View of the New Deal at the National Level

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“THE BEST FORM OF ASSISTANCE ALWAYS IS THE KIND THAT ENABLES FOLKS TO HELP THEMSELVES”: PUBLIC REACTION TO THE NEW DEAL IN HANCOCK, SENECA, AND WOOD COUNTIES OF OHIO

Anthony J. Bolton

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2021

Committee:

Rebecca Mancuso, Advisor

Michael Brooks

Anthony J. Bolton

ABSTRACT

Rebecca Mancuso, Advisor

The Great Depression and New Deal had a profound impact on the United States. It led to the need for fundamental changes in the nation, especially regarding the federal government’s role and size. The beginning of the Great Depression marked the end of the “New Era” that the

United States had experienced in the 1920s. However, one group of Americans—farmers—did not participate in this “New Era,” including those in three Northwestern Ohio counties: Hancock,

Seneca, and Wood. This study analyzes through voting and media analysis how these three counties reacted to the Great Depression and the New Deal from 1929 to 1936. As the

Depression continued to worsen, their suffering continued and even worsened, and with Herbert

Hoover’s inability to provide relief or a path to recovery, these counties and the rest of the nation turned to Franklin Roosevelt and his promise of a “new deal” to provide that relief. Within these counties, the New Deal was initially seen as successful; however, it was soon seen as having a corrosive effect on traditional American values. Because of this, these counties rejected

Roosevelt and the New Deal in 1936, while the rest of the nation overwhelmingly supported him.

While there has been historical scholarship published on rural farming in the Midwest during the

Great Depression, there has been little analysis of Northwest Ohio and especially these three counties. There has also been little historical scholarship published on the New Deal’s impact on a more local level. I argue that Hancock, Seneca, and Wood counties’ citizens saw traditional

American values as the best solutions to economic problems. If federal relief was deemed necessary, it should only provide enough to allow those values to resume their effectiveness. iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to thank Dr. Rebecca Mancuso and Dr. Michael Brooks for agreeing to serve on my committee. All of their comments and feedback throughout this process have been most appreciated. I would also like to thank all of the Bowling Green State University faculty who have helped me through my six years here. From the History Department, Dr. Amilcar

Challu, Dr. Benjamin Greene, Dr. Walter Grunden, Dr. Ruth Herndon, Dr. Scott Martin, and the

Political Science Department, Dr. David Jackson, Dr. Melissa Miller, and Dr. Marc Simon. All of them helped me to become a better writer and historian. I also wanted to extend thanks to my cohort members who helped make these a memorable two years. I would also like to thank my friends Tyler Marchok, Mark O’Malley, Mike Schaefer, and Thomas Tedesco, who helped to provide many opportunities to forget about this thesis and relax. Finally, I wanted to thank my parents, my sisters, and all of my family. Without your love and support, I would not be here, and for that, I am forever grateful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER I. THE RISE AND FALL OF A “NEW ERA”: 1929-1932 ...... 11

The United States During the 1920s ...... 11

The Beginning of the Great Depression ...... 14

A Rise in Crime and Fear...... 20

Hoover’s Relief Efforts ...... 27

CHAPTER II. “A NEW DEAL FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE”: 1932-1933 ...... 36

Possible Solutions to the Depression ...... 38

The Bonus March ...... 44

The 1932 Election ...... 48

American’s Hope for Roosevelt ...... 56

CHAPTER III. ROOSEVELT’S NEW DEAL: 1933-1935 ...... 59

The Banking Crisis of 1933 ...... 61

Banking Reform in the New Deal ...... 64

The New Deal and Economic Theory ...... 66

Farmers and the New Deal ...... 69

Federal Relief Programs in the New Deal ...... 73

Is The End Near? ...... 78

CHAPTER IV. A RETURN TO TRADITION: 1935-1936 ...... 82

Criticism of New Deal Relief Agencies...... 83

Criticism of New Deal Agricultural Policies ...... 87 vi

The “New Deal Dissidents” ...... 90

The 1936 Election ...... 98

CONCLUSION ...... 112

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 115

INTRODUCTION

On October 24, 1929, the Great Depression began with the New York Stock Exchange

crash. For over the next decade, the Depression impacted almost every facet of the United States

and led to significant transformations. One such transformation came with Franklin Roosevelt’s

election in 1932 and his promise of “a new deal for the American people.”1 Under the New Deal,

there became expansive changes to the federal government and to the idea of what the

government should do to help its citizens, a debate that continues to this day. This study

examines how three Northwest Ohio counties—Hancock, Seneca, and Wood—reacted to the

Great Depression and New Deal from 1929 to 1936.

These three counties were chosen because they comprised “a microcosm of rural and

urban America.”2 All three counties in the 1930s had a population between 40-50,000 and were

also primarily rural counties, with Findlay being the largest city in the counties with 19,363 in

1930.3 Therefore, these counties had an economy based around agriculture, with the counties’

major metropolitan areas serving as the business centers for the surrounding farmers. These

counties were also successful for farming, with The Ohio Guide stating “the rich river valleys”

are “great flat fields of corn and wheat, and pastures full of cattle, sheep, hogs, and horses.”4

Because of this, farmers there operated “his own trucks and drives a large car into town,” while those in other areas of the state may still rely on “a Model T, or even in a buggy” to travel.5

1 Steve Neal, Happy Days are Here Again: The 1932 Democratic Campaign, the Emergence of FDR—and How America Was Changed Forever, (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 313. 2 Bernard Sternsher, “The Harding and Bricker Revolutions: Party Systems and Voter Behavior in Northwest Ohio, 1860-1982,” Typescript, Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, 2. 3 “Table 4—Population of Counties by Minor Civil Divisions: 1930, 1920, and 1910,” U.S. Government, 1930 Census, Population—Ohio, 850, 859, & 863. 4 “The Farm and the Farmer,” The Ohio Guide, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), 84. 5 Ibid. 2

This study examines the years from 1929 to 1936 to determine the Great Depression and

New Deal’s impact upon these three counties. October 1929 marked the beginning of the Great

Depression with the stock market crash and would continue ultimately until the United States

entered World War II in 1941. However, 1936 was chosen as the end date for this study due to

its reliance on these three counties’ voting analysis. For this study to have the most significance,

it must cover the elections in which the Depression and New Deal were of most significance to

the voters. After the 1936 election, and even during the election, there became a much greater

concern with what is happening in Europe, specifically Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. After the

1936 election, not many major New Deal legislation or programs were enacted.

The primary source base for this study consists primarily of newspaper editorials from

the counties. These editorials are essential because these newspapers served as the primary

source of news for the counties’ residents, with the Advertiser-Tribune in Tiffin delivered to 99.3

percent of the city’s residents.6 Because of this, the newspaper editors wielded significant

influence over their readers regarding the editorials. According to the Wood County Republican,

editorials were vital since they were “for the purpose of molding opinions and assisting in good

government.”7 The newspapers also provided the election results, along with substantial commentary on the elections. Other primary sources included in the study come from the Ohio

History Connection site “Ohio Memory,” a collection of historic photographs from Ohio’s counties, which help provide a “first-hand account” of Hancock, Seneca, and Wood counties during the Depression and allows for a better understanding of their citizens’ lives. While this study will not collect any oral history, it will still be utilized through Joseph Arpad’s Southern

6 “A Message To The Merchant Who Wants The Most Of His Advertising Dollar,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, Tiffin, Ohio, February 15, 1933, 3. 7 “Here’s Some Big New To The Readers Of The Republican,” Wood County Republican newspaper, Bowling Green, Ohio, June 1, 1933, 7. 3

Wood County Oral History Project, a collection of oral histories from Wood County residents

during the Depression.

During the Depression, Ohio formed a vital sector of Roosevelt’s “New Deal” coalition

that would propel him to four terms as President, making these three counties’ voting records

worth studying. We can learn from this that public reaction to the New Deal and the increased

federal government intervention was complex and varied because of regional differences. The

Midwest was and continues to be a crucial area in national politics—illustrated by the

Democratic and Republican Parties’ decision to host their 1932 and 1936 national conventions in

Midwestern cities and the Union Party in 1936. However, historians have failed so far to study

these counties or the surrounding region. Much of their focus has been on either the western

Midwest’s agricultural sector in Iowa, Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Wisconsin, or the eastern

Midwest’s industrial areas, such as northeastern Ohio and the Detroit or Chicago metropolitan

areas. There has not been an extensive examination of rural Northwest Ohio citizens, how the

Depression affected them, and how they responded to the New Deal.

Today, the Depression and the New Deal’s legacy maintain their relevance as the debate

continues over the level of the federal government’s involvement in the American peoples’ lives.

There is intense debate over whether there needs to be another New Deal, especially with the

federal government’s issuance of stipends for COVID-19 relief. For some, it builds on criticism of the New Deal that the federal government provides too much assistance and creates a “welfare state”—in that people do not adequately rely on their initiative. For the three Ohio counties in this study, the Depression and New Deal’s legacy reinforced opinions that local government and local solutions were best to solve economic depressions. 4

As this study covers three Northwest Ohio counties, at its core, it is a local history study.

Local history is a field that historians increasingly utilize as “people of every place and time

deserve a history.”8 Because of this, local historians help to provide “the natural link between immediate experience and general history.”9 It accomplishes this through its usage of a region to

be a “backdrop for their stories of place” and a way to illustrate broader historical themes at a

local level.10 Local historians also help provide their communities a voice in these historical

themes, though sometimes, they can focus too much on their community and lose track of the

larger world.11

This project consults several historians’ works surrounding the Depression and New Deal

on a national level. Rethinking the Great Depression by Gene Smiley inspects the Great

Depression and its broader influence and legacy, while Anthony Badger’s The New Deal: The

Depression Years, 1933-40, and Michael Hiltzik’s The New Deal: A Modern History both

provide an overview of the New Deal at the national level. R.G. Tugwell’s The Brains Trust

provides a first-hand account of the role of Roosevelt’s leading group of advisors, the Brains

Trust, during the 1932 election and the New Deal programs they were responsible for inspiring

Roosevelt to create. Happy Days are Here Again by Steve Neal studies the 1932 Democratic

convention and critical people, like Huey Long, and issues, like Prohibition, surrounding the

1932 election and the fight to prevent Roosevelt from being nominated. Jonathan Alter’s The

Defining Moment examines Roosevelt’s campaign through the 1932 election, his decisions

during Hoover’s lame-duck period, and the Hundred Days of 1933 regarding the worsening of

8 Joseph Amato, Rethinking Home: A Case for Writing Local History, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 3. 9 Ibid., 4. 10 Ibid., 15. 11 Ibid., 185-187. 5 the Depression. Clyde Weed’s Nemesis of Reform inspects the decline of the Republican Party during the 1930s and how instead of turning to the political left and embracing some elements of the New Deal, it instead chooses to turn right and become ardently opposed to the New Deal.

Winter War by Eric Rauchway looks at the political debates between Roosevelt’s election and inauguration between Roosevelt and Hoover on what the New Deal meant to the nation’s future.

Both works are significant as they outline the central struggle between Roosevelt and Hoover over the federal government’s role in ending the Depression. These works shed light on the three counties’ struggle over the federal government’s role in ending the Depression.

Beyond the Bonus Army by Stephen Ortiz outlines the role veterans had in driving national politics from 1932 to 1936. This study is significant because it describes how in 1934 and 1935, a coalition was emerging to potentially challenge Roosevelt in 1936, made of Huey

Long’s and Father Charles Coughlin’s supporters and veterans. What united them was the veteran’s Bonus and Roosevelt’s refusal to grant it to veterans. David Bennett’s Demagogues in the Depression and Paul Marshall with his MA thesis explore the 1936 election and the short- lived Union Party’s influence, which proposed alternatives to the New Deal. Bennett’s work is significant as it influenced my thinking of the 1936 election into a referendum on Roosevelt and the New Deal.12 This analysis interpreted the 1936 election results, not in terms of individual party votes but a yes-no vote on the success of Roosevelt and the New Deal.

This study also analyzes historical works on how the Depression and New Deal impacted specific communities. With his memoir Prosperity Far Distant, Charles Wiltse outlines a farmer’s life in southern Ohio and how he felt forgotten by the New Deal due to the lack of assistance he received, even though he supported Roosevelt in 1932. The New Deal at the Grass

12 David H. Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression: American Radicals and the Union Party, 1932-1936, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 218. 6

Roots by D. Jerome Tweton researches a county in Minnesota and how the Depression and New

Deal affected it. What is significant about this study is that the county, in many ways, reflects

Northwest Ohio in the ethnic makeup and the industries, specifically its reliance on agriculture.

George Melloan’s When the New Deal Came to Town is a memoir that details life in the eastern

Midwest, specifically a county in rural Indiana, which leads to a more conservative view of the

New Deal. However, it does not provide any analysis of how the New Deal impacted the county.

Bernard Sternsher in Hitting Home researches a wide variety of towns, counties, and regions and

the different challenges that the Depression presented before the New Deal, specifically the

unrest in the western Midwest by farmers. “The Harding and Bricker Revolutions” by Bernard

Sternsher analyzes voting behavior in Northwest Ohio from 1860-1982 and how the ethnic and

religious makeup of that region impacted their voting behavior. What is significant for this study

is that he looks at what he calls the “Bricker Revolution” in Ohio in 1938-the election of

Republican John Bricker as governor of Ohio-because of “farmers’ and other rural residents’ defection from the New Deal on ‘cultural’ rather than economic grounds: resentment of aid to labor and city people and of an alien kind of general change.”13 Sternsher also notes that “if ever

there was a microcosm of rural and urban America, northwestern Ohio represents that

microcosm.”14 While mainly focusing on the Upper Midwest, Preserving the Family Farm by

Mary Neth still provides analysis for the importance of farming to the Midwest and the

connectedness of rural communities that it created. Neth’s work is significant because for

Hancock, Seneca, and Wood counties’ rural communities, they would have turned to their

neighbors before the local, state, or federal government if they needed assistance. Lisa Ossian’s

The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, while it analyzes Iowa from 1929 to 1933, still

13 Sternsher, “The Harding and Bricker Revolutions,” 3. 14 Ibid., 2. 7

provides an analysis of how the Depression held power over rural communities. What makes

Ossian’s book significant is that it analyzes only from 1929 to 1933, which provides a better

understanding of the Depression’s sway on rural communities, such as the rise in crime and

debate over Prohibition.

The final field of historical works relates to the economic impression of the Depression

and the New Deal. Price Fishback, William Horrace, and Shawn Kantor, in their article “Did

New Deal Grant Programs Stimulate Local Economies?” explores whether the Agricultural

Adjustment Act (AAA) stimulated local economies through retail sales. This article is significant

because it finds that the AAA did not significantly affect stimulating local economies, but it may

have harmed local economies’ recovery. In Peddling Protectionism, Douglas Irwin reveals the

politics and adverse effects that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930 had upon the Depression and the political debates surrounding it. This work is significant because it outlines farmers’ initial hope with the tariff and how they became angry at its favoring of industries at the farmers’ expense. In This Land, This Nation, Sarah Phillips researches the role of conservationism in the

New Deal for rural America and how the New Deal’s center was conservation programs designed to revive agricultural economies. Its goal was to create an “American standard of living,” which would allow farmers to buy manufactured goods, thus keeping industrial jobs necessary.15 Roger Backhouse and Bradley Bateman in Capitalist Revolutionary critique John

Maynard Keynes’ economic theories, which came to dominate the post-Depression and World

War II world. Say’s Law by Thomas Sowell inspects the origins of Say’s Law, the idea that

supply creates demand, and criticisms it receives, specifically from Karl Marx and John Maynard

15 Sarah T. Phillips, This Land, This Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3. 8

Keynes.16 The Great Contraction by Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz examines

from 1929 to 1933 the economic crisis within the United States. It does not refer to this crisis as

the Great Depression, instead using the term “Great Contraction” due to viewing the crisis’s

cause through the “massive contraction of the money supply” within the nation.17

Through the research, several crucial questions emerged. These questions can be divided

into two areas: the Depression’s impact and the solution to the Depression. The first section has two main questions: how were Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties affected by the Great

Depression and New Deal? How did the newspapers present the New Deal and other proposed solutions to the Depression? These questions help to understand how the Depression affected the counties and how its residents viewed its impact. Was the Depression something that a stronger work ethic could beat? Or did the Depression require more relief in order to alleviate it? Who was responsible for that relief: the individual, the local community, or the state/federal governments? With these questions, a better understanding of the residents of these three counties’ core beliefs can be determined and how they influenced their views during the period analyzed. From these questions, I argue that Hancock, Seneca, and Wood counties’ citizens saw the traditional American values of hard work and limited government as the best solutions to economic problems. If federal relief was deemed necessary, it should only provide enough to allow those values to resume their effectiveness.

The historical perspectives utilized in this work are local history, political history, social history, and economic history. As the study focuses on Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties and their voting record, it will undoubtedly make it a local history and political study work. Also,

16 Thomas Sowell, Say’s Law: A Historical Analysis, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 1. 17 Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, The Great Contraction, 1929-1933: New Edition, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), ix. 9

as it discusses the Great Depression, examining the different economic theories, both before the

Depression and those suggested as cures for the Depression, is necessary. This study seeks to

provide a voice for rural people on the New Deal and the federal government’s role, especially

concerning relief and involvement in their lives through voting and media analysis.

The first chapter covers 1929 to 1932 and analyzes Hoover’s response to the Great

Depression and its impact in Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties. It examines the United

States in the 1920s and the growing inequality between farmers and the rest of the nation. With

the stock market crash in October 1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression, this chapter

focuses on the initial economic downturn coverage. It also covers the Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the growing concern over the Depression within the counties due to the rise in crime locally and nationally. The final section of this chapter focuses on Hoover’s relief plan and its implementation nationally and in the counties.

Chapter two studies from 1932 to 1933, specifically the 1932 presidential election. It analyzes the many potential solutions to ending the Depression proposed as the Depression had worsened. This chapter then examines Franklin Roosevelt’s rise to be the Democratic nominee for President in 1932 with his pledge of a “new deal” for the American people. However, the counties’ newspaper editors pushed back against Roosevelt, arguing instead through an analogy that the United States should stay with Hoover—the old and trusted doctor making the nation better—instead of Roosevelt-the new, uncertain doctor promising all kinds of relief. However, the counties’ citizens, who saw no end to the Depression under Hoover, felt Roosevelt’s promise of new-in some cases radical-cures was worth the risk if it meant an end to the Depression.

Chapter three examines 1933 to 1935 and the implementation of the New Deal. First, the growing banking crisis in early 1933 is analyzed and its impact on Hoover and Roosevelt’s 10

relationship. Once Roosevelt takes office, three segments of the New Deal are analyzed and their

impact on the counties. The first is the banking reform legislation, notably the Glass-Steagall

Act. The many relief agencies are examined and their work within the counties and the New

Deal’s agricultural policies and its efforts to help farmers. There is also an examination of economic theory as it relates to the Depression and the New Deal.

The final chapter analyzes from 1934 to 1936, the 1936 election, and why Roosevelt and the New Deal lost support from the counties’ residents. This chapter includes local criticism of the New Deal programs and their perceived corruption of the traditional values of hard work and limited government. The Union Party, a third party consisting of the programs of Father

Coughlin, the late Huey Long, Dr. Townsend, and others, is studied and its popularity within the counties. The chapter includes an analysis of the 1936 election results, both individual and the referendum on Roosevelt and the New Deal. While Roosevelt won in a national landslide, he failed to take any of the counties. When the Democratic and combined Republican and Union

Party votes are analyzed, the New Deal is soundly defeated within these counties. This was because the counties’ citizens believed its corrupting effect too much to justify any contributions it made to end the Depression.

CHAPTER I. THE RISE AND FALL OF A “NEW ERA”: 1929-1932

Following World War I, the United States experienced a period of significant economic

growth throughout the 1920s. This growth coincided with significant social changes and a large

segment of the population able to experience unknown levels of prosperity. The period, best known as the “Roaring Twenties,” is also known as “a New Era, one of confidence and endless

optimism” that this prosperity had brought.18 However, not all Americans shared this prosperity, specifically farmers, including those in Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties in Ohio. They had

participated for a short period in the prosperity, but by the mid-1920s, they were mired in economic uncertainty, and it only worsened with the Great Depression. This chapter argues that

Hoover and other leaders’ inability to provide a clear path to a quick end of the Depression led

the counties’ residents to grow more concerned about their futures.

The United States During the 1920s

In 1929, Chrysler’s chairman proclaimed the year to be one of “unprecedented

prosperity.”19 That prosperity had existed throughout the 1920s, as car production had almost

tripled in the 1920s.20 The GDP also rose more than 6 percent, and unemployment was

approximately 3 percent in the 1920s.21 From 1923 to 1929, the real income per person—

determined by Gross National Product per capita—had increased 12.6 percent and manufacturing

production 23.5 percent.22 With this economic growth came the ability to spend more, especially

in Ohio. By 1930, a little under half of all Ohio families owned a radio.23 So prevalent were

18 Lisa L. Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 1929-1933, (Columbia, MS: University of Missouri Press, 2011), 21. 19 “Outlook For Year Of Big Prosperity Seen By Chrysler,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, Findlay, Ohio, January 2, 1929, 1. 20 Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression, (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 2002), 4. 21 Douglas A. Irwin, Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 16. 22 Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression, 4. 23 “Half Ohio Homes Have Radio Set,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, Bellevue, Ohio, August 13, 1931, 1. 12

radios in Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties that all their significant newspapers printed the

daily radio schedule. Along with Illinois, Iowa, and Texas, Ohio ranked in the top four states in ownership of cars, trucks, and tractors.24

The 1928 presidential election between Herbert Hoover and Alfred Smith was marked by

a continuance of this “New Era” present in the 1920s. A now-infamous 1928 Republican brochure that promised a “chicken in every pot and car in every garage” best exemplified the nation’s confidence that the “New Era” would continue.25 This confidence resulted in Hoover

winning the Electoral College 444 to 87, along with “the entire West and most of the East” and

the reliably Democratic Southern states of Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.26 In

Ohio, Hoover won all but two counties due to the prosperous economy of the “New Era.”27 Two

other reasons for Hoover’s victory were Smith being Catholic and labeled a “wet” (opposed to

Prohibition.)28 Following his loss, Smith remarked that “the time hasn’t come when a man can

say his [rosary] beads in the White House.”29

Part of Hoover’s appeal was his vision of a nation where “freedom from ‘poverty and

fear’ allowed opportunities for greater service to the community, the country, and the world.”30

The Bowling Green Sentinel-Tribune stated Hoover was “not merely America’s leading

citizen—he is the world’s best known citizen,” and that “an era of good will nationally and

internationally may be expected under his guidance of America.” 31 Americans had no reason to

doubt that this “era of good will” had arrived and would remain.

24 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 22. 25 Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression, 1. 26 “Electoral Votes Mostly Hoover’s,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, November 8, 1928, 1. 27 Kyle Kondik, The Bellwether: Why Ohio Picks Its President, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2016), 69. 28 Ibid., 70. 29 Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: FDR’s Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 71. 30 Phillips, This Land, This Nation, 46. 31 “An Era Of Good Will,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, Bowling Green, Ohio, November 7, 1928, 4. 13

However, not all Americans participated in this prosperity, with farmers experiencing more uncertainty than the rest of the nation about their economic future. Europe, ravaged by

World War I, struggled to rebuild and turned to American farmers for food, causing food prices in the United States to double from 1915 until the end of the war. 32 This new prosperity led farmers to expand their enterprises, producing more food while seeking even more prosperity. To do this, they borrowed money from banks to buy more land. Unlike the rest of the nation, however, farmers were unable to continue living in prosperity. In 1920, banks began to crack down on lending, leading to a collapse of prices and a recession. While manufacturing bounced back and continued to grow, farmers’ incomes did not return to pre-war levels until 1925.33

Simultaneously, their taxes continued to increase during this time, 14 percent from 1913 to

1928.34 Most never saw the prosperity others did during the 1920s. As a result, economic trends diminished their prospects instead of helping them. By relying on bank loans to purchase land and equipment, they accumulated massive debt, almost $10 billion in debts in 1929.35 These debts resulted in a rise in foreclosures. In 1920, farm foreclosures were about 3 percent. By 1925, that rose to 11 percent, and in 1929, around 18 percent.36 Many farmers saw no escape except to the cities, and from 1925 to 1928, over 3 million farmers moved to cities, resulting in 1929 having the smallest farm population in 20 years.37 Those who remained, however, were

“becoming more optimistic, believing that they must eventually share in this new urban prosperity,” and believing that “consistent hard work and a positive attitude would always suffice no matter the economic weather.”38

32 Irwin, Peddling Protectionism, 17-18. 33 Ibid., 18. 34 “Taxes On Farm Property Increase,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 6, 1930, 3. 35 Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40, (New York: Noonday Press, 1989), 14-15. 36 Irwin, Peddling Protectionism, 18. 37 “Farm Population At Lowest Point In Twenty Years,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 6, 1930, 6. 38 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 22 & 8. 14

Northwest Ohio farmers were not exempt from this uncertainty, as Ohio experienced

significant demographic changes from 1910 to 1930. During this time, Northwest Ohio farmers

primarily grew corn, wheat, oats, sugar beets, and tomatoes, with their main crop, corn, used

almost exclusively for livestock; in 1930, Ohio had over 2 million pigs and cows and over 1.5

million sheep. 39 From 1910 to 1930, Ohio’s farm population decreased 18 percent, with only 15

percent of Ohio’s population living on farms in 1930. In comparison, the rest of the state’s

population increased 64 percent during the same period.40 Ohio farmers’ income fell almost 70

percent by the end of the 1920s compared to 1920; however, their expenses remained the same

throughout the decade.41 Their land price also fell, with Hancock County seeing a loss of almost

half its value in the 1920s, from $158 to $86 per acre. In Seneca and Wood Counties, there was

also a significant decrease. In Seneca County, the price fell from $128 to $86 per acre, while

Wood County saw a decrease from $196 to $117 per acre.42 The farmers in these counties likely

shared the belief that if they continued to work hard, they would eventually join the rest of the

nation in the “New Era.”

