Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies

The Talkers and the Silent Ones

The EU and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations

Bahar Rumelili, Ph.D. Research Fellow Bogazici University/ University of Birmingham

No. 10 October 2004

I. Introduction Greek-Turkish relations, in many ways, provides a fruitful case for scholars interested in the EU’s role in the transformation of border conflicts. First of all, it is a case where the impact of the EU is widely mentioned, but has not yet been comprehensively and systematically studied (Rumelili, 2004a). Secondly, because the EU has been a factor in Greek-Turkish relations since the early 1960s, the case contains many useful insights about the conditions under which the EU can positively impact border conflicts. There is a clear puzzle in the EU involvement in Greek-Turkish conflicts: Up until late 1990s, the EU failed to have a positive impact. Countering the links made between European integration and peace, Greek-Turkish conflicts multiplied and intensified as Greece and Turkey developed closer institutional relations with the EU. However, clearly since 1999, we observe a promising rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, one which is founded on the principles and procedures of the EU (Rumelili, 2003; 2004a). How the role of the EU changed from an additional forum for Greek- Turkish rivalry to a foundation for Greek-Turkish reconciliation is a very interesting empirical question that contains valuable insights for understanding the conditions for successful EU involvement in border conflicts. And finally, the case of Greek-Turkish relations demonstrates the complex interaction between the domestic and EU-level conditions in bringing about conflict change. As will be discussed in detail in this working paper, there have always been domestic actors in both countries, who saw the futility of the ongoing conflicts, and sought to improve the bilateral relations. The longer-term democratization and socialization influences of the EU in Greece and Turkey have cascaded1 with Turkey’s EU membership candidacy in 1999, enabling the pro-change domestic actors to convince the skeptics, mobilize coalitions, and to silence their opponents. Afterwards, the domestic actors thus enabled have, in turn, furthered EU impact by successfully using the EU as a symbol and as a legitimating handle in their advocacy for change.

1 See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) for a discussion on how ‘norm cascades’ occur.

1 Commenting on the recent changes in Greek-Turkish relations, Hercules Millas, an eminent scholar and a vocal advocate of Greek-Turkish cooperation, concludes:

‘The talkers and silent ones have changed places. There have always been both hawks and doves in the two countries. Before, the environment was hospitable to the hawks; now, it is more suited to the doves’ (2004: 21).

This quote provides an apt title for this paper because it highlights the two important arguments that I will advance: First, the tipping point for change in Greek- Turkish relations has been a change ‘in environment’; that is, in the material and social structures within which political and civil society leaders act. I will argue that these new material and social structures have been provided, first and foremost, by Turkey’s EU membership candidacy. In Greece, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has given a basis to consolidate an alternative foreign policy towards Turkey, the policy of encouraging Turkey’s Europeanization. In Turkey, the explicit link made by the Helsinki European Council between Turkey’s progress on EU membership and the peaceful resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes has given official and private efforts to promote Greek-Turkish cooperation significance, urgency, and most importantly, legitimacy. In addition, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has unleashed funding to civil society efforts directed toward Greek-Turkish cooperation. Second, Millas underscores that the change in Greek-Turkish relations has been achieved through the empowerment of those political and civil society actors in favor of Greek-Turkish cooperation in relation to others who perceive the Greek and Turkish national interests as naturally conflicting. This captures well the complex interaction between EU and domestic-level factors that was mentioned earlier. The empirical research that will be presented in this paper also validates the argument that the effectiveness of the EU in promoting Greek-Turkish cooperation has stemmed mostly not from its direct interventions but from the success of various domestic actors, empowered by the EU, in using the EU as a symbol and as a legitimating handle. The first section of this paper charts the nature and extent of positive change achieved in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999. It highlights the fact that Greek-Turkish relations have never suffered from a lack of domestic actors pushing for change, but that those actors have lacked an environment conducive to consolidating their efforts. The

2 second section of the paper draws on interviews conducted with Greek and Turkish political and civil society leaders in 2004 to analyze what the EU has meant for domestic actors in promoting change. The interview findings suggest that among the four pathways identified by Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2004) as the processes through which the EU can impact border conflicts, the enabling impact has been primarily important in Greek-Turkish conflicts. Other forms of EU influence have served more specific, but nevertheless important, functions. The material resources granted to non-governmental initiatives by the EU, i.e. the connective impact, have been used by civil society actors in diversifying and consolidating Greek-Turkish civil cooperation. The compulsory impact of the EU –the link made between the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes and Turkey’s EU membership- has been crucial at the domestic level to convince the skeptics and to disempower the opponents of Greek-Turkish cooperation.2 And, the constructive impact of the EU has not fully materialized, but is noticeable in the ways in which the domestic actors in Greece and Turkey reproduce the authority and symbolic capital of the EU to build coalitions and silence their critics.

