DOCSLIB.ORG

Corrected Version Aysegul Keskin Zeren

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Corrected Version Aysegul Keskin Zeren IRAQ’S DE-BA`THIFICATION: RATIONALES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONTESTED TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISM A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Aysegul Keskin Zeren January 2014 Dissertation written by Aysegul Keskin Zeren B.A., Istanbul Bilgi University, 2005 M.A., Sabanci University, 2007 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2014 Approved by Patrick G. Coy, Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Landon E. Hancock, Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Andrew Barnes, Committee Member Pete W. Moore, Outside Committee Member C. Lockwood Reynolds, Graduate Faculty Member Accepted by Andrew Barnes, Chair, Department of Political Science Raymond Craig, Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION ............................................................................................................... VIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. IX CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 12 1.1 Research Question and Argument ........................................................................... 12 1.2 Transitional Justice .................................................................................................. 17 1.3 The Case: De-Ba`thification .................................................................................... 22 1.4 Structure of the Dissertation .................................................................................... 28 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......... 30 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 30 2.2 Terminology ............................................................................................................ 31 2.2.1 The Origins of Lustration .............................................................................. 32 2.2.2 Contemporary Meanings and De-Ba`thification ........................................... 34 2.3 Understanding how countries deal with the past ..................................................... 45 2.3.1 Transitional justice in general ....................................................................... 45 2.3.2 Lustration in particular .................................................................................. 49 2.4 Rationale(s) ............................................................................................................. 54 2.5 Design and Implementation .................................................................................... 57 2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 60 CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 62 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 62 3.2 Methodology and Case Selection ............................................................................ 63 iii 3.3 Data Gathering ........................................................................................................ 65 3.3.1 Interviews ...................................................................................................... 67 3.3.2 Archival Research ......................................................................................... 77 3.4 Observations and Reflections .................................................................................. 79 3.5 Data Analysis .......................................................................................................... 86 3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 88 CHAPTER 4 RATIONALES FOR ENGAGING IN DE-BA`THIFICATION ............... 90 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 90 4.2 Ba`thification: Brainwashing, Fear, and Purges ...................................................... 91 4.3 The Origins and Evolution of the De-Ba`thification Idea ..................................... 101 4.4 Literature on Rationales for Disqualification ........................................................ 111 4.5 Rationales for De-Ba`thification ........................................................................... 122 4.5.1 U.S. Administration..................................................................................... 122 4.5.2 Iraqi Elite: The Architects and Directors of De-Ba`thification ................... 134 4.5.3 Iraqi Public Opinion .................................................................................... 144 4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 148 CHAPTER 5 THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DE- BA`THIFICATION ............................................................................................................................. 153 5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 153 5.2 Design and Implementation Frameworks ............................................................. 154 5.3 Design and Implementation of De-Ba`thification ................................................. 167 5.3.1 Who Should be De-Ba`thified and Why? ................................................... 167 iv 5.3.2 First the Occupier, Then the Politicized Commissions ............................... 181 5.3.3 Dismissals, Exemptions, Reinstatements, Appeal, and Pensions ............... 190 5.3.4 When to Begin; When to End ..................................................................... 201 5.3.5 De-Ba`thification and the Iraqi High Tribunal ............................................ 207 5.4 Consequences: “It was a necessary surgery, but the patient died.” ....................... 209 5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 218 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION......................................................................................... 220 6.1 Main Arguments and Findings .............................................................................. 220 6.2 Lessons Learned .................................................................................................... 222 6.2.1 Policy-Makers ............................................................................................. 222 6.2.2 Arab Spring Governments ........................................................................... 224 6.3 Research Contribution and Future Direction ........................................................ 229 APPENDIX A COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 1 DE-BA`THIFICATION OF IRAQI SOCIETY.................................................. 