Solidarity Economy in Italy

Author: Iside Tacchinardi

Student number: 12759007

Supervisor Dr. ir. Y. P. B. (Yves) van Leynseele

Second Reader Dr. D. L. (Dannis) Arnold

Research Master’s International Development Studies

Graduate School of Social Science University of Amsterdam

31 May, 2021

Acknowledgements

To all the people who believe in change, who wake up and still act upon this world at their local and small-scale level. We need you. I met many inspiring and determined people in this journey through the solidarity economy in Italy. Thank you all. Even if we met in rather peculiar global circumstances, you still passed down to me your beautiful values and essence. There are many people that I wish to thank for accompanying me during this unexpected year. Thank you to my supervisor, Yves, for your sharp comments and ability to push me to improve my work. Thank you to Dario from Bologna University, for our meetings in Piazza Verdi and your availability to discuss my findings during fieldwork. Thank you, Dad, for always being incredibly good at making me laugh even on the gloomiest days. You have thought me how to be passionate about whatever I am doing, about life. I thank all my family, my grandmother, Giusi, for her unconditional love; Marina, for her endless acceptance; my young sisters Ella and Naima, for their cheerfulness, and for contributing to the cover of this thesis. Thank you to my dear friend Emma, for your sweetness, for always believing in me, and for the long hours studying together. To Yassine, for your love, support, and understanding. You have given me confidence and motivation also in the most stressful times. I sincerely thank you for that. To Enrico and Federico, for your kind words helping me to navigate the maze of life since we were small. To my one and only friend in Bologna, Francesco, thank you for making me feel at home in Bologna and giving me the chance to live with your sweet dog Django. Thank you to my Amsterdam friends and community, you were there to sustain me during my move back to Amsterdam, to Johnny, Tasha, Adam, Koen, Matteo, Michele, Anna, and Jaya. Thank you for our cooking, dancing, and talking. To my dear friends around the world, who are never too far away to give me strength, courage, and enthusiasm. Thank you for all our calls and for always checking up on me. Indeed, the people I would like to thank are endless as everyone I have met has given me something to treasure, contributing to my work and the person I have become. I get my resiliency, inspiration, and joy from all of you, young and old, every day.

Abstract

Our food system urgently needs a change to address problems on both the production and the consumption side. Whilst agricultural land is degrading due to intensive industrial agriculture, consumers face obesity and malnutrition. Alternative food networks (AFNs) take up the challenge to produce, distribute, and consume food differently. These networks – comprising of solidarity purchasing groups, food cooperatives, and community sustained agriculture – are sustainable in environmental and social terms. Existing literature has addressed how AFNs can be mainstreamed by scaling out, up, and deep. Thus, this paper seeks to understand the scaling- up process; it unravels how these groups can reach institutional extension and influence policymaking. Creser (the Regional Coordination Network for the Solidarity Economy in Emilia-Romagna) is the case study of this investigation. It is a network that links AFNs and different solidarity economy organizations together. Applying naturalistic inquiry, this investigation draws its results from semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant observation. Firstly, findings show that networking and having leaders steering the movement’s actions and discourse are key scaling-up drivers. Although, Creser upscaling does not happen without constraints, namely: a lack of human resources and little knowledge- sharing at the network level. Hence, scaling-up unfolds as a slow and complex bottom-up practice. Secondly, the results highlight interesting alliance-building practices: democratic discussion methods (e.g., consensus method), community-based relations, and word-of-mouth communication. In conclusion, this paper argues that to influence policymaking AFNs should create trans-local allices (e.g., join a solidarity economy network), have key leaders, and maintain their autonomous and democratic organizational form.

Keywords: Scaling-up, Scaling, Alternative Food Networks, Solidarity Economy, Alliance- making.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3

ABSTRACT 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

LIST OF FIGURES 8

LIST OF TABLES 8

LIST OF TEXTBOXES 8

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 10

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 13

2.1. EMERGENCE OF THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY 13 2.2. SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: A GENERAL DEFINITION 14 2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY 14 2.4. ALTERNATIVE FOOD NETWORKS 17 2.5. TRANSLOCALITY AND SCALING 18 2.6. SCALING OUT, UP, AND DEEP 19 2.7. CONCEPTUALIZING ALLIANCE-BUILDING 20 Organizational Form 20 Common Discourse 21 2.8. CONDITIONS & STRATEGIES FOR SCALING-UP 22 Capacity Building 22 Network Building 23 Socio-political context 23 Presence of Key Actors 24 2.9. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 25

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODS 26

3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 26 3.2. OPERATIONALIZATION TABLE 27 3.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 30 3.4. DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS 31 a. Units of observation and units of analysis 31 b. Sampling methods 38 c. Data Collection and Analysis 38 3.5. QUALITY CRITERIA 39

3.6. ETHICS AND POSITIONALITY 40

CHAPTER 4: CRESER, TRACING ITS ORIGINS & CURRENT FORM 42

4.1. INTRODUCTION 42 4.2. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN ITALY 42 4.3. THE ITALIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 43 4.4. THE EMERGENCE OF AFNS IN ITALY 44 4.5. EMILIA-ROMAGNA: STRONG FOOD & COOPERATIVE TRADITION 45 4.6. HISTORY OF CRESER & THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY LAW 47 Law-making Process: how did It all start? 47 Two Parallel Journeys: solidarity economy assemblies & institutional dialogue 50 Creser: how was it born and structured? 51 The Law Formulation 54 4.6. THE INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 55 Solidarity Economy Forum 55 Thematic Working Groups (GLTs) 56 Permanent Roundtables 56 Solidarity Economy Observatory 56 4.6. CONCLUSION 56

CHAPTER 5: FACTORS ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING THE SCALING-UP 58

5.1. A PROGRESSIVE REGION WITH CONSTRAINING REGULATIONS 58 5.2. LEADERS, INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS, & INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS 61 5.3. KNOWLEDGE-SHARING & CO-CREATION 64 Knowledge-sharing with peripheral organizations 66 “We are not very well prepared when it comes to communication” 67 5.4. NETWORK-BUILDING 68 Vision for change 69 Networking 69 Working on the ground (‘lavoro sui territori’) 70 On-the ground-work strategies 71 5.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 72

CHAPTER 6: SCALING-UP STRATEGIES & CHALLENGES 74

6.1. CRESER UPSCALING DIFFICULTIES 74 Creser and the institutional bodies: a complex relationship 74 Different decision-making methods & intentions 75 Difficult dialogue: bureaucracy & professionalism 76 Institutional turn-over 77 6.2. SCALING-UP STRATEGIES 78 The Solidarity Economy Forum and the 19/2014 Law 78

Practical strategies: bring examples and be well prepared! 79 6.3. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 80

CHAPTER 7: CRESER ALLIANCE-BUILDING 82

7.1. ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 82 Community-based relations 83 Creser Formalization: risk of bureaucratic relations 84 7.2. DECISION-MAKING METHOD 86 Democratic relations: enriching but slow consensus method 86 7.3. ALLIANCE-BUILDING DIFFICULTIES 88 7.4. ALLIANCE BUILDING STRATEGIES 90 7.5. COMMON DISCOURSE 92 Why do people join Creser? What is their mission? 92 7.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 95

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 97

BIBLIOGRAPHY 101

APPENDIX 108

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES (IN THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE, ITALIAN) 108 INTERVIEW GUIDELINES TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH 109 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 109

List of Figures

FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL MODEL...... 25 FIGURE 2: RESEARCH DESIGN VISUAL MODEL (ADAPTED FROM INVANKOVA ET AL., 2006). .... 31 FIGURE 3: CAMPI APERTI FARMERS MARKET IN BOLOGNA, ITALY. RETRIEVED ON MAY 5, 2021, FROM: HTTPS://WWW.CONSIDEROVALORE.IT/MERCATI-CONTADINI-BOLOGNA/ ...... 46 FIGURE 4: TIMELINE SHOWING THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY LAW-MAKING PROCESS...... 50 FIGURE 5: THE PICTURE WAS TAKEN AT A MONTHLY CRESER ASSEMBLY ON THE 17TH OF OCTOBER 2020. SOURCE: AUTHOR...... 52 FIGURE 6: VISUALIZING THE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND THE LAYERS OF REPRESENTATION...... 55

List of Tables

TABLE 1: OPERATIONALIZATION TABLE. 27 TABLE 2: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY GROUPS PARTAKING IN THIS RESEARCH (UNITS OF OBSERVATION). 37 TABLE 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS INDICATING THE INTERVIEW NUMBER (USED IN THE THESIS), DATE, LOCATION, AND THE INTERVIEWEES’ GENDER, PSEUDONYM, AND ORGANIZATION NAME. 109

List of Textboxes

TEXTBOX 1: LEADER FIGURE EXAMPLE. ______62 TEXTBOX 2: CHIEF FIGURE EXAMPLE. ______64 TEXTBOX 3: CRESER TYPICAL MEETING. ______85 TEXTBOX 4: EXAMPLE OF CRESER MEMBERS DIFFERENT POSITIONS. ______90

“Today we are faced with a challenge that calls for a shift in our thinking, so that humanity stops threatening its life- support system. We are called to assist the Earth to heal her wounds and in the process heal our own – indeed, to embrace the whole creation in all its diversity, beauty and wonder.”

