Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies The Talkers and the Silent Ones The EU and Change in Greek-Turkish Relations Bahar Rumelili, Ph.D. Research Fellow Bogazici University/ University of Birmingham No. 10 October 2004 I. Introduction Greek-Turkish relations, in many ways, provides a fruitful case for scholars interested in the EU’s role in the transformation of border conflicts. First of all, it is a case where the impact of the EU is widely mentioned, but has not yet been comprehensively and systematically studied (Rumelili, 2004a). Secondly, because the EU has been a factor in Greek-Turkish relations since the early 1960s, the case contains many useful insights about the conditions under which the EU can positively impact border conflicts. There is a clear puzzle in the EU involvement in Greek-Turkish conflicts: Up until late 1990s, the EU failed to have a positive impact. Countering the links made between European integration and peace, Greek-Turkish conflicts multiplied and intensified as Greece and Turkey developed closer institutional relations with the EU. However, clearly since 1999, we observe a promising rapprochement between Turkey and Greece, one which is founded on the principles and procedures of the EU (Rumelili, 2003; 2004a). How the role of the EU changed from an additional forum for Greek- Turkish rivalry to a foundation for Greek-Turkish reconciliation is a very interesting empirical question that contains valuable insights for understanding the conditions for successful EU involvement in border conflicts. And finally, the case of Greek-Turkish relations demonstrates the complex interaction between the domestic and EU-level conditions in bringing about conflict change. As will be discussed in detail in this working paper, there have always been domestic actors in both countries, who saw the futility of the ongoing conflicts, and sought to improve the bilateral relations. The longer-term democratization and socialization influences of the EU in Greece and Turkey have cascaded1 with Turkey’s EU membership candidacy in 1999, enabling the pro-change domestic actors to convince the skeptics, mobilize coalitions, and to silence their opponents. Afterwards, the domestic actors thus enabled have, in turn, furthered EU impact by successfully using the EU as a symbol and as a legitimating handle in their advocacy for change. 1 See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) for a discussion on how ‘norm cascades’ occur. 1 Commenting on the recent changes in Greek-Turkish relations, Hercules Millas, an eminent scholar and a vocal advocate of Greek-Turkish cooperation, concludes: ‘The talkers and silent ones have changed places. There have always been both hawks and doves in the two countries. Before, the environment was hospitable to the hawks; now, it is more suited to the doves’ (2004: 21). This quote provides an apt title for this paper because it highlights the two important arguments that I will advance: First, the tipping point for change in Greek- Turkish relations has been a change ‘in environment’; that is, in the material and social structures within which political and civil society leaders act. I will argue that these new material and social structures have been provided, first and foremost, by Turkey’s EU membership candidacy. In Greece, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has given a basis to consolidate an alternative foreign policy towards Turkey, the policy of encouraging Turkey’s Europeanization. In Turkey, the explicit link made by the Helsinki European Council between Turkey’s progress on EU membership and the peaceful resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes has given official and private efforts to promote Greek-Turkish cooperation significance, urgency, and most importantly, legitimacy. In addition, Turkey’s EU membership candidacy has unleashed funding to civil society efforts directed toward Greek-Turkish cooperation. Second, Millas underscores that the change in Greek-Turkish relations has been achieved through the empowerment of those political and civil society actors in favor of Greek-Turkish cooperation in relation to others who perceive the Greek and Turkish national interests as naturally conflicting. This captures well the complex interaction between EU and domestic-level factors that was mentioned earlier. The empirical research that will be presented in this paper also validates the argument that the effectiveness of the EU in promoting Greek-Turkish cooperation has stemmed mostly not from its direct interventions but from the success of various domestic actors, empowered by the EU, in using the EU as a symbol and as a legitimating handle. The first section of this paper charts the nature and extent of positive change achieved in Greek-Turkish relations since 1999. It