231 APPENDIX B COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2 DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES ......................................................................... 233 APPENDIX C INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS.................................................................. 238 APPENDIX D INTERVIEWEE LIST ........................................................................... 242 APPENDIX E ABBREVIATIONS/LIST OF FREQUENCY USED ............................ 246 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 248 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1-1. Transitional Justice Strategies ........................................................................ 18 Figure 1-2. Transitional Justice Spectrum ........................................................................ 19 Figure 4-1. Ba`th Party Membership Hierarchy. .............................................................. 98 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Disqualification Efforts.................................................................................... 43 Table 3.1. Official CPA Documents. ................................................................................ 78 Table 4.1. Rationales and Criticisms .............................................................................. 149 Table 5.1. Range of Collaborative Activity in Occupied Europe DuringWorld War II . 155 vii DEDICATION To my son, Berk Zeren, who is my source of motivation and inspiration… viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many people especially my dissertation committee members. I am greatly indebted to the chairs of my committee, Patrick Coy and Landon Hancock for spending countless hours reading and commenting on the many drafts I submitted. Their support has been essential to the progress of this study. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr. Coy. It was in his graduate seminar that I first developed an interest in transitional justice. His kind personality and wisdom has mainly shaped my academic perspective. I am grateful to Dr. Hancock for his many insights on this dissertation and his intellectual guidance throughout my time at Kent State. I am also thankful to Andrew Barnes for helpful insights and suggestions that improved my dissertation considerably. I want to extend my special thanks to Pete Moore who generously
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Terrorist Links of the Iraqi Regime | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 652 Terrorist Links of the Iraqi Regime Aug 29, 2002 Brief Analysis n August 28, 2002, a U.S. federal grand jury issued a new indictment against five terrorists from the Fatah O Revolutionary Command, also known as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), for the 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan. Based on "aggravating circumstances," prosecutors are now seeking the death penalty for the attack, in which twenty-two people -- including two Americans -- were killed. The leader of the ANO, the infamous Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna), died violently last week in Baghdad. But his death is not as extraordinary as the subsequent press conference given by Iraqi intelligence chief Taher Jalil Haboush. This press conference represents the only time Haboush's name has appeared in the international media since February 2001. Iraqi Objectives What motivated the Iraqi regime to send one of its senior exponents to announce the suicide of Abu Nidal and to present crude photographs of his bloodied body four days (or eight days, according to some sources) after his death? It should be noted that the earliest information about Nidal's death came from al-Ayyam, a Palestinian daily close to the entity that may have been Abu Nidal's biggest enemy -- the Palestinian Authority. At this sensitive moment in U.S.-Iraqi relations, Abu Nidal could have provided extraordinarily damaging testimony with regard to Saddam's involvement in international terrorism, even beyond Iraqi support of ANO activities in the 1970s and 1980s. In publicizing Nidal's death, the regime's motives may have been multiple: • To present itself as fighting terrorism by announcing that Iraqi authorities were attempting to detain Abu Nidal for interrogation in the moments before his death.
    [Show full text]
  • The Importance of Collective Visual Memories in the Representations In
    Capturing the Void: The Importance of Collective Visual Memories in the Representations in Documentary Films on September 11, 2001 Jodye D. Whitesell Undergraduate Honors Thesis Department of Film Studies Advisor: Dr. Jennifer Peterson October 24, 2012 Committee Members: Dr. Jennifer Peterson, Film Studies Dr. Melinda Barlow, Film Studies Dr. Carole McGranahan, Anthropology Table of Contents: Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….. 3 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………… 4 Part I: The Progression of Documentary Film Production………………………………… 9 Part II: September 11, 2001….…………………………………………………………….. 15 Part III: The Immediate Role of the Media………………………………………………... 18 Part IV: Collective Memories and the Media,,,……………………………………………. 25 Part V: The Turn Towards Documentary…………………………………….……………. 34 (1) Providing a Historical Record…………………………………….……………. 36 (2) Challenging the Official Story…………………………………………………. 53 (3) Memorializing the Fallen………………………………………………………. 61 (4) Recovering from the Trauma…………………………………………………... 68 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 79 Works Cited………………………………………………………………………………... 83 2 Abstract: Documentary films have long occupied a privileged role among audiences as the purveyors of truth, offering viewers accurate reproductions of reality. While this classification is debatable, the role of documentaries as vehicles for collective memory is vital to the societal reconstructions of historical events, a connection that must be understood in order to properly assign meaning to the them. This thesis examines this relationship, focusing specifically on the documentaries produced related to trauma (in this case the September 11 attacks on the United States) as a means to enhance understanding of the role these films play in the lives and memories of their collective audiences. Of the massive collection of 9/11 documentaries produced since 2001, twenty-three were chosen for analysis based on national significance, role as a representative of a category (e.g.
