Thoughts from Bangkok on the Anti-Thai Riot in Phnom Penh
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MZW-3 SOUTHEAST ASIA Matthew Wheeler, most recently a RAND Corporation security and terrorism researcher, is studying relations ICWA among and between nations along the Mekong River. Thoughts from Bangkok on the LETTERS Anti-Thai Riot in Phnom Penh Since 1925 the Institute of FEBRUARY 26, 2003 Current World Affairs (the Crane- By Matthew Z. Wheeler Rogers Foundation) has provided long-term fellowships to enable BANGKOK, Thailand – On January 29, 2003, a mob in Cambodia’s capital looted outstanding young professionals and burned the Royal Thai Embassy. The Phnom Penh riot began with a protest in to live outside the United States front of the Embassy, prompted by reports that Suvanan Kongying, a Thai soap- and write about international opera star with a large following in Cambodia, had said that she would not visit areas and issues. An exempt Cambodia until Angkor Wat was returned to Thailand. Considered one of the operating foundation endowed by architectural wonders of the world, the Angkor Wat temple complex is Cambodia’s the late Charles R. Crane, the national symbol. Every Cambodian national flag since independence from France Institute is also supported by in 1954 has featured an image of Angkor Wat, including the flag of Democratic contributions from like-minded Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge regime that presided over the death of two mil- individuals and foundations. lion Cambodians from 1975 to 1979. Days before the riot, Cambodian TRUSTEES Prime Minister Hun Sen had castigated Bryn Barnard Suvanan for her alleged comments, say- Joseph Battat ing, “She’s not worth a few blades of Mary Lynne Bird grass that grow around Angkor.” Pro- Steven Butler testers burned Thai flags before storm- William F. Foote ing the Embassy and attacking Thai- Kitty Hempstone owned businesses. The Embassy’s Thai An image of Angkor Wat Pramila Jayapal staff members were forced to flee by embellishes the Cambodian flag. Peter Bird Martin boat after climbing over the Embassy Ann Mische compound’s rear wall. One Cambodian employee of a Thai-owned hotel was killed Dasa Obereigner in the violence, and many people were robbed and injured. Cambodian security Paul A. Rahe forces and firemen failed to intervene until late at night when the violence had Chandler Rosenberger largely run its course. Katherine Sreedhar Edmund Sutton In the wake of the riots, Thailand evacuated several hundred Thais from Cam- Dirk J. Vandewalle bodia, suspended bilateral aid and cooperation, closed the border and downgraded its diplomatic ties to chargé d´affaires level. Thailand’s defense minister ordered HONORARY TRUSTEES that all Cambodian “workers and beggars” be rounded up and “dumped at the David Elliot border.” The Cambodian government expressed regret at the incident, arrested a David Hapgood number of people in connection with the riot and agreed to pay US$50 million in Pat M. Holt compensation. Suvanan denied having made the comments attributed to her by Edwin S. Munger the Cambodian media and expressed sorrow at the incident.1 Richard H. Nolte Albert Ravenholt The Thai government and media immediately recognized the riot as a mani- Phillips Talbot festation of what passes for politics in Cambodia, where democracy remains more a promise than a reality. The day after the riot, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Institute of Current World Affairs 1 The Crane-Rogers Foundation The editor of the Cambodian newspaper Rasmei Angkor (Light of Angkor), which first ran Four West Wheelock Street the story alleging Suvanan had demanded the “return” of Angkor Wat, was arrested and Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 U.S.A. charged with printing false information and inciting people to riot. According to the editor, three anonymous visitors to his office told him of Suvanan’s alleged comments. “Newspa- per Editor Charged with Inciting Riot,” Bangkok Post, February 2, 2003. Shinawatra explained, “[Thai- land is] a victim of complica- tions in Cambodian politics. Someone tried to make a stir of nationalism [sic], to make it look as if Thailand wanted to snatch Angkor Wat from [Cambo- dia].”2 The Thai ambassador confirmed that the mob was or- ganized rather than spontane- ous. Indeed, even before the vio- lence, Thai media interpreted Hun Sen’s comments about Suvanan as an effort to gain some political ad- vantage over his rivals before a general election in July by kin- dling nationalist sentiment.3 Thus there was instant under- standing that the violence was not simply a spontaneous out- burst of anti-Thai sentiment, but a political ploy run amuck. This appreciation of the do- mestic Cambodian provenance of the incident has not pre- cluded a search for “root causes.” Indeed, the violence was so shocking to most Thais that it seemed to demand fur- ther explanation. While no one denies that the protest and sub- sequent riot were organized,4 Thai and Western journalists and academics sought to eluci- date features of the Thai-Cam- bodian relationship that might explain why Cambodians ap- peared to be primed for such an explosion of anti-Thai senti- ment. Put crudely, many Thais sought an answer to a question that has become familiar to Americans, namely, “Why do they hate us?”5 As with the American query, although the question is worth answering, it may not speak directly to the cause of violence perpetrated by self-professed champions of an oppressed people against the perceived oppressor. Answers to the question are interesting in 2 “Envoy Recalled, Apology Rejected,” Bangkok Post, January 31, 2003. 