CONFIDENTIAL
SECTION V
U.S.S. SUWANEE (CVE27) U.S.S. SANTEE (CVE29) Kamikaze Damage Kamikaze and Under water Damage Off Samar Off Samar 25 and 26 October 1944 25 October 1944
U.S.S. SANGAMON (CVE26) Kamikaze Damage Off Okinawa 4 May 1945
Class ...... SANGAMON (CVE26) Length (0.A.). . ... 553 Ft. 0 In. Comissioned as Carrier s Beam (O.A.) ...... 114 F t. 3 In. CVE26 ...... AUGUST 1-942 CVE27 § 29 . . . SEPTEMBER 1942 Displacement (Full Load).. 24,275 Dr ait (Full Load). 31 Ft. 0 In. Tons
Refer ences:
(a) C.O. SUWANEE ltr. CVE27/Al6- 3(3), Ser ial 008 of 6 November 1944 (Action Repor t). (b) SUWANEE War Damage Repor t p r epar ed by Navy Yard, Puget Sound. (c) C.O. SANTEE ltr. CVE29/Al6 - 3, Ser ial 10018 of 5 November 1944 (Action Report). (d) C.O. SANTEE ltr. CVE29/Lll- l, Ser ial 433 of 7 Januar y 1945 (War Damage Repor t). (e) SANTEE War Damage Repor t Prepar ed by Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. (f) C.O. SANGAMON ltr. Al6- 3/CVE26, Serial 044 of 20 Ma) 1945 (Action Report). (g) C.O. SANGAMON ltr. A9/CVE26, Serial 041 of 8 May 1945 (War Damage Report).
Plates V - 1 SUWANEE - Kamikaze Damage V -2 SANTEE - Kamikaze and Under water Damage V -3 SANGAMON - Kamikaze Damage V- 4 ASHTABULA (A051) and MISSISSINEWA (A057) - P r ofile and Tank Ar rangement V - 5 COMMENCEMENT BAY (CVE105) - P r ofile and Deck Arrangement
Photogr aphs - Furnished as follows :
5- 1 to 5- 10 by C.O. SUWANEE and Navy Yar d, Puget Sound 5- 11 to 5- 20 by C.O. SANTEE and Navy Yar d, Pear l Har bor 5- 21 to 5- 30 by C.O. SANGAMON and Navy Yard, Norfolk
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUWANEE (CVE27), SANTEE (CVE29) and SANGAMON (CVE2Ei)
5-:. The COMMENCEMENT BAY (CVE105) Class of escort carriers is the latest class and is, at present, the only class of CVE's in active service. The first of these ships was completed too late in the war to see much action and as a result, they ex perienced no batlle damage. Their prototype was the SANGAMON Class which had been converted from CIMARRON (A022) Class fleet oilers. The latter were twin-bwkhead, twin-screw vessels, 553 feet in length overall and 75 feet in beam. Ships of the SANGAMON Class of which there were on1y four, saw continuous service as carriers from the fall of 1942 until the end of the war. To provLde some basis for estimating the damage resbtance of the COMMENCEMENT BAY Class, orief summaries follow of damage experience in SUWANEE, SANTEE ana SANGAMON. The principal damage in each case was due to Kamikaze altack. SUWANEE and SANGAMON both had severe fires among parked aircraft. The fire in the former was br0ught under control with surprising prompt ness. In SANGAMON the devastating blast and fragment effect of a oomo detonating in tne hangar disabled the sprinkling system and water curtains locally and made the conflagration much more difficult to control. SANTEE also suffered underwater damage which was reported to have been due to a submarine torpedo. The extent of her underwater damage, however, was considerably less than would norma1ly have been anticipated from a torpedo hit. To amplify the information on torpedo damage in hulls of similar construction, bnef outlines of such damage occurrrng in two CIMARRON Class tankers, ASHTABULA (A051) and MISSISSINEWA (A059), are included with the paragraphs on SANTEE.
SUWANEE (CVE27)
5-2. About ObOO on the morning of 2::> October 1944, enemy aircraft attacked the CV E's of U.S. Task Unit r 7.4.1, the southern of the three escort carrier um ts which were east of Samar, operating aircraft in support of the amphibious forces in Leyte Gulf. At that time, SUWANEE was in a modified Material Condition ABLE, having secured from rouline dawn General Quarters stations lo send the crew to breakfast. Only three of her aircraft remained aooard, two on the flight deck and ,rne in the hangar, none of which were fueled or armed. The ship'!:' gasoline system was secured. b-3. At 0804, a Kamikaze identified as a ZEKE dived on SUWANEE at an angle of about 45 degrees from an altitude of about 8000 feel. Although it was set afire by defensive gunfire, this p1ane with its bomb crashed into the flight deck 40 feet forward of the after 1 .e'. alor and penetrated to the hangar where the bomb de- tonated and the remains of both the ZEKE and the plane parked in
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the hangar burned until extinguished by the fire party about 15 minutes later. A hole about 10 feet in diameter was opened in the flight deck by the passage of the plane and a hole about 20 feet in diameter was opened in the hangar deck at frame 04 by the pass age of the plane's engine and by the bomb detonation. The engine came to rest on the main deck below. The blast of the bomb detonation sprung the after elevator platform slightly and elevator machinery was made inoperable by fragment damage to electrical cables. Fragments also damaged the after master gyro compass and the electric wiring to its repeaters. This damage made it necessary to transfer steering control to the after steering station.
5-4. Prompt employment of the sprinkling system in the after end of ti1e hangar effectively controlled the hangar fire. Foam was used to extinguish the burning remains of the Kamikaze and C02 was used against the fire in the parked plane. The latter could not readily be jettisoned owing to the absence of large enough side openings in the hangar. Fragment damage to the main deck and first platform permitted fire fighting water to arain in:o the crew's ga1ley, A-212L, and to the bread stowage below in A-314AL, to a depth of about 10 inches. This water was too shallow to permit submersible pumps to maintain a suction and had to be removed by bucket brigades. The galley was restored to operation in time for the noon meal the same day.
5-5. Other essential emergency repairs were promptly undertaken by the ship's force, and by 1010 the flight deck had been patched and flight operations were resumed (Photo 5-2). Arrest ing wires 1, 2, 3, and 4 only were used due to damage to the five units farther forward. Normal steering control was not restored until that evening at 2037.