    [Show full text]
  • The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003
    THE REGIME CHANGE CONSENSUS: IRAQ IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1990-2003 Joseph Stieb A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2019 Approved by: Wayne Lee Michael Morgan Benjamin Waterhouse Daniel Bolger Hal Brands ©2019 Joseph David Stieb ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Joseph David Stieb: The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Under the direction of Wayne Lee) This study examines the containment policy that the United States and its allies imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and argues for a new understanding of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. At the core of this story is a political puzzle: Why did a largely successful policy that mostly stripped Iraq of its unconventional weapons lose support in American politics to the point that the policy itself became less effective? I argue that, within intellectual and policymaking circles, a claim steadily emerged that the only solution to the Iraqi threat was regime change and democratization. While this “regime change consensus” was not part of the original containment policy, a cohort of intellectuals and policymakers assembled political support for the idea that Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of the Baathist regime made Iraq uniquely immune to “management” strategies like containment. The entrenchment of this consensus before 9/11 helps explain why so many politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change and invasion.
    [Show full text]
  • The Civilian Impact of Drone Strikes
    THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS Acknowledgements This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. At the Columbia Human Rights Clinic, research and authorship includes: Naureen Shah, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict. Liz Lucas of Center for Civilians in Conflict led media outreach with Greta Moseson, pro- gram coordinator at the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School. The Columbia Human Rights Clinic and the Columbia Human Rights Institute are grateful to the Open Society Foundations and Bullitt Foundation for their financial support of the Institute’s Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, and to Columbia Law School for its ongoing support. Copyright © 2012 Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly CIVIC) and Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America. Copies of this report are available for download at: www.civiliansinconflict.org Cover: Shakeel Khan lost his home and members of his family to a drone missile in 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • A Legal Appraisal of Military Action in Iraq James P
    Naval War College Review Volume 57 Article 6 Number 3 Summer/Autumn 2004 A Legal Appraisal of Military Action in Iraq James P. Terry Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Terry, James P. (2004) "A Legal Appraisal of Military Action in Iraq," Naval War College Review: Vol. 57 : No. 3 , Article 6. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Terry: A Legal Appraisal of Military Action in Iraq A LEGAL APPRAISAL OF MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ James P. Terry he determination by the George W. Bush administration to enter Iraq and Tremove the regime of Saddam Hussein from power in early 2003 followed twelve years of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Prior to the decision by the United States and its coalition partners to intervene in Iraq with military force, Saddam Hussein had done everything possible to avoid complying with the will of the international community. Of the twenty-six demands made by the Security Council since 1990, Iraq had com- plied with only three. Equally significant, the regime’s repression of the Iraqi people continued. The 2 October 2002 joint resolution of Congress authorizing the use of all means, including force, to bring Iraq into compliance was merely one of a series of actions by Congress to address Baghdad’s noncompliance with its interna- tional obligations.1 In 1998, for example, Congress James P.
