ABSTRACT
SELLING AUTHORITARIANISM: SINGAPORE AND CHINA’S BRANDING PROCESSES
by Connor Joseph Gahre
This thesis explores the phenomena of nation branding, an informal political institution of national reputation and its usefulness to authoritarian countries, specifically Singapore and China. It discovers that branding has been a vital part of the enduring stability of authoritarian regimes by pacifying the populace against greater calls for democratization. Singapore and China both had to contend with and use history in their respective branding projects in order to continually hold power internally against an international pressure toward more democratic government throughout the world. SELLING AUTHORITARIANISM: SINGAPORE AND CHINA’S BRANDING PROCESSES
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of Miami University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
by
Connor Joseph Gahre
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
2019
Advisor: Yihong Pan
Reader: Stephen Norris
Reader: Ann Wainscott
©2019 Connor Joseph Gahre
This thesis titled
SELLING AUTHORITARIANISM: SINGAPORE AND CHINA’S BRANDING PROCESSES
by
Connor Joseph Gahre
has been approved for publication by
The College of Arts and Sciences
and
Department of History
Dr. Yihong Pan
Dr. Stephen Norris
Dr. Ann Wainscott
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements iv
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 13
Chapter 2 36
Conclusion 55
Bibliography 58
iii Acknowledgements
This project is something that I always envisioned as so far in the future that I wouldn’t have to deal with it. But here it is. This represents the culmination of my time at Miami University and the experiences thereof. Hopefully that experience has improved my knowledge and made me a better person. Regardless of my hopes, there are people I must thank that helped me to this point.
First, I must thank my committee and the three professors that helped me so much through my time. Dr. Yihong Pan helped me narrow down my ideas that seemed so overwhelming at first, her help, especially with Chinese knowledge and history made my thesis and experience much better. Dr. Stephen Norris was able to help me bring this project even close to completion, as I was awash in confusion and poor conceptualization until I visited him before my summer of research. He always welcomed my anxious questions whenever I had them, and I cannot thank him enough for that. Finally, Dr. Ann Wainscott aided me in making this thesis into something I not only am proud of, but also enjoyed. Without her class on authoritarian political systems and her consistent advice to me, this thesis would be nowhere near as complete and important as it is today. Furthermore, she helped me enjoy the process of interacting with different disciplines and broadening my horizons to match my curiosity. I cannot thank these three enough for their contributions. Even though he was not on my committee, Dr. Will Brown provided so much advice to me that he cannot be overlooked, I was able to teach under his supervision, and he made me a better teacher, and more able to approach the difficulties of academic life.
No scholar is an island, and I would not have been able to call my experience a success without the connections and friendships I made within my cohort at Miami University. Adam Bruno consistently provided support, whether it being discussing an idea, editing a paper, or venting frustrations. Similarly, Ed Strong read numerous drafts of my first chapter, and consistently counselled me in my work and in life. If there is a person more caring than Erin Johnson, I have not met them yet. She always made time for me to discuss ideas and proofread my papers. She helped me through numerous colloquia, and I would not be as strong of a writer without her. She never made me feel bad about myself, even if I felt woefully overwhelmed with school or life. Of course, I cannot forget the others within the history department that helped me in some way or another. Amanda, Hannah, Kristin, Austin, Paul, Terry, and all the others, too numerous to list. Thank you all. You truly made this a remarkable experience.
Finally, I have to thank my friends and family from California. Even though most of you never knew exactly what my project meant, you all helped away. Jocelyn Aguilar consistently challenged me intellectually, and drove me to be a better scholar and a better person. Ray Calderon would always have time for my ideas or concerns, day or night. Anthony Martin has never been anything but my best friend. Amber and Cassidee always sated my thirst for philosophy and political ideas. Ivan allowed me to never take things too seriously. And of course, my father and mother, as well as my grandmother. I can never repay you for all the things you have given me, but hopefully this is one thing that will always make you proud. Thank you to all of you for what you have done, even though it made me a little homesick along the way.
iv
Introduction
Authoritarianism will not be extinguished. Despite many predictions and theorems of its ultimate demise, authoritarian regimes have not only survived, but also have grown more robust as history has marched on. Scholars have been unable to explain the endurance of authoritarianism in the contemporary world, largely to a neglect of the informal institution of nation branding and authoritarian adaptability. One school of thought, immerses itself in the study of the institutions of authoritarianism, or how regimes co-opt opposition to stay in power.1 Those who discuss national branding always leave it in the realm of business interaction, and neglect the political element branding is used for. This thesis seeks to fill the gap in this historiography by exploring how authoritarians are able to adapt and retain power using branding as an informal institution. Furthermore, historical dimensions are a necessity in understanding the limitations of each branding process. The strength of authoritarian countries is not necessarily in their absolute control and stability, although those can be selling points, the strength of authoritarian countries is in their ability to adapt and change as the world does around them. The goal of this thesis is to fully explore that unique dimension of branding using China and Singapore as case studies. Legitimacy is a consistent obstacle for all regimes, but especially those which are not democratic. In democracy legitimacy is gained by consent, where the majority consistently reinforces its will within the government. Rebellions and seditious acts within democracy are often an oligarchic revolt, where a minority attempts to gain more power than the people over the government.2 In authoritarian regimes, the people do not provide legitimacy through the ballot box, and their legitimacy needs to be reinforced through other means. National parties and authoritarian leaders attempt many different things to try to create this legitimacy, and nation branding is one of the more novel forms of creating legitimacy. All regimes engage with nation branding. In order to maintain control, a regime has to sell itself to the populace in a different way. Similarly, in order to engage with other nations
1 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 38; Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25. 2 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Politics, trans. Carnes Lord. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 139-141.
1 without complications, those same regimes cannot afford isolation from everyone else. Most importantly, the branding process is a tool to reinforce internal consistency in an authoritarian party, while appearing to be an externally focused development of national image. The primary goal of any branding process is internal control and consistency over the populace. External benefits are helpful, especially in making the branded nation indispensable in a certain sphere of influence e.g. China in Southeast Asia, which would provide checks against international action against and authoritarian regime. Even that however, is to continue internal control within the authoritarian country, rather than mere international development goals. Due to this, a nation brand attempts to avoid certain international biases against the regime while the party shores up power and control as the brand requires it. This thesis is guided by the following questions as regards authoritarian branding processes: How do these regimes engage in branding their rule? What are the historical contingencies to the process? And how do these processes reinforce the legitimacy authoritarian rule?
Defining Terms: Authoritarianism, Nation Branding, Legitimacy and Globalization
This thesis borrows heavily from political science for defining authoritarianism, and hopes to avoid the conceptual murkiness that it often entails. Authoritarianism, in this analysis, is singular rule by a political party, which is not bounded by constitutional limits. Singapore is classified as “competitively authoritarian” a term defined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way’s Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War where they describe it as “…formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as a primary means of gaining power, but in which the incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents…the playing field is skewed heavily in favor of the incumbents.”3 Singapore holds regular elections that merits this classification they are open to opponents, nevertheless those elections are farcical, either with ballot forging, reporting incorrect numbers, or the destruction of votes for the opposing party, and no other party would come to power democratically without significant changes in the way the country is constituted.
3 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 3.
2 National brand, also referred to as the image or trademark, is an identifiable reputation that can be easily recognized by both citizens and foreigners. It is, specifically, a collective effort by multiple parties to create a viable representation of geographical-political-economic- social entity.4 In this thesis, the parties discussed in creating that image are the parties in power in both Singapore and China. A national brand is an amalgamation of cultural values that promises a certain, special experience to both buyers and sellers, whether they be citizens or external investors.5 Much like a product’s brand, the nation brand is a recognizable source of characteristics, which they hope will mobilize diverse coalitions of people into a collective which fosters loyalty, either material or symbolic.6 A national brand needs to inspire people to sacrifice for it, and transcends the mere profit incentive of consumer products.7 A successful branding process enables people at home and abroad to appear legitimate and credible.8 Similarly, the image of a nation is influenced by the country’s history than a product is. A product and its reputation can easily reinvent itself, and destroy itself in a quick manner, such as Netflix when it tried to introduce Qwikster, or the debacle of New Coke. But, those products rebounded just as easily in order to reclaim their market share. Nation brands take a long time to build, and take a long time to destroy due to their historical buildup and cultural elements.9 The process of forging a national image, when undertaken by the government, is when ruling parties attempt, through policy and reputation, to create an image to both its citizens and internationals. Some counties employ public affairs firms to create an image that appeals to tourist investment, other countries create or co-opt traditions to make their rule appear as the defender of the past. There are many different types of branding processes, but this thesis is directed toward the ruling parties co-opting traditions, ideas, and policies to create loyalty domestically and goodwill internationally. Through these manipulations, the ruling party seeks to control and channel imagery into a package that they can sell to citizens and foreigners alike, in order to create and retain investment, loyalty, tourism,
4 Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy” in Nation Branding in Modern History eds. Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C.E. Glenow-Hecht, Annika Estner, and Marcel K. Will. 1-2. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018). 5 Keith Dinnie, Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice (New York: Routledge, 2016), 3-4. 6 Melissa Aronczyk, Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9. 7 Melissa Aronczyk, Branding the Nation, 9. 8 Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy”. 1-2. 9 Keith Dinnie, Nation Branding, 5.
3 without reference to the political organization of the state.10 As it is not in reference to any specific party apparatus, branding is an informal institution, one that isn’t explicitly codified by law, rather more customary in its proceeding. Branding has a strong overlap with greater globalization after the Second World War. Globalization can be made terribly complicated, but for the purposes of this thesis, it only refers to the increasingly international scope of national action, whether it is from specific corporations, or countries themselves. Furthermore, globalization refers not to the mere facet of international trade, but the sheer volume of global trade. Branding specific aspects of the nation has existed for a long time; but due to this increase in global interaction, the process has become more crucial to the continual survival and thriving of the nation. International investment, development funds, or even mere goodwill creates a new path for national prosperity for external actors, which could not be achieved before the globalized world economy. However, this does not mean that the project of marketing a nation has only international applications, as it still retains importance for domestic use. Government branding is still crucial for internal legitimacy above all, and external good will provides a feedback loop to internal control and security of authoritarian parties, which in turn aids in the retention of legitimacy abroad. Finally, legitimacy is the right to rule that any government lays claim to. Max Weber’s definition in The Vocation Lectures, is the gold standard of scientific inquiries into political legitimacy, and that will be maintained in this study. Weber’s claim that the state is “a legitimate use of force, that is to say, force that is perceived to be legitimate…if the state is to survive, the ruled must acquiesce to the rulers.”11 Legitimacy is what the brand is supposed to supply, and stabilize authoritarian regimes in a more liberalized world.
Why Singapore and China?
China and Singapore provide a number of similarities, emerging from tumultuous invasions from Japan and colonial influence from the West. Additionally, there exist stark differences including size and branching historical paths, which merit an examination of their
10 Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy” 2. 11 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishers, 2004), 33-34.
4 countries as case studies in competing branding practices. Each of these countries provides constants and variables which are useful for study. Both have a majority of ethnically Han Chinese citizens, with numerous minorities that are not simply content with a lesser say in governance. Each country shares a similar governing structure of single party control instead of one-man charismatic rule. Charismatic rule was common in especially communist countries, where a figure like Stalin or Mao would create a cult of personality, drawing legitimacy from his personal power and allegiance from the citizenry. Furthermore, both of them began their current government formation within 11 years of each other, with the charismatic rule of Chairman Mao ending in 1976 and Singapore being repulsed from a greater federal polity in Indonesia in 1965. This means that both had to deal with similar external forces of the time, and adjust to the same external factors in the world at large. Culturally, both countries have a long history of Confucianism which has been utilized in order to defend the elite hierarchy government as well as the country generally. Confucianism is apparent in these branding efforts, and both regimes refer to this venerated tradition to strengthen authoritarianism. Similarly, both regimes share an interest in molding education in order to create loyal subjects that will be able to strengthen the regime against Western ethics and ideas. Both hope to distance themselves intellectually from the West and avoiding what they envision as the pitfalls of Western beliefs. Through this, each government would create a culturally distinct country with beneficial Western technologies, without being saddled by Western political or social systems. While these regimes may share commonality, their differences are stark enough to provide valuable insight upon the options and variation in national image creation. Most extreme of these is that China is a declared communist party, while the People’s Action Party (PAP hereafter) in Singapore purged the communists from their ranks, and the whole country, shortly after independence. Also, each country had remarkably distinct historical developments, each that lead to different branding processes. Furthermore, China had to change its mode of legitimacy from the isolated Communist era to the economically expansive Reform and Opening period since the late 1970s; Singapore had no such change in political theology in its recent past, as its founding leaders maintained their original influence. The variability of Chinese leadership led to a branching path on branding promotion and branding practices. Whereas Singapore was able to maintain its political and intellectual leadership from independence, changes in Chinese governance led to different obstacles and realities to the process as a whole. Those obstacles
5 have not minimized in importance in the present age. The current government under Xi Jinping (as President 2013-present) has to engage in proactive policies in order to maintain authoritarian power. Because of this change in China toward a more open economy, both cases are constantly in reference with each other. Lee Kuan Yew was fascinated by Chinese efforts to remake its image and how that will reflect on Singapore, stating that “China can learn from the Singapore system.”12 Since the reign of Deng Xiaoping and the opening of the Chinese market to international actors, the Singaporean model has become more interesting to the Communist regime. Regardless of these similarities and differences, both these countries have an outsized influence on international political and economic events. Singapore is one of the so-called “Asian Tigers” a collection of four economic powerhouses in the Pacific Rim. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) incorporates Singapore as a vital member, and its economic influence reaches around the globe. China is the second largest economy in the world, and many consumer goods are made by Chinese workers. Both countries also are two different authoritarian systems, with Singapore holding elections and having some nominally democratic institutions, whereas China labors to never let control be wrested from the Party. Because of these similarities and differences, the countries provide valuable analysis for studies on branding within authoritarian countries. Their differences do not push them too far away from each other to make a comparison farcical; and their similarities are not clouded by substantial repetition within the case studies. Furthermore, both cases are constantly in reference with each other. Lee Kuan Yew was fascinated by Chinese efforts to remake its image and how that will reflect on Singapore, stating that “China can learn from the Singapore system.”13 While China is less open to citing outside influences, as it would diminish their claim to superiority, Xi Jinping has followed a similar path to Lee Kuan Yew, including and especially retaining his post indefinitely, in order to guide his national project to greater heights.