II. The EU and the Changing Context of Greek-Turkish Cooperation There have always been numerous courageous politicians, businessmen, intellectuals, and activists on both sides of the Aegean, who have realized the futility of the ongoing Greek-Turkish conflicts and strived to improve the relations between the two societies. After the two crises over the continental shelf in 1976 and 1987, the leaders of the two countries (Karamanlis and Ecevit in 1978, and Papandreou and Ozal in 1987) initiated dialogue, signed memoranda of understanding on bilateral disputes, and undertook some reciprocal concessions (Tsakaloyannis, 1980; Pridham, 1991). In 1979, Zulfu Livaneli, a popular Turkish singer and composer, initiated a cultural dialogue with Greek artists and organized a series of joint concerts with the famous Greek composers and singers, Mikis Theodorakis and Maria Franduri (Livaneli, 2004). In 1980, the Turkish Milliyet daily began to award individuals who contribute to Greek-Turkish cooperation with the Abdi Ipekci Friendship and Peace Prize, commemorating its head

2 This argument is elaborated in detail in Rumelili (2004b).

3 journalist who was assassinated by rightist terrorists in 1979. Shortly after, a similar prize that began to be offered in Greece, through the efforts of retired engineer Andreas Politakis and the newspaper Eleftherotypia (Aydintasbas, p. 150). In the 1980s, in order to take better advantage of the tourism potential of the two countries, the municipalities of the Turkey’s Aegean Coast and of the Greek islands across began to cooperate (Toksoz, 2004). In 1985, the mayor of Dikili, Osman Ozguven, organized with the Mayor of the Lesvos, Stratis Pallis, the first Dikili Festival of Art and Culture. The two mayors were later awarded the 1989 Abdi Ipekci Peace Prize for this organization (Atauz, 2004). In the year 1987, Theodorakis and Livaneli established the Turkey-Greece Friendship Association (TGFA) (Aydintasbas, 2004). In 1988, a Turkish-Greek Media Conference was organized at the UNESCO General Center. Greek environmentalists from Chios and Lesvos participated in the human chain campaign to oppose the thermal power plant in Aliaga, Turkey (Atauz, 2004). The Turkish History Foundation, founded in 1991, brought together critical Greek and Turkish historians in projects aiming to purge chauvinistic content out of schoolbooks (Silier, 2004). As transnational contacts developed around the world, civil society leaders from Greece and Turkey also found the opportunity to meet during various international conferences. These meetings proved to be valuable contacts upon which Greek-Turkish cooperation was later advanced. For example, the founders of Women’s Initiative for Peace (WINPEACE), Zeynep Oral from Turkey and Margarita Papandreou initially met at the World Conference on Women held in Nairobi in 1985 (Oral, 2004). The former Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, was part of the Greek group that came to the founding Assembly of the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly (HCA) in 1990. The HCA introduced Papandreou to different and critical voices from Turkey, and was formative of Papandreou’s future political vision towards Turkey. (Belge, p. 28; also interview #8). Turkish and Greek municipalities met at the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) meetings, and cooperated in the implementation of certain EU Mediterranean Projects (Toksoz, 2004). Greek and Turkish university students met in the context of their participation in international and European student organizations, such as Association des Etats Generaux des Etudiants de l’Europe (AEGEE). Later, AEGEE-Istanbul and

4 AEGEE-Athens organized student exchanges in the springs of 1996, 1997, and 1998. (Demesticha and Aksakoglu, 2004). However, both these official and civil cooperation efforts always stumbled on crises between Greece and Turkey. The ‘Davos Process’ initiated by Ozal and Andreas Papandreou quickly crumbled under the uncooperative attitude of the public opinion and the press, and came under severe attack from the opposition for abandoning the so-called national causes (Pridham, 19991; Kirisci and Carkoglu, 2003). From 1992 onwards, with the changing political climate in Greece after the elections, interest in the Greek-Turkish Friendship committee waned and the TGFA could no longer find anyone to address itself to. (Aydintasbas, p. 152-3) In reaction to Ocalan’s capture on his way out of the Greek embassy in Kenya, Turkish businessmen unilaterally cancelled the scheduled meeting of the Turkish-Greek Business Council and ‘even the most pro-Greek business personalities felt the need to make anti-Greek statements.’ (Ozel, 2004: 167) After the Ocalan affair, Greek women also cancelled their trip to Istanbul only two days before the scheduled meeting of WINPEACE because of fear that they would not be safe in Istanbul (interview #9). Since 1999, Greek-Turkish relations have entered into a seemingly sustainable period of cooperation. The suffering of the Turkish people, following the Izmit earthquake of August 1999 brought out feelings of empathy and solidarity among the Greeks, and vice versa during the Athens earthquake in September (Gundogdu, 2001; Siegl, 2002). Greek and Turkish rescue teams, doctors, and humanitarian workers got the chance to work together in a highly emotional setting. Before the earthquakes, Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister of the time had sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, inviting him to cooperate with Turkey on terrorism. Papandreou had replied positively, and also had suggested further avenues of cooperation. Following the earthquakes, the two leaders initiated wide-scale cooperation on various secondary issues, claiming also that they are acting on a ‘popular mandate’. During the Helsinki European Council in 1999, in line with the prevailing positive spirit, Greece chose not to use its veto against the EU’s decision to grant Turkey candidacy status. With the Helsinki Council decisions, Turkey, like all other candidate states, entered into a commitment to resolve any of its outstanding border disputes; and failing

5 this, to bring these disputes before the International Court of Justice. This decision linked progress on Turkey’s EU membership bid with the resolution of its border disputes with Greece. Since 1999, many things have changed in Greek-Turkish relations (Heraclides, 2002; Keridis, 2001) The two states agreed to cooperate in various issues, such as tourism promotion, fight against terrorism, removal of landmines along the border, illegal migration, incentives for trade and mutual investment, environmental and health issues.3 In addition, as confidence building measures within the framework of NATO, the two states have agreed to reduce and exchange information about military exercises. Most importantly, Turkey’s EU membership became the focal point of bilateral cooperation. Greece that persistently vetoed any advances in the relations between Turkey and the EU suddenly became the most ardent supporter of Turkey’s EU membership. Despite changes of government in Turkey and Greece, bilateral relations were never made an issue during the election campaigns. Also upon taking office, each new government committed itself to maintaining the positive relations between Turkey and Greece. When George Papandreou paid an official visit to Turkey in January 2000, it was the first such visit of a Greek Foreign Minister in 38 years. Since then, official visits have become routine, and the officials of the two countries have not missed an opportunity to meet on the sidelines of various NATO, EU, and UN meetings. Progress towards the resolution of bilateral disputes has been slow; since 2002, thirty plus rounds of secret negotiations have taken place at the technical level between the two foreign ministries. Reportedly, the two sides are very close to an agreement. However, the Greek government has recently announced that it will not insist on the 2004 deadline and that it is willing to extend the negotiations beyond. Transnational contacts between the two countries have multiplied both in form and in number. In the last two years, the annual bilateral trade between Turkey and Greece has exceeded one billion dollars. The number of people visiting Turkey from Greece and vice versa has increased tremendously. Many cultural activities, festivals, concerts, and joint theater productions have been organized. Numerous youth exchanges

