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Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit

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Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit: EU and Greece in Multilevel Perspective Alexandros Kyriakidis Dissertation submitted for Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) degree in Politics 2016 First Supervisor: Prof. Simon Bulmer, FAcSS Second Supervisor: Dr. Owen Parker Department of Politics University of Sheffield Sheffield, UK Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | i Table of Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................ iv List of Graphs ............................................................................................................... iv List of Figures ............................................................................................................... iv Abstract .......................................................................................................................... v List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 SECTION A: RESEARCH FOUNDATIONS, METHODS & LITERATURE ........... 9 Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Existing Literature ............................................ 11 2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 11 2.2. EMU & Democracy: Supranational Level .................................................... 12 2.3. Eurozone Crisis: National Level.................................................................... 21 2.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 22 Chapter 3: EU Democratic Deficit Evaluative Framework ............................... 25 3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 25 3.2. The EU Democratic Deficit Approaches ....................................................... 26 3.2.1. Input ........................................................................................................ 28 3.2.2. Output ..................................................................................................... 31 3.2.3. Throughput .............................................................................................. 34 3.3. The Foundations of the EU Democratic Deficit ............................................ 35 3.3.1. Democratic Theory ................................................................................. 36 3.3.2. EU Integration Theories .......................................................................... 38 3.4 Ontological Concerns ..................................................................................... 41 3.5. Construction of an EU DD Empirical Evaluation Model .............................. 44 3.5.1. Key National Policy Areas, Redistribution & Delegation ...................... 46 3.5.2. Majoritarian/Representative Institutions‘ Influence ............................... 47 3.5.3. Processes of EU institutions.................................................................... 48 3.5.4. Direction of EU policies & Opposition .................................................. 49 3.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 53 Chapter 4: Research Methods & Design .............................................................. 56 4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 56 4.2. Research Design ............................................................................................ 56 4.2.1. The EU Level .......................................................................................... 59 4.2.2. The National Level ................................................................................. 62 4.3. Research Methods.......................................................................................... 66 4.3.1. Document Analysis ................................................................................. 67 4.3.2. Enquiries relating to additional information ........................................... 68 4.3.3. Interviews ................................................................................................ 68 Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | ii 4.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 71 SECTION B: SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL & EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT ......... 73 Chapter 5: Supranational Timeline ...................................................................... 73 5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 73 5.2. The onset of crisis – USA .............................................................................. 73 5.3. EU & Eurozone ............................................................................................. 75 5.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 81 Chapter 6: Overview of Supranational Measures ............................................... 83 6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 83 6.2. Pre-Crisis Mechanisms .................................................................................. 83 6.2.1. Medium-Term Financial Assistanceee ................................................... 83 6.2.2. Stability and Growth Pact ....................................................................... 84 6.3. EU/Eurozone Crisis Measures ....................................................................... 86 6.3.1. European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism ......................................... 86 6.3.2. European Financial Stability Facility Société Anonyme ......................... 87 6.3.3. TFEU Article 136 Amendment & ECJ Case C-370/12 .......................... 89 6.3.4. Euro Plus Pact ......................................................................................... 90 6.3.5. European Stability Mechanism Treaty.................................................... 92 6.3.6. European Supervisory Authorities .......................................................... 93 6.3.7. Six-Pack .................................................................................................. 94 6.3.8. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Growth ....................................... 97 6.3.9. Two-Pack ................................................................................................ 98 6.3.10. Banking Union .................................................................................... 100 6.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 100 Chapter 7: Supranational Measures Evaluation ............................................... 103 7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 103 7.2. Indicator A: Key national policy areas, redistribution, delegation .............. 103 7.2.1. Key national policy areas, redistribution .............................................. 103 7.2.2. EC Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity........................................... 118 7.2.3. ECB Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity ........................................ 125 7.2.4. ECJ Delegation/Decision-Making Capacity ......................................... 129 7.2.5. Interim Conclusion on Indicator A ....................................................... 131 7.3. Indicator B: Parliamentary authority (EP and national Parliaments) .......... 135 7.3.1. European Parliament ............................................................................. 135 7.3.2. National Parliaments ............................................................................. 138 7.3.3. Interim Conclusion on Indicator B ....................................................... 139 7.4. Indicator C: Processes of EU institutions .................................................... 140 7.5. Indicator D: Direction of EU policies & EU Citizens Rights ...................... 141 Eurozone Crisis & EU Democratic Deficit – Alexandros Kyriakidis | iii 7.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 143 SECTION C: NATIONAL LEVEL & EU DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT .................... 146 Chapter 8: National Timeline.............................................................................. 146 8.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 146 8.2. 2009-2011: Deficit Issues and 1st Economic Adjustment Programme ....... 146 8.3. 2011-2012: 2nd Economic Adjustment Programme ..................................... 156 8.5. 2012-2013: First post-2009 elections & Coalition government .................. 156 8.6. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 161 Chapter 9: Overview & Evaluation of National-level Measures ..................... 162 9.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 162
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