Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°90 Jakarta/Brussels, 23 March 2009 Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach sees the military as its principal opponent and encourages I. OVERVIEW the perception that all attacks on its members or offices are somehow linked to the TNI, even when many over the Tensions in Aceh are high as elections approach, although past three years have been the result of internal friction. they have receded somewhat from a peak in mid- February. The murders of three former combatants of The military’s fears are misplaced, despite the cam- the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, paign rhetoric of some Partai Aceh members. The GAM), other shootings and numerous grenade attacks problem with many GAM members is that they are over the last two months – all with unidentified per- using democratic means not to push for independence, petrators – have set the province on edge, and there but to acquire access to spoils. This has turned an remains a risk of sporadic, low-level violence before organisation that was always decentralised into a frac- and after general elections on 9 April. Disputes over tured association that, while ready to unite in the face the results, with 44 parties competing for seats in of a serious threat, is composed of small units out for district, provincial and national legislatures using a themselves. The former guerrillas, now called the Aceh new and complicated system of voting, are also likely. Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), There is little danger in the short term of violence still use a modified version of their old hierarchical struc- escalating out of control, let alone a return to armed ture, but power is locally concentrated, and in some conflict, but the underlying causes of the tensions are areas at the village or sub-district level, the KPA has not just election-related and need to be addressed if replaced some functions of the civilian government. peace is to be preserved in the long term. Arms are not in short supply among ex-combatants, but The crux of the problem is the mutual fear and loathing the KPA’s power is not from weapons so much as between GAM and the Indonesian military (Tentara from the implicit threat that comes from past history, Nasional Indonesia, TNI), based partly on perceptions its links with elected GAM officials and its own carried over from the conflict and partly on actions unaccountable status. Extortion continues to be rampant. since. The police have been relegated to a minor role, but All available evidence suggests that far from working enhancing their professional skills, such as criminal toward independence, most KPA members are inter- investigation – not just their community relations ested more than anything else in getting their fair share approach – is essential. The challenge for Acehnese of post-conflict benefits. As an organisation which civil society, the Indonesian government and donors seems to consider itself above the law, the KPA is a is to put in place programs that change behaviour problem – but one that many countries struggling with first, so that confidence-building measures have some the after-effects of an insurgency would recognise. foundation to build on. The solution, in addition to patience, employment and Many in the TNI are convinced that GAM has not targeted civil society efforts, is better law enforcement. changed its goals, only its tactics, since the 2005 Good policing is required, not more soldiers deployed Helsinki agreement ended armed conflict between in villages, but the police in Aceh have been singu- them. They believe that GAM still is committed to larly ineffective. Various reasons have been advanced: independence, despite repeated denials by the top leader- lack of training, insufficient numbers, family ties, eco- ship, and that it reneged on a commitment to dissolve nomic collusion and even fear. Donor funding has itself after Partai Aceh was established. Many, both in focused on human rights and community policing, but Aceh and Jakarta, believe it continues to constitute a professional skills remain in extremely short supply. potential threat to the unity of the republic, parti- A new provincial police commander with a good repu- cularly if Partai Aceh candidates win control of key tation, appointed in late February, may be able to help, district legislatures and enough seats in the provincial but meanwhile, the military, with its own perceptions parliament to have a dominant voice. GAM, for its part, and priorities, not to mention unmitigated contempt Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°90, 23 March 2009 Page 2 for the police, has moved into the vacuum and become randum of Understanding (MoU) on its behalf.2 Other the dominant security force. members of the former “cabinet”, including Zaini Abdullah, former foreign minister, and Zakaria Saman, A strong speech by President Yudhoyono in late Feb- former defence minister, serve as a kind of executive ruary in Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, was council for the conglomerate, but there is no GAM widely interpreted locally as a warning to the regional structure below them – it has been subsumed by the military commander to take a less hardline approach. KPA. Although there are many ordinary GAM mem- Whether or not there is a causal link, the TNI since bers in Aceh who are not KPA members, they do not has gone out of its way to make examples of soldiers necessarily look to Malik Mahmud for leadership. who violate military ethics or the law, holding a widely publicised court-martial of a subdistrict com- Malik Mahmud presides over important ceremonial mander and his men for pulling up Partai Aceh flags occasions like the return of Hasan Tiro, GAM’s founder, in one case and dismissing a district military intelli- in October 2008; high-level discussions about imple- gence officer accused of physical abuse of a Partai Aceh mentation of the Helsinki agreement; discussions with cadre in another. Such actions are welcome but do not Vice President Jusuf Kalla or former members of the erase concerns about the TNI’s non-neutral stance Indonesian government’s MoU negotiating team; or towards the party. meetings, as in February 2009, with Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish president and Nobel laureate, who The election climate exacerbates the uneasy relation- brokered the agreement. Malik is very protective of ship among GAM/KPA, the Indonesian military and his relationship with the Indonesian government and the police, but the problems are long-term. The trouble has no interest in confrontation. When Hasan Tiro came, is that the depth of the challenge is being recognised Malik went out of his way to make sure his speeches, just as most international donors, finished with their post- delivered with top provincial military and police tsunami reconstruction, are pulling out of Aceh. Four officers present, included references to the new era of years after the peace, they are needed more than ever. cooperation that the MoU had ushered in and how the bitter past was over. II. THE GAM CONGLOMERATE Malik, however, is acutely conscious of the divisions in GAM and his own precarious position as head of a structure that has less and less need for him. If GAM The institution at the heart of Aceh’s post-conflict dissolved, he would have no role left vis-à-vis the Indo- political development is GAM, but over time it has nesian government and lose the last bit of authority he become less of a single structure and more like a wields over the fractious membership. His problems sprawling, somewhat dysfunctional conglomerate with are exacerbated by the fact that he is not an Indone- 1 several different heads. It now comprises at least four sian citizen (nor is Zaini Abdullah or Zakaria Saman) components: GAM, KPA, Partai Aceh and parts of and spends more of his time in Malaysia and Singa- the local government. pore.3 The idea that four years after the peace, the Indo- nesian government is still dealing with non-citizens who maintain foreign addresses is an ongoing irritant, par- A. GAM ticularly to the military. Geurakan Acheh Meurdeka (the Acehnese spelling of GAM), is headed by Malik Mahmud, its former “prime B. KPA minister” and the man who signed the Helsinki Memo- The Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA) is led by Muzakkir Manaf, former commander of the Aceh National Army (Tentara Negara Acheh, TNA), GAM’s armed wing. KPA was originally set up 1 For earlier Crisis Group analyses of Aceh see Crisis Group in December 2005, the new manifestation of TNA, Asia Briefing N°81, Indonesia: Pre-Election Anxieties in without the weapons but with an essentially unchanged Aceh, 9 September 2008; Crisis Group Asia Report N°139, Aceh: Post-conflict Complications, 4 October 2007; and Crisis Group Asia Briefings N°61, Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh, 22 March 2007; N°57, Aceh’s Local Elections: 2 Prior to the Helsinki agreement, GAM designated Malik The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 29 November Mahmud as “prime minister in exile, State of Acheh”. 2006; N°48, Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, 29 March 2006; 3 Malik Mahmud carries a Singaporean passport and has N°44, Aceh: So Far, So Good, 13 December 2005; and permanent residency in Sweden. Zaini Abdullah and Zakaria N°40, Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, 15 August 2005. Saman are Swedish citizens. Indonesia: Deep Distrust in Aceh as Elections Approach Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°90, 23 March 2009 Page 3 structure. The KPA has evolved into a broader organi- Malik loyalists and they have warned the rank and file sation, in some areas recruiting new members, in others against provocative actions.