COUNTRY REPORT
Tanzania Comoros
2nd quarter 1998
The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through specific research reports, whether for general release or for particular clients; through electronic publishing; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group.
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Contents
3 Summary
Tanzania
4 Political structure 5 Economic structure 6 Outlook for 1998-99 10 Review 10 The political scene 12 The economy 15 Agriculture 17 Energy and mining 19 Foreign trade and payments
Comoros
22 Political structure 23 Economic structure 24 Outlook for 1998-99 25 Review 25 The political scene 29 The economy
31 Quarterly indicators and trade data
List of tables 8 Tanzania: forecast summary (domestic) 9 Tanzania: forecast summary (external) 13 Tanzania: IMF selected economic indicators 13 Tanzania: actual and seasonally adjusted inflation 14 Tanzania: government finances 16 Tanzania: lint output forecasts by region, 1998/99 19 Tanzania: trends in foreign trade 20 Tanzania: external debt 25 Comoros: the new cabinet, May 1998 30 Comoros: total foreign debt 31 Tanzania: quarterly indicators of economic activity 31 Comoros: quarterly indicators of economic activity 32 Tanzania: foreign trade 33 Tanzania: UK trade 34 Comoros: foreign trade 34 Comoros: French trade
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 2
List of figures 9 Tanzania: gross domestic product 9 Tanzania: Tanzanian shilling real exchange rates 25 Comoros: gross domestic product 25 Comoros: Comorean franc real exchange rates
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June 8th 1998 Summary
2nd quarter 1998
Tanzania Outlook for 1998-99: President Mkapa will come under increasing pressure from international donors and multilaterals to reduce corruption in public life. Crucial aid inflows and food relief, required in the wake of a poor 1997/98 harvest due to the El Niño weather phenomenon, are unlikely to materialise unless progress is made on this front. Although the Zanzibari president, Mr Amour, has made some encouraging concessions, his failure to release detainees held on spurious treason charges will stoke political tensions on the semi-autonomous islands.
Review: The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has requested that the Civic United Front (CUF) respect the Zanzibari constitution and accept the legiti- macy of Mr Amour’s presidency. Tensions in Zanzibar have increased in the run-up to the treason trials. The government has denounced religious riots staged by the Muslim community in protest against ill-treatment of women. Relations between Tanzania and Rwanda and Burundi have failed to improve. Burundi has maintained claims that refugee camps in northern Tanzania are being used to train interhamwe rebels. The IMF has withheld the second tranche of Tanzania’s enhanced structural adjustment facility. There was fiscal im- provement in the first quarter of 1998, with revenue rising to $90m. The Dar es Salaam stock exchange has been launched. Mr Mkapa has promised assistance to help coffee growers to double output within five years. The World Bank has remained adamant on the Independent Power Tanzania Ltd (IPTL) issue, while the government has assured it that the contract will be renegotiated with the Malaysian company concerned. There has been further foreign investment in the mining sector, although there is increasing concern about poor safety standards. The trade deficit narrowed slightly in 1997, while the total external debt stock fell slightly.
Comoros Outlook for 1998-99: President Taki will continue to face substantial polit- ical problems, and in particular the impasse over secessionist demands by the archipelago’s second-largest island, Anjouan. A threatened new phase of civil disobedience—involving the non-payment of taxes—will exacerbate economic difficulties, but splits in the opposition suggest that the president’s position is secure, for the time being at least.
Review: A cabinet reshuffle has cleared out government veterans and brought a prominent Anjouannais politician into government. However, this has failed to defuse the antagonism of secessionists or Moroni-based opposition leaders, and external efforts to break the deadlock have proved futile. Protests over salary arrears have spread from civil servants to the military, increasing the likelihood of further political instability, while the IMF and World Bank have slated the government’s mishandling of its finances, suggesting that donors are unlikely to extend assistance in the short term.
Editor: Pratibha Thaker All queries: Tel: (44.171) 830 1007 Fax: (44.171) 830 1023
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 4 Tanzania
Tanzania
Political structure
Official name United Republic of Tanzania
Form of state Republic, formed by the 1964 union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar
Legal system Based on English common law, the 1977 Union and 1985 Zanzibari constitutions, as amended
National legislature National Assembly, comprising 269 members (232 directly elected and 37 women appointed); elected members are chosen by Union-wide adult suffrage every five years; Zanzibar has its own House of Representatives of 59 members (nine women appointees), which legislates on internal matters
National elections October-November 1995 (legislative and presidential); next elections due by 2000 (legislative and presidential)
Head of state President, elected by universal adult suffrage every five years
National government The president, vice-president and Council of Ministers; last cabinet reshuffle February 1997
Main political parties The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM); Civic United Front (CUF); National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi); United Democratic Party (UDP); Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)
President Benjamin Mkapa Vice-president Omar Ali Juma Prime minister Frederick Sumaye
Key ministers Agriculture & co-operatives Paul Kimiti Communications & transport William Kusila Community development, women’s affairs & children Mary Nagu Defence Edgar Majogo Education Juma Kapuya Energy & minerals Abdallah Kigoda Finance & planning Daniel Yona Foreign affairs Jakaya Kikwete Health Aaron Chiduo Home affairs Ali Ameir Mohammed Industry & trade William Shija Justice & constitutional affairs Bakari Mwapachu Labour & youth development Sebastian Kinyondo Lands, housing & urban development Gideon Cheyo Natural resources & tourism Zakia Meghji Science, technology & higher education Jackson Makweta Water & livestock development Pius Ng’wandu Works Anna Abdallah
Central bank governor Idris Rashid
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Economic structure
Latest available figures
Economic indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a GDP at market pricesb (TSh bn) 1,404 1,823 2,395 2,999a 3,649 Real GDP growthb (%) 3.9 3.0 4.5 4.7 3.1 Consumer price inflationb (av; %) 25.3 33.0 29.8 19.6 16.1c Population (m) 28.0 28.8 29.7a 30.6a 31.5 Exports fob ($ m) 439 519 683 764 717 Imports cif ($ m) 1,540 1,540 1,576 1,388 1,338c Current-account balance ($ m) –770 –681 –629 –511 –570 Reserves excl gold ($ m) 203.3 332.1 270.2 440.1 622.1c Total external debt ($ m) 6,798 7,257 7,430 7,412 7,779 External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 35.9 21.5 20.8 18.7 13.7 Coffee productiond (’000 tonnes) 47.9 48.5 43.5 52.0 12.3 Cotton (lint) productiond (’000 tonnes) 68.8 48.4 44.5 84.2 n/a Exchange rate (av; TSh:$) 405 510 575 580 612c
June 5th 1998 TSh644.45:$1
Origins of gross domestic product 1996a % of total Components of gross domestic product 1994a % of total Agriculture, forestry & fishing 55.7 Private consumption 89.6 Mining 1.4 Government consumption 7.7 Manufacturing 6.5 Gross fixed capital formation 27.5 Construction & utilities 7.0 Increase in stocks 3.2 Trade & hotels 7.1 Exports of goods & non-factor services 26.4 Transport & communications 14.7 Imports of goods & non-factor services –54.4 GDP at factor cost incl others 100.0 GDP at market prices 100.0
Principal exports 1996 $ m Principal imports 1996 $ m Coffee 137.8 Machinery & transport equipment 458.5 Cotton 137.6 Consumer goods 361.8 Manufactures 110.8 Industrial raw materials 349.3 Cashew nuts 93.8 Petroleum & products 158.4 Minerals 50.4 Building materials 42.5
Main destinations of exports 1996e % of total Main origins of imports 1996e % of total India 9.1 South Africa 12.6 Germany 8.1 Kenya 9.9 Japan 7.3 UK 8.0 Malaysia 6.0 Saudi Arabia 6.4 Rwanda 5.3 Japan 4.8 Netherlands 4.7 China 4.0 a EIU estimates. b Mainland only. c Actual. d Crop years ending June. e Based on partners’ trade returns; subject to a wide margin of error.
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Outlook for 1998-99
Mr Mkapa will be urged to Over the coming months the president, Benjamin Mkapa, is likely to come tackle corruption under increasing pressure to tackle corruption in government and the public sector. The Bretton Woods institutions and more recently the EU, Tanzania’s largest source of development assistance, have reiterated concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability of several major recent investment decisions, notably the Independent Power Tanzania Ltd (IPTL) deal (see Energy and mining), and have indicated that concrete measures must be taken to reduce corruption at all levels of government and public-sector activity. While the recommendations of a second report on official corruption by the Warioba commission (headed by a former prime minister, Joseph Warioba) have yet to be implemented, international donors and multilaterals are holding Mr Mkapa to electoral promises made in 1995 to eradicate corruption from Tanzanian public life. Tougher action can be expected by the Mkapa administration on the corruption issue. In the context of a poor harvest due to erratic weather conditions associated with the El Niño oceanic current—torrential rains in the north, drought and famine in the south—the government can ill afford to alienate donors, and it is likely that several moderately serious cases of graft will be exposed in the second half of 1998. However, it remains to be seen whether Mr Mkapa will muster the courage to mount a more comprehensive anti-corruption campaign, which would probably affect the upper echelons of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. The president will have to try to balance the exigencies of domestic political expediency, which means ignor- ing more pervasive, entrenched patterns of graft, and bowing to international pressure to clean up government and the public sector.