    [Show full text]
  • Lustration Laws in Action: the Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland ( 1989-200 1 ) Roman David
    Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland ( 1989-200 1 ) Roman David Lustration laws, which discharge the influence of old power structures upon entering democracies, are considered the most controversial measure of transitional justice. This article suggests that initial examinations of lustrations have often overlooked the tremendous challenges faced by new democracies. It identifies the motives behind the approval of two distinctive lustration laws in the Czech Republic and Poland, examines their capacity to meet their objectives, and determines the factors that influence their perfor- mance. The comparison of the Czech semi-renibutive model with the Polish semi-reconciliatory model suggests the relative success of the fonner within a few years following its approval. It concludes that a certain lustration model might be significant for democratic consolidation in other transitional coun- tries. The Czech word lustrace and the Polish lustrucju have enlivened the forgotten English term lustration,’ which is derived from the Latin term lus- Roman David is a postdoctoral fellow at the law school of the University of the Witwa- tersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa ([email protected]; [email protected]). The original version of the paper was presented at “Law in Action,” the joint annual meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law, Budapest, 4-7 July 2001. The author thanks the University for providing support in writing this paper; the Research Support Scheme, Prague (grant no. 1636/245/1998), for financing the fieldwork; Jeny Oniszczuk from the Polish Constitutional Tribunal for relevant legal mate- rials; and Christopher Roederer for his comments on the original version of the paper.
    [Show full text]
  • 2003 Iraq War: Intelligence Or Political Failure?
    2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Dione Brunson, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April, 2011 DISCLAIMER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ACADEMIC RESEARCH PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OR POSITIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL INFORMATION AND SOURCES FOR THIS PAPER WERE DRAWN FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS. ii 2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? Dione Brunson, B.A. MALS Mentor: Ralph Nurnberger, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you God for continued wisdom. Thank you Dr. Nurnberger for your patience. iv DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Mom and Dad for their continued support.
    [Show full text]
  • The Controversy Over Climate Change in the Public Sphere
    THE CONTROVERSY OVER CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE by WILLIAM MOSLEY-JENSEN (Under the Direction of Edward Panetta) ABSTRACT The scientific consensus on climate change is not recognized by the public. This is due to many related factors, including the Bush administration’s science policy, the reporting of the controversy by the media, the public’s understanding of science as dissent, and the differing standards of argumentation in science and the public sphere. Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth was produced in part as a response to the acceptance of climate dissent by the Bush administration and achieved a rupture of the public sphere by bringing the technical issue forward for public deliberation. The rupture has been sustained by dissenters through the use of argument strategies designed to foster controversy at the expense of deliberation. This makes it incumbent upon rhetorical scholars to theorize the closure of controversy and policymakers to recognize that science will not always have the answers. INDEX WORDS: Al Gore, Argument fields, Argumentation, An Inconvenient Truth, Climate change, Climategate, Controversy, Public sphere, Technical sphere THE CONTROVERSY OVER CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE by WILLIAM MOSLEY-JENSEN B.A., The University of Wyoming, 2008 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ATHENS, GEORGIA 2010 © 2010 William Mosley-Jensen All Rights Reserved THE CONTROVERSY OVER CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE by WILLIAM MOSLEY-JENSEN Major Professor: Edward Panetta Committee: Thomas Lessl Roger Stahl Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2010 iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There are many people that made this project possible through their unwavering support and love.
