1150 East andNorthAfrica. gence ofrevolutionarymovementsintheMiddle movementinSyriatothe emer- prodemocracy linked toeventsrangingfromsuppressionofthe world oftheQF shed lightintotheotherwisedarkandsecretive us withthenamesofseveralkeyindividualswho survey ofPersianopen-sourcematerialsprovides force underhiscommand.However, aclose the activitiesofSuleimaniandclandestine veteran ofIRGCQFBaseRamezan. Masjedi, senioradvisertoSuleimanianda one suchindividual:BrigadierGeneralIraj the fifthinaseriesaboutIRGCQF, discusses mander ary GuardsCorpsQudsForce(IRGCQF)com- General QassemSuleimani,IslamicRevolution- international presseswithoutmentionofMajor Not asingleweekpassesintheIranianand predict whowilldirecttheIRGCQFinfutureshouldthereforelooktothisnascentgenerationoffieldoperatives. being promotedtoadvisorypositionsinTehran, anewgenerationoffieldoperativesisemerging.Thoseseekingto qualified themtodirectQFoperationsafterthe2003US-ledinvasionofcountry. AsMasjedi’s generationis new generationofIRGCcommanderswhosecareersatBaseRamezanduringthe1980swarbetweenIranandIraq Brigadier GeneralIrajMasjedioftheIslamicRevolutionaryGuardsCorpsQudsForce(IRGCQF)personifies This isthefifthinaseriesofMiddleEasternOutlooksaboutIRGCQF. By AliAlfoneh Brigadier GeneralIrajMasjedi Revolutionary GuardsCorpsQudsForce: Generational ChangeintheIranian at AEI. Ali Alfoneh([email protected]) is aresidentfellow Despite presscoverage,littleisknownabout S e . v Suleimani andtheIRGCQFcanbe e n tee n . hSre,NW,Wsigo,DC 03 0.6.80www.aei.org 202.862.5800 th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 This Middle EasternOutlook 2 , public figurewhenheunveiledacommemorative Previously undertheradar, Masjediemergedasa From ObscurityintotheLimelight Key pointsinthis • • • in theIRGCQF. help identifywhoelsemayrise topower QF, andexamininghisbackground can generational changewithinof theIRGC Masjedi’s careerilluminatesacycleof tactics intheborderregion. bonds withIraqiinsurgentstoenhancewar from the1980sIran-Iraqwarwhoformed leaders inIran—BaseRamezanveterans Masjedi ispartofanemerginggroup der QassemSuleimani. role assenioradvisertoIRGCQFComman- Force (IRGCQF),heservesinaninfluential Islamic RevolutionaryGuardsCorpsQuds about BrigadierGeneralIrajMasjediofthe Though littleisknownintheUnitedStates 1 Outlook No. 2•March 2012 :

Middle Eastern Outlook - 2- bust of Kazem Kazemi, late IRGC Intelligence Bureau provide only vague insight into his thinking. In his cofounder, in Laleh Park in on January 16, 2012. December 16, 2010, interview with the Tehran-based Fars News Agency presented Masjedi as “senior adviser International Peace Studies Centre, Masjedi delivered a to the commander [of the IRGC QF].”3 cogent analysis of the negotiation tactics of the Iraqi Kurds concerning redistribution of Iraq’s oil revenue, territorial disputes among ethnic groups in Kirkuk, rela- A close survey of Persian open-source materials tions between the Iraqi Kurds and the government of provides us with the names of several key Turkey, and related issues.7 Masjedi’s tone was almost triumphant in his September 4, 2011, interview on ’s individuals who shed light into the otherwise influence in Iraq: “The political authority in Iraq is mov- dark and secretive world of the QF. ing in a direction parallel to the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Masjedi said, and then described Iran as “the most influential stream in Iraq’s political issues.”8 Masjedi used the occasion to praise Kazemi, but also When speaking to an IRGC audience, Masjedi uses commented on the relationship between the IRGC the organization’s well-known official rhetoric; in Intelligence Bureau, its Intelligence Ministry, and the addressing the Salman IRGC unit in Sistan va Balou- Quds Force: “The Guards’ Intelligence [Directorate] was chestan province, Masjedi said: transformed into the present day Intelligence Ministry— a sacred institution which came out of the heart of the The Islamic awakening in the Middle East and Guards Intelligence,” Masjedi said. “The second organi- North Africa follows the path of the late Imam zation and establishment is the Quds Force in which me [Rouhollah Khomeini] and the example of the and many