The Beginning of the Great Depression

On October 24, 1929, however, the “New Era” of post-war prosperity began to end. The stock market, in the words of the Sentinel-Tribune, had “blown up.”43 This crash lasted almost a

month, with economists marking its end date on November 14—22 days and $50 billion in

39 “Agricultural Map of the State of Ohio,” Ohio Federal Writers’ Program, 1936, Ohio Guide Photographs, Accessed on “Ohio Memory,” by Ohio History Connection, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p267401coll34/id/8970, & “Do You Know That?,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, May 23, 1930, 4. 40 J. I. Falconer, “Twenty Years of Ohio Agriculture 1910-1930,” Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin, 526, July 1933, 4. 41 Ibid., 9. 42 Ibid., 17-18. 43 “Stock Market And Business,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, October 26, 1929, 3. 15

losses.44 On one day alone, the market lost more than $3 billion.45 Immediately following the

crash, the nation turned to Hoover, who, with his experience of a “former business man of large

affairs and as secretary of commerce,” had “knowledge of the real business conditions of the

country equaled by few.”46 He claimed the “fundamental economic condition of the country”

was still sound, with his Treasury department in agreement, stating it was nothing more than the

market “merely ‘correcting itself,’” and would “eventually arrive at some fair level.”47 For many

Americans, though, the stock market was viewed as their new “get-rich-quick game,” their ticket to the “New Era.”48 This feeling reflects itself in the three reactions to the stock market crash

nationally: scorn, recognition, and optimism.

All three of these feelings are shown in a Tiffin Daily Advertiser political cartoon. Titled

“Every Man for Himself,” there are two men in a boat that got overturned in a storm, with the

clouds labeled “stock market slump.” Both men are in the water, or “Wall Street Speculation.”

While one man, “Big Operator,” is standing knee-deep in water, the other, “Little Speculator,” is

drowning.49 This cartoon outlined the counties’ feelings about some people suffering from the

crash while large businesses remained afloat and economic prosperity continued. To many, the

stock market was “gambling, or, at best, speculation,” and that “gambling remained a dangerous

game, and any gambler should know the risks.”50 Farmers especially did not feel much sympathy

for them, as Will Rodgers said in his column: “you know there is nothing that hollers as quick

and as loud as a gambler… now they know what the farmer has been up against for eight

44 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 28. 45 “Billions Lost In Frenzied Trading,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, Tiffin, Ohio, October 28, 1929, 1. 46 “Expect Hoover to Air His Views on Market Collapse,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, October 25, 1929, 10. 47 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 22. 48 Ibid. 49 “Every Man for Himself!,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, October 25, 1929, 4. 50 Ibid., 29. 16

years.”51 However, farmers also recognized the potential similarities between this crash and the

recession that impacted them in 1920. Still, there remained “a continued optimistic belief that

this stock market crash would not necessarily guarantee a later economic decline.”52

Throughout the rest of 1929 and into 1930, there was little concern about the rising economic Depression. In Hancock County, for example, their only concern was if the local sugar beet company in Findlay would open for the season, which had closed in February 1930.53 On

the other hand, Bowling Green was thankful for the Royal Manufacturing company, responsible

for enabling approximately 400 people to not rely on relief.54 This was because Bowling Green’s

“citizens have had the grit and determination to push it.”55 In Bellevue, the newspaper ran an ad about the value of “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses.” The secret of the Joneses, according to the newspaper, is that they study the advertisements and then they know where to go when they need something. “It’s fairly easy,” the advertisement claims, “if you make the most of your opportunities.”56 These opportunities were sure to continue, even with the stock market crash.

And why would they have believed otherwise with Hoover reassuring them they will?

Having withstood “a great economic storm,” he assured the nation of the “certainty of prosperity

ahead” and believed “we have now passed the worst and with continued unity of effort we shall

rapidly recover.”57 However, the nation did not recover, with many cities needing bread lines to

provide relief, with estimates for relief agencies to “provide four or five times as much relief as

ever before.”58 Nevertheless, to some, these bread lines were “fakes and public nuisances.”59

51 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 30. 52 Ibid., 30-31. 53 Philip F. Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio during the Great Depression,” Master’s Thesis, Ohio State University, 1958, 10. 54 “Why Bowling Green Grows,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, June 11, 1930, 3. 55 Ibid. 56 “The Pace-Setters,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, April 14, 1930, 4. 57 Ibid. 58 “Social Expert Predicts Long Bread Lines,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August, 17, 1931, 4. 59 “Bread Lines ‘Fakes,’ Lutheran Group Told,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, May 17, 1930, 1. 17

Instead of being filled with those seeking help, it was “professional floaters and beggars,

unwilling to work, in the majority of cases.”60 Citizens in the counties saw this as evidence that

the nation was not that bad off as reports initially suggested, for those in these bread lines were

seen to be people taking advantage of others and not in desperate need of aid.

The newspaper editors also encouraged a lack of concern among citizens over the

economic collapse due to the repeated mentions of their belief in a return to prosperity. The

Tiffin Daily Tribune published an editorial about a speech given by Senator Dwight Morrow who

stated that, while there is still uncertainty about when prosperity will return, “we have faith that a

great people…will go on with their work, raising still higher their power of consuming goods,”

and thus turning the wheel of prosperity.61 The editorial continues, noting that “there is more

fundamental, sound optimism in that statement” than any report could ever deliver and that “if

everybody goes on with his work, fearlessly and hopefully and sensibly, the result will be

good.”62 This editorial highlights a significant point from Hoover’s relief efforts: the responsibility for economic improvement laid on individual workers and consumers.

However, not everyone could go on “fearlessly and hopefully and sensibly.” In late 1929,

300 people found work on farms from the state of Ohio employment offices. What is significant about these 300 people—and the 124 others who applied but were unable to get work—is that they were all from cities.63 While it is unknown if any went into Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

Counties, this would have likely been met with hostility by their citizens, primarily as prosperity

remained elusive. A Tiffin Daily Advertiser editorial held a more realistic view, stating, “the only

assumption is that if he [prosperity] is behind the corner he has no intention of showing his

60 “Bread Lines ‘Fakes,’ Lutheran Group Told,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, 1. 61 “Why Business Should Be Good,” Tiffin Daily Tribune newspaper, Tiffin, Ohio, June 17, 1930, 10. 62 Ibid. 63 “City Folk Want Jobs on Farms,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, January 16, 1930, 2. 18

face.”64 The editorial pointed out a net loss of 16,000 employees among 51 plants in Toledo from last year and questioned why such a belief in prosperity returned, especially as the plants continued to lose workers—almost 400 jobs were lost from the previous week.65 Many of the

counties’ citizens were also skeptical about returning to prosperity and likely felt hostility

towards those moving from the city into rural areas searching for work, for they now had to

compete with them.

Another reason for citizens to be skeptical was Washington’s relief efforts. Due to the

difficulties farmers faced throughout the 1920s, many farm groups called on Congress to pass

new tariffs to create “equality for agriculture” and increase tariffs on agricultural goods.66

Historically, the Republican Party was the party of tariffs, with broad support from Northeastern

manufacturing leaders as tariffs reduced foreign competition for their goods. The Democratic

Party and its main base in the Southern states were opposed to tariffs due to concerns over

reducing tobacco and cotton trade, their main crops. The Midwest, however, traditionally wanted

the best of both. They wanted low tariffs on manufactured goods yet high tariffs on foreign

crops.67

Upon Hoover’s election in 1928, Midwestern Republicans found a new ally in their efforts to impose a new tariff. The previous administration under Calvin Coolidge had primarily

been hostile to their efforts, even remarking that “farmers never had much money. I don’t believe

we can do much about it.”68 With his humanitarian and relief work background, Hoover

disagreed, and in his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination, he stated he would “use

64 “Prosperity Remains ‘Around the Corner,’” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, June 17, 1930, 4. 65 Ibid. 66 Irwin, Peddling Protectionism, 18. 67 Ibid., 12. 68 Ibid., 24. 19

my office and influence to give the farmer the full benefit of our historical tariff policy.”69 By the

end of May 1930, a new tariff bill was before the Senate: the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.

Initially, farmers heard they would “benefit greatly by the new tariff bill.”70 Senator

Smoot argued the bill would result in an “increase in protective rate for agriculture four times as

much as the protective rate for industry.”71 However, while the tariff debate continued, it became

harshly criticized due to its new focus on industrial and manufacturing goods rather than

agriculture. The Findlay Morning Republican remarked, “no other kind of legislation develops as

much selfishness as that in which tariff duties are involved.”72 When the tariff arrived before

Hoover, the public outcry was such “had seldom been in this country such a rising tide of

protest.”73 The Akron Times Press ran a political cartoon blaming the Depression on the Smoot-

Hawley tariff, even though experts today “doubt that Smoot-Hawley played much of a role.”74

Locally, the Tiffin Daily Advertiser was the tariff’s strongest critic, viewing it as “a bill which the

nation does not want.”75 It continued with how “certain it is that nobody else has yet discovered

just how he [farmers] is to benefit,” which was the whole reason for the new tariff’s purpose.76

Washington and Wall Street continued to press forward, convinced not only that the tariff would help farmers but that prosperity was returning soon. One government official suggested that if Americans just hung “a ‘Keep Smiling’ sign and refrain from expecting the worst,” the nation would improve.77 One economist foresaw an immediate continued increase in business,

ending when a “revolutionized business world, capable of withstanding a similar situation for

69 Irwin, Peddling Protectionism, 29. 70 “Claim Farmers Will Benefit by Tariff Rates,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, May 24, 1930, 1. 71 “Tariff Schedules Written Primarily For Agriculture,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, May 27, 1930, 1. 72 “Tariff Bares Selfishness,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, June 17, 1930, 10. 73 Irwin, Peddling Protectionism, 82. 74 Ibid., 115-116. 75 “Is Mr. Hoover Missing His Big Chance?,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, June 17, 1930, 3. 76 “Farm Relieve,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, June 18, 1930, 3. 77 “Believe Fears of Unemployment are Exaggerated,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 12, 1931, 1. 20

many years,” was reached.78 On Wall Street, the belief was that “the depression had taken a

definite turn about, and that a slow recovery soon would be underway.”79 One reason Wall Street

had this confidence was the wage cuts, previous indicators of the end of a depression, from the

major steel companies. It initially appeared that they were right, as a month later, the United

States Steel Corporation decided to pay its dividend to its stockholders, an action that took $11 million from its surplus. Pittsburgh, home to many steel companies’ headquarters, had its glass, building construction, and food manufacturers also report business increases.80 This optimism

carried them through the year, bringing an “undercurrent of hope and confidence regarding

business conditions” for many business leaders.81 The one caveat to their optimism was that “ no miraculously rapid return to prosperity could be expected.” Still, they met this with optimism, noting how “many businesses were rapidly getting set for an upward tide.”82

A Rise in Crime and Fear

However, within Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, 1931 saw a decrease in

optimism for the “New Era’s” return. What did increase was fear “of unemployment, of

impoverished old age, and of what people subject to or afraid of those horrors might do.”83 One of the main fears present in the counties was losing money from the bank, either through closure or robbery. In Findlay, the Buckeye Commercial Savings Bank closed on May 7, 1930, because it was “unable to realize on farm and other loans as would have been desireable[sic]” and resulted in the loss of approximately $3 million for its 10,000 customers—about half of

78 “Economist Sees End of Present Business Slump,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 16, 1931, 4. 79 “Wall Street Sees Definite Turn in Business Outlook,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 23, 1931, 1. 80 “U.S. Steel Pays Dividend From Surplus,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 28, 1931, 1. 81 “Leaders Are Optimistic For Coming Year,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, December 30, 1931, 1. 82 Ibid. 83 John Marsh, The Emotional Life of the Great Depression, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 89. 21

Findlay’s population.84 Bowling Green almost had a similar situation happen in 1931 with the

Bank of Wood County. In that case, an insurance company was concerned about some of the

properties they held and their worth. However, after a tense few days, one of the bank employees

could write to his wife to “draw a long breath; the crisis is over!”85

While Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties suffered some bank closures in 1931, they

were nowhere near Toledo, Ohio’s banking crisis. In August 1931, the “four major Toledo banks

and their 34 branches failed to open their doors,” resulting in more than 150,000 people losing

more than $100 million in savings.86 According to historian Timothy Messer-Kruse, this crisis

stemmed from Toledo’s bankers “capturing their own regulators and bending the laws of the

state to their own ends.”87 The crisis had significant impacts outside of the financial institutions,

with an estimated 12-13,000 unemployed, and the city’s budget disappeared, due not only to

having 1.35 million in the failed banks but a loss of almost $3 million from a drop in tax revenue

and bond sales.88 The crisis also impacted the University of Toledo, which was forced to

announce the “abandonment of the university’s football schedule this fall.”89 Toledo’s bank

crisis most likely affected the neighboring counties, including Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

Counties. The reason for this is that Toledo was, and remains, the largest urban center in

Northwest Ohio.

84 Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio during the Great Depression,” 11-12 & “State Bank Head Takes Charge of Bank in Findlay,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, May 7, 1930, 1. 85 “Letters describing the Wood County bank crisis of 1931,” Belle Case-Harrington papers, 1931, Wood County Public Library, Accessed on “Ohio Memory,” by Ohio History Connection, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/19850. 86 “Toledo is Calm After Closing of Four Banks,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August 17, 1931, 1. 87 Timothy Messer-Kruse, Banksters, Bosses, and Smart Money: A Social History of The Great Toledo Bank Crash of 1931, (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2004), 60. 88 Ibid., 88. 89 “Closing Of Banks Causes School To Abandon Football,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August 24, 1931, 4. 22

Citizens also feared that their money might disappear from the banks via robbery.

Throughout the Depression, the United States became “more and more littered with thieves and murderers.”90 It eventually got to the point where, “if you had ten dollars, you thought somebody’s goin’ to come rob you in the middle of the night.”91 In Bettsville, a small village in

Seneca County, three “unmasked bandits” stole $7,000 from the local bank.92 In Stony Ridge, one bank was robbed three times in 1930 and was a part of six bank robberies in 15 months in

Wood County.93 There was such great concern that the Union Bank & Savings Company ran an advertisement in the Bellevue Gazette about how to deposit money into their bank safely. The advertisement noted that “hold-ups have increased lately at an alarming rate” and to keep yourself and your money safe after the bank has closed, to use the depository to deposit it.94 The belief was that once criminals heard “that money is no longer kept in homes, stores or offices and they [would] move to communities where this protection is not furnished.”95 However, banks were not the only target for criminals. In North Baltimore, three slot machines were stolen, and two others broke into in two weeks.96

Local farmers were especially fearful of their crops’ potential to fail or their livestock stolen. In the summer of 1930, a drought struck Ohio and cost Seneca County farmers “many thousands of dollars.”97 After stealing five cattle from a Seneca County farmer and selling them

90 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 17. 91 Interview with Max Shaffer by Joseph Arpad, 1979, in Joseph J. Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, (Fresno, CA: Archival Books, 1994), 319. 92 “Trio of Bandits Loot Bettsville Bank of $7,000,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, January 30, 1930, 1. 93 “Stony Ridge Bank Robbed Third Time; Bandits Get $1,900,” December 10, 1930, in Some Interesting Wood County, Ohio Crime Stories: 1880-1983, 1998, Wood County Public Library, Accessed on “Ohio Memory,” by Ohio History Connection, 117, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/9285. 94 “Beat the Hold-Up Racket!,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, May 16, 1930, 4. 95 Ibid. 96 “Slot Machine War Breaks Out,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, Findlay, Ohio, January 3, 1934, 9. 97 “Seneca Corn, Pasture Die in Dry Heat,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, August 5, 1930, 1. 23 at a Cleveland market, one man was arrested.98 In Wood County, another concern was over chickens. The Wood County Sheriff’s Office created a patrol to help watch for potential chicken thieves. Nevertheless, one farmer still lost 27 of his to theft.99 Others sought to take the situation into their own hands, with one farmer able to grab his gun and scare would-be chicken thieves away.100 The fear among them was so high that any suspicious car was reason to call the sheriff.

One traveler found this out the hard way when he stopped in a driveway north of Bowling Green on North Dixie Highway, and, after “facing the array of shotguns, revolvers, etc. into which he looked when he woke up,” hastily explained that he was feeling tired and stopped to rest for a few hours.101 As Bruce Pratt, the Wood County Sheriff during the 1930s, later remarked, “we

[police officers during the Depression] had it much, much, rougher than they do today.”102

During the Depression, one of the most famous crimes in the counties took place April

16, 1931, when Charles “Pretty Boy” Floyd and William “Billy the Killer” Miller came to

Bowling Green. After being spotted by police chief Carl Galliher and officer Ralph Castner, a gunfight ensued. After it was over, Floyd escaped, while two women with him were arrested, one of whom was wounded. Officer Castner was also wounded, and Miller died in the fight.103

Instantly, the city hailed the two policemen heroes with the Sentinel-Tribune writing how

“sometimes people wonder why Bowling Green maintains a police force,” until something like that occurs, then “we realize why a force of hardy police is needed.”104 The news of the gunfight soon spread and gained attention, for, as the Cleveland Plain Dealer put it, the “hick cops” were

98 “Arrest Reveals Operation of Cattle Thieves in Seneca Co.,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, November 9, 1931, 1. 99 “Chickens Are Stolen,” Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, Risingsun, Ohio, April 26, 1934, 1. 100 “Farmer Shoots at Suspected Thieves,” January 1930, in Some Interesting Wood County, Ohio Crime Stories: 1880-1983, 97, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/9265. 101 “Spoiled His Sleep,” August, 7, 1930, in Some Interesting Wood County, Ohio Crime Stories: 1880-1983, 112, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/9280. 102 Interview with Bruce Pratt, unknown interviewer, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 266. 103 “Chief Kills Bandit, Castner And Girl Wounded In Fight,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 16, 1931, 1. 104 “Killers Visit Bowling Green,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 17, 1931, 3. 24

able to do what cops from no significant city had been able to do, track and bring down one of

the “rodents.”105 The Bradner Advocate speculated that Mayor Cermak in Chicago might want to take Chief Galliher for his “clean-up campaign.”106

However, Ralph Castner was unable to enjoy the praise; he died from his wounds on

April 23. Immediately the city went into mourning to “pay its last respects to an officer who

went down, giving up his life protecting the homes and properties of its citizens.”107 Sheriff Pratt

placed a $1,000 reward for the capture of Pretty Boy Floyd following Castner’s death.108

However, Pretty Boy Floyd evaded capture until 1936, when he died in a gunfight. For his

funeral in Oklahoma, “fully 50,000 persons felt that they had to attend,” and that it signaled “a

democracy that will turn out 50,000 people to squabble over the flowers on a dead bandit’s

coffin is not giving a good indication of its ability to meet a democracy’s problems

intelligently.”109

Pretty Boy Floyd was not the only gangster to visit these counties, however. On two

separate occasions, John Dillinger and his gang robbed banks within the counties. On August 14,

1933, the first robbery took place in Bluffton, a village in Allen and Hancock County. There, “in

true wild west style,” Dillinger and his gang stole about $2,000 from a bank.110 Dillinger was

captured about a month later and imprisoned in Lima, Ohio. However, he only remained for

about a month. On October 12, Dillinger escaped with four associates’ help, killing the Allen

County sheriff in the process.111 In an ironic twist, Dillinger escaped the same day the federal

105 “In Their Own Language,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 20, 1931, 3. 106 “‘Shorty’ Galliher Real Hero,” Bradner Advocate newspaper, Bradner, Ohio, April 24, 1931, 1. 107 “Stores To Close For Funeral Of Patrolman Castner,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 24, 1931, 1. 108 Rap Sheet for Charles Arthur Floyd, in Some Interesting Wood County, Ohio Crime Stories: 1880-1983, 10, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/9178. 109 “Democracy’s Shame,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 8, 1936, 8. 110 “Guns Rattle as Yeggs Rob Bluffton Bank,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, August 15, 1933, 1. 111 “Bandits Kill Lima Sheriff; Free Yegg,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, October 13, 1933, 1. 25

government designated Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay as the place for “crooks who annoy

Uncle Sam,” like John Dillinger.112 Dillinger returned to the counties on May 3, 1934, and

robbed over $17,000 from the Fostoria First National Bank. However, the robbery did not go

unnoticed, with Dillinger and his gang quickly involved in a shootout with Fostoria police. In the

shootout, the Fostoria police chief and five others were wounded before Dillinger finally escaped

and fled the city.113

Along with the robbers and gangsters, the counties’ citizens had to be concerned about

bootleggers. Since its inception as a “‘great experiment’ in social improvement,” Prohibition

proved to be a great boon to the criminal underworld.114 In 1930, more than 200,000 speakeasies

existed to supply illegal alcohol, and people came-over half a million arrests for illegally

drinking alcohol. Almost 1,000 Treasury Department agents were either fired or prosecuted for

their roles in aiding bootleggers and racketeers. 115 By 1930, Prohibition became viewed as “an

experiment in trial and error, decidedly error.”116 One reason for this was the increase in alcohol

bootlegging, including in Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties. In 1929, the Wood County sheriff destroyed 85 gallons of alcohol. After crashing their car, the bootleggers tried to hide it under a bridge; however, the alcohol was quickly spotted and destroyed.117 There was great

concern about illegal alcohol coming down from Canada, and there were many reports of

bootleggers caught either once they made it to the Ohio shoreline of Lake Erie or them washing

up after a storm on the lake. To combat this, the US government established an office for

112 “Prison Island for Crooks That Annoy Uncle Sam Is Chosen by Justice Bureau,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, October 13, 1933, 1. 113 “Police Chief, Four Others, Shot as Bank Bandits Escape with $17,000 at Fostoria,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, May 4, 1934, 1. 114 Rauchway, Winter War, 145. 115 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 238. 116 Rauchway, Winter War, 145. 117 “85 Gallons of Booze is Taken,” Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, October 3, 1929, 1. 26

Prohibition agents in Toledo. However, like other agents, they were susceptible to bribes—so much so that in early 1930, five new agents had replaced those dismissed.118 One citizen commented that Rudolph, a small village south of Bowling Green, had “an awful lot of fellows that made booze around there,” so much that “they [police] never raided anyone for making beer unless you sold it.”119

Another trend from the newspapers that citizens noticed was the increase in deaths, either by accident, murder, or suicide. Throughout the United States, but especially throughout the

Midwest, this rise in death was attributed to “increased tensions fostered by the economic depression,” and for many farmers, as historian Roger Biles stated, “the long-cherished

American goal of owning a family farm seemed genuinely at risk.”120 The growing number of suicides during the Depression has become one of many legends to emerge from the era.

However, the truth is more complicated. The national suicide rate increased during the

Depression, from 13.9 per 100,000 people in 1929 to 17.4 per 100,000 in 1932, the highest from the 1930s. For the rest of the 1930s, however, suicide rates were approximately 15 per 100,000, and it had steadily increased throughout the 1920s.121

Another legend that emerged from the Depression, and was close to home for residents of

Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, was of the “Norwalk Ape.” On June 7, 1930, the first report of an “anthropoid ape” had created a “condition of terror” near Norwalk, Ohio, a city about 13 miles east of Bellevue.122 The “Ape” had been in the area for a few days, and while residents were convinced it was some ape, the sheriff’s office tried to reassure people that the

118 “New Prohibition Force Takes Charge of Toledo Office,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, January 22, 1930, 5. 119 Interview with Max Shaffer by Joseph Arpad, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 306. 120 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 117-119. 121 St. Louis Fed, “Suicide and Homicide Rate Changes During Prohibition (1920-1933) in the United States from 1900 to 1950 (rate per 100,000 people),” Chart, January 16, 2020, Statista, https://www-statista- com.ezproxy.bgsu.edu/statistics/1088644/homicide-suicide-rate-during-prohibition/. 122 “Shaggy Dog or Ape? Question Agitates Norwalk Residents,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 7, 1930, 4. 27

animal was only a “large shaggy dog.”123 Within a week, the “Norwalk Ape,” named by the local

newspapers, had moved to near Fremont, Ohio, about 15 miles northwest of Bellevue. The

“Norwalk Ape” continued to travel throughout Northwest Ohio, with sightings reported in

Sandusky, Ohio, and Cygnet, a village in Wood County. There, it reportedly “walked on the porch” and “scratched on the screen door” of a resident there.124 By this time, it was believed to

have escaped from a circus.125 This belief was confirmed when a sideshow operator from Illinois

wrote a letter in which he described the lost animal being “‘as gentle as a child,’ and responded to the name of ‘Mamba,’” and that officers if they encountered it, should be gentle.126 Those who

had been around while “Mamba” was loose, however, did not feel at ease, with one resident

saying, “I know they tell me that animals of that kind rarely if ever attack human beings, but just

the same we are all afraid that this one might be the exception.”127 The citizens of Hancock,

Seneca, and Wood Counties also felt they were no longer the exception and that the rest of the

nation had joined them in suffering from the end of the “New Era.”