3 However, many of these agreements still exist solely on paper, requiring a lot of technical committee work to be put into implementation (interview #2).

6 have taken place; among them, AEGEE- Ankara has organized conferences and a festival to promote dialogue between Greek and Turkish students; a youth initiative, Kalimerhaba, has organized exposure trips; the Aegean Initiative project has offered a common course and a joint conflict resolution session to Greek and Turkish students (Banias, 2004). Currently, Sabanci University in Turkey and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) are engaged in a joint project to develop concepts of conflict resolution and to generate a conflict resolution syllabus to be used in universities in Greece and Turkey (Rumelili, 2004c). Lozan Mubadilleri Vakfi (The Foundation for Lausanne Immigrants) was founded in 2001 in Turkey to conduct research about the history and culture of the Greek and Turkish people subjected to compulsory population exchange as agreed to by Turkey and Greece in the Lausanne Treaty. Recently, this organization has begun a collaborative project with Research Center for Minority Groups (KEMO) in Greece. WINPEACE, founded in 1996 to promote a culture of peace between Turkey and Greece, diversified its activities into the organization of youth camps, agro-tourism, and peace education. In the years 1999 and 2000, Greek and Turkish journalists have gotten together several times in conferences and in the context of a conflict resolution project organized by the European Center for Common Ground. Environmentalist groups are cooperating in the conservation of rare species, such as the Mediterranean monk seal, and in the protection of the Ergene basin in the Turkish Thrace. At the local government level, more than 20 twin city agreements have been signed between Turkish and Greek cities since 1999, and municipalities associations have concluded cooperation and partnership agreements. What is notable in this growing cooperation is that the joint activities are no longer the domain of courageous individuals but are increasingly brought out into the streets. WINPEACE, for example, takes women from three villages on the Turkish Aegean coast to the women’s cooperative in the Greek island of Lesvos during the olive- picking season to teach them about agro-tourism. The Foundation for Lausanne Treaty Emigrants has reached out to a wide group of emigrant families and educated them about

7 their unique heritage and hybrid identities.4 In addition, civil society activities after 1999 have become more specific, issue oriented, and professional. The activities are no longer just meetings of ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’ for dialogue and friendship, but joint efforts around common causes and interests, be they promoting the status of women, or exploiting the tourism and trade potential.5 Activists have become more professionally organized in order to qualify for funds granted to civil society activities from the European Union or other international organizations. Professionalization gives civil society cooperation more durability as it is no longer dependent on contacts and relations between specific individuals. It is not that moments of tension between Greece and Turkey have not occurred since 1999. For example, in October 2000, Greece withdrew angrily from the NATO’s Destined Glory exercises following dog-fight incidents between Greek and Turkish fighter jets. The issue of Cyprus’ EU membership has sporadically generated threatening and provocative statements –Turkey threatening the division of the island and Greece threatening to block Turkish membership in the EU. In May and June 2003, allegations that Turkish fighter jets have harassed Greek jets and an Olympic airways passenger plane have raised the tensions between the two countries. What is significant, however, is how such moments of tension have been handled by the government leaders, media, and civil societies in Turkey and Greece. Where the governments have fueled the tensions, the media have refrained from jumping on the ‘crisis bandwagon,’ and when the media published provocative stories, the leaders have cooled off the situation (cf. Ozgunes and Terzis, 2000). And none of these incidents have ruptured the relations established between the peoples, be they festivals, civil society meetings, tourism, or trade agreements.

4 Impression attained from informal interviews with participants at the Symposium commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Lausanne Population Exchange, Istanbul, 7-8 November 2003. 5 Millas often speaks out against organizing ‘Turkish-Greek’ activities because it presupposes a separation of the participants as ‘Turkish’ and ‘Greek’. Instead, issue- specific organizations, such as those about the environment, unite their participants around a common environmentalist or other identity. Speech delivered at ‘Re-building Communication - Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue’ conference, Mar. 20-23, 2003, Sakarya University, Turkey.

8

Various scholars have put forth different explanations of how, the two arch-rivals of the past, could all of a sudden switch to cooperative relations. Some underscore the fact that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was becoming increasingly necessary in the new international context; others privilege the increasing civil society activity since 1996; and yet others underline the importance of the exogenous shock provided by the earthquakes (Heraclides, 2002; Gundogdu, 2001; Siegl, 2002) I think that the order of events is potentially misleading and leads some scholars to minimize, if not ignore, the role played by the EU in changing Greek-Turkish relations. While it is true that the civil society activity, the exchange of letters by Cem and Papandreou, etc. preceded the EU’s Helsinki Council decision to grant Turkey candidacy status, which in turn was made possible by Greece’s lifting of its veto, I argue that in the absence of this EU intervention, the positive momentum in relations would have been, once again, short-lived. As noted by one of my interviewees, after 1999, ‘Greek-Turkish relations gained an EU dimension’ (my emphasis). In highlighting the role of the EU in this context, my intention is neither to put the EU on a pedestal, nor to downplay the will and agency of actors in Turkey and Greece. However, in Greek-Turkish relations, as it is often the case in conflict societies, the conflict discourses, identities, and interests are so entrenched that they often disrupt the cooperative activities of individuals at too early of a stage. The role, or maybe more appropriately, the function of the EU in such settings is to serve as a symbol around which domestic actors can mobilize coalitions, legitimate new policies, and disempower the critics. The next section of this paper draws on interviews with Greek and Turkish policymakers and civil society leaders to demonstrate what the EU has meant for domestic actors promoting change.