other friends are and which is another child of warriors during eight years of Sacred Defense and the Guards’ Intelligence [Directorate].”4 the Imposed War [against] Iran [reference to the Given the fierce rivalry between the IRGC Intelli- 1980–88 war with Iraq]. The heads of state have gence Bureau and Intelligence Ministry, the IRGC’s on many occasions admitted this.9 decision to commemorate Kazemi and Masjedi’s choice of words are hardly surprising. The IRGC Intelligence Speaking in Ahwaz in the Khouzestan Province on Directorate—currently known as the Sazeman-e Ettelaat-e September 27, 2011, Masjedi stressed that “export of Sepah [Guards’ Intelligence Organization]5—used this the Islamic revolution is one of the achievements of occasion as an opportunity to remind the rival Intelli- the Sacred Defense.”10 From the limited material avail- gence Ministry of its debt to the IRGC. able, one can distinguish between Masjedi’s thoughtful It is nonetheless surprising that the IRGC chose to statements given to journalists and his repetition of expose Masjedi to the broader public. The IRGC leader- official IRGC slogans when addressing the public. ship may have done so to communicate Masjedi’s ele- The open-source material provides slightly better vated position as the commander’s senior adviser to the insight into Masjedi’s military career. The earliest refer- greater fraternity of IRGC members—both those in ence to Masjedi appears in the February 21, 1987, entry active duty and veterans from the Iran-Iraq war. The of the IRGC’s Iran-Iraq War Chronology, which claims action may also have been an attempt to expose Masjedi that Masjedi was the Base Ramezan deputy.11 He served to the press by bringing him in from the field. Regardless under Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr,12 the first commander of the reasons behind Masjedi’s exposure, it heralds a in the history of the base,13 who is currently the Societal generational change in the IRGC QF. Security and Crime Prevention director of the Judiciary.14 By September 15, 1987, Masjedi was appointed chief Iraj Masjedi: Biography, Ideology, of staff at the Quds Base,15 a tactical location north of the and Career Overview Karkheh River.16 Recent references to Masjedi present contradictory information about him. For example, a Personal information about Masjedi such as his date September 27, 2011, story reported by the Iran Labour and place of birth cannot be found in public records.6 News Agency (ILNA) refers to Masjedi as “Quds Force There is a similar dearth of information about Masjedi’s deputy,”17 while the Sistan va Balouchestan branch of the ideological tenets. His few publicly available speeches Basij Resistance Force more plausibly presents him as - 3- “Quds Base deputy”18 in a report dated the same day as mander;30 Gholam-Ali Rashid, IRGC operations com- ILNA’s story. It is unclear when exactly Masjedi was mander;31 Mostafa Izadi, IRGC staff member;32 Moham- appointed senior adviser to Suleimani, though it must mad-Baqer Zolqadr, IRGC Irregular Warfare have occurred prior to Fars News Agency’s January 16, Headquarters commander;33 and Asghar Moqaddam, 2012, article mentioning said title.19 whose role during the war is unclear.34 Other first- generation Base Ramezan commanders with whom Masjedi’s Service in IRGC QF’s Masjedi must have been in contact include Mohammad- Base Ramezan Ali Rahmani, former Ramezan Base intelligence comman- der;35 , former engineer at the Masjedi’s record of service in Base Ramezan is significant IRGC Special Operations Brigade and current president for two important reasons: it was the hub of the IRGC of Iran;36 Sadeq Mahsouli, former IRGC Special Opera- QF’s war effort behind enemy lines in Iraq, and many Base tions Brigade commander who served as welfare minister Ramezan veterans are now IRGC QF commanders. to Ahmadinejad;37 and Parviz Fattah, who served as Toward the end of 1984, the IRGC presented a plan energy minister in the same cabinet.38 to then-president and the Supreme Defense Council calling for the establishment of an Irregular War- The QF, tasked with the extraterritorial operations fare Headquarters.20 After experiencing a stalemate on the