5-Ei. The limited extent of bomb damage on 25 October in- dicated that the bomb carried by the attacking plane was more prob:.lbly o3 Kg GP rather than 250 Kg GP, the estimate of the ship's bomb disposal officer.
5-7. Severe damage was incurred the next day while SU- WANEE was headed into the wind at 18 knots, recovering aircraft. True wind was not reported, but it was subsequently observed that the high relative wind prevented the effective use of fog in fire fighting on the flight deck. The crew had just finished lunch and a modified Material Condition ABLE was in effect. Seven fighters and three torpedo bombers were parked forward on the flight deck and ten aircraft were parked in the hangar. All twenty were fully gassed, including belly tanks. The three torpedo bombers on the
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flight deck were each armed with two 350- pound torpex- loaded depth bombs. At about 1238, a VT landed and taxied onto the forward elevator. Almost immediately thereafter an attacking enemy plane, another ZEKE, dived from a 3000 foot altitude at an angle of 45 degrees and crashed into t11e plane on the forward elevator. Observers reported that the Kamikaze's bomb appeared to have been released at bridge height and detonated a short distance after penetrating the elevator platform. A few minutes later another attacking plane, which did not attempt to crash SUWANEE, releas- ed a bomb which penetrated the flight deck farther forward on the port side and detonated in the catapult machinery room. From the extent of damage both bombs are estimated to have been 63 Kg GP.
5- 8. As a result of the first of these two hits, flaming gas- oline and fragments ignited nearly all surrounding aircraft on both the hangar and flight decks. JZ circuits were disrupted and a.l dam age control communications were conducted by messenger. B.a ~t and fragments ruptured nearly all gasoline tanks in the parked planes and also ruptured piping and hoses at forward plane fueling stations on the flight deck level, causmg large quantities of gasoline to be added to the conflagration. The ship's fire marshal, who was in the hangar when the crash occurred, manually opened the spriruding and water curtain control valves despite having been knocked down and stunned by the blast. This prompt action limited the spread of fire in the hangar. Fragments pierced the risers to the sprinkling system forward in several places, but did not interfere seriously with its operation. The fire on the flight deck was much more dif ficult to control. All available topside personnel not assigned to gun stations assisted in handlmg hose lines and in jettisoning air craft. Eight 2-1/2-inch hoses were employed and high and low ve locity fog, solid streams, liquid and powder foam were all tried. Liquid foam proved the most effective. The depth bombs in the three torpedo bombers were ruptured by fragments and the torpex burned. This complicated the fire hghling prvolem cons ,aerao1y. However, no depth bomo explosions occurred and all fires were reported under control in twenty-five minutes and extinguished in fifty minutes. The ship had left the formation in the meantime and headed down wind at five knots to reduce the relative wind over the flight deck.
5-U. On the bridge, which became engulfed in smoke and flames so that conn had to be shifted aft, most of the ship control instru ments were seriously damaged oy shock or fragments, ::>r were madt> 1noperao1e oy aamage to interior communication cables. Dis ao.ed instruments included tne followrng: (1) All bridge gyro repeaters (2) Engine order telegraph (3) Engine revolution telegraph (4) Anemometer and wino direction indicator
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(5) Rudder angle indicator (6) All sound-powered telephones ('7) lMC, 3MC, and 5MC systems (8) Pitometer log indicator (9) Shaft revolution counter indicator While temporary repairs by the ship's force permitted re sumption of conn at the bridge within 24 hours, all lighting, ven tilation and some power systems on the flight deck, gallery deck and in the hangar were disrupted and largely beyond repair by the ship's force.
5-10. The hit in the catapult machinery room completely dis- abled the catapult (Photo 5-9). The bomb appeared to have detonated just above the air flask adjacent to the accumulator. Fragments punctured the 2-1/2-inch steel walls of the flask. The flask was not under pressure at the time; so no damage was done by rapid release of high pressure air. The distribution panel and power transfer switch for the normal and alternate power feeders to the catapult machinery were destroyed by the blast and subsequent fire, although the fire was promptly extinguished. Catapult motor controllers were damaged beyond repair. The motors were damaged but salvage able.
5-11. The forward 40mm mounts and directors were damaged slightly and the power supply was interrupted by fire, blast and salt water. Similarly, the various radar and radio installations were partially damaged so that, while a large proportion of the repairs were within the capacity of the ship's force, the cumulative repair work load was too great to permit satisfactory restoration without a major overhaul.
5-12. Blast and fragment damage to the gallery, forecastle and main deck from the hit in the catapult machinery room permitted fire fighting water to flood several spaces below the flight deck. Very soon after hoses were turned on, flooding in compartment A-204L was noted and effective corrective action was prompt- ly taken. Within 15 minutes after the hits, three submersible pumps were operating in this compartment. These pumps were powered through casualty power cables which had to be led from the main dis tribution board due to the inadequate number of casualty power out lets. Water was prevented from rising more than four feet above the deck. As soon as the space was pumped out, shortly after SUWANEE returned to her position in the formation, openings to this compart ment were sealed off with welded plates. Water which accumulated in gallery and forecastle deck spaces was drained to the main deck and overboard through holes burned with portable oxy-acetylene out fits. The casualty power system in CVE105 Class has been markedly
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improved and extended in order to obviate the difficulty experienced by SUWANEE in not finding a convenient outlet.
5- 13. The personnel casualties in SUWANEE were severe and the facilities to care for them heavily overloaded. F .T .P. 1'70 (B) , Damage Contr ol Instr uctions, specifically lists, as an integral part of damage control, " facilitating care of personnel casualties" In SUWANEE over 100 men were killed in action or died of wounds soon thereafter. Another 170 were wounded. Altogether, nearly a third of the complement required medical care. A pr oblem of this scope had not been planned for in either the design of the ship or the composition of the complement. The problem of damage con trol was made more difficult by the lack of medical facilities and of personnel who had been adequately trained in emergency first aid measures. The case of SUWANEE emphasized the importance of making adequate preparations to provide battle dressing stations and emergency wards with appropriate stocks of burn dressings, morphine; plasma, Stokes stretchers and other essential first aid supplies together with a staff of personnel who are competent to undertake first aid. The adequacy of such arrangements is clear ly interrelated with the overall effectiveness and morale of a ship's damage control organization in the event of major damage.
