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The Ghazi Force JULY 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 7 The Role of Lal Masjid in the Formation of the in South Waziristan.8 Fidaullah, who The Ghazi Force: A Threat to Ghazi Force was arrested by Pakistan’s authorities Pakistan’s Urban Centers For many years, Lal Masjid served in June 2009, also reportedly ordered as an indoctrination and waypoint the beheadings of three men in Buner By Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi station for Islamic fighters traveling to District of the North-West Frontier Afghanistan during the jihad against Province (NWFP) on charges of spying pakistan is increasingly under siege the Soviet Union. More recently, the for security forces.9 from militant factions that are primarily mosque became a jihadist symbol based in the country’s northwest tribal of defiance against the Pakistan Niaz Raheem, the current leader of the region. Most attacks are blamed on government’s pro-Western and anti- group, came from Swat in Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an jihadist policies. Students at Lal Masjid northwest, and was a student of Jamia umbrella group of multiple Pakistani openly defied the writ of the state in the Faridia at Lal Masjid.10 During his time Taliban factions led by Hakimullah heart of Islamabad when they brazenly at the mosque, Niaz was in charge of Mehsud. Disaggregating the various commandeered government buildings, communications for the women’s wing militant factions part of the Pakistani kidnapped Chinese women who they of the Lal Masjid establishment, known Taliban is more difficult. Yet details are accused of being sex workers and emerging about a relatively new militant openly displayed weapons.4 The leading group that has undertaken a number of clerics at Lal Masjid, Abdul Rashid Ghazi “In accordance with deadly attacks on Pakistani government and his brother Maulana Abdul Aziz, the TTP’s tendency to and Western targets. Known as the were responsible for a 2004 fatwa that Ghazi Force, it emerged in the wake said Pakistani soldiers killed while outsource operations to of the government’s July 2007 siege of fighting the Taliban in South Waziristan other organizations, the Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), Agency of the Federally Administered a bastion of extremist thought. The Tribal Areas (FATA) did not deserve Ghazi Force appears to be attack on Lal Masjid is largely considered a Muslim funeral or burial at Muslim the TTP’s ‘Delta Force’ in a turning point in Pakistan’s struggle cemeteries.5 against militancy, and the rise in Islamabad. Typically, those domestic attacks since 2007 is seen as a On July 10, 2007, after a security that undertake attacks in direct result of the incident.1 standoff, government troops stormed the facility, and there were heavy urban areas are locals who According to Islamabad’s inspector exchanges of gunfire between fighters know the area and are able general of police, the Ghazi Force in the mosque compound and security has been behind some of the capital’s forces. The operation infuriated radical to blend in with the city’s deadliest attacks since 2007.2 The Muslims throughout Pakistan and population.” official argues that the Ghazi Force is likely responsible for the rise in dispatched a suicide bomber to attack domestic attacks in the country. The the government’s commando unit Ghazi Force soon emerged, named involved in the Lal Masjid siege in after Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the leader as Jamia Hafsa.11 During the July 2007 September 2007, helped to recruit the of Lal Masjid who was slain during the security operation against Lal Masjid, Niaz suicide bomber who blew himself up in government operation.6 escaped the complex with other students the offices of the World Food Program and took refuge with Maulana Sher Ali in October 2009, was involved in a The Ghazi Force Enters the Jihadist Milieu Khan of the Akora Khatak seminary in deadly suicide bombing at the Marriott Due to limited intelligence on militant Attock District of the NWFP.12 While Hotel in Islamabad in September 2008 groups in South Asia in general, it is at Akora Khatak, Niaz founded a and attacked a NATO supply convoy in not completely clear how the Ghazi students’ organization of those who fled June 2010.3 Force developed. It is believed that Lal Masjid; this grouping was peaceful, Niaz Raheem and a militant known as however, and did not yet have militant This article profiles the Ghazi Force, Fidaullah co-founded the Ghazi Force overtones.13 He eventually traveled with identifies how the group was formed and with the support of two militants other Lal Masjid students to Swat, where assesses its future trajectory. It finds known as Habibullah and Ajmal.7 Niaz he reportedly came under the influence that this relatively new militant group is a former student at Lal Masjid, while of Maulana Fazlullah.14 Fazlullah then is posing a growing threat to Pakistan’s Fidaullah reportedly indoctrinated urban centers. students at Lal Masjid and convinced 8 Ibid. them to join suicide training camps 9 Ibid. 10 Lal Masjid had two seminaries—Jamia Faridia, the 1 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “‘Red Trigger’: Lal Masjid 4 Zaidi. male madrasa, and Jamia Hafsa, its female counterpart. and its Aftermath,” International Journal of Terrorism and 5 Ibid. 11 Personal interview, Amir Rana, director of Pakistan Political Hot Spots 4:1-2 (2009). 