There may be a Although no lasting solution to the “Zanzibari question” is likely to materialise breakthrough on the without the removal of Salmin Amour, the president who was returned to office “Zanzibari question”— in the highly dubious national elections of November 1995, a breakthrough in the impasse now seems possible. After several weeks of shuttle diplomacy be- tween the Tanzanian capital, Dar es Salaam, and the semi-autonomous islands, Moses Anafu, a special envoy to the region dispatched by the Commonwealth, has indicated that Mr Amour is willing to concede many of the demands advanced by the opposition Civic United Front (CUF). The president has report- edly agreed to the reform of the electoral commission and judiciary, the review of electoral laws and the Zanzibari constitution, and the improvement of the islands’ human rights record. This last concession will have come as a particular relief to Mr Mkapa. The “Zanzibari question” and alleged human rights abuses on the islands have elicited increasing criticism from the international commu- nity in recent months, and Mr Mkapa is probably concerned—with good reason—that key donors and multilateral organisations will use the speedy resolution of the Zanzibari political impasse as a condition for further relief and development assistance. The Norwegian government, for example, announced a $28m aid package to Tanzania in late March, but stipulated that the funds will be withheld until the crisis is resolved.
—but major obstacles While Mr Amour’s apparent willingness to entertain several concessions is an remain encouraging development, he has made it clear that his resignation from the
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presidency will not be a consideration in any negotiations. The CCM has also yet to indicate whether it will consider relinquishing any of the ten seats it holds in the Zanzibari legislature, the House of Representatives, as requested by the CUF. Another key point of contention remains the fate of the 17 CUF members detained by the CCM on treason charges. Not only has the CCM failed to produce any substantive evidence of the detainees’ alleged involve- ment in an “external plot”, but there are growing concerns among locals and international aid agencies about the conditions of their imprisonment.
There is little evidence as yet that Mr Mkapa is willing to intervene formally in the Zanzibari crisis. The Tanzanian president probably calculates that most islanders have by now reconciled themselves to the fact that Mr Amour is unlikely to be removed from office. If, however, Mr Amour rescinds on the apparent olive branch which he has extended to the CUF in the form of concessions, and if the detainees’ trials involve blatant abuses of the judiciary to further the CCM’s political ends, further instability on Zanzibar is almost certain.
Peace talks should Amid escalating tensions between the Tanzanian and Burundian governments mitigate tensions with (Burundi remains adamant that refugee camps in north-west Tanzania are Burundi being used to train rebel Hutu militia) a date has been set for peace talks, to be hosted by the former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere. The confirmation in mid-May that the Burundian military leader and head of state, Pierre Buyoya, would attend the talks on June 15th suggests that both parties are approaching the negotiations with the intention of settling disputes, in contrast to the spate of accusations and counter-accusations traded in recent months. Mr Nyerere now faces the task of building confidence between the two sides, but it will prove a difficult task given that Mr Buyoya boycotted talks in August 1997 owing to security concerns and Mr Nyerere’s alleged bias. The Tanzanian government probably has more to lose than Mr Buyoya if the peace talks collapse. Regardless of whether the camps are being used for military training purposes—after several inspections, UN observers maintain that they are not— it is in Mr Mkapa’s interest to find a quick solution to the diplomatic crisis. Notwithstanding the relief efforts of the international donor community, the refugee population in north-west Tanzania, which numbers an estimated 180,000, represents a significant burden on the country’s already stretched resources. Moreover, security questions throughout the region may begin to thwart foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mining sector, which the govern- ment has struggled to attract since the mid-1990s.
Fiscal and monetary Improved fiscal performance in the first quarter of 1998 attests to the govern- austerity measures will ment’s determination to keep to revenue and expenditure targets set by the remain in place— Bretton Woods institutions (see The economy). The most recent available official data from the Bank of Tanzania (BoT, the central bank) confirm that monetary and fiscal austerity measures have begun to pay dividends, notwith- standing the strain put on government finances by the El Niño weather phenomenon, which has caused food shortages and widespread damage to in- frastructure, in northern Tanzania particularly. Although it is too soon to assess the full impact of the reduced 1997/98 harvest on current revenue, the fact that the government has stuck to tough targets has not escaped the notice of the
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Bank and the Fund. Relations between the government and the two institutions will nevertheless remain somewhat strained until the IPTL contract is renegoti- ated. By linking the disbursement of further funds under Tanzania’s enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) agreed with the IMF in November 1996 to the hasty resolution of the IPTL fiasco, the Fund has indicated that good govern- ance and sound decision-making applies to more than the efficient manage- ment of public finances.
Meanwhile, the government will redouble efforts to attract FDI inflows, in the mining sector particularly. Fresh mining legislation aimed at simplifying the regulatory environment and facilitating the entry of new players should help to entice investors, but a sustained effort will be required if foreigners are to be convinced that backhanders and corruption are the exception and not the rule in Tanzania. The government is also notionally committed to the reduction of red tape, which currently dissuades many potential investors. However, the implementation of relevant legislation is tricky, since it implies a reduction in opportunities for patronage.
Tanzania: forecast summary (domestic)a (% change, year on year) 1996b 1997c 1998d 1999d GDP at factor cost 4.7 3.1 3.9 5.0 Agriculture 5.4e 1.3 2.0 2.8 Industry 4.1c 4.5 9.3 2.3 Services 4.3c 4.2 4.4 6.9 Consumer prices (av) 19.6 16.1 14.0 15.0
a Mainland only. b Actual. c EIU estimates. d EIU forecasts. e National estimate.
—but inflation will The disruption of key transport links and widespread damage to crops will remain in double digits— continue to stoke food-related inflation in the coming months. The latest available seasonally adjusted inflation statistics from the BoT point to a dra- matic increase in underlying food-related inflation at the end of the first quarter, suggesting that the extent of damage caused to arable areas by El Niño was initially underestimated. Nevertheless, the EIU has revised its projections for average consumer price inflation downwards to 14% in 1998, although inflation is then expected to creep up to 15% in 1999. While there appears to be a consensus among meteorological experts that weather patterns will im- prove in the second half of 1998 and 1999, such has been the devastation to the agriculture sector since late 1997 that the 1998/99 harvest is likely to be mediocre at best. However, indications are that the reconstruction of roads and bridges is already well under way, and there is evidence that the circulation of food and foodstuffs has begun to improve, easing inflationary pressures.
—and the prospects for Although it is important to reiterate that the overall impact of El Niño makes economic growth are for imprecise projections of average real GDP growth in 1998, the EIU has limited revised its forecast downwards slightly to 3.9%, reflecting the more pessimistic outlook for the agriculture sector. A recovery in the production of key cash crops such as cotton and coffee is not anticipated before 2000 because plants and bushes have been damaged so severely by the excessive moisture. More- over, lower revenue in the smallholder farming sector, which accounts for the
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majority of agricultural activity in Tanzania, will reduce farmers’ ability to purchase crucial fertilisers and seeds for replanting. The government has indi- cated its willingness to assist smallholder farmers, in the coffee sector partic- ularly, but with resources already stretched to the limit, the financing of palliative measures will be impossible without donor funding. Meanwhile, the industrial sector will continue to be hampered by intermittent power short- ages, which in turn are unlikely to be rectified until the IPTL saga is resolved. We continue to expect stronger economic expansion in 1999, on the back of hefty investment in the mining sector; however, our projections may prove over-optimistic if weather conditions fail to improve.
The current-account Although revenue from traditional exports such as cotton and coffee will be deficit is still expected to significantly reduced in 1997/98, healthy growth in the mining sector should narrow help to offset the shortfalls. Merchandise imports will rise considerably over the forecast period, to $1.5bn in 1999, reflecting increased purchases of food and of key factor inputs, primarily for the energy sector. Debt-service payments will bolster the invisibles deficit; however, portfolio inflows are expected to increase steadily throughout the forecast period following the March launch of the Dar es Salaam stock exchange. We continue to expect the current-account deficit to narrow slightly, to $552m in 1998 and $530m in 1999.
Tanzania: forecast summary (external) ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1996a 1997b 1998c 1999c Merchandise exports fob 764 717 951 1,027 of which: coffee 138 117 90 100 cotton 138 116 95 110 manufactures 111 104 145 160 Merchandise imports fob1,213 1,338 1,407 1,500 Current-account balance –511 –570 –552 –530 Exchange rate (av; TSh:$) 580 612a 640 670
a Actual. b Provisional. c EIU forecasts.
Tanzania: gross domestic product Tanzania: Tanzanian shilling real % change, year on year exchange rates (d) 1990=100 6 Tanzania (a) Africa 150 5 140 TSh:$ 4 130 3 120 2 110 1 KSh:$ 100 n/a 0 1995 96 97(b) 98(c) 99(c) 90 (a) Mainland only. (b) EIU estimates. (c) EIU forecasts. (d) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices. R:$ Sources: EIU; IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Economic Outlook. 1990 91 92 93 94 95 9697(b) 97 98(c) 98 99(c) 99
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Review
The political scene
The “Zanzibari question” Evidence that the so-called Zanzibari question continues to preoccupy the remains unresolved— ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party emerged in late February, when the CCM National Executive Council (NEC) identified political instability on the semi-autonomous islands as a key hindrance to peace and security in Tanzania. In particular, the NEC specified the intransigence of the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) over the issue of the re-election of the Zanzibari president, Salmin Amour, in dubious polls in 1995 (4th quarter 1997, page 10) as a central obstacle not only to normalising the political process in Zanzibar itself but also to healing relations between Zanzibar and the mainland. The CCM reiterated what has now become a familiar request: that the CUF, in accordance with the constitution, respect the results of the 1995 presidential election and end its boycott of the islands’ legislature, the House of Representatives. Almost three years on from the ballot, which remains central to the Zanzibari question, the CUF has probably recognised that there is little likelihood of ousting Mr Amour, notwithstanding the widespread acknowledgement throughout Tanzania that the election was highly suspect.