southern front, the IRGC went about establishing of the IRGC, used Base Ramezan to organize Ramezan headquarters as a northern front against Iraq.21 Shi’a Iraqi refugees looking to engage in armed The QF, tasked with the extraterritorial operations of struggle against Iraq’s Ba’ath regime. the IRGC, used Base Ramezan to organize Shi’a Iraqi refugees looking to engage in armed struggle against Iraq’s Ba’ath regime. The refugee groups included the Supreme Masjedi’s presence at Base Ramezan also allowed him Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,22 led by Iraqi to establish a relationship with senior KDP officials such Shi’a leader Mohammad-Baqir al-Hakim. More impor- as Fazel Mirani, Molazem Babak, and Abd al-Mohaiman tantly, the IRGC QF managed to cooperate with Kurdish Barzani,39 as well as the highest officials in the PUK, insurgents inside Iraqi territory, such as the Kurdistan including Jalal Talabani, the current president of Iraq.40 Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of It was Masjedi who, during a meeting with Talabani, Kurdistan (PUK).23 The presence of various Iraqi groups assured him of Iran’s commitment to the war against provided Base Ramezan with the necessary operational Iraq: “You rest assured, we will not under any circum- flexibility to gain allies whenever a particular Iraqi insur- stances have peace with Saddam. We believe in fighting gent group was unwilling to cooperate with the IRGC.24 against the Ba’th regime until it is toppled.”41 By 1985, the IRGC QF had engaged in serious irregular The United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a warfare against Iraqi oil installations from Base Ramezan, mixed blessing for the Islamic Republic. In the words of particularly against those in Kirkuk.25 Thus, Base Rahmani, former Ramezan Base intelligence comman- Ramezan managed to disband enemy forces in the border der, the invasion “did away with a real menace…[but] zone, manage counterrevolutionary groups in Northern the Ba’th party’s rule in Iraq was replaced with the Iraq, ease information-gathering and operations, and take United States Army.”42 Rahmani continues: part in cooperative efforts against the Ba’ath regime.26 There is no reference to Masjedi’s functions at Base Saddam’s goals were limited to Iraq’s geography and Ramezan with the exception of his hiding irregular forces its periphery, but the goals of the United States among the local Iraqi population to ensure that increased encompass the entire region. Should the Americans demand for food did not lead to rising prices in the local desire to stay in the region forever . . . it is natural that market.27 Nonetheless, Masjedi must have been deeply we have not benefited from the toppling of Saddam. involved in operational planning at Base Ramezan. But should the Americans wisely think that their According to the Iran-Iraq War Chronology, he participated presence in the region is not to their benefit, and in meetings with senior IRGC officials including Mohsen should they feel that they must pay a heavy price for Rezaei, IRGC commander;28 Ali Shamkhani, IRGC their presence, doubtlessly, they will reduce their mil- deputy;29 Rahim Safavi, IRGC ground forces com- itary presence and return to their country.43 - 4- How the IRGC QF has tried to impose a “heavy price” Notes on the United States since 2003 is outside the scope of this Outlook44—but according to some sources, Base 1. For the previous Outlooks in the series, see Ali Alfoneh, Ramezan resumed direction of operations on Iraqi soil in “Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani: A Biography,” AEI Middle the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq and has Eastern Outlook (January 2011), www.aei.org/outlook/foreign- since expanded its presence with smaller tactical bases. and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa Unfortunately, references to the post-2003 activities /brigadier-general-qassem-suleimani-a-biography/; Ali Alfoneh, of Base Ramezan are limited to information provided “Iran’s Secret Network: Major General Qassem Suleimani’s by the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a sometimes unreli- Inner Circle,” AEI