Raphael J. Spoetta

FOKUS | 7/2019

A new nuclear crisis? Consequences arising from the US-Iranian­ collision course over the Nuclear Agreement

Driving towards the cliff events. Whether the sabo- On 14 August 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, the taged the tankers themselves in order to spokesperson for the Mujahedeen-e Khalq On 5 May 2019, National Security Adviser have a pretence to attack Iran, as Tehran (MEK), an Islamist-Communist opposi- John Bolton announced the deployment implied,4 or Iran sabotaged the tankers in tion group, revealed the extent of Iran’s of an US aircraft-carrier strike group, led order to hinder oil transporting through clandestine nuclear programme, including by flag ship USS Abraham Lincoln to the the Strait of Hormuz has remained unclear the enrichment facility at and the Persian Gulf.1 This carrier group would be at the moment. However, these events heavy-water reactor at Arak. Iran had not accompanied by B-52 bombers and Mr. clearly demonstrate the role hybrid disclosed the existence of their nuclear Bolton stated that any attack on the Uni- tactics play in this situation. The questi- facilities to the IAEA, though it was obliged ted States or its allies would be met with on is whether these measures will ease to do so under the 1974 comprehensive “unrelenting force.” The Iranian response, the international pressure or will further Safeguards Agreement. as expected, was defiant. Tehran has re- escalate the tensions under these volatile peatedly threatened to close the Straits of circumstances. At the September 2002 Board of Governors Hormuz, a region which contains appro- meeting, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the ximately 20 percent of the world’s annual Historical review head of the Atomic Energy Organisation consumption of oil. Furthermore, Iranian of Iran (AEOI) confirmed to then-IAEA President announced he The origins of the conflict between the Director General Mohammad ElBaradei would only negotiate with the United Sta- United States and Iran began in 1953, the the scope of Iran’s nuclear programme. tes should Washington re-instate the Joint year of the US-backed coup against former Furthermore, he stated that Iran aimed at Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossa- further developing its nuclear fuel cycle. commonly known as the Iranian Nuclear degh. The coup against Mr. Mossadegh This led to an international outcry and Agreement. and the subsequent Iranian rule under the IAEA attempted to gain access to the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi led to the Iranian nuclear sites. Precisely one year after US President perception of the late Shah as a mere pup- Donald J. Trump announced the USA’s pet of the West. The Shah ruled as a deeply After an IAEA inspection in February 2003, withdrawal from the JCPOA2, it was fore- unpopular monarch, and as a result he was the IAEA concluded in June 2003 that Iran seeable that tensions between Iran and overthrown in the 1979, had failed to comply with its comprehen- the United States would escalate. Any US and fled to the United States. The subse- sive Safeguards Agreement. After intense Navy military presence in the Persian Gulf quent Iran hostage crisis5 lasted for 444 negotiations in the IAEA framework, the bears the potential for further conflict, as days, which brought about the profound Board of Governors passed a resolution any incident with the Iranian navy could mistrust between the USA and Iran. that included a passage about a potential potentially lead to military confronta­ referral of the Iranian nuclear file to the tion between those two states. Such an At this point in time, the Iranian nuclear UN Security Council in September 2003. incident would not be the first between programme had just entered its third Should Iran be found noncompliant, the the US Navy and the navy of the Iranian decade. Originally launched under the file would be submitted to New York. Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). In Shah in 1957 with US support, the nuclear 2016, two US Navy riverine command programme gained momentum during In October 2003, the Iranians reached an boats entered Iranian waters due to a navi- the 1960s. The post-revolutionary Islamic agreement with the foreign ministers of gational error and, as a consequence, were Republic originally decided to abandon , Britain, and (E3 or EU3). captured by the IRGC. As a matter of fact, the nuclear programme. However, the The Tehran Agreement obliged Iran to the IRGC “[…] had a history of provoking Islamic Republic restarted the programme suspend enrichment for the duration of the U.S. side with reckless maneuvers that soon after in 1984. The fundamental secu­ negotiations. Furthermore, the Islamic Re- on many occasions could easily have led to rity-related question in this respect was public agreed to allow the IAEA to inspect a military confrontation.”3 whether the Iranian nuclear programme its nuclear sites. Moreover, Iran signed an was, as Iran repeatedly claimed, exclusively additional protocol with the IAEA on 18 The sabotage acts against oil tankers peaceful in nature. December 2003, thereby allowing IAEA near the strategically important Strait of inspectors to conduct “snap inspections” of Hormuz have to be seen in light of these Iranian nuclear sites.

