Generational Change in the Iranian

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Generational Change in the Iranian k o No. 2 • March 2012 o l Generational Change in the Iranian t Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force: u Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi O By Ali Alfoneh n r This is the fifth in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about the IRGC QF.1 e t Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) personifies the new generation of IRGC commanders whose careers at Base Ramezan during the 1980s war between Iran and Iraq s qualified them to direct QF operations after the 2003 US-led invasion of the country. As Masjedi’s generation is a being promoted to advisory positions in Tehran, a new generation of field operatives is emerging. Those seeking to predict who will direct the IRGC QF in the future should therefore look to this nascent generation of field operatives. E Not a single week passes in the Iranian and From Obscurity into the Limelight e international presses without mention of Major l General Qassem Suleimani, Islamic Revolution- Previously under the radar, Masjedi emerged as a d ary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC QF) com- public figure when he unveiled a commemorative mander. Suleimani and the IRGC QF can be d linked to events ranging from suppression of the i prodemocracy movement in Syria to the emer- Key points in this Outlook: gence of revolutionary movements in the Middle M East and North Africa.2 • Though little is known in the United States about Brigadier General Iraj Masjedi of the Despite press coverage, little is known about Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds the activities of Suleimani and the clandestine Force (IRGC QF), he serves in an influential force under his command. However, a close role as senior adviser to IRGC QF Comman- survey of Persian open-source materials provides der Qassem Suleimani. us with the names of several key individuals who shed light into the otherwise dark and secretive • Masjedi is part of an emerging group of leaders in Iran—Base Ramezan veterans world of the QF. This Middle Eastern Outlook, from the 1980s Iran-Iraq war who formed the fifth in a series about the IRGC QF, discusses bonds with Iraqi insurgents to enhance war one such individual: Brigadier General Iraj tactics in the border region. Masjedi, senior adviser to Suleimani and a veteran of IRGC QF Base Ramezan. • Masjedi’s career illuminates a cycle of generational change within of the IRGC QF, and examining his background can help identify who else may rise to power Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a resident fellow in the IRGC QF. at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2- bust of Kazem Kazemi, late IRGC Intelligence Bureau provide only vague insight into his thinking. In his cofounder, in Laleh Park in Tehran on January 16, 2012. December 16, 2010, interview with the Tehran-based Fars News Agency presented Masjedi as “senior adviser International Peace Studies Centre, Masjedi delivered a to the commander [of the IRGC QF].”3 cogent analysis of the negotiation tactics of the Iraqi Kurds concerning redistribution of Iraq’s oil revenue, territorial disputes among ethnic groups in Kirkuk, rela- A close survey of Persian open-source materials tions between the Iraqi Kurds and the government of provides us with the names of several key Turkey, and related issues.7 Masjedi’s tone was almost triumphant in his September 4, 2011, interview on Iran’s individuals who shed light into the otherwise influence in Iraq: “The political authority in Iraq is mov- dark and secretive world of the QF. ing in a direction parallel to the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Masjedi said, and then described Iran as “the most influential stream in Iraq’s political issues.”8 Masjedi used the occasion to praise Kazemi, but also When speaking to an IRGC audience, Masjedi uses commented on the relationship between the IRGC the organization’s well-known official rhetoric; in Intelligence Bureau, its Intelligence Ministry, and the addressing the Salman IRGC unit in Sistan va Balou- Quds Force: “The Guards’ Intelligence [Directorate] was chestan province, Masjedi said: transformed into the present day Intelligence Ministry— a sacred institution which came out of the heart of the The Islamic awakening in the Middle East and Guards Intelligence,” Masjedi said. “The second organi- North Africa follows the path of the late Imam zation and establishment is the Quds Force in which me [Rouhollah Khomeini] and the example of the and many other friends are and which is another child of warriors during eight years of Sacred Defense and the Guards’ Intelligence [Directorate].”4 the Imposed War [against] Iran [reference to the Given the fierce rivalry between the IRGC Intelli- 1980–88 war with Iraq]. The heads of state have gence Bureau and Intelligence Ministry, the IRGC’s on many occasions admitted this.9 decision to commemorate Kazemi and Masjedi’s choice of words are hardly surprising. The IRGC Intelligence Speaking in Ahwaz in the