Middle Eastern Outlook (March 2011), able source. According to the MEK, Base Ramezan www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle- commands more than five operational bases (each of east-and-north-africa/irans-secret-network/; Ali Alfoneh, “Iran’s which has several affiliate command posts) along the Most Dangerous General,” AEI Middle Eastern Outlook (July Iran-Iraq border: Nasr Garrison in Naqdeh; Fath Garrison 2011), www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional in Sardasht; Ra’d Garrison in Marivan; Zafar Garrison in /middle-east-and-north-africa/irans-most-dangerous-general/; and Kermanshah; and Fajr Garrison in Ahwaz.45 The MEK Ali Alfoneh, “Esmail Qaani: The Next Revolutionary Guards also claims that Masjedi, along with Brigadier General Quds Force Commander?” AEI Middle Eastern Outlook (January Hamid Taqavi (a Base Ramezan operations commander 2012), www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/ whose identity could not be verified through other regional /middle-east-and-north-africa/esmail-qaani-the-next- sources), and Brigadier General Obeidavi (whose first revolutionary-guards-quds-force-commander/. name is not known and who according to the same source 2. “Khabar-e Velayati Darbareh-ye Naqsh-e Bi-Badil-e Sepah-e was Fajr Garrison commander in 2003) were instrumental Qods Dar Tahavolat-e Mantaqeh” [Velayati’s News About the in organizing the IRGC QF’s operations in Iraq.46 Unrivaled Role of the Quds Force in Regional Events], Ghased News (Tehran), February 25, 2012, www.ghasednews.ir/fa Conclusion /news/19755/%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9% 84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8 If the information provided by the MEK is accurate, and %B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%86% Masjedi has indeed played a role in directing IRGC QF D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8% activities in Iraq since 2003, we can draw several inter- AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9% esting conclusions. 87-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8% Masjedi’s career demonstrates that experience in the AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9% Iran-Iraq war and personal bonds with Iraqi insurgents 85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87 (accessed February 27, are crucial components to getting promoted within the 2012). IRGC. Similar to Masjedi, other senior IRGC QF 3. “Rounamayi az Sardis-e Sardar-e Shahid Seyyed Kazem commanders operating in Iraq today are likely to be Kazemi Dar Park-e Laleh” [Unveiling the Statue of the Martyr Base Ramezan veterans who worked behind Iraqi Seyyed Kazem Kazemi in Laleh Park], Fars News (Tehran), lines during the war, having developed close bonds January 16, 2012, www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn= with Iraqi insurgents who are now in power in Iraq. 13901026001296 (accessed February 20, 2012). For photos, Masjedi’s promotion to senior adviser to the IRGC see “Rounamayi az Sardis-e Shahid Kazemi Dar Park-e Laleh” QF commander is a sign of generational change [Unveiling Martyr Kazemi’s Statue in Laleh Park], Fars News within the IRGC QF: as the older generation of Base (Tehran) January 16, 2012, www.farsnews.com/imgrep.php?nn= Ramezan veterans is vacating operational positions in 13901026001395 (accessed February 20, 2012). the field for desk jobs in Tehran, they will be replaced 4. “Movafaqiat-ha-ye Sazeman-e Ettelaat-e Sepah Marhoun-e by a younger generation of IRGC QF field operatives. Fadakariha-ye Shahid Kazemi Ast” [Successes of the Guards’ Therefore, following this trend, future IRGC QF Intelligence Organization Are Due to the Self Sacrifice of Martyr commanders operating in Iraq are likely to be those Kazemi], Fars News (Tehran), January 16, 2012, www.farsnews serving in Base Ramezan today, which narrows the field .com/newstext.php?nn=13901026001351 (accessed February 20, of candidates Iran watchers should pay attention to in 2012). order to predict the future composition of the IRGC 5. “Ertegqae Moavenat-e Ettelaat-e Sepah Be Sazeman-e QF leadership. Ettelaat” [Promotion of the Intelligence Bureau to the Guards’ - 5-