Historiography
12 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew. (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2013), 69-71. 13 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew. (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2013), 69-71.
6 In relation to the current historiography, the subject of branding and its relation to political systems is remarkably scant. Most studies upon branding consist of overarching observations, or specific brands and how they relate to economics. Lack of historical studies into political branding is most likely due to its dependence on contemporary sources and events; as well as the diverging approaches to the study, mostly left to the realm of economics and business. Nation branding belongs exclusively to a globalized world, and while historical roots of the brand image can regress ceaselessly into the past, it is only after globalization that a branding process can be exploited for reputation and influence. Much of the research on branding is dependent on contemporary news, and concentrates on recent events, as if the brand emerged out of nothing. This reality is also an opportunity, as this research seeks to fill that gap and open more pathways of study in nation branding. For branding as a concept, two books have made the biggest impact on the nation branding as a scholarly concept as well as this analysis, where both works are used to describe what the brand actually consists of. Those books are Keith Dinnie’s Nation Branding, and Melissa Aronczyk’s Branding the Nation. Keith Dinnie’s work is structured as a textbook in order to understand what the brand is and how it interacts with the world market. Dinnie sparsely references different countries in little one page anecdotes, but it is more for conceptual constructions of the national brand. He clarifies many important ideas, specifically how the nation brand is a variety of cultural ideas, how stereotypes about the nation fit within the process, and how it is different from competition among consumer products.14 Instead of hammering down conceptual ideas, Aroncyzk emphasizes specific case studies of nation brands and what made them successful or fall short. She places importance on the recently established brand promotion agencies, primarily based in the United Kingdom, that interact with governments and how they both work together to create the brand image.15 Both of these works are seminal in their pioneering of the field, but they leave opportunities of different case studies, as well as their effect on political systems. There is one book that pushes the concept of nation branding into the historical realm, which provides valuable insight into the long history of branding the nation. Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, and Marcel K. Will trace the long history of nation
14 Dinnie, Nation Branding, 3-5. 15 Aroncyzk, Branding the Nation, 73, 85, 97, 111.
7 branding then analyze specific case studies present in the world with their book Nation Branding in Modern History. They posit that nation branding is as old as 1896, when German businessmen attempted to rebrand Germany, but has especially come to the fore with the British cultural change under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.16 The book thoroughly discusses major nation branding projects, from the Civil War to the Cold War and the major countries in between. Most importantly they state that all political systems have utilized branding in some sense to bolster the image of their country.17 This book is an example of the historical facet of branding projects within nations, and the authors attempt to fully explain the concept, which was helpful for the definition used in this thesis. Despite the usefulness, the book delivers case studies in short explorations, without fully explicating entire histories of each case. Nor does the book truly explore the importance of branding to the survivability of modern authoritarian systems. Nation Branding in Modern History comes closest to filling the void in historical study, but it leaves substantial room to apply historical methodology to political sustainability. With regard to the specific countries involved, there is one major work on each of them, both only discussing certain aspects of the branding process in each. Singapore’s branding is discussed by Koh Buck Song in his book Brand Singapore. This is the only book that singularly explores Singapore’s brand. Koh directs his book mostly at the future of the brand, as he sees it, and where the PAP would likely look to advance with their branding image. To Koh the brand is something of a given, as he does not specifically discuss what the Singaporean brand is, merely content to explore its characteristics. Lee Kuan Yew is his brand manager however, because the entire book is framed around the brands future after Lee Kuan Yew passed away.18 Only scant attention was paid to the historical aspects of the image, and the primacy was placed upon what the brand had delivered so far. Specific to his study was the expansion into new markets and the importance of future brand diplomacy.19 The last part of his book is discussion and analysis of the 2050 project of Singapore, and the issues that Singapore needs to address in order to sustain itself.20 Koh concentrates on how the future will progress without the oversight of Lee Kuan
16 Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy,” 8-10. 17 Carolin Viktorin, Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, Annika Estner, Marcel K. Will, “Beyond Marketing and Diplomacy”, 3. 18 Koh Buck Song, Brand Singapore: Nation Branding After Lee Kuan Yew, in a Divisive World, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2017), 1. 19 Koh Buck Song, Brand Singapore, 73-75. 20 Koh Buck Song, Brand Singapore 114-182.
8 Yew in the government. He concludes that the project will be more strained, but that there is a clear project out until 2050. The PAP will have to change the image of being an overbearing regime in regard to its citizens. Despite these conclusions, without discussing the past of the brand, he provides the impression that the brand emerged at some indeterminate moment in time, and obfuscates the political purposes in the image. Of all the writings about China, only one of them discusses the branding efforts of the country. Fan Yang explores the process in Faked in China: Nation Branding, Counterfeit Culture, and Globalization. This is the one book that considers the effects of politics on the branding process and how political elites have to interact with the citizens within their country. She specifically addresses the idea of counterfeiting in China and how the government attempted to crackdown on the sham products within the country.21 But aside from this narrow chapter of discussion, she almost entirely hinged her argument on the attempted change of Chinese reputation after its ascension to the World Trade Organization. Understanding that the country had been dogged by a less than reputable image due to counterfeiting and corrupt trade practices, Chinese government officials attempted to relaunch a China brand more connected to respectable traditions and characteristics.22 Fan Yang creates an assumption that the China branding process began around the ascension to the World Trade Organization, where the government had to rein in the counterfeit culture. Also, she emphasizes the external benefits of the branding process, where the relations on the international stage are most crucial and necessary instead of the effect within the country. Scholarship of nation branding is valuable, but there are large gaps that this thesis attempts to fill. Branding has vital connections to legitimacy, which have yet to be explored. Similarly, authoritarianism places a vital importance on control of the country and its institutions, which the brand is necessarily part of political life as an informal institution. Expanding the process allows for an in depth look into the survival and adaptation of authoritarianism to new obstacles in the globalized world. Certain conceptual formations are valuable from all these works, especially understanding what the process of national image making involves, but addressing them as though they existed in a vacuum, outside of governmental legitimacy is what this report seeks to change in the paradigm.
21 Fan Yang, Faked in China, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016) 74. 22 Fan Yang, Faked in China, 51.
9
A Note on Nationalism
Some readings that are used as sources within this analysis fit within a different historiography than nation branding, that being nationalism. Although nationalism has been studied since the 1800s, contemporary studies of nationalism began in the 1980’s with Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities and his discussion of capitalism’s importance to the spread of nationalism based on language.23 Anderson’s book is a starting point for all current studies on nationalism, and most books on nationalism have to accept or dismiss his central thesis on nationalist ideology. While the studies of nationalism and of its creation and perpetuation within the state are vital within their own field, they do not form a vital impression on the analysis. Certain elements have overlap in the analysis, however. Anderson’s concentration on capitalism mirrors capitalism’s importance to branding. Adrian Hastings in his book The Construction of Nationhood, offers a more in-depth study of historical developments and how they imprinted certain ideas upon what would become to be the nation.24 This approach has correlates to the importance of historical legacies to national image creation. My analysis adopted certain methodological approaches from that work, specifically the importance of historical developments and how the regime attempted to either change or adopt the historical imagination as one of the pillars of nation branding. Scholars of nationalism were invaluable for their examinations on how nationalism has an effect upon the populace, and how the regime could look to co-opt nationalism to reinforce their rule. However, due to the increasingly abstract nature and conceptual concerns in regards to nationalism as a concept, it becomes too burdensome for useful analysis. For this reason, the term “nation” carries, in the following pages, no conceptual baggage from earlier studies, and will be used the word interchangeably with “country” or “state”. In this analysis, the process of creating a national image is not tied to an imagined community, rather to the ordering of institutions and power structures in the political realm to enforce hierarchy upon civil society. Specifically, the parties in power interact with the population in a certain way to
23 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (New York: Verso, 1993). 24 Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
10 gain legitimacy, rather than to attempt to create the “nation” as it is described in early studies of nationalism, mired in postmodernist ideology and incoherence, which hinges upon the studies of vernacular languages and upper classes, as per Anderson’s argument.
The Source Base
Primary sources in this thesis include speeches by leaders from each country, but especially Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee, both founding members of their parties and the country of Singapore. Their ideas account for much greater influence, as they held power from Singaporean independence until their respective deaths. As for the Chinese government, many of the sources are speeches and saying of certain leaders, but especially Xi Jinping, as he is the center point of the most proactive point of Chinese national image making. Newspapers are a core part of both chapters, because they are heavily influenced by the party in power, specifically Straits Times in Singapore, and People’s Daily in China. These papers explain ideas and hint toward branding hopes of the regime, and sometimes publish op-eds to press the citizenry into a patriotic mindset. In regard to secondary sources, the study uses the four books discussed previously in the historiography, as well as other writings that discuss the place of the state and political actions in the realm of nation building. A few of them are nationalist in scope, and those sources are added to bolster the certain aspects of nation branding, rather than speaking to their discussions upon nationalism.
Chapter Breakdown
Each chapter begins with a general introduction to the branding process and how that country’s government attempted to create or reinforce the brand within its borders and abroad. In both chapters a brief historical outline is explained and is connected to how those historical developments changed the branding process for the country when they attempted to market themselves and their regimes. Then each chapter analyzes specific case studies to illustrate the facets of the brand in each country. Each chapter concludes with the brand as it stands at the present day, and what each process provided to the regime.
11 Singapore’s brand is pragmatic. The government pursues what it has decided to be the “common good” which it then pushes the citizenry to accept. Singaporean leaders, after its independence in 1965, concentrated upon the enticing of citizens to accept the national brand in order to ensure its survival as an independent country. They hoped to accomplish this through continuous interference in education and private life, to prevent problems before they started. Education was the hallmark of these efforts. Early childhood education was made to reduce ethnic identity in order to lessen the demands of the minority, and instead force them into the government education programs. Later in collegiate education, the Party would provide opportunity to join the elite sphere when gifted students exhibited loyalty to the regime. Finally, private life was defined by this pragmatism as well, with marriage, childbirth, and burials all experiencing substantial interference from the state. Such long-term influence served the brand well, as Singapore is seen as an international leader in finance and safety. Pragmatic thought is victorious and firmly entrenches the authoritarian regime. China’s brand is much more proactive and radical. Partially due to the changes in guard in leadership, Chinese imaging efforts have tended toward difference with each leader. Hu Jintao (as President 2003-2013) and Jiang Zemin (as President 1993-2003) sought to adopt the history of China to influence its citizens into a new patriotism. This new patriotism was more rabid, and wanted justice for past misdeeds against the Chinese state and people. The most proactive phase of the branding process occurred under the auspices of Xi Jinping (as President 2013-Present). His proactive projects included the anti-corruption campaigns within the Party. These campaigns re-instilled confidence in the total control of the Communist Party of China, which it desperately needed after a weakening of Marxist legitimacy and scandals surrounding corrupt officials and actions. The crown jewel of his tenure, however, is the New Silk Road Initiative, an attempt to provide an outlet for obstacles to the branding process and the Party. Furthermore, it would tie the Chinese government to numerous projects around the world, increasing national power. Chinese branding efforts are much more in doubt, as the proactive nature of it does not seek to avoid problems, but respond to them and create greater allegiance. On a small scale only considering two case studies, I seek to understand the enduring stability of authoritarian regimes and how they expand their power, in an ever-democratizing world. I hope these pages will provide answers to these crucial questions hindering political freedom and open the opportunity for further study into these historical matters.
12 Chapter 1: Singapore’s Pragmatic Control
Without an easily identifiable national brand, Singapore would not exist as a modern nation. An island micro-state on the edge of a peninsula would not draw much attention without a competitive edge in the human mind, both domestic and international. After independence from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore was a relative backwater that lacked any international good will or domestic hegemony. The project of creating a new Singaporean image from these rather humble beginnings was the task of the first political party, and the only one to hold tremendous power in modern Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP). The first-generation Singaporean political leaders main aim was to survive as an independent country. To do this Singapore needed to attract foreign investment which would enable the country to make use of its population, the only resource it had in relative abundance. In order to attract foreign investment, the citizens had to inherently trust the Party in power, regardless of the public penetration into private life. This project, at least in the eyes of the PAP, required a new national brand that would be broad enough to attract fiscal attention from around the world, and focused enough to motivate the Singaporean citizens to create a new national ideal. Singapore’s geography, history, political system, and the ideas of its statesmen all contributed to the national brand, either in instilling a certain virtue or proactively attempting to create a distinct vision for the country. All the factors of Singapore’s unique existence lead to the adoption of a certain “pragmatism” as the marketable image of the island, not limited by tradition, faith, creed, or overarching, rigid ideology. From its inception, in other words, the modern nation of Singapore has centered on branding. Singapore has an authoritarian political system. Since independence a single party has held control of the island’s civic society. While Singapore does hold elections, they are not highly contested because the victor is never truly in doubt, which can reinforce the legitimacy of authoritarianism without any danger.25 Other parties exist in Singapore, but those parties never held a majority or even a significant minority26. Under authoritarian rule, those in power, in this
25 Jennifer Gandhi, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 38; Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25. 26 Michael K. Miller “Elections, Information and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes,” Comparative Political Studies, 48, no. 6, 2015. 699-702.
13 case a political party, are the main forces and actors behind the national branding processes and have been since the modern inception of the country. In democratic countries, while the elite still have a function within the national image, the mass of citizenry adjusts the process and the final outcomes of branding processes. Democratic branding is a different process, and mainly involves the cultivation of individual freedom and pursuit of equality. Under authoritarian countries the elite have to cultivate a trademark of safety and stability in order to retain internal legitimacy, with international benefits.27 Singapore’s main political party, the People’s Action Party, created the flexible ideal of pragmatism to represent a country of safety and security. The PAP holds power firmly in the country, and the Party took control of the branding process since Singapore’s independence (1965-Present, which will be called “Modern Singapore”). Two major figures in the party, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee crafted the early political frameworks of the party goals and the early image that they hoped would spread in the country. Their efforts were successful, but also made Singapore’s negative image into the “nanny state” as the minor shortcoming of the national trademark. Singapore’s national image has to fulfill two criteria. One of them is specific to Singapore as a country. The specific history, particular facts, events, allies, cultures, and traditions are the issues related to a particular country. Additionally, as an authoritarian state the party in power needs to legitimize their authority without fomenting rebellion and calls for a democratic, or even more competitive authoritarian system, which would destabilize not only the nation, but the entire branding process as well. In order to maintain a powerful hegemony, Singaporean leaders must avoid allowing a second party to challenge their electoral strength which would necessitate a more corrupt election procedure.28 This thesis will scantly touch on issues of authoritarianism related to the national branding process, as that is more the realm of a broader political science project, but it does change the nature of the process entirely. Particular Singaporean issues deal with the realm of historical action and theories of modern statesmen and will be the main concentration of this chapter. Furthermore, because of the authoritarian nature of the country, the party in power is the primary actor in the country. While the actions of
27 Juan Linz, “Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Regimes” in Handbook of Political Science Volume 3, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Press, 1975), 197 28 Steven Levitsky and Lucian A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: 1-5.
