The Revolutionary Crisis of 1846-1849 and Its Place in The
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The Revolutionary Crisis of 1846-1849 and Its Place in the Development of Nineteenth- Century Galicia Author(s): ANTONY POLONSKY Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies , 1998, Vol. 22, Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe (1998), pp. 443-469 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41036752 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Harvard Ukrainian Studies This content downloaded from 134.95.82.11 on Thu, 25 Mar 2021 16:10:21 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Revolutionary Crisis of 1846-1849 and Its Place in the Development of Nineteenth-Century Galicia ANTONY POLONSKY Sir noble, you with your high words Too ready seem.'Twere best today No more of "forty-six" to say. 'Twas you yourselves, you Polish lords, Who first shot down the serfs, poor folk! Yourselves brought down the storm which broke Upon your heads, as your just due. Yes noble Sir! Had lords like you But looked upon your serfs as men, They never would have tried to do You harm, but would have helped you then. You never think of that at all. You make their life a constant hell, Yet you as constantly rebel When your own selfish interests call. But let the Tsisar justly try To treat both lord and serf, the cry Of confiscated rights you raise And swear the people him mislead. Ivan Franko, "The Passing of Serfdom"1 The importance of the revolution of 1848 cannot be overestimated. According to George Macaulay Trevelyan, the English liberal historian, 1848 was "the turning point at which modern history failed to turn."2 Sir Lewis Namier, who was himself born in Koshylivtsi in east Galicia on the estate of his father, a Jewish landowner, referred to it as a "seedplot of history" and wrote that the revolution "crystallized ideas and projected the pattern of things to come; it determined the course of the century that followed."3 Like most historians of 1848 in Central Europe, Trevelyan and Namier were preoccupied with the failure of the German liberals in Frankfurt to reconstruct Germany on liberal and constitutional principles. Certainly the Prussian king was unwilling to put himself at the head of the movement for German unification in 1848 while the Habsburg governing elite was able to exploit the divisions between "historic" and "non-historic" nations, between landlords and peasants, and between urban This content downloaded from 134.95.82.11 on Thu, 25 Mar 2021 16:10:21 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 444 POLONSKY and rural revolutionaries to preserve its power. Yet, as Namier in particular has pointed out, the revolution in the Habsburg lands, even though it was unsuc- cessful in the short-run, highlighted many of the problems which were ulti- mately to lead to the collapse of the monarchy. In the Austrian province of Galicia it constituted a major turning point in the history of all three of the largest national groups to inhabit the area, the Ukrainians, the Poles, and the Jews. The revolutionary crisis began here, not in 1848, but rather with the failed Polish revolution of 1846 and the violent peasant jacquerie that followed it in western Galicia, which led to the incorporation of the Free City of Cracow into the Habsburg monarchy. The years between 1846 and 1849 were characterized by four interrelated developments which I should like to examine in this article. They are the failure of the attempt by the Polish revolutionaries to regain the independence of Poland by armed insurrection, the emergence of the Ukraini- ans (then usually referred to as Ruthenians) of Galicia as a self-conscious national group, the final abolition in Galicia of the labor tribute, and the increased political mobilization of the Jewish population of the province. These phenomena were not only interrelated but were also affected by developments in the Habsburg monarchy as a whole and in the other parts of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and indeed by the progress and ultimate collapse of the revolutionary wave over most of Europe. The crushing of the 1830 uprising in the Kingdom of Poland had been followed by the emigration of between 5,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries, most of whom eventually made their way to France. This "Great Emigration" in- cluded the poets Mickiewicz and Slowacki, the historian Lelewel, and the pianist and composer Chopin, as well as other prominent political and cultural leaders, statesmen, generals, and journalists. Most of its members were junior officers; regular soldiers in the army of the Kingdom of Poland had for the most part been forced to accept the Russian amnesty. As a consequence, 75 percent of the Emigration was of szlachta origin, though mostly without sub- stantial means. The members of the Emigration did not see themselves as defeated refugees. They were welcomed as heroes as they progressed through Germany and were convinced that they were the harbingers of an imminent international revolu- tion which would destroy despotism and would make possible the resurrection of Poland within its 1772 frontiers, a goal which they all sought. It was in the years after 1831 that the "Polish Question" was to emerge as a major interna- tional problem although the Poles, unlike the Italians, the Germans, and even the Hungarians, did not succeed in the following generation in achieving national independence or unification. The Emigration was deeply divided politically as the rifts which had already become manifest during the November uprising soon became even more appar- ent in the conditions of exile. The Conservatives were led by the great aristo- crat Adam Czartoryski, who had been a key figure at the court of Tsar This content downloaded from 134.95.82.11 on Thu, 25 Mar 2021 16:10:21 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS OF 1846-1849 445 Alexander I. He saw the Polish problem as, above all, a diplomatic question. His aim was to preserve the unity of the Poles in emigration in anticipation of a general European war, which would lead the Western powers, in their own interest, to reestablish Poland as a buffer against Russian expansionism. He hoped to create some links with Austria, whose policies in the Balkans seemed to be leading to a clash with Russia. Internally, he favored a constitutional monarchy and the slow emancipation of the peasantry by the granting of freeholds, with compensation for the nobility. Czartoryski's left-wing opponents within the Emigration were organized in the Polish Democratic Society, founded in March 1832. Initially, its supporters were convinced that the resurrection of Poland was dependent on the European revolution which they thought to be imminent, and as a consequence, they participated in the activities of the Italian Carbonari and the French and German revolutionaries. In the words of one of their number, Józef Kajetan Janowski: "When the future of Poland depends upon the progress of humanity, then he who does not uphold the continuous progress of humanity, does not wish the happiness of Poland."4 With the collapse of the anticipated revolutions in 1833, there came a change in mood, and the left came increasingly to the view that only activity in Poland could bring about the restoration of a Polish state. As Joachim Lelewel wrote in January 1834: "It is my belief that the Polish nation cannot resurrect itself except at home and by its own forces . not counting upon [outside] help."5 By December 1836, the process of crystallization had reached the point at which a "Manifesto of the Polish Democratic Society" could be produced, described by Robert Leslie as "the most influential document in the history of Poland in the nineteenth century."6 In its preamble, it asserted that Poland, long the bulwark of Europe in the East, had fallen on difficult times because the democratic principle "had degenerated into caste privilege depriving the masses of their just place in the constitution." This obsession with "caste privilege" was the main reason for the debacle of the 1830 uprising. If, during the insurrection, the Polish authorities had appealed to the masses, the people would have risen as one man, would have braced the gauntlet of war on their vigorous arm and crushed the invaders without foreign aid; Poland, from the Oder and the Carpathian mountains to the Borysthenes and the Dvina - from the Baltic to the Black Sea would have founded her indepen- dence upon the general happiness of her sons. The manifesto continued: If our next revolution is not to be a sad repetition of the past, the first battle cry must be the emancipation of the people, their restoration, unconditionally to the ownership of the soil of which they have been plundered, the restitution of their rights, the admission of all, without distinction of birth or creed to the enjoyment of the blessings of independence. This content downloaded from 134.95.82.11 on Thu, 25 Mar 2021 16:10:21 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 446 POLONSKY As a consequence, the Democratic Society favored the emancipation of the peasantry without compensation being paid by the peasants, through the aboli- tion of their obligations to their landlords and the granting to them of the freehold of the land which they at present cultivated.