SANTEE (CVE29)
5-14. SANTEE was damaged in the same action as SU - WANEE on 25 October 1944 while operating with Task Unit 77.4. l off Samar. About )140, while modified Material Condition ABLE was in effect, a JUDY or TONY in a surprise Kamikaze attack dived on SANTEE and strafed during its approach. At this time, personnel in the hangar were in the process of arming a number of torpedo planes with depth bombs. These planes had just been fueled. The exact number and location of aircraft on board at the ttme was not reported, but it is estimated that appr oximately 12, the full complement of VT's, were in the hangar at the time. About 24, 350- pound, depth bombs containing 245 pounds of torpex and the same number of 100- pound, GP bombs loaded with TNT had been removed from the magazine and were laid out on deck pre paratory to arming the planes. A few additional aircraft, complete ly armed and fueled, were located on the flight deck.
5- 15. The attacking plane hit the flight deck near frame 62 about 15 feel fr.om the port side. It carried a small bomb, iden tified from fragments as 63 Kg GP, which detonated a short dis tance below the flight deck in the same vicinity. The impact and blast opened a long narrow hole in the flight deck about 30 feet by 15 feet (Photo 5-11). In the carpenter and shipfitters' shop on the hangar deck many of the repair division personnel were killed or
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wounded and the shop was demolished. Owing, however, to the shallow penetration of the bomb and the failure of the attacking plane to hit over a lethally loaded area of the hangar deck, the resultant fires were of a minor nature. The hangar deck was de pressed a few inches over an area about 10 feet in diameter be low the blast. Structurally the blast and fragment damage was not extensive and the ship's force effected repairs which permitted resumption of flight operations at 0935.
5-16. Fragments split open some of the depth bombs in the hangar, causing the torpex filler to burn with a sizzling noise with out exploding. Two fire hoses, previously laid out, were put in use immediately lo extinguish the blaze and to cool other depth bombs and general purpose bombs in the vicinity. Steps were under taken immediately to jettison this ordnance material.
5- ~ l. During these proceedings, and 16 minutes after the Kamikaze hit. an underwater explosion occurred on the starboard side near frame 58 abreast the after elevator. This was reported to have been a submarine torpedo hit; however, several circum stances indicate the possibility that it was the detonation of one of the jettisoned depth bombs. Tanks 8S, 9S, BC and 9C immediately flooded from the sea. Uncontrolled slow flooding took place in A-415A, A-414M, A-316AE, and A-214L. A-413M, the bomb stow age above tank BC, had some leakage which was readily controlled with one submersible pump. The pump room, B-3E, abaft tank 9C remai:ied dry and suffered no damage. No serious engineering casualties resulted although some vibration was noted thereafter in the starboard main engine. SANTEE's speed of 17-1/2 knots was maintained. The ship initially developed about a 7 degree star board list, but by OG35, when flight operations were resumed, this had been entirely removed. The draft increased as follows:
Forward Aft Mean Before Damage 21' -10" 29' -B" 2B' -9" After Damage 26' -8" 35' -2" 30' -11"
5-18. Before the explosion occurred, the liquid loading in way of the damage had been as follows:
Tank BS - 25' -4" water Tank 9S - 25' -0" water Tank SC - empty Tank 9C - empty
5-19. The damage to structure in way of the underwater explo-
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sion, as may be observea from the accompanying photographs, was less extensive than would be expected from a contact explosion of even the smallest Japanese submarine torpedo warhead in use at the time, the "6th year type" containing about 450 pounds of block loaded Shimose, an explosive of power comparable to TNT. The report of the first repair yard suggested that the limited extent of damage was attributable to a glancing torpedo hit such that the detonatton occurred some distance from the side. Reference (d) stated that the wake of the torpedo was visible in photographs taken by PETROF BAY. However, an examination of these photographs indicated that this wake more probably was that of SANTEE. b-~O. The absence of a major rupture in the starboard longi- tudinal bulkhead and the absence of flash or debris thrown up by the explosion indicated a detonation deeper in the water and of less power than was normally associated with Japanese torpedoes. The wrinkling of the bottom, the shock to machinery aft and the tearing of the side plating rather than its shattering - all appear to confirm that the explosion occurred below the turn of the bilge and a few feet away from the shell. The power of the 245 pounds of torpex in a depth bomb was not so much less than that of the 450 pounds of Shimose in the type of torpedo mentioned in paragraph 5- 19 that its effects would be readily distinguishable. Therefore, the best evidence as to the weapon causing the damage is the apparent location and time of the blast. Although the length of the opening in the shell, about 36 feet, was comparable with that to be expected from a tor pedo hit, the manner in which the hinged section of shell was torn suggests that much of the missing structure may have been carried away by working at sea rather than by blast. The extent of flooding which took place was somewhat less than might have been expected from the usual torpedo hit since bulkhead 5 7 was not breached and the distortion of the longitudinal bulkhead was slight.
5-21. ASHTABULA (A051) and MISSISSINEWA (A059), CIMARRON C1ass fleet oilers with hulls similar to SANTEE's, hoth were definitely torpedoed and their experiences are related for comparison. b-G2. On 24 0clober 1944, while under air attack in formation in Leyte Gulf, ASHTABULA was hit on the port side almost squarely amidships in way of No. 6 wing lank by a Japanese aircraft torpedo, probably containing 520 pounds of cast Shimose. Al the time of the attack, the ship was loaded to 65% of capacity with a mixed cargo of fuel oil, Diesel oil and aviation gaso1ine. All tar1ks were partially fill ed except for No. 3 centerline and No. 6 wing tanks which were empty. The h.t immediately flooded No. 6 port wing tank while the level in No.6 centeriine tank, contain.ng Diese1 011, dr">pped down to the external waterline. The port wing oulkheads, 06 and 6\:i, were ruptured forward
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and aft of No. 6 port wing tank. This opened No. 7 and No. 5 port wing tanks to the sea. The increase in the mean draft of 24 feet - 6 inches before damage was only 1 foot - 4 inches. Trim did not change. A 12 degree port list developed immediately, then slowly increased to 13-1/2 degrees and remained such until it was counteracted by trans ferring fuel oil from two undamaged port wing tanks to corresponding starboard wing tanks and by flooding No. 6 starboard tank by sluicing from No. 6 port tank. This brought the ship to an even keel within approximately an hour. There was no fire and no engineering or gyro casualties occurred. The ship carried out her mission without further casualty. Subsequent reports as to the extent of structural damage as observed in dock are, unfortunately, not available.