14 individuals are important, they do not contribute to national affairs in the same way as they would in a democracy. While the political system of Singapore is integral to the entire branding process, it cannot be discussed without the specific history of the country. The PAP was able to control much in regard to the country, but it needed to adapt to the specific situation of Singapore itself in order to maintain control of the process. Historical forces and political necessity make the foundations of the national image. The PAP inherited the contextual situation and had to act within historical and physical constraints. Singapore is small at 697 square miles in total. In perspective that is half the size of New York City. Along with the limited space, the population of Singapore is upwards of five and a half million.29 With half the size of New York City but over half of New York’s population there are issues involving burials, traditions, military, education, genetics and simple population pressure. There exist many obstacles to the Singaporean brand but many of them are ultimately connected and spring from the issue of space and geography in Singapore. The geographic reality and background of Singaporean society must always inform any outlook on Singapore’s society and branding process. It often remains in the background of many issues, both political and economic, but much like historical forces, it provides the limits of any project that a government, democratic or authoritarian, desires to undergo. Similarly, the reality of authoritarian rule is a facet of political necessity to the party in power. In order to act with legitimacy, the PAP needed to address the necessities of being an authoritarian regime. These are; pacifying the elites while maintaining their influence over the levers of power, repressing the populace while not appearing too arbitrary, and creating the image of stability on the international sphere.30 Singapore’s PAP had to accomplish this with the particular historical forces that led to the moment of independence, and harness those forces for the creation of the national brand.
History on the Island: Singapore’s Tumultuous Past
29 “Is Singapore the Smallest Country in the World?” National Library Board of Singapore, accessed September 27, 2018. http://www.nlb.gov.sg/sure/is-singapore-the-smallest-country-in-the-world/ 30 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins University Press, 2013), 15-23
15 The particular history of Singapore is integral to its branding process. From an English colony, to a global financial powerhouse, the changes and events that the country experienced constructed the image that the PAP would pursue after independence. Many of the facets of the rule of the PAP after independence come from specific historical circumstances, from the colonial era under Britain to the modern era after 1965. A certain flexibility and competitiveness came forth the colonial era as an outgrowth of the materialist interest of the United Kingdom. An appeal to authority resulted from the abandonment of Singapore by British forces in World War II, as well as the fight against communism and socialist elements in the country before and after independence. Singapore has been continuously populated since prehistorical times, due to the biodiverse lifeforms, and the calm waters that allowed for less ornate boats to travel the Melaka Straits between Singapore and Indonesia.31 But Singapore began its historical existence in the Western mind as a trading post for the British Empire in Southeast Asia, taken over from the Dutch controlled Sultan of Johor (1528-1855). In this era, the British had truly begun spreading voraciously over the earth, many Asian and African territories absorbed into British colonial authority, and with British industry investing in the less developed portions of the world through factories and cheap labor. The Dutch first held the territory prior to the British taking interest in the island, but was not anywhere near a central concern in the Dutch control of Indonesia, as it remained underdeveloped under the Dutch auspices. Sir Stamford Raffles was the leading figure in the attempt to adopt Singapore as a small post for British operations. Colonial Singapore was established after the Treaty of London was signed in 1824 between the Dutch and the British, and was an attempt to crystallize the territorial claims over Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent.32 Dutch governmental authorities rescinded the territorial claims to the island of Singapore, and London, after the Dutch withdrew their forces from Singapore, gained full control over the island. Stamford Raffles strongly encouraged the development of Singapore within the British Empire. He had always considered the position of China in relation to the British markets, and the hope to facilitate more trade with the emerging Chinese market, which, up until that point, had rejected all trade opportunities with foreign powers, limiting them to specific, tightly
31 John Curtis Perry, Singapore: Unlikely Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5. 32 Perry, Singapore, 41.
16 controlled places.33 Raffles always had an eye toward what would come to be known as the Pacific Rim and its potential to the British economic power. He also kept a traditional name, instead of naming it after a British location or monarch, thus Singapura would mix new and old, and eventually evolve into Singapore.34 Mixing new and old became commonplace in later Singaporean politics, especially in regard to age-old traditions, but this marked the beginning of the synthesis. Furthermore, Raffles hoped to bring substantial development to the island, with ancient trading traditions throughout the East Asian sphere.35 Ancient traditions formed a convenient and important foundation that allowed the novel English free trade system to thrive in Singapore, first as a new trading post, then beyond to an independent republic. As colonial life developed, Singapore experienced many changes and challenges in its sphere of action. After the defeat of China in the Opium War (1839-1942), Hong Kong was transferred to British hands. Closer in proximity to the emerging European market in China aided Hong Kong greatly in terms of development preference, as the British overseers dumped investment and capital into the new colony.36 Competition also factored greatly in the Singaporean existence, as the French created military and economics bases in Saigon as direct competitors to the ever growing, but still small, British trading post.37 Thrown harshly into an early global trading system based off colonial competition, Singapore needed to attract laborers and human capital in order to compete and survive, with British interests elsewhere and French competition aiming to push Singapore out of their economic market. With this ethos established, it is clear to see where later pragmatic branding principles in the country sprung from, and what rhetorical appeals the leaders would make. As the history of the Singapore was based on British free trade and the harsh competition with competitors that possessed more a priori physical and international advantages, proximity to economic powers, useable and expandable land size, and pre-colonial and post-colonial backing from former dominion powers. While the ethos of competition was established in this time, and development occurred at a fast pace, Singapore was not experiencing the exponential economic increase that occurred in other colonial territories. As Japan emerged onto the stage after World War I as an economic
33 William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 122- 135. 34 Perry, Singapore, 39. 35 Perry, Singapore, 38. 36 Perry, Singapore, 88. 37 Perry, Singapore, 87.
17 competitor, then as a militaristic competitor as well, Singapore became much more vital as a military base and a connection to Commonwealth nations Australia and New Zealand, as opposed to an economically viable trading post and market.38 While its strategic location provided it more attention, it hampered the economic progress that would be an issue early on in modern Singapore. Additionally, Singapore’s short-lived existence as a military base abated by the Japanese war fleet soon after the Second World War had begun. The Japanese Navy, which had been enhanced and upgraded in the interwar years came to the peninsula. Two British capital ships, HMS Repulse and the HMS Prince of Wales, constituted Singapore’s meager defense fleet. Repulse and Prince of Wales soon earned dubious honors, as the first capital ships to be sunk by aircraft while at sea, Britain had provided a fleet that it could not lose, but was too weak to defend Singapore, as her concerns lied elsewhere than its forgotten colonial outpost.39 Japan’s naval force arrived at Singapore quicker than anyone had expected, and the island was forced to surrender. Singapore was taken and the British humiliated, and the Empire lost its legitimizing power and appeared a shell of its former self.40 Singapore lost all confidence in its colonial overlord, and after the war many decisions had to be made as to the future of Singaporean politics and leadership after the defeat of the Japanese and the decolonization movement in Southeast Asia. After the War, Singapore could no longer depend on British protection, and became one of the many new territories that emerged from colonialism with choices to make about governmental and societal organization. Much of the tenor of the debate worldwide was over communism or capitalism, first or second world, and Singapore was no different. At first the small, now new, nation sought a political unification with the broader Malaysia, as seemed natural given history and location of both these countries. But too much time had passed, different traditions had been ensconced and both countries diverged from each other. Malaysia was concerned with the Chinese presence on the island, and did not want Chinese nationals to have a say in any Southeast Asian government.41 Singapore had imported Chinese citizens as laborers for generations, and a large contingent of ethnic Chinese Singaporean citizens made a
38 Perry, Singapore, 121. 39 Perry, Singapore, 132. 40 Perry, Singapore, 134. 41 Perry, Singapore, 170.
18 home on the island.42 The Chinese presence allowed for Singapore to increase its economic prominence, but raised ethnic concerns for the broader Malaysian regime. Malaysia rejected Singapore as a province, and Lee Kuan Yew announced on August 9, 1965, after a tumultuous process, that Singapore was now an independent nation, to find her own way separate from Malaysia.43 Regardless of previous British presence and development, which, as previously stated, was not as extensive as other colonies, Singapore was not entirely ready for independent existence in any way. Outside of a wondrous sea port and a natural harbor that would allow for maritime trade and growth, not much seemed powerful enough to preserve Singapore as an independent country. Historian Arnold Toynbee even predicted that Singapore would not preserve as a nation state for much longer, as all technological advancements, especially the steamship, favored larger nations.44 This is where the People’s Action Party (PAP) and its leadership take center stage as the guiding force behind Singaporean policy and society. At first the party had to contend with communist forces still persisting throughout the city, as communist forces had penetrated into the labor unions as an extensive part of the labor force after 1965. This had been with the help of the PAP early on in its existence. It should be noted that the British still had some interaction with the independent country.45 As far as financial backing and diplomatic ties, Singapore and the PAP had the support of the United Kingdom as a party that could stabilize and grow the small republic. But this should not be overstated, as Singapore was still a relative backwater, and British concern, again, lay with Hong Kong’s predicament of a hostile and massive communist power on its northern border. Additionally, the British persisted on Hong Kong for decades more as the ruling power, and the loss of Singapore as a dependent colony did not fully endear the British to the independent Singaporean cause. After the conflict with the communists subsided on Singapore, the PAP finally consolidated its political power. Electorally, the PAP did not lose power up until and including the present, and any serious opposition is overstated, the Party remained in complete control. The PAP, therefore, utilized complete control over the island’s policies, and began to create a distinct brand in order to compete with much
42 Perry, Singapore, 130. 43 Perry, Singapore, 175. 44 Arnold Toynbee, Cities on the Move (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). 45 Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 75.
19 larger international powers. Historical and contextual forces of Singapore are the base of the Singaporean brand. Historical forces like the ones in Singapore will not be quite as influential or operate in a same way as a place that has a longer and more tumultuous history, like Russia, or a history of being a hegemonic power, similar to China. As Singapore is newer on the world stage the historical situation offers fewer obstacles to the process. But historical events and realities are still integral to supporting the national image and the obstacles that are there still need to be contended with by the PAP. In terms of the historical contingencies, the PAP inherited from its history; the ethos of competition, a free market system, a small land area to contend with, and a sizable Chinese Confucian influence as a priori factors to the national branding process.
Singapore Becomes Pragmatic
Singapore’s history and leadership at the time of Independence made Singapore’s brand unique and authoritative. Neither one of these elements, historical conditions or the ideals of the post-independence elite, should overstated as the most influential in the branding process, however. Without the history that Singapore experienced, the brand would be nowhere near the current identification as pragmatic, nor would the PAP have taken power in the modern period. Similarly, without the particular political system that took power at the beginning of the Independence movement, pragmatism would not have become the guiding principle of Singaporean national image. The People’s Action Party branded itself and its rule as pragmatic. Similarly, the party approach to ruling the country was also pragmatic, which is how they defended questionable policy. As stated previously the PAP, where the party has not had to contend with any broader historical forces as they did in China, were able to create a flexible ideology in order to illicit commitment from the general Singaporean populace. Additionally, the flexible and adaptable ideology propagates an image of stability to investors and possible immigrants abroad. Due to this reality, those influential statesmen who constructed the principles of the party have a greater influence over the country as a whole, and its branding process. Hence, the writings and speeches of Lee Kuan Yew, the leader of the PAP, and Goh Keng Swee, the theoretical mastermind behind the Party, are inherently connected to the national image of the country.
20 In terms of the leading generation after independence, the two most important figures of the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee. Lee Kuan Yew led the political leadership of the PAP. He held the Office of Prime Minister until 1990 and after still retained power until 2011, four years before his death.46 Goh Keng Swee was the thought leader behind many of the foundational theories in Singapore. He held the Office of Defense Minister, but more importantly, he instilled many of the principles and structures into the economy and education that allowed Singapore to develop so quickly. These two men, their theories and actions created the pragmatic brand for Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew never ceased discussing and arguing the place for Singapore in the world. From answering criticisms, developing theories for growth, and the role of international affairs, he never ceased debating the merits of his home country. He primarily shaped the role of the nation and the need for citizens to work toward a better Singapore to survive on its own. Furthermore, he was a leader that idolized Machiavelli and his dictates, stating that they can be used to guide a country to prosperity.47 Machiavellian machinations often underlie many of Lee’s the PAP’s actions, and that is apparent through the pragmatic political manipulations of the country. Lee himself wrote a book called From First World to First: The Singapore Story. In it he outlined the history of the micronation as he imagined it, the challenges, the triumphs, and how he fit into the country’s present and future. The Singapore Story is obviously heavily biased, but such a valuable primary source is instrumental to understand the approach of the leader of the PAP. In it he dismisses his attachment to the unions, explains why a communist party is no longer necessary, the challenges that Singapore possesses and how to address them in order to develop a country that can survive and thrive in the modern world. Early on in the book, Lee stated “the citizens should not strive for softness, or those that promise a soft way out of hardship; there are no soft ways out, there is nothing that Singapore will get for free.”48 Citizens needed to not be lured to the communists who promised soft ways for Singapore, because none existed. Survival was the goal, survival which made for harsh realities with no easy answers. In order to survive the country had to adopt what guaranteed their survival, even if that be outside
46 Perry, Singapore, 190-192 47 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew, 48-49 48 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story (New York: Harper Collins, 2000), 53
21 morality and traditional norms. The citizens needed to be molded, and understand their role for the future. Lee’s intelligence and pragmatism would guide the people, as they could not guide themselves. The departure of the British from Singapore left a large impact on of Lee Kuan Yew’s mentality. A struggle for survival would come to characterize the complications for Singapore, prior to any other concerns.49 Struggling for survival legitimates any action that a government or person takes in order to secure it. Overturning traditions, undercutting labor unions, or supporting any kind of policy that can be considered eugenic and a threat to fundamental human rights is legitimate, if it is all for survival. These are the underpinnings of Lee’s actions as the Prime Minister. Furthermore, Lee Kuan Yew, always thought that people needed to be molded by the Party if they had any hope of being be happy. “Human beings are inherently vicious…humanity is animal like, and in order to be improved they much be disciplined.”50 Innate beliefs of a need for discipline and ethos of every human enables expansive and intense infiltration into private life and ethics. If left to their own devices people are an animalistic race then the government has a responsibility to interfere in deeply private matters, across almost all facets of human social life if a city is to be completely safe. Lee Kuan Yew feared communists, and his struggle for survival ethos became more radical due to the Communist presence on the island. Trade unions, which the PAP first supported, became the foremost problem to the Party before independence, and to Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister after independence. He viewed these unions as what injured the British economy and empire, and that they would similarly ruin Singapore based on terrible practices.51 Socialism was to be avoided, but the government was still to be in full control of the economy and where the wealth would be funneled to.52 A fair society protected the profit motive, but there could be no creation of the dispossessed when the profit motive enacts itself on unequal parties, as humans would always remain unequal.53 While this sounds like the perfect situation in which there would be monetary support for everyone if they needed it, Lee was strongly opposed to a
49 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 52 50 Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 128 51 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 84-85. 52 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 95. 53 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 96.