Khouzestan Province on Directorate—currently known as the Sazeman-e Ettelaat-e September 27, 2011, Masjedi stressed that “export of Sepah [Guards’ Intelligence Organization]5—used this the Islamic revolution is one of the achievements of occasion as an opportunity to remind the rival Intelli- the Sacred Defense.”10 From the limited material avail- gence Ministry of its debt to the IRGC. able, one can distinguish between Masjedi’s thoughtful It is nonetheless surprising that the IRGC chose to statements given to journalists and his repetition of expose Masjedi to the broader public. The IRGC leader- official IRGC slogans when addressing the public. ship may have done so to communicate Masjedi’s ele- The open-source material provides slightly better vated position as the commander’s senior adviser to the insight into Masjedi’s military career. The earliest refer- greater fraternity of IRGC members—both those in ence to Masjedi appears in the February 21, 1987, entry active duty and veterans from the Iran-Iraq war. The of the IRGC’s Iran-Iraq War Chronology, which claims action may also have been an attempt to expose Masjedi that Masjedi was the Base Ramezan deputy.11 He served to the press by bringing him in from the field. Regardless under Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr,12 the first commander of the reasons behind Masjedi’s exposure, it heralds a in the history of the base,13 who is currently the Societal generational change in the IRGC QF. Security and Crime Prevention director of the Judiciary.14 By September 15, 1987, Masjedi was appointed chief Iraj Masjedi: Biography, Ideology, of staff at the Quds Base,15 a tactical location north of the and Career Overview Karkheh River.16 Recent references to Masjedi present contradictory information about him. For example, a Personal information about Masjedi such as his date September 27, 2011, story reported by the Iran Labour and place of birth cannot be found in public records.6 News Agency (ILNA) refers to Masjedi as “Quds Force There is a similar dearth of information about Masjedi’s deputy,”17 while the Sistan va Balouchestan branch of the ideological tenets. His few publicly available speeches Basij Resistance Force more plausibly presents him as - 3- “Quds Base deputy”18 in a report dated the same day as mander;30 Gholam-Ali Rashid, IRGC operations com- ILNA’s story. It is unclear when exactly Masjedi was mander;31 Mostafa Izadi, IRGC staff member;32 Moham- appointed senior adviser to Suleimani, though it must mad-Baqer Zolqadr, IRGC Irregular Warfare have occurred prior to Fars News Agency’s January 16, Headquarters commander;33 and Asghar Moqaddam, 2012, article mentioning said title.19 whose role during the war is unclear.34 Other first- generation Base Ramezan commanders with whom Masjedi’s Service in IRGC QF’s Masjedi must have been in contact include Mohammad- Base Ramezan Ali Rahmani, former Ramezan Base intelligence comman- der;35 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, former engineer at the Masjedi’s record of service in Base Ramezan is significant IRGC Special Operations Brigade and current president for two important reasons: it was the hub of the IRGC of Iran;36 Sadeq Mahsouli, former IRGC Special Opera- QF’s war effort behind enemy lines in Iraq, and many Base tions Brigade commander who served as welfare minister Ramezan veterans are now IRGC QF commanders. to Ahmadinejad;37 and Parviz Fattah, who served as Toward the end of 1984, the IRGC presented a plan energy minister in the same cabinet.38 to then-president Ali Khamenei and the Supreme Defense Council calling for the establishment of an Irregular War- The QF, tasked with the extraterritorial operations fare Headquarters.20 After experiencing a stalemate on the southern front, the IRGC went about establishing of the IRGC, used Base Ramezan to organize Ramezan headquarters as a northern front against Iraq.21 Shi’a Iraqi refugees looking to engage in armed The QF, tasked with the extraterritorial operations of struggle against Iraq’s Ba’ath regime. the IRGC, used Base Ramezan to organize Shi’a Iraqi refugees looking to engage in armed struggle against Iraq’s Ba’ath regime. The refugee groups included the Supreme Masjedi’s presence at Base Ramezan also allowed him Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,22 led by Iraqi to establish a relationship with senior KDP officials such Shi’a leader Mohammad-Baqir al-Hakim. More impor- as Fazel Mirani, Molazem Babak, and Abd al-Mohaiman tantly, the IRGC QF managed to cooperate with Kurdish Barzani,39 as well as the highest officials in the PUK, insurgents inside Iraqi territory, such as the Kurdistan including Jalal Talabani, the current president of Iraq.40 Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of It was Masjedi who, during a meeting with Talabani, Kurdistan (PUK).23 The presence of various Iraqi groups assured him of Iran’s commitment to the war against provided Base Ramezan with the necessary operational Iraq: “You rest assured, we will not under any circum- flexibility to gain allies whenever a particular Iraqi insur- stances have peace with Saddam.
