you can to protect your staff, students, and visitors is an invaluable asset. It sends the message to the GCSD community that you care about them. Remember, you and your staff will not rise to the occasion; you will fall to your level of preparation.

Respectfully submitted,

Brian P. Rossomanno Matthew Tesreau Craig R. Grob

0311 Tactical Solutions, LLC

P.O. Box 1163

Fenton, MO 63026

314-813-0311 [email protected]