22 welfare society.54 Any criticism he faced from “Western media”, a catch all term for his detractors, he would reduce to attacks from those that did not understand the great and revered tradition from which he was operating.55 Always shielded from outside criticism through rhetorical tactics, and in full control of a country that he could remake with the departure of the British presence, Lee Kuan Yew was the man who would be able to engineer the global brand of Singapore, and the policies of the party had his ethical implications underlying all of them. Two sayings directly from Lee Kuan Yew summarizes his approach to rule and leadership in Singapore and the PAP, and how Singapore’s brand would develop. “My faults are impatience in getting things done, pressing my associates and aides in putting in their best to get the job done, or fairly quickly replacing them when they are not making the effort well…I tend to blow up on my secretaries are dilatory and I am under pressure. This is not an exhaustive list I cannot see myself.”56 Instead of patience and deliberation, Lee was interested in correct action at the right time. To Lee, discipline and utilitarian ideals held more importance over theoretical wisdom and personal compassion. Additionally, “So Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, I am not guided by them. I read them cursorily because I was not interested in philosophy as such. You may call me utilitarian or whatever. I am interested in what works…if a proposed solution does not work, I move to the next one, whatever offers the highest probability of success.”57 Lee Kuan Yew was not a man of ideological fervor, and his approach allowed for tremendous governmental flexibility, possibly arbitrariness, to achieve the proper results. As well as being a hallmark of authoritarian leadership, these principles enabled the PAP to address multiple issues that had the Party intrude into the private lives of citizens. While Lee Kuan Yew was the political face of Singapore, economically another statesman crafted the economic principles of the Party, which would be used to legitimize the invasive decisions of the PAP, and advertise economic excellence to the world abroad. Lee Kuan Yew was the political nexus in modern Singapore, Goh Keng Swee was undoubtedly the theoretical center of the modern nation. Lee Kuan Yew established the means, and to be stated later, his ethical concepts bolstered the education system and the approach to religious beliefs in the country. Goh Keng Swee supplied the ends of the project, what Lee’s
54 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 104. 55 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 104. 56 Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew, 51. 57 Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew, 54.
23 ethos pointed toward, greater economic prosperity. The ends of political life and society being economic prosperity is perfectly in keeping with pragmatism as the philosophic, or lack of philosophic basis. Pragmatism does not have any underlying limitations or principles that would prevent certain actions or enshrine any specific human rights. Its principle encourages flexibility before all else, which can lead to an arbitrary approach to governance. Any principle that does not function, no matter how sacred or moral, would be discarded for further pragmatic growth. As such, sacred principles themselves are minimized in order to lessen the obstacles to the stated goal of the government. Pragmatism as an end goal is conducive to authoritarian governments. The lack of principled claims of political life allows for the hallmark of authoritarianism, arbitrary rule, to be widely accepted in a particular country. Therefore, pragmatism directed toward economic prosperity was an obvious direction for the PAP. Goh Keng Swee enshrined this belief in economics through his wrtings, and would later implement them as the Minister of Education, and the Deputy Prime Minister, both under Lee Kuan Yew. Goh wrote several works discussing the place of Singapore and the world system, and how to implement certain economic forces to further the status of the country. First and foremost, Goh separated Singapore from the other liberal international economists in the attitude toward market forces. Furthermore, Goh believed in a separate destiny for his country, as between poor and rich and in need of guidance. He is quoted as saying: “Nobody owes Singapore a living…we cannot afford the wayward habits of some developing countries nor the easy-going attitudes that are growing in some rich countries.”58 While other liberal economists tended to advise reacting to the market and developing the necessary sectors of the economy, Goh states that for Singapore to have developed to the heights necessary for survival, the Party needed to dictate the market.59 This isn’t the same as a command economy, but instead a strong state incentive in certain sectors to drive economic growth. Goh thought that the political party in power was the most important facet of a given country, because the party has control over the
58 Govindasamy Selvadas “Graduates are Grateful for Subsidized Education” Straits Times, August 14, 1984. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singmonitor19840814- 1.2.24.1?ST=1&AT=search&k=goh%20keng%20swee%20quotes&QT=goh,keng,swee,quotes&oref=article 59 Goh Keng Swee, “Paper Delivered at the Hao Ran Foundation Summer Workshop (1992),” in Wealth of East Asian Nations (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 39.
24 prosperity of the country.60 Luckily in the opinion of Goh, Singapore was controlled by his Party for decades, leading to greater prosperity in the ASEAN sphere. In order to avoid human suffering and civil conflict, a newly independent country needed to avoid the communist threat. The way to ensure the defeat of communist forces and the proper counter measure to deter communism was economic growth. Good government defined as an active government at all levels and the growth of opportunity would successfully deter the communist threat.61 The most pressing need for the establishment of good government was, in the mind of Goh Keng Swee, the development and maintenance of education, especially in Singapore due to its lack of space and ability to physically expand. The position and populace of the country was the imbalance that Singapore had over other countries in the Asian economic sphere. Singapore held a strategic post, both militarily and economically in the middle of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) all while being a fraction of the size of the other ASEAN countries; but Singapore had a majority of Chinese citizens, that other nations in the ASEAN sphere did not.62 The PAP needed to emphasize these factors if Singapore was to make substantial progress toward greater prosperity, the cornerstone of their national image. Accordingly, the way to make productive use of these factors toward the brand was through rigorous education of citizens. Education was to guard citizens from the corruptive influences of Western life, specifically pornography and drug addiction, where the state would institute repressive policies.63 Goh even railed against Western music in 1973, as “barbarically corrupting the youth during their impressionable age.”64 Asian values constituted repressing these views with a modified Confucian ethics to mold children. Furthermore, the political system of democracy cannot exist without intelligent citizens that are
60 Goh Keng Swee, “Opening Speech Delivered at the Seminar on ‘Democracy and Communism’ Sponsored by the Ministry of Education” in The Economics of Modernization (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 161. 61 Goh Keng Swee, Communism in Non-Communist Asian Countries (Singapore: Ministry of Culture Publication, 196), 34. 62 Goh Keng Swee, “Speech Delivered at the Official Luncheon on the Opening Day of the 10th Meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council,” in Wealth of East Asian Nations (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 134. 63 Goh Keng Swee, “Speech Delivered at the Opening of the International Conference on Confucian Studies” in Wealth of East Asian Nations (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 274. 64 “Let’s Have More Classical Music on Radio” Straits Times, March 7, 1973. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19730307- 1.2.114.5?ST=1&AT=search&k=goh%20keng%20swee%20quotes&QT=goh,keng,swee,quotes&oref=article
25 informed enough to vote for the correct choices.65 If Singapore was to achieve the pragmatic brand that would enable prosperity, Asian values would need to be proliferated through the populace. Substantial control over education by the PAP was the solution to the possible obstacles to the brand, whether they be communist, uninformed voters, or the corruptive influence of Western values. To be effective, this education had to be thorough, beginning at the kindergarten level and continuing throughout the school system to the Universities.
But Think of the Children: Singapore’s Education, Eugenics, and Exclusions
The most startling example of Singaporean intrusion into the private lives of citizens is the education, child rearing and the incentive-based nature of marriage, education, and exclusion. Each of these specific tenets of private life relate to the propagation and raising of children in the country and assimilating citizens into a Singaporean vision that did not allow for oppositional voices. The regime interacts consistently with the lives of children and their parents in order to make superior workers that will contribute to the regime’s survival domestically, and the increasing of good reputation on the international stage. Singapore and the PAP, early in their independence, began a rigorous education campaign which would begin to inculcate Singaporean values as early as kindergarten, move citizens into technical vocational training without much free choice, and attempting to keep graduate mothers reproducing and in the workforce all while excluding oppositional voices outside the sphere of the elite. Dominant elites dismissed oppositional voices as flippant because the education system was used to inculcate specific ideas into children and to lessen ethnic distinction in the country. All of these actions contributed to the creation the national image of a unified and intelligent Singapore that had adequate human resource to compete in the globalizing world economy. Structurally, the Singaporean education system went through some changes in the modern period. But the important structural major change occurred in the late 1970s. The Ministry of Education made the early education process more rigid, and prepare students for school with reading, math, English, and “mother tongue” (Chinese).66 Without proper primary
65 Goh Keng Swee, “Speech Delivered at 3rd Graduation Day Ceremony of the Singapore Polytechnic” in The Economics of Modernization (Singapore: Marshal Cavendish Academic, 2004), 168. 66 Speech by Dr. Tony Tan, Minister of Education, November 15, 1990.
26 school achievement in education, a child could be steered away from university education and even secondary school education.67 Without a proper basis in early childhood education, children would be excluded from the system and be left as an outsider to the country. In order to assuage the frustration of early primary school, the Ministry of Education formed the PAP Community Foundation in 1987.68 The Community Foundation’s explicit goal was to train students for primary school education. Training mostly encapsulated the teaching of English and Chinese as well as the acclimation of students to the importance of tests and exams. Community Foundation was given guidelines at the discretion of the PAP and Lee Kuan Yew’s vision of a scholar, which was based on the Chinese model of education and the need of students to learn English and Chinese.69 While this may not seem problematic by any means, the early education as a tool of assimilation to authoritarian political theory becomes apparent in the attack upon the ethnic minorities in the country. The Malaysians, the group most resistant to the assimilation into modern Singapore, and therefore targeted for education policies by the PAP Community Foundation. Pre-primary school education did not enjoy the same state sponsorship in the same way that the Ministry of Education sponsored primary school. It was instead a private system, and households had to pay for them out of pocket, and failure to attend kindergarten correlated to worse performance in the primary school system and in the country overall.70 While the regime provided lower cost schools for lower income families, those cheaper schools operated directly under the discretion of the PAP Community Foundation and attempted social manipulation in order to erase distinctions between ethnicities and mold students to a system of examinations and fear of failure.71 Integral to the process of a national image, the erasing of ethnic distinctions and replacing them with Singaporean assimilation to “Chinese values” and a culture of fearing failure and chasing the ideals of classical Chinese preferred student.
67 Ministry of Education, The Goh Report 1979. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/8f0a445f-bbd1-4e5c- 8ebe-9461ea61f5de 68 “PAP Unit Takes Over Education Centre” Straits Times, August 7, 1987. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes19870807-1 69 Lee Kuan Yew, Wit and Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew, 152. 70 Tharman Shanmugaratam, “Keynote Address by Minister of Education at the PAP Community Foundation 20th Anniversary Celebration Dinner,” May 19,2006. http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view- html?filename=20060519987.htm 71 Michael D. Barr and Zlatko Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-Building Project (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2008), 138.
27 Advancing through levels of Singaporean education made no difference in terms of government interjection. Throughout all of the education system, primary, secondary, to post- secondary the constant pressure toward assimilation into the national brand never abates. Singaporean elites use a classical Confucian label of the scholars and the commoners as their basis for meritocratic judgment.72 Confucian mantras are not entirely held to, as explained later in this chapter, but they are a convenient way for the regime to defend less than reputable actions and policies. The PAP and Goh Keng Swee made the education system of advancement and progress toward university and based upon proficiency and Mother Tongue language.73 Only those who are top of the line students in secondary school are allowed to attend the National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University, or take government funding to go overseas.74 The secondary education system was the main resource of elite formation by the ruling party. Lee Kuan Yew compared social organization to military organization, that the greatest of students had to be enlarged and fit within a general hierarchy by the system.75 While the comparison of education to the formation of building an armed force may seem inflammatory, the possible elite individuals needed to fit into the system of rigid education that the leaders of the PAP had outlined for them. Possible elites required scholarship of virtuous traits and independently minded while paradoxically fiercely loyal to the regime, pragmatic and materialistic; scholars of lower rank needed to be creative, but limited to fill lower level posts.76 Most importantly, the scholars at all levels needed to be fiercely loyal to the regime, and part of a collective entity working for specifically Singaporean progress. Even after the education system, the Singaporean regime did not cease with meddling in the affairs of the citizens. That is, unless the citizen existed outside the preferential sphere of the regime and not part of the elite or middling elements of society that could contribute to the path toward greater Singaporean prosperity. State policies first targeted mothers and women that graduated from university. State legislatures created the graduate mother policy, meant to
72 Barr and Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore,179. 73 Ministry of Education, The Goh Report 1978. http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/record- details/7b01f369-115d-11e3-83d5-0050568939ad 74 “Fast Track” Straits Times, July 12, 1998. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes19980712-1 75 Lee Kuan Yew, New Bearings in Our Education System, Singapore, Ministry of Culture 1966-67, 12. 76 Barr and Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore, 202.