—but inflammatory The fact that the NEC identified the island of Pemba as the locus of anti-CCM remarks add insult to sentiment and activity, and as a political centre from which the rejection of the injury— 1995 election results emanated, merely added to Zanzibaris’ indignation. Tem- pers flared further when Mr Amour declared that political stability in Tanzania was dependent upon the CCM winning all future elections. As if that pro- nouncement were not inflammatory enough, the president exacerbated the situation by couching his comments in rhetorical and anachronistic terms, pontificating that CCM incumbency was fundamental to the furthering of the Tanzanian revolution.
—as tensions mount over The trials of the 17 detained CUF members accused of staging an “external pending treason trials plot” to destabilise Zanzibar (1st quarter 1998, page 10) were delayed by the state prosecutor in early March, on the grounds that additional evidence had to be procured and that other suspects, reportedly on the mainland, needed to be apprehended. Little attention was paid to the vociferous objections of the defence until the UK Foreign Office minister with responsibility for Africa, Tony Lloyd, arrived on an official visit to Tanzania in late March and urged the government to acknowledge its role in the Zanzibari question. Mr Lloyd ex- pressed his concerns about the precarious state of human rights in Tanzania, echoing diplomatic counterparts in Dar es Salaam and abroad, and indicated that there was particular concern over the fate of the detainees. The fact that the evidence in this case is especially spurious has done little to improve either the perception of Tanzania’s human rights record or the judiciary’s reputation as unaccountable and opaque.
The government Riots broke out in Dar es Salaam in late March when members of the Muslim denounces religious riots community protested against the banning of a meeting of the Committee of
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Muslim Women (CMW). The demonstrators, who set fire to two government vehicles and two CCM municipal offices, were also protesting against the “humiliation of Muslim women”, and the alleged sexual humiliation and tor- ture of women held in police custody after a similar incident in February. The use of tear gas to disperse protesters—several of whom were arrested—has heightened Muslims’ perception that the Tanzanian authorities are actively discriminatory, and that Muslims regularly suffer from “government suppres- sion”. Platitudes offered by the vice-president, Omar Ali Juma, and his assertion that peace and unity in the country were being jeopardised by the activities of the Muslim community did little to reduce demonstrators’ ire. Mr Juma went on to add that it was only through the promotion of education that Muslims would escape poverty, but he did not indicate where the resources for improved educ- ational opportunities were to be found. The subsequent decision to arrest and expel Muslim foreigners without appropriate residence status did nothing to reduce tensions, although the government explained that these were precau- tionary measures intended to neutralise the threat of Islamism. Meanwhile, the Muslim Council of Tanzania (MCT) accused various Saudi Arabian and Libyan Islamic organisations of fuelling tensions in the country, although both embas- sies in Dar es Salaam vigorously denied the charges.
Relations with Rwanda Notwithstanding the efforts of the local office of the UN High Commissioner and Burundi remain for Refugees (UNHCR), relations between Tanzania and Rwanda and Burundi tense— remain strained (1st quarter 1998, page 11). In mid-March the Tanzanian government issued a warning to the Rwandan and Burundian authorities that refugee camps in Tanzania would be closed immediately if there were any further allegations that they were being used as bases for military training of Hutu rebels. Amid accusations and counter-accusations that the Rwandan and Burundian governments had established training camps for rebels in north- west Tanzania, the UNHCR vigorously denied that the camps were housing anyone other than refugees seeking political asylum in Tanzania. The assertion gained credence when the UN high commissioner herself, Sadako Ogata, vis- ited the camps in early April and warned inmates to desist from political or military activity. Later that month the UNHCR announced plans to finance the construction of two police stations in the Kigoma region in order to monitor the camps more closely. The fact that in mid-April the Tanzanian government transferred around 30 Burundian refugees from Kibondo to Tabora for closer surveillance suggests that illicit activities of some sort have been occurring in the camps; however, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from a remote, volatile region in which various competing interest groups are operating.
—as security in the border Tensions between the three governments escalated again when the Burundian area deteriorates authorities accused a group of rebels of attempting to infiltrate the border in Mukerezi. According to soldiers from the Burundian national army the rebels were rebuffed, but three were killed in skirmishes. Fears of a further deterioration in border area security increased when reports emerged that a refugee camp established at Mbuba was housing around 1,200 interhamwe Hutu militia mem- bers and former Forces armée rwandaises (FAR) soldiers. Although the precise nature of Hutu rebel activity in the Lake Victoria area remains uncertain, it is
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widely acknowledged that it contains numerous opponents of Pierre Buyoya, the president of Burundi.
Moreover, while the assistance or complicity of certain Tanzanian elements in the Hutu cause has not been disproved, the continuing disruptions in the region are a source of understandable frustration for the Tanzanian government for two reasons. First, the government is more dependent than ever on continued devel- opment assistance from international donors owing to the poor 1997/98 har- vest, which has been severely affected by adverse weather conditions associated with El Niño. Second, increased foreign interest in the Tanzanian mining sector has centred on major finds of gold, predominantly in the Lake Victoria area. Foreign mining operators are likely to be dissuaded from undertaking pros- pecting activity if concerns over political stability in the region persist.
An outbreak of diseases In early March more than 20 people died when a particularly virulent form of plagues northern Tanzania malaria, accompanied by the equally deadly rift valley fever, swept through northern Tanzania. Health authorities in Arusha battled to stop the epidemic by distributing medication and vaccinations, and by launching information campaigns, but four districts in the region were nevertheless cordoned off and kept in quarantine. Meanwhile, a fatal epidemic appeared in the Lake Victoria area, claiming almost 700 lives. Local health officials have been unable to identify the illness, but victims have reportedly complained of malarial-type symptoms that make particularly rapid progress.
The economy
The second tranche of the After concluding a mid-term review of the enhanced structural adjustment ESAF is temporarily facility (ESAF) agreed with Tanzania in late 1996 (4th quarter 1996, page 13) withheld— the IMF indicated that approval for the release of the remaining portion of the second tranche was expected soon (1st quarter 1998, page 12). However, by early April negotiations between the IMF and the government had broken down, with the former chastising the Mkapa administration for its handling of an outlandish $163m deal that it had signed with Independent Power Tanzania Ltd (IPTL), backed by Malaysian interests (see Energy and mining). In the context of widespread flooding and resultant infrastructural damage in north- ern Tanzania, it was clear that the IMF was hesitant to withhold the funds, which have been increased to $23m owing to the extenuating circumstances, but such was the outcry from IMF officials and international donors at the inappropriateness and expense of the IPTL deal that the Fund decided to sus- pend the talks. By mid-May, however, IMF officials and the minister of finance, Daniel Yona, had reportedly drafted a letter of intent, with a view to releasing the funds by June.
—and El Niño puts IMF Since the ESAF was agreed with the Mkapa administration in 1996 the IMF has growth targets beyond been particularly strict where the meeting of key targets is concerned (1st reach— quarter 1998, page 12). However, even the Fund has acknowledged that the targets set for real GDP growth and inflation for 1997/98 and 1998/99 are probably unrealistic owing to widespread damage caused by adverse weather conditions. The disruption to transport links which has impaired access to key
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factor inputs and hampered the mobility of goods in many areas, and food and foodstuffs in particular, means that the original target of 4.7% average real GDP growth in 1997/98 is probably optimistic. Moreover, the drought conditions which have affected southern parts of the country have meant that consider- able resources have had to be diverted for relief efforts in order to prevent a full-scale famine.
Tanzania: IMF selected economic indicators
1996/97 1997/98a 1998/99a Real GDP (%) 3.9 4.7 5.7 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 17.1 13.0 7.8 Budget balance (% of GDP) 2.3 0.5 0.2 Current-account balance (excl official transfers; % of GDP) –12.4 –14.4 –12.1 Gross official reserves ($ bn) 2.6 2.9 3.7
a IMF forecasts.
Sources: Tanzanian government; IMF.
—but inflation holds According to the latest available data from the Bank of Tanzania (BoT, the its own central bank), year-on-year inflation continued to fall steadily between January and March, declining from 15.2% to 13.4%, while underlying average con- sumer price rises, excluding food-related inflation, recorded a fall from 11.1% to 4.1%. In line with earlier EIU projections (1st quarter 1998, page 13), season- ally adjusted food-related inflation jumped from 10.5% to 19.9% in the first quarter of 1998, while the year-on-year index fell slightly from 17.7% to 16.1%. Notwithstanding the damage to the road network, in northern Tanzania partic- ularly, it appears that supplies of basic food and foodstuffs improved slightly towards the end of the first quarter.
Tanzania: actual and seasonally adjusted inflation (% change) Year on year Seasonally adjusted Non- Under- Under- Month on Headline food lying food lying food month 1997 Jan 14.0 15.4 13.5 17.4 0.3 Feb 13.8 16.9 12.6 18.2 1.8 Mar 17.5 18.5 17.2 25.3 4.5 1998 Jan 15.2 9.0 17.7 10.5 0.3 Feb 14.7 7.9 17.4 11.2 1.3 Mar 13.4 6.1 16.1 19.9 3.2 Sources: Bureau of Statistics; Bank of Tanzania.