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However, the E3 were unable to build on ment facility and declared that it would President Ahmadinejad was re-elected. the success of the Tehran Agreement due resume enrichment. Germany, France and In an election that was generally seen as to the inability of circumventing the US Britain, together with the United States, being rigged7,8, Mr. Ahmadinejad defeated sanctions on Iran and due to the fact that subsequently formulated a common his opponent Mir-Hussein Mousavi 66 to both the USA and Iran refused to nego­ position with and called the 33 percent. “In the following weeks mil- tiate directly with one another. In February P5+1, composed of the five permanent UN lions took to the streets, swathed in green 2004, the IAEA discovered Iranian experi- Security Council members and Germany. (the colour of Mousavi’s election cam- ments with Polonium-210, which is used On 4 February 2006, the IAEA Board of paign), to protest against the government in the production of nuclear weapons. Governors passed a resolution with 27 to and the election result; in response, the While the USA pressed to refer the Iranian 3 votes referring the nuclear file to the UN regime shut down the internet, threw out nuclear file to the UN Security Council, Security Council. foreign journalists, killed and imprisoned the E3 stalled these attempts. At the same demonstrators, and generally demonstra­ time, the Iranians pressed for further nego- In 2006, then-US Secretary of State Condo- ted its rogue status.”9 tiations with the E3 in order to be able to leezza Rice and Under Secretary of State resume enrichment as soon as possible. Nicholas Burns offered to negotiate direct- On 21 September 2009, Iran informed the ly with the Iranian side, but were refused. IAEA about a hitherto secret enrichment Given the pressure from the IAEA Board of As a consequence, the UN Security Council facility at Fordow, near . Given the Governors, which had passed a resolution passed resolution 1737 in December 2006, fact that the Fordow site was located close threatening UN Security Council referral of imposing a first round of sanctions on Iran. to an IRGC base and that it was too small the Iranian nuclear file, the Iranians agreed When Iran continued its enrichment activi- in scale to serve as a backup for the Natanz to further negotiations with the E3 in Paris ties in 2006 and 2007, the Security Council plant, as Iran claimed, the international in November 2004. In the resulting Paris imposed additional sanctions on the community generally suspected Fordow Agreement (not to be confused with the Iranian missile programme with Resolution to be of military purpose. In Geneva, the Paris Climate Accord), Iran reiterated that it 1747 in March 2007. P5+1 and Iran started negotiations on an was not seeking nuclear weapons capacity, agreement on the Iranian nuclear pro- and agreed to continue the suspension of The USA attempted several times to start gramme which ultimately failed. On 9 June enrichment. The Paris Agreement, further- direct negotiations with Iran, in accor- 2010, the