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8. an Assessment of the Financial Assistance Programmes TÍTULO CAP XXXXXXXXXXXXX 8. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES GUNTRAM B. WOLFF1 ABSTRACT This chapter aims at assessing the assistance programmes implemented by the Troika in four countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus) along the lines of two main cri- teria: (i) whether it succeeded in allowing the country to regain market access; (ii) whether expectations and outcomes, or the underlying assumptions of the programme proved reasonable. Ireland and Portugal exited the programmes recently and can there- fore be seen as the most successful with regards to the first criterion. The Greek pro- gramme cannot be judged as successful at this stage, while it is too early to judge if and how Cyprus will be able to regain market access at the end of the programme, in May 2016. Regarding criterion two, the fall in domestic demand and the resulting unem- ployment was much worse than expected in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. This can be seen as a mistake in the design of the programmes but is also partly due to unexpected external factors. The trade balance and the current account improved more quickly than expected. Finally, all four countries have by-and-large adopted the fiscal consolidation measures prescribed by the Troika. As the funding was limited by the size of the already large programmes, the consolidation had to happen as demanded by the Troika. The Spanish programme has to be considered separately, since it essentially focused on the financial sector and the IMF was not involved as a Troika member. The pro- gramme was designed in a way to cover significant eventualities in terms of needed gov- ernment funding. Less funding was eventually needed after a stress test exercise was undertaken and the banking reforms were undertaken. In the course of the programme, significant improvements in equity over asset ratios can be noted, however, non-per- forming loans remain an issue even though less than in many other big euro area coun- tries. High unemployment rates, high (private and public) debt levels, a fragile global economy, disinflationary tendencies in the EU and the remaining banking problems, suggest that caution should be exercised when considering future exits. 1 This chapter summarizes work of Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and myself. It updates this work and adds a short assessment of the Spanish financial assistance programme. Carlos de Sousa also provi- ded significant input into the work on Cyprus. Excellent research assistance by Pia Hüttl is gratefully ack- nowledged. 255 ANUARIO DEL EURO 2014 8.1. INTRODUCTION Four years ago, in May 2010, Greece became the first euro-area country to receive financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The financial assistance was combined with a commitment to implement an economic adjustment programme. The programme was designed in discussions between the national authorities and the so-called Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On 21 November 2010, Ireland became the second euro-area country to request financial assistance, fol- lowed by Portugal in April 2011. Spain followed in June 2012 under a different arrange- ment aimed at the restructuring and recapitalisation of financial institutions. Roughly two years later, in March 2013, Cyprus applied for financial assistance under a regular programme. This report updates the previous assessment undertaken in Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff (2013) and includes three new major developments: First, the exit of Ireland from financial assistance programme in December 2013 and its risk outlook is discussed. Second, the chapter examines the unique and controversial programme of Cyprus in May 2013. Specifically the initial decision to impose losses on insured bank depositors in Cyprus, and the later decision to introduce capital controls are scrutinized. Third, the chapter reviews the Spanish programme. The report also discusses the risks involved in Portugal’s clean exit from the programme. An analysis of the programmes faces numerous methodological challenges, as artic- ulated in detail by Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff (2013). The most significant is the absence of a clear counterfactual. Financial assistance in the euro area is unprecedented; the programmes are the first to occur within a monetary union. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) determined not only the conditions at the start of the pro- gramme, as the severe imbalances were largely endogenous to the way the common cur- rency was constructed, but also the performance of the programmes in the course of the last four years. In order to evaluate the success of the programmes, factors external to the programmes must also be taken into consideration, such as forecast errors, changing programme assumptions, policy decisions taken in the programme countries without intervention of the Troika, different degrees of programme implementation and the external growth environment. shows how the IMF growth forecast for the euro area changed between 2010 and 2014. To the extent that financial assistance programmes were counting on the recovery in the euro area to support growth in the programme countries, those bets were disappointed. 256 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES FIGURE 1. CHANGES OF THE IMF FORECAST FOR EURO AREA REAL GDP BETWEEN 2010 AND 2014 Note: For each line, numbers for years after the release date correspond to GDP forecast Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. The assistance programmes undertaken in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus within the context of a currency union had a number of important implications. First, solutions used to «jump start» economies, such as competitive devaluation, were not pos- sible within the EMU (see Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, Wolff (2013), p.37). Second, the union had led to a large increase in cross-border financial integration and capital flows. The result- ing financial contagion made debt restructuring more difficult. Third, the ECB provid- ed large amounts of financing to the banking system and thereby prevented that the bal- ance of payment crisis turned into a full-blown funding crisis and a meltdown of the financial system. Because of these challenges, the ECB implemented policy measures to enhance banks access to liquidity2. Decreased capital inflows were replaced by ECB liquidity and official financial assistance. This liquidity has been essential in preventing a collapse of the euro area financial system, at a time when the interbank market had frozen. Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s national central banks provided substantial emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to banks (see )3. On the other hand, official financial assistance was focused on the financing of governments, including bank recapitalisations. Specifically, the different countries received different amounts of funding from different sources. The Greek programme received the most money in both absolute terms, and as 2 Merler (2013). 3 According to the ECB, ELA consists in the provision by a Eurosystem national central bank of cen- tral bank money and/or any other assistance that may lead to an increase in central bank money to a sol- vent financial institution, or group of solvent financial institutions, that is facing temporary liquidity problems, without such operation being part of the single monetary policy. 257 ANUARIO DEL EURO 2014 a percentage of GDP. In the first three programme countries, roughly a third of the fund- ing came from the IMF while 2/3 were provided by European partners. In the case of Cyprus, these percentages changed and only 10% of the funding came from the IMF, while in the case of Spain financing was fully provided by European partners. FIGURE 2. EMERGENCY LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE- CENTRAL BANKS OF IRELAND AND GREECE Fational Central Bank’s balance sheets. Programme success can be assessed along the lines of three different criteria: (i) whether it succeeded in creating the conditions for the country to regain market access; (ii) whether expectations and outcomes, or the underlying assumptions of the pro- gramme proved solid; (iii) whether loan conditionality was optimally timed or framed in a way that allowed and promoted compliance and contributed to adjustment and growth. Broader considerations of success such as unemployment or inequality are not consid- ered here. Under criterion one, Ireland and Portugal were the most successful. Both countries successfully exited their programmes in a clean manner (i.e. without a precautionary programme in place). Greece does not seem to be near to success, and it is too early to analyse the prospect of exit in the case of Cyprus. Also Spain exited successfully its pro- gramme in January 2014, following an extensive clean-up of bank’s balance sheets and other major financial sector reforms in the context of its financial sector programme. 258 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES These findings are reflected in export and price competitiveness indicators. In par- ticular Ireland (and also Spain), and to some extent also Portugal, managed to substan- tially boost exports, thereby partially compensating for the collapse in domestic demand. In contrast, Greek exports did not pick up and actually performed also much worse than initially hoped. As a result, the correction in the Greek current account can almost exclu- sively be attributed to the drop in imports.4 In terms of regaining price competitiveness, shows that relative price adjustment is well underway in all countries. It started in Ireland and was followed by Spain a year after, in mid-2008. The adjustment in Portugal and Greece started relatively late: only markedly in 2012. FIGURE 3. QUARTERLY REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE VERSUS EURO AREA 18 (GDP DEFLATOR, 2000 = 100) Fuente: European Commission. Under criterion two, programme assumptions are found to be way off in Greece, but far less so in Portugal and in Ireland, as detailed in below. A striking element of all the programmes is that the increase in unemployment was systematically underestimated.
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