5-23. MISSISSINEWA was less fortunate. While at anchor at Ulithi on 20 November 1944, ready for sea with a mixed cargo of aviation gasoline, Diesel oil and fuel oil, she was hit forward, port side, near bulkhead '79 by a Japanese midget-submarine torpedo. The torpedo contained approximately 790 pounds of block-loaded, Type 9'7 explosive, about equal in power to a similar weight of TNT. A violent explosion occurred which enveloped the forward half of the ship in flame, and threw debris high in the air. Thirty seconds later a second violent explosion took place in the same vicinity. This later blast had the characteristics of a gasoline vapor explo sion. The conflagration ignited by the torpedo detonation was spread aft rapidly by a strong wind from ahead. Control of the fire was never attained despite extensive assistance from eight salvage vessels. About 45 minutes after the torpedo struck, a third heavy explosion occurred, apparently a mass detonation in the after five-inch magazine initiated by fire since none of the after tanks con tained gasoline. This resulted in extensive flooding aft. Two hours after the third explosion, MISSISSINEWA capsized slowly to port and remained floating keel up for about an hour before she sank, bow first. Just before the attack the ship had reported ready for sea with a standard 10ad which consisted of 404,000 gallons of aviation ga~oline in No. 2 center tank, 9,000 barrels of Diesel oil in No. 6 center, and fuel oil in all other tanks except fo.ur, No. 1 port and starboard, No. 3 center and No. \.l center, which were empty but not yet gas-freea. ll is conjectured that the torpedo hit ruptured centerline tanks Nos. 2 and 3 at the top and sides, igniting the gas oline thrown out of No. 2 tank, and thereby initiating a vapor ex plosion in No. 3 tank. IL wUl be noted from Plate V - 4 that wing tanks forward are considerably narrower than those afl, which would facilitate the pa3sage of flame and fragments to tne center line tanks. With respect to the capsizing, it is to be noted that enormous quantities of fire fighting water were pumped into the su perstructure by assisting vessels and that MISSISSINEWA rolled over
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almJst three hours after the initial damage and after three major explosions had occurred.
5- 24. The digest of these cases of underwater damage to tanker type hulls indicates that for an unarmored vessel these ships are exceptionally resistant to damage and can absorb a large amount of underwater damage without critical danger to the strength or stability of the ship. In the CVE105 Class the presence of the heavy twin longitudinal bulkheads and the extensive proportion of the total full load displacement devoted to ballast (nearly 35%) pro bably gives these ships as large a measure of underwater pro tection as many cruisers or other formally designed warships of comparable size.
SANGAMON (CVE26)
5- 25. SANGAMON received damage of relatively minor ex- tent from a bomb near-miss, southeast of Surigao Strait during the Batlle for Leyte Gulf (See Section VII-D). Major damage to SAN GAMON was incurred, however, off Okinawa the following May. On the latter occasion the ship was conducting flight operations with night fighters when a twin-engined Japanese Army plane with a large bomb crashed into the flight deck between the elevators among about 18 parked aircraft. The Kamikaze's bomb detonated in the hangar, also densely loaded with aircraft. Fortunately all planes were degassed and unarmed in accordance with the ship's establish ed practice, except for approximately 25 gallons of gasoline left in each plane to facilitate handling. The bomb detonation exten sively disrupted the hangar fire protection installations. This seri ously handicapped the effort to establish control of the ensuing se vere fire which largely destroyed installations and equipment on the flight, gallery and hangar decks from the forward end of the is land to abaft the after elevator. The fire was finally extinguished after about three hours. Further flight operations were impossible without virtual reconstruction of the flight and hangar decks and renewal of almost all plane handling gear. The ship therefore re tired to Ulithi, thence to Norfolk for repa1r. The end of hostilities occurred before she could be returned to service and SANGAMON has since been stricken from the Navy List.
5-26. The action summarized above took place shortly after dark on 4 May 1945. SANGAMON had replenished provisions and ammunition at Kerama Retto that day and was returning to the oper ating area at ld knots when the attack occurred. The sea was calm with a slight swell. There was a. 3-knot wind from the east. The ammunition had bee:i struck below except for ammunition boxes con taining 48,five-inch,a1rcraft rocket bodies and a similar number of
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rocket warheads, which were stacked in the hangar. Radar inter ception of enemy aircraft permitted General Quarters stations to be manned and Material Condition ABLE to be set adequately in advance. About 1900,an attacking TONY was shot down and narrow ly missed the ship. Two night fighters were then catapulted and preparations were made to launch two more. Approximately 2 7 other aircraft were aboard, 11 in the hangar and the rest on the flight deck. As stated above, all 2'7 planes had been degassed, leav ing only 10 to 25 gallons in each.
b-2 7. About 1930 as darkness set in, a second bogey was picked up by SP radar. The air- borne fighters failed interception and the attacking plane, with a speed estimated to have been 350 knots, penetrated intense gunfire in a 20 degree glide from astern. Just before the plane crashed, the pilot released a bomb which penetrated the flight deck '7-1/2 inches forward of frame 6 7 on the centerline and detonated high- order in the hangar at frame 70, about 7 feet below the flight deck. The plane penetrated the flight deck at frame 70 and a major portion, including the plane's engines and heavily armor ed wing sections, was found on the hangar dee!< directly below the entry hole. Severe fires were ignited on the main, hangar, gallery and flight decks. The ship was promptly turned out of the wind and slowed down to reduce the intensity of the flames. The bridge was then clt~ared of all persoMel except the Captain and three others. Efforts to employ the water curtain and sprinkling systems in the hangar were initially thwarted by the damage to risers and the inaccessibility of controls, although parts of the system were later operated. All interior communications to spaces above the hangar deck were disrupted by fire within 15 minutes after the hit. Al 2025, conn was shifted to the forward end of the flight deck, steering control having· been previously shifted to Batt. II.
5-28. In the meantime, much assistance was rendered by accompanying vessels. HUDSON (DD475) came alongside to wind ward (starboard) at 2010, supplied fire-fighting waler via eight hoses and took off some wounded persoMel. Topside damage forc ed HUDSON to move clear about 202v, after which three amphibious vessels came alongside to render similar assistance. The fire was reported under control by 2200. At 2330,the screen resumed formation and the ship proceeded to join its task group.
5-29. The plane which hit SANGAMON was identified from re- covered parts as a NICK, a twin-engined Japanese Army fighter weighing about 12,000 pounds. This type of aircraft normally carried no bombs but on a suicide mission from a nearby field it could have handled a 250 Kg bomb by sacrificing some fuel capacity. The bomb
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used was identified from the base fuze as a 250 Kg GP Army type, containing aboul 230 pounds of block-loaded Shimose. The same fuze was used with the 500 Kg GP type which might, therefore, have been the type which hil SANGAMON.