28 encourage educated women to continually procreate in order to “help” the future of Singapore and usher in more economic prosperity. In a policy related to the educational demands of the PAP encouraged women that graduated from college to; one, reproduce, and two, reproduce with preferably more than two children. Due to the concrete statistical nature of Singaporean pragmatism, morally principled arguments could be easily dismissed if they did not serve to increase the greater statistical good in economic prosperity. The PAP had illustrated that the children of graduate mothers performed better at all stages of school, meaning that the encouragement of graduate motherhood not only helped the child, but the common good of the country altogether.77 Without any methodological discomfort, the Ministry of Education and the PAP could decide to incentivize graduate mothers in order to create the ideal Singaporean to improve the qualitative measures of the nation. The graduate mother, if she had a third child, was allowed to choose the school of her choice for that third child.78 Furthermore, the regime encouraged marriage among educated citizens and expected, if not mandated through economic incentive, the poor to limit their offspring to under two, which, as stated above, would not possess the same educational opportunities as a child of the elite.79 In order to save their retirement funding, the poor mothers had to limit their offspring, or the regime would deduct a large sum from retirement benefits.80 All of these government policies geared toward the broader appeal of education and the creation of ideal citizens. Government mandated education policies and incentives are the foundational aspects of the nation branding process, both domestically and internationally. Domestically it formed citizens into loyal citizens that propagated PAP rule. Internationally, it qualitatively raised certain economic factors, making the global clout of the country vastly improved over the life of the education program. Any opposition or resistance to these policies the state-controlled press deemed foolish, because the PAP was merely enacting a harsh nature to respond to these realities because people needed guidance.81 Lee Kuan Yew’s political rhetoric instituted this policy, he said, after stepping down from the Premiership, that “Democracy needs smart people in order to elect it, an
77 Goh Kim Leong, “Education System Open for Study” Straits Times, September 4, 1984 78 Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 71. 79 Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 68. 80 Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 68. 81 “Seek Advice on Guiding your Children” Straits Times, August, 18, 1984. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes19840818-1
29 elected government is only as good as the people are smart.”82 The authoritarian control of the PAP allowed for the gradual molding of these “smart” citizens on the terms of the PAP and its statesman. While education helped improve the brand, it also formed a positive feedback loop to the reinforcement of the authoritarian regime. The PAP helped the elite and middle-class citizens form a cohesive civil society, which felt indebted to the regime due to the education making them loyal citizens and granting them a place in Singaporean society and brand. The only resistance was among the poor, that could not easily propagate their lineage, their native culture was pushed out in lower income education systems, and the limit on children made them subsist at replacement rate levels, and lower if they accepted an incentivized buyout by the regime. Due to this, without any suitable ground for resistance and the continued molding of citizens, the PAP retained power over decades and continued to control all aspects of the national image.
Confucianism Adopted Rhetorically, Rejected Substantially
Confucianism purportedly formed a core facet of the “Chinese values” that the PAP desired to propagate among the citizenry. Confucianism is the ancient Chinese philosophy that brand managers would morph into a civic and individual religion, changing its tenets drastically. Confucius admired the order and stability of the past, retracing Chinese greatness back to the Duke of Zhou in 1000 BC.83 This veneration of the past became the principle of ancestor worship, which the state hoped to inculcate in citizens to increase civic loyalty to the “beneficent” government.84 This system of ancestor veneration and the veneration of those superior classes as the beneficence of the hierarchy folded nicely into the mentality of the PAP, but the other requirements of ancestor veneration the Party tacitly ignored, as they instead emphasized the increased pragmatic use and improvement of the country. Pragmatism overwrote Confucian religious and cultural beliefs and have the people believe in the country and its direction over religion. Similarly, Confucian rhetoric, continually employed by politicians to maintain the hierarchy of the Singaporean system and its distinction from Western decadence and decline, painted certain Singaporean policies as Confucian after the event in order to retain
82 Lee Kuan Yew, Wit and Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew, 46 83 Confucius, Analects, 1:2 84 Patricia Ebrey, Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10-65
30 an ideological and cultural legitimacy over the citizens. The image of Singapore as a nanny state that consistently pries into the private life of citizens as well as the pragmatic philosopher-king harkens to this specific manipulation of Confucianism in the country and compared to other systems. In this way, government policies retained a cultural basis, but never had to follow through to actual action that would problematize the Party’s control of the brand. Rhetoric utilized in this way is similar to the authoritarian concept of “mentality” proposed by Juan Linz in his seminal work on authoritarianism. A “mentality” meant that the populace knew what they needed to do in order to avoid punishment by the regime, but the regime had no ideological basis, the same way regimes do in democratic systems by way of human rights, or totalitarian systems where the party in power silenced dissenters for disputing the grand ideology.85 Rhetorically, the party modified Confucianism to a proper foil, as well as justification for policies that did not coincide with general human rights. While the West was engaged in the midst of civil unrest and social upheaval in the 1960s, Singapore thought that there was a general decline in Western beliefs due to the problems of individualism and Western values.86 If Singapore was to persevere as an independent nation, she could not forget her traditional values, which became Asian values of Chinese Confucianism, stated by Lee Kuan Yew, in a post- political interview with Western news outlets, as “hardworking, thrifty, disciplined with family values.”87 While Confucianism was the rhetorical aim of the Party, the practical effect of such rhetoric was to curtail the effects of democracy in the country. The reality of the Confucian rhetoric was to allow for the reinforcement of authoritarian practices within the country as a whole. Confucian values were to be implanted in children and older citizens, specifically the loyalty and obedience to power.88 Interference in private lives challenged certain core beliefs of Confucianism and its cultural effect upon the populace. As the nation could not adhere to a strong ideology, the PAP would utilize middle men to mold beliefs to the need of the country. Without a rigid ideology, the Party would be able to make the changes to the branding process that were needed for proper development. Confucian ideology, a rhetorically adopted construct in education and loyalty of citizens against the decadent West, but
85 Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” 188. 86 Lee Kuan Yew, Wit and Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew, 137. 87 Lee Kuan Yew, Wit and Wisdom of Lee Kuan Yew, 137. 88 Koh Tai Ann, “Culture and the Arts” in Management of Success: The Molding of Modern Singapore eds. Kernial Sighn Sandhu and Paul Wheatly. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1980), 710-749.
31 departed from as Lee Kuan Yew and the Party saw necessary in order to grant a greater chance of survival, while at the same time reinforcing the rule of the People’s Action Party. One of the most important creeds of Confucianism is the veneration of personal ancestors. Ritualistically, this meant that the descendants were expected to take care of the grave of their ancestors on a special Confucian holiday, Qingming, where descendants would flock to gravesites, illustrating their filial piety and gratitude for their life and gifts to the future generations by cleaning the tombs of their ancestors.89 While this is a noble goal by the people for the veneration of ancestors, this did not translate into a feasible policy for Singapore. The lack of useable land for proper burials and gravesites meant that the PAP needed to change the policy for the good of the country undermining crucial Confucian principles as a consequence. While this reality of the country relates to the necessity that the PAP confronted, the Party was not heavily disturbed by the manipulation of religious and cultural pillars to serve the good of the country. Instead of outright banning the practice of burial for the country, the government decided to have an incentive focused system based upon manipulating costs for each service. The government wants to keep the use of land scarce and available, so the costs for cremation are deliberately kept lower than the cost for burial.90 While the land use of Singapore makes this almost a necessary policy, the supposed freedom of religion in Singapore created tension in the religious community. Issues with burials led to citizens hoping for reburial abroad, which the Singaporean government generally accepted.91 The Party used funeral specialists to change attitudes about the cultural and religious aspects of death. Seen by citizens as reliable sources on Chinese death practices, these specialists changed popular conceptions on burials.92 While they were used by the Party, they were able to maintain a crucial distance from the elite, directly changing and undermining serious resistance to burial practices and indirectly aiding the Party in the fortification of the national trademark.
89 “List of Public Holidays in Macao”, Macao Government Website, http://www.macaotourism.gov.mo/events/calendar.php 90 “Burial, Cremation Rates Up” Straits Times, August 14, 1997. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes19970814-1 91 Singapore Land Clearance Unit, Housing and Development Board, September 20, 1997. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes19970920-1 92 Lily Kong and Brenda S.A. Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Constructions of “Nation” (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 65.
32 More important to the Party was the ability to interfere in private lives then claim that it was virtuous ex post facto. Occasionally, the leaders of the country would cite abstract Confucian meritocracy of their past actions, and how the West cannot understand the different Asiatic values in Singapore.93 But the national clout of Singapore was always much more important. Lee Kuan Yew could state in 1986 that “I am accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yet, if I did not, had I not done that, we would not be here today.”94 Any outside criticism would be deflected by the regime as a misunderstanding of their specific context as Singaporeans, but more importantly the pragmatic conclusion that current ends justify the means is always the final resource of the authoritarian party. So long as the Singaporean brand was one of strength and prosperity, the Party would undertake any questionable policy.
Singapore Today: Branding Successes and Futures
The first generation of statesmen in Singapore defined much of the policies and societal makeup of the Republic of Singapore. In addition to their theoretical basis of the country, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee continued to hold power in the government for decades which consistently reinforced their political and ethical theories through political action. The PAP would never lose power, and even a dip in electoral support the Party explained away as a sign of dissatisfaction rather than the hope for a change in, or principled opposition to the ruling party. However, the death of Goh Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew in 2010 and 2015, respectfully, lead to a slight degree of instability for the Party and the country as a whole. As a Party, the PAP had to maintain political control while continually growing the Singaporean brand to new markets and countries. As a nation, the effects of the branding process needed maintenance to retain an economic and pragmatic supremacy over competing Asian nations. The most major obstacle for the newly constituted PAP is how to continue the country branding process without the direct influence of these first-generation politicians. While maintenance of the national image domestically is crucial, the biggest challenges have come from abroad. A wave in Western
93 Lee Kuan Yew, “Crucial to Hold onto Asian Values” Business Times August 17, 1988. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/biztimes19880817- 1.2.3?ST=1&AT=search&k=lee%20kuan%20yew%20asian%20values&QT=lee,kuan,yew,asian,values&oref=articl e 94 “Why Government Intervenes” Straits Times August 18, 1986. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes19860818-1
33 politics has revitalized populism and a withdraw from globalism have changed the ways in which national brands can compete on a global stage.95 A new PAP, tasked with growing the pragmatic brand, needed to reinforce domestic loyalty while being flexible to new and distinct challenges internationally. Singaporean branding has been extremely successful, and remains a cornerstone of the success of national branding.96 In terms of national rankings, Singaporean pre-tertiary education ranks in the top ten, while it is first in science and math worldwide.97 Singapore’s top national university, National University Singapore is in the Top 50 Universities worldwide, higher than the University of Southern California, Ohio State, and any other University in Asia.98 The same study places their second best university, Nanyang Technological University, 53rd on the same Global University rankings.99 Singapore is within the top 10 of cleanest cities, alongside international and historical cities like Hamburg, Honolulu, and Copenhagen.100 Regardless of the authoritarian leanings, Singapore’s modernization and the branding process is an unbounded success. This is good for the PAP, because the creation of the brand image is arduous and takes decades, if not centuries, to build up, but also difficult to destroy entirely.101 But there are a few challenges to the future of Singapore and its brand. For the first 40 years of its independence, Singapore existed in the “manufacturing era” of utilizing factories and external research to change the dynamics of Singapore domestically.102 After the mid-2000s, Singapore’s goal for the future was a vibrant and new global city, dynamic, sustainable and the global city of all Asia.103 Succeeding in this endeavor meant marketing abroad but also the continued support of the Singaporean populace. A new branding endeavor, named “Future Ready Singapore” was and is the outline for Singapore to address the challenges and opportunities in the global era. The key idea is that Singapore is well-equipped to embrace
95 Koh Buck Song, Brand Singapore: Nation Branding After Lee Kuan Yew, 10. 96 Keith Dinnie, Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice, 77 97 Sean Coughlan, “Singapore Tops Global Education Ratings” BBC News. November 29, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/education-38131731 98 Best Global Universities Ranking, U.S. News and World Report 2018. https://www.usnews.com/education/best- global-universities/rankings 99 Ibid. 100 “Cleanest Cities in the World 2017” citi.io. https://www.citi.io/2018/01/01/top-cleanest-cities-in-the-world-2017/ 101 Keith Dinnie. Nation Branding, 187; Koh Buck Song. Brand Singapore, 27. 102 Koh Buck Song, Brand Singapore, 192. 103 Economic Strategies Committee. “Report on Making Singapore a Global City” February 1, 2010. https://www.mof.gov.sg/Portals/0/MOF%20For/Businesses/ESC%20Recommendations/ESC%20Full%20Report.pd f
34 the future in all aspects, maximize opportunity, nurture creativity, and contend with any obstacles in the future.104 Singapore’s Future Ready program, like much of the past branding efforts, is aimed at investors abroad to drive economic activity to Singapore; but it is also for the citizen on the street that can dream of global achievement while contributing to the nation’s brand indirectly.105 A new face and supposed aim of the Party, but the same pragmatism and hope for economic development as political legitimacy. While the current branding process is new, it will not overturn the pre-global PAP policies of Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee, immortalized in the veneration of Lee’s book The Singapore Story. Education, modified Confucian ethics, and the pragmatic use of space and human resources all allowed the tremendous success and the new policies of the post-Lee and Goh PAP are merely the same ethics but with nicer, more global names and adjectives. It remains to be seen how much the authoritarian nature of the PAP will need to change, or if the country will have to liberalize more socially as time marches on. While historical studies seem to indicate that modern nations governed by one party tend to not last more than 70 years, it remains to be seen if Singapore’s uncontested elections and achievements in pragmatism are enough to forestall any changes. It is doubtful that there will be any external pressure, as the globalized brand of pragmatic economic development sets Singapore apart as a victory of capitalist ethos. Any resistance or change will seemingly have to be internal, and with the PAP in control of education and all avenues to power, the brand process is safe for decades to come.
104 “Branding Singapore” Straits Times, June 28, 2010. http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes20100628-1 105 Koh Buck Song, Brand Singapore, 206.
35 Chapter 2: China’s Proactive Emergence onto the World Stage
China’s rise onto the contemporary world stage was the process of a long branding and rebranding process in order to increase national influence through prosperity and international respect. A long history of hegemonic power decrees that China must become a powerful actor in order to accord with its rich and powerful history.106 Although the age old Confucian theory of the mandate of heaven, where the ruling dynasty was required to adequately govern the empire, ceased to be a legitimizing device for ruling regimes, a similar substitute has taken its place in and after China’s Reform and Opening Era (1979-Present). The Chinese government and populace expect direct action from the government and respect from other countries, respect that originates in the strength of the Chinese nation.107 The marketing of the Chinese nation is bounded by much more history and governmental opposition than Singapore, ranging from obstacles of geography, foreign pressure, an eclectic mix of ideology, and party structure. Through all of these obstacles and realities, the Chinese brand has been one of strength and security, with a growing economy and influence in the world. However, Chinese efforts have been more radical and proactive than Singapore. The Communist Party of China (CPC) undertakes grand projects in order to contend with historical obstacles and instill confidence within the populace. Through these grand actions, the country is able to legitimize its rule as beneficent, not only by economically improving the populace, but by rectifying old grudges. Because of the greater degree of obstacles to the complete control of the Chinese populace, the CPC’s efforts often are geared toward quelling domestic concerns, but there is always future international benefit in each policy that they undertake. Both Singapore and China hope to reach the same point, that of completely control of the internal population, and a strong influence on affairs abroad. Both hoped to enshrine their authoritarian regimes without major challenges that could destabilize the ruling party internally.108 However, merely because these regimes share the goal, does not mean that they
106 Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Knopf, 2017), 24. 107 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, Diplomacy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 19. 108 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 685-687; Mao Zedong “On Coalition Government” in Quotations from Chairman Mao TseTung. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972) 2.