Hoover’s Relief Efforts

For Hoover, his primary mission became to alleviate this fear and install hope he could

return the nation to the “New Era.” For farmers, the Federal Farm Board, created in June 1929,

was the initial federal service to help them recover. Its purpose was to provide loans to farm

cooperatives to stabilize farm prices and create companies to buy crops, like wheat, if prices

were still falling. It intended to stabilize farm prices and allow farmers to rejoin the rest of the

123 “Shaggy Dog or Ape?,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, 4. 124 “Our Ape,” Sandusky Star Journal newspaper, Sandusky, Ohio, September 24, 1930, 7. 125 “‘Norwalk Ape’ Believed Seen Near Fremont,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 13, 1930, 4. 126 “Norwalk Ape Said Gentle as Child,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 26, 1930, 1. 127 “Shaggy Dog or Ape?,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, 4. 28

nation in prosperity. However, it failed to stabilize prices, and in early 1930, wheat and other

grain prices began to fall.128

The Federal Farm Board’s initial failure to stabilize prices led Hoover to prove his title of

“Great Humanitarian” was correct, and the Hoover administration began to oversee “a big

business venture of unprecedented proportions” to help wheat farmers.129 However, a significant

problem for wheat prices was that farmers anticipated stable prices. Because of this, they had

planted large quantities of wheat to pay off their growing debts, which led the market to be

flooded continuously with wheat, leading to lower prices. However, throughout the summer,

farmers slowly began to see prices stabilize and grow in some cases. This growth led Legge to

proclaim that “American farmers were in a better condition and facing a brighter future than

virtually any other industrial group.”130 The over-production, which a few months earlier he was calling for farmers to stop, was because “the food reserves of the world is not so very great after all,” and any “wide-spread disturbance to production would put us all on short rations in a short time.”131 Indeed, by the end of 1931, the Ohio Farm Bureau reported that “the farmer’s 1931

dollar has gone farther in purchasing than that same dollar in previous years.”132

The 1930 midterm election showed many did not agree with Legge or Hoover on their

farm relief policy. For Hoover, “his preconceptions got in the way of his common sense,” in that

he refused to consider any option that prevented “ordinary marketing processes or the freedom of

individuals to do as they liked.”133 Because of this, the vote then “came as a mighty protest, not

128 Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression, 13. 129 “Pres. Hoover Supervises Move to Save Farmer,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 27, 1930, 1. 130 “Legge Declares Farmers’ Future is Encouraging,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, July 14, 1931, 1. 131 Ibid. 132 “Farmer’s Dollar Went Farther in 1931 Despite the Bad Year,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, December 31, 1931, 2. 133 R.G. Tugwell, The Brains Trust, (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 448-449. 29

alone at prevailing conditions but against those responsible for them.”134 This was reflected with

Democrats “eating deep into Republican majorities in both the Senate and House,” eventually so

deep as to allow them to become the majority in the House.135 The majority of the Democratic gains came from the Midwest, with victories in congressional and gubernatorial races in all but

Iowa, Michigan, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.136 In Ohio, Democrats “scored the greatest

victory it has achieved in the state in 14 years” by winning the governor’s seat, a Senate seat,

nine congressional seats, 14 state Senate seats, 57 state representatives, and many local

elections.137

Hoover had to put the defeat behind him and work on tackling what the Secretary of

Labor James Davis called the “gravest problem now confronting the country”: unemployment.138

In April 1931, the estimated number of unemployed by the US Census was over 2.5 million.

However, these figures were thought to be lower than the actual figure, “attempting to be too

optomistic [sic] in order that they may combat ill feeling.”139 Within Wood County, over 750

men were unemployed, with almost 3,000 people dependent upon them, and this was likely a low

estimate.140 Homelessness was another concern, with an estimated 1.25 million Americans

homeless, including 160,000 to 170,000 children.141 To Secretary Davis, however, these

numbers did not reflect the United States. To him, the nation was on the cusp of having

“potential prosperity of the present seem like poverty in comparison,” and it “has shown the

134 “Watch Them Try to Get From Under,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 7, 1930, 8. 135 “8 G.O.P. Seats in Senate are Shaky by Early Returns,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, November 5, 1930, 1. 136 “Map Shows How Democrats Scored Heavy Vote Gains,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 6, 1930, 10. 137 “Ohio Victory is Greatest for 14 Years,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 6, 1930, 1. 138 “Unemployment is Gravest Problem-Secretary Davis,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 10, 1930, 4. 139 “A Low Down on Unemployment,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, Bowling Green State College, Bowling Green, Ohio, April 7, 1931, 3. 140 “Unemployed in Wood County,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 10, 1932, 2, & “Unemployment Survey,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January, 4, 1932, 2. 141 “Homeless Youths,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, February 27, 1933, 2. 30

genius that we have displayed in creating mechanical machines will be equally able to put the

human machine on a paying basis.”142

The growing unemployment led both Hoover and the new Congress to begin to think of

ways to relieve those who were suffering. Hoover first sought “to inject a vitalizing stream of

money and credit” of about $500 million into the economy, with the hope it would spark the

economy.143 However, when this failed, the new Congress began to propose programs, using

Labor Day in 1931 to present them. They ranged from creating a public works initiative to

passing a stimulus.144 One senator proposed a bill that called for $3 billion to be distributed to

the states to provide highway construction funds. Under this plan, the senator estimated millions

to gain employment, which “might easily speed up industry sufficiently to completely break the

depression.”145 Two others called for a stimulus, one of $375,000 and the other $250,000,

arguing that since federal funds were already going to banks and other financial institutions, why

not provide money for the unemployed? However, Hoover still refused to agree to any

government assistance, arguing it “has no place in American life.”146 Instead, Hoover appointed

Walter Gifford to lead the nation’s unemployment relief efforts, who created the slogan, “Fight

Distress Arising From Unemployment,” and proposed a “national campaign to raise funds for local relief agencies.”147 Hoover also urged the nation to have “confidence, faith, courage,

strength, and resolution for the future” and for a “neighbor-to-neighbor spirit to help the man in distress.”148 Hoover also believed that Americans were “providing against distress from

142 “Unemployment is Gravest Problem-Secretary Davis,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, 4. 143 “Confidence is Shown in Hoover Finance Plan,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 9, 1931, 1. 144 “Work or Doles: Labor’s Challenge to United States,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 8, 1931, 1. 145 “Bill Would Give Ohio Millions to Aid Unemployed,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, November 10, 1931, 6. 146 “Battle Lines are Forming on Relief Question,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, December 28, 1931, 1. 147 “Gifford Begins Organization of Relief Efforts,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August 25, 1931, 1. 148 “Pres. Hoover Urges Nation to Have Confidence,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 19, 1931, 1. 31

unemployment… a magnificent response to public appeal and by action of the local

governments.”149

This statement reflects Hoover’s plan for providing relief and aid to Americans. He

wanted to use “public and private agencies” to “take care of relief of unemployed,” which meant

federal resources were not necessary for relief, especially with Hoover’s mission not to “raise a

national fund but to aid local agencies to organize and take care of the unemployed.”150 There were many different relief efforts conducted throughout the nation to provide help to those suffering. One method of aid was loans, as a former North Baltimore resident recalled the local

Red Cross giving loans to people who “had no collateral, and who couldn’t go to the banks.”151

They also ran food shelters that would be “furnished with rations during the winter” for those

who needed it.152 However, all of their efforts required constant help from others, especially when a National Association of Community Chests and Councils report came out in October

1931. It estimated that more than $5 million would be “needed this winter to care for the barest sort of relief work.”153

To fill this need, many different varieties of charity drives were organized. A January

Red Cross drive in Wood County had 1,172 people contribute to help continue “the splendid

work this great organization has done in the past” and that “there is no association which is

comparable to this one.”154 Findlay held a charity ball to help the Hancock County Red Cross

149 “First Step Toward Recovery is to Re-establish Confidence-Pres. Hoover,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, December 8, 1931, 1. 150 “Gifford Confident Federal Funds are not Necessary,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September, 18, 1931, 1. 151 Interview with Grace Hamman Bower by Max Shaffer, 1967, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 42. 152 “Service Stores Contribute To The Relief Of Needy,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 15, 1931, 5. 153 “Half Billion Funds Needed To Relieve Jobless,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 16, 1931, 1. 154 “Red Cross Is Helped,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 4, 1932, 2. 32

and the “splendid relief work the Red Cross is carrying on the community” and how all of

Hancock County is “fortunate in the possession of its Red Cross relief machinery.”155

There were significant public charity events held throughout the nation. Hollywood declared a “national motion picture week” in November 1931 in which over 20,000 theaters nationwide would hold events, with all proceeds going to different unemployment relief organizations.156 In 1931, four college football games amongst the Big Ten athletic conference

members were proposed, with all the proceeds to one of the states’ unemployment funds.157

However, the Big Ten universities were not alone in this, as 128 schools announced their

intention to either play a charity game or donate from their regular season to help unemployment

funds. The proceeds from these games were estimated to be more than $250,000.158

These charity events provided more than just unemployment relief, however. They also allowed Americans a chance to cheer and celebrate something, even with so much misery around them. With the opening day of the 1930 MLB season, there was a strong belief that “it would not be surprising if new attendance records were set this year.”159 A cartoon titled “Pull For The

Shore, Sailor” further commented on baseball’s popularity amid the Depression. Depicting a raft

named “our troubles” manned by the “fans,” it was on its way to an island shaped by a baseball

titled “Opening of the Season.”160 One of the fans was shown kicking an old man, representing

“Old Depression,” off the raft and into the water.161

155 “The Charity Ball,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, February 15, 1933, 4. 156 “Movies Will Aid Unemployed Funds,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 12, 1931, 1. 157 “Permit Charity Games By Big Ten Teams,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 1, 1931, 5. 158 “Expect Charity Games Will Raise Quarter Million,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, November 5, 1931, 7. 159 “Baseball Remains a National Pastime; Big League Races Get Underway Today,” Bellevue Gazette, April 15, 1930, 2. 160 “Pull For The Shore, Sailor,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, April 12, 1932, 4. 161 Ibid. 33

The citizens in Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties reflected that “neighbor-to- neighbor spirit” in their attempts to alleviate the effects of the Depression. As one Bowling

Green resident recalled later, “everybody helped everybody else in those days.”162 Another

Wood County resident recalled his mother’s words that “if you live in a community, help make it

a better place to be.”163 Many residents in these counties believed in that and actively practiced

it. A Sentinel-Tribune editorial reflected this when it stated that “the best form of assistance

always is the kind that enables folks to help themselves” and that “the average person prefers to

give value received in the form of service rather than to accept mere gifts.”164 The counties’

residents did not want to need relief, but the Depression forced many to accept it.

Sometimes, the “neighbor-to-neighbor spirit” led to more radical approaches. A

Sandusky, Ohio lumber company announced its intention to “begin the manufacture of lumber

substituted from cornstalks.”165 The belief behind this was that by “ridding the corn fields of

corn borers, weed seed, and vermin,” Northwest Ohio farmers would not only gain “a splendid

non-conductive sheathing lumber at low cost,” but it would “increase the value of corn lands at

least $100 per acre.”166 In Lima, Ohio, a program was enacted to help farmers with excess wheat.

For 50 cents a bushel, an estimated 2,000 bushels of wheat were to be sold by farmers there to

“solve the wheat problem for the county’s farmers and to provide flour for Lima’s destitute

families.”167

162 Interview with Nan James, by Deborah Pniewski, May 1, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 149. 163 Interview with Alva Bachman, by Monica Lynn Manny, 1987, in “Times Were Hard and Then There Were Kids: Oral History about the Union Grange #1475 in Plain Township, Wood County, Ohio during the Great Depression of the Thirties,” Master’s Thesis, Bowling Green State University, 1987, 73. 164 “Unemployment Survey,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, 2. 165 “Sandusky Firm May Offer Market For Cornstalks,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 11, 1930, 2. 166 Ibid. 167 “Lima Merchants Will Buy Wheat, Aid Destitute,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August 5, 1931, 1. 34

Another example of these radical approaches was the penny sales in Wood County. A penny sale was when the bank placed a foreclosed farm up for auction to pay off the debts, “and some people would come in there expecting to get something cheap.”168 To counter this, “the farmers organized” and bid for items at a penny to “help the farmer, so he could buy his farm back cheap.”169 These penny sales were not small, with one attracting between 750 to 3,000 farmers. Nor were they all peaceful. At a penny sale in Henry County, farmers were able to gain a 60-day moratorium on foreclosures after announcing their determination to “fight to the last ditch.”170 Near the Wood County town of Haskins, farmers, with the assistance of communists from Toledo, limited the auction to only $1.96.171 The most extreme penny sale occurred in

January 1933 in Wood County. There, a mob of farmers surrounded John Crom, a representative of the Intercounty Finance company, and only the protection of the sheriff and County

Prosecutor prevented the farmers from actually reaching Crom. However, they could not get the mob to disperse. When one farmer was told that the mob’s actions could be treasonous, he responded that “he was like Patrick Henry in that if that was treason ‘give him liberty or give him death.’”172

The penny sales also highlight the differences between the counties’ residents in terms of extremes they were willing to go for their neighbors’ aid. Wood County was the more extreme of the counties, as evidenced by most penny sales occurring within that county. Wood County’s residents also received assistance from farmers of other counties, especially Lucas County. There was even a proposal from a University of Toledo professor to consolidate Fulton, Henry, Lucas,

168 Interview with Ivan Myer, unknown interviewer, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 235. 169 Ibid. 170 “Malinta Farm Sale Called Off Today as Farmers Gather,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, February 2, 1933, 1. 171 “Thousands at Forced Farm Sale at Haskins, Proceeds Total $1.96,” in Some Interesting Wood County, Ohio Crime Stories 1880-1983, 129, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/9297. 172 “Angry Wood County Farmers Limit Sale Bids to Dime Each,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 26, 1933, 1 & 5. 35

Ottawa, and Wood Counties into one county to “reduce the operating costs and provide lower tax rates for the residents.”173

While not as extreme in their efforts as in Wood County, Hancock, and Seneca County residents still worked to provide aid to their neighbors. Within these counties, the most extreme action was in Seneca County, when two farmers forced work to stop on a highway when they threatened the workers with shotguns. The reason for this display was their anger over the highway’s widening and the consequential destruction of trees on their properties. Having already obtained two injunctions to stop the work—but to no avail—the farmers then decided to take matters into their own hands.174 Within Hancock County, the Findlay Emergency

Employment and Relief Committee, created in October 1931, sought to find work for as many unemployed as possible, using a stimulus as only a last resort. To fund this, they received donations from employed individual’s daily wages once a month.175

While local leaders in these counties provided some assistance and tried to save the “New

Era,” it was not enough to prevent its fall and the worsening of the Depression. For this, they needed the federal government to rise to the challenge and help them. However, the Hoover administration’s insistence upon local relief measures to end the Depression prevented these counties, and the nation, from receiving the relief needed. As the Depression under Hoover continued to worsen, the nation began to try to envision any relief program, regardless of practicality, that could fill the void left by the failure of Hoover to live up to his title of “Great

Humanitarian” and return the United States to the “New Era” of the 1920s.

173 “Would Consolidate Governments of 5 Ohio Counties,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, November 18, 1931, 3. 174 “Armed Farmers Drive Workers From Highway,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 13, 1931, 1. 175 Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio During the Great Depression,” 17. 36

CHAPTER II. “A NEW DEAL FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE”: 1932-1933

With the Depression worsening, and Hoover’s continued refusal to use the federal government to provide direct relief, many Americans tried to envision anything, regardless of feasibility, that would bring economic recovery. These varied from ending Prohibition to publishing a silver dollar’s travels to advocating for a communist government. In this period of uncertainty, Franklin Roosevelt pledged a “new deal for the American people” and a path to the end of the Depression. 176 However, Hancock, Seneca, and Wood county newspaper editors, like

Hoover, argued against this “new deal” for its uncertainties and potential dangers. This chapter argues that these counties’ citizens, along with much of the nation, rejected this argument in favor of Roosevelt due to Hoover’s proven inability to end the Depression.

However, in early 1932, the Depression showed no signs its end was near. In Findlay,

where unemployment never reached 10 percent due to many factories running part-time, there

were still almost ten times as many people unemployed in early 1931 as all of 1930.177 Still,

Findlay’s main challenge was keeping its schools open. Since 1910, Findlay residents had paid

“only a comparatively small sum in taxes,” which resulted in “thousands of dollars less” in taxes

for its local government, including running schools.178 This lack of revenue resulted in all

Hancock County schools closing in April 1932, and as a result, over 1,600 children did not go to

school for the rest of the year.179 Findlay city leaders tried to pass an emergency levy of $3

million to keep the schools open, but it failed. While the schools did reopen the following year,

in 1935, they were again in danger of closing and needed another levy to remain open.

176 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 313. 177 Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio During the Great Depression,” 16. 178 “Taxes In Findlay,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, March 12, 1935, 4. 179 “Close Of School Terms Is Nearing,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, April 11, 1932, 6. 37

Supporters of the levy ran the campaign slogan “Good Schools or Empty Houses-Which?”180

The argument behind this was that if the schools closed again, many families would leave

Findlay for other communities that valued and financed their schools.181 The slogan worked, as the levy passed by almost 1,800 votes.182

A resident of Rudolph, a village in Wood County, also had problems with schools’ rising costs. He noted how from 1920 to 1930, the population of Wood County increased by 12 percent, and the percentage of children increased by 24 percent. However, the cost of schooling increased by 150 percent during that time. His solution was to lower the school levy to only one dollar per acre instead of its current two to two and a half dollars. In a chart, he showed the difference with the lower school levy for each school district, with the lowest and highest excess

$1.60 and $10.20 per acre, respectively, with an average of $5.70 per acre.183 He acknowledged the “direct responsibility of the state for the education of the children within its limits. Our school standards must be kept up, but not with the lifeblood of our farmers.”184 One county resident replied, “but who is the state?” regarding the responsibility of education.185 They continued, noting how Americans “are constantly accusing our state officials of fraud and graft and demanding that the governor appoint expensive investigating committees,” and questioned why they would want those same officials responsible for their children’s education.186 This reply, as one editorial mentioned, “touches upon one of the vital questions of the day, namely,

180 Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio During the Great Depression,” 37. 181 Ibid. 182 “School Levy Wins By Large Majority,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, March 20, 1935, 1. 183 “A Proposal to Relieve Taxes in Wood Co. Offered by Rudolph Man,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 6, 1932, 2. 184 Ibid. 185 “Liberty Township Taxpayer Writes About Taxation,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 15, 1932, 8. 186 Ibid. 38 shall our government be removed farther and farther from us or shall each community demand more latitude for self-government?”187

Nevertheless, many Northwest Ohio residents began to feel hopeless at the thought that the Depression might not end. An editorial in the Bowling Green State College’s Bee Gee News pointed out the irony of those unemployed celebrating Thanksgiving and how they were

“required by social custom to set aside a day to show thankfulness for their blessings.”188 It asked the rhetorical question, “how can Thanksgiving be properly observed by people laboring under these hardships?”189 Another editorial in the Advertiser-Tribune interpreted journalist John

T. Flynn’s analysis of how a “man out of work is a depression. A factory closed down is a depression. An industry working at a loss and without business is a still bigger depression.”190

With all of these forms of depressions, which existed before the stock market crash, when “a real check to national prosperity came, they [the forms of depression] helped spread the infection everywhere.”191 Despite the bleak outlook that both editorials provided, each also provided a silver lining to show that there was a way out, and people should still be thankful. The Bee Gee

News indicated that anyone suffering should “turn the pages of a history book” and see that their lives are not that bad, especially compared to the Pilgrims.192 The Advertiser-Tribune had a slightly different message: “that ultimately we all stand or fall together. Unless all are getting a share of prosperity, none of us is really safe.”193

Possible Solutions to the Depression

187 “But Who Is The State?,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 16, 1932, 2. 188 “Why Thanksgiving Day?,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, November 29, 1933, 2. 189 Ibid. 190 “What Depression Is,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 8, 1936, 8. 191 Ibid. 192 “Why Thanksgiving Day?” Bee Gee News student newspaper, 2. 193 “What Depression Is,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, 8. 39

That message of “we are all in this together” highlighted how many residents of

Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties felt about ending the Depression, that if they can work together, they can defeat the Depression and not require assistance from others. An advertisement in the Findlay Morning Republican called on farmers to spend more in local businesses, noting that both farmers and businesses are “dependent upon the other and unless both work in closest harmony they are certain to fall short of accomplishing the best results for each other.”194 The Sentinel-Tribune echoed this, stating that “if this were still a backwoods district like it was about a hundred years ago, no one would need think much about his neighbors’ welfare,” but during the Depression, “we all do have to consider all our neighbors.”195 Many farmers already actively helped their neighbors through the “country code.”

This “code” originated from Nellie Kedzie Jones in a series of articles in the Country Gentleman magazine from 1912 to 1916. The first rule, according to Jones, was that “borrowing and lending were good,” and was “‘neighborly,’ not ‘nervy.’”196 Through this “country code,” farmers created their neighborhoods based on “visiting, exchanging work, exchanging products, and sharing life events.”197

However, farmers also embraced the philosophy of “make it over, wear it out, make it do, or do without.”198 While many Americans adopted this philosophy during the Depression, farmers were the most prevalent at practicing it, using it as “a form of daily coping as a domestic survival mechanism.”199 Since their income coincided only with the selling of their crops, it became “an economic necessity, a rural tradition, and a custom valued by farm people” to “make

194 “Mr. Farmer: Think This Over,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, November 5, 1930, 3. 195 Editorial from Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 10, 1932, 2. 196 Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, Community, and the Foundations of Agrobusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 40. 197 Ibid., 44. 198 Ossian, The Depression Dilemmas of Rural Iowa, 59. 199 Ibid., 13. 40

do” with what they have.200 Farming communities were best suited to “make do” due to their

self-sufficiency and the ability to not rely on others for food or necessities.

For some, the problem was not with farmers but the rich. Former Ohio state senator

Thomas Latham suggested in a letter published in Collier’s Weekly that “if the women of Park

Avenue, New York, and the likes of them in other cities” only wore “more cotton stockings and

eat more bread and bologna and drink more beer it would help us farmers to reduce our

surplus.”201 Dr. Alvan Barach, a psychiatrist from New York City, noticed a “new form of

mental disease” that only affected rich people through how they “get a vague and reasonless

sense of guilt and they try to atone for it by spending less money.” 202203 Instead, Dr. Barach said

that “‘buy now’ campaigns must be directed” against them as their “senseless refusal to spend

what they easily could afford to spend holds up recovery and does no one any good.”204

The idea of a “buy now” campaign was something Findlay residents practiced, as some

believed the Depression “could be completely defeated on the local level by local action.”205

Findlay businesses would try many different approaches, from a “Buy in Findlay” campaign to

semi-annual “Dollar Days” and a “Hoarded Dollar.” The first two sought to draw people into

Findlay businesses with “values that will move swiftly.”206 However, the “Hoarded Dollar” was a slightly different approach to encouraging spending. It was a silver dollar, and if you came across this silver dollar in your spending, you were to put your name in a book and what you paid for with it. The idea was to “emphasize the importance of getting money into

200 Neth, Preserving the Family Farm, 30. 201 “Tom Suggests Depression Remedy,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August 28, 1931, 4. 202 “Senseless Economy,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, February 20, 1934, 8. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 205 Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio, During the Great Depression,” 16. 206 “It’s Dollar Day in Findlay Today,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, February 28, 1933, 1. 41

circulation.”207 The silver dollar’s daily travels were then published in the Findlay newspaper,

hoping to encourage spending further. The “Hoarded Dollar” campaign did not last very long,

with the last mention of its travels being only two weeks after it began.

Findlay residents, and many Americans in general, also turned toward religion in the

hope of an answer. In 1932, the First Presbyterian Church’s sermon asked if “Christ [is] Big

Enough to Solve Our Current Problems?”208 To one Kansas City store owner, the answer was

yes. He argued that if the community “put religion in business if you would kill this depression

[sic],” and that “only one thing can permanantely [sic] do away with it: the religion of Jesus.”209

For Dr. Ernest Tittle of the Garret Biblical Institute, Western civilization was “more gravely

imperiled today than at any time since the days of the Roman Empire.”210 The causes of this

were the Depression, “the constant presence of huge, expensive, and provocative armaments,”

and “a general breakdown in human morale,” with the solution being “a religion of faith and

courage, based on facts, not sentiment.”211

Many communities tried just about anything to help those suffering from the Depression.