Wangari Maathai – Nobel Lecture, Oslo, 2004

Chapter 1: Introduction

The global food system is unsustainable and under threat. Both environmental and social problems result from the current patterns of food production and consumption (Marsden et al., 2001). On the one hand, we observe rising levels of obesity – affecting 672 million people worldwide, while an additional 1.3 billion are overweight (UNEP, 2020). Whilst conversely, we notice malnutrition problems and food poverty – which sees 820 undernourished people around the globe (UNEP, 2020). These contradictory yet interconnected socio-health impacts are the outcomes of how our food system is structured nowadays (Marsden et al., 2018). As it currently exists, the food system is not only negatively affecting consumers but also producers (Marsden et al., 2018). It constrains small and middle-size producers who experience a “cost- price” squeeze. Accordingly, the added value of food products goes mostly into the hands of catering, retailing, and processing corporations (Marsden et al., 2018). Thus, farmers struggle to survive market pressure (Hebinck, 2018; Marsden, 2016).

On the other hand, the literature and the wider public (FAO, 2019; UNEP, 2020) stress the environmental externalities associated with the food system (Marsden et al., 2018; Marsden et al., 2001; Sonnino et al., 2016). The industrialized agri-food sector causes rising levels of carbon emissions and water, air, and soil pollution (Sonnino et al., 2016). Thus, when considering the aforementioned issues, it is undeniable that the dominant food regime needs a change (FAO, 2019). In this context, countervailing food movements are emerging and thriving for sustainable food production. The literature refers to these movements as Alternative Food Networks (AFNs) (Hebinck, 2018; Marsden et al., 2001; Marsden et al., 2018). Multiple authors address AFNs as niches of social innovation because they re-localize the food system building on consumer-producer relationships. If scaled up, AFNs could enable transitioning towards a more sustainable food system that begins to tackle the above-mentioned socio- environmental ills (Marsden et al., 2018; Pitt & Jones, 2016).

To understand how to mainstream AFNs, this research merges insights from social innovation theory (Moore et al., 2015; Pitt & Jones, 2016; Omann et al., 2019) and rural sociology (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017; Marsden et al., 2018; Rosset, 2015). These theories pinpoint two intertwined processes necessary to scale up AFNs. First, theories about sustainable food production within rural sociology show how AFNs must create trans-local

alliances to increase their impact on the food system (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017; Marsden et al., 2018; Santo & Moragues-Faus, 2019). Interestingly, AFNs often build alliances with solidarity economy movements, as in the researched case. Thus, in this research, the solidarity economy figures as an umbrella movement under which multiple AFNs build alliances among themselves and with other solidarity economy groups (i.e., ethical financing groups, Fair-Trade cooperatives, etc.). Second, social innovation theory addresses scaling up, out, and deep, as the mechanisms behind scaling niche innovation, such as AFNs (Moore et al., 2015). This research focuses on scaling up, which means reaching up to institutions to influence policymaking (Moore et al., 2015). Here, social innovation theory (Omann et al., 2019) lays out four main enabling factors for scaling-up: networking, key actors; capacity building; and a favorable socio-political context. These factors represent an important framework of analysis in the current research. Nevertheless, this theory does not go deeper into understanding how these enabling factors play out in practice, how they unfold, and what the constraints are in scaling up. Aside from this, the theories about sustainable food production do not delve into the practices and strategies that AFNs use when they build a trans-local network (e.g. within the larger solidarity economy movement). Here, alliance-building means finding a middle ground among the different positions and ideas of the participating groups (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). Since food systems need urgent change and multiple questions remain unanswered in the literature, this topic calls for further research.

The current investigation prioritizes the area of Bologna in Italy. It takes the experience of the Creser (“Coordinamento Regionale dell’Economia Solidale dell’Emilia-Romagna”) as a case study for scaling-up. Creser is a regional solidarity economy coordination network comprising fifty-three different groups, including several alternative food networks (i.e., Bologna’s biggest producers’ group, Campi Aperti; two food cooperatives, Camilla and OltreFood; more than ten solidarity purchasing groups; one community-supported agriculture, Arvaia). Here, these AFNs join Creser because they embrace the same set of values as the solidarity economy. Both groups aspire to create and mainstream an alternative economic model – which also envisions an alternative food system – respecting people and the environment. Hence, in the Creser context, AFNs can align their interests with the solidarity economy and build a network to transform the policy realm from the bottom-up (i.e., scale up). Accordingly, Creser has pushed the regional government into approving the 19/2014 law: “NORME PER IL SOSTEGNO E LA PROMOZIONE DELL’ECONOMIA SOLIDALE” (2014) (‘Norms for the support and promotion of the Solidarity Economy Law’). Since then, Creser

continues to be a citizen-led network that seeks to get this law implemented. Therefore, Creser serves as a case study for investigating the processes of scaling up and alliance-building at play. Consequently, the main research question leading this investigation is:

How are the AFNs within CRESER involved in scaling up and how are they able to forge alliances within the expanding Solidarity Economy movement?

This research mainly draws on semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and focus groups. The researcher conducted embedded research, as she worked voluntarily within Creser, helping with the movement’s communication (i.e., websites publications, emails, meetings briefs). Her presence in the network allowed her to participate in different meetings, discussions, and gatherings, giving her interesting insights into the inner workings and processes at play. In the following section, this research lays out the theoretical framework. Afterwards, it touches upon the research methodology and ethical considerations. The third chapter displays the research context, explaining Creser history and organization. Later on, the research findings are elaborated in the analysis into three chapters. Lastly, the research presents its conclusion.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This research positions itself within the topic of the solidarity economy. Indeed, Creser – which represents the case study of this investigation – is the Solidarity Economy coordination network for Emilia-Romagna. Thus, to better understand the research context, the theoretical framework starts with an overview of the solidarity economy. Secondly, it zooms in on alternative food networks (AFNs), which are often part of the solidarity economy. The literature refers to AFNs as re-localized sustainable food niches. Thirdly, the theory highlights the idea of trans-locality; it shows how AFNs have to join larger networks (e.g., solidarity economy networks) to move beyond their local scale and gain strength. Here, the literature review shows a knowledge gap. The strategies and practices that AFNs use to build alliances appear under-researched; thus, the current study aims at unveiling such practices and strategies. Moreover, the literature stresses the need to mainstream alternative food networks. Hence, the theoretical framework focuses on scaling up, namely, how AFNs can reach up to institutions and influence policymaking to enhance their impact on the food system. Thereby, the last section examines the scaling-up factors that social innovation theory identifies; it highlights the second knowledge gap. Indeed, the factors that enable the scaling-up process of AFNs remain quite unexplored; the literature does not indicate how these factors play out in practice.

2.1. EMERGENCE OF THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY

The literature mostly portrays the Solidarity Economy movement as the reaction to socioeconomic shocks and crisis. Moulaert and Ailenei (2005) describe the solidarity economy as society’s response to fix the damages made by the economic growth development model. The literature underlines how the solidarity economy is a movement that stands out as a reaction to the neoliberal individualistic logic and principles (Dash, 2016; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005). Indeed, dissatisfactions with the capitalistic model prompt the emergence of new social bonds, relationships, and innovations to satisfy people’s needs (Dash, 2016; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005; Uttig, 2015). This movement introduces solidaristic forms of collective provisioning as a response to recurring financial, energy, food, and climate crises (Dinerstein, 2014; Uttig, 2015). The solidarity economy seeks to meet society’s needs given that the state and the market (in crisis) are not able to fulfill them (Muleart & Ailenei, 2005; Utting, 2015). Since markets

and states cannot ensure jobs for all, the solidarity economy seeks to provide new economic activities outside of the market (Kawano, 2009; Laville, 2009; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005; Utting, 2015). These activities have two characteristics. First, they re-embed the economy in social and environmental principles (Laville, 2009; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005; Utting, 2015). Secondly, they rely on active citizenship to strengthen the role of communities in the economy (Laville, 2009; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005; Utting, 2015).

