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LEARNING THE HARD WAY, OR NOT AT ALL: BRITISH TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION DURING THE BOER WAR 1899-1902 A MONOGRAPH BY Major Rob B. McClary United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Second Term AY 98-99 Appmved for I'ublic Iklcusc Dislribution is hlimited ;! Form Approved , I REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OM6 No. 07044188 . '1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS L-rrt'-q T1.e kkrd LJ~., I\l. t *r A1 1; h c ~-d5rr-k-i~ 4dae t4 hul ,j ~ZQi30.r UC..- ,899 - lqo2. 6. AUTHOR(S) L b 4, PAC Y 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADORESS(E5) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Stajif-College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 9. SPONSORlNGlMONlTORlNG AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADORESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 I 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES .. 121. DlSTRlBUTlONIAVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 100 wolds) 15 UMBER OF PAGES 14. SURJECT TERMS q6 rfic71.n~ fiJy.b.f-lY*, 5~r~t-t~;~A3 =,f)s+,o,, , 1% 16. PRICE COOL '&ec \/J-r, ~op.do(br(o4 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSlflCATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 10. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNLIMITED 5:a,-d<,,: :P~T2913 ,Q+d !.V* -hSV 75.iO 01-180.5505 ., . SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPROVAL Major Rob B. McClary Title of Monograph: Learning the Hard Way, or Not At All: The British Strategic and Tactical Adaptation During the Boer War of 1899-1902 Approved by: Monograph Director Robert F. ~aMann,Ph.D. Director, School of Advanced LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS Military Studies Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program Accepted this 27th Day of May 1999 ABSTRACT LEARNING THE HARD WAY, OK NOT AT ALL: BRITISH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ADAPTATION DURING THE BOER WAR OF 1899-1902 by Maj. Rob B. McClary, USMC, 46 pages. The United States' current strategic environment is increasingly complex, with security, economic, and humanitarian interests around the world. Consequently, the United States' military may be callcd upon at any time to perform missions ranging from peacckceping to total war, in environments ranging from the desserts of South West Asia to the jungles of Central Amcrica, against enemies ranging from Somali warlords to Chinese divisions. This uncertainty prevents the United States' military from organizing, equipping, and training for any specific situation. Therefore, to be successful the United States military must bc capable of quickly adapting to thc particulars of its mission whcn called. In the late 1800's England found itself in much the same position, with its military engaged around the world protecting its diverse and widely-dispersed interests. In 1899 when it went to war against the Boers it found its military unsuited for the South African terrain, thc effects of modern weaponry, and the unconventional Boer tactics. This paper examines the British military's strategy and tactics, and how thcy changed throughout the war. Ultimately it determines that the British failed to adapt their strategy and tactics effectively throughout the war. Although their performance varied from commander to commander, and from unit to unit, the British typically resisted change, for various reasons, even when the need for change was TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. I 11. Theoretical Dasis; Adaptation and Coevolution ...................................................... 5 111. The Setting of the Boer War .................................................................................. 8 The Road to War .............................................................................................. 8 The Thcatcr of War ......................................................................................... 12 IV . Analysis................................................................................................................14 ... Adaptation of Br~llshStrategy ........................................................................ 14 ... Adaptation of Brllrsh Tactics......................................................................... 31. Appendix I Map of the Theater of War .................................................................. 44 Appendix 11 Map of the Battle of Talana Ilill ....................................................... 45 Appendix 111 Map ol'the Battle of Colcnso .............................................................. 46 Endnotes................................................................................................................... 47 Bibliography...............................................................................................................50 Chapter I: Introtluctiun "At least two years of failure and experience are needed to turn a civilian and commercial nation into a military powcr." ' Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in The Great Boer War Military I-listorian Michael Howard once said that, in war, "everybody starts even, and everybody starts wrong ....when everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly adjust to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from its mistakes."' Howard asscncd that for a variety of reasons, such as the uncertain impact of technological advancements, ever-changing social and political restrictions, and the inability to experiment in the same conditions under which they must fight, armies historically cntcr wars without the proper structure, cquipment, and training. For the United States, in its current strategic environment, the problcm of properly preparing li)r hc next war is even more difficult. With economic and their accompanying security interests distributed literally all around the world, the United States' military must be prepared for action against virtually any force around the world, and anywhere along the "spectrum of conllict." With possible cnemies ranging from Somalia warlords to Serbian armor formations, with potential terrains on which to fight ranging from thc Iraqi dessert to the Panamanian jungles, and possible missions ranging from peacekeeping to total war, the United States military must be flexible and capable of rapid adaptation. After all, the validity of given tactics and strategies depends entirely on the character of thc opposing forces, the technical qualities of thcir weapons, thc skill and determination of thcir soldiers and leaders, and the nature of thc terrain. Recognizing the importance of adaptation, Paul Davis, in the 1998 IUND Issue Paper, "Transforming the Force," stated that, "...the singlc most important task for Secretary of Defcnse Cohen and his successors ovcr the next two decades is to transform U.S. military forces I'or adaptiveness in new and strategic and operational circumstances.".' In "Joint Vision 2010," General John M. Sl~alikashviliwrotc that? "...regardless of how sophisticated technology becomes, the individual warfightcr's judgment, creativity, and adaptability in the face of highly dynamic situations will be essential to thc succcss of future operations."' Fortunately, however, the United States military's position is not without precedent. In thc latc 1800's. with colonies, possessions, and economic interests spanning the globe, the British Empire found its military continuously in conflicts, performing a widc varicty of missions against a wide variety of enemies. In 1906 Major- General Sir Frcdcrick Maurice of the British Army expressed the dil'ficultics that the British forccs faced when planning expeditionary operations: "Lvery Army grows up according to its traditions c$pust history. Those ofthe (:ontinent having only to cross afrontier, marked by Royal, Imperial, or Repblican stones, have, in their rare but terrible campuigns, to pursue dc/inite objects that can be anticipated in nearly rill ($their de1tri1.s years he/i)rehand. The British Army, on the contrary, throughout the nineteenth century, has had to carry out a series oj'expeditions in every variety uf climate, in all quarters ofthe globe, amidst the deserts qf North Ajiica the hills, plains, and tropica1,forest.s on South Africa, the mountains (?f India, the swamps ofBurma, or the vast regions c$ Cunrrda. Such expedirions have been more numerous than the yec1r.s ($the century; each ofthem has diffcredfromthe other in almo.st all of'its conditions. "I In fact, when the British govcrnment decided to wage war against the independent Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal in 1899, the forces they sent came from India, North Africa, the Mediterranean Sea, and England. In addition to unfamiliar terrain and climate, these forccs encountered an enemy who [ought with tactics, organization, and strategy totally foreign to thc British. Adding to the British forces' difficulties was the emergcncc of new technologies whose effects upon tactics and strategy were yet to be dctcrmined. Blind to thcir difficulties and brimming with coniidcncc, the British expected thcir fight against thc Doers to be a quick and easy one, referring to the Boer republics as, "trumpery little States," with their, "impudent burghers," and predicting "Pretoria by Christmas!""I-lowevcr, the