The Wood County engineer, for example, used “men on road work for a couple of weeks and

then replacing them with others who have no work elsewhere,” which allowed “more men to

make some money for the support of themselves and families.”212 At Western Reserve

University in Cleveland, a lecture for those unemployed drew 700, well above the 50 people expected to attend to “justify itself.”213 Schools were one of the primary tools to try and help the

207 “‘Hoarded Dollar’ Soon to Begin Rounds in Findlay,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, March 29, 1932, 7. 208 Flemton, “Findlay, Ohio During the Great Depression,” 23. 209 “Business Man Urges Religion as Panacea,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, August 3, 1931, 2. 210 “Civilization Gravely Periled, Pastor Says,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 10, 1931, 4. 211 Ibid. 212 “Engineer Jones Plan,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 18, 1931, 3. 213 “Employing the Unemployed,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, May 10, 1932, 5. 42

unemployed by allowing them to enroll in classes “for advanced training” despite “severe

reductions in funds for regular services and increases in teacher load.”214 In Minneapolis, 500

men had enrolled in classes, and in San Francisco, the Fisherman’s Wharf’s superintendent ran a

class for unemployed fishermen.215

The rising unemployment concerned many Americans, and there were many possible

solutions proposed to end it. One Wood County resident suggested providing a person with

specific amounts of food. He argued “one day’s work a week should furnish the fundamentals if

carefully spent for the food requirements of a family of three,” with adjustments made if there

are more than three family members.216 The food provided was fifteen pounds of flour, ten pounds of cornmeal, four pounds of sausage and sugar, three pounds of lard, one pound of coffee

and milk, and a half-bag of potatoes, which came out to $1.78.217 This suggestion received much criticism, with one resident writing, “three jeers and Bronx cheer” for the suggestion.218 They

continued with how they hoped “this plan be tried first on Subscriber and his family,”

questioning how anyone on the plan “could find a liveable [sic] dwelling for twelve to fifteen

dollars per month, then there would be a question of fuel for heating and cooking and lights.”219

The responder continued to question the logistics of the plan and ended with, “American labor is

not illiterate nor blind…they do not want charity, nor do they want $1.78 cents worth of

groceries for 1 day a week,” but instead for “a fair wage paid in US currency and they will use

their own God-given brains to spend their money how and where they please.”220

214 “Schools Assist the Unemployed,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, July 29, 1932, 3. 215 Ibid. 216 “Suggests Method to Give Assistance to Unemployed,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 6, 1932, 2. 217 Ibid. 218 “Writes Answer to ‘Subscriber,’” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 9, 1932, 2. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid. 43

However, it was not only the unemployed that drew concern in Wood County. In a letter

to the Bee Gee News, the President, Dr. Homer Williams, wrote how the winter was “one of

hardships to this nation, as well as other nations of the world,” and how those who could “assist

the unfortunate through this winter, have unselfishly given time, money, effort, and love.”221

However, he was concerned about another neglected group: the “poor little squirrels of the

campus.”222 His concern stemmed from a drought last summer, which led to fewer nuts on trees.

His message was that “something ought to be done to relieve this condition, inasmuch as we are

all such humane people, and so repulsive to anything brutal, as allowing the squirrels to starve to

death.”223 He mentioned appealing to the Ohio State Appropriations Committee or the Ohio

House Finance Committee for funds to buy nuts for the squirrels and that the “dormitory

dietitians would be only too glad to take care of the distribution end.”224

To the rest of Americans, however, unemployment was a more pressing concern.

Nationally, the American Federation of Labor’s executive council, at a convention in Vancouver,

Canada, presented seven proposals for “permanent unemployment relief.”225 These ranged from

a five-day week to the guarantee of at least six months of work by employers. The council also

called for all employers to hire two more people and create a public works program. The reason

for these proposals was that “either we must make employment secure, or provide an income for

the unemployed,” which they estimated would hit 7 million over the coming winter.226 The

delegates would eventually vote on 50 different resolutions to end the Depression, ranging from

the five-day workweek, taxing the rich more, creating a public works program, and preventing

221 “Intercepted,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, March 24, 1931, 1. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 “Labor Offers Unemployment Relief Program,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 5, 1931, 2. 226 Ibid. 44

wage cuts. The most interesting proposal presented to the delegates was the legalization of beer

and priced at $2.75.227

The “experiment in trial and error, decidedly error” of Prohibition led many to begin to

think of using the sale of beer as a way to end the Depression.228 One Wall Street firm concluded that if they repealed Prohibition, it would “lift the price of all commodities (including cotton), reduce the tax burden, and give health and life to international trade.”229 By 1932, a Literary

Digest poll showed that 75 percent of Americans were for Prohibition’s repeal, with Kansas and

North Carolina the only two states opposed.230 Hoover, however, viewed using alcohol sales to

end the Depression as “illogical proposals.”231 His reason was that to repeal Prohibition would

require a constitutional amendment, which “in the light of the political lineup, is for practical

purposes a question completely beyond current possibility.”232 However, supporters for the

repeal argued it “would bring in millions of dollars in taxes…give employment to thousands,

stimulate numerous lines of business, and provide an outlet for surplus grain and grapes.”233

The Bonus March

World War I veterans were also advocating for the federal government to help with

economic recovery. For them, it involved the payment of their promised bonuses. In 1924,

Congress passed the Adjusted Compensation Act, which granted World War I veterans a bonus

certificate they could exchange in 1945 for between $1,000 and $1,600, depending on how long

and where they served, or their families could if the veteran died before 1945.234 As the

227 “Five-Point Plan is Presented to Labor Convention,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, October 7, 1931, 1. 228 Rauchway, Winter War, 145. 229 “Wall Street Firm Declares Dry Law Causes Depression,” August 15, 1931, 2. 230 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 240. 231 “Beer Proposal is Illogical, Hoover View,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 8, 1931, 1. 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid. 234 Stephen R. Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era, (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 27. 45

Depression worsened, veterans began to increase their calls for the federal government to grant

them their full bonus. A significant reason for this was the differences between the two major

veteran organizations, the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and how

to help unemployed veterans. The American Legion sought to use its middle-class and elite members to provide, as the American Legion chairman said, the “contact necessary between the veteran out of a job and the man who has a job.”235 The VFW, however, sought to convince

Hoover and Congress that federal assistance was necessary to help veterans. In a letter to

Hoover, the VFW’s national commander wrote how veterans were “shuffling along the streets of

our cities, thinly-clad and hunger-driven, in futile search for employment and a chance to exist in

the country for which they fought and were willing to die for.”236 For the VFW, this included endorsing the Patman Bill, named for Texas congressman Wright Patman, which called for the immediate payment of the veterans’ bonus.237 However, these efforts did not persuade Hoover to offer federal assistance to veterans. For him, the financial impact of the veterans’ bonus on the federal government, with the Patman Bill requiring $2.2 billion in federal spending, was too much for them to accept, and that “the American government can carry no additional burden of expenditure without grave risks.”238 One reason why Hoover advocated against the bill was the

belief that the federal budget should remain balanced, and if the bill were to be passed, then

drastic cuts would be required to keep its balance.

Veterans, though, still called for their bonus and began to march to Washington D.C. to

demand it. In the summer of 1932, they began marching, with approximately 40,000 in

235 Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill, 33. 236 Ibid., 34. 237 Ibid., 35. 238 “Hoover Warns Against Demands for Bonus; Ignores “Beer” Cries,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 21, 1931, 1. 46

Washington by the end of June.239 Named the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF), they quickly

raised concerns within the military and the Hoover administration that it was “a dangerous

gathering of Communists and criminals that threatened the security of the nation’s capital.”240

There was some evidence to support this, as communists from the Worker’s Ex-Servicemen

League were in the BEF. However, their recruiting efforts were mostly in vain, as some veterans

even forced them to leave the camps.241 After the Patman Bill failed on June 17, more than 5,000

veterans left Washington and returned home. However, there was still a large force of veterans

and communists in the capital, and Hoover began to consider how he could force them to leave.

He eventually settled on the army being deployed to remove them as the Washington police chief

stated that “the clearing out of marchers forcibly cannot legally be done by Washington

police.”242 After two veterans were killed in a skirmish with police, Hoover ordered the army to

remove the remaining veterans from the capital under Douglas MacArthur’s command.

MacArthur ordered the soldiers “to drive the veterans out of all of their encampments,” which

resulted in them leaving Washington but also an outcry from many Americans at their treatment.

For many Americans, the feeling of outrage at their treatment is demonstrated in World

War I veteran Lawrence Pugh’s letter to Hoover. In his letter, he wrote that the veterans marched

due to “the failure of the leaders of this country in furnishing relief” and that “clubbing these

men, women, and children from Washington will not remove the cause of their pilgrimage.”243

However, within the three Ohio counties, there was a different feeling. A Sentinel-Tribune editorial reminded its readers that the veterans “were self-imposed guests of the government, that

239 Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill, 49. 240 Ibid., 57. 241 Ibid., 49. 242 “Police Won’t Oust Marchers,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 27, 1932, 1. 243 Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus Army and GI Bill, 57. 47

they had been allowed to occupy the buildings,” that “the men had been fed at public expense,

and that the government had provided means to send them home.”244 The editorial also mentions how “we are witnessing today just such action as that which soldiers of the Revolution threatened to exact from the Continental Congress.”245 It ended with the employed citizens’

responsibility to “share their incomes with others, either by gifts or employment,” as “men out of

work are likely to become desperate.”246

The Bonus March signifies two powerful feelings of Americans at the time. One is that

they would take drastic steps as they sought to rise out of the Depression. The second is the fear

of communism and a potential communist uprising amid economic and social strife. Following

the Russian Revolution in 1917 that saw the Bolsheviks take control and create the Soviet Union,

there was fear that the same could happen in the United States, especially with the rise of more

radical labor groups and “farmer-controlled political organizations” in the Midwest.247 The rise of the Farmer-Labor Party, the Farmers’ Union, the American Society of Equity, the Industrial

Workers of the World (IWW), and others, while not communist or espousing communist rhetoric, were seen as dangerous organizations by many Americans.248 Their fear stemmed from

the idea that if a figure like Lenin emerged, they could unite and further radicalize them.

There was some rationale for American leaders to fear a potential communist uprising. In

Otter Tail County, Minnesota, a county with strong similarities to Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

in its economy and ethnic makeup, the Communist party was relatively active, holding a summer

camp throughout the 1930s with about seventy children from the county participating one

244 “Rioting In National Capital,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 29, 1932, 2. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 Neth, Preserving the Family Farm, 105. 248 Ibid., 105-106. 48

summer.249 However, the party never attempted any radical takeover, advocating instead for

“support for unemployment insurance and a farm-relief bill, a relief program based on need, and a protest against appropriations for defense.”250 The persistence of that fear, however, remained

very much with Americans. The Sentinel-Tribune ran an editorial of a potential communist plot

in Michigan to “wreck banks in a number of cities through propaganda.”251 According to the editorial, their objective was to “destroy confidence of the public in their banks…based on the theory that failures serve to create more impoverished people and therefore more who are dissatisfied with the existing order of things,” and willing to join the Communists.252

Within Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, there was no distinguishable Communist

Party during the Depression. When the news of the plot in Michigan broke, the Sentinel-Tribune referred to the typical communist as a “hair-brained individual” and that “they deserve the contempt of all thinking citizens; they deserve whipping and imprisonment, even death.”253

However, there was an active Communist Party in Toledo that would travel south to the counties

to gain membership. When they arrived, they were given a “short shift,” with one farmer

commenting that “we were still civilized even if we was poor [sic].”254

The 1932 Election

With a rising fear of what the future held and how to end the Depression, Americans

became embroiled in the 1932 presidential election between Democratic nominee Franklin

Roosevelt and President Herbert Hoover. Before Roosevelt could face Hoover, however, he

needed to secure the nomination. Roosevelt entered the Democratic convention, held in late June

249 D. Jerome Tweton, The New Deal at the Grass Roots: Programs for the People in Otter Tail County, Minnesota, (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1988), 30. 250 Ibid. 251 “Plot to Injure Banks,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 28, 1932, 2. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Interview with Ivan Myer, unknown interviewer, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 235. 49

and early July 1932 in Chicago with a substantial lead in delegates. Of the 1,154 delegates

available, Roosevelt held more than 600, with the majority from southern and western states that

had supported William Jennings Bryan and his Populist campaign.255

Initially, Ohio’s delegation did not support Roosevelt, instead favoring their “favorite

son” Governor George White. When an Ohio delegate who supported Roosevelt asked the

governor to drop out and support Roosevelt, he refused, saying he would “pay no attention to the

telegram.”256 Ohio’s delegates further rejected Roosevelt over his efforts to remove the two-

thirds rule, which stated the Democratic nominee must secure two-thirds of the delegates,

something he called “undemocratic.”257 His opposition stemmed from, as former Speaker Champ

Clark wrote in his memoirs, it being “a device of the pro-slavery propagandists to enable them to

nominate Democratic candidates for the presidency in whom they could trust.”258 However, with little support for it, especially from southern delegates, as Senator John Williams from

Mississippi called the rule “the South’s defense” and “it would be idiotic on her part to surrender it,” Roosevelt stopped the fight over its removal.259 The Ohio delegation determined that if

Roosevelt brought the rule to a vote on the convention floor, they would vote against its

removal.260

As Roosevelt was the front-runner, his ability to leverage the vice presidency ultimately

secure Roosevelt the nomination. Speaker of the House John Garner, with his 101.5 delegates

from Texas and California, proved to be the key by agreeing to become Roosevelt’s vice

president and secured him the nomination.261 Roosevelt then made the unprecedented journey to

255 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 3-4. 256 “White Refuses to Give Support to Roosevelt,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 27, 1932, 1. 257 “Roosevelt Drops Fight to Change Two-Thirds Rule,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 27, 1932, 1. 258 Ibid., 188-189. 259 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 196. 260 “Ohio Delegation Opposes Roosevelt on Rule Abrogation,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, June 27, 1932, 3. 261 “Speaker Garner Named for Vice Presidency,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, July 2, 1932, 1. 50

Chicago to accept the nomination. Traditionally, the nominee accepted the nomination in their hometown a few weeks after the convention. Roosevelt chose not only to abandon this and travel to Chicago, but he chose to fly there.262 Once he arrived at the convention, Roosevelt began his acceptance speech by calling for the Democratic Party to “break foolish traditions and leave it to the Republican leadership, far more skilled in that art, to break promises.”263 He continued with how “the people of this country want a genuine choice this year, not a choice between two names for the same reactionary doctrine,” and how the Democrats must “be a party of liberal thought, of planned action, of enlightened international outlook, and of the greatest good to the greatest number of our citizens.”264 He ended his speech stating that Americans “cherish the hope that their old standards of living and of thought have not gone forever,” and to accomplish this, “I pledge myself to a new deal for the American people…give me your help, not to win votes alone, but to win in this crusade to restore America to its own people.”265

On the campaign trail, Roosevelt sought to highlight Hoover’s failure to end the

Depression and help Americans prosper. In his acceptance speech, Roosevelt noted how

“Republican leaders,” namely Hoover, “have failed in national vision, because in disaster they have held out no hope, they have pointed no path for the people below to climb back to places of security and of safety.”266 Roosevelt continued to increase his attacks on Hoover, culminating with him calling him a “veritable cancer in the body politic and economic.”267 Roosevelt’s main criticism of Hoover centered on his view of the federal government’s role in relief efforts. For

Hoover, while he did believe that the federal government was necessary to improve the nation,

262 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 295. 263 Ibid., 311. 264 Ibid., 312. 265 Ibid., 313. 266 Ibid., 312. 267 Hiltzik, The New Deal, 5. 51

he believed it should only work by “coordinating (and occasionally financing) the organization

of those interested in collective self-help.”268 His reason for this was that if the federal

government inherited too much power, it “would threaten liberty by regimenting and dominating

the country’s economic life.”269

Locally, there was some criticism of Hoover’s inability to lead an economic recovery.

The Bee Gee News ran a poem entitled “A New Psalmist.” In it, the author describes how

“Hoover is my Sheperd [sic].”270 It continues with how “he maketh me to lie down on parq [sic]

benches; he leadeath me beside the still factories,” and “he leadeth me in the paths of destruction

for his party’s sake.” The poem ends that “surely employment and poverty will follow me all the

days of your administration. And I will dwell in a mortgaged [sic] house forever.” One former

resident also recalled how, while “people didn’t blame the President for everything,” they still

felt that if they had “gotten a Democratic President, he wouldn’t let us get in this slump.”271

However, most Hancock, Seneca, and Wood County newspapers did not criticize

Hoover. Instead, they turned their attention on Roosevelt and the logistics of his “new deal.” A

Sentinel-Tribune editorial stated that the “generalities in which he indulged in his recent review of his party’s platform are not convincing” and “it is easy to say that a thing ought to be done; what the people would like to know is how it may be done.”272 Because of this lack of specifics,

many newspaper editorials questioned, “why should we swap horses in the middle of the stream,

at a time when the tide is turning and prosperity may be just around the corner?” and instead of

accepting Roosevelt’s slogan of a “new deal,” citizens should support “A Fair Deal for President

268 Phillips, This Land, This Nation, 46-47. 269 Ibid. 270 “A New Psalmist,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, March 22, 1936, 6. 271 Interview with Phyllis Reese, by Jeanne M. Biesiada, October 18, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 271. 272 “Roosevelt’s Coming Speech,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, August 3, 1932, 2. 52

Hoover.”273 Another editorial quoted college football coach Fielding Yost, who urged Americans to “not substitute the quarterback who has led us within scoring distance.”274 It continued with how Hoover had “marshalled his team, outlined his strategy and started his players down the field toward the goal.”275 However, now that Hoover almost has a touchdown, “there is a discordant cry from the bleachers for a new quarterback,” someone they describe as someone who “looks well in his uniform and takes a fetching photograph.” The editorial ends by urging its readers to “leave the winning veteran Hoover on the field and make certain that the touchdown will be scored.”276 These editorials all address a common criticism of Roosevelt that he was “so devoid of substance and full of ‘sunny generalities’ that at the time of his inauguration his ‘plans remained largely unknown to the public.’”277

However, Northwest Ohio residents knew what Hoover’s plan was, as an editorial from the Fostoria Daily Review outlined. It stated how Hoover was battling “the greatest peace-time economic problems that have confronted the United States in its 150 years of history” and had successfully “set in motion the machinery to restore normal prosperity and provide employment.”278 It listed seven of Hoover’s achievements, from calling for shorter workweeks to working with labor and businesses to limiting immigration and saving American jobs. The editorial also included a letter addressed to “Mr. Workingman.” The letter mentions how “Mr.

Workingman” is “an American breadwinner,” and their real need is “a job—not a dole!”279 The letter warns them not to be “fooled by Democratic promises of prosperity under their plan of a

273 “Why Need We Fear,” Tiffin Daily Tribune newspaper, July 28, 1932, 4. 274 “Don’t Change the Quarterback, Says Yost,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, Fostoria, Ohio, November 5, 1932, 4. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid. 277 Rauchway, Winter War, 14-15. 278 “A Message to The Workingman,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, November 2, 1932, 5. 279 Ibid. 53

lowered tariff,” stating that it is “only a form of political bait,” and its implementation would

result in them being on “a scale of living equal to the coolie labor of China and Japan, or the

lower wages of the rest of the world.”280 The letter ends with the slogan “KEEP HOOVER on

the Job and KEEP YOUR JOB.”281 Another editorial from the Fostoria Daily Review warned its

readers of “a base falsehood” of the Democratic slogan “It Couldn’t Be Worse” and how “IT

COULD STILL BE WORSE” by electing Roosevelt, whom it referred to as a “demagogue” and

someone who “cries out for Revolution.” 282 It ends with its new slogan: “DON’T GAMBLE

WITH THE DESTINY OF YOUR NATION.”283

These editorials reflected Hoover’s messages from the campaign trail. To him, “the rest

of the world turned to recovery in July, 1932, and only the United States marched in the opposite

direction.”284 Only through Roosevelt’s promise of his “new deal,” something Hoover believed

was, as he called it, the “fumes of the witch’s cauldron which boiled in Russia,” did the United

States not recover and return to the “New Era.”285 Hoover believed that Roosevelt was such a threat that his election “would destroy the very foundations of the American system of life.”286 In

a speech in Madison Square Garden, Hoover decried Roosevelt and his “new deal” as something

that would “directly undermine the American system,” and “not a change that comes from

normal development,” but from a desire “to alter to whole foundations of our national life.”287

Newspaper editors in Northwest Ohio also began to use a metaphor comparing the two

candidates to doctors. As a Sentinel-Tribune editorial stated, Americans would rather “stand by

280 “A Message to The Workingman,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, 5. 281 Ibid. 282 “The Tide Has Turned,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, October 31, 1932, 8. 283 Ibid. 284 Hiltzik, The New Deal, 10. 285 Rauchway, Winter War, 10. 286 Ibid., 11. 287 Ibid., 41-42. 54

the same old doctor who, although they have been very sick, has pulled them through months of

illness and now has them on the road to recovery” instead of turning to a doctor who “doesn’t

seem to understand our case so well.”288 A Fostoria Daily Review editorial continued the

metaphor, as Roosevelt and his “new deal” was nothing more than a collection of “vague

remedies supposed to cure all economic ills” spread by “a flying squad of calamity crying spell

binders…preaching a doctrine of despair and disorder.”289 However, Roosevelt saw these “vague

remedies” as a positive, stating that “the country demands bold, persistent experimentation,” and

“it is common sense to take a method and try it: if it fails, admit frankly and try another. But

above all, try something.”290 To these newspaper editors, there was no need to “try something,”

as there was “evidences of recovery on every hand” under Hoover, and “it is inconceivable that

the voters would risk a change of leadership at the coming election.”291

There was another argument that editors used to convince their readers not to reject

Hoover. Though they viewed recovery as near, there was concern about the inauguration date if

Roosevelt was elected. Their argument rested on how Roosevelt would not take office until

March 4, and it would still take “many, many months of tiresome wrangling in Congress before the country could know what was going to be done.”292 The editorial then asks, “what would you

do? You’d sit twaddling [sic] your thumbs and wondering what was going to happen.”293

However, if Hoover was reelected, “we all know that certain things, at least, will happen,” that

he would continue his policies with no break, and Americans and businesses would not have to

wait and see if Roosevelt can bring relief.294

288 “Roosevelt’s Coming Speech,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, August 3, 1932, 2. 289 “November 8—The Day of Great Decision,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, November 7, 1932, 4. 290 Alter, The Defining Moment, 92-93. 291 “A Record of Performance,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, November 7, 1932, 4. 292 “What Would You Do?” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, October 29, 1932, 2. 293 Ibid. 294 Ibid. 55

As the election approached, the strategy appeared to have worked, as Hoover seemed to

be gaining momentum both locally and nationally. The two main reasons the editors pointed to

were the “growing evidence of slowly returning industrial activity” and Roosevelt offering

“nothing more than empty promises.”295 At Bowling Green State College, Hoover won a straw

poll with 219 votes out of 500 votes from faculty members and students. The socialist candidate

Norman Thomas was second with 132 votes, while Roosevelt received only 121 votes.296 A

Cincinnati Enquirer straw poll further showed Hoover’s supposed growing support in Ohio, as over fifteen days, he gained 18 percent more votes, while Roosevelt, while still leading in the state, lost about nine percent of his votes.297 The Sentinel-Tribune determined that Hoover would

win Ohio by a little more than two percent if the trend continued. They urged their readers to be

conscious of the possibility “that the Ohio vote may determine who shall be the next president of

the United States,” and Wood County may decide Ohio.298

However, Hoover’s momentum did not result in a victory. Instead, all three counties

supported the landslide victory for Franklin Roosevelt, as he won forty-two states, including

Ohio, and the popular vote by almost 18 percent, 57.4 to 39.7.299 Roosevelt won Hancock

County by almost 6,700 votes, and the Democratic candidates for governor, representative, and

senator were also victorious. However, Roosevelt lost Findlay by around 150 votes.300 This was

even more exaggerated in Bowling Green, where Roosevelt lost by almost 1,000 votes while he

won the county by about 750 votes.301 Like in Hancock County, the other Democratic candidates

295 “Wood County Assert Republicans Support for Hoover,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, October 28, 1932, 1. 296 “Herbert Hoover Elected in B.G. Straw Vote by Large Majority,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, October 25, 1932, 1. 297 “Hoover’s Rapid Ohio Gain,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 7, 1932, 2. 298 Ibid. 299 Alter, The Defining Moment, 134. 300 “Election Results,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, November 9, 1932, 2. 301 “Election Results,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 9, 1932, 8. 56

performed well, with all but four county offices filled by Democrats.302 Seneca County’s

newspapers did not provide a breakdown by precinct but based on Roosevelt carrying the county

by over 2,700 votes; if he did lose Tiffin, it was likely by a small margin. The other Democratic

candidates also performed strongly in Seneca County, with Governor White winning by almost

4,500 votes.303 Roosevelt’s ability to win these counties without their major urban areas indicates where most of his support laid: farmers and rural residents. These residents did not get to

participate in the “New Era” of the 1920s, and with the onset of the Depression, they likely felt

they were not going to get to participate anytime soon. Therefore, during the 1932 election, they

rejected Hoover and the newspaper editors’ criticism of Roosevelt and his “new deal” and

supported him because of the potential Roosevelt held for them to enjoy in the nation’s

prosperity.