Recommended publications
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran March 2009
    COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAN 17 MARCH 2009 UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE IRAN 17 MARCH 2009 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN IRAN, FROM 2 FEBRUARY 2009 TO 16 MARCH 2009 REPORTS ON IRAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 2 FEBRUARY 2009 TO 16 MARCH 2009 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.03 Iran............................................................................................. 1.03 Tehran ....................................................................................... 1.04 2. ECONOMY ............................................................................................ 2.01 Sanctions ...................................................................................... 2.13 3. HISTORY ............................................................................................... 3.01 Calendar ........................................................................................ 3.02 Pre 1979......................................................................................... 3.03 1979 to 1999 .................................................................................. 3.05 2000 to date................................................................................... 3.16 Student unrest .............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Ideological Expansion
    Iran’s Ideological Expansion “We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry ‘there is no god but God’ resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.” – Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini June 2018 Table of Contents About the Author ......................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4 Profiles of Institutions Spreading Iran’s Revolution Abroad ...................................................................... 6 Universities .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Al-Mustafa International University ..................................................................................................... 6 Islamic Azad University ......................................................................................................................... 8 Charitable Organizations ..................................................................................................................... 10 Imam Khomeini Relief Committee ...................................................................................................... 11 Ahlul Bayt World Assembly ................................................................................................................. 13 Iran’s
    [Show full text]
  • Grenzen Politischer Reform- Und Handlungsspielräume in Iran
    Semiramis Akbari Grenzen politischer Reform- und Handlungsspielräume in Iran Die Bedeutung innenpolitischer Dynamiken für die Außenpolitik HSFK-Report 9/2006 Redaktionsschluss: 22. Januar 2007 © Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK) Adresse der Autorin: HSFK x Leimenrode 29 x 60322 Frankfurt am Main Telefon: (069) 95 91 04-0 x Fax: (069) 55 84 81 E-Mail: [email protected] x Internet: www.hsfk.de ISBN-10: 3-937829-41-5 ISBN-13: 978-3-937829-41-8 Euro 6,- Zusammenfassung Nahezu täglich berichten die Medien über Irans Nuklearambitionen. Das internationale Medieninteresse an Teherans Atompolitik hat insbesondere seit dem Amtsantritt des sechsten Staatspräsidenten der Islamischen Republik im August 2005 zugenommen. Ent- gegen den Erwartungen und Prognosen im In- und Ausland wurde in Iran am 24. Juni 2005 ein Ultrakonservativer zum Nachfolger des reformorientierten fünften Staatspräsi- denten Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) gewählt. Der Sieg Mahmud Ahmadinejads wird nicht nur als eines der wichtigsten Ereignisse in die postrevolutionäre Geschichte der Isla- mischen Republik Irans eingehen, sondern stellt zugleich eine Zäsur im Verhältnis der westlichen Staatengemeinschaft zu Iran dar. Dies lässt sich unter anderem daran ablesen, dass die internationale Kritik, insbesonde- re der USA an Iran enorm zugenommen hat. Die Bush-Regierung begreift den schiiti- schen Gottesstaat vor allem aufgrund seiner Nuklearambitionen als Bedrohung für den Weltfrieden. Iran befindet sich seit 2003 in schwierigen Verhandlungen mit der Interna- tionalen Atomenergie Organisation (IAEO) in Wien über das umstrittene iranische Nu- klearprogramm. Neben dem multilateralen Kontrollregime (IAEO) spielen bei den Ver- handlungen externe Akteure, darunter die USA, die EU-3 (Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien) sowie Russland und China eine wichtige Rolle.
    [Show full text]
  • B C1 COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010
    2010D0413 — EN — 08.06.2013 — 011.002 — 1 This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents ►B ►C1 COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP ◄ (OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, p. 39) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Council Decision 2010/644/CFSP of 25 October 2010 L 281 81 27.10.2010 ►M2 Council Decision 2011/299/CFSP of 23 May 2011 L 136 65 24.5.2011 ►M3 Council Decision 2011/783/CFSP of 1 December 2011 L 319 71 2.12.2011 ►M4 Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012 L 19 22 24.1.2012 ►M5 Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP of 15 March 2012 L 77 18 16.3.2012 ►M6 Council Decision 2012/169/CFSP of 23 March 2012 L 87 90 24.3.2012 ►M7 Council Decision 2012/205/CFSP of 23 April 2012 L 110 35 24.4.2012 ►M8 Council Decision 2012/457/CFSP of 2 August 2012 L 208 18 3.8.2012 ►M9 Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012 L 282 58 16.10.2012 ►M10 Council Decision 2012/687/CFSP of 6 November 2012 L 307 82 7.11.2012 ►M11 Council Decision 2012/829/CFSP of 21 December 2012 L 356 71 22.12.2012 ►M12 Council Decision 2013/270/CFSP of 6 June 2013 L 156 10 8.6.2013 Corrected by: ►C1 Corrigendum, OJ L 197, 29.7.2010, p.