highlights the fact that Greek-Turkish relations have never suffered from a lack of domestic actors pushing for change, but that those actors have lacked an environment conducive to consolidating their efforts. The 2 second section of the paper draws on interviews conducted with Greek and Turkish political and civil society leaders in 2004 to analyze what the EU has meant for domestic actors in promoting change. The interview findings suggest that among the four pathways identified by Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2004) as the processes through which the EU can impact border conflicts, the enabling impact has been primarily important in Greek-Turkish conflicts. Other forms of EU influence have served more specific, but nevertheless important, functions. The material resources granted to non-governmental initiatives by the EU, i.e. the connective impact, have been used by civil society actors in diversifying and consolidating Greek-Turkish civil cooperation. The compulsory impact of the EU –the link made between the resolution of Greek-Turkish disputes and Turkey’s EU membership- has been crucial at the domestic level to convince the skeptics and to disempower the opponents of Greek-Turkish cooperation.2 And, the constructive impact of the EU has not fully materialized, but is noticeable in the ways in which the domestic actors in Greece and Turkey reproduce the authority and symbolic capital of the EU to build coalitions and silence their critics. II. The EU and the Changing Context of Greek-Turkish Cooperation There have always been numerous courageous politicians, businessmen, intellectuals, and activists on both sides of the Aegean, who have realized the futility of the ongoing Greek-Turkish conflicts and strived to improve the relations between the two societies. After the two crises over the continental shelf in 1976 and 1987, the leaders of the two countries (Karamanlis and Ecevit in 1978, and Papandreou and Ozal in 1987) initiated dialogue, signed memoranda of understanding on bilateral disputes, and undertook some reciprocal concessions (Tsakaloyannis, 1980; Pridham, 1991). In 1979, Zulfu Livaneli, a popular Turkish singer and composer, initiated a cultural dialogue with Greek artists and organized a series of joint concerts with the famous Greek composers and singers, Mikis Theodorakis and Maria Franduri (Livaneli, 2004). In 1980, the Turkish Milliyet daily began to award individuals who contribute to Greek-Turkish cooperation with the Abdi Ipekci Friendship and Peace Prize, commemorating its head 2 This argument is elaborated in detail in Rumelili (2004b). 3 journalist who was assassinated by rightist terrorists in 1979. Shortly after, a similar prize that began to be offered in Greece, through the efforts of retired engineer Andreas Politakis and the newspaper Eleftherotypia (Aydintasbas, p. 150). In the 1980s, in order to take better advantage of the tourism potential of the two countries, the municipalities of the Turkey’s Aegean Coast and of the Greek islands across began to cooperate (Toksoz, 2004). In 1985, the mayor of Dikili, Osman Ozguven, organized with the Mayor of the Lesvos, Stratis Pallis, the first Dikili Festival of Art and Culture. The two mayors were later awarded the 1989 Abdi Ipekci Peace Prize for this organization (Atauz, 2004). In the year 1987, Theodorakis and Livaneli established the Turkey-Greece Friendship Association (TGFA) (Aydintasbas, 2004). In 1988, a Turkish-Greek Media Conference was organized at the UNESCO General Center. Greek environmentalists from Chios and Lesvos participated in the human chain campaign to oppose the thermal power plant in Aliaga, Turkey (Atauz, 2004). The Turkish History Foundation, founded in 1991, brought together critical Greek and Turkish historians in projects aiming to purge chauvinistic content out of schoolbooks (Silier, 2004). As transnational contacts developed around the world, civil society leaders from Greece and Turkey also found the opportunity to meet during various international conferences. These meetings proved to be valuable contacts upon which Greek-Turkish cooperation was later advanced. For example, the founders of Women’s Initiative for Peace (WINPEACE), Zeynep Oral from Turkey and Margarita Papandreou initially met at the World Conference on Women held in Nairobi in 1985 (Oral, 2004). The former Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, was part of the Greek group that came to the founding Assembly of the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly (HCA) in 1990. The HCA introduced Papandreou to different and critical voices from Turkey, and was formative of Papandreou’s future political vision towards Turkey. (Belge, p. 28; also interview #8). Turkish and Greek municipalities met at the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) meetings,