Meanwhile, at a meeting of Tanzanian, Kenyan and Ugandan central bank governors in Dar es Salaam in early April, the governments of the three East African Cooperation (EAC) member states were urged to monitor inflation developments closely. The first report issued by the EAC monetary affairs com- mittee set the target of average EAC zone inflation rates of less than 5% a year by 2000.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 14 Tanzania
Fiscal performance According to latest available data from the BoT, the government’s fiscal per- improves in the first formance improved considerably in March 1998, with revenue reaching quarter— TSh58bn ($90m), 34% up on the previous month. Although the increase was certainly encouraging, it was largely attributable to quarterly income tax obli- gations which were due for collection at the end of the quarter, and was still TSh5bn below the revised government target for March. On a cumulative basis, government revenue for the period July 1997-March 1998 reached TSh461bn, or around 92% of the revised target. While the Bretton Woods institutions have repeatedly insisted on the importance of meeting revenue targets, they are likely to be lenient in the context of the downturn in economic perform- ance associated with El Niño. On the expenditure front, the government had by March only disbursed 53% of budgeted spending of TSh928bn for 1997/98, largely because of lagging inflows of donor assistance. Recurrent expenditure (including amortisation) increased marginally between February and March, climbing some 8% from TSh56bn to TSh60.6bn, but there is still concern that expenditure levels in key sectors, and notably health and education, remain insufficient.
Tanzania: government finances (TSh m; Jul-Mar) 1996/97 1997/98 Target Actual Budget Target Actual Total revenue 400,720.2 424,991.6 695,300.0 501,139.8a 461,242.4 Total expenditure 504,819.8 430,564.2 927,483.5 695,612.6 493,844.5 Financing 51,634.5 –56,214.1 4,818.0 3,613.5 3,014.2 External 45,932.3 –32,461.0 76,968.0 57,726.0 –7,144.8 Domestic 5,702.3 –25,753.1 –72,150.0 –54,112.5 10,159.0
a Revised target.
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review.
—and the budget deficit The budget deficit (excluding grants) shrank dramatically from TSh13.8bn shrinks ($21.3m) in January to TSh5bn in March. However, the latest BoT calculations indicate that on a cumulative basis from July to March the budget deficit reached TSh24.1bn, or roughly 0.6% of GDP, compared with a targeted budget surplus of 1.9% of GDP for 1997/98.
The stock exchange is The Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE), which was originally due to open at finally launched the beginning of 1998, was finally launched on April 15th after a series of delays (1st quarter 1998, page 14). The fledgling bourse got off to a bumpy start, since its first listing, Tanzania Oxygen Ltd (TOL), had recorded net losses of TSh562m ($871,000) in 1997. Nevertheless, the government remains bullish about the DSE’s prospects, and it is widely anticipated that the 1998/99 budget, due to be presented in June, will include incentive schemes such as corporate and capital gains tax breaks to boost activity levels on the bourse. It is also likely that corporate and government bonds, commercial paper, and other securities and equities will be added to the DSE’s portfolio later in 1998, while the East African Development Bank (EADB) will probably introduce its own bonds, as it did on the Nairobi and Kampala bourses. However, activity on the DSE is unlikely to take off until foreign participation is permitted. Total market capitalisation is currently estimated at a mere TSh7.1bn ($11m). If EAC plans
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Tanzania 15
to cross-list stocks on the Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Nairobi bourses materi- alise, implying access for foreign investors within and beyond the region, the DSE may record rapid growth.
Agriculture
El Niño wreaks havoc Erratic weather conditions associated with the El Niño oceanic current have with Tanzanian disrupted agricultural production throughout Tanzania, and there are indic- agriculture— ations that the 1997/98 harvest will be significantly reduced. Not only have excessive rains in the north and dry to drought conditions in the south severely impaired crop performance, but severe flooding in northern Tanzania since early 1998 has caused widespread infrastructural damage. Consequently, many key transport links in the region have been severed, disrupting access to mar- kets and key factor inputs. The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has been carefully monitoring the status of food security throughout the country, and in early April the organisation had to intervene in Singida region in central Tanzania, delivering around 1,300 tonnes of maize. According to local officials, Singida region alone required more than 6,000 tonnes of food in April, but damaged roads impaired the relief effort. Although the urgency of WFP appeals for food donations appears to have abated somewhat since late 1997, grain supplies in particular remain precariously low in many parts of central and southern Tanzania.
—and the coffee sector is Latest available forecasts from the Tanzania Coffee Board (TCB) suggest that especially badly hit— output of clean coffee in 1997/98 will fall to around 667,000 60-kg bags, down from 717,000 60-kg bags in 1996/97. Although these are slightly more encour- aging projections than those provided in the first quarter (1st quarter 1998, page 15), the TCB has confirmed that heavy rainfall in February and March, in the Kilimanjaro area particularly, destroyed early flowers on many bushes and has accelerated the spread of leaf rust and coffee berry disease. While the TCB maintains that production in southern Tanzania has remained unaffected by El Niño, damage to bushes in northern regions has been so extensive that the board is already projecting a fall in output of premier mild washed arabica in 1998/99.
—but Mr Mkapa In a somewhat incongruous speech in early April, the president, Benjamin challenges producers to Mkapa, challenged Tanzanian coffee producers to double output within five double output— years. Mr Mkapa pointed out that Tanzanian coffee yields, at around 200 kg/ha, lagged considerably behind Kenyan yields of some 500 kg/ha, and were one- eighth of Costa Rican yields of roughly 1,600 kg/ha. The president recognised that income levels for the 250,000 or so smallholder producers in Tanzania— who account for some 96% of total output—had been severely reduced in 1997/98, and pledged government support to reverse declining yields. Mean- while, the head of the TCB, Leslie Omari, echoed Mr Mkapa’s concerns, indic- ating that average coffee output in 1990-97, at 753,000 60-kg bags, was modest given the abundance of arable land in Tanzania. According to Mr Omari, the quality of coffee had also declined over the same period because of farmers’ poor education levels, ageing bushes, limited use of fertiliser, poor processing tech- niques and labour-intensive practices in the production of arabica.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 16 Tanzania
—although concerns While Mr Mkapa’s recognition of the difficulties facing the coffee sector was remain about taxation probably encouraging to many growers, there is still widespread concern about levels the structure of taxation in the industry. In late March the chairman of the Tanzania Coffee Association (TCA), Jeremy Lefroy, voiced fears that output levels might fall further if value-added tax (VAT), due to be implemented in July, is extended to the coffee sector. Mr Lefroy praised government legislation ex- empting coffee exports from the tax, but pointed out that existing regulations only enable local coffee merchants to recover 90 days after the initial outlay. Consequently, local merchants are likely to cut their offer prices by as much as 20%, and the resultant income losses at the smallholder level will accelerate the process of disinvestment, and falling output and quality levels. The government has yet to respond to the TCA’s concerns, but it is unlikely to adopt a hardline approach on taxation given the precarious state of this crucial sector.
Disease-resistant crop Notwithstanding widespread concern about the current state of the coffee varieties are the key industry, the TCA remains optimistic that annual output could exceed 920,000 60-kg bags—possibly even reaching 1m bags—within five years. However, it also warns that urgent action is required in the immediate term if the coffee sector is not to disappear entirely by 2001. The association has identified five areas that could help to revitalise the sector:
• the introduction of disease- and drought-resistant bush varieties;
• improved access to key factor inputs and credit for the smallholder sector;
• tax breaks for smallholder farmers;
• guaranteed rights of land tenure; and
• marketing reforms.
Tanzania: lint output forecasts by region, 1998/99 (bales)
Mwanza 100,000 Shinyanga 140,000 Kigoma 15,000 Mara 15,000 Tabora 7,000 Singida 2,000 Kagera 500 Mbeya 15,000 Morogoro 3,000 Coastal 500 Tanga 1,000 Kilimanjaro 1,000 Total 300,000 Source: Tanzania Cotton Lint and Seed Board.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Tanzania 17
The outlook for cotton The Tanzania Cotton Lint and Seed Board (TCLSB) has maintained its forecasts production improves for the 1997/98 crop at around 200,000 bales. Although the cotton crop in- itially benefited from the moist conditions produced by El Niño, by late February there was growing concern that excessive rainfall would begin to damage bushes. Fortunately, drier conditions in the Mwanza and Shinyanga regions of the Lake Victoria basin allowed crops to recover in early March. Assuming that weather patterns normalise during the 1998/99 growing season, a healthier crop is expected, and the TCLSB has issued a preliminary forecast of 300,000 bales, or around 54,300 tonnes, of lint for the coming harvest.
A sugar estate is to be South Africa’s Illovo and the British firm ED&F Man have announced plans to upgraded increase Tanzanian sugar output by upgrading the country’s Kilombero sugar company. The two firms are to take respective stakes of 55% and 20% in Kilombero, while the government will retain 25% control. Kilombero’s current output of just 30,000 tonnes/year represents a fraction of potential production, and the firm supplies just 10% of Tanzania’s annual consumption and 27% of its yearly output. News of the investment will have been welcomed by the World Bank, which has long insisted on the importance of privatising the sugar industry. The two foreign companies are planning to increase domestic output to 100,000 tonnes/year by 2001. Moreover, Illovo has indicated that there is room for further development and expansion at Tanzania’s two main sugar estates around 375 km south of Dar es Salaam, the eventual goal being to reduce the country’s dependence on sugar imports.
Energy and mining
The World Bank remains The World Bank has refused to back down over its opposition to the contro- intransigent over IPTL— versial $163m Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) project (1st quarter 1998, page 16), indicating that $200m of Bank assistance for the Songo Songo gas project and the release of the second tranche of the enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) by the IMF may be at stake if the government pro- ceeds with the deal. The Bank remains adamant that the cost of electricity under the IPTL deal—21 cents/kilowatt-hour (kwh)—would cripple the country’s power parastatal, the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company (Tanesco), which would have to pay IPTL $5m a month. The Bank and the Fund have long insisted that the Songo Songo gas project, which would pro- duce electricity at 4 cents/kwh, is more viable economically, but the govern- ment remains adamant that the IPTL project would put a permanent end to Tanzania’s intermittent power shortages. In mid-April, however, it succumbed to increasing pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions and international donors and started to renegotiate the terms of the IPTL deal.