    [Show full text]
  • The Militarisation of Iran's Politics
    MIDDLE EAST The militarisation of Iran’s politics KEY POINTS Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is ■ Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has mobilised the Revolution Guards commanders. increasingly looking towards former members of the ■ The aim is to repel internal pressure for political Islamic Revolution Guards Corps to help maintain influence. and economic reform and external pressure related to the nuclear stand-off. Ali Alfoneh investigates what this could mean for the future ■ Such political calculations might deliver the in- of the Islamic Republic. tended outcome, but it also endangers clerical rule in Iran. ith Iran facing formidable chal- during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Be- administration as well as from his associ- lenges in its nuclear stand-off sides Ahmadinejad, the nine out of his ates during his term as Tehran’s mayor W with the West, and given the 21 cabinet ministers all come from the (2003-2005). Jane’s discovered IRGC internal pressures for political and eco- IRGC: backgrounds in the governors of Qom, nomic reforms, the political leadership ■ Minister of Energy: Parviz Fattah Kerman, Western Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, of the Islamic Republic is increasingly ■ Minister of Welfare and Social Secu- Hamedan and Ilam. In addition, the gov- relying on the Islamic Revolution Guards rity: Abdol-Reza Mesri ernors of Zanjan, Lorestan, Esfahan and Corps (IRGC) to maintain power. ■ Minister of Industries and Mines: Ali- Southern Khorasan are recruited from Having chosen the path of defiance in Akbar Mehrabian the prison administration in the Islamic relation to the West and repression of do- ■ Minister of Justice: Gholam-Hossein Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • Iransosinfo2august05.Pdf
    PDF created with pdfFactory Pro trial version www.pdffactory.com IRAN SOS INFO Nr. 2 August 2005 Adolescent serial killer hanged in Sanandaj, northwest Iran, killing several Iran: report people including two children and Mon. 1 Aug 2005 starting riots throughout the town, eye- AFP witnesses reported. At least 1,000 TEHRAN - An Iranian people had gathered at Esteghlal Park in man convicted of the evening, peacefully demonstrating in murdering and protest to the brutal torture and murder of robbing five men a young Kurd by police in the when he was a minor neighbouring town of Mahabad which has been hanged had acted as a catalyst for widespread in the southern city of Bandar Abbas, the anti-government protests in Kurdistan Khorasan daily reported Monday. and Western Azerbaijan provinces for Farshid Farighi, 21, was hanged at the the past three weeks.Protestors held up city prison after he was convicted of placards demanding justice for the killers stabbing to death five men in separate of Shoan Qaderi. There were also chants incidents after they gave him a lift in their against senior officials within Iran’s car. The first murder was carried out in theocratic leadership. Uniformed and 1998, when Farighi was believed to be plain-clothed police attacked protestors 14 years old, and he was arrested in in Enghelab Square and Sheshom-e 2000. Bahman Street and at one point started to shoot live rounds. Eye-witnesses His sentence included 74 lashes. reported that several people were injured So far this year, Iran has executed at or killed.
    [Show full text]
  • EXPLANING the ECONOMIC CONTROL of IRAN by the IRGC by MATTHEW DOUGLAS ROBIN
    EXPLANING THE ECONOMIC CONTROL OF IRAN BY THE IRGC by MATTHEW DOUGLAS ROBIN A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science in the College of Sciences and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Fall Term 2011 Thesis Chair: Dr. Houman Sadri ©2011 Matthew Douglas Robin ii ABSTRACT In 1979, Iran underwent the Islamic Revolution, which radically changed society. The Iranian Revolution Guard (IRGC) was born from the revolution and has witnessed its role in society changed over time. Many have said the IRGC has reached the apex of its power and is one of if not the dominating force in Iranian society. The most recent extension of the IRGC’s control is in the economic realm. The purpose of this research is to explain the reasoning and mechanism behind this recent gain in power. The literature review demonstrates flaws by previous studies of Iran. Most used a singular focus on explaining the IRGC’s influence on Iran’s economy by only focusing on political or economic aspects. This study will show how explaining the political economy of Iran best explains the role of the IRGC in Iran. The research uses event-data analysis to synthesize previous research performed on Iran. The researcher used various sources to explain the recent rise in the IRGC’s power. Focus was placed on explaining three aspects of Iran’s political economy, elected institutions, accountable businesses, and unaccountable businesses. Elected institutions included the majlis (the Iranian parliament) and the presidency.