2.2. SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: A GENERAL DEFINITION

Moulaert and Aileni (2005) claim that there is no one-fits-all definition of the solidarity economy. However, the literature shows how, generally, the solidarity economy aims at providing collective services and common goods (i.e., creating benefits, relationships, and new knowledge for the community) (Backie & Connelly, 2016; Laville, 2009; Moulaert & Aileni, 2005). It is an economy that enhances active citizenship; it involves producers, consumers, and, more in general, more workers to act in solidarity in multiple economic sectors (e.g., agriculture, good provisioning, and service sector) (Utting, 2015). Accordingly, Grasseni et al. (2015) call the solidarity economy experiences “schools for democracy” to stress their democratic and participative dimension. The literature sees this movement as a space for cross- fertilization among different activists’ networks, for experimenting with models of participation, representation, and shared construction of values (Grasseni et al., 2015; Utting, 2015). Additionally, the solidarity economy promotes an economy with social and environmental objectives at its core (Utting, 2015). Indeed, this movement pools together many alternative ways of living, producing and consuming goods that share social, economic, environmental, and cultural goals (Kawano, 2009). Similarly, Miller (2009) describes the solidarity economy as a framework in which to envision a more sustainable and just economy. Also, the literature emphasizes this movement as a space for understanding how to put in practice economic alternatives outside of the market (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Grasseni et al., 2015).

2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY

As it emerges from above, the purpose of the solidarity economy is to transform society and its underlying economic system (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). As a result, the solidarity economy presents practical alternatives beyond the capitalistic and business-driven

economy (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). It focuses on sustainability rather than profits; it highlights the role of ethics and redistributive justice in economic activities; and it emphasizes active citizenship and democracy as key for re-thinking the economy (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). Interestingly, to create this alternative economic model (for which there exists no blueprint), the solidarity economy has to connect multiple experiences of non-market economies existing on the ground (examples below). It has to link them together to forge a powerful social movement (Miller, 2009; Grasseni et al., 2015). However, these solidarity economy initiatives are mainly run by volunteers (Grasseni et al., 2015; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005). Lohmann (1992) characterizes voluntary associations as having free participation and uncoercive membership. Thereby, Grasseni et al. (2015) highlight how solidarity economy groups – due to their volunteer base – sometimes lack the human resources needed to implement projects that require the connection of different actors on the ground.

In addition to this, the literature pinpoints how the solidarity economy faces other shortcomings besides a lack of human resources. Indeed, a lack of organization at higher scales, amateurism in financial management, and fluctuating institutional support emerge as challenges (Beckie & Connelly, 2016; Moulaert & Ailenei, 2005; Utting, 2015). Also, Utting (2015) highlights how “structural contexts, relations with external actors and institutions, trade- offs between different objectives, and internal dynamics within SSE [Social and Solidarity Economy] organizations […]” (p. 5) constrain this movement in linking together the existing alternative economic activities on the ground. Thus, the literature critically remarks that due to internal factors (i.e., trade-offs between the different goals of solidarity economy organizations) and external factors (i.e., contextual dynamics and constraining relations with institutions), building a solidarity economy movement is not easy (Utting, 2015).

Another characteristic of the solidarity economy is that it does not hold a finalized ideology (Miller, 2009). Instead, different groups pave the movement’s way together as they share the following values: cooperation rather than competition, individual and collective wellbeing rather than profit, social and economic justice, environmental responsibility, democracy, and pluralism (Miller, 2009). Here, the solidarity economy actors comprise a wide array of grassroots initiatives to produce services and goods (Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). Indeed, they include fair trade networks, solidarity purchasing groups, consumers groups for collective provisioning, solidarity finance (i.e., alternative currencies, community-based saving schemes), workers and producers cooperatives, open-source software projects, community land trusts, community gardens, community-supported agriculture (Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). A

couple of examples of solidarity economy movements from the literature are the Unemployed Workers Organizations in Argentina – end of the 1990s, and Brazil’s Rural Landless Workers Movement (MST) – occurring at the end of the 1980s (Dinerstein, 2014). The former started as a large number of unemployed people who autonomously created workers’ cooperatives and communal projects to meet their needs (Dinerstein, 2014). The latter saw a multitude of landless farmers occupying land and organizing themselves in settlements as a way to demand agrarian reforms (Dinerstein, 2014). These farmers promoted solidarity by leading a community life and working and sharing the land. Also, they developed projects to educate people to live in solidarity and respecting the environment (e.g., through farming and housing cooperatives) (Dinerstein, 2014).

Despite the promising benefits of the Solidarity Economy, Dinerstein (2014) raises a critical issue in regard to this movement. The author claims that the solidarity economy risks transforming itself into a tool of neoliberal governance when translated into state policies (Dinerstein, 2014). Dinerstein (2014) argues that this translation (i.e., creating social policy that incorporates solidarity economy activities) often erases the emancipatory and transformative potential of the solidarity economy (i.e., being experiences beyond capitalism). So, state policies tend to reduce solidarity economy practices into tools for neoliberal governance: they can wipe out every aspect – evading the capitalist logic – deemed inadequate (Dinerstein, 2014). Therefore, the solidarity economy has to negotiate between getting co- opted into the power dynamics regulating the status quo and providing alternatives beyond it (Dinerstein, 2014).

As we have seen above, the solidarity economy offers an overarching framework to the present research; in the context of this research, it encompasses multiple actors, among which it included community-supported agriculture (CSA), solidarity purchasing groups (Gas), producer’s groups (e.g., farmer’s groups). In these solidarity-economy groups, food production, distribution, and consumption rely on citizen participation (Dacheux & Goujon, 2012). For example, solidarity purchasing groups are citizen-led consumer groups, while CSA and food cooperatives build on citizen participation on both the farmer and the consumer’s side. These economic activities show a commitment to citizens’ autonomous management, collective decision-making (i.e., the consumers and farmers of a CSA make decisions jointly), and freedom of association (Dacheux & Goujon, 2012). Hence, they advance the democratization of the economy (Dacheux & Goujon, 2012). Consequently, the next section

sheds light on these groups (i.e., Gas, CSA, farmer’s cooperatives, etc.), which are often part of solidarity economy movements (as in my case-study).

2.4. ALTERNATIVE FOOD NETWORKS

This research mainly focuses on sustainable food production, distribution, and consumption. Nevertheless, groups producing, distributing, and consuming food alternatively (i.e., CSA, Gas, farmer’s groups) often join larger solidarity economy movements. In the current investigation, the solidarity economy (specifically Creser) represents the entry point to zoom in on these groups. Alternative food networks (AFNs) are often portrayed as counter- movements emerging against the industrialized model of production, distribution, and consumption of food (Marsden et al., 2001; Marsden & Farioli, 2015). Whilst these counter- movements acquire multiple names, Feagan (2007) employs the headings of ‘AFNs’ to generally capture the different food initiatives and movements spreading across Europe and Northern America.

These food movements actively position themselves against the agri-food system (i.e., industrialized agriculture and supermarket chains) and aim to solve forms of regional food insecurity (Marsden et al., 2018). They advocate for food sovereignty (i.e., framers’ rights to produce and distribute food independently from market dynamics) and strong ecological objectives (Marsden et al., 2018). To offset the corporate food model (Harris, 2010), AFNs employ the following tools: a) they embrace territorial specificity and diversity by adopting agroecological principles (i.e., growing local and organic food crops in polycultures); b) they reduce transaction costs – the expenses implied in buying and selling goods on the market (i.e., bargaining costs and search and information costs); c) they create new relationships with society through direct selling; d) and they gain extra value by promoting the quality of their products (Marsden et al., 2001). Indeed, they promote the specificity of local food, crop diversity, a more holistic type of agriculture, and dynamic rural-urban links (Virnig, 2009).

Furthermore, Marsden et al. (2018) highlight the solidarity and cooperative values embodied in AFNs. The authors explain how AFNs are civil regulatory arrangements that strive to achieve local food security by promoting autonomous production and consumption. Interestingly, Jarosz (2008) define AFNs according to four principles, namely: 1) shortened consumer-producer distances; 2) local purchasing venues for food, such as farmer markets, co-

operatives, and community-supported agriculture (CSA); 3) small producers adopting holistic agricultural practices; 4) a commitment to sustainability throughout the food supply chain. In light of the above, AFNs alignment with the Solidarity Economy appears clear, as both movements seek to escape the capitalistic system and create sustainable economic activities outside market logics by embracing solidarity and cooperative values.

Moreover, since people within AFNs start producing the fruits, vegetables, and food crops typically found in their geographical region and diets (and not cash crops to export), they re-connect with the ecology of the place they live in (Horlings, 2016; Horlings et al., 2020). They learn new local varieties of crops and re-discover what species of plants their soil has to offer. So, these people evade an agri-food system that forces farmers to cultivate non- place-based crops (i.e., soya, cacao, sugar) to answer market demands (Horlings, 2016; Horlings et al., 2020). Interestingly, both Feagan (2007) and Harris (2010) show support for the notion that food systems should re-localize. However, both authors recognize how any form of localism is tied to the global scale. Indeed, Feagan (2007) and Harris (2010) hold that AFNs should integrate the local with the non-local and always keep in mind the interconnection of scales. In addition, Born & Purcell (2006) stress how there is nothing inherent about scale. Therefore, the authors claim that the local scale can lead to certain outcomes (i.e., sustainability) depending on the agenda of the ones empowered by such a scale. Hence, Born & Purcell’s (2006) argument – suggesting to move beyond a fixed conception of scale – brings forward the idea of trans-locality.