Americans’ Hope for Roosevelt

After the election, the focus turned to help Roosevelt, and the nation, end the Depression.

A Sentinel-Tribune editorial from Election Day noted that the “one big task of the American

people now is to support the administration in its efforts to overcome what remains of the

depression” and that “we Americans must all stick together, regardless of who is our next

president, or our individual sticks will be broken.”304 An advertisement from the First National

Bank in Fostoria called for readers to see “how we can sell more merchandise, use more

materials, put more men to work” and help all the unemployed and suffering in the “greatest

market in the world.”305

302 “Democrats Sweep all but Four Offices in Wood County,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 9, 1932, 1. 303 “Here are Totals of County Vote,” Tiffin Daily Tribune newspaper, November 9, 1932, 1. 304 “All Over But The Shouting,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 8, 1932, 2. 305 Advertisement from the First National Bank, Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, November 9, 1932, 3. 57

Roosevelt’s inauguration speech further echoed this, as a Findlay Morning Republican

editorial noted how it inspired “the entire country with his inspiring call to arms in construction

with the war against the economic and financial unsettlement.”306 An Advertiser-Tribune editorial also commented how it helped to “satisfy and reassure the nation that a steady hand is at the helm of our ship of state” and that Congress should not try and bicker over issues, but instead, “speedy action by the new Congress should clear the atmosphere as well as the course to recovery.”307 The Sentinel-Tribune spoke on Congress’s responsibility, and that because of the

Depression and Roosevelt’s landslide victory, “the people of the United States will demand that

he be given whatever authority he requires to exercise to bring order out of the chaos.”308

Another Findlay Morning Republican editorial chastised those who believed “that a few years hence we will look back and long for the ‘good times’ we had in 1932 and 1933.”309 It responded

with how “it takes time to bring about a recovery of ‘normalcy,’ whatever that term may now

mean,” and yet they were still “optimistic enough to believe there will be an upward

tendency.”310 One reason for the optimism was the hope that there was finally a path to victory

over the Depression. As a Risingsun Unique Weekly editorial put it, “no one man can return this country to prosperity but all of us together can banish this old depression in a short time if we set our minds to that end.”311 To accomplish this, “merchants should show their faith” in the New

Deal, and that “people are in an attitude of buying and with the proper incentives and a little

encouragement of optimism we are sure will start the whole machine to moving.”312

306 “A Heartening Message,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, March 6, 1933, 4. 307 “A Steady Hand At The Helm,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, March 6, 1933, 6. 308 “The President’s Address,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, March 6, 1933, 2. 309 “Beginning Of A New Administration,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, March 6, 1933, 4. 310 Ibid. 311 “The Time Is Here For Everyone to Work For Prosperity’s Return,” Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, March 9, 1933, 1. 312 Ibid. 58

After the election, the citizens of Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties had renewed hope that they could see a return to the “New Era” under Roosevelt. However, between

November 7, 1932, and March 4, 1933, the Depression continued to ravage the nation and its core institutions, specifically its financial institutions. With the New Deal, Roosevelt assured the nation that their faith in him was warranted and that not only could he handle these crises, but that he could return the nation to the “New Era” of the 1920s.

CHAPTER III. ROOSEVELT’S NEW DEAL: 1933-1935

In Roosevelt’s inauguration speech, he famously stated that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”313 However, as the Depression continued to worsen through the winter with the banking crises, many Americans, including those in Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, feared the Depression would never end. Once Roosevelt took office, in his first hundred days, he immediately began to implement the New Deal and create programs that sought to end the

Depression and restore Americans’ faith in economic recovery. This chapter argues that based on voting behavior and media analysis, Hancock, Seneca, and Wood County citizens initially viewed the New Deal as valuable and capable of ending the Depression.

During the winter of 1932-1933, the nations’ banks came under incredible stress. Banks had already been struggling since the Depression began, with approximately 2,300 failing in

1931 alone. A significant reason for this was the “American frontier ethos” that “every small town must have its own saloon and bank, even if it couldn’t afford a general store.”314 To halt the banking failures, Congress created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), with $3 billion to keep banks open.315 However, it could not prevent more banks from closing, and in

1932, only the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont did not have a bank fail.316 The financial situation continued to worsen to where in early February 1933, the Treasury

Department estimated that approximately 10 to 15 million dollars were leaving the nation’s banks daily, “disappearing wherever people felt it would be safe—into luggage, under mattresses, behind radiators.”317 These numbers actually relieved Hoover some, as he felt they

313 Alter, The Defining Moment, 339. 314 Ibid., 76. 315 Hiltzik, The New Deal, 13. 316 Editorial from Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, February 16, 1933, 1. 317 Rauchway, Winter War, 209. 60

“might be even worse” and gave him some hope that “things may remain as they are for the next four weeks. If they do, if there is no crash, then we will be out and the other fellows will have the responsibility.”318

This statement reflected Hoover’s belief in the nature of the banking crisis and his relationship with Roosevelt. In late 1932, some Americans suggested Hoover appoint Roosevelt to a cabinet position, then resign and allow Roosevelt to assume the federal government’s powers and potentially end the Depression sooner. However, a Tiffin Daily Advertiser editorial noted “it is contrary to all precedent” and “little if anything could be accomplished.”319 Hoover also thought the idea “silly” and remained committed to finishing his term.320 Instead, Hoover sought to convince Roosevelt not to pursue his “new deal” but to remain within the federal government’s traditional confines regarding the economy and relief. Hoover encouraged

Roosevelt to walk back his platform due to the danger he felt it posed to the United States. By urging Roosevelt to abandon these policies, knowing Roosevelt would refuse, Hoover also began to craft a narrative for Republicans, of the “foolish New Dealer” who refused to listen to the warnings, and when it failed, they could position themselves as the party that warned the nation.

If the nation refused to listen, Hoover and Republicans could use that to return to the presidency.321 Hoover’s attempt to force Roosevelt to abandon the New Deal would continue up until Roosevelt took office. Hoover believed that Roosevelt was “the only man who has the power to give assurances which will stabilize the public mind.”322 Hoover also pressured

318 Rauchway, Winter War, 209. 319 “No Hoover Resignation,” Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, November 10, 1932, 4. 320 Rauchway, Winter War, 64-65. 321 Ibid., 12-13. 322 Ibid., 216. 61

Roosevelt to tell the nation he would not leave the gold standard, the budget would

“unquestionably be balanced,” and he would not publish the names who received RFC loans.323

The gold standard was one of many disagreements between Hoover and Roosevelt. Since the 1880s, gold had been used, as journalist Michael Hiltzik stated, “as the pillar of the international trading system,” as it established a set rate for both paper currency and government funds.324 After World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, however, the gold standard became unstable as some nations tried to pay off their debts and reparations through gold, and there became growing calls for the United States to leave the gold standard. There had always been fierce resistance to the gold standard amongst farmers, marked by their fervent support for

William Jennings Bryan and his proposal of “bimetallism,” or using both gold and silver.325 This opposition only grew as the Depression worsened, as Hoover’s stubborn insistence on remaining on the gold standard contributed to deflation and farmers suffering the most. Hoover’s refusal also contributed to the banking crisis, as Americans wanted the gold in the banks for fear that all paper currency would soon be worthless.326

The Banking Crisis of 1933

Hoover and Roosevelt’s relationship continued to deteriorate when news began to reach

Washington that Detroit’s banks were on the verge of collapse. At the most significant risk of collapse was the Union Guardian Group, already in need of help once as it had received a $15 million loan in July 1932. However, with approximately $3 million being withdrawn weekly, it now needed another $50 million to remain open.327 Hoover tried to convince Henry Ford,

323 Alter, The Defining Moment, 179. 324 Hiltzik, The New Deal, 138. 325 Ibid., 138-139. 326 Ibid., 139-140. 327 Ibid., 14. 62

already heavily invested in the bank, to offer his $7.5 million in deposits as a loan along with a

loan from the RFC. However, Ford responded with an ultimatum: not only would he not give a

loan to the bank, but if it failed, he would withdraw the $25 million he had in the First National

Bank, the second-largest bank in Detroit. Ford reasoned that a crash was the only way to purge the nation of its broken banks, telling two members of Hoover’s administration to “let the crash come, it had to come.”328 Leaders in both Washington and Michigan were stunned and forced

Governor William Comstock to call a statewide bank holiday to begin to reorganize the 550

Detroit banks and their holdings of $1.5 billion from 900,000 depositors into one bank.329

About ten days later, most banks within Michigan were reopened, with only those in

Detroit being reorganized and a few banks which remained closed “until the status of their deposits in Detroit banks was established.”330 However, the crisis and the fear it had created had spread, with Arkansas, Indiana, and Oklahoma’s banks all closed by their governors to prevent a rush of panic.331 In Ohio, Governor George White stated that “there will not be a bank holiday”

after rumors circulated that he was considering one.332 However, Ohio did pass a law allowing

banks to limit withdrawals to five percent, as officials feared “if they opened normally the next

day, the state’s banking system could fall apart.”333 Banks in Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland,

Columbus, Dayton, and Youngstown all limited withdrawals.334 Locally, the banks tried to

present a message of preemptive caution and that there was no reason to fear. Both Hancock and

Seneca County banks announced that while there would be restrictions on withdrawals, it was

“not due to local conditions but is entirely the result of developments in surrounding states and

328 Rauchway, Winter War, 211-212. 329 Badger, The New Deal, 69. 330 “Practically All Michigan Banks Operating Again,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 23, 1933, 1. 331 Badger, The New Deal, 69. 332 “White Denies Report Holiday Contemplated,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 25, 1933, 1. 333 Rauchway, Winter War, 219. 334 “Restrictions On Bank Withdrawals Spread Over State,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 28, 1933, 1. 63 communities.”335 In Bellevue, the banks there stated that “by keeping our heads and working together for the common good we can avoid a situation that would be painful and damaging to all.”336 Wood County banks and their citizens were not so lucky to be able to take preemptive measures. During the 1930s, banks in Bowling Green, North Baltimore, Pemberville, Risingsun, and Rudolph all failed.337 However, while the rest of the nation was worried about their banks closing, Pemberville was able to celebrate the reopening of the Citizens Savings Bank, and by the end of the day, “the faith which Pemberville has in its bank is clearly shown” as “deposits

Saturday were ten times the amount of that checked out.”338

Banks were not the only institution at risk of closing in Wood County, however. Due to the Depression, Ohio faced a financial crisis and was forced to slash its budget drastically. One measure proposed to save money was the closure of its universities and colleges, like Bowling

Green State College. The argument behind this was that the state could save approximately $4 million, and estimates suggested that “less than 50 percent of the students now enrolled will be able to return because of existing financial conditions.”339 However, the state finance committee gave “no serious consideration” to the proposal.340 Bowling Green State College was also suffering from the Depression, as it canceled the 1933 Key yearbook because of the 675 initial subscribers; only a third had paid the three dollar fee for it.341

Another proposal sparked greater fear within the college’s faculty, staff, and greater

Bowling Green community about its future. This proposal called for one of Ohio’s teaching

335 “Outside Pressure Restriction Cause,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, February 28, 1933, 1. 336 “Calmness, Co-operation The Need Of The Hour,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, February 28, 1933, 1. 337 Interview with Max Shaffer, by Joseph Arpad, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 319. 338 “Pemberville Celebrates Bank Re-Opening Sat.,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, Perrysburg, Ohio, March 3, 1933, 1. 339 “Would Close State Schools As Saving,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, March 8, 1933, 3. 340 “Will Not Close B.G. Summer School Terms,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 26, 1933, 1. 341 “Mr. Lackey Announces Abandonment Of ‘Key’,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, March 22, 1933, 1. 64 schools, Ohio University, Miami University, Kent State College, or Bowling Green State

College, to “be turned into a welfare institution,” with the argument behind it that Ohio’s existing institutions had “conditions that are shocking to the minds of normal persons,” and converting one of these universities would help relieve some stress on the system.342 When this proposal was announced, there was an outpouring of support for the college to remain open. An editorial from Sentinel-Tribune discussed the college’s economic impact on Bowling Green due to a scholarship contest. An estimated 1,500 people participated, and “those visitors ate,” which benefited not only the restaurants but the butchers and farmers who gave the restaurant the food.343 The college was also a significant employer in the area, with faculty, administration staff, and others. The community also began to plan a campaign to save the college. Called the

Northwestern Ohio Educational Protective association, it consisted of twenty men. It had almost twenty committees, ranging from Bowling Green State College alumni, faculty, and students, to local newspapers and radio, the American Legion, churches, farmers organizations, medical and legal associations, and others.344 The college’s students had their organization, the Student

Protest Committee. It sent a letter to Governor White which reflected “the unanimous opinion of the students” and urged him and other lawmakers not to pass the resolution.345

Banking Reform in the New Deal

By the time of Roosevelt’s inauguration, the nation was gripped with fear about its future, as the New York Stock Exchange had suspended trade, and 34 out of 48 states had “no economic pulse,” as all their banks were closed for a bank holiday.346 Once his inauguration was over,

342 “Use Of College May Be Changed,” Toledo Blade newspaper, April 28, 1933, 1-2. 343 “Scholarship Contest,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, May 9, 1933, 2. 344 “College Friends Are Organized To Fight For The Institution,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, May 10, 1933, 1-2. 345 “Students Rally To Support Of College,” Bee Gee News student newspaper, May 17, 1933, 1. 346 Alter, The Defining Moment, 2. 65

Roosevelt began working to halt the panic over the nation’s banking system. On March 6, he

ordered a four-day national banking holiday, which prohibited banks from distributing funds.

During the holiday, Treasury Secretary William Woodin had the authority to allow some banks

to begin payments, issue clearing house certificates for financial institutions, and have banks

create a separate fund for deposits that could be removed during the holiday.347 The holiday

allowed Roosevelt and the Treasury Department to review the nations’ banks and divide them

into three categories. The first category consisted of banks that were able to reopen immediately,

while the second group needed some help to reopen, and the third was of such poor status that

they were denied reopening until they were reorganized.348 Locally, Roosevelt was praised for the bank holiday. A Findlay Morning Republican editorial compared him to a surgeon using anesthesia in that they use local anesthesia for minor surgery, while a more major surgery requires general anesthesia. With “local operation having proved of no avail,” Roosevelt turned to general anesthesia, and, “once the source of trouble is removed, and the patient recovers from the shock, we should rapidly recover.”349

Roosevelt and Congress also worked to craft legislation to ensure that the American financial system was finally rid of banking panics, signified by the Glass-Steagall Act’s passage.

It had two main components, the first that banks were required to separate their commercial and

investment funds, which prevented banks from conducting “hasty and ill-judged speculation in

stocks and bonds.”350 The second element was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(FDIC) and the idea of deposit insurance. Roosevelt was opposed to deposit insurance, believing

347 “These Are Orders For Bank Holiday,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, March 6, 1933, 1. 348 Alter, The Defining Moment, 229-230. 349 “President Roosevelt Gives Promised Action,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, March 8, 1933, 4. 350 Hiltzik, The New Deal, 92. 66

that, as he told his vice president John Garner, “the weak banks will pull down the strong.”351

However, more rural politicians and bankers wanted it as protection against larger banks, and

eventually, Roosevelt relented and agreed to sign the bill with it in. It initially protected only

$2,500 in deposits but rose to $5,000 by mid-1934.352 The Glass-Steagall Act successfully re-

established stability in the nation’s banks, as there was a sharp decline in bank failures, with

fewest failing in Roosevelt’s two years compared to any previous administration, and in 1936, no

banks failed for the first time in over fifty years.353

The Glass-Steagall Act also attempted to address a significant criticism of the nation’s banking system. Glass-Steagall attempted to address this with the FDIC, as banks certified by it had to agree to inspections by it. However, there was still significant pushback from Western and

Southern politicians, who, according to historian Anthony Badger, “wanted neither to see their state banks put under control of a New York-dominated Federal Reserve, nor their single unit banks to compete with the branches of giant national banks,” which resulted in the Act keeping the current system.354

The New Deal and Economic Theory

Ultimately, the New Deal’s main goal was to enable the nation’s economy to recover and

return to the “New Era.” To understand how the New Deal was to accomplish this, an analysis of

the leading economic theory before the Depression is necessary and the challenges it received

from economists. During the Industrial Revolution, economists began to formulate a theory that,

according to economist Thomas Sowell, “appears on the surface to be one of the simplest

351 Hiltzik, The New Deal, 93. 352 Ibid., 92-93. 353 Badger, The New Deal, 73. 354 Ibid., 72. 67

propositions in economics”—supply creates its demand.355 Known as Say’s Law, its premise was

that “income generated during the production of a given output is equal to the value of that

output” and that an “increased supply of output means an increase in the income necessary to

create a demand for that output.”356 In other words, the more an industrial entity produces, the

more significant demand there is for that product, and workers would earn more for making that

product. Say’s Law posited that an excess of supply over demand rarely occurred in a capitalist

economy.

However, Say’s Law faced two primary attacks, one by Karl Marx and one by John

Maynard Keynes. Marx’s argument built upon previous economists’ criticisms that Say’s Law

only promoted “general glut” within a nation through excessive production.357 However, Marx did not attack any specifics of Say’s Law, but instead focused “on specific auxiliary doctrines, rather than on the essential principle.”358 This lack of argument against the principle of Say’s

Law allowed for its supporters, like John Stuart Mill, to argue that those who criticized it were

“outsiders attacking one of the carefully erected pillars of classical economics.”359

However, Say’s Law, and capitalism in general, faced essential questions about its

viability due to the Great Depression. Ultimately, Say’s Law was rejected by economists in favor

of John Maynard Keynes’s theory, which centered on the belief that if people spent more, it

would increase production and generate higher incomes. This theory also provided a path for an

end to the Depression, as Keynes argued that if government spending increased and taxes were

reduced, it would spur growth in both production and employment.360 What was appealing about

355 Sowell, Say’s Law, 3. 356 Ibid., 4. 357 Ibid., 4. 358 Ibid., 181. 359 Ibid., 221. 360 Roger E. Backhouse, and Bradley W. Bateman, Capitalist Revolutionary: John Maynard Keynes, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 6-7. 68

Keynes’s theory was that it “would become seen as the ‘middle way’ between socialist central planning and the free-market capitalism that had failed so calamitously” during the

Depression.361

One of the many myths to emerge from the Depression was that Roosevelt modeled the

New Deal around Keynes’s theory. While Roosevelt’s administration did eventually adopt

Keynesian policies, it took a long winding road to reach that. Roosevelt was initially more fiscally conservative and campaigned in 1932 to balance the national budget and referred to

Hoover as a “dangerous profligate” due to his budget deficit. This criticism originated in the fact that in 1932, maintaining a balanced federal budget was seen as a way to help end an economic recession.362 However, once he took office, he ran a deficit due to the “emergency relief expenditures” necessary to save the nation from the Depression.363 Keynes and Roosevelt did meet in 1936, but neither was very impressed by the other, as Roosevelt remarked that he did not understand anything Keynes said, while he viewed Roosevelt as “an economic illiterate.”364

Roosevelt still maintained that he needed to balance the budget until his second term, when it became clear to him and his advisors that spending more money, even if it created a deficit, was necessary to continue to carry the nation out of the Depression.365

After World War II, there emerged a competing theory to Keynesian economics: monetarism. Unlike Keynesian, which believes that the government should increase spending during recessions to improve aggregate demand and production, monetarism argues that money supply is crucial to reversing a recession. Monetarists, like Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson

361 Backhouse and Bateman, Capitalist Revolutionary, 35. 362 Ibid., 28. 363 Ibid., 28. 364 Alter, The Defining Moment, 276-277. 365 Backhouse and Bateman, Capitalist Revolutionary, 29. 69

Schwartz, place the blame for the “Great Contraction” of the 1930s on the Federal Reserve

System for its failure to “act as a lender of last resort during a series of banking panics” and

resulted in the worsening of the Great Depression.366

Farmers and the New Deal

With the banking crisis managed, Roosevelt began to implement different programs to

aid the group he had wished to first address with the New Deal: farmers. Conditions for farmers,

especially in the western Midwest, had continued to deteriorate throughout the early 1930s.

There, farmers had engaged in three different strikes, which reflected the anger they felt at

Washington and the tremendous impact the Depression had on them. The largest of these was the

Farmers’ Holiday Association Strike. It occurred in the summer of 1932 and began in Iowa but

quickly spread throughout neighboring states. According to historian John Stover, the strike

“manifested a spirit of frustration and resentment that the depression had set astir in the

countryside.”367 As its organizer, Milo Reno, argued, “if we cannot obtain justice by legislation,

the time will have arrived when no other course remains than organized refusal to deliver the

products of the farm at less than production costs.”368 The farmers’ argument centered around

the idea of an “American standard of living”—that if farmers can buy manufactured goods, more industrial jobs are saved, and the nation’s economy can recover faster.369 To Reno, if farmers had

disposable income, “you have reestablished an endless chain of prosperity and happiness in this

country.”370

366 Friedman and Schwartz, The Great Contraction, 1929-1933, ix. 367 John L. Stover, “The Farmers’ Holiday Association Strike, August 1932,” in Hitting Home: The Great Depression in Town and Country, edited by Bernard Sternsher, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 149. 368 Ibid., 150. 369 Phillips, This Land, This Nation, 3. 370 Stover, “The Farmers’ Holiday Association Strike, August 1932,” 152. 70

When the strike was taking place, Roosevelt met with both the Farmers’ Holiday

Association and the Farmers’ Union leaders and pledged “if elected he would devote more time

to agriculture than to any other single problem.”371 He agreed with Reno’s assessment of the need for farmers to have more purchasing power and advocated for “one of the most daring economic experiments ever seriously attempted in this country”—domestic allotment.372

Domestic allotment had grown increasingly popular among Midwestern politicians, including

Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace. Their support stemmed from how

domestic allotment differed from other policy suggestions. According to historian Anthony

Badger, “neither voluntarism nor compulsion seemed feasible,” due to farmers not willingly

cutting their production and the logistical and legal nightmare of trying to force farmers to

reduce production.373 Domestic allotment, however, was deemed possible as it involved the

federal government analyzing how much of a crop the nation could consume. Once determined,

the government then specified to each state how much of that crop it was allowed to produce.

The state then divided its allotment down to the county level and eventually individual farmers

who volunteered to participate. To offset the lost revenue, farmers who participated were

provided a check that varied depending on how much they reduced their production.374 The hope

was that farmers would have more income, as the decreased production would drive agricultural product prices up and help spur economic recovery through farmers’ spending.