36 share the same means, or even the same obstacles. Singapore had close relationships with the former colonial administrator Britain, whereas China was carved up by numerous Western powers with no strong ties with colonial powers. After the victory of the Communist Party, China had no strong connections with the Western powers, even the USSR looked upon China with neglect and often contempt after Stalin’s death.109 Singapore eradicated a large amount of communist support within its borders early in its independent existence.110 The territorial space is also vastly different, and while there were minorities that the Singaporean government had to contend with, there was nowhere near the same degree of localism that has historically defined and continues to define China.111 These differences create key pathways of the imaging process. Singapore emphasized addressing problems before they started, and creating good citizens through continual interference into private life. CPC leaders often undertake huge public projects to quell internal resistance through Party allegiance, or they export development to bring in more prosperity and find an outlet for internal strife. This chapter discusses those changes to legitimacy and the proactive approach to the Chinese image. In the 21st century, China is the second largest economy and a major force in international relations. The CPC holds absolute political and economic power and that power is being concentrated in the hands of Xi Jinping (2013-Present), the General Secretary of the CPC. Starkly different from Singapore, Chinese influence does not utilize inward penetration into private life in the same way as Singapore to create good representatives for national image. Instead, Chinese power is focused upon outward force and influence in order to gain the goodwill of the Chinese populace, as well as foreign powers. Often, authoritarian regimes fall by pressures of foreign powers, the Chinese image seeks to alleviate that possibility.112 After Deng Xiaoping (r. 1978-1989) stepped away from power, the engine of this image has been economic power, especially investment of infrastructure, as well as building trust within the Party, especially after the Tiananmen Square Protests. Infrastructure investment from China purports to be merely economically interested, but there is a strategic element that cannot be ignored, both domestically and involving those foreign countries. Deng Xiaoping and the two subsequent
109 Linda Benson, China Since 1949. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 26, 37. 110 Lee Kuan Yew, From First World to First, 133. 111 Jeremy A. Murray, China’s Lonely Revolution. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2018), 112 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 4, 13, 142-56.
37 General Secretaries promoted a withdrawal from the world stage and bide their time, which was changed when Xi came to power.113 While the beginning and origins of a specific branding process could be argued based on definitional quarrels, the Chinese process begins in earnest after Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989) steps down from power and dies shortly thereafter. Previous to the rule of Jiang Zemin (1993- 2003) and Hu Jintao (2003-2013) the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was defined by an ideological foothold in communism, or the cult of personality surrounding the leadership of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) or Deng Xiaoping. After the death of Mao, and the revision of communism to “socialism with Chinese characteristics”114 under Deng, the Party, stripped of the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism, needed a new legitimacy. They would attempt to craft a development-centered legitimacy that still borrowed the unquestioned loyalty of prior nationalistic communism.115 This is the beginning of what we call the true branding process, although it would be influenced heavily by historical developments and the obstacles faced by the national leaders, to the post-communist changes, especially in regard to the Party, and its role in ending the “century of shame”. All of these factors combined still do not create an unquestioning loyalty within the country, as legitimacy is consistently questioned and needs continual reinforcement through recent branding processes.
From a Century of Shame to the Third Revolution: China’s Historical Developments in Branding
Chinese history has provided different circumstances and obstacles to the branding process. Most obvious is that the People’s Republic inherited a large amount of space, much more than Singapore. Whereas Singapore has a dearth of natural resources as a result of territorial size, China has expansive natural resources. But China also has larger communities, more difficulty in managing the affairs of citizens and autonomous resources that occasionally motion toward greater autonomy, which could be interpreted as a slow crawl toward independence. Outside of specific concerns of territorial space, which form merely the canvas on
113 Xi Jinping “Let the Sense of Community of Common Destiny Take Deep Root in Neighboring Countries” (speech at a Party Work Conference on Regional Diplomacy). October 25, 2013. 114 Deng Xiaoping, “Building Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character” People’s Daily, October 1, 1984. 115 Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 272.
38 which historical occurrences have played out, specific developments in history have changed the present obstacles for the regime. Major factors of historical development are: presumption of good governance of the strong Chinese state, past events of China suffering at the hands of foreign powers, and rampant localism which began in the late Qing Empire (1644-1911). Throughout the length of Chinese history, it was mainly governed by a strong, centralized empire which shaped citizens expectations. Chinese empires possessed a bureaucracy that began and remained a quite advanced for several centuries before any Western regime could boast a similar structure.116 Chinese bureaucracy was strong throughout the Dynastic Era (221 B.C.-1911 A.D.) and was bolstered by an examination system that trained possible administrators in governance.117 These exams were based upon Confucian text and philosophy, and allowed the ruling family to oversee the vast empire, especially by placing these scholars in different localities, hopefully preventing nepotism within the administrative ranks. While the government was given a lot of power, they also were expected to benefit the people and illustrate that they were worthy of the Mandate of Heaven, a Confucian concept that defended the right to rule.118 Primarily in dynastic history, the Mandate was lost when the ruling dynasty failed to properly manage the Yellow River, which was known to cause environmental devastation with flooding and droughts.119 But more than that, there was an expectation of beneficence for the populace, that the government would improve the lives of the citizens. Communist party structure inherited this strong centralizing tendency, but it was substantially increased by the rhetoric of the Party leaders, especially Mao Zedong. Chairman Mao believed that the Party’s power should be absolute, and that it should benefit the people and the country as a whole. The Party should be “…firmly in control of the gun, and the gun must never command the Party.”120 While the reforms of Deng Xiaoping changed the economic system of the country, Deng never believed in ceding control that the Party had. The goal was to “keep China safe” but with a mere economic change, the power structure already in place was
116 Dieter Kuhn and Timothy Brook. The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) 19-53, 120-137. 117 Timothy Brook. The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasty. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 136-150. 118 Mark Edwards Lewis and Timothy Brook. The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 62. 119 Mark Edward Lewis and Timothy Brook. China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 9-12. 120 Mao Zedong, “Problems of War and Strategy” in Quotations from Chairman Mao TseTung. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 102.
39 perfect for that goal.121 The contemporary Communist Party structure has inherited this near- unlimited power, one of the gifts of the historical developments of China; but their inheritance of power had a tradeoff to it, including the expectation of a strong state. While the Imperial system collapsed after the Revolution in 1911, the belief that the government should be beholden to the well-being of the people has not disappeared from common ideology of the citizens, as one opinion author noted in the op-ed piece after the Belgrade Bombing.122 This mentality is especially evident when considering the so-called “Century of Humiliation” and the harm that was done to the Chinese Empire by Western powers and eventually Japan. Recent history as the victims in the historical imagination has bounded the nation to seek international strength and clout, in order to reverse the past wrongs of Chinese civilization. According to Chinese leaders, China’s Century of Humiliation began during the Qing Dynasty. The Qing was a foreign dynasty of Manchus that hailed from the Northeast region of Manchuria, which today encompasses the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and the northeastern section of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. The Empire of the Qing began with three strong emperors, Kangxi (r. 1661-1722), Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735), and Qianlong (r. 1735-1796), that presided over great innovations and economic developments of the Middle Kingdom.123 About halfway through the Qianlong Emperor’s reign, the Empire was plagued by the civil strife known as the White Lotus Rebellion, a religious movement that hurt the finances of the regime through continued corruption and investment in the skirmishes.124 Soon after the end of Qianlong’s reign, the Qing Dynasty was racked by foreign wars and a catastrophic domestic rebellion. The First Opium War (1839-1842), and was quickly won by the British Navy with superior technology. Hostilities of the Opium War ceased when the Qing Empire was heavily coerced into signing the Treaty of Nanking, which ceded the territory of Hong Kong to the British as a colonial possession.125 After the Treaty, a domestic rebellion occurred that rocked the Empire and destroyed much centralized structure in the Empire. A man who believed he was the
121 Sulmaan Wasif Khan, Hunted By Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 131. 122 Han Zhongkun, “Zhongguo, bushi yibajiujiu” People’s Daily. May 11, 1999. 123 William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing, 136-165. 124 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 155-157. 125 “Treaty of Nanking” in China’s Last Empire by William T. Rowe.
40 brother of Jesus Christ began a rebellion and called himself the Taiping Emperor.126 Dynastic rule of the Qing prevailed, but at astounding loss of life and resources by the rulers. Furthermore, the banner system of the Qing military was shown to be ineffective, and strong local rulers were used as replacements for a regular army.127 While this action preserved the Empire, this drastic change in power dynamics between the imperial center and localities would lead to later local ties that would persist in Chinese society. Beyond the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion the Qing Dynasty was strongly coerced into other unfair treaties, by both the West and Japan, that removed territorial sovereignty, provided legal protections to foreigners, and made certain areas of the Empire spheres of influence for Imperial powers. While the losses suffered by the Qing Empire were awful for national moral, the defeat at the hands of the Japanese were even more demoralizing. Throughout history, Japan was beholden to Chinese influence, including the shaping of the Japanese language itself. Japanese victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) lost the island of Taiwan, a part of the late Qing Dynasty, which was unable to sustain impactful resistance to the Japanese Imperial Forces.128 Later defeats by the Japanese hit at the heartland on Chinese civilization and brought savagery on an immense scale.129 Loss of international clout harmed the Celestial Empire, but the shattering of influence within its own sphere affected the realities of the Chinese condition itself. Over a century after the Opium Wars, and 80 years after Japanese invasion these two historical events often define the consciousness of China’s citizens. The country, as this narrative stressed, must never be victimized again, and Japan should suffer the consequences of its previous actions. The CPC often is afforded leeway due to them “ending the Century of Humiliation” but they still cannot be seen as losing influence in the region or on the international stage. Due to the replacement of a regular army with a local militia beholden to local lords, localities were strengthened by this loss of central control. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the previous territory of the Empire did not easily fold into the new Republic of China. Warlords held power in localities, and they would not be united under the fledging Republic until the late
126 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 186-187. 127 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 250-251. 128 Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 226-227. 129 R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 261-263.
41 1920s.130 Even with the unification in the Republic, the fluctuating nature of Chinese society during the Republican Era did not fully unite the country. After the victory of the Communist Party in 1949, the new regime struggled to meld certain localities into the fold.131 The Party is forced to contend with many local influences that attempt to draw power away from the center in Beijing. If the authoritarian structure of the Party is to survive, in the mind of Party leadership, there can be no leeway given to these local movements, thereby lending opportunity to fracture China at the seams. After the declaration of the People’s Republic by Mao Zedong, certain aspects of the brand come to the fore. Mao sought to make the new Chinese government strong, and most importantly, independent of Western influence. He would concentrate power within his own hands and use anti-corruption campaigns to purge the party of outside influence and draw a stronger connection to “Chinese society.”132 Creating an independent China would lead to outsized influence on international affairs, but, more importantly, it would continue the dominance of the Communist Party over the most populous country in the world. After Mao’s rigid communist construction of the nation’s reputation, his rule gave way to a new conception of strength under the auspices of Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s “capitalist revolution” led to greater liberalization of markets and an overturning of Mao’s communist rigidity in economic and some social aspects.133 Through this, Deng adopted a pragmatism of socialism without the zealotry and rigidity. Economics became a new way to quell the populace of the country and reinforce the authority of the Communist Party. It is important to note that these two phases under Mao and Deng were the early creation of a brand, but with different obstacles and changes due to the stark differences between the two rulers. Xi Jinping had to create what has been deemed by Elizabeth Economy and others as the “third revolution” a new political and social change to the Chinese state. He would inherit and contend with previous branding formations, and previous historical issues with the Chinese state. His answer was to envision the “China Dream” the hope to create a better future for China and her citizens. While
130 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 151-156. 131 Murray, China’s Lonely Revolution, 163-171. 132 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 36-37. 133 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution, 103.
42 this was advertised toward external influence and power, its most important function was to tie disparate parts of China to the center in Beijing and reestablish loyalty and trust in the CCP.
Trust in the Brand: Xi Jinping and Governmental Changes
Xi Jinping’s current reign as the leader of China has been markedly different from his predecessors. Those previous rulers, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao followed the advice of Deng Xiaoping and desired China to make alliances and friendships without exerting power abroad.134 They were technocrats, interested in merely continuing the predecessor’s reforms, in a rather “dull and uninspired manner.”135 Xi Jinping envisioned a different path for national renewal. He wanted, as he noted in 2012 as he ascended to power, to “take the baton of our history, and run it across the finish line…and create a national renewal.”136 Renewal was a mixture of continued economic progress, but more importantly it was a change in governmental structure in order to strengthen the accountability, but also the centralizing power in the President himself as a hidden facet of the “China Dream”. New reforms and campaigns against corruptions allow the CPC to appear beneficent to the people, but also shore up sources of legitimacy to stabilize authoritarian rule. Most drastically, early in the Xi administration he engaged in anti-corruption campaigns within the CPC. Corruption among the Party was consistent throughout the late-Mao era, and especially in the Cultural Revolution, but it had been allowed to fester within the Party since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping in opening market economies. Party malfeasance was apparent most drastically in the catastrophic 2008 Sichuan Earthquake. In the aftermath, many schools were destroyed and it was discovered that those schools were built with poor reinforcements and substandard concrete.137 While there is no obvious facet to plan for a natural disaster, the lackluster protection for schools is suspect to any Chinese citizen. As an activist noted a decade later; “The government still has not been honest about the earthquake…it concerns people’s
134 Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin Wenxuan, 3 Volumes, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006), I: 20-33. 135 Khan, Hunted by Chaos, 172. 136 “Full Text of Xi’s Address to the Nation,” China Daily, November 16, 2012. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012cpc/2012-11/16/content-15934514.htm 137 Choi-Chi Yuk, “The Shame of Sichuan’s Tofu Schools” South China Morning Post. May 6, 2013. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1230807/shame-sichuans-tofu-schools
43 rights and dignities and the governments responsibilities, lies, and corruption.”138 Accused of dereliction of duty, the government often has a legitimacy problem among the populace, where corruption is merely expected by the citizens. Expectations such as these do not increase loyalty to a regime, and cleave a way for oppositional voices and competing claims. President Xi continued anti-corruption campaigns from earlier leaders, but he wanted redouble efforts to address the problem, instead of paying it mere lip service. He traced the survival of the regime to addressing corruption within the Party.139 He stated 12 years before his presidency, while an official as the Fujian Province, discussed the issue directly:
“If you go into politics to make a career, you must give up any thought of personal advantages. That is out of the question. An official may not through a long career have achieved very great things, but at least he has not put something up his sleeve. He is upright. In a political career you can never go for personal advantages or promotion. It is just like that. It can’t be done. These are the rules…you should not go into politics if you wish to become wealthy. In that case you will inevitably become a corrupt and filthy official. A corrupt official with a bad reputation that is always afraid of being arrested, and who must envisage having a bad posthumous reputation.”140
Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns, in addition to strengthening the connection to the Chinese people, simultaneously needed to reinforce the stability of the one-party state. The Party needs to fulfill that history of beneficent governance, while not challenging the hegemony of the massive Party structure, and not allowing even nominally democratic institutions to be established that would check regime power. While engaging in this campaign to purge the Party of nefarious practices, Xi began another campaign against broader values within Chinese society. This all came with the unification narrative, not only would the Party bring itself closer to the people, but also to change the people in order to preserve legitimacy. Reminiscent of Singaporean practices, Xi targeted
138 Ai Weiwei “10 Years on China still won’t tell truth about Sichuan quake: activist Ai Weiwei” interview by Hua Min Neo, ABS-CBN News, May 12, 2018. https://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/05/12/18/10-years-on-china-still- wont-tell-truth-about-sichuan-quake-activist-ai-weiwei 139 “Xi Warns of Regime’s Demise Unless China Tackles Graft.” Bloomberg News, November 19, 2012. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-11-19/xi-jinping-warns-of-regime-s-demise-unless-china-tackles- graft 140 Xiaohuai Yang, “Xi Jinping: My Road into Politics,” Zhonghua Ernu (Summer 2000), trans. Carsten Boyer Thagersen and Susanne Posborg, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.