2.5. TRANSLOCALITY AND SCALING

Marsden et al. (2018) understand trans-locality as building a coalition beyond the locality to connect different alternative food niches. The solidarity economy is an example of this trans- local coalition (linking AFNs on the ground). Indeed, the movement’s agenda includes, among other themes, the promotion of a sustainable food systems. Hence, creating trans-local food movements (e.g., embedded in solidarity economy movements) can kickstart a change in food production, distribution, and consumption patterns (Marsden et al., 2018; Sonnino et al., 2016, Rosset, 2015). Here, the idea of mainstreaming AFNs is explored merging two different but intertwining theories. First, rural sociology highlights the necessity to create alliances among AFNs for stimulating wider change in the food system (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017; Marsden et al., 2018; Santo & Moragues-Faus, 2019; Sonnino et al., 2016). From the same

perspective, since AFNs and solidarity economy groups can have different positions and ideas, alliance-building often implies finding a common ground between the more progressive and radical advocates (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011).

On the one hand, the progressive stance offers practical alternatives to the industrial agri-food model; it moves within the political and economic framework of the capitalistic system (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). It focuses on creating public policy that can enhance food justice and decrease inequity (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011, p. 124). On, the other hand, the radical stance in AFNs targets a deep structural change in the system governing food and agriculture (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). If extended to the solidarity economy movement, this division means that progressive groups believe more in a collaboration with the state and working within state policies while radical groups do not wish to do so (as they seek structural change). Beside finding a common ground between different positions, these rising movements need to enhance their social organization to establish themselves (Rosset, 2015). They must build a social infrastructure – which is key to construct a long-lasting movement of alternative food networks within the solidarity economy movement (Beckie and Connelly, 2016). Having a social infrastructure means building collaborations, relationships, and trust among community partners.

Second, social innovation theory emphasizes how, for transitioning into a more sustainable society, ‘scaling’ is necessary (Pitt & Jones, 2016). Accordingly, innovation at the microscale will accomplish more if expanded beyond the local, thus becoming widespread (Pitt & Jones, 2016). Multiple authors argue that alternative food networks should scale to mainstream their practices and achieve a far-reaching food system change (Ilieva & Hernandez, 2018; Moore et al., 2015; Omann et al., 2019; Pitt & Jones, 2016; Westley et al., 2014).

2.6. SCALING OUT, UP, AND DEEP

As seen above, the literature often links ideas of ‘scaling’ with theories of social innovation and Strategic Niche Management for system change (Moore et al., 2015; Omann et al., 2019; Pitt & Jones, 2016; Westley et al., 2014). Although the latter theories go beyond the scope of this research, it is interesting to see how this literature defines ‘scaling’. Moore et al. (2015) claim that if social innovations desire greater systemic impacts, they must undergo three types of scaling, namely: scaling out, up, and deep. Scaling out (horizontal) means disseminating successful practices to new communities (Moore et al, 2015); it involves increasing the number

of geographies and people engaged in AFNs (Pitt & Jones, 2016). Instead, scaling up (vertical) entails reaching institutional expansion and, thus, achieving institutional changes (i.e., reforms, laws, and policies) (Moore et al, 2015). Lastly, scaling deep implies changing the inner dimension of people; it means raising people’s awareness about sustainability, thus influencing their values, habits, and ideas (i.e., shopping at farmers’ markets rather than at supermarkets) (Moore et al., 2015). This definition of scaling has been widely adopted in the analyzed literature about alternative food networks and agroecological movements (Backie & Connelly, 2016; Ilieva & Hernandez, 2018; Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Omann et al., 2019; Parmentier, 2014; Pitt & Jones, 2016; Westley et al., 2014). Yet, this research focuses on the institutional dimension of scaling (scaling-up) which is elaborated in section 2.8.

2.7. CONCEPTUALIZING ALLIANCE-BUILDING

As we have seen above, AFNs must forge alliances also with other movements (i.e., the solidarity economy), to mainstream a sustainable food system. Here, the first gap in knowledge emerges. The strategies and practices through which AFNs can find a common ground and build alliances appear understudied in the literature. This research aims at unveiling such alliance-building practices and strategies. Consequently, it conceptualizes alliance-building into two dimensions. Accordingly, building an alliance implies both choosing an organizational form (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017) and reaching an agreement about a common discourse (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Miller, 2009; Rosset, 2015). The next section addresses the organizational form that a trans-local alliance of AFNs can take on. Afterwards, it elaborates further on the idea of common discourse.

Organizational Form

While building alliances, a rising movement must decide how to organize itself. Choosing an organizational form impacts the outcomes of such an alliance (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Interestingly, Duncan & Pascucci (2017) propose a framework to analyse the organizational forms of AFNs (which is here applied to the solidarity economy movement in which AFNs are embedded). They set out four typologies of relations that can characterize AFNs. Namely: community-based, market-based, democratic, and bureaucratic relations. Accordingly, market- based relations imply the presence of market incentives (i.e., quality-based and premium prices), and penalties (i.e., fees) (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Instead, communitarian relations

emphasize the sharing of knowledge and values among AFNs participants. Democratic relations entail a non-hierarchical structure with elections and shared decision rights (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Lastly, bureaucratic relations involve regulations, membership formalized by participation rules, and the application of standards, brands, and quality labels within the network (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017).

Moreover, Duncan & Pascucci (2017) argue that the way these networks organize themselves affects their transformative potential (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Indeed, if AFNs take on the organizational forms of the dominant food regime – bureaucratic and market based relations – they risk being co-opted by the dominant food regime. Instead, when AFNs organize around community-based and democratic relations – thus avoiding market pressure – they are more likely to have a transformative impact on the food system without being co-opted by it (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Similarly, the literature about agroecology highlights the importance of horizontal relationships and participatory and inclusive methods (i.e., non-hierarchical and community relations) for social mobilization, as these can empower the communities on the ground and strengthen their human capital (Altieri & Nichols, 2012; Parmentier, 2014; Rosset, 2015).

Common Discourse

As seen in the solidarity economy case, alliance-building is difficult and faces practical and organizational constraints (i.e., internal trade-offs between different members’ goals, organization amateurism) (Utting, 2015). Thus, having a common discourse is fundamental for overcoming such alliance-building constraints, and, in general, for social mobilization (Rosset, 2015). Indeed, Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al. (2018) declare that, “a clear, easily understandable discourse or frame that helps promote social action in a way that is understood and reproduced by collective is important” (p. 649).

Hence, a common discourse serves the purpose of both mobilizing and motivating people to join a specific cause (Rosset, 2015). Creating a common discourse means identifying a common identity and a shared set of values (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018). Similarly, Miller (2009) stresses how a perceived common identity and creating a set of shared values can link different solidarity economy actors and bring people together. Besides building alliances and joining larger movements, the literature considers ‘scaling up’ as how ANFs can mainstream their practices by influencing policy-making.

2.8. CONDITIONS & STRATEGIES FOR SCALING-UP

As it emerges from social innovation theory, scaling-up is the process through which alternative food networks can reach institutions and make an impact on policymaking (Moore et al, 2015). This means that AFNs can influence ‘the rules of the game’ by pushing for laws, regulations, and policies that enable them to operate more freely on the territory and institutionalize change in the food system (Omann et al., 2019; Pitt & Jones, 2016; Westley et al., 2014). Therefore, scaling-up implies that innovative civil society groups (such as AFNs and solidarity economy groups) reach up to and establish a relationship with the communal and regional government bodies. Considering the risks of scaling-up, an interesting issue emerges from the literature. Whilst grassroots movements cooperate with the state to develop public policies, they risk getting co-opted (Giraldo & McCune, 2019; Ilieva & Hernandez, 2018). Here, Ilieva and Hernandez (2018) show an almost paradoxical character of scaling up. Grassroots sustainable initiatives, such as AFNs, must show a degree of compatibility with the political and economic regime they oppose. In this respect, Ilieva and Hernandez (2018) argue that it is key that AFNs master the “ability to mobilize existing institutions while maintaining autonomy” (p. 13). Likewise, when Giraldo & McCune (2019) study agroecological movements participating in state politics, they explain how grassroots organizations can benefit from state support (e.g., through public procurement of sustainable food, etc.) as long as their autonomy is preserved. Therefore, one of the downsides of scaling up can be that grassroots organizations get co-opted by the agri-food system if they do not protect their autonomy (Giraldo & McCune, 2019; Ilieva & Hernandez, 2018).

Moreover, the literature about scaling-up pinpoints some drivers that enable and facilitate this bottom-up process. Precisely, Omann et al. (2014) layout four conditions for scaling up social innovations, namely: capacity building, network building, a favourable socio- political context, and the presence of key actors. This research employs these factors as an important framework of analysis. The upcoming section provides a conceptual definition of each factor.