Ultimately, the strike proved unsuccessful in providing any relief. A primary reason it failed was when violence broke out when some farmers tried to block highways to enforce the

371 Stover, “The Farmers’ Holiday Association Strike, August 1932,” 157-158. 372 “In Allotment Bill, Government May Try Daring Experiment in Farm Relief,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, February 17, 1933, 2. 373 Badger, The New Deal, 149-150. 374 Rauchway, Winter War, 84. 71 strike. This led the state police to begin to attack the farmers, and Reno and other leaders declared an end to the strike after they grew “frightened at the appearance of the ugly monster into which its innocent child had so unexpectedly grown,” as described by the New York Times correspondent.375

Northwestern Ohio farmers never participated in any of the strikes that took place in the western Midwest, likely due to differences in the farming populations in the two regions. While the western Midwest had between 35 to 61 percent of its population living on farms in 1920, the eastern Midwest had only between 19 and 31 percent on farms.376 Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

County each averaged around 3,500 farm operators in 1920.377 However, the counties’ farmers still tried to help each other, as evidenced by the penny sales. While not on the level of farmers from the western Midwest, Wood County farmers still did organize, along with some Lucas

County farmers, into the Farm Debt Protective, to petition the state to stop foreclosures and lower taxes on farmers.378

Roosevelt created the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) to oversee domestic allotment, and initially, it only applied to butterfat, cotton, hogs, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and wheat. Of these, wheat was the most important within the profiled counties, as all three ranked within the top ten

Ohio counties in wheat acreage in 1929.379 By December 1933, over $200,000 was distributed to over 5,000 Ohio farmers, with more farmers expecting a check by the end of the year.380 The

AAA and domestic allotment appeared to be working, with an increase of over $150 million

375 Rauchway, Winter War, 156-157. 376 Neth, Preserving the Family Farm, 7. 377 “County Table 1-Farms and Farm Acreage, 1930, 1925, and 1920, and Crop Land Harvested, 1929 and 1924, by Color and by Tenure of Farm Operator,” U.S. Government, 1930 Census, Ohio Agriculture, 404 & 407-408. 378 “Lucas Co. Farmers To Join Movement To Stop Foreclosures,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, February 14, 1933, 1. 379 Falconer, “Twenty Years of Ohio Agriculture 1910-1930,” 27. 380 “Await First Wheat Checks In County,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, December 5, 1933, 1. 72

reported between August 1933 and August 1934 of farmer’s cash income, and August 1934

seeing a total of $572 million.381 Not only was the AAA proving successful, but it was incredibly

popular, especially within Ohio. When “specially privileged interests” attempted to get the AAA

removed through a “barrage of vicious, untruthful, and scurrilous propaganda,” Ohio farmers

responded by putting on “their fighting clothes” and called on Congress not only to keep the

AAA but to strengthen it.382 This was especially true in Wood County, where a vote by farmers

saw overwhelming support for it, with 69 percent of them in favor.383

However, one complaint that Northwest Ohio farmers had with the AAA was the non-

inclusion of the sugar beet, a vital crop within Ohio. While sugar beets only started being grown

in the state after 1910, their production had exploded, with over 4,000 farmers, all within

Northwest Ohio, growing them by 1924. Wood County was the largest producer, with over 4,000

acres in 1929.384 Therefore, Wood County farmers called for more protection of the sugar beet

industry, especially after the Roosevelt administration decreased the sugar quota from American

farmers while increasing the Cuban farmers’ quota.385 They sent five resolutions to Washington,

ranging from protesting a tax on the sugar to calling for a sugar beet industry survey and the

administration to adjust accordingly.386 Their criticisms were heard, and several months later,

“cheering news for the farmers of this vicinity” arrived with word that they would receive checks through the AAA.387

Roosevelt wanted to do more than increase farmers’ income, however. In an article for

Farm Journal, then-Governor Roosevelt wrote about the different measures the government

381 “Report Increase In Farm Income,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 28, 1934, 1. 382 “Ohio Farmers To Fight For AAA Says Perry Green,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 22, 1935, 1. 383 “Farmers Favor Wheat Program,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, May 27, 1935, 1. 384 Falconer, “Twenty Years of Ohio Agriculture 1910-1930,” 41. 385 “Wood County Sugar Beet Growers Fight Crop Curtailment,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, February 23, 1934, 1. 386 Ibid., 2. 387 “Sugar Beet Checks To Appear Soon,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 10, 1935, 1. 73

could do to help farmers, ranging from possibly removing land from production, building better

schools and roads, and giving farms electricity.388 The last point would inspire the Rural

Electrification Administration (REA), created on May 11, 1935, to help to “close the gap

between urban and rural standards of living.”389 This program was especially needed in Ohio,

where it appeared that electrification, after having proceeded “at a feverish pace in the previous decades, seemed to have stopped just shy of the farmer’s door.”390 In 1935, only 20 percent of

Ohio’s farms had access to electricity, and by May 1936, Ohio had the most people connected to

electricity through the program of any state.391 However, within Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

Counties, there were no REA projects as of the end of 1936.392 One reason for this was

resistance from private electric companies, who viewed the resources needed to extend

electricity to these rural areas as wasteful.393

Federal Relief Programs in the New Deal

While agriculture was a significant focus for Roosevelt since it was a considerable

concern of his supporters, he also began to create programs to get people employed and increase

their disposable income, much like domestic allotment. When Roosevelt took office, officially, a

quarter of the nation’s workforce was unemployed. However, many considered this too low of a

figure, with some areas, like Toledo, Ohio, reporting 80 percent unemployment.394 Roosevelt

388 Rauchway, Winter War, 83. 389 “First Annual Report of the Rural Electrification Administration,” The United States and the Rural Electrification Administration, First Annual Report: Rural Electrification Administration, Washington, 1937, 8. 390 Kevin Moore, “Lighting Up The Darkness: Electrification in Ohio, 1879-1945,” Master’s Thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2013, 83-84. 391 R. Douglas Hurt, “Ohio: Gateway to the Midwest,” in Heartland: Comparative Histories of the Midwest, edited by James H. Madison, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 218. 392 Chart B, The United States and the Rural Electrification Administration, First Annual Report, 17. 393 Moore, “Lighting Up The Darkness,” 79. 394 Alter, The Defining Moment, 2. 74

created several different relief programs to help individual Americans find work and ease their

counties’ relief burdens.

One of these was the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), created to deal with the

increasing number of “young men and women without work or lacking enough of it.”395

However, it only applied to certain Americans, specifically men between 17-23, not married, unemployed, and not on probation or parole. The work the men did was “healthful outdoor work on forest, park, and soil conservation projects of definite practical value to all the people of the

Nation.”396 The camps also provided educational and technical classes to allow the men to gain

employment outside of the CCC. Hancock and Wood Counties both had a camp near their major

cities, with their primary work being clearing the counties’ ditches. Seneca County, however,

had a more challenging time with the CCC. Initially, it did not have a camp, although the federal

government looked into one in April 1935.397 Seneca County did not have a camp because it did

not have the enrollment of other counties. The possible reasons for low enrollment were either

because they did not want to work or, due to the camps being run by reserve Army and Navy

officers and the other camp policies, they had “a mistaken view that the camps are military in

nature.”398

Of those who received help from the CCC to clear ditches, the overall response was

positive. Perry Township trustees in Wood County wrote a letter in which they stated they were

“very well satisfied with the results of the work” the CCC did.399 They continued by applauding

the “very workmanlike ditch cleaning job” and that the CCC “cannot come back in our township

395 Rauchway, Winter War, 129. 396 “‘CCC in Ohio’ Pamphlet,” Ohio Federal Writers’ Project, Works Progress Administration, accessed on “Ohio Memory,” by Ohio History Connection, 2, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p267401coll32/id/28784. 397 “CCC Camp For Seneca County Suggested By U.S. Officials,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, April 18, 1935, 1. 398 “Seneca Boys Dodge CCC Camp Service,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, August 22, 1935, 1. 399 “Trustees Laud CCC Work,” Messenger newspaper, Perrysburg, Ohio, December 12, 1935, 1. 75

any too soon to suit us.”400 An editorial in the Perrysburg, Ohio Messenger newspaper stated that

“if you want to know something about the CCC, ask the CCC.” It proceeded to converse with

“Mr. Average United States Citizen” over the importance of the CCC.401 The editorial argued that “the young men of today are the citizens of tomorrow,” and through the CCC, they went from an “aimless, monotonous existence into the healthful and wholesome camps.”402 It also

pointed out how “while preparing the youth of the nation to be honorable men of tomorrow, it is

also repairing the United States itself for the future” through its conservation work.403 It ends by

asking “Mr. Citizen” if the CCC is “not worthy of permanency? To help for today and to save for

tomorrow.”404

However, the CCC alone could not save the nation from the depths of the Depression,

especially with no direct relief. Because of the severity of the Depression, Hoover’s strategy of

relying on relief efforts from organizations like the Red Cross had proven unsuccessful, and state

and local governments needed federal assistance to provide relief. Roosevelt believed in direct

relief efforts, arguing in a speech in Detroit in 1932 that “if we make the average of mankind

comfortable and secure in their prosperity it will rise upward just as yeast rises upward.”405 To accomplish this, he created the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil

Works Administration (CWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and placed Harry

Hopkins in command of their operations.

Hopkins’s first program, FERA, was designed to aid the states’ relief efforts with a budget of $500 million and, according to historian D. Jerome Tweton, was to match “one federal

400 “Trustees Laud CCC Work,” Messenger newspaper, 1. 401 “Help Today-Save Tomorrow,” Messenger newspaper, December 24, 1935, 1. 402 Ibid. 403 Ibid. 404 Ibid. 405 Rauchway, Winter War, 150. 76

dollar for every three of state money expended for relief.”406 However, this reliance upon the

states’ budget hindered its ability to provide relief, as it punished poorer states unable to fund

extensive relief efforts. Many states also had a firm desire to maintain a fiscally conservative

approach and “refused to jeopardise [sic] their balanced budgets to spend on relief.”407 Some

states flat out refused to consider direct relief options, like Georgia, whose governor believed

“castor oil was the best cure for the poor,” or Oregon, whose governor believed that anyone

incapable of working should be chloroformed.408

This hostility led Hopkins to envision a new, strictly federally-run program, the CWA.

This allowed the program to be in every state without relying on local politicians and managing

their opposition. Its purpose was to “provide regular work on public works at regular wages able

and willing to work.”409 The CWA was widely utilized, with only three Ohio counties not using

it by the end of 1933.410 By the end of 1933, Seneca County had almost 400 people working on

road maintenance throughout the county.411 Seneca County had an additional 1,500 enroll to work on CWA projects.412 One reason for this was the higher pay rate; one earned $1.20 an hour,

similar to a skilled worker’s rate, while unskilled workers earned 50 cents an hour. For 30 hour

weeks, workers’ paychecks ranged from $36 to $15, respectively.413 In fact, according to

historian Anthony Badger, it was “the only work relief programme of the New Deal to pay

wages that began to measure up to private industry.”414 However, these men did not remain

406 Tweton, The New Deal at the Grass Roots, 42. 407 Badger, The New Deal, 193-194. 408 Ibid., 194. 409 “Purpose,” The United States and the Federal Civil Works Administration, Federal Civil Works Administration Rules and Regulations no. 1, (Washington: U.S. Government Print Office, 1933), 1. 410 “Only Three Counties In State Out,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 27, 1933, 1. 411 “Nearly 400 Men At Work On County CWA Projects,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, December 4, 1933, 1. 412 “1,500 Unemployed Enroll In County,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, December 4, 1933, 1. 413 “Hours of Labor, Wage Rates, Etc.,” Federal Civil Works Administration Rules and Regulations no. 1, 3-4. 414 Badger, The New Deal, 199. 77

within Seneca County but were sent throughout Ohio to different projects where they could help.

Wood County would benefit from this, as 226 workers arrived by the end of 1933 to help with

projects.415 Wood County also received men from the Public Works Administration, who built

waterworks systems in Pemberville and North Baltimore.416 Of the three counties, Hancock

County had the most, around 650, working on their CWA projects.417 Hancock County officials

were commended as well for the “celerity with which they acted in the matter of putting needy

men to work under the CWA,” as the “employment of so many men on these projects, on pay

from the federal government, will be a great help toward solving the problem of relief in this and

other areas.”418

However, the CWA did run into a significant problem. With an initial budget of $400

million and over 4 million employed by the beginning of 1934, it quickly ran out of money.

Once Hopkins realized the CWA would run out of funding in early February, he went to

Roosevelt and asked for more. However, Roosevelt told Hopkins “he would simply have to make do with what he already had” and eventually ended the CWA in March 1934.419 Any projects

that were unfinished under the CWA were transferred to the Federal Emergency Relief

Administration to be finished.420 However, the popularity of the CWA and PWA and FERA’s

inability to compensate for its removal led Roosevelt to create the WPA in 1935, and it soon

became just a popular as the CWA, employing 3.5 million by the end of 1935.421 Locally, the

415 “Wood County To Get 226 More At Work,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 27, 1933, 1. 416 Editorial from Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, February 15, 1934, 1. 417 “CWA Workers Will Get $3,000 Today,” Findlay Courier newspaper, December 2, 1933, 2. 418 “Quick Action Commendable In Emergency Work,” Findlay Courier newspaper, December 2, 1933, 4. 419 Badger, The New Deal, 199-200. 420 Editorial in Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, April 12, 1934. 421 Badger, The New Deal, 201, & Tweton, The New Deal at the Grass Roots, 70. 78

WPA functioned much like the CWA, constructing buildings for public use, with the most

notable being the stone wall around the Bowling Green City Park and the parks’ shelters.422

The other primary federal relief legislation was the Social Security Act of 1935. The idea

of an old-age pension was not new to the United States or Roosevelt. Many nations in Europe,

led by Germany in 1883, had some form of social program, and many prominent economists had

begun to call for the creation of a state pension system.423 Since his term as governor of New

York, Roosevelt had been in favor of unemployment insurance, with Badger noting he “had been committed to protect the individual against the vicissitudes of old-age and unemployment.”424 A

significant component of the Act was unemployment compensation, run by the states and

“prodded by tax incentives from the federal government.”425 If employers agreed to the state

unemployment plan, they would receive a 90 percent tax reduction for the federal payroll tax.426

This system was praised locally, with one resident remarking later that “the only thing that saved

this economy, I believe, was unemployment compensation.”427

Is The End Near?

By 1934, there was growing optimism that the Depression may finally be nearing its end.

A political cartoon in the Risingsun Unique Weekly pointed to the “dawn of better days” due to

the CWA and other relief programs as they provided better living conditions.428 Nationally, there

were also signs that industry, specifically automobiles, was rebounding, and the industry

422 Interview with Alva Bachman, in Manny, “Times Were Hard and Then There Were Kids,” 66. 423 Alter, The Defining Moment, 309. 424 Badger, The New Deal, 227. 425 Ibid., 230. 426 Ibid., 230. 427 Interview with Oral Moor, by Doug Durliat, May 1, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 227-228. 428 “The Future,” Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, April 12, 1934, 1. 79 reported its “first genuine upturn” of the Depression.429 This uptick stemmed from public demand as “the cars that are leaving the factories these days are being sold.”430

Locally, there were other signs that recovery was near. In Bowling Green, it was “very welcome news to farmers of Wood County and to citizens of Bowling Green” that the local

Heinz tomato factory would continue to be open.431 As a former resident recalled, “Heinz’s was the main thing in Bowling Green for years and years.”432 The reason that this was so crucial, according to a Sentinel-Tribune editorial, was that “let no citizen forget that his prosperity is either directly or indirectly involved in the welfare of the factory” through the estimated

$500,000 it generated each year.433 Wood County was also a significant tomato producer, ranking 29th in total tomato crop nationally in 1933.434 Tomatoes were so crucial in Wood

County that in 1938 and 1939, it held a tomato festival and crowned a “Queen of Tomato Land” to serve over “those who produce the delicious fruit which makes its home in Wood County.”435

Wood County also received more good news regarding Bowling Green State College as in 1935; it was named a university, which gave the county’s citizens, according to a Sentinel-Tribune editorial, the right to “be a bit cocky these days.”436

Nationally, Republicans saw the 1934 midterm election as a chance to return to power, as every midterm election in the 1900s had seen the party in control of Congress lose seats.437

429 “Another Good Omen,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, May 11, 1933, 4. 430 Ibid. 431 “Heinz Factory To Run,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, February 3, 1933, 2. 432 Interview with Nan James by Deborah Pniewski, May 1, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 145. 433 “Heinz Factory To Run,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, 2. 434 “Wood Ranks 29th in Tomato Production,” Findlay Courier newspaper, December 2, 1933, 7. 435 “Second Annual Wood County Tomato Festival Program,” Bowling Green Chamber of Commerce, 1938, accessed on “Ohio Memory” by Ohio History Connection, 2, https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p15005coll18/id/19269. 436 “Bowling Green State University,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, May 22, 1935, 2. 437 Clyde P. Weed, The Nemesis of Reform: The Republican Party During the New Deal, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 44. 80

However, primarily due to the economic growth and signs of hope, the election saw a reversal of

this trend when Democrats, “in defiance of both off-year tradition and contemporary expectations, again gained seats in Congress.”438 Republicans saw their already small caucuses

diminished further after losing thirteen seats in the House and ten in the Senate, bringing their

totals to 104 and 25, respectively.439

Ohio participated in this “defiance,” electing both a Democratic governor, Martin Davey,

and a Democratic Senator, Vic Donahey.440 Donahey’s victory was especially significant, as he

won by close to 450,000 votes over Simon Fess, someone who had been a senior Republican

leader in the Senate.441 Fess had campaigned “on a platform on strict opposition to the Roosevelt

policies,” and his major defeat indicated that Ohio favored the New Deal and the hope it had

provided.442 Donahey was able to win all three counties, though without the extensive margin he achieved statewide. In Hancock County, he won by a little over 150 votes, while in Wood

County, he won by almost 1,800 votes.443 Seneca County elected him with the largest margin of

the three—over 2,900 votes.444

The 1934 midterm election showed that many residents of Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

Counties believed that relief efforts were necessary, at least in the short term. However, there

began to be an increasingly critical look at the New Deal and whether it should remain. From

1934 to 1936, the New Deal would face increased criticism both from within the counties and

nationally from prominent figures like Huey Long, Father Charles Coughlin, and Dr. Francis

438 Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 44. 439 Ibid., 44-45. 440 “Returns On Elections Are Complete,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 8, 1934, 1. 441 “Ohio’s Vote Indorsement Of New Deal,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 7, 1934, 10. 442 Ibid. 443 “Unofficial Abstract of Vote Cast in Hancock County at Election Tuesday,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, November 7, 1934, 2, & “County Results,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, November 8, 1934, 1. 444 “Election Results,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 7, 1934, 2. 81

Townsend, who did not want such policies to for the long term. Within Hancock, Seneca, and

Wood Counties, their criticism centered around how the New Deal may be permitting the corruption of traditional American values, specifically hard work and limited government.

CHAPTER IV. A RETURN TO TRADITION: 1935-1936

Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 noted that there was “only one issue in this campaign—it’s myself—and people must be either for or against me.”445 This strategy proved successful, with

Roosevelt winning a historic landslide. However, Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties did not join the landslide, with all three counties supporting the Republican nominee, Governor Alf

Landon of Kansas. The 1936 election also saw the Union Party, a third-party coalition comprised of populist figures such as Father Charles Coughlin, Dr. Francis Townsend, William Lemke, and the late Huey Long’s supporters, perform well in Ohio, especially in Hancock, Seneca, and

Wood Counties, despite its failure nationally. This chapter argues that the counties’ residents rejected Roosevelt and the New Deal in 1936 in favor of more traditional values of hard work and limited government due to the New Deal’s perceived corrosion of those values.

Within Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, criticism of Roosevelt and the New Deal began early in his first term. In July 1933, a Sentinel-Tribune editorial commented that

“‘Roosevelt’s New Deal’ may find the Democratic [P]arty far removed from the principles of

Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson.”446 One reason for this was concern over the New

Deal’s cost, with one editorial asking “whether it is worth what it cost.”447 It remarked on how the 1933 fiscal year “was the most expensive one in the peace-time history of the United States,” with over $7 billion spent.448 For the editor, the more startling number was the $4 billion budget deficit the New Deal had created, and it was expected to increase to $7.5 billion in 1934.449 The recipients of this metaphorical promissory note would not just be the rich, with one editorial

445 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression: American Radicals and the Union Party, 218. 446 “Changing Political Ideas,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 31, 1933, 2. 447 “What It Will Cost,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 17, 1934, 2. 448 Ibid. 449 Ibid. 83

stating, “there are not that many rich as there once were, and those left have a way of avoiding

paying more than they consider their share of the taxes.”450 Instead, both “rich and humble alike”

would pay for the New Deal through increased taxes.451 To the counties’ editors, this went against what was “most needed to give the nation the confidence, the spirit and the optimism that will break depression.”452 The editors claimed that the government’s continued spending

jeopardized recovery since “real, permanent and sound recovery cannot arrive so long as industry

faces the prospect of confiscatory taxes that will seize whatever profits it is able to make.”453

Within Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, the main criticisms of the New Deal were its

negative effect on traditional American values by its relief agencies and the mismanagement and

ineffectiveness of its agricultural policies.

Criticism of New Deal Relief Agencies

Some of the harshest criticism within the counties centered around the New Deal relief

agencies’ management and their impact on those enrolled in them. In Hancock County, a

committee was created to oversee citizens’ complaints of CWA projects and “remove anyone

from the payroll for various causes including drunkenness, unwillingness to work and

fighting.”454 The county’s director had received numerous complaints from citizens, and within the first week, eight men were removed from the program’s payroll.455 This was not isolated to

Hancock County either, with over 50,000 people removed in California due to having “no

legitimate claim to government aid” for refusing to work for the established wages.456

450 “What It Will Cost,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, 2. 451 Ibid. 452 “In The Balance,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, September 10, 1935, 6. 453 Ibid. 454 “CWA Adjustment Group Functions,” Findlay Courier newspaper, December 28, 1933, 2. 455 Ibid. 456 “Work Or Starve,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, January 6, 1936, 1. 84

These removals highlighted a significant concern for the counties’ residents, that those on the projects were, as a former Wood County resident put it, “getting paid to lean on a shovel.”457

Another noted how before the New Deal, “men were good, willing workers, willing to give a man a day’s work,” but that with its implementation,” they were allowed to loaf out along the roads and paid 40 cents a hour.”458 While they did agree “some projects were, well, they were good,” overall, “it made it awful expensive to have 50 or 60 men standing out there leaning on shovel handles.”459 A Risingsun Unique Weekly editorial continued this criticism, noting how

“some of these C.W.A. workers are those who never had a job or cared for one when work was plentiful a few years ago,” and that they spend their paychecks “at pool, in beer places, at gambling or on knick knacks; that they in some cases do not provide for their family’s needs.”460

The editorial demanded that “these loafers, dishonest, unappreciative bums” be removed in favor of “good, honest, conscientious community building citizens.”461 If that did not happen, “there is going to be an awful blow-up on the part of our better citizens and an investigation demanded.”462 This lack of “good” citizens and the prevalence of “bums” likely led many to question the New Deal’s effect. As a Sentinel-Tribune editorial put it, “the best form of assistance always is the kind that enables folks to help themselves,” something that the New Deal did not appear to be doing.463 An Advertiser-Tribune editorial echoed this with how

“unemployment relief, no matter how it is set up or what benefits it may provide, is in the end

457 Interview with Helen Munsel, by Richard Fortney, October 30, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 232. 458 Interview with Calvin Tyson, date unknown, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 379. 459 Ibid. 460 “Are C.W.A. Workers Worthy of the Help? Some Are, Some Not!,” Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, January 18, 1934, 1. 461 Ibid. 462 Ibid. 463 “Unemployment Survey,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, 2. 85

only a substitute for something better.”464 It continued with how “the immediate need may be to

take care of the jobless, but the long-range need is to get the jobless back to work.”465

The relief agencies also faced criticism from the men whom they employed. In Wood

County, the workers there demanded “a 50 cent minimum wage on all relief work,” along with

better food and medical attention and the removal of two caseworkers the men described as

“incompetent.”466 Of these demands, the wage increase went into effect immediately, while the

other demands were further examined.467 To those who viewed them as lazy, these “bum” likely further upset them since they made demands while not working. To them, this was proof that

“government was the ‘bane of their existence.’”468 Even though the New Deal had good

intentions with these relief programs, the editorial writers argued it had created a group of

Americans who had abandoned the traditional American value of hard work.