Security Council passed Resolu- more, obliged the E3 to begin negotiations dance with the above-mentioned offer tion 1929, thereby imposing another with Iran in the near future. by Mr. Burns and Ms. Rice. These attempts round of sanctions on Iran, in addition to were seen favourably by but newly imposed US sanctions. In 2005, the principlist Mahmoud Ahma- Iranian president Ahmadinejad seemed to dinejad was elected President of Iran. The have stifled the possibility of direct nego- During this phase, the Iranian nuclear pro- country then restarted uranium enrich- tiations. In June 2007, a delegation of 300 gramme was targeted, likely by Western ment activities on 8 August 2005 due to a Iranians were invited to direct negotiations intelligence services. Not only were lea- lack of progress in negotiations with the in New York, but did not even leave Tehran. ding nuclear scientists assassinated in Iran E3 and an United States who refused to As a result, the United States continued but in June 2010, malware was detected negotiate directly with Iran. In fact, Iran to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran in Iranian nuclear sites that manipulated would have likely changed its policy in and on 17 October 2007 it designated a Iranian centrifuges. This computer virus, this respect even if Mr. Ahmadinejad had part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards named “”, likely set back Iran’s not been elected President as Supreme Corps (IRGC) as supporters of terrorism. On nuclear programme for years. Leader favoured re-starting 20 October 2007, Mr. Larijani resigned as enrichment. One of the key decisions chief nuclear negotiator. Within Iran, this In 2013, Iran elected Hassan Rouhani, who by Mr. Ahmadinejad in relation to the increased pressure on Mr. Ahmadinejad had previously served as chief nuclear ne- nuclear crisis was the replacement of chief as he was now thought of harming Iran’s gotiator, as the new president. In Septem- nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani with interests in refusing to negotiate with the ber 2013, in the wake of the UN General Ali Larijani. USA. In March 2008, the Security Council Assembly, US President Obama and Iranian passed another round of sanctions with President Rouhani had a phone call. This After the controversial September 2005 Resolution 1803. was interpreted by the public as a sign that speech by then-President Ahmadinejad the two heads of state would be serious before the UN General Assembly, the E3 In November 2008, was in attempting to reach a comprehensive were less reluctant to refer the nuclear elected President of the United States. Un- agreement on the Iranian nuclear pro- file to the UN Security Council. In January der President Obama, the USA changed its gramme.10 2006, in an “[…] outrageous refutation of policy as in starting negotiations with Iran everything the UN stood for […],6 Iran offi- on the highest possible level. However, In the same year, the USA and Iran began cially broke the seals at the Natanz enrich- in the Iranian presidential election 2009, secret negotiations about a potential