III. The Functions of the EU in Greek-Turkish Cooperation:

According to Greek and Turkish policymakers and civil society leaders, the EU has facilitated and promoted Greek-Turkish cooperation in two main ways. First, the EU, as an economic power, has provided funding for many civil society activities. Secondly, the EU, as a symbol and a model, has legitimized the pursuit of Greek-Turkish cooperation both at the governmental and the civil society level. The EU symbol and

9 model has served to unite different strands of the state and civil society elites. By performing these functions, the EU has supported the Greek and Turkish policymakers and civil society leaders in their efforts to promote and consolidate Greek-Turkish cooperation.

The EU as a Funder:

Starting with the late 1990s, some NGOs in Turkey and Greece have begun to use various EU funds for activities related to Greek-Turkish cooperation and dialogue. Recently, however, European Commission has introduced two forms of funding that are directed specifically at Greek-Turkish civic cooperation. The first is the Civil Society Development Program, introduced in 2002 with has a budget of 8 million euros for two years to promote Greek-Turkish civic dialogue at the grassroots and local level, and to enhance the capacity of NGOs in Turkey (www.stgp.org). To carry out the program an NGO support team has been established at the Commission Representation in Ankara. The Greek-Turkish Civic Dialogue Program first granted three macro-grants to organizations that are already active in Greek-Turkish issues to run demonstration/ cooperation projects. The European Center for Common Ground has brought media professionals and students from Greece and Turkey in various meetings, and coordinated the joint production of radio and television documentaries; WINPEACE has used the fund for meetings, youth camps, the agro-tourism project, and peace education; and AEGEE-Ankara has organized two student conferences and a friendship festival in Kayakoy, Turkey. Afterwards, the Program has also organized three workshops- two in Istanbul, and one in Athens- with the aim of bringing together civil society actors from both sides. Through various activities, these workshops actively encouraged the participants from both sides to design joint projects. After the 1st and 2nd workshops, the Program has launched calls for proposals for Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue micro-grants. A total of 11 projects have been funded under this micro-grants scheme,6 some of them originally conceived during the workshops. In the Athens workshop, where I was also a participant,

6 For further information, see the website of the Civil Society Development Program, www.stgp.org.

10 a great majority of the participants were meeting for the very first time, and I can attest that at least one of the ideas developed in casual conversation has made its way into a concrete proposal. The small Greek-Turkish projects, funded under the micro-grants scheme, focus on many issues, ranging from protection of endangered species, women’s rights, fight against women trafficking, rural development, peace education, study of the 1923 population exchange, joint theater productions, and tourism promotion and development. Some organizations like the Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants and the Hellenic Society for the study and protection of the Monk Seal have been funded for two projects with different partners. The second form of funding directed specifically at Greek-Turkish cooperation is the 35 million euro package to support cross-border cooperation between Greece and Turkey for 2004-2006. This package was approved by the European Commission in February 2004 and is to be financed by INTERREG 3 and pre-accession funding for Turkey.7 This is the first package for the Greek-Turkish border; previous cross-border initiatives and twin-city arrangements between Greece and Turkey have been funded by other EU funds or the INTERREG 2 funds made available to Greece (interview #10). The call for proposals for Greek-Turkish cross-border cooperation will be announced in September 2004 (interview #11). The availability of EU funding has been crucial especially for Turkish NGOs, which are mostly dependent on foreign funding for their activities. As a leading Turkish human rights activist explains, Turkish organizations generally choose not to apply to state, government, and municipal funds in order to keep clear of ideological influences. On the other hand, the Turkish business community, except for a handful of people, is hesitant to provide funding because they are not used to NGOs and fear that their contribution will put them at political risk. Under these conditions, many organizations rely on foreign funding for their activities (Belge, 2004). In Greece, on the other hand, NGOs are not that reliant on foreign funding. ‘Governments are more inclined to help and less eager to control the NGOs’ (Belge, 2004). The chairman of the Turkish History Foundation also notes that there is a huge difference between the amount of EU cultural