Capacity Building

In general terms, capacity building involves the activities and procedures that improve an organization’s ability to perform its stated objectives (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001). It is both a process (learning to acquire specific skills) and an outcome (better performance due

to novel abilities). Thus, capacity building is an internal learning process —that can also be facilitated by external inputs, such as infrastructure and financial aid— wherein a group of people gains specific skills that can improve their performance (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001). Omann et al (2019) underline the importance of capacity building in scaling up social innovations. Here, training and knowledge exchange programs are key elements. In this research context, training means exchanging best practices and know-how in terms of both farming practices and organizational techniques (i.e., how to make online food orders and then organize the food distributions in a Gas, or the most effective way to structure a farmers market connecting different producers). Besides, at the level of an organization, capacity building translates into coordination and communication with other organizations and resource mobilization (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001).

Network Building

Interestingly, network-building closely relates to the previously illustrated idea of alliance- building. Along these lines, Rosset (2015) emphasizes the importance of involving a lot of people in social movements, thus creating a critical mass which can spread innovation. To build a network, the actors involved must have a common vision which means holding common objectives (similar to the notion of having a discursive identity and a shared set of values for social mobilization) (Omann et al., 2019). A common vision motivates and gives the network its guidelines for action. Also, the different communities that partake in a network must collaborate among themselves to create economic circuits (Grasseni et al., 2015). Thus, collaboration is a fundamental element; it allows the sharing of knowledge and experiences whilst it increases people’s social capital (Omann et al., 2019). Besides collaboration, co- creation is another essential element when building a network. It entails co-creating initiatives and projects (Omann et al., 2019).

Socio-political context

A favourable socio-political context can complement the efforts of AFNs as they scale up (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Omann et al., 2019). Indeed, institutional support can greatly influence the results of alternative food networks, especially through supportive policy (i.e., agricultural policies) (Laville, 2009; Rosset, 2015; Varghese & Hansen-Kuhn, 2013). However, it is mostly progressive governments that make such assistance available (Giraldo & McCune, 2019). Also, whilst Laville (2009) talks about how to scale up the solidarity economy,

he argues that public authorities should establish a social dialogue with the local civil society (e.g., in local concertation bodies). The author emphasizes that public authorities must collaborate to bring together local politicians and representatives. Laville (2009) pinpoints that institutional support can sometimes entail allocating funds for these movements that seek to scale up. Moreover, a favourable socio-political context can imply accommodating regulatory mechanisms and financial services provided by the public sector (Omann et al., 2019). It can also manifest itself through contextual factors such as external allies (e.g., NGOs) (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018) and forms of cultural encouragement that can play an auxiliary role in the scaling-up process (Omann et al., 2019).

Presence of Key Actors

Another important mechanism fostering the upscaling of AFNs is the presence of key actors within and outside the network. This points to the role played by pioneers, leaders, intermediary agents, and institutional entrepreneurs (Omann et al., 2019; Rosset, 2015; Westley et al., 2014). Here, pioneers and leaders are the frontrunners of the different movements which the network comprises of. Similarly, Rosset (2015) refers to charismatic leaders within a movement as drivers for scaling up. Nepstad and Bob (2006) argue that leaders can mobilize followers and attract the support of third parties thanks to their leadership capital. Leadership capital includes cultural capital, namely: communication skills and knowledge about both the communities on the ground (i.e., their context, experiences, and values) and the public context they wish to engage with (i.e., the circulating cultural principles, political ideas, policy frameworks) (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). Also, leadership capital involves social capital, rooted in strong ties (resulting from personal relationships and face-to-face interactions) and weak ties to larger outside networks (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). Lastly, leaders usually hold a degree of symbolic capital, intended as charisma, prestige, and social authority (Nepstad & Bob, 2006).

Instead, intermediary agencies can help to empower the movements’ stakeholders in different ways. They mainly “enable exchange of knowledge, skills development, and perform connecting and mediating functions to support innovation” (Bush et al., 2017, p. 138 in Omann et al., 2019, p. 13). Thus, intermediary agencies can comprise of individuals, research communities, institutions, and organizations such as NGOs (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Omann et al., 2019). Additionally, institutional entrepreneurs are actors (within the network) who aspire for institutional change and can cross scales to move AFNs upwards (Laville, 2009; Westley et al., 2014). To do so, they must have social, political, and resource

mobilization skills. Indeed, these skills allow the institutional entrepreneurs to sense when the momentum for scaling is happening and thus mobilize their contacts (Westely et al., 2014).

2.9. CONCEPTUAL MODEL

This conceptual model (Figure 1) combines the theoretical concepts mentioned above. It shows how, within the solidarity economy framework, mainstreaming AFNs requires a process of scaling (out, up, and deep) and alliance-building. The conceptual scheme emphasizes how this research focuses on the factors enabling scaling up (i.e., capacity building, network building, socio-political context, and key actors). Also, the model illustrates how alliance-building is the practical action required to build a network – which involves an organizational form and a common discourse. Hereafter, the next chapter displays the research methodology.

Solidarity Economy

Organizational Form

Capacity Building

Network Building Alliance- Building Scaling Scaling Up by Alternative Socio-political Food Context Networks Common Discourse Key Actors

Figure 1: Conceptual model.

Chapter 3: Research Design & Methods

3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This chapter lays out the research methodology and the researcher’s ethical reflections. Here, it is relevant to mention again the main research question leading the investigation, namely: how are the alternative food networks within Creser involved in scaling up and how are they able to forge alliances within the expanding Solidarity Economy movement?

The sub-questions are:

A. What is the history, composition, and organization of the Emilia-Romagna Solidarity Economy network (Creser)? B. What are the most important enabling factors in Creser scaling-up process and how do they unfold in practice? C. How does scaling-up unravel in the Creser context, and what are the struggles and strategies at play in this process? D. How are Creser members able to build alliances within the expanding solidarity economy movement?

Accordingly, this chapter starts by portraying the operationalization table. Then, pragmatism is depicted as the ontological and epistemological framework of this research. Also, the chapter illustrates the research design employed to answer the research questions. Thereafter, it clarifies the research quality criteria. Lastly, the researcher reflects on both her positionality and the ethical considerations underlying this study.

3.2. OPERATIONALIZATION TABLE

This section provides the operationalization table. The latter serves to visualize how this research concretely measures and nails down the different concepts and dimensions explained in the theoretical framework.

Table 1: Operationalization Table.

CONCEPT DIMENSION VARIABLES ATTRIBUTES

Solidarity - Name of activity - What type of group do Economy Composition - Type of group you belong to, a cooperative, a GAS, or a CSA?

- How long have you been part of Creser? - Do you recall the initial law-making - Creser process? History formation - How did Creser come process to its current structure and organization? What is the logic behind it?

Alliances- - community- - Presence of based relations assemblies, sharing making knowledge and values - Presence of fees, - market-based penalties, and market relations incentives

Organizational - Presence of shared form - democratic decision rights, relations elections

- Presence of procedures, definition - bureaucratic of different bodies, relations membership, and regulations/statutes

- Different - Strategies and process positions and for reaching a ideas common ground - Motivation - Perceived motivation Common to join the network discourse - Principles & - Perception of common values principles and values - Perception of a shared - Identity mission and identity as a movement

Scaling-up - Training - Presence of training sessions/workshops Capacity - Presence of building - Knowledge forums/platforms for sharing the exchange of ´best practices’ - Common vision - Having a shared manifesto for change Network building - Collaboration - Presence of between collaborative projects initiatives

- Supportive - Availability of infrastructure financial support Availability of legal - Supportive legal - Socio-political system facilitation context - Perceived cultural - Cultural encouragement (e.g., encouragement tradition, cultural values)

- Presence of perceived - Pioneer roles pioneers - Presence of perceived Key actors - Leadership roles leaders - Presence of - Institutional institutional entrepreneurs entrepreneurs

- Presence of intermediary - Mediating organizations (e.g., actors NGOs, external supporting organizations)

3.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Pragmatism informs this research. From an ontological and epistemological perspective, this means acknowledging that multiple realities exist and that both objective and subjective knowledge try to give a portrait of such realities (Feilzer, 2010). Pragmatic research aims at solving 'real-world problems' and should have a degree of utility. Therefore, the focus is on the problem at the core of the investigation and the consequences of the research (Feilzer, 2010). This research mainly focuses on alternative food networks – part of a solidarity economy movement – advancing sustainable food production, distribution, and consumption patterns. Thus, the ‘real-world problem’ at hand is the current food system's unsustainable features. Since pragmatic research should pursue solutions to problems (Morgan, 2007), this investigation stresses alternative food networks as solutions to an unsustainable food system. Accordingly, this study aims at understanding how to mainstream alternative food networks (i.e., how to build alliances and scale-up). Hence, the practical implication of this investigation is to help and support other AFNs and solidarity economy movements in their upscaling by clarifying the main factors, challenges, and strategies at play in this process.