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agreement concerning the Iranian nuclear The US cancellation of the JCPOA now agreement. As a consequence, it is way programme. On 24 November 2013, Iran forces the EU to decide whether to con- more likely that the JCPOA is abandoned and the P5+1 agreed on a preliminary front the USA directly in supporting Iran than the EU giving up the North Atlantic framework agreement, also known as the and its anemic economy. This decision Alliance. At the end, the stress-test for the “Geneva Interim Framework Agreement” however, is not entirely the EU’s to make. transatlantic partnership was the EU’s ca- or “Joint Plan of Action” which served as The EU neither controls each European pacity to compensate for and circumvene precursor for negotiations for the Joint company, nor does it control its member US sanctions and its performance in trade Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). states in a way that could force them with Iran. Within the Joint Plan of Action, Iran agreed to trade with Iran on a G2G basis. As a to roll back some activities of its nuclear consequence, it is a private-business In the larger picture however, the cancella- programme provided that certain sanc- decision whether or not to use the newly- tion of the JCPOA by the USA further com- tions were lifted. established “Instrument in Support of plicated the transatlantic situation. The Trade Exchanges” (INSTEX) in order to cir- JCPOA is not the first agreement President Within the Joint Plan of Action, the P5+1 cumvene US sanctions and still trade with Trump unilaterally withdrew from. The and Iran agreed to negotiate a follow-up Iran.13 However, it is unlikely that the EU Paris Climate Accords and the Trans-Pacific agreement until July 2014. The deadline could compensate Iran’s losses due to the Partnership (TPP) are just two agreements for these negotiations was extended sever- sanctions, as European firms who would that Mr. Trump already cancelled. Others, al times. During this phase of negotiations, be willing to trade with Iran fear fines by which he publicly contemplates about both sides, in particular US Secretary of the US for circumventing its sanctions. withdrawing from, include NAFTA and the State John F. Kerry and Iranian Foreign US-Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). Minister Javad Zarif, publicly stated A similar view has been taken by This is signalling not only a rejection of negotiations were constructive.11 On 14 Germany’s Foreign Minister Maas: multilateralism on the US side but increa­ July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 reached a s­ing isolationism and potentially even ground-breaking agreement: The Joint “It will be difficult to protect Ger- abandoning long-standing US allies. Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).12 man businesses that continue doing This agreement aimed at curbing Iran’s business in Iran after the US reimpo- Defiance under pressure capacity to construct a nuclear weapon ses sanctions, Foreign Minister Heiko in limiting its enrichment and research Maas said on Sunday. ‘I don’t see any Immediately after the announcement of capabilities. In turn, the sanctions against simple solution to shield companies President Trump that the United States Iran would be lifted. Briefly thereafter, on from all the risks of American sanc- would withdraw from the JCPOA, conser- 8 May 2018, Donald J. Trump, in fulfilling tions,’ Maas told the German newspa- vative members of the Iranian parliament, one of his presidential campaign promises, per Bild am Sonntag.“ 14 the Majles, set ablaze an US paper flag announced that the USA would unilate- within the parliamentary chamber. The Ira- rally withdraw from the JCPOA. Furthermore, in his visit to Tehran, the nian conservatives were allegedly proven German Foreign Minister emphasised the correct by Mr. Trump that the “” A tarnished alliance importance of the nuclear agreement for could not be trusted. As a consequence, European security.15 This visit highlighted Hassan Rouhani’s moderates came under Despite being stressed, it is highly unlikely the intense pressure lasting on the EU pressure to explain why exactly they that the Western alliance will fall apart by but also on Iran. The EU is unable to meet thought that the United States could be opposing views on the Iran nuclear deal. Iranian interests in any significant way and trusted and therefore, started negotia- The United States, in what was clearly in turn, the Iranians put into question their tions about curbing the Iranian nuclear a unilateral move, decided to abandon adherence to a deal they do not benefit programme in the first place. the nuclear agreement. This move runs from. counter to and undermines the European Indeed, moderates will most likely remain position. While President Trump decided The fundamental question in the first place under constant pressure until the next to withdraw from the accord, it is in the was whether the EU could trade enough Iranian presidential elections, which are EU’s interest to curb the Iranian nuclear with Iran to convince Tehran to continue scheduled for 2021. The main challenge for programme and to prevent as thoroughly adhering to JCPOA provisions. At the same moderates is to explain why they chose to as possible an Iranian nuclear weapon. time, the EU needed to make sure not trust and negotiate with the United States The JCPOA, from a non-proliferation per- to trade as much with Iran as to openly and Europe in the first place. With each spective, accomplished precisely this. In affront their closest partner, the United new escalatory step taken by the United curtailing the quantity and the quality of States. Taking into account the Iranian States, the pressure on the moderates will Iranian centrifuges and other nuclear sites, dissatisfaction with the European perfor- increase. In addition to this, the sanctions the JCPOA managed to stop short Iran’s mance, it is ever more likely that Iran will, are causing further domestic pressure on nuclear programme. as the USA did, withdraw from the nuclear the Rouhani administration stemming