5-3r. The structural damage caused by the plane impact and bomb detonation was very extensive as indicated in the appended photographs. Although no flexural vibration of the hull was reported, the impact of the plane and detonation of the bomb caused a heavy shock which threw personnel in the vicinity off their feet. The combined effect of the plane impact and the bomb detonation opened a hole in the flight deck approximately 20 feet by 10 feet on the centerline al frame 70. The impact of the plane sheared the flight deck bent at frame 70, a 32-inch by 12-inch by 3/4-inch I beam, and turned the ends 90 degrees so that they pointed toward the hangar deck. The bomb detonation blew both elevators out of their wells and produced a considerable crown in their platforms. The after elevator platform was inverted and deposited upside down, on edge in the pit. The for ward elevator piatform was canted and thrown onto the flight deck. The flight decK was buckled upward for a length of 150 feet between the elevators. Four holes, each approximately 6 feet square were blown in the port and starboard hangar bulkheads between frames 66 and '70, and roller curtains throughout the hangar were demolished. Fragment damage was very extensive. Numerous perforations occurred in structure above the main deck throughout a 100 foot radius from the center of the blast. b-31. The flash of the bomb detonation enveloped all of the hangar and a large part of the flight deck and had an intense in cendiary effect. Damage to equipment in way of the fire was so extensive that no attempt to itemize il will be made. The island was gutted and all ship-control, fire-control, radio, radar and nav igational equipment there10 was disabled. The hangar, gallery, and flight decks were similarly gulled throughout the midship area. Be loiN the main deck, the ship was intact. Fueling equipment on the open main deck under the hangar remained about 70% effective. In way of the hangar itself, cable runs and piping for the fire main and gasoline system were largely destroyed. All aircraft aboard were jettisoned or de:;troyed except the one on the port catapult. Those in the hangar were particularly difficult to dispose of and were finally cut up with acetylene torches since no sufficiently large side openings existed through which an assembled plane could be jettisoned.
5-32. It is notable that SANGAMON overcame the confla- gration and survived. No other escort carrier managed to bring under
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control a fire which had gained similar headway. This singular ac complishment is worthy of some analysis.
5-33. The action report, reference (f ), attributed the accom- plishment in large measure to the following: (a) Reduction of fire hazard through the plane de- gassing procedure. (b) Reduction of personnel casualties by clearing the hangar and flight deck as soon as the guns started firing. (c) Thorough training of all hands in fire fighting 3.t Navy Ft!""e F.ghtingSchoo1s. The discussion of these points in the actLOn report, reference (f), is quoted below: "(a) The recently instituted practice on the SAN GAMON of degassing all planes on the hangar deck at all times and those on the flight decK except the im mediate flight or the standby planes, paid large divide:-ids for the considerable effort required. None of the bar rier crashes where planes ended up in the spot caught fire. One particular bad crash caused numerous minor electrical fires but these were extinguished with C02. When the ship was hit there were less than 1800 gallons of gasoline in the olanes aboard in::;tead of the 11 or 12 thousand gallons which would have been in them if the tank!:> had been full. The 1800 gallons could have been reduced had the planes been degassed completely dry. However, this would interfere with operations an un acceptable amount. About 25 gallons were left in each plane for taxiing forward. This gasoline burned but il was a much lesser problem than had the same tanks contained 450 gallons per plane.
"(b) The relatively small number of casualties was a direct result of the doctrine of clearing the hangar deck of all personnel as soon as the guns started firing. In this particular case no one was killed on the hangar deck because there was no one there. It is certain that if anyone had been on the hangar deck they would have been killed. This is proven by the fact that men in clipping rooms on both sides of the hangar deck were killed, although they had the protection of the clipping room bulkheads.
"(c) Again it has been proved that fire fighting school is worth all the man days it requires. It is re commended that material such as gasoline, lubricating
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oil, rubber tires and aviation engines be used in the instruction fires as these materials are a great deal harder to extinguish than fuel oil fires. In fact the only burning material that could not be extinguished was the burning aircraft engines. It is impossible with the equipment at hand to stop the magnesium in the engines from burning once it gets started. "
5-34. In addition to these factors, there were two unusual design features which gave an inherent advantage to the SANGAMON Class over other carriers insofar as overcoming a hangar fire was concerned. These were as follows: (a) The open main deck under the hangar virtually eliminated the problem of loss of stability due to the pocketing of large volumes of fire fighting water high in the ship. This was in contrast to GAMBIER BAY and FRANKLIN (CV13) in particular. (b) The placement of machinery spaces aft of the hangar permitted the engineering plant to function throughout the conflagration without interference. This was in contrast to almost every other severe hangar fire in other types of carriers. FRANKLIN and OMMANEY BAY were outstanding cases of contrast.
5-35. In the CVE 105 Class the space between the hangar deck and main deck has been enclosed. Half of the propulsion plant is located aft, hence the second advantage has been partially retained.
- 73 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Photo 5- 1: SUWANEE (CVE2 7) - 25 October 1944. Picture taken a few seconds after Kamikaze crashed the flight deck 40 feet forward of after elevator. The torpedo-loaded TBM visible abaft the blast was undamaged.
Photo 5-2: SUWANEE (CVE27) - 25 October 1944. Repair party star ting to patch the hole in the flight deck in way of the crash shown above.
- 74 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Phuto ~ -3: :::-'UWANEf, ~CVE:d/) - 2f> 0<.:lot.>er :944. P1ane wre<.:K~ge 0n the rnarn ue<.:K under the t.angar. Nole the extent )f ...;tructura. damage tu the tianr'lr ae-:k.
Ph-.itJ f> - 4: SUWAI:cc {CVE,2 l) - 2t 0.:l.Jber l~J41. ViPW of .rnWANf E from GA.NGA!-..101! irnrnP.Jiately after a Kami1rnze htt the forwcJ.rd 01evatur.
- '15 -
CONFIDENTIAL
PilotJ 5- t; : ~UWAt!EE tCVE21) - 2G Oct oer , \!44. 3,_.cond ' iew fr-:im SAtiGAMOI\ after hit furW'.ir,1, sl:owinr; exLent Jf f1igLt dPCr< fire.