7 EU Flash, Representation of the European Commission to Turkey Press Release, Ankara 9 February 2004.

11 funds available to Turkey and Greece, and this prevents Turkey from taking the initiative in most cases (Silier, 2004). Certainly, not all civil initiatives on Greek-Turkish cooperation are funded by the EU; to my knowledge, the Greek-Turkish Forum’s activities are funded by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, a student exchange has been funded by the Fullbright Commission (Banias, 2004), and some meetings between Greek and Turkish journalists have been funded by UNESCO (Birand, 2004). Most of the NGOs funded by the Greek- Turkish Civic Dialogue program could have found other sources of funding for their activities. But there are some, such as youth initiatives and small-scale cultural activities, that could not and it is on them that the EU impact is the most noticeable. It is also the case that the availability of EU funding for Greek-Turkish initiatives has also unleashed other sources of funding. Previously, for example, domestic funders in Turkey hesitated to become implicated in Greek-Turkish issues. The improved climate, as well as the legitimacy provided by the EU funding, has changed their inclinations. While grateful for the availability of EU funding, civil society actors also raise some concerns regarding the timing and implementation of the funding. While the Greek- Turkish civil society activity peaked following the 1999 earthquakes, the European Commission has initiated the Greek-Turkish Civic Dialogue Program only in 2002. This time lag has been a result of the institutional/ bureaucratic constraints in the Commission. Following the earthquakes, the then Representative of the European Commission in Ankara, Karen Fogg, has actually put forward such a proposal; however, has failed to obtain funding from Brussels (interview #10). On the other hand, there is the fact that Turkish organizations became eligible for certain form of EU funding only after Turkey got declared as a candidate in December 1999. When I asked interviewee #11 why the cross-border cooperation program between Turkey and Greece took off so late, she was surprised and replied that Turkey just became eligible. The time lag has been stressed by many of my interviewees. As interviewee #9 remarked: ‘The EU has been important, but we were there first.’ The time lag was not so crucial this time in the case of Greek- Turkish relations, because civil society cooperation was maintained after the earthquakes, and when these specific instruments of EU funding were introduced, they served to consolidate the transnational contacts already made. However, taking the previous

12 slipperiness of Greek-Turkish relations into account, it could also have been too late, civil society relations may have been disrupted by the time EU funding is introduced. A second concern is the bureaucratic obstacles and limitations that civil society activities funded by the EU run into. For example, interviewee #6 noted:

‘The Commission gives us money but limits the activities that we can do. It says that I am providing this money for civil society development in Turkey, you cannot organize an activity in Greece. It does not accept the bills from Greece. However, it is also hard to persuade the Greeks. There are still prejudices. They complain that they always have to come to Turkey. I talked to the Commission Representative in Greece and asked him to provide money to make the project bilateral, he told me they have no such fund available.’

Therefore, the fact that the funds for Greek-Turkish civil dialogue were granted under the Civil Society Development Program limited the range of activities that the receivers of these funds could do. When choosing to combine Turkish civil society development and Greek-Turkish civil cooperation objectives, the Commission thought that encouraging networks and collaboration with the more advanced and developed Greek NGOs would also be a way to develop Turkish civil society. The comments by interviewee #5 reflected this thinking: ‘Greeks are much more vocal. The Turks lack knowledge, leadership capacity, and persuasive skills.’ However, many Turkish activists noted problems in Greek civil society, such as the domination of civil society by political parties, lack of grassroots and youth initiatives, the tendency to take the government line on national issues, as obstacles to effective Greek-Turkish collaboration (interviews #4, #6, and #8). The coordinator of one of the Greek-Turkish civic dialogue projects concluded: ‘I think the Commission needs to do civil society development in Greece, too’ (interview #6). A third concern raised by the activists is the elitism of the organizations active in Greek-Turkish cooperation. I was repeatedly told that these organizations are mostly dominated by elites and that Greek-Turkish cooperation should infiltrate the masses (interview #4, #6, and #7). This is essential for civil society cooperation to make an impact on the conflicts. As Belge notes: ‘Solving problems with people who do not see them as problems is not the most fruitful way of working for peace.’ (2004: 31) According to some, the form and implementation of EU funding perpetuates this elitism.

13 One Turkish interviewee noted that: ‘in the beginning, it was extremely difficult to apply to these funds. They accepted applications only in English. Now they have translated the forms to Turkish. This thing needs to go beyond the NGOs based in the few major cities of Turkey’ (interview #6). Interviewee #4 characterized the initiatives as ‘self-indulging’ and ‘self-perpetuating’ but ‘having minimal impact.’ He argued that ‘these initiatives reflect a peculiar culture developed around the EU that creates new bureaucracies and new avenues for corruption.’ Therefore, when assessing the impact of EU funding on Greek-Turkish civic cooperation, issues, such as the form and implementation of EU funding, also have to be taken into account. Based on my interviews and participant observations at EU sponsored workshops, I can argue that the impact of EU funding has been the strongest, in cases where the EU has specifically supported local and grassroots organizations, successfully combined the objectives of Greek-Turkish cooperation and Turkish civil society development, and facilitated the formation of new partnerships between Greek and Turkish organizations. The form and implementation of EU funding have sometimes eased and other times hindered the realization of these goals.

The EU as a Legitimizer

‘Europe has been a parameter of identities for both Greece and Turkey. Greek and Turkish politicians linked modernization with Europe and the West. Consequently, [they] regarded the EU as the measuring stick for modernization. Hence, they were willing to accept the challenges it posed to their sovereignties, even though they were generally very jealous of their independence and sovereignty otherwise.’

As has been aptly put by interviewee #4 in the above quote, the EU, because of its association with Europe, modernity, and enlightenment, possesses a great deal of symbolic capital in Turkey and Greece. Policymakers are often tempted to use the EU as a legitimizing handle, and justify their policies by reference to EU requirements and norms. Activists also choose to frame their struggles in terms of EU norms and expectations. This is a role that EU indirectly performs, not through its willful agency,