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from major economic problems such as This comes at a time when Iran faces a East, should the situation escalate further. rising prices and shortages in consumer double strategy by the USA. On the one The rationale behind such a move would goods. This situation will arguably hit the hand, US National Security Adviser John clearly be demonstrating that the price younger, more urban population the most Bolton, a known hawk on Iran, and Secre- of escalation for the United States would since they are likely to vote for a more tary of State Mike Pompeo argue for robust be too high. However, such a tactic might moderate president. action regarding Iran. President Trump, on very well lead to further internal pressure the other hand, while reiterating bellicose as many Iranians are no longer willing to Furthermore, the recent floodings in Iran, rhetoric, is explicitly passive and does not follow with Iran’s regional policy. in wake of which the government has appear to be willing to go to war with Iran. been criticised for not reacting quickly Therefore, Iran does not have much choice Conclusion enough, as well as the 2018-9 economic when it comes to foreign policy. If it wants protests should also be taken into account. to exert pressure on Europe, gradually The unilateral decision to withdraw from These crises only heightened pressure on restarting the nuclear programme seems the JCPOA by US President Trump adds Mr. Rouhani’s government. Fortunately, to be the right choice. This is even more so another aspect to his campaign slogan Mr. Rouhani is the chief nuclear negotiator as Iran no longer benefits from adhering to “America first”. Trump’s actions have resul- and Secretary of the Supreme National Se- the JCPOA given the unilateral sanctions ted in a distinct unilateralism and isolatio- curity Counil and has a strong background by Washington. nism that is in stark contrast to the alliance in security establishment. This is the main system the United States have built since reason for him being supported by Supre- Iran’s strategic options are limited. They the end of World War II. The cancellation of me Leader Khamenei and for being able to will most likely not negotiate directly with the JCPOA will contribute significantly to compromise with the conservatives. the US President as this would mean a the straining of the North Atlantic Alliance. loss of face. This stance has been publicly However, it will not serve as the reason for The conservative and hard-line elements in stated by Supreme Leader Khamenei and the alliance to fall apart. One explanation Iran now have a critical advantage due to repeated by officials of the Islamic Repub- for this is that the EU still heavily relies the cancellation of the JCPOA. As hard- lic. In reckoning that the United States will on the United States as its main security liners often reiterated that the USA could not directly attack Iran, their best options provider within the NATO framework. not be trusted, their beliefs were seemingly are to exert pressure on Europe in ramping proven correct by President Trump’s recent up its nuclear programme, shift its foreign Given Iran’s geopolitical position and its actions. In their eyes, Iran should never policy focus to Russia and China, ensure significance for stability in the Middle have negotiated with the United States that it can affect US allies, and hope that East, Tehran is of course highly important in the first place. “From the outset, Iran’s President Trump is not re-elected in 2020. for the EU’s security interests. Nonethel- hard-liners rejected the 2015 nuclear deal, ess, the United States serves as the most lamenting it as a series of humiliating con- Shifting Iran’s foreign policy focus towards important European ally whose assistance cessions to the West in exchange for nearly Russia and China is not too far-fetched. is needed in various geopolitical challen- nothing. They repeatedly demanded that Russia, as a permanent member of the UN ges. As long as the EU is not “strategically Iran quit the agreement. With Rouhani’s Security Council, is certainly capable of autonomous”17, it will continue to rely on stance now marking a significant shift to- easing some of the international pressure the USA for military protection, hence not ward their argument, hard-liners no longer on Iran and it might not be too reluc- counter US interests significantly. find themselves isolated. The idea of sus- tant when it comes to assisting Iran. This pending nuclear commitments, in fact, now even more so, as there is no international This makes the position of the EU as dominates Iran’s political sphere and has consensus on imposing sanctions on the difficult as it could possibly be. As it cannot become the mainstream attitude among Islamic Republic. On the other hand, it is confront the USA openly but clearly has political elites.”16 This means that President clear that Russia’s and Iran’s interests might significant security interests in the Middle Rouhani now has to justify his actions. diverge when it comes to establishing a East, the only possible path for European post-war order in . Furthermore, China decision makers is diplomacy. The two Therefore, it hardly comes as surprise that is also one of Iran’s main trading partners. most important preconditions in this moderates shifted their position from de- respect are unity among all EU member liberate inaction to deliberate and gradual Keeping their attack capacity vis-à-vis US states and the potential to emphasise action. Though Iran continued to adhere troops in the Middle East and might the EU’s position, if necessary, by mili- to JCPOA provisions, they believe that little be a second strategic step. In ramping up tary force. These two preconditions are has been done by the Europeans. In order its defences through Iran’s allies Hezbol- virtually unfulfilled. Recent examples of to increase the pressure on Europe and to lah and Hamas and further escalating European disunity are the disagreement likely ease the pressure on the Rouhani the conflict in Yemen, Iran could easily over appointments for the EU leadership administration, Iran now gradually starts not only have Israel attacked by pinprick positions18,19 and the withdrawal of the ramping up the nuclear programme. tactics but also US troops in the Middle from the EU. In addition