Drawing on pragmatism, the current research takes the shape of a naturalistic inquiry (Beuving & De Vries, 2015). Accordingly, the latter “aims to describe, interpret, and explain social reality” (Beuving & De Vries, 2015, p. 19). As to say, it seeks to develop a theoretical understanding of society and its process (e.g., alliance-building process) by looking at ordinary people (Beuving & De Vries, 2015). Here, naturalistic inquiry draws its conclusion by observing how people make sense of their own social behavior in a specific context (Beuving & De Vries, 2015). Thus, it implies a process of observation of everyday life practices, carrying out open and semi-structured interviews, but also the exploration of texts and networks of people (Beuving & De Vries, 2015). Besides this research’s emphasis on qualitative methods, this inquiry displays a case-study approach because it draws inferences on a single case (Flyvbjerg & Sampson, 2001). In addition, since the researcher actively engaged in the studied network collaborating as an intern (i.e., I was responsible for the Creser website, communication, mailing list, and meetings briefs), this investigation builds on embedded research (Flyvbjerg & Sampson, 2001). According to Flyvbjerg and Sampson (2001), the embedded case-study approach makes the researcher closer to the studied reality; this proximity allows the researcher to undergo a great learning process (Flyvbjerg & Sampson, 2001). Consequently, this learning process can bear the fruits of experienced and contextually

situated knowledge (Flyvbjerg & Sampson, 2001). Once the research design has been illustrated, the figure below (Figure 2) portrays the different research phases. Afterwards, the next section sheds light on the data collection and analysis.

Phase Procedure Product

Preparation • Selection of participants based purposive and snowball sampling • Cases (n=40 ca) Qualitative Data • Development of interview questions • Interview Protocol Collection

• Individual in-depth semi-structured interviews (n=40 ca) • Text data (interview transcripts & focus groups • Focus groups (n=3) transcripts, field notes) Qualitative Data Collection • Participant Observation at different organizations’ locations, farmer • Image data (photographs) markets, thematic working groups meetings, Creser assemblies, and • Text data Forum meetings • Document Analysis

• Coding and thematic analysis using Atlas-ti (9.0.7) • Visual model of multiple case analysis Qualitative Data Analysis • Within-case and across-case theme development • Codes and themes • Cross-thematic analysis • Similar and different themes and categories

• Interpretation and explanation of the quatitative • Discussion Integrating and qualitative results • Implications Qualitative Results

Figure 2: Research design visual model (adapted from Invankova et al., 2006).

3.4. DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS

a. Units of observation and units of analysis

In this research, the units of observation are the AFNs (i.e., Gas, CSA, farmers’ groups, food cooperatives) and the solidarity economy groups (i.e., solidarity economy districts, ethical banks, solidarity financing groups, etc.) that are actively participating in Creser. This study considers 31 civil society groups belonging to Creser (see Figure 3 for further details). Conducting participant observation during Creser meetings and working as the network’s intern revealed the most central actors in the network and those who have partaken in the solidarity economy law formulation. Hence, I was able to identify the active actors that could provide me with important insights into the history and process of scaling up. Moreover, this research holds two main units of analysis. First, central to this inquiry are the most important factors enabling and constraining the scaling-up of Creser groups. Although the literature about

scaling-up identifies four main enabling factors, the qualitative data collection wishes to unfold the processes, struggles, and practical steps behind these factors. The second unit of analysis involves the practices and strategies that Creser employs to build alliances. The latter entails finding a middle ground between the solidarity economy groups' different approaches and perspectives.

NUMBER NAME LOCATION BRIEF DESCRIPTION

A solidarity purchasing group 1 Gas Fidenza Fidenza located in Fidenza comprising about 100 consumers.

It is the solidarity economy district of Reggio-Emilia, composed of Gas, producers’ 2 Des Reggio Emilia Reggio-Emilia groups, and other solidarity economy groups (i.e., Mag6 and social cooperatives). A solidarity and mutualistic financing group composed of 7 employees and about 1500 associates. It is a cooperative 3 Mag6 Reggio-Emilia wherein its members invest their capital in solidarity businesses and share the risks of these investments. A solidarity purchasing group from Reggio Emilia that is very 4 Gas Le Giare Reggio-Emilia active (i.e., purchasing many goods and involving new people).

A solidarity purchasing group 5 MioGas Modena from Modena that is composed of about 50 families.

A Fair-Trade cooperative that has a shop in the Modena area. It Cooperativa promotes and develops 6 Modena Oltremare partnerships with countries in the Global South through the Fair- Trade channels.

A solidarity purchasing group 7 GasBo Bologna from Bologna.

A solidarity purchasing group 8 GasBosco Bologna from Bologna.

It is the solidarity economy district of Bologna, composed of some of the Gas and solidarity 9 EcoSol Bologna Bologna cooperatives (e.g., Nexus) of Bologna. The group never really took off; it is mostly inactive. The largest and most well-known farmers’ group in Bologna. It sustains food sovereignty and 10 Campi Aperti Bologna agroecological farming. It organizes seven weekly farmers' markets in Bologna. It is an NGO that promotes international cooperation aiming 11 Nexus Bologna at improving people’s quality of life and worker’s conditions in the Global South. A community-supported agriculture group (CSA) managing 47 hectares of public land in the outskirt of Bologna. It is a cooperative which includes 8 employed farmers (the worker associates) and about 200 12 Arvaia Bologna consumer associates. The latter invest a fixed about of capital ahead of the year to support the farmers and share the agricultural risks. Then, during the year, they equally share the agricultural harvest. A community shop that is autonomously organized by a group of consumers in collaboration with local producers. It is a cooperative of about 500 consumers who manage 13 Camilla Bologna a shop. Here, organic producers directly deliver their products to the consumers. To be able to shop in Arvaia, you must be an associate and work in the shop as a volunteer for 2 hours a month.

It is a social cooperative that works on many different projects Cooperativa Sociale supporting the social and 14 Bologna Lo Scoiattolo professional integration of emarginated people in society (e.g., disabled people). It is a sub-section of the Cooperativa Sociale lo Scoiattolo, 15 ARES Bologna which handles mutualistic and solidarity insurance. It is an ethical bank, widely known in Italy, wherein the contributors are actively involved in deciding the ethical investments 16 Banca Etica Bologna of the bank. Since it is a bank present on a national scale, this research considers the Bologna sub-group. By Regione Emilia-Romagna is intended the regional government agency comprising: the legislative assembly (i.e., the regional parliament composed of 50 members) and the regional council (composed of 12 assessors Regione Emilia- including the president and the 17 Bologna Romagna vice-president of the council). Each assessor is in charge of a different department. In this research two technicians working in two different departments (i.e., the agricultural and the economic development department) were interviewed. A research and development organization working in partnership with the regional 18 Art-ER Bologna government bodies to promote sustainable development and innovation on the regional territory.

A civil society group that is part of the Transition Network. It organizes different activities, among which; the BioMercato (a San Lazzaro in weekly ecological farmers’ 19 San Lazzaro Transizione (SLIT) market), the ‘Orto Delle Meraviglie’ (a vegetable garden), conferences, book presentations, and workshops about the sustainability transition. A civil society association that developed around the themes of non-violence, peace, solidarity, and human rights. It is located in Caselocchio, a village in the Associazione countryside of Bologna. It 20 Casalecchio di Reno Percorsi di Pace promotes a wide array of activities, namely: Gas, a second- hand market, a choir for disabled people, weekly hikes and walks, conferences, workshops, and cultural events. A civil society association aimed at promoting sustainable lifestyles and food production and consumption. It started in Parma with the opening of Mercatiamo, a weekly farmers’ market (happening three times per week). 21 Parma Sostenibile Parma Then, the association developed Fruttorti, an urban community- agriculture project. Also, this association gives workshops in primary and middle schools about sustainable food production and consumption. The solidarity economy district of Parma, composed of Gas, 22 Des Parma Parma producers’ groups, and consumer cooperative (i.e., Oltrefood).

A solidarity purchasing group 23 Gas Filò Parma from Parma.

A community shop organized by a group of consumers. It was born in 2019 in Parma. It is a cooperative of about 250 consumers who manage a shop wherein organic producers 24 OltreFood Parma directly deliver their products. To be able to shop in OltreFood, one must be a member who participates with 3 hours of ‘cooperative work’ in the shop per month.

A solidarity purchasing group 25 LuGas Lugo from Lugo, a small town in Ravenna’s province.

A solidarity purchasing group 26 Gas Imola Imola from Imola, one of the most long- standing Gases in Italy.

A solidarity purchasing group from Faenza, the first Gas that 27 Gas Faenza Faenza was ever founded in Italy back in 1994.

A solidarity purchasing group 28 Gas Malatesta Cesena from Cesena.

A solidarity purchasing group 29 InGasati Meldola from Meldola, a small town in the Forlì-Cesena province.

A solidarity purchasing group 30 Ri-Gas Rimini from Rimini.

A Fair-Trade cooperative that has a shop in Bologna. It develops partnerships with countries in the 31 Ex-Aequo Bologna Global South collaborating with the AltroMercato, the Italian Fair- Trade network.