14 but through the activities and choices of others.8 In my interviews with policymakers and civil society leaders in Turkey and Greece, this role of the EU was stressed the most. In this section, I will outline the ways in which the EU has legitimized Greek-Turkish cooperation in Greece and in Turkey. The function of the EU as a legitimizer has manifested itself in many ways. In Greece, the EU has been the bedrock upon which the alternative policy towards Turkey - the policy of supporting Turkey’s Europeanization- has been formulated and advocated. Until the late 1990s, Greek policymakers sought to use the EU as a lever against Turkey (Yannas, 1994; interview #1). This policy rested on the following logic: Because Turkey is a threat, Greece should use all of its means against Turkey, including its influence in international organizations, like the EU. Starting with Simitis, however, the reverse logic began to be articulated as the basis of an alternative policy towards Turkey: If Turkey sufficiently Europeanizes, then it will no longer constitute a ‘threat’ to Greece. Hence, first timidly, and then more consistently, Greek policymakers began to support Turkey’s membership in the EU (Keridis, 2001). This radical change in Greek policy towards Turkey depended on the EU –for its very being and legitimization.9 The new policy rests on the existence of an actor like the EU, with the imputed ability to induce change and reform in other countries, like Turkey. It presupposes peaceful relations as the natural outcome of the process of Europeanization. And it therefore legitimizes, and renders rational, that Greece should work towards bringing its main rival into the European Union. According to both my Greek and Turkish interviewees, the new Greek policy of supporting Turkey’s Europeanization is rational from the point of view of Greek interests. Interviewee #1 argues that Greece has moved beyond short-sighted policies, and among the policymakers in both countries, the belief that being together in the European Union will facilitate the resolution of disputes has become prevalent. Even though interviewee #4 acknowledges that the previous strategy of using the EU to

8 The legitimizing effect of the EU in Greece and in Turkey has been limited until the mid-1990s. For a discussion of the reasons why, see Rumelili (2004a). 9 According to interviewee #4, the new Greek policy of encouraging Turkey’s Europeanization would lose its basis if Turkey does not get a date to begin accession negotiations in December 2004.

15 balance Turkey was also successful, he strongly believes that ‘many potentials will be unlocked with Turkey’s membership. Having Turkey within the EU will benefit Greece enormously.’ In Turkey as well, the European Union has legitimized the pursuit of reformist policies, in areas such as human rights, Cyprus and relations with Greece. The legitimization of Greek-Turkish cooperation has taken place at different levels. At one level, there is belief that the disputes with Greece would lose their meaning once Turkey also becomes a member of the EU. Interviewee #2 says: ‘We’ve been saying this from the very beginning. Once Turkey is in the EU, the problems with Greece will be resolved. We give the example of France and Germany. Many issues are resolved within the EU in the long term.’ Thus, the perception of the EU as a successful security community, which defuses interstate conflicts, is well-established among the Turkish elite and serves to legitimize the joint efforts to gain membership in the EU and to resolve the outstanding disputes with Greece. At another level, Greek-Turkish cooperation is legitimized because maintaining good relations with Greece is essential to Turkey’s EU membership bid. Because attaining membership in the EU is presented as Turkey’s foremost strategic objective, all other national issues, including disputes with Greece can be presented as secondary. Interviewee #3 puts this in crude give-and-take terms, ‘we are pursuing good relations with Greece because we want to be in the EU.’ For interviewee #2, on the other hand, it is a matter of realism:

‘It is a fact that without Greece’s positive stance –I am not saying if it does not just use its veto- it will not be possible for Turkey to enter the EU. We have to assess this realistically, and we’re doing so, Greece is one of the countries that has to be on our side.’

In short, the capacity of the EU to socialize states, its success as a security community, and the attractiveness of the EU membership carrot are all invoked by Greek and Turkish policymakers to convince themselves and others of the desirability and necessity of Greek-Turkish cooperation. It is significant that the EU is endowed with similar meanings and capacities by Greek and Turkish policymakers. Coupled with these shared meanings is also a reciprocal understanding that the other is becoming more

16 European. Interviewee #2 believes that the EU culture is settling in Greece, and one can see this in the changing attitudes towards Turkey. Interviewee #4 sees in Turkey the evidence for how European ideas help to transcend existing problems. The EU also serves to legitimize Greek-Turkish cooperation at the civil society level. Among my interviewees, a positive (perhaps too positive) identification with the EU is discernable. Interviewee #8, for example, does not hesitate to call herself an ‘EU agent.’ The activists working for Greek-Turkish cooperation mostly support Turkey’s membership in the EU. In fact, when I asked my interviewees –both Greek and Turkish- to discuss the impact of the EU in their activities, they generally mentioned their support for Turkey’s EU membership (interviews #7 and #9). I initially failed to see the connection but I later realized what they meant was that the EU provides a common denominator or reference point for them to gather around. The EU dimension of the Greek-Turkish relationship is also an important additional motivating factor, especially for the Turkish activists, to work for Greek-Turkish cooperation. The VEN Volunteers Association, for example, states this very explicitly in its mission statement:

‘It became apparent that the common denominator of our vision was to contribute to Turkey’s process of European Union membership and this vision directed us to re-orient ourselves. The active members all agreed that the most important advantage for Turkey in the EU membership process would be the establishment of strong and healthy relations between Turkey and Greece’ (Tarikahya, 2004)

In other words, especially in the case of Turkish activists, the EU legitimizes their efforts for Greek-Turkish cooperation, because they perceive themselves and are also perceived by others as not only working for Greek-Turkish cooperation but also for [Turkey’s membership in] the EU. Because of the meanings wrapped around the EU, this means that they are also working for progress, modernity, and development. Interviewee #6 puts it in this fashion:

‘We are more organized and show more effort [than the Greeks] because we are not in the EU and democracy is not fully established in our country. We are motivated by an underdog feeling.’