Pr.Jto ::>-C: JUWA:'.!:.E (CVE27) - 21· Xluuer H•4'1. fn~rr1 view irom ....;AI!GArv:o:,, after SUVJJ.-, , •.·in turn<-'d dJhr. wind ar.1 ..;, Jwc:d t0 t. r:nJt.,;. F .re 1.uw Jaq•ely u:,dt r ·ur.t>·ol.
- 76 -
CONFIDENTLAL
Photo ~. - 1 : SUWAI'JEE (CVt·; 7) - ?o October 1044. Scene in w:J.rdroom whk!. •ns :tr. unprovisea w·trd and dr>-> ..;::;irw station.
, t.JtJ :-i-8: ~·u1.A'JEi:; ,cJ_',7) - :./October 1J44 . Darndge to 1orvnrd .,~..,VcLt.1r r,latiorrn and elev·tLJr pit.
- 7 7 -
C ONFID ENTlAL
·..
··~
Photo 5-9 : SUWANEE (CVE27) - 26 October 1944. Damage in way of the por t catapult and forwar d elevator.
Photo 5- 10: SUWANEE (CVE2 7) - 26 October 1944. Damage in catapult room in way of bomb detonation.
- 78 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Photo 5- 11 : SANT EE (CV E28) - Hole in flight deck, looking aft in way of impact of plane and of bomb bla.:;t.
Photo o- 12: SANTEE (CV E2D) - Flooding in afler messing compar tment A- 214L.
- 79 -
CONE'IDENTIAL
l,\
Photo 5- 13: SANTEE (CVE29) - Shoring installed at MANUS in compartment A - 315A to support the starboard longitudinal bulkhead; the space outboard of which was open to the sea.
1 I ~ ) )~ - I t
Photo 5- 14: SANTEE (CVE29) - View as docked at Pearl Harbor, looking forward along the starboard side.
- 80 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Photo 5-15: SANTEE (CVE29) - Damage to the first plat form deck in compartment A- 214Al which was directly over the W1derwater explosion.
"""'~ .... . :<..... • ~...... "'-• ...,,., J l,... • l I ' ..
Photo 5- 10: SANTEE (CVE29) - Closeup of the hole in the side. Note tearing of plating through rivet holes and the hinged effect of the damaged shell plating.
- 81 -
CONFIDENTIAL
- ,,, /--=c:~1m1 ·
~ --! ~ -----...
Photo 5- 17: SANTEE (CVE29) - Damage to bulkhead 60, star boar d s ide, looking forward in tank 9- S.
Photo 5- 18: SANTEE (CVF:29) - Damage to the bottom, loo~ing for war d along the ..>larboar d side from the vicinity vf frarne bO . - 82 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Photo 5- 19: SANTEE (CVE29) - Damage to the first plat form deck at the starboard side in way of the underwater exµl-Jsi0n, frames 57 to ~J .
Pll-::>to 5-20: :ANTSE (CVE29) - Temporary hull repairs 1n way of the underwater damage just before undocking at Pearl Haroor.
- 83 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Ph )LO 5- 21: SANGAMON (CVE26) - Debri~ on the after half of the f1ight deck, the morning after damage occurred. Hole, left center, was from impact of the plane; hole on right was caused by bomb blast. Sixteen aircraft were jetti!:3oned in the night.
Photo b-22: SANGAMON (CVE2li) - Debri..;; in hangar, looking forward and to starboard from about frame 62.
- 84 -
CONFlDFIJTIAL
Phot0 5 - ~3 : SANGAMON (CVE26) - View of the hole in the Light decK at frame 0 made by the plane's impact as seen from the hangar, about frame 63.
Photo 5- 24 : SANGAMON (CVE26) - Holes blasted in the starooard .3ide of the hangar, frames 10 to 73.
- 85 -
CONFIDENTIAL
..... , -. ,.. -*a «;; 5 < iS)i .. ·'
Pt.u1.c.. t - 2.5 : SA:J.JAMON (CV~2o) - V ew Ji <.he flight de<.;r: tLe rr.orrar.g after tr.E: damage oc.:urred, looKir.g forward 1-'Lut\J :,-t::li: 3AITGAI\!01: 1CVF~oJ - Ma1:i deck under the •1aqr·1r, f>Ort s10e, ira.me 10, 10or:ir.g- 'lft. :lot~ damage t0 plfJl'.~' frun. ir2.gn~er.1.;:; ana dist0r1.ion of stanchions by o.a..;t. - 8() - CLmFID FNT l A._. PhutJ fi- i-' f : SAI:CA.i\!!OI: ~C'lf2o) - View aft al0ng the pori:. . id"' of i:.l.e f~tght decK. Plane 1 n for i:>gr ound was the only une riot burned. ':'he starboard wing was broken off oy the forward e1e\·ator phlfurm as it w'l..; l.Jlown out of it.; well. The after elevator i..; vi~3ible in llie background. Phutu b- ::::b : SANGAMOi.J (CV E2o) - Blast damage to the por t Langar oulkhead. - 87 - CONFIDENTIAL • Photo 5-29: SANGAMON (CVE26) - Fragment damage to the forward hangar bulkhead. This bulkhead was over 100 feet from the bomb burst. Arrows point to larger holes only. Smaller holes were more numerous. i " Photo ~J-30: SANGAMON (CVE26) - Fragment holes in the hangar deck near the center of damage. Weight of this plating was 15 pounds per square foot. - 88 - PLATE "'Q.