44 university education, to more strongly inculcate “socialist” values. He wanted stronger ideological controls over the universities, because if the anti-corruption campaigns did not improve their standing, the control of the university certainly would.141 Primarily, Xi sought to prevent foreign ideas from taking hold in the country. He believed that, “The disintegration of the regime starts in the ideological arena…it is a long-term process…if it becomes breached other defenses are difficult to hold.”142 While not fully probing into private life like Singapore’s regime, the CPC and its elites wanted stability within the national brand. Ideological control of the universities is crucial to believe in the nation, but more crucial is the denial of foreign influences and the primacy of a new Chinese patriotism abroad. Legitimacy problems has plagued the CPC since the ending of the ideologically communist regime under Mao. Without the strength of Marxist thought and organization, different sources of justifications need to control the populace. Branding the Party as stable and in control is only applicable if the party is truly in control. The anti-corruption campaigns address concerns that the citizens may have, increasing trust in the self-policing of the government. Furthermore, restricting the universities would hedge against ideological opposition within the country. Placing universities within the new Chinese system of ideology does admit an inability to justify an ethos in the presence of others, but it increases trust amongst the elites that will operate within the government structure and hold the power in the governing bureaucracy; a hallowed echo of the Confucian exam system bolstering the imperial structure.
From Passive to Active: China’s Foreign Pressure and New Patriotism
Along with assuring the Party’s dedication to the improvement of the common good through reducing corruption, the regime also sought to adopt the long history of Chinese power and greatness into a new ethos. Adopting Chinese history would increase citizen identification with the regime, which would blend the CPC with the Imperial autocracy of the past through ages-old custom.143 Originally, the Communist Parties of Europe and Asia were supposed to
141 “Chinese President Signals Tightening of Control over Universities,” Guardian, December 30, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/30/chinese-president-signals-tightening-of-control-over-universities 142 Xi Jinping “August 19 Speech at the National Ideology and Propaganda Work Conference” China’s Digital Times. August 19, 2013. https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2013/11/网传习近平 8•19 讲话全文：言论方面要敢 抓敢管敢/ 143 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 37.
45 radically break from the past traditions of governance and society. But as the Communist Era in China dragged on, reinstituting connections to the past became necessary as the Party strayed from dogmatic Marxist-Leninism. Reinvigorating these connections to past glory encapsulated two facets. One was the vindicating of old grudges and aspirations of the past; while the other is the embracing the specific Chinese traditional characteristics, especially Confucianism. Adopting past grudges and goals is immensely aids in the appearance of beneficence to the common citizen. A connection to past struggles establishes some limits to the complete arbitrariness that so often plagues authoritarian governance. Stable authoritarianism is defined by arbitrariness that does not exceed a certain level so as to become completely tyrannical, subjects know the limits and how to act.144 Past grudges and historical moments provide that. Chinese governmental policy can be somewhat arbitrary, often with imprisoning some people, while cracking down on sects that seem revolutionary.145 But, if the Party has adopted the attitude of seeking justice for past sins of the Japanese, or the “Imperialists” then the populace realizes that not only are certain actions for the “good of the people” as well as some measure of revenge, which psychologically increases loyalty to the avenging angels. Most importantly, the newest change after the Deng Xiaoping Era has been the transition from passive to active diplomacy as the framework of this new ethic in China. During the years of Deng Xiaoping, China sought a passive role in order to accomplish certain goals and methods. Deng stated early in his administration that China should “Hide and Bide” conceal outward power and wait for the opportune moment to emerge on the world stage.146 Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao adhered to this policy, becoming more technocratic in their rule, with more subtle branding efforts in the country. President Xi envisioned his reign as the time when China would emerge from hiding. Ultimately, China’s complete emergence onto the world stage would come under Xi Jinping’s programs, but diplomacy had become continually more proactive after the Deng Xiaoping left power. It is possible that the CPC wanted to continue to bide its time in the same vein as Deng Xiaoping more than they were able to. But historical events forced a different path. After the
144 Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, 188. 145 Vicky Xiuzhong Xu and Bang Xiao, “Falun Gong: Two decades after a deadly ban in China, adherents still face pressure in Australia” ABC News, April 20, 2018. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-21/what-is-the-falun-gong- movement-and-does-china-harvest-organs/9679690 146 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Hide Your Strength, Bide Your Time,” Aljazeera, November 21, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/china-hide-your-strength-bide-y-201411198028498329.html
46 Tiananmen Square Protests and crackdown by the CPC, the country was struck by foreign sanctions. This forced a more proactive brand to be projected by the leadership. In order to gain the world’s favor once again, the Party needed to familiarize itself, and its authoritarianism with the world powers. Passivity was no longer an option, and although the new leaders had much less charisma than the previous two, their direction in foreign policy set the stage for a proactive change in the country.147 Connections to Confucianism were revivified by the CPC. Confucius Institutes were spread around the world as satellite branding centers to normalize the presence of the CPC and its influence. Familiarization such as this de-incentivizes prolonged international pressure, as the fear of the unknown subsides. Additionally, the populace sees the spread of Chinese strength abroad, through these institutional establishments. Reviving Confucianism was not only used for international branding process. Internally it was revived after being exiled during the Cultural Revolution. In 1995 Jiang Zemin held an international conference to celebrate the anniversary of Confucius’ birth, a celebration that has continued to the present day.148 Furthermore, National Day celebrations no longer referred to Marx and Engels, instead Confucius and Sun Yat-Sen as the fathers of the Chinese polity.149 Confucianism as a philosophy certainly aids in reinforcing authoritarianism, one of its central tenets is the importance of hierarchy and deference to the leaders of a society. But more importantly, it allows the Party to claim the mantle of a rich Chinese history that they seek to defend and carry into the future. Selling to their own citizens that the CPC are the protectors of this crucial legacy they, at the same time, adopt a seemingly benign ancient philosophy as their symbol abroad. Disconnected from modern abuses, Confucianist elements in branding harkens back to the halcyon days of Ancient China and its mysticism to Western audiences. Confucianism was one of the central tenets that would lead to a greater project of a broader Chinese patriotism exemplified by the CPC. All past successes, especially in the 20th Century were supposedly carried on by the authoritarians. The May Fourth Movement, which was an uprising of students against the lack of democracy in China, was co-opted by the Party. Jiang Zemin stated that “The patriotic movement that the May 4th Movement demonstrated
147 Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies, and Significance, (Self-Published, 2010), 6. 148 Kelvin K.C. Cheung “Appropriating Confucianism: Soft Power, Primordial Sentiment, and Authoritarianism.” China’s Rise to Power. Eds. Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, Siu-Keung Cheung. (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012), 30-32. 149 Suisheng Zhao, Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 229.
47 patriotism…in serving as a vanguard and a bridge.”150 Broader patriotism such as this, creates a different brand which places the Party in the firm foundations of patriotic devotion. Not only does this quell calls for liberalism within the country as the Party appear to be the great liberator, but unites the populace against ethnic concerns outside of the heartland of China, the eastern coastal region. Patriotism, while it may seem to drift into zealotry, often promises stability when it is controlled by the ruling powers, and stability is the main draw of a specific authoritarian brand.151 But, in manipulating these factors, the CPC has to settle past debts of Chinese history, specifically the ramifications of the “Century of Humiliation.” After the “Century of Humiliation” Mao Zedong, in the newly declared People’s Republic, claimed that the Chinese people had stood up! While they may have stood up, the CPC still needed to rectify past misdeeds. If the regime did not accomplish that, they could neither claim that they had facilitated continued liberation, or that they firmly held the weighty mantle of the patriotism. During the Maoist Era this was of little consequence. China had little to no allies, as the Soviet Union, which pledged support, was changing under Khrushchev and the other leaders that followed in the wake of Stalin. Saber rattling by the Chairman had no bearing, because while the threats to Taiwan were of some concern, the new Communist nation had little outward force and unity. However, after the Reform and Opening period, the Party, which was making new relationships in a globalized economy, now had to contend with the ghosts of history. Most important of this malfeasance was the extreme loss of life and honor at the hands of the Western powers, seen as the imperialist takeover during the Qing Empire and the Republic Era. Increasing the level of patriotism has caused more nationalist fervor to resonate with the populace. As the fervor increased, so did the demands of the people. There existed an increasing conception that China needed to stand up against the prying tactics of the West and its allies. Opinion authors penned a polemic against the United States, which stated that the U.S. “was willing to manipulate the rules of the game in order to victimize China.”152 Officials within the government created the nationalistic fervor, then had to hold by its demands. The CPC was stuck between two bad options. Needing the world’s positive image, but also requiring the obedience
150 “Patriotic Education Vivid Among College Students in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, September 30, 1994. 151 Juan Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes’” 197. 152 Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Ben, Gu Qingsheng, Tang Zhengyu. “China Can Say No.” The China Journal Vol. 37, (January 1997).
48 of the people, the brand was divided. There existed a minute fear that the Reform and Opening would lead to inequality that would provide the excuse for Western powers to intervene.153 Several manifestos were penned discussing the fear that the Western powers would have of China as their own imperialist power is repulsed by other countries.154 Western powers, especially the United States, were constructed as a foil to Chinese patriotism, an alter ego that the government could exploit to draw further unity within its borders.155 Imagining the “western devils” as the foil to the great Chinese landscape, can create a zealotry among the populace that forces the hand of the authoritarian party, but so far, it has only served to legitimate Chinese rule and the national image of unity and stability against the oppressors. While actions against the West have been minimal, that does not mean that the branding process has been a complete success with no further developments required. Proactive diplomacy with foreign powers led to questions about the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and other institutions seen as seeking to stifle Chinese growth and power.156 These proactive policies aided in creating unity and legitimizing the Party as a seeker of justice on behalf of the Chinese people, so wronged in the past. Regardless of these benefits, the country still had a strong basis of localism that the Party had difficulty in controlling. Furthermore, political zealotry creates difficulties for the regime in its interaction with foreign powers. With so many political rivals, globalized industry becomes much more difficult to rationalize to a rabid populace. In order to contend with the unintended consequences from proactive measures, the Party under Xi Jinping launched the proactive project par excellence, that would address all the lingering issues in the nation. A project this grand was to be the same in scope as the Silk Roads of the past, tying countries together and economically strengthening China’s image, both domestically and worldwide.
One Belt, One Road: China’s Catch All Solution
Changes to the Party structure and foreign relations aid in reinforcing China’s legitimacy, but much of China’s problems derives from continuous localism that sometimes evolves into full
153 Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era. (New York: Routledge Press, 2006), 97. 154 Ten Thousand Word Letter, 2006, 103-104. 155 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 35. 156 Fan Yang, Faked in China, 56.
49 scale separatism at the nation’s fringes. However, economics is often the great refuge of authoritarian politics; so long as an economic well-being continually increases, the citizens have less to justify a revolution. China’s massive infrastructure project, either called the Belt and Road Initiative/One Belt, One Road, or the New Silk Roads, is their most radical branding and infrastructure project since the establishment of the People’s Republic. Accompanied by Chinese created financial institutions, Overland routes would tie dissatisfied province of Xinjiang, populated mostly ethnic minorities called the Uyghurs, to the central authority in Beijing. While the government would imply that this is to benefits all the provinces, the crucial policy is to prevent internal strife that would destabilize Communist authority. Another trade route over the sea connects to Pakistan through the Malacca Straits. Similarly, creating a trade hub on the edge of the frontier would move more of the Han ethnic majority, who are friendlier to the ruling regime, out to the fringes of the nation in Uyghur historical territory. Routes over the sea would forge relationships with Southeast Asia, and allow for infrastructure projects in the Indian ocean. More than tying ethnic minorities into the national image process, the overland route would stretch into a sphere of influence that was historically Russia’s, infrastructure projects would expand Chinese influence to Sri Lanka, adjacent to China’s developing political and economic rival in India. All of these routes also intended to push Japan out of those economic spheres in the process, tying more foreign governments to China instead of their historical enemy. Certain proactive programs have been useful short-term measures for entrenching authoritarianism. But, Xi Jinping’s radical change and major policy is eschewing short-term goals for long-term dominance.157 The Initiative accomplishes multiple goals at once, it exerts foreign power to rectify past injustices and reinvigorate the nation on the international stage, while quelling domestic resistance at the same time. Localism has been a consistent issue in Chinese history. The old divisions of earlier eras are a consistent threat to unity and legitimacy within the People’s Republic. A particular thorn in the side of the Party is the autonomous region of Xinjiang in the northwest of China. Xinjiang is primarily populated by an ethnic and religious minority, the Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim. Ethnic consciousness, which has become more intense through patriotic efforts, has
157 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution, 15.