Roosevelt was aware of these criticisms and tried to address them in a speech in which he

stated the “primary responsibility for community relief needs rests upon the community

itself.”469 He continued with no “thinking or experienced person” believed the “responsibility of

the community shall be eliminated by assigning this great humanitarian task to any central body”

and it was “only because we have realized the imperative need for additional help” that these

programs were created.470 However, with increased criticism about the CWA becoming a “habit

with the country” and a continued desire to balance the budget, Roosevelt began its phase-out in

spring 1934, with its eventual end in March that year.471 Once news arrived of Roosevelt’s

464 “The Fundamental Task,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, March 18, 1935, 6. 465 Ibid. 466 Editorial from the Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, April 26, 1934, 1. 467 Ibid. 468 Sternsher, “The Harding and Bricker Revolutions,” 25. 469 “Says Community Responsible For Relief Burdens,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, September 28, 1934, 1. 470 Ibid. 471 Badger, The New Deal, 200. 86

consideration for terminating the CWA in the three counties, there were mixed reactions. A

Sentinel-Tribune editorial cited that while it “was and is intended only to provide employment for men till private industry can get to going better,” it still seemed “proper for the government to continue the work it has begun for sometime yet,” due to the still high number of unemployed.472

However, the editorial still pointed out that those employed by the CWA and other programs

would ultimately have to accept “private employment if it be offered to them.”473 The

Advertiser-Tribune noted another criticism, that “when the CWA was organized, 80 per cent

[sic] of those given jobs from Tiffin were taken directly from relief lists.”474 With its end,

“virtually all of these return to the lists as soon as the jobs are gone.”475

This editorial also highlighted Ohio’s growing crisis over its inability to provide relief. In

March 1935, Governor Martin Davey requested the federal government take over relief efforts in

the state due to the “inability of the governor and senate Republicans to agree on placing relief

workers under civil service,” which had resulted in the state relief bill’s expiration.476 After some back and forth between the state and federal governments, the Federal Relief Administrator,

Harry Hopkins, appointed Dr. Charles Stillman, an Ohio State professor and regional FERA representative for Ohio, in charge of Ohio’s relief efforts.477 Roosevelt also asserted that he

would not “allow the relief population of Ohio to become the victims of either corruption or

political chicanery.”478

472 “CWA And Other Jobs,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, January 24, 1934, 2. 473 Ibid. 474 “Relief Lists Grow With CWA Failure,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, February 23, 1934, 1. 475 Ibid. 476 “Makes Request At Height of Crisis,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, March 5, 1935, 1. 477 “U.S. Takes Over Relief In Ohio As President Hints At Corruption In Its Handling,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, March 18, 1935, 1. 478 Ibid. 87

However, the state continued to struggle to provide relief. Between September and

October 1935, 18 counties saw direct federal relief leave their counties, including Seneca

County.479 In December 1935, Wood County saw its federal relief disappear. This resulted in the

commissioners traveling to Columbus, Ohio, to tell the state, “there are no funds in the county

treasury to handle the case load.”480 While the WPA took a significant portion of the county’s

unemployed, there was still a sizeable portion that relied on the county for relief.481

Criticism of New Deal Agricultural Policies

Another major criticism in the counties centered on the AAA and its general

mismanagement. A Findlay Morning Republican editorial stated that “more than a million

dollars were spent last year to kill crop pests, which are credited with destroying crops.”482 The

problem with this was that the AAA was already “spending millions to save the American farmer

from over-production because the natural pests did not destroy enough.”483 A letter to the

Sentinel-Tribune further demonstrated this hypocrisy to residents, as it pointed out that Secretary

Henry Wallace had bought poison to kill pests, allowing the farmer to grow more wheat, while also “taxing the bread eater, to get money to pay the Farmer to reduce their acreage to raise less

wheat.”484 A Fostoria Daily Review editorial stated that “what a farmer plants in his own fields

should be his own business” and “what he does with his crops should be his own business.”485 It

went further with how “there is nobody in Washington or any other place with brains enough to

tell all farmers” what to do, and “such regimentation may be all right in Soviet Russia, but the

479 “Direct Relief Will End Here On October First If Present Plans Stand,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, September 10, 1935, 1. 480 “County Faces Relief Problem,” Messenger newspaper, December 5, 1935, 1. 481 Ibid. 482 “What A World We Are Living In,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, December 7, 1933, 4. 483 Ibid. 484 “Dad’s Brain Storm Over Farm Policy,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, April 16, 1934, 1. 485 “This Is Not Russia,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, October 30, 1936, 4. 88

United States of America are not in Soviet Russia.”486 It continued to discuss how “the

farmer…typified American individualism,” and yet “with the advent of the New Deal, he found

himself a ward of the federal government.”487 All of these complaints were illustrated in a

political cartoon titled “The Next Farm Legislation.” Divided into two panels, the top panel

depicts Uncle Sam tell a prospective landowner that “you can have this property if you’ll work

it,” with the sign “Homestead Land” in the corner.488 However, the bottom panel had Uncle Sam

telling a farmer that “you can’t [emphasis in original] have this land if you work it,” with silos in

the background labeled “surplus crops.”489

Many citizens of the counties might have overlooked the AAA’s mismanagement if it had successfully provided relief to all farmers, but it did not. A study by Price Fishback, William

Horrace, and Shawn Kantor looked at the impact the AAA and other New Deal programs had on local economies through retail sales. While Ohio received enough money from the AAA for every Ohioan to receive $7.50, this was nowhere near the level received from public works programs, like the CWA and WPA, as from them, every Ohioan received $140.20, almost twenty times more than from the AAA.490 Moreover, the AAA did not distribute this money evenly,

with tenants receiving less than landowning farmers, resulting in the actual impact on local

economies to depend on “whether the increased spending by the actual recipients of the

payments was offset by the reduced spending of farm workers, tenants, and sharecroppers.”491 In

Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, there was a significant percentage of tenant farming. In

486 “This Is Not Russia,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, 4. 487 Ibid. 488 “The Next Farm Legislation,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, February 23, 1934, 6. 489 Ibid. 490 Table 2, Price V. Fishback, William C. Horrace, and Shawn Kantor, “Did New Deal Grant Programs Stimulate Local Economies? A Study of Federal Grants and Retail Sales during the Great Depression,” The Journal of Economic History vol. 65, 1 (2005): 41. 491 Ibid., 44. 89

1930, Hancock County had 1,172 tenants who comprised 40 percent of all farm operators.492

Seneca County saw a slightly smaller percentage, with its 1,121 tenants comprising 38.7 percent.493 While it had the most tenants at 1,384, Wood County also had the smallest percentage, with only 37.1 percent.494 With such a large percentage of tenants, for them to suffer more from the AAA would have certainly hindered these three counties in their recoveries, regardless of how successful the CWA or WPA was. Even those who received funding did not necessarily support the AAA, with historian Bernard Sternsher noting farmers “liked price supports but did not care for the device used—production controls—to attain them.”495

The New Deal also did not help all farmers. Charles Wiltse, a farmer in Pike County in southern Ohio, failed to benefit from the AAA, and in his journal, he detailed life on his family’s farm and his thoughts on the New Deal. In one entry, he noted “the efforts of the administration to placate the embattled farmer become every day more confusing” and that “the layman can only wait and hope, if there are any laymen left.”496 He went further in a later entry, stating “it is an old, old story to the tired, resentful, rather bitter man who tills the soil that other men may be fed and clothed,” and that farmers have “been promised many things in glowing words by every administration for half a century, and his stubborn distrust of government assistance is born of long and hard experience.”497 Even with the New Deal, Wiltse and other farmers realized “that the game is still being played with the same old dog-eared deck.”498 Farmers were not the only people who did not benefit from the AAA. According to one former Wood County resident who

492 “County Table 1,” 404. 493 Ibid., 407. 494 Ibid., 408. 495 Sternsher, “Harding and Bricker Revolutions,” 25. 496 Charles M. Wiltse, Prosperity Far Distant: The Journal of an Ohio Farmer, 1933-1934, edited by Michael J. Birkner, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012), 75. 497 Ibid., 94. 498 Ibid., 94. 90 ran a butcher shop during the Depression, he claimed that “during the reign of King Franklin

Roosevelt, I never received one red cent’s business from the United States, in any relief order at all.”499 Instead, he recalled paying a tax on the meat he butchered and that it directly impacted his business, along with the Depression.500

The Agricultural Adjustment Act also faced legal challenges, being ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in January 1936. The Court determined that it was a “plan to regulate and control agriculture production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government,” and infringed on “the reserved rights of the states.”501 After the ruling, the Perrysburg Journal published a poem that began: “what does Wall Street care for your black despair, you men growing corn and cotton?”502 It noted how “while the man who toils and tills our soils bemoans his sorry lot—our coupon clippers in dancing slippers laugh at the ‘breaks’ he got.” To the author, this was further proof that “the rich men take what the poor men make then make them think it’s Fate” and that “nine bent old Beezers, who wield their tweezers pinching each hopeful ray.” It ended with “but from an oligarchy to stark anarchy is such a short, short way” and that

“when the mobs advance as they did in France—pray tell them—who will hide them?”503

The “New Deal Dissidents”

This poem highlighted a growing feeling among some Hancock, Seneca, and Wood

Counties’ residents that the New Deal had failed in its promises and was only worsening the nation’s economic situation. This feeling permeated throughout the nation and allowed several figures to gain influence with their messages of how to fix the nation and end the Depression.

499 Interview with Halbert Phillips, date unknown, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History, 255. 500 Ibid. 501 “Supreme Court Rules AAA Unconstitutional,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, January 6, 1936, 1. 502 “Around the Corner,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, January 10, 1936, 1. 503 Ibid. 91

Initially referred to as “New Deal Dissident,” Father Charles Coughlin, Huey Long, Dr. Francis

Townsend, and others would eventually coalesce into a third party in 1936—the Union Party.

The Union Party was to serve as an alternative to the Democratic and Republican parties’

“reactionary elements” and would “save democracy and put an end to the so-called

Depression.”504

Nicknamed the “Radio Priest” due to his sermons delivered over the radio, Father

Coughlin initially gained considerable support nationally due to both his message and usage of the radio to deliver it. Coughlin’s primary support was from Catholics and Midwestern farmers, with historian David Bennett stating that Coughlin’s “denunciation of the wealthy, Anglicized, eastern elite” enabled his supporters to “turn his [a supporter’s] socioeconomic unrest into hostility toward individuals or institutions he was told had caused him suffering and denied him access to a better life.”505

Bennett also argued that Catholics supported Coughlin through his promotion of “a kind

of inverted nativism.”506 When Coughlin was named priest of the Shrine of the Little Flower in

Royal Oak, Michigan, in the 1920s, the local Catholic population had long been terrorized by the local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan. During the shrine’s construction, the Klan repeatedly put burning crosses on the lawn in front of it, continually reminding Coughlin and the Catholics that they were not wanted.507 During the 1920s, the Klan experienced a national revival, with

Catholics, Jews, African Americans, immigrants, and anyone else deemed “enemies of true

Americanism” the main targets of this version of the Klan.508 This national revival included

504 Paul Michael Marshall, “The Union Party and the 1936 Presidential Election,” Dissertation, University of Suffolk, 2013, 1-2. 505 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 62-63. 506 Ibid., 65. 507 Ibid., 31. 508 Michael Brooks, The Ku Klux Klan in Wood County, Ohio, (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2014), 61-64. 92

Northwest Ohio, especially Wood County. During the 1920s, 1,390 of Wood County’s citizens

became members of the local Ku Klux Klan, comprising about 15 percent of those eligible to

join the county’s Klan. Of those, about 17 percent were farmers.509 Like the Royal Oak chapter,

the Wood County Klan used cross burnings for intimidation, with three crosses burnt within a

block of St. Aloysius Catholic Church in Bowling Green on August 13, 1923.510 However, while

nationally, the Klan saw its membership decline in the mid-1920s, there was still a Klan presence

in Wood County, with a core of a few dozen active through the 1930s.511 They continued

throughout Ohio, as in 1933, a cross was burned on the Ohio State House grounds, with three

placards found on nearby trees that read, “Communism will not be tolerated. The Ku Klux Klan

rides again.”512

With the decline of the Ku Klux Klan nationally in the 1930s, coupled with Coughlin

attesting blame for the Depression to wealthy Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites, many Catholics felt

they were now able to claim “they were more honest, more democratic, and more American than

their enemies. And as such they well deserved the brand of social justice offered by Father

Coughlin.”513 This “social justice” manifested in the creation of the National Union for Social

Justice (NUSJ) in November 1934. Comprised of sixteen principles, these included the right to a

“just, living annual wage,” a central bank for the nations’ money and maintaining the cost of

living, and the right of private ownership.514 Nationally, NUSJ was met with acclaim, with over

200,000 people pledged within the first two weeks of its announcement.515 By April 1935,

509 Brooks, The Ku Klux Klan in Wood County, Ohio, 61-64. 510 Ibid., 75. 511 Ibid., 116. 512 “Fiery Cross at Ohio Capitol Reveals Klan Is Again Riding,” Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, February 27, 1933, 1. 513 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 65. 514 Chris Lause, “Nativism in the Interwar Era,” Master’s Thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2018, 78. 515 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 69. 93

Coughlin claimed 8.5 million Americans supported it and that in January 1936, it was active in

26 states and 302 of the 435 congressional districts.516

Within Ohio, there was an estimated 6,000 supporters of NUSJ in January 1936, tied for second-most in the nation with Pennsylvania and only behind New York. Between Hancock,

Seneca, and Wood Counties, there was support for Coughlin, as a former Wood County resident recalled being “a Father Coughlin man,” and that “every once in a while, we get outta gear, and

Father Coughlin, just telling the truth, that was all there was to it.”517 Coughlin’s most significant support in the counties was in Seneca County due to its large German-American Catholic population.518 He still held support in the other counties, evidenced by a message in the

Perrysburg Messenger of a joint NUSJ, Townsend club, and Farmers’ Union meeting in the

Perrysburg council room.519

Huey Long, however, did not share the same popularity locally as Father Coughlin or others. One reason for this was his Share Our Wealth society. Announced in February 1934, it was more radical than NUSJ, consisting of “breaking the power of the rich” by limiting individuals’ wealth to only $3 million and “sharing” this wealth via an annual income of $2,000-

$3,000. 520 It would also implement an old-age pension of $30 a month for those over 65 and for

World War I veterans to receive their bonus immediately.521 The counties’ residents preferred a return to more traditional American values than the radical policies of Long. While lacking support within Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties, Long had widespread support nationally, with an announced 7.7 million supporters of the Share Our Wealth Society only a year after its

516 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 71. 517 Interview with Max Shaffer, by Joseph Arpad, 1979, in Arpad, Southern Wood County Oral History Project, 309. 518 Sternsher, “The Harding and Bricker Revolutions,” 20. 519 Editorial from Messenger newspaper, October 22, 1936, 1. 520 Edwin Amenta, Kathleen Dunleavy, and Mary Bernstein, “Stolen Thunder? Huey Long’s ‘Share Our Wealth,’ Political Mediation, and the Second New Deal,” American Sociological Review 59, no. 5 (1994): 679. 521 Ibid., 679-680. 94 creation. This popularity raised concern within the Roosevelt administration that Long posed a severe threat to reelection in 1936.522 However, with his assassination on September 9, 1935, and death the next day, Long was never able to present that challenge. Locally, the headlines of his death further indicate a lack of support for Long, with one reading: “Dictatorship Ends With

Long’s Death: Radical Politics Suffers Blow.”523 Another editorial stated while Long’s “political creed was for the most part wholly unsound, and his methods were ruthless, it cannot be denied that the man was energetic, resourceful, and strong.”524 It continued with how “he was, of course, headed for a reckoning and defeat,” since “the state could not long support the extravagance of his political regime, nor submit to the rule of the sycophants who called him master and did his bidding.”525

While Father Coughlin and Long were the more prominent national figures of the “New

Deal Dissidents,” locally, Dr. Francis Townsend and his Townsend clubs enjoyed the most support. Dr. Townsend was an older man who had been Long Beach, California’s assistant director of City Health Office during the Depression. However, upon losing this job through local politics, Dr. Townsend found himself in need of aid and began to think of a method to provide relief, not only for himself but all elderly Americans who had no means of income. In

1935, there were an estimated 7.5 million Americans over the age of 65, only a little over half the states had any form of a pension plan, and those that did were not enough to provide relief.526

Dr. Townsend’s vision called for the creation of a “2 per cent tariff on all transactions— wholesale as well as retail—because this would presumably place the burden less heavily on the

522 Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein, “Stolen Thunder?,” 678. 523 “Dictatorship Ends With Long’s Death,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, September 10, 1935, 1. 524 “Huey P. Long,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, September 12, 1935, 5. 525 Ibid. 526 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 156. 95

consumer.”527 Dr. Townsend figured that this tariff’s revenue enough to provide every American

over 60 with $200 a month.528 The only rule for how the money was spent was that it had to be

used in 30 days to have “the ‘velocity effect’ of the pension money” and help end the

Depression.529

Townsend’s plan was quickly met with acclaim nationally, with one editorial declaring,

“the Townsend movement, it must be agreed, is growing like a mushroom in all parts of the

United States.”530 It continued with how “by the time the primary elections are held the

candidate who does not openly declare himself in favor of this plan will, perhaps, find himself

out on a limb.”531 Locally, there was strong support for the Townsend plan. By August 1935, the

Bowling Green Townsend club consisted of 741 members, and throughout Wood County, there were more than 2,000 members.532 Hancock County also had a large following, with Findlay’s

club having at least 600 members when it celebrated its first birthday in January 1936.533 The local chapters also actively promoted it, as the Perrysburg Journal ran an editorial to “join your nearest Townsend Club” and that “our organization is strong enough at the present time to bring this plan to a successful conclusion.”534

However, while these programs attracted a great deal of praise, they also drew much

criticism. A political cartoon from the Bellevue Gazette, titled “Another Threat Of Wind

Erosion,” is an excellent example of this. It depicts a giant sack, named “The National Income,”

being torn apart by fierce winds, labeled “demagogue schemes,” “Share the Wealth,” “vocal

527 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 528 Ibid. 529 Ibid., 152. 530 “A Serious Situation,” Messenger newspaper, December 5, 1934, 1. 531 Ibid. 532 “Townsend Clubs Hold County Wide Meeting in B.G.,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, August 30, 1935, 1. 533 “Townsend Club In Its First Birthday,” Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, January 8, 1936, 4. 534 “Townsend Plan,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, January 10, 1936, 1. 96 economics,” and “taxation.” A man is shown looking at the sack being torn apart, and he wonders, “what’ll the harvest be?”535 The two who came under the most criticism were Father

Coughlin and Huey Long. In fact, Roosevelt considered Long to be “the second most dangerous man in this country” due to his ability to make Americans believe “he knows there’s a promised land and he’ll lead ‘em to it.” 536 According to Roosevelt, the only man more dangerous was

Douglas MacArthur, due to him being “a potential Mussolini” if “things get disorderly enough and good citizens work up enough anxiety.”537 Long was also accused of being a dictator in

Louisiana, cutting public employees’ salaries for personal benefit, and using the state police as

“his private police force,” along with other charges.538 When faced with these accusations, in his typical “Kingfish” fashion, Long responded with how “there may be smarter men than me, but they ain’t in Louisiana.”539 For Father Coughlin, his criticism is best portrayed from a political cartoon. Titled “The Audiences Have Grown Bigger; but the Speakers—,” it has Abraham

Lincoln looking down upon Father Coughlin while he rails into a microphone giving a sermon.

Father Coughlin also has a label attached to him: “demagogue.”540 Both men resented being referred to as “demagogues,” with Long commenting that he would “describe a demagogue as a politician who don’t keep his promises” and that “I’m the first man to have power in Louisiana who ain’t a demagogue because I kept every promise I ever made!”541

Both Coughlin and Long also came under intense criticism from former National

Recovery Administration director Hugh S. Johnson, who called for “a national campaign to

535 “Another Threat Of Wind Erosion,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, April 23, 1935, 1. 536 Tugwell, The Brains Trust, 433. 537 Ibid., 434. 538 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 221. 539 Ibid., 220. 540 “The Audiences Have Grown Bigger; but the Speakers—,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, February 12, 1935, 6. 541 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 122. 97 exterminate the political influence” of “this pair of political termites.”542 He further highlighted the danger both men posed, telling a crowd that “you can laugh at Father Coughlin, you can snort at Huey Long—but this country was never under a greater menace.”543 This began an exchange between Coughlin and Johnson, with Coughlin referring to Johnson as a “cracked gramophone record squawking the messages of his master’s voice.”544 Not to be outdone, Johnson responded by categorizing Coughlin’s use of “absolute falsehood and distortion” as “pious flubdub.”545

Dr. Townsend also came under criticism when a Washington congressman called for a

“special committee to investigate all old age pension organizations, ‘rackets and schemes.’”546

The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., a committee on old age security, determined that the implementation of the Townsend Plan “would gravely aggravate the very ills which it seeks to cure.”547 The committee further argued that for it to be able to distribute the $200 pensions, it would need a tax rate “about six times as large or 12 percent,” which would result in “increases in prices, decreases in wages and decline in the standard of living,” and “would subject the whole economic structure to dangerous strains.”548 Locally there were efforts to discredit these criticisms, with one editorial comprised of attacks on the fictional Dr. Ezekiel Applehead and

Philthy Plushbottom, two critics of the Townsend Plan. For Dr. Applehead, the editorial noted how he would say “that to have things in one’s old age, one must work and slave and save and all that old Wall Street bologna.”549 The editorial remarked that Ms. Plushbottom, someone who

542 “Johnson Rallies Support To Exterminate ‘Political Termites’; Coughlin Praises Roosevelt, Denounces General and Baruch,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, March 12, 1935, 1. 543 Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March, 136. 544 “Johnson Launches Campaign To Exterminate Political Influence of Fr. Coughlin,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, March 12, 1935, 1. 545 “‘Pious Flubdub,’ Replies Johnson,” Findlay Republican Courier, March 12, 1935, 1. 546 “Asks Investigation Of Townsend Plan,” Bellevue Gazette newspaper, January 6, 1936, 1. 547 “Says Townsend Plan Would Be Dangerous,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 16, 1936, 2. 548 “Townsend Plan,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, 1. 549 Ibid. 98

had “never seen a picture show, drank a glass of beer or ridden in an automobile and had more

than $3 in her pocketbook at one time in her whole life,” would say that “people will ruin

themselves with money, that it will be bad influence on the Nation.”550 The editorial also warned

its readers to be on the lookout for “the forming of an organization known, let us say for

example, as the ‘Patriots of the Republic,’” a group that will “call upon the red-blooded citizens

to join their organization in a patriotic endeavor to ‘save the Republic.’” It warned that “these

fascist organizations will be hiding behind the American flag and using the glorious name of our

republic” in order to “perpetuate human misery, to end all social objectives, to go back to the

cutthroat philosophy of 1929.”551

The 1936 Election

While Coughlin denied that he and Long were planning a third party in 1936, stating

there was no proof NUSJ was “allied with Republican or Democrat, with Catholic or Protestant,

or with any other individual or group of individuals,” both were in the process of planning a third-party run.552 This was not the first time that Long had been approached for a third-party run. In 1932, the National Farmer-Labor Party asked Long to serve as their nominee. Long turned them down, saying that “what is the use being the head of a party if you don’t have anyone to rule?”553 By 1935, however, the situation was different. The success of both NUSJ and

the Share Our Wealth Society, along with Long’s well-known ambition to hold the Presidency,

led many to believe that Long would either directly challenge Roosevelt in the Democratic

primary or go straight to a third party in 1936.554 His assassination ultimately ended his

550 “Townsend Plan,” Perrysburg Journal newspaper, 1. 551 Ibid. 552 “Coughlin Answers Johnson’s Charges In Radio Broadcast,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, March 12, 1935, 1. 553 Neal, Happy Days are Here Again, 220. 554 Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein, “Stolen Thunder?,” 679. 99

ambition, but it did not end Coughlin’s or the other “New Deal Dissidents,” with the Share Our

Wealth Society taken over by Gerard Smith, one of Long’s lieutenants.

In July 1936, “the third party political alliance” of Coughlin, Smith, Townsend, and

Representative William Lemke of North Dakota was formally announced, with Lemke to be the

nominee of their new party, named the Union Party.555 In a speech to Townsend supporters in

Cleveland, Ohio, Father Coughlin railed against the “Roosevelt dictatorship,” stating that “no

candidate for [C]ongress of the National Union can support that great betrayer and liar—Franklin

Delano Roosevelt.”556 Coughlin also referred to him as “Franklin ‘double-crossing’ Roosevelt”

and urged “all those opposed to the double-crossing Democrats and gold standard Republicans” to rise in support of the new party.557

The Union Party faced many challenges between July and November 1936. The first of

them was to determine the party’s platform, with the final product “in no way the result of an

effort to compromise the clashing interests of the nation” typical of a party’s platform.558 Instead, the platform “was a potpourri of the monetary panaceas of the time,” with “the only clashing interests compromised here were those of the radical movements themselves.”559 Comprised of

fifteen points, it called for the creation of a central bank, a “living annual wage for all laborers

capable of working and willing to work,” the “assurance of reasonable and decent security for

the aged,” and the end of “the economic domination of monopolies.”560 The platform also called

for the United States to be “self-contained and self-sustained; no foreign entanglements, be they

political, economic, financial or military” and for a limit on how much one can make in a year.561

555 “Townsend, Coughlin, Smith Announce Complete Agreement,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 16, 1936, 1. 556 “Coughlin Speaks To Townsendites,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 16, 1936, 1. 557 Ibid., 2. 558 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 193. 559 Ibid., 193-194. 560 Ibid., 193-194. 561 Ibid., 194. 100

The Republican Party was also working on its message to the American people. It was

still trying to recover from its drastic drop in power and influence from 1932 to 1935. To the

party leadership, the path back to the White House lay in rebuilding “the east-west sectional coalition that was critical to the party’s presidential success prior to 1932.”562 To accomplish

this, Republicans turned to the only Republican governor to win reelection in the 1934 election—Alf Landon of Kansas.563 However, Landon was not the only candidate who tried to

gain the nomination. Three individuals posed the most significant challenge to Landon’s

nomination: Senator William Borah of Iowa, Chicago Daily News editor Frank Knox, and the

31st President, Herbert Hoover. Senator Borah’s support came, like Landon’s, from his origin in

a western state. Borah had also been an outspoken critic of the Republican Party, remarking that

in 1932, Republicans had “offered the Constitution—but the people can’t eat the Constitution,”

and it cost them the 1932 election.564 Knox’s popularity stemmed from his reputation as “a

fearless spokesman of opposition to the whole New Deal.”565 However, both of these men failed

to unite the eastern and western factions of the party. The only other candidate with that potential

besides Landon was Hoover. As mentioned earlier, Hoover had never left the political arena like

his predecessors but instead remained active in criticizing Roosevelt and the New Deal. Many

party leaders believed Hoover viewed 1936 “to achieve personal vindication” for his loss in

1932.566 However, in September 1935, Hoover made public his decision for 1936: he would not

seek the nomination. Instead, “his primary interest was the nomination of a candidate who was

resolutely opposed to the New Deal.”567

562 Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 88. 563 Ibid., 89. 564 Ibid., 48. 565 Ibid., 91. 566 Ibid., 90. 567 Ibid., 90. 101

Hoover’s decision cleared the way for a “unanimity that was remarkable and very rare in

American politics,” with Landon named the Republican nominee for President and Knox his

Vice Presidential nominee.568 In his acceptance speech, Landon referred to himself as “one whose life has been that of the everyday American.”569 He noted that “the time has come to stop

fumbling with recovery,” and the question was not “how much money the American people are

willing to spend for relief,” but “how much waste the American people are willing to stand for in

the administration of relief.”570 The Republican Party platform effectively condemned “the

present administration for practically everything it has done” and that “the administration has

dishonored American traditions.”571 Some of these traditions were the “violation of the rights and liberties of American citizens,” the “flaunting of the integrity and authority of the Supreme

[C]ourt,” and the “creation of a vast number of new offices, and the filling of these with political

favorites, setting up a centralized bureaucracy,” along with others.572

The Democratic Party did not have as hard of a time as the Republicans or the Union

Party in creating its party platform. Their platform centered around presenting Roosevelt and the