3 “A Soap Opera or Déjà Vu?” The Nation, January 28, 2003. 4 Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy, Cambodia’s major opposition figure, have each blamed the other for instigating the riot. 5 Sutichai Yoon, group editor-in-chief of The Nation Group, wrote, “On our part, the main task is to launch a national search for the real answer(s) to the big question: Do we know why they think we are exploiting them?” “In Search of Deeper Answers to Cambodia,” The Nation, February 6, 2003. 2 MZW-3 their own right, but are potentially misleading as an ex- “from a battlefield to a trading market.” The spirit of planation for a particular instance of violence. Chatichai’s “New Look” diplomacy was symbolized by his invitation to Cambodia’s Vietnamese-backed premier, An article in the Bangkok Post’acknowledged that the Hun Sen, to visit Thailand in January 1989. In essence, riot was organized for some political end, then went on the new policy sought Thai security as a result of regional to declare, “[T]here are other factors that must be taken prosperity rather than regional conflict. Recognizing the into account, including a long history of territorial dis- commercial opportunities of a region no longer at war, putes and pent-up resentment at Thailand’s overwhelm- particularly in reconstruction of a shattered Cambodia, ing economic and political influence in a much poorer Thailand advanced a vision of itself at the center of a Cambodia.”6 This quotation suggests two broad themes peaceful and prosperous mainland Southeast Asia. Thai- that emerged in the reports, commentaries and analyses land would serve as the gateway for capital, technology about the incident in Thailand and the West. First, the and expertise to Indochina and Burma as those countries riot was explained as an expression of resentment of integrated with the world economy. Meanwhile, Thai- Thailand’s economic and cultural dominance in Cambo- land would benefit from access to natural resources in dia. Given the fact that the riot appeared to be sparked neighboring countries. This vision came to be associated by comments attributed to a Thai starlet who was very with the term Suwanaphume, or “Golden Land,” which popular in Cambodia, and that Thai businesses suffered the Thai government used to signify a new era of peace serious damage at the hands of the rioters, this theme and prosperity for mainland Southeast Asia. appears to carry much explanatory power. The second theme, related to the first, concerns the burden of history The reality fell somewhat short of this optimistic vi- on Thai-Cambodian relations. Some argued that the riot sion. Although the economic orientation of Thai policy exemplified the suspicion and even hatred that many prevailed over the old “security-first” approach,7 Cam- Cambodians have toward Thais owing to a history of bodia remained a battlefield throughout the 1990s. With Siamese territorial aggrandizement at Cambodia’s ex- a large stockpile of Chinese weapons and a wink and a pense. Some who looked a little deeper saw the riot as a nod from the Thai military, Khmer Rouge forces carried malignant consequence of a powerful but faulty nation- on a fight against Phnom Penh. The longevity of the alist view of Thailand’s history that has bred a danger- Khmer Rouge illustrates that fighting and trading are not ous kind of Thai chauvinism. mutually exclusive. Thai businesses, most with close ties to the Thai army, struck deals with the Khmer Rouge and Battlefield to Marketplace: Baht Imperialism and Phnom Penh authorities alike, mostly to extract logs and Cultural Colonialism gemstones from western Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge used the revenue thus generated to prolong the war. In- Negative perceptions in neighboring countries about deed, it was only after international pressure forced Thai business practices and cultural influences may be Bangkok to stop looking the other way (and Phnom Penh traced to the late 1980s, when the Cold-War thaw offered amnesty to enemy troops), that the Khmer Rouge prompted a reorientation of Thailand’s foreign policy. For began to splinter. The Khmer Rouge finally collapsed al- a decade after Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted together in 1998. the Khmer Rouge at the end of 1978, the regional dynam- ics of mainland Southeast Asia were characterized by While illicit economic relations with the Khmer stalemate over Cambodia, with the Vietnamese unable Rouge gave Thailand a black eye in world opinion, the to defeat the coalition of anti-Vietnamese resistance domi- activities of Thailand’s “legitimate” businesspeople did nated by the Khmer Rouge and supported by Thailand, little to improve Thailand’s international image.