Finally, more generally, the EU has legitimized a limited change in the prevalent discourse in the two countries, such that the ‘talkers and the silent ones have changed

17 places’ (Millas, 2004). While previously, the conflict-enhancing talk of the hawks, with its emphasis on threat and irreconcilability was the more vocal and legitimate discourse for talking of the Other, now it is the conflict-diminishing talk of the doves, with its emphasis on friendship, similarity, and cooperation. However, this change has been so sudden and across-the-board that Millas suspects there is a great deal of ‘double-talk’ in what he calls the ‘mysterious affectionate chat between the Greeks and the Turks.’ In other words, in adopting the talk of the doves, people are not necessarily voicing their genuine feelings, but acting out of a sense (and duty) of political correctness. Millas’ observation calls for caution; however, it must also be noted that a change in the terms of political correctness is significant just by itself. The EU is a common reference point in the conflict-diminishing talk of the doves; while the Greek-Turkish conflict discourse mostly revolves around the nation, memory, and security, the Greek-Turkish cooperation discourse invokes the EU, interests, and the future. Through this discursive linkage, being for the EU necessitates being also for Greek-Turkish cooperation. It is in this sense and to this extent that the EU has legitimized a change in the discourses prevalent in the two countries.

IV. Conclusions

There have always been policymakers and civil society leaders in Turkey and Greece who strived to improve Greek-Turkish relations. However, too many times, these cooperation initiatives, always begun with good intentions, were disrupted before they have had the chance to flourish. Either these efforts were not reciprocated by the other side at the right time, or they were exploited domestically by the opposition for political gain. Civil society cooperation remained limited to few courageous elites and could not infiltrate the masses, who were more easily mobilized by the nationalist rhetoric. Since 1999, however, we have entered into a seemingly sustainable period of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In this paper, I have argued that the current Greek- Turkish cooperation is more likely to be durable because it clearly possesses an EU dimension. While the EU has always been in the background of Greek-Turkish relations –Greece and Turkey have established relations with the EEC in the early 1960s and Greece is a member of the EU since 1981- Greek and Turkish political and civil society

18 leaders are for the first time consciously and systematically utilizing the EU’s material and normative resources to mobilize and legitimize Greek-Turkish cooperation. In this paper, I have demonstrated this argument by drawing on the interviews that I have conducted with Greek and Turkish policymakers and civil society activists between January- June 2004. My objective has been to assess the EU’s impact on Greek-Turkish cooperation, by analyzing what the EU has meant for them in their efforts to promote Greek-Turkish cooperation. Two functions of the EU have been especially stressed by my interviewees: the EU as a funder of Greek-Turkish activities, and the EU as a legitimizer. Therefore, from the point of view of Greek and Turkish domestic actors, the enabling and the connective impacts of the EU have been the most important and effective. The interviews also highlight that most of the impact of the EU on Greek- Turkish relations has been achieved not necessarily through the EU’s purposive agency but from the ways in which the EU, as a resource, symbol, and a model, has been put to use by Greek and Turkish actors. The EU has given their struggles resources and legitimacy, but had they chosen not to make use of the EU in this fashion in their activities, the impact of the EU on Greek-Turkish relations would have been much more limited. It is interesting that my interviewees rarely made reference to the compulsory impact of the EU, through the linkage that Helsinki Council decisions made between the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes and Turkey’s EU membership bid. There may be a methodological bias; domestic actors are more inclined to stress the impact of their own activities and initiatives, and demote outside actors like the EU to a secondary, supportive role. Therefore, interview results may be biased towards emphasizing indirect influences of the EU rather than its direct impact. Secondly, my interviewees were largely drawn from policymakers and civil society leaders who actively sought to improve Greek- Turkish relations. Therefore, it is to be expected that they felt enabled, rather than constrained or coerced by the EU’s Helsinki Council decisions.

19 REFERENCES: Literature: Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ International Organization, 52: 4, pp. 887-917. Gundogdu, Ayten (2001) ‘Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?’ Middle East Review of International Affairs 5 (1): 106-117. Heraclides, Alexis (2002) ‘Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Détente: A Preliminary Evaluation’ The Review of International Affairs, 1: 17-32. Keridis, Dimitris (2001) ‘Domestic Developments and Foreign Policy’ in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds.) Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, pp. 2-18. Everett, MA: Brassey’s. Kirisci, Kemal and Ali Carkoglu (2003), ‘Perceptions of Greeks and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public in Barry Rubin and Ali Carkoglu (eds.) Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente, London: Frank Cass. Ozel, Soli (2004) ‘Turkish-Greek Dialogue of the Business Communities’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 163- 168. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Ozgunes, Neslihan and Georgios Terzis (2000)’Constraints and Remedies for Journalists Reporting National Conflict: the Case of Greece and Turkey,’ Journalism Studies, 1: 405-426. Pridham, Geoffrey (1991) ‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Raprochement’ in Dimitri Constas (ed.) The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, pp. 73-88. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Rumelili, Bahar (2003) “Liminality and the Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of the Community-Building by the EU,” European Journal of International Relations, 9:2 (June 2003), pp. 213-248. Rumelili, Bahar (2004a) ‘The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the Literature’ Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, No.6. University of Birmingham.

20 Rumelili, Bahar (2004b) ‘The Microprocesses of Hegemonic Influence: The Case of EU and Greece/Turkey.’ Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 17-21 March 2004. Montreal, Canada. Rumelili, Bahar (2004c) ‘Research and Policy Centers in Greece and Turkey’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 169-176. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Siegl, Erik (2002) ‘Greek-Turkish Relations- Continuity or Change?’ Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs, 18: 40-52. Tsakaloyannis, Panos (1980), ‘European Community and Greek-Turkish Dispute’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 29 (1): 35-54. Yannas, Prodromos (1994), ‘The Greek Factor in EC-Turkey Relations’ in Panos Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis (eds.) Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, pp. 215-221. London: Pinter Publishers.