Intelligence Organization], Alef News (Tehran), October 6, /1388-08-18-16-14-46/266-1388-09-08-21-50-24.html (accessed 2009, http://alef.ir/vdcauanm.49nyu15kk4.html?54822 (accessed February 20, 2012). March 8, 2012). 14. “Zolqadr Khabar Dad…” [Zolqadr Informed…], Qoveh-ye 6. The only public record reference of interest is to a certain Qazaeiyeh-ye Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (Tehran), March 7, Reza Masjedi, who, according to one source, received guerrilla 2012, www.dadiran.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=40&ctl=Edit&mid= warfare training in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria before the 389&Code=9389 (accessed March 8, 2012). revolution, and functioned as a military instructor at the IRGC 15. Mahmoud Yazdanfam, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh QF’s Imam Ali Air Base in Sa'd Abad in Tehran after 1979. A [Iran-Iraq War Chronology] (Tehran: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e shared family name and career in extraterritorial IRGC activities Enghelab-e Eslami, 2008), 50: 656. may indicate that the two men are blood relatives, but this is not 16. “Sharh-e Kamel-e Amaliyat-e Beit al-Moqaddas” enough information to establish a clear relationship between [Complete Tale of the Beit al-Moqaddas Operation], them. See “Khaterat-e Yeki Az Farmandehan-e Bazmandeh Az Aviny (Tehran), n.d., www.aviny.com/Occasion/Enghelab Amaliat-e Beit al-Moqaddas” [Memoirs of a Suviving Comman- _Jang /3Khordad/83/Beitolmoghaddas/beitolmoghaddas.aspx der from the Beit al-Moqaddas Operation], Ayeh-he-ye Entezar (accessed March 8, 2012). (Tehran), n.d., www.ayehayeentezar.com/archive/index.php 17. “Sodour-e Enghelab-e Eslami Yeki . . . ” /t-15200.html (accessed March 10, 2012). 18. “Tavan-e Defaei-ye Iran Payeh-ha-ye . . . ” 7. “Kordestan va Moadeleh-ye Qodrat Dar Eraq: Goftegou Ba 19. “Rounamayi az Sardis-e Sardar-e Shahid Seyyed . . . ” Sardar Iraj Masjedi” [Kurdistan and the Balance of Power in Iraq: 20. “Modiriat-e Pazhouheshha-ye Amaliati-ye Nirou-ye A Conversation with Commander Iraj Masjedi], Strategic Review Zmini-ye Sepah, Sanad-e Shomareh-ye 37514” [Directorate (Tehran), December 16, 2010, http://strategicreview.org/1389/09 for Research into the Operations of the Guards Ground Forces, /25/%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8% Document Number 37514], quoted in Said Mohammadpour, A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7% “Tasir-e Amaliat-ha-ye Namonazam-e Qarargah-e Ramezan D8%AF%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1% Dar Jang-e Tahmili” [Impacts of the Irregular Operations of Base D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7% Ramezan During the Imposed War], Faslnameh-ye Siasat-e Defaei D9%82/ (accessed March 11, 2012). (Tehran) 12, no. 17 (2004):85. 8. “Senior Analyst: Baghdad Policies Parallel with Iran,” 21. “Revayat-e Jang Az Zaban-e Farmandeh-ye Jang.” Fars News (Tehran), September 4, 2011, http://english 22. “Tasir-e Amaliat-ha-ye Namonazam-e . . . ,” 87. .farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9006130080 (accessed 23. Ibid. March 10, 2012). 24. Ibid, 88. 9. “Tavan-e Defaei-ye Iran Payeh-ha-ye Estekbar Ra Larzan- 25. Ibid. deh Ast” [Iran’s Defensive Capabilities Have Shaken the Founda- 26. Kamil Karimian, “Monasebat-e Iran Ba Kordha-ye tions of Arrogance], Paygah-e Ettelae-Resani-ye Sepah-e Salman Eragh Dar Toul-e Hasht Sal Jang” [Iran’s Relations with the (Zahedan), September 27, 2011, http://sb.basij.ir/?q=node/20850 Iraqi Kurds During Eight Years of War], Negin-e Iran (Tehran), (accessed March 10, 2012). Autumn 2002, 2:104, quoted in “Tasir e Amaliat ha ye 10. “Sodour-e Enghelab-e Eslami Yeki az Dastavard-ha-ye Namonazam e . . . ,” 89. Jang Boud” [The Export of the Islamic Revolution Was One of 27. Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh, 51: 613. the Achievements of the War], ILNA (Tehran), September 27, 28. “Ashnayi” [Acquaintance], Paygah-e Ettela-e-Resani-ye 2011, http://ilna.ir/newsText.aspx?ID=209767 (accessed Doktor Mohsen Rezaei (Tehran), n.d., http://rezaee.ir/vsdehq March 10, 2012). 841b1j-b9i2.b4b1bj.