—and the government However, the Mechmar Corporation (MC) of Malaysia, which won the contract faces a nasty dilemma— to built the thermal power plant outside Dar es Salaam, has insisted that the government honours the terms of its agreement, under which the Malaysian firm is due to provide ten 10-mw generators. After the government indicated to MC that the proposed price of electricity sales to Tanesco was unacceptable, a Malaysian delegation promptly travelled to Tanzania to ensure that the government complied with the contract. This delegation was deported in late
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 18 Tanzania
April after negotiations had become increasingly fraught. The government reiterated its intention to uphold the terms of the IPTL contract, but main- tained that unless the proposed electricity prices were revised downwards Tanesco would be forced to pass price hikes of around 50% on to domestic consumers.
It appears that the government has managed to keep MC at bay, temporarily at least. However, the deal is so lucrative that the Malaysian company may well take the case to international arbitration on the grounds of default. The government can ill afford such a deterioration in relations with Malaysia, which remains one of the Tanzania’s key sources of South-east Asian foreign direct investment (FDI).
—jeopardising the Songo The World Bank, which had earlier questioned the viability of the Songo Songo Songo gas project gas project, citing poor management and dubious finances (1st quarter 1998, page 16), seems to have grown more confident about the venture, and would certainly prefer to back Songo Songo over the IPTL deal. This will have come as a great relief to the Tanzania Petroleum Development Company (TPDC), which is responsible for Songo Songo and feared huge losses if the project was closed. The Bank has indicated that $200m of International Development Agency (IDA) and International Finance Corporation (IFC) loans may be made available to develop the gas initiative if the IPTL deal is brought to a swift end. For the moment the Bank is willing to review the revised contract between the government and MC before categorically withdrawing support for Songo Songo. However, it is unlikely that MC’s proposals for lower-priced electricity sales to Tanesco will be sufficient for the World Bank to give its blessing for the IPTL deal and release the funds for Songo Songo.
The mining sector The government has continued to make advances in attracting FDI to Tanzania’s continues to attract mining sector, with Canadian and Australian firms leading the way in pros- investment— pecting activity for gold deposits. For example, Sutton Resources (SR) of Canada is interested in mining the Bunyanhulu gold deposit beginning in 1999. According to the company, 78 fresh drillings indicate proven and prob- able reserves of around 7.45m oz, and an initial production target of 300,000 oz/year has been set. If the development proceeds, SR will make a total invest- ment of around $185m in the venture, and plans to produce gold at $175/oz. Meanwhile, Australia’s Spinifex Gold (SG) purchased 19.7% of the East Africa Gold Corporation (EAGC), an interest registered in Canada. The motive for the purchase was clearly the 860 sq km property under EACG control in the Lake Victoria gold fields, which is known to hold 2m tonnes of gold resources with an average of 186,000 oz/tonne. The Australian company has endeavoured to get a foothold in east Africa for some time, and there are rumours of a possible merger between SG and EAGC.
—bolstered by a fresh In mid-March the government announced the introduction of fresh legislation legislation— to streamline the mining sector in a bid to facilitate foreign investment, partic- ularly in the gold subsector. The new mining bill will provide for security of tenure for prospectors, simplify the regulations governing operations in Tanzania and make licensing procedures more straightforward. According to the deputy minister for energy and minerals, Manju Msambya, four or five gold
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Tanzania 19
mines are expected to be operational by 2001, and official projections suggest that around 26 tonnes/year of gold will be exported. The government is also keen to encourage prospecting and exploitation of some of the country’s other minerals, and reserves of phosphates, kaolin, tin and coal. Foreign mining com- panies with operations in Tanzania are currently eligible for tax breaks such as exemption from sales tax and excise duties on mining equipment until the first year of production, after which a duty of 5% is levied. Further measures to attract operators are likely in the coming months, as the government has real- ised that the mining sector could become a key source of revenue by the turn of the century.
—but safety standards are The death of several miners in northern Tanzania in mid-April floods has raised a growing concern questions about safety standards in the country’s mining industry. Although the precise number of fatalities remains unknown, the governor of Arusha, speaking shortly after the accident, mentioned a figure of up to 100 dead, and indicated that relief operations had been hampered by a lack of resources and water pumps. On April 15th the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF) was called in to search for survivors, but only 21 miners were found alive. As a result of the disaster the government has come under renewed pressure to ensure that those controlling the artisanal sector in particular adhere to the mining stand- ards of the foreign companies operating in the region. It has emerged that basic safety equipment is lacking in many Tanzanian mines, while safety and rescue procedures are rudimentary. Unless the government moves to formalise and enforce standards foreign operators will be increasingly deterred by the poten- tial liabilities of mining activity in Tanzania.
Foreign trade and payments
Tanzania: trends in foreign trade ($ m) Exports Imports Trade balance 1996 1997a % change 1996 1997a % change 1996 1997a % change Jan 82.3 87.4 6.2 156.5 121.1 –22.6 –74.2 –33.7 –54.6 Feb 69.3 76.4 10.2 105.9 102.7 –3.0 –36.6 –26.3 –28.1 Mar 62.7 66.0 5.3 114.2 119.6 4.7 –51.5 –53.6 4.1 Apr 43.0 63.7 48.1 71.5 87.4 22.2 –28.5 –23.7 –16.8 May 53.1 47.3 –10.9 96.2 95.8 –0.4 –43.1 –48.5 12.5 Jun 42.9 42.3 –1.4 107.4 119.0 10.8 –64.5 –76.7 18.9 Jul 39.9 42.2 5.7 115.9 126.4 9.0 –76.0 –84.2 10.8 Aug 52.9 46.9 –11.4 118.9 94.8 –20.3 –66.0 –47.9 –27.5 Sep 54.4 42.3 –22.2 119.0 116.5 –2.1 –64.6 –74.2 14.9 Oct 75.7 55.8 –26.3 126.6 126.3 –0.2 –50.9 –70.5 38.6 Nov 88.2 67.0 –24.0 139.0 107.1 –23.0 –50.8 –40.1 –21.1 Dec 99.2 79.8 –19.6 122.7 121.0 –1.4 –23.5 –41.2 75.3 Year 763.6 717.1 –6.1 1,388 1,337.7 –4.0 –630.2 –620.6 –1.5 a Provisional.
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Monthly Economic Review.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 20 Tanzania
The trade deficit narrows According to the latest available official statistics from the BoT, the trade deficit slightly narrowed slightly to $621m in 1997 from $630m the previous year. Although the 4% drop in imports was encouraging, the 6% decline in exports to $717m is cause for concern. The BoT has indicated that the fall was due to lower export volumes and prices. Apart from cotton and tea, whose unit prices climbed slightly, unit prices for all other traditional exports—sisal, tobacco, coffee and cashew nuts—declined considerably. Meanwhile, only tobacco and coffee ex- ports recorded increases in volumes. Because of the impact of adverse weather conditions on exports of key cash crops, further improvements in the trade deficit are unlikely until well into 1998.
Tanzania: external debt ($ m unless otherwise indicated; debt stocks as at year-end) 1994 1995 1996 Total external debt 7,257 7,430 7,412 Long-term debta 6,142 6,251 6,149 Short-term debt 903 982 1,057 of which: interest arrears on long-term debt 822 922 929 Use of IMF credit 212 197 206 Public & publicly guaranteed long-term debta 6,130 6,208 6,104 Official creditors 5,761 5,824 5,741 Multilateral 2,674 2,811 2,903 Bilateral 3,088 3,013 2,838 Private creditors 369 383 364 of which: commercial banks 0 0 0 Total debt service 184 230 258 Principal 115 146 153 Interest 69 85 105 of which: short-term debt 5 4 6 Ratios (%) Total external debt/GNP 178.4 153.9 129.7 Debt-service ratiob 21.5 20.8 18.7 Short-term debt/total external debt 12.4 13.2 14.3 Concessional long-term loans/ long-term debta 72.0 72.0 73.5 Variable interest long-term debt/ long-term loansa 7.9 8.4 8.5
a Long-term debt is defined as having an original maturity of more than one year. b Debt service as a percentage of earnings from exports of goods and services.
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.
The external debt stock According to the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (previously World falls slightly— Debt Tables), a review of the external debt position of developing countries, Tanzania’s total external debt stock stood at $7.41bn in 1996, 0.2% down on the 1995 figure of $7.43bn. Although this represented a welcome, if slight, decline in the country’s indebtedness, the proportion of total debt made up of long- term official lending has remained high, at around 80%. Interest arrears on long-term debt have also risen, but it is unlikely that the government will
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Tanzania 21
manage to clear this in the short to medium term given that the country re- mains highly dependent upon external borrowing and development assistance.