50 made unity with ethnic groups outside the Han majority more difficult.158 Originally, China could make common cause with Western governments by connecting Uyghur separatism with domestic terrorism during the early years of the Bush Administration, after the September 11 attacks. The state would attempt to engage the minority in re-education camps to prevent apparent violence against the state.159 Re-education programs have been met by outside pressure and resistance, and is merely a stop-gap measure against calls for greater autonomy. One Belt, One Road is supposed to be the long-term solution to the problem. Much easier, and more productive to the country’s image, is to make the ethnic separatists a minority in their own autonomous region. That is exactly what has happened to the Uyghurs, as the emphasis on development in Xinjiang decreased the Uyghurs from 90 percent of the population in 1949, to 40 percent in 2017.160 Development in Xinjiang quells ethnic separatism also by increasing wealth in the area. Xinjiang is the crown of the Chinese portion of the Silk Roads project, and provides a springboard into Central Asia. A road of development transitions from Xinjiang to numerous Central Asian countries. Historically, Central Asian countries have been under the cultural and often political sway of Russia. But, Belt and Road seeks to connect these countries to China instead. Xi Jinping referenced the thousands of years of trade at a 2013 speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, also adding “A nearby neighbor is better than a distant relative.”161 Many Central Asian countries are not willing or able to resist, many of them are economically poor, badly in need of Chinese development in order to bolster their economy.162 Furthermore, there is a possibility that economic developments by the CPC and private citizens will re-entrench authoritarian rules in those countries.163 Many of the CPC’s issues are due to democratic resistances and their neglect of human rights, which prompt democratic countries to pressure for
158 James Townsend, “Chinese Nationalism.” In Chinese Nationalism. Ed. Jonathan Unger. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 20-21. 159 Gerry Shih, “China Defends its ‘People-Oriented’ Muslim Re-education Program as Job Training.” Washington Post. October 16, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-defends-its-people-oriented- muslim-reeducation-program-as-job-training/2018/10/16/521964a8-d12b-11e8-a275- 81c671a50422_story.html?utm_term=.321ccc687164 160 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road. (London: Zed Books, 2017), 60; 161 “Xi Proposes a ‘New Silk Road’ in Central Asia.” China Daily. September 8, 2013. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisitcenterasia/2013-09/08/content_16952228.htm 162 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream, 85. 163 “Travels Along the New Silk Roads”, Gavekal Dragonomics. October 24, 2014.
51 liberal reforms.164 A plethora of authoritarian countries along the Belt and Road Initiative help tie the countries together without political pressures upon either political system. A similar project has expanded Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, the most monetary investment moving into Laos. China, both the government and private business have become the largest investor in the country, and propped up the Revolutionary Party’s government in the country.165 Similarly to its plans in Central Asia, the regime has found an outlet for Chinese development while influencing other countries. But, the Party does not stop at gaining alliances and goodwill, the project has been able to undermine legitimacy in long standing institutions in the region. This has changed the hierarchy of power, offered alternatives, and crowded out the competition in lucrative markets. The main rivals of Chinese power in its immediate sphere of influence is Japan, India, and Russia. Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative competes with all of their possible projects in each region that it delves into. Russia has their own economic union, called the Eurasian Economic Union, which attempts to tie Russia to several of the former Soviet countries. Japan has long been an investor in Southeast Asia, from Taiwan to the Straits of Malacca. India is a possible emerging superpower, that would look to develop more heavily in the Indian Ocean. China’s major project hits all these regions, and forces a decision upon their rivals. Either join the Initiative as a lesser partner, or risk losing all opportunity. It is no small coincidence that the project is a major detriment to Japan, as they occupied a key position in China’s “Century of Humiliation”. They are a target of the patriotic mindset, and the Party cannot openly benefit them without risking the wrath of the citizens. Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union is an older idea, but its full establishment comes after Xi Jinping’s declaration of a New Silk Road by two years. Historically, Russia has been closely connected politically and culturally with the Central Asia region, and hoped to create a Union there to rival the European Union to its West.166 Continuing expansion of China within that region has stoked a bit of a rivalry and competition among the major powers. Russia itself has
164 Robert G. Sutter, U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 243. 165 “China Plans 31b Investment for Border Zone with Laos”, China Daily. October 20, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-10/20/content_22229715.htm 166 Carol J. Williams, “Russia Expands Eurasian Union in Competition with European Bloc”, Los Angeles Times, December 23, 2014. https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-eurasian-union-versus-europe-20141223- story.html
52 attempted to co-opt the Silk Road Initiative by incentivizing Chinese exporters to run the new development through Russia to the European Union.167 Furthermore, other incentives are being used in order to expand Chinese development in the Far East of Russia, to tie the distant provinces to the Russian center.168 In the face of Chinese expansion, Russia has attempted to make the development beneficial to itself, and tie the two powers together in some sense. It remains to be seen if China will neglect to expand military ties within the Russian sphere of influence, in addition to economic ties that already challenge Russian designs. Japanese reputation in China has been awful since the Second World War. Part of the new patriotism mentioned earlier was the attempt to destabilize Japan, and to gain power at the expense of the Japanese government and society. The Silk Road Initiative attempts to not only develop infrastructure, but also replace prevalent Japanese financial institutions with newly created Chinese ones, specifically Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In order for the bank to serve its purpose and to enhance Chinese image abroad, it needs to be well-run, and support countries through loans and pre-existing economic relief packages.169 Through this, the AIIB uses its economic relief efforts in order to tie other countries closer to the Chinese homeland, which means that those same countries would be further distanced from Japanese infrastructure projects.170 The investment arm of the Chinese Silk Road idea would lead to greater influence among emerging market countries, and possibly creating a coalition that could rival ASEAN and other regional economic units.171 It is impossible to view the Initiative without reference to the possible military expansion of China throughout Central Asia and especially the South China Sea across to the Indian Ocean. Among the most concerned is India, which envisions being strangled by China’s numerous construction projects in the Indian Ocean. On the Chinese side, development in the Indian Ocean helps obviate the difficulty of the strategic Malacca Straits, which could be cut off rather easily. The Silk Road Initiative will theoretically link within Pakistan, an old rival of India, where the
167 “China to Build 400Km/h Train for Russia’s High-Speed Railway,” RT, June 6, 2016. https://www.rt.com/business/345535-china-train-russia-kazan/ 168 “China Considers Construction of High-Speed Rail to Russia’s Far East,” RT, August 22, 2018. https://www.rt.com/business/436545-china-russia-railroad-construction/ 169 “AIIB’s First Annual Meeting of its Board of Governors held in Beijing: Governors note progress during bank’s first 6 months of operation”. https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2019/20190116_001.html 170 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream, 44. 171 Geoff Wade, “Changing Asia: China’s High-Speed Railway Diplomacy”, The Strategist. December 2, 2013. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/changing-asia-chinas-high-speed-railway-diplomacy/
53 overland route can merge with the sea. Helpful to this vision is that Pakistan offered a deep- water port to the Chinese, making this merge point a reality.172 Such developments with an old rival constrains Indian defense and leverage in the rivalry. India cannot push Pakistan diplomatically without offending the Chinese designs upon the subcontinent. Similarly, further infrastructure buildup removes opportunity of the Indian government to engage with the infrastructure projects and create a sphere of influence for themselves. At the moment, China is merely developing infrastructure and economic ties, but this project cannot be separated from potential military application. Mixed with the patriotic encouragement within the country, the brand could become more forceful and aggressive on the world stage in order to alleviate the internal strife of the country. Current Chinese branding is relatively newer, and often lagged behind the substantial economic progress that has occurred since the Reform and Opening period, due to the legacies of one-man charismatic rule under Mao, which was mired in communist legitimacy. Charismatic rule and communism used to provide a stable ideological legitimacy, and since the shift away from pure communist or Maoist thought, legitimacy had to be adjusted accordingly. But with the old institutions of communism present in the current system, such as one allowed political party, and the informal institution of branding was used to fill the gap. Major proactive programs were made in order to inculcate loyalty to the regime. In addition, these programs would tie other countries to the People’s Republic in a loose, economic confederation which would allow for greater international support. Branding in this way is more aggressive, because the regime does not attempt to cull problems before they start, in the way that Singapore does; instead large projects are used to illustrate a regime worthy of trust and able to provide vindication and rewards to the populace. The branding practices of China and Singapore change the dynamic of authoritarian regimes, and point toward a future of authoritarianism and how it will be sustained. Rather than a bright and happy future of liberalization and democracy, authoritarianism can use alternative legitimacy to secure unfree government against both internal and external political and economic pressure.
172 CSIS Briefs, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific” Center For Strategic and International Studies. April 2, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new- naval-base-chinas-string-pearls-indo-pacific
54 Conclusion
China and Singapore both contain lessons for historical scholarship. Both illustrate the success of branding processes and how they are able to sustain authoritarian legitimacy. Each of them offers different lessons and paths to continued legitimation. Singapore undoubtedly had a much easier time due to its lower profile and crucial backing of the United Kingdom as its former vassal state. China has always been an international player, partly because of its clout and population, but also its influential history. That being the case, the Communist Party in China has been under more scrutiny, and its actions needed to accomplish multiple goals simultaneously. Singapore became pragmatic in order to justify continued penetration into public life, and addressing problems before they morphed into unruly issues. Reducing ethic differences was accomplished through early childhood education at the behest of the ruling party. Class conflict was minimized by inculcating loyalty with the ruling party through government benefits to the needy. The regime adopted and rejected ruling philosophies that coordinated with regime projects and goals. Singapore caught them early in order to create ideal citizens, and external pressure is slight to non-existent. His combination has created untold success for Singapore, both economically and educationally, the nation branding process was and is excellent in continual reinforcement of authoritarian legacies in Singapore. Future prospects and actions are difficult to predict in any historical study, but there are some clues to the Singaporean brand moving forward. The Party has released the plan for the image into the future. This plan ranges to population control to the future of building on the island.173 Regardless of any future plans and development issues, something drastic would have to occur if there is to be any democratic revolt or change from the populace. Most believe in the Singaporean government can be trusted to deliver the best future to the country.174 Whatever is attempted, it will not be too drastic, nor will it be radical enough to turn international eyes upon the nation. The PAP has already created the ideal citizen and country, smart, economically prosperous, and most important, loyal.
173 Rina Chandran, “Digging Deep: Singapore Plans and Underground Future” Reuters. December 23, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-singapore-landrights-planning/digging-deep-singapore-plans-an-underground- future-idUSKCN1ON01J 174 “Singapore’s Trust Up in Government and Media: Survey” Straits Times. March 18, 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singaporeans-trust-up-in-govt-media-survey
55 Chinese branding has not had the same measure of success as Singaporean practices, due to their continued necessity to engage in big projects to tie disparate localities to the center. Partly due to continual change in leadership, Chinese ideology has lurched from Marxist belief in historical materialism, to a patchwork of different concepts to create a Chinese patriotism that can reinforce the CPC as much more Chinese than socialist. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics has become more Chinese and less socialist. Incremental changes to the brand throughout successive leadership lead to reactions to necessities by the CPC. Unlike the Singaporean regime, the CPC responded to needs instead of addressing them before they became major issues. This means that the projects they undertook were more radical and proactive, and attempted to be a magic bullet for multiple obstacles. Anti-corruption campaigns sought to increase trust and accountability in the government, while increasing reputation abroad as a reliable trading partner and investor. The New Silk Roads are enacted with a view to tying religious and ethnic minorities to the governmental center in Beijing. Furthermore, it provides a strategic resource for future Chinese developments and alliances abroad. The future of the China brand can proceed in a variety of ways. It all hinges upon the success of the Belt and Road Initiative and how much Xi Jinping exerts now that he eliminated term limits for the leader of China. If the Belt and Road runs low on steam and investment it could become an unfinished mess of projects. Certain countries along the Initiative could pull out or larger powers could fill the gap in emerging markets to compete with China. Furthermore, the Project could fail to quell the resistance within Xinjiang, leading to more forceful attempts and international pressure due to human rights abuses. Because of the proactive branding effort, certain policies are merely reacting to the symptoms rather than addressing the caused. This can lead to absolute successes or continued obstacles and difficulties. One of the more crucial facets of the success of the China branding project is the continued interaction with Western audiences, especially the United States. Singapore is shielded from international criticism, being a former colony of the British, as well as being content to not “rock the boat” internationally. China has had a long history of chasing supremacy, both culturally and economically. This puts it on a path of conflict with the world hegemon the United States of America. The United States, being democratic, does not have the same legitimacy issue as the PRC, and can often act with a freedom that the Communist Party cannot. Due to this reality, China and Xi Jinping often have to meet economic aggression with a ferocity that equals
56 or surpasses the U.S. Xi Jinping recently called for a “New Long March” to combat U.S. attempts to coerce more accountability out of the PRC.175 Xi’s response came amid the tensions over the U.S. banning Huawei from the country. Appealing to patriotic pride, and also the CPC’s historic past, Xi seeks to mold the citizens to fall in line against the U.S. but also to accept some hardship, citing the tumultuous Long March of the early Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War. Because of the creation of the rigid and patriotic branding, Xi is often unable to be flexible on any matter of policy with the outside world, or else he risks losing internal support and fervor. The future of the China brand, and the China Dream could be brought into question, as further combativeness with the West and the United States can lead to more international meddling in China, which may destabilize a country already so fearful of internal revolt. These projects also have policy implications outside of the specific countries in which they take place. Branding efforts such as Singapore’s and China’s also illustrate the importance of informal institutions to the continuation of authoritarian regimes. Improving reputations of the nation abroad can assist in international good will, preventing external forces from pressuring the regime. More importantly and centrally, it can quell internal resistance from the citizens. Instead of collapsing in the wave of democratic awakening, authoritarian regimes can adapt and sell themselves through branding their country and the regime. Authoritarian branding can mean even greater authoritarian policies within authoritarian countries, and even outside of them. If a national image can dismiss authoritarian measure as necessary or proactive, that can only mean future backslides into authoritarian regimes. The opportunity is there to create a more robust authoritarian system within already existent authoritarian regimes, as well as unstable democratic regimes becoming more authoritarian by appealing to a common culture of the specific nation and its historical reality.
175 “China’s Xi Calls for ‘New Long March’ as U.S. Tensions Rise,” Bloomberg News. May 22, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-22/china-s-xi-calls-for-new-long-march-as-u-s-tensions-worsen
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