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to this, the new High Representative Josep 11) BBC News (2015): Iran nuclear: US ‘will not be rushed over deal’ – Kerry https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- Borrell has to settle in, which means that east-33457805, last access on 25 May 2019 the EU does not have a strong and estab- lished top diplomat at a crucial moment. 12) Borger, Julian (2015): Iran nuclear deal reached in Vienna https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear- Moreover, the only potent military powers deal-expected-to-be-announced-in-vienna, last access on 25 in the EU besides the UK are Germany and May 2019

France, causing the necessary projection 13) EEAS (2019): Statement by High Representative/Vice- of power to support EU diplomacy to be President Federica Mogherini on the creation of INSTEX, Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges https://eeas.europa. less potent. eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/57475/statement- high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-creation- This means that the only potential path instex-instrument_en for the EU to avoid a major crisis and 14) Deutsche Welle (2018): Heiko Maas: Germany can‘t protect a potential conflict in the Persian Gulf businesses from US sanctions in Iran https://www.dw.com/en/ heiko-maas-germany-cant-protect-businesses-from-us-sanc- would be high-level diplomacy in order tions-in-iran/a-43760967, last access on 30 May 2019 to diffuse tensions between the USA and Iran. Should the crisis escalate, however, 15) Shams, Shamil (2019): Heiko Maas in Tehran: Why Germany can‘t concede too much to Iran https://www.dw.com/en/heiko- the EU would have no other option than to maas-in-tehran-why-germany-cant-concede-too-much-to- support the USA more or less openly. iran/a-49128510, last access on 12 June 2019

16) Jafari, Saeid (2019): US ‘maximum pressure’ changing Iranian attitudes toward nuclear program https://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2019/05/iran-nuclear-deal-jcpoa-attitudes-wea- ponization-trump-talks.html, last access on 30 May 2019 Endnotes 17) Fiott, Daniel (2018): Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European 1) DeYoung, Karen/Ryan, Missy (2019): In message to Iran, White sovereignty’ in defence? https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/de- House announces new military assets in Middle East. https:// fault/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%2012__Strategic%20Autonomy.pdf, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-message- last access on 13 July 2019 to-iran-white-house-announces-new-military-assets-in-middle- east/2019/05/05/7d7381d8-6f9b-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_sto- 18) France 24 (2019): EU leaders meeting in Brussels divided ry.html?utm_term=.0c067ad60379, last access on 19 May 2019 over who should get bloc‘s top jobs https://www.france24.com/ en/20190701-eu-leaders-meeting-brussels-divided-over-who- 2) Landler, Mark (2018): Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He should-get-blocs-top-jobs, last access on 13 July 2019 Long Scorned https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/ middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html, last access on 19 19) Chazan, Guy (2019): Von der Leyen’s elevation sparks baffle- May 2019 ment in Germany https://www.ft.com/content/7ccc011a-9cf0- 11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb, last access on 13 July 2019 3) Parsi, Trita (2017): Losing an Enemy. Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy, p. 2. New Haven & London, Yale Univer- sity Press

4) Mehr News Agency (2019): US must end false flag opera- tions in region: Iran UN mission https://en.mehrnews.com/ news/146413/US-must-end-false-flag-operations-in-region-Iran- UN-mission, last access on 13 July 2019

5) Kinzer, Stephen (2014): Thirty-five years after Iranian hostage crisis, aftershocks remain https://www.bostonglobe.com/opi- nion/2014/11/04/thirty-five-years-after-iranian-hostage-crisis- aftershocks-remain/VIEKSajEUvSmDQICGF8R7K/story.html, last access on 13 July 2019

6) Patrikarakos, David (2012): Nuclear Iran. The Birth of an © Austria Institut für Europa- Atomic State, p. 227. I.B. Tauris und Sicherheitspolitik, 2019

7) The Economist (2009): Demanding to be counted https:// Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck oder ver­ www.economist.com/briefing/2009/06/18/demanding-to-be- gleich­bare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des counted, last access on 13 July 2019 Austria Instituts für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger 8) Addis, Casey L. (2009): Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections Genehmigung gestattet. Die im AIES-Fokus https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf, last access on 13 veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die July 2019 Meinung der jeweiligen Autorinnen und Autoren wieder. 9) Patrikarakos, David (2012): Nuclear Iran, p. 249 Dr. Langweg 3, 2410 Hainburg/Donau 10) Charbonneau, Louis/Mason, Jeff (2013): Obama, Iran’s Tel. +43 (1) 3583080 Rouhani hold historic phone call https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-un-assembly-iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic- E-Mail: [email protected] phone-call-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928, last access on 25 May Website: www.aies.at 2019 Layout: Medienbüro Meyer

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