Cybergeo : European journal of Geography, N°242, 31/07/2003 The Amur River border. Once a symbol of conflict, could it turn into a water resource stake ?1 Le fleuve Amour : symbole de conflit passé, futur enjeu de ressource hydraulique ? Frédéric Lasserre Professeur adjoint, département de géographie Université Laval, Québec Chercheur régulier Institut québécois des hautes études internationales (IQHEI) Abstract : the relations between Russia and China have become much warmer since the beginning of the 1990s ; they put an end to severe tensions between the two countries. Now trade is expanding, and investment from China in the border area is stimulating growth along the Amur River. But with growth also come water withdrawals : sortages have already appeared in the basin. Prospects are all the more problematic as northern China is facing severe water shortages that could partly be solved, in the medium term, by a derivation from the Amur/Heilongjiang Basin. Would such a project be considered given the still volatile state of relations between Moscow and Beijing ? Keywords : border, water management, water scarcity, China, Russia, Amur, Heilongjiang, development. Résumé : les relations entre la Chine et la Russie se sont considérablement détendues depuis une dizaine d’années. Ce réchauffement diplomatique met un terme à la forte tension qui régnait entre les deux pays. Le commerce croît, et les investissements chinois dans la zone frontière stimulent la croissance le long du fleuve Amour. Mais avec la croissance viennent les prélèvements en eau : des cas de manque d’eau sont déjà apparus dans le bassin. Les perspectives sont d’autant plus problématiques que la 1 This research has been made possible thanks to a grant from the FQRSC. Cybergeo : European journal of Geography, N°242, 31/07/2003 plaine de Chine du Nord est confrontée à de graves pénuries d’eau, lesquelles pourraient être en partie résolues, à moyen terme, par un canal en provenance du bassin de l’Amour/Heilongjiang. Une telle perspective pourrait-elle être envisageable, compte tenu de la volatilité des relations entre Moscou et Beijing ? Mots-clés : frontière, gestion de l’eau, rareté de l’eau, Chine, Russie, Amour, Heilongjiang, développement. On March 2nd, 14th and 15th, 1969, near Damanski/Chenpao Island on the Ussuri River, Soviet and Chinese forces clashed severely (about 1 000 soldiers were killed). With this confrontation that involved several hundred troops, the air force and heavy mechanized equipment on both sides – the tensions between Moscow and Beijing had escalated beyond the mere border clash. This heavy battle took place not far from the site of the first battle between Chinese and Russian troops, in 1650… In 1969, China and the Soviet Union seemed on the brink of war. After tension receded somewhat, the Amur River remained a tense area, heavily patrolled, a closed border. With the warming of relations between the two countries, trade expanded and economic growth began to alter the economic geography of the region. The then Russian side slipped into recession, the Chinese side witnessed an unprecedented economic boom. The Amur River border had become a trade gate between the two neighbours; most political and border issues were settled peacefully through a series of treaties. It seems, however, that the new era of sino-russian relations is also tainted with suspicion and long-term fears. Growth and trade opportunities in the Amur area have attracted migrants to the area. Chinese immigration to the region is fuelling local Russian fears of a “creeping invasion” aimed at claiming the former Chinese territories back. At the government levels, relations are normalized and both sides have engaged in trade and security cooperation, but the relationship remains uneasy and tainted with long-term mistrust. 2 Cybergeo : European journal of Geography, N°242, 31/07/2003 Could water sharing become an issue between Russia and China ? Growth, population expansion and agricultural development, especially on the Chinese side, have also brought about the expansion of water withdrawals, at a time when the water situation is worsening in the North China plain. Slow expansion, both industrial and agricultural, is unlikely to create water scarcity in the Russian Far East, but water demand on the Chinese side, coupled with a precipitation pattern that makes the region vulnerable to droughts, is becoming an issue. In the Amur Basin, a region where the water resource was considered infinite, scarcity is also becoming a problem, both locally and because the Amur Basin water is becoming coveted in other Chinese regions. Derivation projects have surfaced, conflicting uses of the Amur’s water have emerged. A plan to rationalize the use of the Ussuri water has been set up, but seems to be failing to reach its objectives because of poor coordination between authorities. The water issue in the border area between Russia and China stems mainly from the growing water scarcity in Northern China, a scarcity that has reached the point where officials openly mention water as a