Table 2: Brief description of the solidarity economy groups partaking in this research (units of observation).

b. Sampling methods

For the qualitative data collection, this research applies purposive sampling (Decuir- Gunby & Schutz, 2016; Ivankova et al., 2006). The main criterion of the sample is that respondents must be in a solidarity economy group that belongs to Creser. I started by contacting one of the network’s chiefs, who introduced me to another couple of members who also held leadership positions (as I later discovered). After that, I created a list with the names, emails, and phone numbers of all the AFNs and solidarity economy groups whose contact I could find on the solidarity economy webpage. Thus, I developed my purposive sampling. Also, snowball sampling occurred (Decuir-Gunby & Schutz, 2016). Indeed, after each interview, I would ask the participants if they suggested I spoke with other members they knew and if they could give me the contact details. Hence, I conducted interviews with the members usually participating in Creser meetings or whose names were often mentioned.

c. Data Collection and Analysis

The qualitative data collection employed semi-structured interviews (see Appendix for interview guidelines) with 36 participants (see Appendix, Table 1 for list of interviews); these investigated the alliance-building and scaling-up practices, struggles, and strategies at play in Creser. Since the scaling-up factors shown in the literature may not fully encompass the phenomenon, the inductive character of semi-structured interviews gave space for concepts to emerge from the data (Bryman, 2012, p.12). Thus, semi-structured interviews allowed more and unpredicted factors to surface. Additionally, I conducted three focus groups with three different solidarity economy groups. They each involved three participants, belonging to the same group. I also carried out participant observation during the whole duration of fieldwork (often in an online setting), in parallel to the other data collection methods. I partook in all the meetings and assemblies of the network. Here, I often performed the role of the silent observer whilst writing the meeting briefs. Indeed, I took field notes during the entire research process to gain an understanding of the context and the relations within the Creser (Beuving & De Vries, 2015). Thus, participant observation allowed me to highlight aspects of the relationships between Creser groups that the informants sometimes did not mention (Beuving & De Vries, 2015)

To allow for triangulation, I integrated the interview results with document analysis on important meeting minutes, written law implementations, and institutional documents about

the Solidarity Economy Forum. Furthermore, this study engages with thematic analysis to analyze the qualitative data. Accordingly, after manually transcribing the 36 interview recordings and three focus groups recordings, I employed Atlas-ti (version 9.0.7) to code the material. I developed the codes through open coding of the interview transcripts. Here, the main concepts and ideas about scaling-up emerging from the literature (see conceptual model and operationalization table) were a starting point to develop the codes. Thus, whilst analyzing the data, the researcher went back and forth between an inductive (letting the themes emerge from the data) and deductive approach (applying the theoretical framework for grounding the interview results into theory).

3.5. QUALITY CRITERIA

Using the quality criteria for qualitative research suggested by Bryman (2012, p. 390), credibility, which corresponds to the internal validity in quantitative research, guarantees the trustworthiness of the data. Establishing credibility means both submitting your results to the studied group for validation (i.e., respondent validation) and applying triangulation (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). The researcher employs both techniques. Also, one can guarantee a degree of transferability by providing thick descriptions of the field and phenomenon studied (Bryman, 2012, p. 392). Thus, to allow other researchers to understand whether my findings can be transferable to different contexts, I give detailed accounts of my data.

Another quality criterion is authenticity which embraces: fairness (i.e., portraying all the respondent’s viewpoints); ontological authenticity (i.e., helping Creser members to better understand their milieu); educative authenticity (i.e., bringing the different perspectives of Creser members back to them and make them appreciate this variety); catalytic authenticity (i.e., trying to unveil the problems of the network and giving impetus for more participation); and tactical authenticity (i.e., pushing some of Creser members to take action and change certain dynamics) (Bryman, 2012, p. 393). Thorough data collection and analysis, clearly stating the methods applied, give this research rigor and “transparency and coherence” (Bryman, 2012, p. 393). Lastly, relevance, in terms of the research’s contribution to theory, will represent an important quality criterion in this study.

3.6. ETHICAL REFLECTIONS

This section deals with the ethical stance of this investigation. In conducting research, social science generally commits to five principles about ethical considerations (Bryman, 2012). This section elaborates on these principles, namely: the no-harm principle, informed consent, voluntary participation, privacy, and deception.

The no-harm principle implies that a researcher should expose the informants to neither physical nor psychological harm (Bryman, 2012). Even if the studied population is not put at risk by this research (as it entails citizen and farmer groups that are lawfully involved with the regional institutions), the principle of no harm is fundamental in the research process. Indeed, the researcher has avoided any situation that might be uncomfortable or pressuring for the respondents. Moreover, Bryman (2012) argues that the no-harm principle translates into ensuring confidentiality and anonymity to the research participants. The interviews have given anonymity to the singular participants (by omitting the informants’ names) but not to the group one belongs to (as it is an important piece of information). Besides, I did not store these data on online platforms that are riskier when it comes to confidentiality (Bryman, 2012). Instead, I granted anonymity by deleting interviewees’ names and addresses in the transcriptions (Bryman, 2012). I used numbers to refer to the interviewees. Thus, the overall data collection respects the principles of anonymity and confidentiality.

The principle of informed consent implies that “participants should be given as much information as might be needed to make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to participate in a study” (Bryman, 2012, p. 138). To comply with such a principle, a description of the research purpose introduced interviews. Here, respondents could understand the terms and conditions of the study and decide whether to take part in it or not. When it comes to participant observation, Bryman (2012) claims that it is more problematic to get informed consent. Nevertheless, as participant observation took place at the Creser and Forum meetings and during field visits, the researcher always presented herself, explained the research, and asked permission to pay her visits. Also, my role as an intern normalized my constant presence in the network. Indeed, by the end of fieldwork, all the members knew who I was and were also contacting me personally for different types of information.

When conducting semi-structured interviews and focus groups, I informed the participants by email or by phone about the nature of the investigation. Firstly, at the beginning of each interview, I have asked permission to record, transcribe the interview, and, eventually,

use direct quotes. This means acknowledging that the quotes might appear in a research article or whatever research output. Secondly, I have informed the participants about the possibility to withdraw from the study at any time if they wished to. I have given them the chance to refuse to answer a specific question and retreat the data provided at any moment. Initially, I wanted to hand out informed consent forms. Nevertheless, since all the interviews moved to the online format, it became unpractical because people had to get the form by email, sign it, and send it back to me. As the people I contacted were very busy and hard to reach, I guessed this process might have been too demanding and complex. Thus, I gave my informants the possibility to receive the transcript of their interview by email if they wanted to check it.

The ‘voluntary participation in the research’ ties together with the informed consent principle. Indeed, I have contacted and informed the informants both orally and in written form (i.e., by emails) about the implications of the research. Therefore, their participation in the research has been voluntary. Moreover, as already stated in the no-harm principle, ensuring privacy is an important ethical concern. It entails ensuring people’s informed consent and anonymity (Bryman, 2012). In the transcripts, it translates into using numbers to name the interviewees and pseudonyms (Bryman, 2012). To avoid privacy violations, the researcher should keep sensitive information confidential (Bryman, 2012). Thus, this research will respect people’s privacy by maintaining recordings and transcripts confidential.

Bryman (2012) defines the principle of deception as the act of presenting one’s research as something different from what it is. In the current investigation, the researcher has no reason or intention to lie about the content and objectives of the study. This study does not intend to apply covert methods; therefore, the researcher does not conceive her identity and research purpose. However, it is “rarely feasible or desirable to provide participants with a totally complete account of what your research is about” (Bryman, 2012, p. 143). In case any respondents may perceive that there has been a misrepresentation of the research, they have the chance to withdraw their data.

Chapter 4: CRESER, tracing its origins & current form

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter answers the following sub-questions: “What is the history, composition, and organization of the Emilia-Romagna Solidarity Economy network (Creser)?”. Thus, it explores the connection between alternative food networks and the solidarity economy movement in Emili-Romagna. It illustrates the history of Creser, showing how AFNs came to join this larger movement for elaborating the Solidarity Economy law. Whilst there is no official definition of AFNs at the national level, in Italy, AFNs mainly operate in urban spaces. Also, they align with the diffusion of “chilomentro zero” (zero-kilometres) and “filiera corta” (short-chain), which both emphasize the territorial connotation inherent to food (Cavallo et al., 2015). Particularly, Emilia-Romagna has experienced the heterogeneous spread of AFNs, such as solidarity purchasing groups (Gas), farmers’ markets, and on-farm direct sales (Rettaroli & Zurla, 2013). In this context, in 2011, the Regional Coordination Network for the Solidarity Economy of Emilia-Romagna (Creser), a network consisting of 53 different actors, emerged. Creser pushed the regional government into approving the Solidarity Economy law (L.R. 19/2014) (Regione Emilia-Romagna, n.d.). This law aims at recognizing and promoting the solidarity economy as a socio-economical model based on principles of solidarity, equity, and environmental respect (Regione Emilia-Romagna, n.d.).