—but Mr Nyerere makes In mid-April the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, prefaced a semi- an urgent plea for debt nar on poverty alleviation with a plea for urgent debt relief from Tanzania’s relief main bilateral creditors, arguing that the country’s debt-service obligations were largely responsible for the deteriorating standards of public health and plum- meting literacy rates. Mr Nyerere urged international donors and creditors to distinguish between the “desire and willingness to pay” and the “capacity to pay”, which Tanzania lacked. He also urged the Bretton Woods institutions to ease the terms of entry into the heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) initiative to facilitate Tanzania’s accession to the programme. Mr Nyerere’s plea was ech- oed by a UK aid agency, Oxfam, which warned in late April that Tanzania’s debt-service obligations were unsustainable. In addition to early admission to the HIPC programme, Oxfam pressed for the establishment of a Multilateral Debt Relief Fund to assist with meeting payments to multilateral creditors. The British and Swedish governments have indicated their willingness to support the scheme.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 22 Comoros
Comoros
Political structure
Official name République fédérale islamique des Comores
Form of state Federal Islamic republic
Legal system Based on Code Napoléon, the 1996 constitution and sharia (Islamic law)
National legislature Assemblée fédérale, deputies from each of the 43 electoral wards are chosen by universal adult suffrage for a term of two years
National elections March 1996 (presidential) and December 1996 (legislative); next elections due December 1998 (legislative) and 2002 (presidential)
Head of state President, elected by universal suffrage for a term of five years
State legislatures Each island has a governor, appointed by the president, and a directly elected council
National government The president and cabinet; the latter was dismissed by the president on September 9th 1997 and replaced by an interim state commission
Main political parties In October 1996 leaders of 24 pro-government parties and movements merged to form the Rassemblement national pour le développement (RND); leading parties in the merger included the Union nationale pour la démocratie aux Comores (UNDC), the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le renouveau (RDR), Udzima, Uwezo and Maecha Bora. Main opposition groups include Front pour le redressement national (FRN), Chuma, Forces pour l’action républicaine (FAR) and Front national pour la justice (FNJ—an Islamist movement)
Head of state Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim
Interim state commission Economics, trade, commerce, industry & energy Isamiddin Mohamed Education, youth, health & transport Sultan Chouzour External relations for Arab states Seif el Miftah Finance & budget Said Said Hamadi Foreign affairs & diplomacy Salim Hadji Himidi Justice & penal affairs Mohamed Abdou Madi Production & regional development Mahmoud Ahmed Abdallah Transport, tourism, crafts, posts & telecommunications Ali Toihir “Keke”
Central bank governor Mohamed Halifa
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Comoros 23
Economic structure
Latest available figures
Economic indicators 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 GDP at market prices (Cfr bn) 69.9 74.6 80.4 84.1 880.0a Real GDP growth (%) 7.7 3.8 –2.3 –2.3 –1.0b Consumer price inflationc (av; %) –6.8 2.9 10.2 7.1 3.6b Population (’000) 580 610 630 647 671 Exports fob ($ m) 21.5 21.5 10.8 11.2 9.2b Imports fob ($ m) 58.2 49.4 44.7 44.5 35.7b Current-account balance ($ m) –14.4 9.5 –8.4 –19.0 –16.0b Reserves excl gold ($ m) 27.1 38.6 44.0 44.5 41.2 Total external debt ($ m) 188 185 192 204 206 External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 8.4 3.0 4.8 1.6 2.3 Exchange rate (av; Cfr:$) 264.7 283.2 416.4 374.4 383.7
June 5th 1998 Cfr445.5:$1
Origins of gross domestic product 1995 % of total Components of gross domestic product 1994 % of total Agriculture, fishing & forestry 39.1 Private consumption 74.4 Industry 12.6 Government consumption 21.1 Manufacturing 4.4 Gross domestic investment 21.3 Services 48.9 Exports of goods & non-factor services 17.8 GDP at market prices 100.0d Imports of goods & non-factor services –34.7 GDP at market prices 100.0
Principal exports 1996 $ m Principal imports 1995 $ m Vanilla 3.5 Rice 14.0 Ylang-ylang 1.7 Petroleum products 7.7 Cloves 0.5
Main destinations of exports 1996e % of total Main origins of imports 1996e % of total France 42.9 France 58.9 US 42.9 South Africa 14.9 Germany 7.1 Kenya 6.0 Madagascar 3.6 a EIU estimate. b Official estimate. c As measured by the GDP deflator. d Total does not sum in source. e Based on trading partners’ returns; subject to a wide margin of error.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 24 Comoros
Outlook for 1998-99
President Taki should be The current government seems set to limp from crisis to crisis until the next able to hold off a divided elections in 2001. Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim’s position as president—already opposition precarious—will be further undermined by civil strife, including industrial action by different sectors, continuing economic deterioration, and continuing separatist discontent in Anjouan and Mohéli. At least one opposition leader, Mohamed Said Mchangama, is said to be planning a new phase of civil disobe- dience, which would include a refusal to pay taxes to the government. Any such reduction in financial resources would lead to a further build-up of pay arrears—a particularly serious threat to political stability given that military pay is starting to fall behind schedule.
Nevertheless, concerted action against Mr Taki is unlikely given the divisions among the opposition in Moroni. Mr Taki’s skill at playing off different local power centres against each other is one factor in this; opportunism among members of the traditional political class—easily tempted by the jobs and other rewards government patronage can offer—is another.
Little hope for an early The economy apart, Mr Taki’s major problem will continue to be the secession deal on Anjouan in Anjouan, the archipelago’s second-largest island. The president’s own role remains central to the affair: the secessionists—deeply resentful of constit- utional changes that reduced previous provisions for island autonomy—remain adamant that he must resign and that fresh elections be held. The president, who insists that he was democratically elected, is determined to stay in office, and is likely to retain ministerial support for this stance.
External efforts at mediation have had little success as yet. A March visit by ministers from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) proved shambolic (see The political scene), while France, the former colonial power, is unlikely to take a lead role in the search for a solution, not least because the socialist govern- ment led by Lionel Jospin is keen to show that it has broken with the interven- tionist approach of past decades. France has, however, discreetly asked Madagascar and Mauritius to find ways of reviving dialogue between opposing parties in the dispute.
The economic outlook Although a recent IMF/World Bank report forecast a possible recovery in trad- remains depressing itional exports, Comorian economic prospects remain gloomy. The weak man- agement of public finances, highlighted in a critical report by the IMF and World Bank (see The economy), will have done little for donor willingness to assist the country. (As it is, donors believe that President Taki’s present troubles are largely of his own making: it is his centralising policies that have helped to provoke the secessionist backlash, and it is his government’s mismanagement of revenue that has left public sector pay far in arrears, so contributing to further instability.) At the same time the continuing civil unrest and the stand- off with secessionists on Anjouan and Mohéli can only further damage hopes of growth in tourism, an important source of foreign exchange for Comoros. Any increase in violence—through Anjouannais resistance to an OAU military intervention, for example—would only make matters worse.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Comoros 25
Comoros: gross domestic product Comoros: Comorean franc real exchange % change, year on year rates (b) 8 1990=100 120 Comoros 6 KSh:$ Africa
4 110
2 100 (a) R:$ 0 90 -2 Cfr:$ 80 -4 1992 93 94 95 96
(a) Official estimate. (b) Nominal exchange rates adjusted for changes in relative consumer prices. Sources: EIU; IMF, World Economic Outlook. 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96(a)
Review
The political scene
There are hints of a Comoros’s president, Mohamed Taki Abdulkarim, appears to have adopted a willingness to new strategy to deal with the simmering discontent on Anjouan, where local compromise— leaders with strong popular support have unilaterally declared their inde- pendence from the rest of the Islamic federation. This aims to divide the secessionists, with gestures of reconciliation to seduce the moderates and leave hardliners isolated. Thus on May 30th Mr Taki used a cabinet reshuffle to bring a prominent Anjouannais politician, Abdou Mmadi, back into government, and the following day ordered the release of Ahmed Charikane, number two in the secessionist movement, from detention. Mr Charikane had earlier been apprehended in Madagascar and extradited to the Comorian capital, Moroni.
Comoros: the new cabinet, May 1998
Prime minister Vacant Economics, trade, commerce, industry & energy Isamiddin Mohamed (the only Mohélian in the cabinet) Education, youth, health & sport Sultan Chouzour External relations for Arab states Seif el Miftah Finance & budget Said Said Hamadi Foreign affairs & diplomacy Salim Hadji Himidi Justice & penal affairs Mohamed Abdou Madi Production & regional development Mahmoud Ahmed Abdallah Transport, tourism, crafts, posts & telecommunications Ali Toihir “Keke”
—as a reshuffle clears out The reshuffle also reduced the cabinet from 11 members to eight, a move government veterans— calculated to please the IMF and other international donors that had been demanding cutbacks in the administration. Ten ministers from the old cabinet were sacked, the only survivor being Mahmoud Ahmed Abdallah, son of the former president, Ahmed Abdallah.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 26 Comoros
There are three prominent figures in the new administration—Salim Hadji Himidi, Ali Toiher “Keke” and Sultan Chouzour. Mr Himidi, the new minister for foreign affairs and co-operation, comes from Mr Taki’s home town, Mbeni, in the north of Grande Comore. Previously he was chef de cabinet at the presidency, acting as Mr Taki’s key diplomatic envoy in efforts to retain regional support for the government’s line on the Anjouan crisis. Ali Toiher “Keke”, from Mitsamiouli, gets the transport and tourism portfolio; he had been in the political wilderness since the 1978 ousting of the crypto-socialist Ali Soilih regime (in which he served as minister of state for defence). Mr Chouzour, ambassador to France under the Djohar regime, is the new minister of education, health and youth; he replaces the veteran politician Mouzawar Abdallah.
Outside the cabinet, the president has also appointed a new governor of Grande Comore, Damir ben Ali, a former head of the national centre for culture and research. His predecessor, Abdou Bacari Boina, has now been appointed roving ambassador to Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries and is expected to play a key role in negotiations with regional leaders who might be brought into play to help resolve the impasse over Anjouan.