New Deal as the central issue of the 1936 campaign. Democrats argued that the New Deal, while not reaching the extent that many, like the Union Party, wanted, was still successful enough to be worth to continue over a return to Landon and the Republican Party’s pre-New Deal politics.573

Ultimately, their message centered on “the ancient call that major party politicians had always

used against the newcomers, ‘Don’t throw your vote away’” by voting for the Union Party.574

568 “Landon, Knox to Lead for G.O.P.,” Messenger newspaper, June 18, 1936, 1. 569 “Just An Everyday American,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, July 25, 1936, 1. 570 Ibid. 571 Ibid. 572 Ibid. 573 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 218-219. 574 Ibid., 219. 102

Republicans had no problem making Roosevelt and the New Deal the critical focus of the

election. Republican Senator Lester Dickinson of Iowa had stated in 1935 that “in my judgment

there is but one issue” and “today, tomorrow, and the next year that issue is Franklin Delano

Roosevelt.”575 He outlined seven criticisms of Roosevelt, ranging from his failure to uphold

campaign pledges to his inability to balance the budget. Dickinson also argued how he had

“debauched the civil service” through a “vast army of political spoilsmen without knowledge or

training for the posts they hold.”576 He also claimed Roosevelt had “been disrespectful to the

[S]upreme [C]ourt of the United States” and sought to offset “the failure of the new deal by

placing the blame falsely on the courts.”577 In an address in Findlay, Frank Knox indicated the

campaign was not about the parties but “between those who are trying to mislead us into the

adoption of some imported ideas of government from Europe.”578 He also illustrated his vision

of how the Republicans would provide a “substitute for the wastefulness of the

administration.”579 This consisted of a “government of few laws and better laws” and “an

administration in which the business man can go to bed at night without worrying what the

government will do to him the next day.”580

The Hancock, Seneca, and Wood County newspaper editors were also happy to make the

election a referendum on Roosevelt and the New Deal. A Sentinel-Tribune editorial in 1935 stated that while Wood County received almost $5 billion in relief aid, it claimed that some in the county believed that the relief money “should have been avoided and could have been avoided.”581 Even though the editors disagreed with Roosevelt, they conceded that “the policy of

575 “The Issue Is Roosevelt Says Senator Dickinson,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, August 30, 1935, 1. 576 Ibid. 577 Ibid. 578 “Text of Findlay Address By Col. Knox, Thursday,” Findlay Courier newspaper, October 23, 1936, 2. 579 Ibid. 580 Ibid. 581 “Partisanship And Patriotism,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, May 18, 1935, 2. 103

the President and Congress is actually the policy of the country for the present.”582 Because of

this, the county’s citizens were urged to act “like good soldiers” who will “merely follow the

man who is the commander-in-chief” and use the “American privilege to change leadership in

1936, if we still feel that his governmental strategy is ineffective in the campaign for general

prosperity.”583

Roosevelt responded to this criticism and continued the Democratic message of the New

Deal’s benefits in his 1936 State of the Union speech. In it, he directly challenged Republicans

and the Union Party “to point the way, definitely, to a substitute.”584 He continued by calling on

Congress to defend against “foreign autocrats bent upon war, and against autocrats within the nation who would ‘gang up’ on the people’s liberties.”585 Roosevelt further urged for the “need

of advancement rather than retreatment—of completion of the broad, humanitarian program

which they have launched in behalf of the American masses.”586 Locally, the speech was met

with modest praise, with one newspaper editorial stating the speech showed “that Franklin D. has

a strain of the old ‘Roosevelt blood’ in him.”587 However, that same editorial still criticized

Roosevelt, stating the New Deal had “almost reached the point where most of us cannot

comprehend what the enormous spending of money means,” and “the average business man sees

in it a hazard that will come to grief and disaster.”588 It commented that large amounts of money

are being “squandered right here in our own country on projects that no sane business man would

attempt,” and it “seems a shame that we can’t take advantage of all the money being poured into

582 “Partisanship And Patriotism,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, 2. 583 Ibid. 584 “Advance—Not Retreat—Urges U.S. Leader,” Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, January 9, 1936, 4. 585 Ibid. 586 Ibid. 587 “Criticism Is Inevitable,” Messenger newspaper, January 16, 1936, 1. 588 Ibid. 104

the country by having projects that will be of a more permanent nature.”589 Even with this

criticism, the editorial still notes how Roosevelt “will never be unseated by the Al Smiths, the

Liberty Leagues, the Father Coughlins or the Herbert Hoovers with their reversed methods of

governmental salesmanship.”590

However, another editorial had a different attitude about 1936. It began by asking its

readers to recall Roosevelt’s inauguration and how “millions of people throughout the land

wildly acclaim him the miracle man sent to remove the nation from the throes of chaos and

disorder.”591 However, three years later, instead of “millions loudly cheering a modern Moses

who has brought peace and security,” there were millions of Americans “faced with serious,

salient conditions that cannot be denied.”592 The reason for this was “not because Mr. Roosevelt

has not tried to do his utmost, but simply because his policies, workable in theory, perhaps, have

become pitifully weak” and unable to offer any substantive relief.593 The editorial ended by remarking that “there must be action, effective, far reaching action,” and if Roosevelt cannot deliver it, then the nation must “turn deaf ears upon the many fantastic, alphabetical divisions of our government and strive to pull ourselves out of the quagmire unassisted by petty political maneuvering.”594 With this continued criticism, the Fostoria Daily Review ran excerpts of some

of Landon’s speeches that illustrated the reasons to vote for Landon, a man they refer to as

having the “heart to conceive, the understanding to direct, and the hand to execute.”595 Several excerpts attacked the New Deal, with one stating, “confidence is far more important than the

589 “Criticism Is Inevitable,” Messenger newspaper, 1. 590 Ibid. 591 “Conditions to Ponder Over,” Messenger newspaper, March 5, 1936, 1. 592 Ibid. 593 Ibid. 594 Ibid. 595 “Why Landon?” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, October 31, 1936, 4. 105 exploitation of a multiplicity of pretentious plans which do not work.”596 Another claimed that

“we need desperately a cheaper, simpler and more responsible relief administration throughout the union.”597 The Union Party was not free from attacks either, with one excerpt stating,

“idealists may have been at the front door preaching social justice, but party henchmen have been at the back door handing out the jobs.”598 Another excerpt criticized Roosevelt’s spending and that “we must consider not only ‘Where is the money going?’ but ‘where is it coming from?’”599

A Sentinel-Tribune editorial also covered Landon’s criticism of Roosevelt’s spending. It began by rhetorically asking its readers that if they could not find time to pay their bills if they asked their wives to and “what would you think, were she to hand it over to some outsider and tell him to do it.”600 To Landon and the editor, that was exactly “what Congress has done with your money and mine” through Roosevelt demanding “blank checks totaling over thirteen billion dollars.”601 The editorial continued its attacks on the New Deal by arguing how “everyone knows of cases of misspending of this public money in his own community,” and it is not hard to see how the New Deal spent $2.12 of every tax dollar and how “it has increased the public debt by more than fifty per cent in three and a half years.”602

Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties’ newspaper editors also recognized the importance of the election and the press’s role in “influencing the voters who have not already made up their minds.”603 An Advertiser-Tribune editorial discussed the importance of “keeping to the middle

596 “Why Landon?” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, 4. 597 Ibid. 598 Ibid. 599 Ibid. 600 “Here’s My Pocketbook,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, October 28, 1936, 2. 601 Ibid. 602 Ibid. 603 “Choose Intelligently,” Messenger newspaper, October 8, 1936, 1. 106

of the road” as a newspaper.604 That newspaper had tried throughout the campaign only to

publish “impartial and unprejudiced news stories,” and any “partisan propaganda, which has

been received by the bale from both parties, has been ignored.”605 The editors also realized that

“the average voter is almost in a daze wondering which road he should take.”606 A significant reason for this was that “both parties are employing the old political method of instilling fear into the minds of the voters.”607 Democrats were warning of “want and hunger” to come with a

Republican victory, while Republicans portrayed “a picture of disaster” through the New Deal’s

“fancy juggling of the constitution and the government and their wild orgy of spending.”608 The

editorial made two suggestions to the voters. The first was to do their “own thinking and cast his

vote according to his own conscience.”609 The second was that “sensible legislators are more

essential than the leader of either party” to ensure a government that works.610 A political

cartoon in the Fostoria Daily Review expressed the exhaustion the election had brought to the

nation. Titled “History Repeats,” in its top panel, it has a World War I soldier exclaiming,

“Hooray! The War’s Over!” with “Armistice Day, Nov. 11, 1918,” rising over the horizon.611 In

its bottom panel, the situation was repeated, except instead of a soldier, it was the American

public, and the rising sun was marked as “Election Day, November 3, 1936.”612

The three parties were also anxious for Election Day to arrive, but not for the same

reason. All three felt that they had, if not a legitimate shot at winning the White House, of at least

performing well enough to be a force for the next four years. For Republicans, their optimism

604 “Middle Of The Road,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, October 31, 1936, 8. 605 Ibid. 606 “Which Way To Go,” Messenger newspaper, September 24, 1936, 1. 607 Ibid. 608 Ibid. 609 Ibid., 4. 610 Ibid., 4. 611 “History Repeats!,” Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, October 28, 1936, 4. 612 Ibid. 107

stretched back to the 1935 election, where Republicans had success, taking the New York State

Assembly and winning several municipal elections in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, including Philadelphia.613 To Republicans and political correspondents, this reflected a lessening

of the “landslide sentiment in his [Roosevelt’s] favor” from the Midwest and an endorsement of

their anti-New Deal platform.614 At least publicly for the Union Party, they continued to assert

that Lemke could defeat Roosevelt, with Father Coughlin proclaiming that “Lemke is three to

one to win the Presidency.”615 Privately, the party’s leaders were a bit more realistic and had

three scenarios they believed could play out in 1936. The first of those was no candidate received

enough electoral votes, which would send the race to the House of Representatives and present

the Union Party with significant bargaining power over who wins. If that failed, the party hoped

to win a sizeable number of Congressional seats and try and force their platform through. If both

failed, they hoped to gain enough votes nationally to allow Landon to defeat their “hated

enemy,” Roosevelt.616 Democrats, however, were not worried about the Union Party. They

believed that their message of not throwing your vote away had dissuaded enough potential

dissidents from doing so. As a Cleveland Plain Dealer editorial asked, who would the Union

Party’s supporters prefer: “Mr. Roosevelt, who has gone further along the path of social justice

than anyone else who ever held the office, or Governor Landon?”617 Roosevelt also believed that

instead of drawing votes from himself, the Union Party would draw them from potential Landon

supporters, as the Union Party had built its base around hatred of Roosevelt.618

613 Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 92. 614 Ibid. 615 Bennett, The Demagogues of the Depression, 210. 616 Ibid., 210. 617 Ibid., 219. 618 Ibid., 218. 108

While all three parties entered Election Day optimistic about their chances, all three

parties were stunned at the “tremendous size of the party victory” for Roosevelt and

Democrats.619 Roosevelt won the “most lopsided electoral victory since the one-party era of the

1820s,” carrying every state but Maine and Vermont and 60 percent of the popular vote.620 The

Sentinel-Tribune ran an article simply titled “The New Deal Wins” and commented it was as if

“some gigantic broom, wielded by some 25,00,000 or more voters, had swept the country clean.”621 Roosevelt’s success reflected down the ticket, with Republicans holding a combined

105 seats in Congress and Democrats claiming 27 of the 36 gubernatorial elections.622 Ohio was

one of those states, with Governor Martin Davey winning reelection by over 116,000 votes, and

it appeared Democrats were “not only going to capture every executive office in Ohio’s

government but were driving hard toward a solid delegation of 24 congressmen.”623

For the Republican and Union Parties, the 1936 election was a national disaster. Landon

won only 36.5 percent of the popular vote and only reached 45 percent in four states: his home

state of Kansas and the solidly Republican states of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont.624

The situation was even grimmer for the Union Party, with under 900,000 people, or under two

percent, voting for Lemke.625 This put them nowhere near able to achieve any of the three

scenarios they had envisioned possible. Lemke had not even been on the ballot in fourteen

states.626 Of the states he was on the ballot, North Dakota, Lemke’s home state, was his highest

619 “The Election,” Findlay Courier newspaper, November 4, 1936, 4. 620 Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus Army and GI Bill, 184. 621 “Roosevelt Victory Is Greatest In History,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 4, 1936, 1. 622 Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 112. 623 “Nearly Clean Sweep By State Democrats,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 4, 1936, 1. 624 Weed, The Nemesis of Reform, 112. 625 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 263. 626 Ibid., 267-268. 109

percentage, taking seven percent of the vote, and only in ten states did he gain more than four

percent of the vote. 627

One of those states in which Lemke reached four percent was Ohio, where he achieved

his most votes, taking 132,212.628 Lemke also had significant support in Hancock, Seneca, and

Wood Counties, receiving over 1,000 from each and between five and ten percent of the total

votes.629 As stated above, two of the Union Party leaders, Father Coughlin and Dr. Townsend,

had considerable support within all three counties. Townsend’s support is evident through the

election results as well. Instead of running a candidate for every office, each separate program

backed candidates from either major party that reflected their values. After the election, the

Townsend National Recovery Plan claimed that 87 of those candidates backed by Townsend clubs had been elected.630 Within Ohio, fourteen of the twenty-four congressmen elected were backed by either the Townsend Club or NUSJ.631

Locally, the Townsend clubs influenced the election, especially in the at-large races. In

1936, Ohio had two statewide congressman-at-large races, with one, called a “full term,” electing the top two candidates, while the other, called a “short term,” only elected one candidate. In the

“full term” race, two Townsend club-supported candidates, Republican George Bender and

Democrat John McSweeney, received considerable support in all three counties. In Hancock

County, Bender received 10,361 votes, with McSweeney tallying 9,579 votes.632 In Seneca

County, both men received more votes than in Hancock County, with 11,506 and 10,097 votes,

627 Bennett, Demagogues in the Depression, 267. 628 Ibid., 268. 629 “Election Results,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 4, 1936, 2; “Unofficial Vote Of Wood County,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, November 4, 1936, 2, & “Complete Vote In Hancock County,” Findlay Courier newspaper, November 5, 1936, 8. 630 “Townsendites Claim 87 They Favored Elected,” Findlay Courier newspaper, November 6, 1936, 1. 631 “Ohio G.O.P. Gets 2 Congress Seats,” Findlay Courier newspaper, November 5, 1936, 1. 632 Ibid. 110

respectively, while both candidates saw their most significant support in Wood County, with

12,046 and 11,262 votes, respectively.633

While Hancock County had the fewest votes for both Bender and McSweeney of the

three counties, that race marked “one of the exceptions in which a state Republican candidate

failed to go out of Hancock with a majority” with L.L. Marshall.634 However, Marshall still

received 9,169 votes in the county, with Seneca County having similar support, with 9,149 votes

for him.635 Like with Bender and McSweeney, Wood County had the most votes for Marshall,

with 11,045.636 Despite Marshall’s defeat, Republicans, including Landon, performed incredibly

well within the three counties. Like the congressional race, the closest contest was Hancock

County, where on November 5, Landon held a 9,932 to 9,931 vote lead over Roosevelt.637 It was

not that close in Seneca or Wood Counties, which Landon carried with 9,952 and 11,618 votes,

respectively.638

However, individual election results are not the best way to view the complete picture of

the 1936 election, especially when one remembers how the race was categorized. It has primarily

been seen as a referendum on Roosevelt and the New Deal, with the Union Party, the anti-

Roosevelt party, and Republicans the anti-New Deal party. Therefore, one should look at the

results, not in terms of three different candidates, but as a yes-no vote on that referendum, with a vote for Roosevelt a yes, and a vote for Lemke or Landon a no. With that, one can see just how sharply Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties rejected Roosevelt and the New Deal. In Hancock

633 “6 Seneca Jobs For GOP; 5 For Dems,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, November 4, 1936, 2, & “Election Returns for Wood County,” Messenger newspaper, November 5, 1936, 1. 634 “Hancock Gives Margin To G.O.P. State Candidates,” Findlay Courier newspaper, 1. 635 “Election Results,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, 2, & “Complete Vote In Hancock County,” Findlay Courier newspaper, 8. 636 “Election Returns for Wood County,” Messenger newspaper, 1. 637 “Hancock Gives Margin To G.O.P. State Candidates,” Findlay Courier newspaper, 1. 638 “Election Results,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, 2, & “Election Returns for Wood County,” Messenger newspaper, 1. 111

County, the one vote lead for Landon suddenly became a 1,008 vote, and an estimated 52.4

percent of the county against the New Deal.639 In Wood County, those numbers were higher, with 55.2 percent opposed to the New Deal, and Seneca County had the most considerable opposition, with 59.7 percent of voters in rejection of the New Deal.640

The question then becomes: why did these counties so strongly vote against Roosevelt

and the New Deal? According to Sternsher, the answer to this lay in the counties’ residents

viewing a vote against Roosevelt as a way to express their “resentment of ‘an alien kind of

general change’ and of defending rural and small-town values.”641 He further argues that many

of the residents viewed government as “the bane of their existence” due to taxes and that

government “as they saw it, provided little in return except restrictions and controls,” specifically

regarding farming.642 Sternsher also points to their rejection in terms of “cultural” rather than

economic means, in that the residents held a “resentment of aid to labor and city people” and the

failures of the New Deal programs, like the AAA, CWA, and others, to provide relief for farmers

and rural Americans.643 Journalist George Melloan furthers this, stating that “farm-village life in an agrarian era” provided its residents with “resilience in coping with adversity.” He continues with how “the intimacy of a small community taught us to recognize and respect differences and to distrust absolutism.”644 Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties’ residents represent this, and it is because of the perceived corruption the New Deal had on traditional American values that led them to reject Roosevelt and the New Deal in 1936.

639 “Complete Vote In Hancock County,” Findlay Courier newspaper, November 5, 1936, 8. 640 “Unofficial Vote Of Wood County,” Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, 2, & “Election Results,” Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, 2. 641 Sternsher, “The Harding and Bricker Revolutions,” 26. 642 Ibid., 25. 643 Ibid., 3. 644 George Melloan, When the New Deal Came to Town: A Snapshot of a Place and Time with Lessons for Today, (New York: Threshold Editions, 2016), 224. 112

CONCLUSION

Theodore Roosevelt once said, “I think there is only one thing in the world I can’t understand, and that is Ohio politics.”645 Ohio has, and continues to, play a significant role in national politics. Thus, it is essential to understand how its citizens voted historically, including from 1929 to 1936. During that period, the United States underwent significant challenges and experienced fundamental changes to many national institutions. These challenges and changes sparked intense debate over their impact on traditional American values. For Hancock, Seneca, and Wood counties’ citizens, these traditional American values were regarded as the best solutions to economic problems. If federal relief was deemed necessary, it should only provide enough to allow those values to resume their effectiveness.

This study raised several critical questions that guided the research: how were Hancock,

Seneca, and Wood Counties affected by the Great Depression and New Deal? How did the newspapers present the New Deal and other proposed solutions to the Depression? These two questions allowed for an understanding of the impacts of the Depression in the counties. They also drove the next set of questions: how did the residents view the impacts of the Depression?

Was the Depression something that a stronger work ethic could beat? Or did the Depression require more relief in order to alleviate it? Who was responsible for that relief: the individual, the local community, or the state/federal governments?

This project shows that the Depression impacted Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties through several means, but one of the more critical means was concern about the future, not only for regional citizens but the nation’s citizens as well. This, coupled with Hoover’s inability to present a clear path to a quick recovery, led to the advocacy of numerous, sometimes radical,

645 Kondik, The Bellwether, 131. 113

solutions to the Depression, culminating in Roosevelt’s victory nationally and within the

counties in 1932. Initially, the New Deal was met with acclaim and viewed by the counties’

residents as able to end the Depression. However, the counties’ attitude swiftly changed

concerning the New Deal, and it came under intense criticism for its effects on the traditional

American values of hard work and limited government. Because of the perceived corrosion of

these values by Roosevelt and the New Deal, these counties rejected them in 1936.

Within the scholarship, this study highlights several topics that need to be researched.

One is to continue to examine Midwestern counties in the New Deal. Was what occurred in

Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties unique to them? Or were there other areas that exhibited

the same response as them? Even though Roosevelt won a historic victory in 1936, it is still

essential to understand the criticisms of Roosevelt and the New Deal. Another research area is to

broaden this study by including neighboring counties or expanding the period examined. Were

these three counties unique in Northwest Ohio? How significant of a difference was there

between Lucas County, Toledo’s home, the largest city within Northwest Ohio, and the

surrounding rural counties? How is the “Roosevelt recession” and his attempts to pack the

Supreme Court interpreted by the counties’ newspapers? Did the escalation in Europe and World

War II impact how these counties viewed Roosevelt, especially when he ran for a third and

fourth term?

This research area also highlights some of the challenges that faced this study, especially given the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. Initially, this study focused on including

Sandusky County due to its similar demographics to the other counties. However, it was impossible to collect enough primary sources from within the county to understand it because of the pandemic. A similar situation unfolded regarding the city of Fostoria, located on the border 114 of all three counties. While some previous research had been conducted, there was indeed a gap in the material. The closure of Fostoria library’s research section prevented any additional research from being conducted. The archives’ lack of access impacted this study’s depth, mainly through time constraints for visits. Both the Seneca and Wood County public libraries placed time constraints upon visitation of fifty and thirty minutes, respectively. Because of this, specific events and dates were prioritized concerning those counties’ newspapers. However, extensive previous research had been conducted before the pandemic, and the availability of Bellevue and

Findlay’s newspapers online allowed for confidence that the project could still be conducted and present accurate findings.

While these challenges impacted the project’s scope, but by no means should they take away from its findings. Extensive primary and secondary research was conducted to understand how the Great Depression and New Deal impacted Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties. That research revealed that the Depression had a significant impact upon the residents’ concern for the future and that Roosevelt and the New Deal in 1932 were seen as an answer to that concern.

However, while initially seen in a positive light, both Roosevelt and the New Deal garnered intense criticism over their corrosive effect on the traditional American values of hard work and limited government. To the residents of these counties, these were essential values that must be maintained and were believed to be a path to ending the Depression. Because of this, they rejected Roosevelt and the New Deal in the 1936 election.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources-Newspapers

Hancock County

Findlay Courier newspaper, Findlay, Ohio. 1933-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, and Findlay-Hancock County Public Library, Ohio.

Findlay Morning Republican newspaper, Ohio. 1928-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Findlay- Hancock County Public Library, Ohio.

Findlay Republican Courier newspaper, Findlay, Ohio. 1928-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, and Findlay-Hancock County Public Library, Ohio.

Fostoria Daily Review newspaper, Ohio. 1932-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Kaubisch Memorial Public Library, Fostoria, Ohio. -also in Seneca and Wood Counties

Seneca County

Advertiser-Tribune newspaper, Tiffin, Ohio. 1933-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, and Tiffin-Seneca Public Library, Ohio.

Bellevue Gazette newspaper, Ohio. 1930-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Bellevue Public Library, Ohio.

Tiffin Daily Advertiser newspaper, Tiffin, Ohio. 1928-1932. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, and Tiffin-Seneca Public Library, Ohio.

Tiffin Daily Tribune newspaper, Ohio. 1928-1933. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, and Tiffin-Seneca Public Library, Ohio.

Wood County

Bee Gee News student newspaper, Bowling Green, Ohio. 1929-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

Bradner Advocate newspaper, Ohio. 1929-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Wood County Public Library, Bowling Green, Ohio.

Messenger newspaper, Perrysburg, Ohio. 1935-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Way Public Library, Perrysburg, Ohio. 116

Perrysburg Journal newspaper, Ohio, 1929-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Way Public Library, Perrysburg, Ohio.

Risingsun Unique Weekly newspaper, Ohio. 1929-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Wood County Public Library, Bowling Green, Ohio.

Sentinel-Tribune newspaper, Bowling Green, Ohio. 1928-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, and Wood County Public Library, Bowling Green, Ohio.

Wood County Republican newspaper, Bowling Green, Ohio. 1929-1936. Microfilm. Accessed at Center of Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

Primary Sources-Other Works

Arpad, Joseph J. Southern Wood County Oral History Project. Fresno, CA: Archival Books. 1994.

Falconer, J. I. “Twenty Years of Ohio Agriculture 1910-1930.” Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station. Bulletin 526. July 1933. http://hdl.handle.net/1811/60973.

Malcolm, Harold R. We Planned It That Way. New York: D. Ryerson, Inc., 1940. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/102359641.

The Ohio Guide. American Guide Series. New York: Oxford University Press. 1940.

The United States and the Federal Civil Works Administration. Federal Civil Works Administration Rules and Regulations no. 1. Washington: US Government Print Office. 1933. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015036666975.

The United States and the Rural Electrification Administration. First Annual Report: Rural Electrification Administration. Washington. 1937. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hl35fi.

The United States Government. 1930 Census. Ohio Agriculture and Population sections. https://www.census.gov/library/publications.html#.html.

Wiltse, Charles M. Prosperity Far Distant: The Journal of an Ohio Farmer, 1933-1934. Edited by Michael J. Birkner. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. 2012.

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