    [Show full text]
  • Trend Analysis the Israeli Unit 8200 an OSINT-Based Study CSS
    CSS CYBER DEFENSE PROJECT Trend Analysis The Israeli Unit 8200 An OSINT-based study Zürich, December 2019 Risk and Resilience Team Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study Author: Sean Cordey © 2019 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich Contact: Center for Security Studies Haldeneggsteig 4 ETH Zurich CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-44-632 40 25 [email protected] www.css.ethz.ch Analysis prepared by: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich ETH-CSS project management: Tim Prior, Head of the Risk and Resilience Research Group, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy Head for Research and Teaching; Andreas Wenger, Director of the CSS Disclaimer: The opinions presented in this study exclusively reflect the authors’ views. Please cite as: Cordey, S. (2019). Trend Analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. 1 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study . Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Historical Background 5 2.1 Pre-independence intelligence units 5 2.2 Post-independence unit: former capabilities, missions, mandate and techniques 5 2.3 The Yom Kippur War and its consequences 6 3 Operational Background 8 3.1 Unit mandate, activities and capabilities 8 3.2 Attributed and alleged operations 8 3.3 International efforts and cooperation 9 4 Organizational and Cultural Background 10 4.1 Organizational structure 10 Structure and sub-units 10 Infrastructure 11 4.2 Selection and training process 12 Attractiveness and motivation 12 Screening process 12 Selection process 13 Training process 13 Service, reserve and alumni 14 4.3 Internal culture 14 5 Discussion and Analysis 16 5.1 Strengths 16 5.2 Weaknesses 17 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 18 7 Glossary 20 8 Abbreviations 20 9 Bibliography 21 2 Trend analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-based study selection tests comprise a psychometric test, rigorous Executive Summary interviews, and an education/skills test.
    [Show full text]
  • Wojciech Roszkowski Post-Communist Lustration in Poland: a Political and Moral Dilemma Congress of the Societas Ethica, Warsaw 22 August 2009 Draft Not to Be Quoted
    Wojciech Roszkowski Post-Communist Lustration in Poland: a Political and Moral Dilemma Congress of the Societas Ethica, Warsaw 22 August 2009 Draft not to be quoted 1. Introduction Quite recently a well-known Polish writer stated that the major dividing line in the Polish society runs across the attitude towards lustration. Some Poles, he said, have been secret security agents or collaborators or, for some reasons, defend this cooperation, others have not and want to make things clear1. Even if this statement is a bit exaggerated, it shows how heated the debates on lustration in Poland are. Secret services in democratic countries are a different story than security services in totalitarian states. Timothy Garton Ash even calls this comparison “absurd”2. A democratic state is, by definition, a common good of its citizens. Some of them are professionals dealing with the protection of state in police, armed forces and special services, all of them being subordinated to civilian, constitutional organs of the state. Other citizens are recruited by these services extremely rarely and not without their consent. In totalitarian states secret services are the backbone of despotic power of the ruling party and serve not the security of a country but the security of the ruling elites. Therefore they should rather be given the name of security services. They tend to bring under their control all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life of the subjects of the totalitarian state, becoming, along with uniformed police and armed forces, a pillar of state coercion. Apart from propaganda, which is to make people believe in the ideological goals of the totalitarian state, terror is the main vehicle of power, aiming at discouraging people from any thoughts and deeds contrary to the said goals and even from any activity independent of the party-state.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Repealing the 1991 and 2002 Iraq War Authorizations Is Sound Policy Charles D
    LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 256 | JANUARY 6, 2020 EDWIN MEESE III CENTER FOR LEGAL & JUDICIAL STUDIES Why Repealing the 1991 and 2002 Iraq War Authorizations Is Sound Policy Charles D. Stimson he Constitution’s allocation of war powers KEY TAKEAWAYS between the legislative and executive branches is a classic example of the sepa- T 1 The 1991 and 2002 AUMF Against Iraq ration of powers. The Congress has the power to Resolutions remain in force even though declare war but cannot fight the war on its own. The their purpose has been accomplished. President, as commander in chief of the Army and Navy, has (and has uniformly claimed) the authority to use military forces abroad in the absence of specific Repeal would not affect the 2001 AUMF, prior congressional approval.2 This authority derives the primary domestic statutory authority from his constitutional responsibility as commander for the war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, in chief and chief executive for foreign and military ISIS, or associated forces. affairs. Without money from Congress, however, the President has no ability to fight those conflicts, nor Debating and repealing those war does he have the authority to appropriate funds to pay authorizations is a matter of congres- for those military conflicts on his own. sional hygiene and gets the Congress This tension between the legislative and executive back in the business of exercising its Article I muscles. branches was purposeful, as the Founders anticipated the grave significance of the country’s going to war. This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/lm256 The Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
    [Show full text]