-1 KAMIKAZE DAMAGE PLATE X -1 CON Fl OENTIAL Su .)£ i'LAN[ or 21 OCTOBER. A BOMB C4.RRtED 8Y THE PLAN[ ON 2~ OCTOBER ONLY THREE ( 'l PLANES REM "ME ~ !T.lJtCIDE PLANE OF 8 EST1MATEO T0t1AVE 8[fN63K• ABOARD, TWO ON THE FLIGHT D(Ct( 8 ONE IN TH[ _,) OCTOBEff GP DETONATED JU5T AFTER 1T HAhOAR, r.orH or Wl-llCH \f[lt[ ,UEL[O OR A MEO PE.N[TRAT[Q TH[ [L[VATOR "'HE SHI PS GASOLINE S'l'&TCM WAS SECUAEO AFTER E EVATOR SPRUNG BY BOMB BLAST OF 2~ OCTOBER I MACHINERY MADE INOPERABLE 0Y FAAGNENT OAlllA<:i[ TO ELECTRICAL CA8Lf:S I I I BOILER CAS I NG ENGINE CASING ELEVATOR P IT 8 • 6[ B·ZOl·IE I I A·IOJI CREWS ioW.£Y IPREPVEG I ,__ fUEL OIL a-..21 ec I I RM PUMP B- 4QIF ROOM ,__ 801LER FLAT 314AL L I ·- A•llE Ollllt. II AUXILIARY IT ~t 1T ENGINE ROOM I 8 -402£ P'UMI" i-...... _-=-----fi--~l .HOLE ABOUT 8 F'EET SY 12 FEf.,.. OPE: NEC ~THE FLIGHT CECK SY THE BOMB WHICH DETONATED IN THE CATAPULT MACHINfRY ROOM - LEGEND 7 FIGHTERS AND 3 TORPEDO 801118ER ALL FULLY GASSEO.PAAl([Q FORWARD THE FOA-.AAO ELEVATc;.ii WAS PAq; AL.L SLOW FLOODlllG 'JN THE FLIGHT DECK ON 21 OCTOBER. DEMO\. SHED 8 CANTED IN ITS WELL C=-1 11 00 I 0 [==1 FIRE .. •• •• .. '. THE 3 TOAPEOO 80M8£AS,EACH ARMED •• •• I 0 ,. I I " 'I~'~}.. •• WI TH TWO 3,0• POUND, TORPEX • ~OAOED OEPTti eowes. --... -'!. -- . 10--FOOT DIAMETER HOLE OPENED tN Fl tGHt otcK 20 FOOT DIAMETER HOLE OPE NED IN HANGAR DECK 8[L0\I REPAIR! TO THE FLIGHT OEOK WEA( COMPL!:TEO AHO FLIGHT OPERATIONS RESUMED IH A80UT 2 HOURS t2D OCTOBER DAMAGE 1 l____ ~~~""=::::::===- FLIGHT DECK 8RIDGE ENGUL.f'CO IN SMOKE FL.AME SO THAT a WHlL[ T'EMPOAARY REPAIRS BY THE SHIPS FORCE" CONN HAO TO Bf SHIFTED AFT. T!iE FOLLOWING PE:RMITTED RESUMPTION OF CONN AT THE BRIOGE INSTRUMENTS WERE Dl5A8L£0 . WITHIN 24 HOURS, ALL L10t!Tl1'G,VENTILATION a ALL 8RIOG£ GYRO REPEATERS SOM E POWl!:R S'l'STENS FORWARD ON TH! P'LIGHT ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH DECK, GALLE RV OECI< 8 IN TH£ HANGAR WERE (NGIN[ REVOLUTION TELf'GRAPH DISRUPTED 8 LAROE LY BE YONO REPAI R BY THE 0 =~g:E :~1~RL: ~~~1oc~'~~;T10N INDIGATOR SHIPS FORCE ALL SOUND• POWERED TELEPHON[S IMC,ZMC 8 &MC SYSTEMS PITOMETER LOG INDICATOR U.S.S. SUWANEE CVE-27 SHAFT REVOLUTION COUNTER IND1t.A TOR OFF SAMAR 25- 26 OCTOBER 1944 KAM I KAZE DAMAGE NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OF SHIPS ?l"...,,,,,.:_, \ 3 c I / T GA 'A 01 0 ER• 01 - IE fOI PLATE Y.-2 KAMIKAZE 8 UNDERWATER DAMAGE PLATE X.-2 CONFIDENTIAL A M B Nl8 0 E MATED B IUK• • i:J[ ONAT[v A 'l AT 01 TAN [ E OW A 'II A D ""I NA I A AFT COMP [T[L'f AltMEO I HE FL HT OF K 0 fU( WERE CA,.. D .t)N rt1[ f.., .1H ,.. OECJI: 'LIGHT DE CK ENG INE CASI NO a· ec LEGEND CJ f\olll FLOOOIHG [ Mlil'TY ICfOlltC OUfA8[ FL IGHT DECK '*ATIAL ,l.OOOIHO fANKS CONTAININt LIQUI D Bt,Ollt[ OUUOf.CONTAMIHATEO OR OP[H TO THE SCA A,.Tfft OAMA G[ tlIDIBH.-- ll "40AA DEC, 01 PRE ') I f' UU,. OIL FUEL OI L c:==i ,,,.( .__/ • 'Rh IN II l ·P 7-P r ~PL. I T 0 .... """Ntf Afl CAUS l'/G T P UMP 8lJjqN WITHOUT EXPLODING ROOM FUEL OIL FUEL. OIL l'UCL OIL UStD.i!ITQ:.Ex.T f4GIJtSHTHE: LAZE ROOM & GP BOMBS 8011118- WEAF' J -- pr1. I If' " IO .. •• ...... • • A'Tfllt Pf AK WAT!A IALLAST • ·c •-c C·I W FUEL OIL ,-U[L OIL • - 9 ------•• 9 APP RO OER~ATER U.S.S. SANTEE r:1pL.()$1u.1 ,..., "' ur.;1. u""c.u '" ••NUTES CVE- 2 AFfER THt f(AMIKAZC HIT T"tlS CXPLOSIOft OFF SAMAR 25 OCT.1 94 ''------'. IS DELI EYED fO HAVE BEEN THE OETONATIOt.. HANGAR DECK or~:l[S~~~~~ )[P";H BOMBS WH 'jH WEftC / HOLD KAM I KAZE B UNDERWATER DAM AGE NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OF SH I PS ~ ' 3 ~ I / - GA TA ro u EA• 01 E Fl'JI IC p AT1 Pl I ll .0 .... PLATE II- 3 KAMIKAZE DAMAGE PLATE Y.