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 11. Mohammad-Hossein Jamshidi and Mahmoud Yazdanfam, 29. “Moshakhaseh-ha Va Vizhegiha-ye Tim-e Jadid-e Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh [Iran-Iraq War Chronology] Kabineh” [Traces and Characteristics of the New Team (Tehran: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 2002), in the Cabinet], Iran (Tehran), August 13, 2001,www.iran- 47:58. newspaper.com/1380/800522/html/politic.htm#s40599 (accessed 12. Mehdi Ansari and Mahmoud Yazdanfam, Rouzshomar-e March 1, 2012). Jang-e Iran va Eragh [Iran-Iraq War Chronology] (Tehran: 30. “Naqsh-e Tavan-e Razm Dar Entekhab-e Mantaqeh-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 2008), 51:612. Amaliati-ye Faw” [The Role of the Ability to Fight in Choosing 13. “Revayat-e Jang Az Zaban-e Farmandeh-ye Jang” [The Al-Faw Operational Zones], Pazhouheshgah-e Oloum va Maaref-e Tale of the War Told by the Commander of the War], Farhang-e Defa-e Moqaddas (Tehran), n.d., www.dsrc.ir/view/article.aspx?id Isar (Tehran), November 30, 2009, www.farhangeisar.net =1254 (accessed March 1, 2012). - 6-

31. “Ashnaei ba Sardar Gholam-Ali Rashid Tarrah-e Tekkeh 38. Ibid. Tekkeh Kardan-e Hormozgan” [Acquaintance with Commander 39. Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh, 47:58. Gholam-Ali Rashid: the Planner Behind the Division of Hormoz- 40. Hossein Ardestani, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh gan into Small Zones], Gooje Geno Blog (Bandar Abbas), July [Iran-Iraq War Chronology], (Tehran: Sepah-e Pasdaran-e 31, 2011, www.goojegeno.blogsky.com/1390/05/09/post-215/ Enghelab-e Eslami, 2003), 52:250. (accessed March 1, 2012). 41. Ibid. 32. “14 Sarlashkar-e Irani Be Revayat-e Tasvir” [Fourteen 42. “Tashkil-e Sepah-e Badr . . . ” Iranian Major Generals According to Photos], Khouz News 43. Ibid. (Khouzestan), April 6, 2011, www.khouznews.ir/fa/news/534 44. For a few sources discussing this issue, see Kimberly /14-%D8% B3%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8% Kagan, Iran’s Proxy War Against the United States and the Iraqi Gov- B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB% ernment (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War and 8C-%D8% A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%DB% The Weekly Standard, 2006-2007), 3, www.understandingwar.org 8C% D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%DB%8C% /sites/default/files/reports/IraqReport06.pdf (accessed March 11, D8%B1 (accessed March 1, 2012). 2012); and Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in 33. “Mohammad-Baqer Zolnour Janeshin-e Vazir…” Iraq: Politics and Other Means,” Occasional Papers, Series (New [Mohammad-Baqer Zolnour, Deputy Minister…], Fars News York: Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint, 2008), (Tehran), November 23, 2005, www.farsnews.com www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Iranian-Strategy- /printable.php?nn=8409020613 (accessed March 1, 2012). in-Iraq.pdf (accessed March 11, 2012). 34. Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Eragh, 51:613. 45. For a survey of tactical bases reporting to Base Ramezan 35. “Tashkil-e Sepah-e Badr, Amel-e Yekparchegi-ye see Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism—The New Amaliat-e Nezami Alayh-e Rezhim-e Bath” [Formation of Global Threat, (Washington DC: Seven Locks Press, 2001), 106; the Badr Corps, Agent of Unity in Military Operations and Alireza Jafarzadeh: The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad Against the Bath Regime], Rasekhoon (Tehran) June 2011, and the Coming Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, www.rasekhoon.net/article/show-86107.aspx (accessed March 7, 2007), 240. 2012). 46. “Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq dar Ettelaeiyeh-I Elam 36. “Khaterat-e Mahsouli az Defae-e Moqaddas” [Mahsouli’s Nemoud…” [The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organizations Declare in Memoirs from the Sacred Defense], Raja News (Tehran), n.d., an Announcement…], Gooya News (London), March 30, 2003, www.rajanews.com/detail.asp?id=19769 (accessed March 11, http://news.gooya.com/2003/04/02/0204-ff-03.php (accessed 2012). March 11, 2012). 37. “Tashkil-e Sepah-e Badr…”