Despite appeals for reconciliation, Mr Taki largely failed in his attempts to co-opt members of the opposition into the new administration. However, the new cabinet does give the president a real—if last-ditch—opportunity to solve Comoros’s acute problems. Most of the appointees are technocrats and intel- lectuals with a serious interest in resolving their country’s difficulties rather than promoting purely sectional interests. And, significantly, at least half of the new cabinet are ready to look beyond the traditional relationship with France to a wider range of international partnerships. The post of prime min- ister remains vacant at present, but according to the president’s new chef de cabinet, Said Hilal Moussa, it will be filled by an Anjouannais secessionist once reconciliation takes place. Mr Moussa himself has good contacts with advisers to the French president, Jacques Chirac; he and Mr Himidi have both played prominent roles in pro-Chirac election campaigns among the Comorian com- munity in France.
—but it fails to defuse However, the appointment of a fresh ministerial team failed to defuse the mistrust among the antagonism of secessionists or Moroni-based opposition leaders. Both camps opposition see the reshuffle as just another attempt by Mr Taki to perpetuate his rule. They continue to regard the president as the major obstacle to the solution of the Anjouan crisis and Comoros’s economic problems, and have not relented on their common demand that Mr Taki resign to pave the way for a caretaker government of national unity—which would also include appointees of the Anjouanese secessionists—as a prelude to fresh elections. Mr Taki, however, insists that he was democratically elected and must complete his term of office, which ends in 2001.
The OAU proves unable to Efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to end the Anjouanese break the deadlock— secession have failed. In late March a delegation of foreign ministers from Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, South Africa, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso arrived in Anjouan’s main town, Mutsamudu, for talks with secessionist
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Comoros 27
leaders. However, their refusal to address thousands of local people who had gathered in the main square prompted a series of protests, and the ministers rapidly called off the talks and returned to government-controlled Grande Comore. The delegation’s leader, Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, blamed the debacle on “anarchy and chaos” on the breakaway island, but the success of the mission was always in doubt. Anti-OAU feeling on Anjouan was already running high because of the organisation’s earlier statements denouncing the separatist movement as a threat to peace in the Indian Ocean region. Most OAU member states remain deeply opposed to the revision of colonial bounda- ries, and island leaders had dismissed the mission as “a waste of time”, arguing that the OAU was incapable of playing an even-handed role. The delegation was also rebuffed in its attempt to meet separatist leaders on Mohéli.
—but European pressure However, in recent weeks there have been indications that the separatists may may push Anjouan be amenable to pressure from another quarter—Europe. The French govern- towards negotiation— ment has already made clear its view that Anjouannais plans for a breakaway were “unrealistic”—refusing to accord any official recognition to the verdict of the island’s February secession referendum (1st quarter 1998, page 24), for example—and it seems highly unlikely that other Western donor governments would dissent from the French judgment that Anjouan is too small an entity to plan independence. Comoros, with 670,000 people, is already one of the small- est countries in Africa, and Anjouan, which suffers from the archipelago’s most acute social and environmental conditions, would be particularly vulnerable on its own.
This message was further reinforced when Michel Rocard, a former French premier and chairman of the European Parliament’s development committee, led a delegation of Euro MPs on a tour of all three Comorian islands. He is understood to have warned the Anjouannais that failure to enter fresh talks with Moroni would deprive them of any chance of obtaining further European Development Fund aid. (At present, the EU is financing a roads programme being carried out by a French construction firm, Colas.)
—and France is keen to While some leading OAU governments remain ready to contemplate the use of promote new talks force—although worries over the practical logistical difficulties would seem to rule out any intervention in the immediate future—France is anxious to avoid the prospect of military action and saw the visit by Mr Rocard as a chance to push the separatists into a negotiated outcome before the question of OAU military action came to a head. In fact, separatist leaders on both Anjouan and Mohéli agreed in principle to resume negotiations, on two conditions—a meet- ing on neutral territory, and the replacement of Côte d’Ivoire’s Pierre Yéré as head of the OAU ambassadorial delegation to talks. However, Mr Rocard re- fused to pass on the second request. Meanwhile, France is trying to encourage Mauritius and Madagascar to mediate in the dispute (although the Malagasy are distrusted by the Anjouannais).
The president names a Prior to the cabinet changes Mr Taki made a speech to religious leaders that was new committee clearly designed to disarm critics and build links with establishment moderates. The president admitted to his government’s failure to resolve the economic and political crises, and even claimed that the three reshuffles conducted since he
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 28 Comoros
took office had been driven by intrigues within the political class (ties of per- sonal and local loyalty are the decisive factor in much Comorian political manoeuvring). He went on to tell the religious leaders that he intended to form a special three-man committee to assist in solving the Anjouan crisis and to act as a watchdog on his government’s competence. This committee has since been established, and comprises Ali Bazi, a founder member and current chairman of the ruling Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le renouveau (RND); a former prime minister, Ahmed Abdou, who is a native of Anjouan but is opposed to secession; and Said Hassan Said Hachim, ambassador to Paris and a former governor of Grande Comore.
The shutdown of Tropic May was a particularly difficult month for President Taki, with a fresh wave of FM radio prompts protests over salary arrears (see The economy). Tensions were exacerbated protests— when the government shut down a private radio station, Tropic FM, prompting protests by hundreds of unemployed youths and students. Tropic FM—which had started to broadcast national news bulletins that were highly critical of Mr Taki and his government—is owned by Said Ali, who is close to Abbas Djoussouf, the leader of FORUM, the main alliance of opposition parties. Mr Djoussouf denied any involvement in the unrest, but does acknowledge that he was the main financier of the radio station. A number of FORUM supporters were arrested during the disturbances, although Mr Taki later or- dered their release.
—while military The wave of protest clearly rattled the once self-confident president, especially discontent increases— as there were also signs of discontent among the military. The reason for this is clear. Soldiers—who are used to prompt and regular payments—are owed three months’ pay. There are also signs that the secessionist movement is finding sympathy among some military units. In late March the Mohelian-born com- mander of the national army garrison in Mohéli refused to meet a high-ranking army delegation, stating that he did not recognise their authority.
Meanwhile, Anjouan-born soldiers increasingly feel that they are the target of a deliberate policy of discrimination and exclusion; 20 have been retired early, and an Anjouannais-born captain was prevented from participating in a meet- ing of Grand Comorian-born army officers. Ironically, the latter were discuss- ing a strategy to protect Anjouannais civilians living on Grand Comore from any anti-secessionist backlash.
—threatening to cause In the wake of disturbances by striking civil servants in mid-May (see The further instability economy) President Taki dismissed his security adviser, Ali Abdallah, who had earlier been blamed for the violent repression of riots, and appointed the army chief-of-staff, Colonel Moilimu Djussu, in his place. While Mr Abdallah’s dismissal was widely seen as a step towards reconciliation, it was not enough to placate fierce critics of the government, and angry demonstrators demanded his punishment. Rifts and discontent within the army could spell disaster for the president, who is increasingly reliant on the continued loyalty of the elite presidential guard. To replace Colonel Moilimu, Mr Taki reinstated Commander Azali, who was army chief-of-staff in the Djohar era—a move that may be intended to broaden his support base.
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The opposition is However, Mr Taki can take comfort from the disarray of his opponents in fragmented— Moroni. Mr Djoussouf, the leader of the main FORUM opposition group, at- tracts wide popular support on Grande Comore—big crowds turned out at the airport to welcome him home from a recent foreign trip—but seems to lack nationwide appeal. The other major party leaders within FORUM, Ali Mroudjae and Mustafa Said Cheikh, are also Moroni-based and share the same inability to mobilise mass support on Anjouan and Mohéli. And in its appeal to anti- government voters, FORUM must now face competition from a new rival, the Parti républicain des comores (PRC), led by Mohamed Said Mchangama.
—and could be outflanked The son-in-law of the former president, Said Mohamed Djohar, and a one-time by the PRC, with its speaker of the National Assembly, Mr Mchangama was closely associated with growing youth support the Djohar regime, where personal intrigues repeatedly undermined the refor- mist efforts of technocrat ministers. But in the few months since the PRC’s inception he has succeeded in attracting considerable support among urban youth, even making his presence felt in rural areas. He has also been prepared to develop some fresh thinking about possible solutions to the Anjouan prob- lems. In April, for example, he put forward proposals for the constitution of a federal system. Anjouan, Grande Comore and Mohéli would each operate as an autonomous state, with its own constitution and legal and financial institu- tions. (Indeed, during the pre-colonial era, the islands were separate sultanates, although their ruling families were related.) A “Comorian Union” would be headed by a rotating presidency, but would not have legislative power. The Taki government feels this scheme would give too much autonomy to the smaller islands, while the separatist leaders on Mohéli and Anjouan think the proposals do not go far enough; however, some observers believe that Mr Mchangama’s plan does at least represent a credible attempt to find a way out of the present impasse.
The economy
Discontent over pay The government owes its employees some 16 months in wage arrears, while arrears soldiers are owed three months’ pay. Such arrears—combined with the health services’ inadequate response to a recent cholera epidemic—has further in- creased Mr Taki’s unpopularity. In early May he suffered the unprecedented indignity of being openly booed shortly after Friday prayers, and later in the month violent demonstrations erupted in and around Moroni when thousands of civil servants went on strike over substantial salary arrears and the cancella- tion of workers’ allowances. In a country where the state is by far the biggest employer, and where a civil servant’s salary is generally used to support at least seven people, any delay in payment has considerable impact on ordinary people and on the monetised urban economy as a whole. Magistrates, finance ministry staff and other civil servants were among the strikers, while teachers on contract held the chief treasurer and paymaster hostage for hours until gendarmes intervened. Similarly, dockers complaining that they had not been paid for unloading the last three ships brought all activity at the capital’s harbour to a halt on May 9th, disrupting the flow of import supplies.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 30 Comoros
A coruscating IMF-World It is government mismanagement rather than a shortfall in revenue which is Bank verdict on largely to blame for the salary arrears. A report from the World Bank and the government finances IMF, delivered to the government, is devastating in its criticism. According to the document, a copy of which was obtained by Agence France presse, revenue- collection targets had in fact been met, but more than 70% of public spending in 1997 had been devoted to “the political superstructure”. This had left other sectors, and vital social services such as health and education in particular, short of resources. The report stated bluntly that: “The majority of payments actually made by the Treasury are not in line with the parameters set in the budget.” It went on to attack “the systematic use of public funds outside legal budget procedures and with contempt for the controls which the appropriate units of the finance and budget ministry are supposed to carry out”. The tenor of the report will further reduce the already slim prospects of Comoros securing any temporary budget bail-out from bilateral donors.