    [Show full text]
  • Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan—Iran's Next President
    Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan—Iran’s Next President? Khoshnood, Ardavan Published in: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Perspective Papers 2020 Document Version: Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Khoshnood, A. (2020). Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan—Iran’s Next President? Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Perspective Papers, (1846). https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-dehghan- candidacy/ Total number of authors: 1 General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Read more about Creative commons licenses: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan— Iran’s Next President? by Dr. Ardavan Khoshnood BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,846, December 13, 2020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan, a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has announced his candidacy for the Iranian presidential elections in June 2021.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestine Issue Will Surely End in Favor of Islamic World: Abe Told a News Conference After His Coalition’S Victory in a Sunday Election for Parliament’S Upper House
    WWW.TEHRANTIMES.COM I N T E R N A T I O N A L D A I L Y Pages Price 40,000 Rials 1.00 EURO 4.00 AED 39th year No.13443 Tuesday JULY 23, 2019 Mordad 1, 1398 Dhi Al Qada 20, 1440 Abdul Mahdi Iranian oil Iran beat Argentina Studios from Czech, Italy, holds talks with irreplaceable: at FIVB U21 World Ukraine join Iranian director Rouhani 2 Zanganeh 5 Championship 15 to make “Blue Land” 16 Iran arrests 17 professional Palestine issue will surely CIA spies TEHRAN — Iran’s Intelligence Ministry nuclear, infrastructural, military and announced on Monday that it had bro- cyber centers, where they collected ken up a CIA spy ring and arrested 17 classified information. professional spies, some of whom have “Some citizens were trapped by the been sentenced to death by the Judiciary. U.S. exploitation of their visa requests and end in favor of Islamic world According to the director general were encouraged to spy in exchange for of the Intelligence Ministry’s coun- receiving a visa,” the official said. “Some ter-espionage department, the spies others were blackmailed by the CIA due See page 2 were employed in sensitive and vital to their need of maintaining or extending state and private sectors in economic, their visas.” 3 Tehran’s tanker seizure arguments more convincing than London’s: Moscow TEHRAN — The Kremlin says Iran’s argu- moment of the arrest of a Panama-flagged ments for its recent seizure of a UK-flagged tanker carrying Iranian oil,” Russian oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz were Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov more convincing than those of London.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran: Verordnung Vom 11
    Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research EAER State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions Version of 01.11.2016 Sanctions program: Iran: Verordnung vom 11. November 2015 über Massnahmen gegenüber der Islamischen Republik Iran (SR 946.231.143.6), Anhänge 5, 6 und 7 Origin: EU / UN Sanctions: Art. 7 Abs. 1 (Finanzsanktionen), Art. 10 Abs. 1 und 2 (Ein- und Durchreiseverbot) und Art. 11 Bst. b (Verbot der Erfüllung bestimmter Forderungen), Anhang 5 Sanctions program: Iran: Ordonnance du 11 novembre 2015 instituant des mesures à l’encontre de la République islamique d’Iran (RS 946.231.143.6), annexes 5, 6 et 7 Origin: EU / UN Sanctions: art. 7, al. 1 (Sanctions financières), art. 10, al. 1 et 2 (Interdiction de séjour et de transit) et art. 11, let. b (Interdiction d’honorer certaines créances), annexe 5 Sanctions program: Iran: Ordinanza del 11 novembre 2015 che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran (RS 946.231.143.6), allegati 5, 6 e 7 Origin: EU / UN Sanctions: art. 7 cpv. 1 (Sanzioni finanziarie), art. 10 cpv. 1 e 2 (Divieto di entrata e di transito) et art. 11 lett. b (Divieto di soddisfare determinati crediti), allegato 5 Individuals SSID: 80-8672 Foreign identifier: I.47.C.1. Name: Abbasi-Davani Fereidoun Justification: Senior MODAFL scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (I.47.C.2.). Relation: Working closely with Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi Mohsen (I.47.C.2., SSID 80-8734) SSID: 80-8676 Foreign identifier: I.AC.50.18.04.12 Name: Aghajani Azim Good quality a.k.a.: Adhajani Azim Nationality: Iran Identification document: Passport No.
    [Show full text]
  • Grenzen Politischer Reform-Und Handlungsspielräume in Iran
    www.ssoar.info Grenzen politischer Reform- und Handlungsspielräume in Iran: die Bedeutung innenpolitischer Dynamiken für die Außenpolitik Akbari, Semiramis Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Arbeitspapier / working paper Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (HSFK) Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Akbari, S. (2007). Grenzen politischer Reform- und Handlungsspielräume in Iran: die Bedeutung innenpolitischer Dynamiken für die Außenpolitik. (HSFK-Report, 9/2006). Frankfurt am Main: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-283709 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use.
    [Show full text]