6 Maulana Abdul Aziz was taken into Pakistani custody Institute of Peace Studies and internationally acclaimed 2 Kathy Gannon, “The Ghazi Force: Vengeful New Mili- shortly before authorities stormed the mosque com- researcher on militancy in Pakistan, July 2010. tant Group Emerges in Pakistan,” Associated Press, July pound. 12 Ibid. 1, 2010. 7 Munawer Azeem, “Mastermind of Islamabad Suicide 13 Ibid. 3 Ibid. Attacks Arrested,” Dawn, June 1, 2009. 14 Ibid. 10 JULY 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 7 introduced Niaz to Hakimullah Mehsud fluid organizational structure are more Second, the Ghazi Force is anti-Shi`a, in Orakzai Agency, who at the time important than numbers. The Ghazi which means its members can associate was the TTP’s deputy amir for the area. Force appears to be relying on cell-based themselves with a range of sectarian Hakimullah reportedly took Niaz under structures within the organization, groups in Pakistan that are operating his wing, and instructed him to set up which amplifies their terrorist potential on the same ideological underpinnings. the militant group that soon came to be and makes disruption more difficult. As a result, alliances with al-Qa`ida, known as the Ghazi Force.15 Moreover, the estimate of the Ghazi Jaysh-i-Muhammad, the Ilyas Kashmiri Force’s cadre size is based on police network, the Punjabi Taliban and other Although it is a distinct group, the interrogations with Fidaullah, who may groups are possible. Clear recognition Ghazi Force can be considered a faction have downplayed the group’s numbers. from these groups, however, will of the TTP umbrella organization. The Kathy Gannon, an Associated Press require the Ghazi Force to execute Ghazi Force is believed to be based journalist who did seminal work on the more significant attacks or increase in Orakzai Agency, with a possible Ghazi Force, believes that the group’s its numbers. Even though these bigger training camp in Guljo in the adjoining terrorist credentials are just the tip of groups are also in intimate contact Hangu District of the NWFP.16 The the iceberg, and that there is more to the with the TTP, they tend to recognize Ghazi Force is reportedly engaged in entity than their propensity to target other TTP “franchises” such as the Islamabad.18 Ghazi Force only if they prove worthy “What is the future path of of attention. Thus, newly emerging In accordance with the TTP’s groups have to prove themselves to the the Ghazi Force? First, the tendency to outsource operations to TTP high command and its partners to Ghazi Force is a relatively other organizations, the Ghazi Force “outbid” other small umbrella groups appears to be the TTP’s “Delta Force” for attention and recognition. Judging by new militant group; in Islamabad, similar to how Lashkar- its recent history, the Ghazi Force may therefore, it will likely try i-Islam is employed for attacks in soon become a more prominent militant Peshawar.19 Typically, those that faction in Pakistan’s increasingly to establish its reputation undertake attacks in urban areas are violent domestic militant milieu. with a series of escalating locals who know the area and are able to blend in with the city’s population. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi is the author of terrorist attacks. These Fidaullah, for example, was arrested two books about the Taliban in Pakistan, attacks are important in Islamabad, raising the possibility and has written extensively about the that other members of the Ghazi Force subject in international scholarly journals. to establish its jihadist use safe houses in Islamabad and He has been a lecturer of terrorism studies credentials.” Rawalpindi.20 In fact, they could still at a British university. His expertise be using the Lal Masjid establishment to lies in the study of Talibanization and “lie low”’ before activating operational transmigration of radical trends from rural cells.21 to the urban mainstream in Pakistan, and resisting Pakistan Army operations a deconstruction of jihadist discourse. He in the tribal areas side-by-side other The Future of the Ghazi Force currently works with the National Counter­ Taliban factions. The main role of the What is the future path of the Ghazi Force? Terrorism Authority of Pakistan. TTP appears to be offering the Ghazi First, the Ghazi Force is a relatively new Force sanctuary for its fighters along militant group; therefore, it will likely with logistical assistance, whereas the try to establish its reputation with a Ghazi Force retains a certain amount series of escalating terrorist attacks.
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