Comoros: total foreign debt ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1994 1995 1996 Total foreign debt 192.3 203.7 205.6 of which: medium- & long-term debt 179.0 190.3 192.9 Total debt service 2.8 1.0 1.4 Principal 2.0 0.4 0.8 Interest 0.8 0.6 0.6 Total debt service ratio, paid (%) 4.8 1.6 2.3 Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1998.
Debt service remains The government cannot proffer substantial debt-service costs in its defence— minimal annual repayments of foreign debt have been running at less than $1.5m in recent years, while inflows of external funding have been many times that amount. The 1998 edition of the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (formerly the World Debt Tables) shows that in 1996, the last year for which figures are available, Comoros’s stock of external debt rose to $206m and repayment of foreign debt amounted to a mere $1.4m—equivalent to a debt- service ratio of only 2.3% (ie 2.3% of revenue from exports of goods and services and remittances from expatriate Comorians).
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Quarterly indicators and trade data 31
Quarterly indicators and trade data
Tanzania: quarterly indicators of economic activity
1995 1996 1997 1998 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr Productiona Annual totals Coffee ’000 tonnes 43.5 ( 52.0 ) ( 42.0 ) n/a Cotton, lint “ 44.5 ( 84.2 ) ( 84.5 ) n/a Sisal ” 25.5 ( 32.0 ) ( 30.0 ) n/a Prices Monthly av Consumer prices 1990=100 353.0 406.6 408.2 397.2 412.3 468.1 476.4 465.3 475.7 518.0b change year on year % 21.8 25.3 23.9 18.3 16.8 15.1 16.7 17.1 15.4 n/a Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj TSh bn 395.83 389.59 411.43 422.08 414.79 433.85 491.80 468.63 456.02 485.95c change year on year % 30.1 12.0 16.9 13.5 4.8 11.4 19.5 11.0 9.9 n/a Foreign trade Qtrly totals Exports fob TSh m 135,765 103,925 98,704 88,429 150,286 137,590 93,690 81,338 126,180 46,108b Imports cif “ 252,974 204,887 162,403 209,782 231,195 205,646 185,301 209,019 218,737 61,898b Exchange holdings End-Qtr Bank of Tanzania: foreign exchange $ m 255.3 211.6 224.8 311.9 425.6 389.3 446.2 473.5 608.5 567.6c Exchange rate Market rate TSh:$ 550.36 542.02 620.19 590.48 595.64 600.14 624.69 615.28 624.57 665.01
Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a Crop year, ending year shown. b January only. c End-February.
Sources: Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Comoros: quarterly indicators of economic activity
1995 1996 1997 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr Money End-Qtr M1, seasonally adj Cfr m 11,646 10,916 11,445 12,461 12,566 13,079 12,366 12,240 12,073 11,447 change year on year % 7.5 –19.8 –5.4 7.5 7.9 19.8 8.0 –1.8 –3.9 –12.5 Foreign tradea Annual totals Exports fob $ m ( 11 ) ( 14 ) ( n/a ) Imports cif “ ( 158 ) ( 168 ) ( n/a ) Foreign exchange End-Qtr Central Bank $ m 46.66 47.89 43.58 47.75 46.01 53.62 49.72 47.26 43.42 43.67 Exchange rate Market rate Cfr:$ 363.98 368.59 367.50 377.36 386.44 387.86 392.78 423.26 440.83 444.98b
Note. Annual figures of most of the series shown above will be found in the Country Profile. a Source: DOTS. b End-4 Qtr, 449.11; end-1 Qtr 1998, 463.84.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 32 Quarterly indicators and trade data
Tanzania: foreign trade
TSh m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Imports cif Food & beverages 14,838 38,566 64,753 44,738 36,710 Fuels 45,217 69,607 75,771 54,309 92,075 Textiles & clothing 102,124 88,966 118,058 86,348 201,676 Metals 34,684 45,327 54,620 39,454 24,428 Machinery 61,245 114,568 155,399 104,167 147,803 Transport equipment 101,188 103,426 122,589 83,815 116,870 of which: cars 69,004 70,329 83,361 56,994 70,122 Total incl others 449,480 615,990 765,757 968,910 804,950 Domestic exports fob Cashew nuts 6,487 9,133 26,507 36,077 53,508 Coffee 17,301 39,428 58,765 81,168 79,649 Cotton, raw 28,367 31,697 53,425 69,238 79,996 Sisal 391 1,441 2,643 3,535 2,780 Minerals 12,920 28,074 15,390 25,545 29,288 Petroleum products 2,487 5,632 2,791 6,215 6,415 Manufactured goods 18,439 21,625 39,162 63,042 64,506 Total incl others 123,966 181,474 265,177 390,378 441,344
$ m $ m Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports foba 1993 1994 1995 1996 Imports cifa 1993 1994 1995 1996 India 40 53 58 73 South Africa 20 57 190 224 Germany 48 50 66 65 Kenya 103 122 150 176 Japan 37 45 49 59 UK 180 139 160 141 Malaysia 4 10 22 48 Saudi Arabia 131 93 104 114 Rwanda 25 30 36 43 India 69 76 78 92 UK 35 31 39 41 Japan 123 90 119 85 Netherlands 21 25 36 38 China 38 72 82 71 Portugal 22 22 27 20 Italy 60 66 62 71 Total incl others 498 558 726 805 Total incl others 1,402 1,414 1,759 1,772 a Derived.
Sources: Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 Quarterly indicators and trade data 33
Tanzania: UK trade (£ ’000) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1995 1996 1997 UK exports fob Food, drink & tobacco 2,377 2,644 3,710 Textile fibres & waste 6,870 7,538 7,311 Petroleum & products 77 98 535 Chemicals 8,792 8,997 7,403 Rubber manufactures 844 507 598 Paper & manufactures 1,170 546 1,173 Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures 522 652 564 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 986 1,671 661 Iron & steel 1,608 1,809 1,580 Non-ferrous metals 405 181 323 Metal manufactures 2,139 2,556 3,746 Machinery incl electric 28,562 28,057 24,598 Road vehicles 20,209 14,091 9,459 Other transport equipment 2,192 1,548 1,214 Clothing 969 669 632 Scientific instruments etc 2,566 3,289 3,508 Total incl others 87,412 81,851 77,008 UK imports cif Sugar & products 4,846 5,802 5,380 Coffee, tea & spices 3,475 4,293 5,269 Tobacco & manufactures 4,131 7,611 7,844 Textile fibres & waste 1,502 1,185 1,578 Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures 926 556 348 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 37 742 5,390 Non-ferrous metals 1,486 0 121 Machinery & transport equipment 4,519 1,011 451 Clothing 4,222 5,255 3,601 Total incl others 27,480 28,983 33,148 Source: UK HM Customs & Excise, Business Monitor, MM20.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998 34 Quarterly indicators and trade data
Comoros: foreign trade ($ m) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports fob 1991 1992 1993 1994 Imports cif 1991 1992 1993 1994 Cloves 3.87 0.41 1.08 1.27 Meat & preparations 4.47 4.43 5.08 3.14 Vanilla 15.89 15.59 19.42 6.72 Rice 7.18 8.16 6.65 6.29 Essential oils 3.68 4.35 3.34 2.26 Petroleum products 6.24 7.19 7.22 6.13 Total incl others 24.91 22.14 25.06 11.39 Cement 3.27 3.31 4.11 4.03 Iron & steel 1.72 2.40 2.52 2.05 Road vehicles 5.75 7.33 6.10 3.89 Total incl others 58.23 68.62 67.76 52.78
Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports foba 1993 1994 1995 1996 Imports cifa 1993 1994 1995 1996 France 10 8 6 6 France 61 66 92 99 US 9 6 2 6 South Africa 12 12 21 25 Germany 2 1 2 1 Kenya 6 7 8 10 Total incl others 22 18 11 14 Madagascar 1 2 5 6 Singapore 5 5 6 5 Total incl others 106 113 158 168 a Derived.
Sources: UN, International Trade Statistics, yearbook; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook.
Comoros: French trade ($ ’000) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 French exports fob Cereals & preparations 841 815 937 1,408 1,319 Chemicals 5,831 7,250 7,670 8,451 10,425 Rubber & manufactures 550 502 449 671 792 Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures 772 726 399 578 538 Iron & steel 1,705 1,098 1,262 1,489 3,933 Metal manufactures 3,215 3,462 3,330 4,740 6,809 Machinery incl electric 16,990 15,263 14,393 24,415 25,986 Transport equipment 11,284 8,896 8,593 14,781 16,348 Scientific instruments etc 1,476 1,905 1,766 2,954 2,793 Total incl others 59,282 57,991 59,924 86,632 100,653 French imports cif Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 5,231 6,417 2,790 1,197 2,085 Chemicals 6,913 5,042 5,664 5,216 4,831 Total incl others 12,304 11,523 8,704 6,525 12,400 Source: UN, External Trade Statistics, series D.
EIU Country Report 2nd quarter 1998 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1998