Published Accounts of Civil Society Leaders: Atauz, Akin (2004) ‘On the Cooperation Between Greek and Turkish Environmentalist Movements’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 115-124. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Aydintasbas, Halis (2004) ‘The Role of NGOs in Relations between the Two Countries and the Turkey-Greece Friendship Association (TYDD)’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 147-154. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Banias, Irene (2004) ‘Building Peace’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 77-82. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Belge, Murat (2004) ‘Observations on Civil Society’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 27-32. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Birand, Mehmet (2004) ‘Media Can Enhance Peace in the Aegean Region’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 69-74. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press.

21 Demesticha, Maria and Yigit Aksakoglu (2004) ‘Youth as a Platform of Peace: AEGEE and Student Exchange Program Between Turkey and Greece’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 83-92. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Livaneli, Zulfu (2004) ‘On Turkish and Greek Civil Society Dialogue’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 11-16. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Macar, Elcin (2004) ‘The Lausanne Treaty Emigrants Foundation’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 93-100. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Millas, Hercules (2004) ‘The Mystery of the Affectionate Chat between Turks and Greeks’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 17-26. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Oral, Zeynep (2004) ‘A Practice for Developing Relations between Turkey and Greece: “WINPEACE”’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 137-146. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Silier, Orhan (2004) ‘A Lot Can be Done to Curb the Effects of Chauvinism’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 101- 106. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Tarikayha, Nilufer (2004) ‘Turkish-Greek Culture and Art Festivals for Promoting Dialogue’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 155-162. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press. Toksoz, Fikret (2004) ‘Relations Between Turkish and Greek Local Governments’ in Belge, T. (ed.) Voices for the Future: Civic Dialogue Between Turks and Greeks, pp. 107-114. Istanbul: Bilgi University Press.

Interviews cited: #1: Former Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Istanbul, 25 February 2004. #2: Turkish Foreign Ministry Directorate General for Bilateral Relations with Greece, Ankara, 3 March 2004. #3: Former Ambassador to Greece, Ankara, 4 March 2004.

22 #4: Greek journalist, Istanbul 18 February 2004. #5: Staff Member, Civil Society Development Program, Representation of the European Commission to Ankara, Ankara, 18 November 2003. #6: Project Coordinator, Turkish-Greek Civic Dialogue Project, Ankara, 2 March 2004. #7: Activist, WINPEACE, Istanbul, 9 February 2004. #8: Activist, Founding Member of Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly, Istanbul, 9 February 2004. #9: Activist, WINPEACE, Athens, 12 March 2004. #10: Project Coordinator, Civil Society Development Program, Representation of the European Commission to Ankara, Athens, 11 March 2004. #11: Project Coordinator, Cross Border Cooperation, Representation of the European Commission to Ankara, Ankara, 3 March 2004.

23 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: • Previous official and civil society efforts at Greek-Turkish cooperation all proved to be short-lived, but the current rapprochement is more likely to be durable because it clearly possesses an EU dimension. The EU has changed the material and social structures in which political and civil society actors act. It has empowered those political and civil society actors interested in promoting Greek- Turkish cooperation in relation to those who see the Greek and Turkish national interests to be necessarily conflicting (pp. 1-7). • This paper assesses the EU’s impact on Greek-Turkish relations by analyzing what the EU means for political and civil society leaders in Turkey and Greece who are working to improve the relations (p. 8). • According to political and civil society leaders in Turkey and Greece, the EU has served two main functions: It has provided crucial funding for Greek-Turkish activities, and it has legitimized the pursuit of Greek-Turkish cooperation (p. 8). • The impact of EU funding has been the strongest, in cases where the EU has specifically supported local and grassroots organizations, successfully combined the objectives of Greek-Turkish cooperation and Turkish civil society development, and facilitated the formation of new partnerships between Greek and Turkish organizations. The form and implementation of EU funding have sometimes eased and other times hindered the realization of these goals (pp. 10- 13). • At the official level, the EU has legitimized the pursuit of alternative, reformist policies in Turkey and Greece. It is significant that the EU is endowed with similar meanings and capacities by Greek and Turkish policymakers (pp. 14-6). • The EU serves to legitimize Greek-Turkish cooperation at the civil society level. The EU provides a common denominator or reference point for activists to gather around. Especially in the case of Turkish activists, the EU legitimizes their efforts for Greek-Turkish cooperation, because they perceive themselves and are also perceived by others as not only working for Greek-Turkish cooperation but also for [Turkey’s membership in] the EU (pp.16-17).

24 • The EU has also legitimized a limited change in the prevalent discourse in the two countries, such that the ‘talkers and the silent ones have changed places’ (Millas, 2004). While previously, the conflict-enhancing talk of the hawks, with its emphasis on threat and nationalism was the more vocal and legitimate discourse for talking of the Other, now it is the conflict-diminishing talk of the doves, with its emphasis on friendship, cooperation, and EU integration (p. 17).

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The University of Birmingham Department of Political Science and International Studies Edgbaston Birmingham B15 2TT United Kingdom Telephone +44 (0)121 414 8233 Fax +44 (0)121 414 3496 Email: [email protected]

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ISSN: 17431840

EUBorderConf working papers are published within the context of the research project “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association” (EUBorderConf), funded by the European Union’s Fifth Framework Programme, with additional funds from the British Academy, and co-ordinated at the Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS), The University of Birmingham. The series may be of interest to anyone engaged with contemporary debates on the EU and border conflicts, including academics, PhD students and people working in the field. For more information please contact Dr Michelle Pace at [email protected], or visit www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk.

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