limitating factor to growth. At the same time, agriculture is still expanding in the Northeast, in particular with crops that require large amounts of water. Water from the Chinese side of the Amur basin (Map 1) is becoming caught between conflicting demands, local needs to expand agriculture so as to feed China, and demand from the North China plain where the rivers are running dry and water tables dropping fast. Russian authorities have not published detailed hydrologic reports as to how water resource sharing could become a political issue with China. The scarcity of Russian figures does not mean, however, that authorities are not wary. They have already expressed their concern over low levels of water in the Amur river basinWith Chinese plans for increased consumption in the Northeast, locally first, and with potential water exports in the longer term to quench an ever thirsty North China plain, are local water resources on the Chinese side sufficient to satisfy demand ? To what extent are growing water needs in Northeastern China going to affect the uneasy China-Russia relationship ? Although it is of course too soon to answer, it is nevertheless relevant to wonder if the fast increasing Chinese water demand, and the probable ensuing water sharing issue, could alter the present mutually beneficial ties 3 Cybergeo : European journal of Geography, N°242, 31/07/2003 between Russia and China, ties that have been forged not on common friendship, but against common adversaries. 1. Becoming a trading border... The Amur as a gate between Russia and China Russia as well as China had strong reasons for improving relations. China could alleviate the military pressure on its northern border and engage in military and technological co-operation with Russia, at a time when the United States began to be more sensitive about transferring high-technology know-how to China. As for Russia, it could then concentrate on the enormous internal challenges implied by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the economy. Rapprochement is not so much a response to NATO enlargement, as Russian policies since September 11 attest to : Russia was quick in accepting, in May 2002, the setting up of a joint NATO-Russia Council to manage military co-operation and intelligence exchange.2 In fact, Russia 2 La Presse, Montréal, May 15th, 2002; May 24th, 2002. 4 Cybergeo : European journal of Geography, N°242, 31/07/2003 recognised its most urgent task was to deal with domestic economic security; to do so effectively, good relations with the West as well as with China were needed.3 But, to be sure, cooperation with China on the security front of islamic militant group is developing fast. In November 1997, Russian and Chinese officials signed a joint statement indicating near-resolution of all border issues, after broad agreements were signed in 1991 and 1994. The leaders also set the target of bilateral trade at $20 billion for 2000, a figure that already seemed unrealistic at the time.4 Old contentious issues, especially disputes about borders, have largely been eliminated, with the few continuing problems managed by diplomatic compromise, the two governments agreeing notably to disagree for 50 more years about the sovereignty over islands near Khabarovsk.5 In 1992, Gorbachev’s promised withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia was completed under Russian President Eltsin. Confidence-building measures have regularly been discussed since 1994, with agreements in 1994, 1996, 1997 and 1999. The last border agreement, signed in December 1999, settled the dispute about Lake Khanka, specifically calls for the development of the Amur River region. Several ports along the Amur, on both sides of the river, have been declared open to trade for shipping companies of both countries.6 Russian-Chinese trade has expanded fast, from negligible levels of mainly barter trade in 1989, to about 9,8 billion $ in 2001. Local trade is completely free since 1995. This, in itself, dramatically alters the border landscape, for the previously sealed border has turned into a border teeming with trade as well as construction and investment projects, mostly from the Chinese side. Indeed, Russia-China trade remains negligible among each country’s global trade, and is largely owing to arms sales and nuclear power technology transfers from Russia. But the impact of this border trade was very significant, especially for Northeast China, a disadvantaged region, far from sea ports and special economic 3 Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, Sino-Russian Relations under Putin, CANCAPS Papier nº24, Toronto, March 2000, p.1. 4 BBC News, November 10, 1997. 5 Sherman Garnett, Limited Partnership. Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia, Russian and Eurasian Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1998, p.17. 6 BBC News, December 9, 1999 ; Jean Radvanyi, La Nouvelle Russie, Armand Colin, Paris, 2000, p.391 ; Sébastien Colin, « Confins sino-russes », in Michel Foucher (dir.), Asies Nouvelles, Belin, Paris, 2002, pp.331.