-3 CONFIDENTIAL r---..J I I i I I I I -r---r r I I I I I I I -i- -,- I ~1-- I I J -1-- I , --1- I ~-- i - .1 1 I ,.j-' I I T I I ,_ _ -----~ I I I I I -r,r- - I ...._ I I I I I T ,r------I . .. I I -- , ..I I ...... •• ...... "' ...-.-,-- 101118 f Ni a PRO fD a P ATr RM •T IOY8 OfTONAT ON 8LCW [L[VATOlll: OUT OP' WCL~ a PRODUCED A CON91D[IU8~[ CROWN 1'~ TH[ PLATfOll':W ,~.~--:. -- .·. ---~.. • • LEGE NO c::J ''"' FLIGHT DECK ... VE- HANGAR DECK 4 MAY 19 DAMAGE BUREAU OF SH I PS ~"""'- PLATE Il.-4 PROFILE AND TANK ARRANGEMENT PLATE 3[-4 CONFIDENTIAL /I rOA!:OASTLI!: OEOIC UPP(R D[CJC I I l.0Utf"1 •oo• ..... OH, ;-l._j ...1- - I I Jl ------~ THI RO DECK ~uo•u ~...,""S" ,,.:~, ~~r:~P·•'}r1rrr~-'"=--=1r-=-~-=-~-=-===-=t-="======~ i-- ---~------1:1;;-,;tHe GEAR CO WPT J 1 i--.J.r --'-.J I""""'~".. '~ I ------,------,- T ------1---- ~ _.. __ _,__ -' I I ------rr: - l (NlfllS WORKSHOP IOILER ROON --,---r------I I • f 0 TANK h.---....------,ORC PEAK j TOU( I I MA IH f WA IN CARGO TANK MAIM CAAIO TANK 1 1 I I T11 ..so 11 MAIN CAlltGO TANK I OI STI LL I NI PLANT 8 I iAMN I AfT SPACE FR[SH WATER TANI( FUEL 01 L FUEL 01 l I 1 NO 2 NO 3 MAIN CARGO TANK I PUlltP MAIN CAIUO TANK MAIN CAR80 TANK MAIN CARGO TANK MAIN CARIO TANK : t!, ~;.-1 ~ CA"GO 4 a[NEAATOR ,LATS 1 1 NO 1 --•..t.•.U!..-U-U------n--- ,raK ~ OR WATER OR WATE1' I I TANK NO 0 : ROOM NO I NO t FUEL OIL FUEL OIL NO 7 NO I : ~ I lfHA1tl'R1 TANK HOLD L _ .J IALLAST BA LLAST : NO I I ,UU. OIL . ~ , I I FUfL O I L FUEL OI L FUEL OIL FUEL Oil .. : A'T[A [NGIN[ ROOM U---j I I ~ l . L-~ I ';;.;.;! II .0 ""'., ...... I 1"•• I: r------1.----.f' • oo• • OTOll I ... ~ ------, ______J 1---+ '"-- _.~!... +"~·~L-_1.--L I I FRESH WAT[llt I I I I 1 l I - I I r I 100 Ill 100 .. .. •• .. " ...... •• ...... " .. 1 0 ------ WI NG CA RGO TANK WINI CAlll:90 TANK WINO CAAIO TANK WING CARGO TANK WINO CAlltGO TANK WIN& CARGO TA NK WING WI NO CAlltGO TUii( CA RGO TANK NO 4 NO. 5 NO 8 NO 7 NO I FUEL O i l NO 2 NO 3 NO 9 O[NEAATOA ,LAT FUEL OIL FUEL OIL fl'U[ L OIL FUEL Oil -- fl'U[L OIL FU[L Oil FUEL Oil ---· - ~. 801LEA lllAI N CAA90 TANK MAIN CARGO TANK lfAIN CARGO TANK MA IN CARGO TANI( MAIN CARGO TAN K MA I N CARGO TANIC MA IN CARGO TANI( MAI N CAA90 TANK lfUfL ~ aoo•""' ... FLAT NO t NO. ' NO 4 NO. NO 6 NO. 1 NO 8 NO I ' •• " ...... •• I I 'U[L OIL FUE.L OIL 'UEL OIL fUE l 01 l FU EL Oil fUCL 01 L FUEL Oil FUEL OIL 1111• OIL ---f------'---t------i------j------1------+-if-----r--iOl lT l~I NI TANK PL ANT WI NG CARGO TA NtC WI NG CARGO TANK W I NG CARGO TANK WING CARGO TANK WINO CARGO T ANK WINO OARGO TANK WING CARGO TANK rLAT f'Uf"L 01 L HO 0 NO 4 NO. 9 NO I NO 1 NO I NO t FUEL OIL 'UEI.. OIL 'U[ L OIL FUEL Oil fU[L OIL FUEL OIL 'Ufl. 0 IL ------~- --- TANK ARRANGEMENT U.S.S.ASHTABULA A0-51 U.S.S.MISSI SS INEWA A0-57 PROFILE AND TAN K ARRANGEMENT NAVY DEPT. BU EAU OF SHIPS PLATEX-4 CONFIDENTIAL .:_ I ______I -r-- - STC CRING I ENGlllS WOfUCSHOP I I OI L [R ROO N ,.0 T AHK h---~------i I TRANSOM OI STI L.Ll NG PLANT 1 f ANK " 1 A MN I AFT SPACE GUtERATOR !'"L ATS ~ l jl.1.U !.... ll-ll. _ - - - -n---'pcuc I C:HA llll B'R: TANK u ___ J i Afl'T E R ENG I NE ROO M I I I ...I ------, _ _J F RESH WA T ER .. •• ...... •• .. to I NK l'UEL OIL GEHEfllATOR F L AT ---- TANK ARRANGEMENT U.S.S.ASHTABULA A0 - 51 U.S.S.MISSISSINEWA A0- 57 PROFILE AND TANK ARRANGEMENT NAVY DEPT. BU EAU OF SH I PS PLATE Y- 5 PROFILE AND ARRANGEMENT PLATE 37:-5 CONF I OENTIAL c lY c b I rfln I I ~ I II lo Ylll TIOlf IMO" • ,Al l , O""1U...•• • n• . •..•..•• , ·c l lhle.No.U ..... CRlWI IP&Cl CtJJ ' m. Cllll• ••aor l •l•I • Ut •l•t ••LI.I f l •IOU. 1 -•0 l• UL ··- I U L lll[P.. 111 J.&. ..vet.• ' ...... Ill II fJI llT IP'l ' " I •• ·~ . HA NO A R ..-- SPACE HANGAR DECK FIRST PLATFORM USS.COMM ENCE MENT BAY CVE- 10!1 SECTION AT FRAME 109 SECTION AT FRAME 6!1 SECTION AT FRAME 4B l.OOlll NG art LOO tt INO l'Oflt·o LOOMIH O AH PROFILE AND ARRANGEMENT NAVY DEPT. BU A OF .SHIPS PL ATE ::SZ:-5 CONF I DENTIAL DECK USS COMMENCEMENT BAY CVE-105 PROFILE AND ARRANGEMENT NAVY DEPT BU A OF SHIPS