To better understand Creser emergence, this section outlines: 1) the current situation of the Italian agricultural sector; 2) the history of the Italian agricultural policy; 2) the emergence of AFNs in Italy; 3) the context of Emilia-Romagna. Afterwards, the focus is on reconstructing Creser history and the law-making process. Lastly, this chapter illustrates the institutional bodies established by the 19/2014 law.

4.2. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN ITALY

At the national level, agriculture represents 2,2 % of the national gross added value (GVA), and it reaches 4,1% when one includes the food industry (ISTAT, 2020). Besides, the economic

volume of the agri-food system is rising. The agri-food industry (including agriculture, forestry, fishery, and the food industry) saw a 0,1 % growth in its GVA since 2018 (ISTAT, 2020). Here, the Italian agricultural production mostly specializes in permanent tree crops (23,1% of the total EU-28 share (Eurostat, 2019)), such as orchards, vineyards, olive tree groves; and arable crops, such as cereals and vegetables (CREA, 2020).

At the same time, the Italian agricultural sector has followed the European trend in two main aspects: a decline in the number of farms and an increase in land concentration, namely, fewer landowners increasingly concentrate more and more land in their possession (CREA, 2020; Eurostat, 2019; ISTAT, 2020). Firstly, between 2005 and 2016, Eurostat (2019) has counted a loss of up to 4.2 million farms, mostly small landholdings under 5 ha in size. The latter trend is mirrored in a 28% reduction in the number of Italian farms since 2013 (CREA, 2020).

Secondly, in Italy, a rise in the utilized agricultural area (whilst the number of farmers has diminished) demonstrates increasing land concentration (CREA, 2020). Highly concentrated landholdings cluster in the Northern regions, especially in Lombardy, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna (CREA, 2020). In these regions, an increasing number of small farmers get squeezed and washed away by unstainable market competition while large industrial agricultural firms keep exploiting more and more land.

4.3. THE ITALIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The Italian agricultural sector and policy went through several phases. Lizzi and Righettini (2018) argue that in the post-unification period (1861-1946) family farming and subsistence agriculture mainly dominated the agricultural landscape. Later, after the end of WWII, state interventionism targeted smallholders. Also, the authors stress that, since the EEC introduced the common agricultural policy (CAP) in 1962, the Italian food and agricultural policy has been highly influenced by the EU regulatory system (Lizzi & Righettini, 2018). After the economic boom, the spread of big food multinationals, supermarkets, and fast-food chains increasingly transformed the food system in Italy (Lizze & Righettini, 2018). During the 1980s, land concentration and industrialized agriculture became the dominant trend. This translated into high agricultural specialization and intensification (Fonte & Cucco, 2015).

Furthermore, between 1992-1994, the governing class was accused of bribery and corruption by what became famous as the “Mani Pulite” (‘clean hands’) judicial investigation.

This led to the shift from the “Prima Repubblica” (the governing structure that had been held for 45 years) to the current political system (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). This political crisis caused disarray in the agricultural sector; it reflected a heavily bureaucratic system and a lack of public transparency in the management of resources (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). Moreover, the food scandals of the 1990s, such as “the mad cow disease”, increased citizens’ distrust in the food system (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). During the same years, the environmental externalities associated with the industrialized agri-food sector entered the EU debate (Fonte & Cucco, 2015). This situation had two main consequences. Firstly, in 1992 the CAP underwent a reform that marked the beginning of the so-called “quality watershed” (Lizzi & Righettini, 2018). This entailed promoting organic farming and advancing quality and safety standards (Lizzi & Righettini, 2018). Indeed, the CAP reform introduced the DOP (Protected Designation of Origin) and IGP (Protected Geographical Indication) quality labels (laws 2081/92 and 2082/92), which ensured food quality based on certified geographical origins (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). Italy used this “quality turn” to settle the public distrust of the food system (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). Besides, since Italian farming had struggled to adjust to industrialized farming and had kept a diversified system of production, “the “quality turn” fell on fertile ground” (Fonte & Cucco, 2015, p. 286). Thus, the country became the first state in Europe for registered quality products (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). Secondly, a process of decentralization occurred (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006). The latter meant that regions were given the task of managing the EU subsidies and formulating rural development plans. Since Italian regions hold strong structural and political differences, this handover of power (initiated by the 142/90 law) meant that EU legislation was implemented differently from region to region (Ferretti & Magaudda, 2006).

4.4. THE EMERGENCE OF AFNS IN ITALY

With the quality turn, different actors in the Italian agricultural landscape came together to create the “Made in Italy” consensus (Fonte & Cucco, 2015). By protecting and promoting the quality of Italian products, this movement countered a standardized food system with homogenizing farming practices (Fonte & Cucco, 2015). Here, the main players were: Campagna Amica by Coldiretti; the organic movement; the Slow Food Movement; and the solidarity purchasing groups (Gas) organized in local food networks (Fonte & Cucco, 2015). Although all these movements advocated for food quality, locality, and family farming, Fonte & Cucco (2015) argue that it is hard to classify these movements as belonging to either

alternative or conventional agriculture. Nevertheless, the authors highlight the alternative character of solidarity purchasing groups (Gas). The latter, disappointed by the industrial agri- food sector and by the standardization of organic farming, advance a new way of consuming and producing food (Fonte & Cucco, 2015). A Gas usually includes a maximum of 30 people who get in contact with farmer makers and small local organic producers to create alternative food networks (Grasseni et al., 2015).

Once the process behind the rise of AFNs in Italy has become clear, it is interesting to focus on the specific context of the Emilia-Romagna region, to better understand the emergence of Creser.

4.5. EMILIA-ROMAGNA: STRONG FOOD & COOPERATIVE TRADITION

Strong agricultural development and food tradition characterize Emilia-Romagna (Marchi, 2015). The region excels for its typical products, just to name a few, Parma Ham, Mortadella di Bologna, and Parmigiano Reggiano (Marchi, 2015). Emilia-Romagna comprises of two very important food cities, namely, Bologna and Parma (the foundation site of two industrial-food giants: Barilla and Parmalat) (Marchi, 2015). Besides, the region is noteworthy when it comes to agriculture for two reasons. Firstly, it takes first place in Europe and Italy for PDO (Protected Designation of Origin) and PGI (Protected Geographical Indication) products, counting more than 30 certified products (Legambiente, 2015). Secondly, since organic farming has spread quickly in the area, the region tops the organic farming national rankings (Legambiente, 2015). At the same time, the importance of short supply chains, Gas, and the solidarity economy is increasing in Emilia-Romagna (Legambiente, 2015). Here, AFNs strongly emerge in the experiences of the cities of Bologna, Parma, and Ferrara (Legambiente, 2015). Interestingly, Fonte & Cucco (2017) highlight the strong economic role of agricultural cooperatives in Italy and particularly in Emilia-Romagna. This region is famous for having one of the highest concentrations of cooperatives in the world; also, it is the region in Italy with the highest cooperative capital created (Cori et al., 2020).

Also, Fonte & Cucco (2017) stress the link between the emergence of AFNs in Italy and the country’s history of cooperatives. In the current context, they identify three types of cooperatives, namely: agri-food cooperatives (that are similar to large corporations due to their focus on being competitive on the market, such as Legacoop and Conad); social cooperatives;

and community cooperatives. Fonte & Cucco (2017) consider the first two typologies as the precursors of community cooperatives, which are part of the AFNs landscape. Accordingly, Corbino (2012) mentions how the country’s “rich solidarity heritage” has paved the way for the solidarity economy movement. Here, the author shows how the Italian tradition of civic mutualism dating back to the 19th century, exemplified by the Società Operaia di Mutuo Soccorso (workers’ cooperative of mutual aid) and consumers cooperative, inspired new socioeconomic innovations to emerge. Indeed, these new arrangements translated the cooperative, solidarity, and mutual values of the past into our current urbanized context (i.e., in Gas, farmers’ groups, and mutual and solidarity financing organizations).

Figure 3: Campi Aperti farmers market in Bologna, Italy. Retrieved on May 5, 2021, from: https://www.considerovalore.it/mercati-contadini-bologna/

4.6. HISTORY OF CRESER & THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY LAW

As seen above, Emilia-Romagna shows advanced agricultural development, a strong cooperative tradition, and a large diffusion of AFNs. In the region, the case of the Coordination Network for the Solidarity Economy of Emilia Romagna (Creser) achieving the regional adoption of the Solidarity Economy Law exemplifies the scaling-up process. The following section explores the history of the solidarity economy law and how Creser was born. By assembling my informants’ stories about their first experiences with this network, I reconstruct the different steps of the law-making process.

Law-making Process: how did It all start?

The Solidarity Economy law 19/2014 is the result of a three-year-long process (see Figure 4 below for a timeline of the law-making process). The majority of my interviewees describe it as a very enriching and fruitful experience (interview 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 & 39) The journey started in 2011 when two councilors of the Emilia-Romagna region decided to make a law to formalize solidarity purchasing groups (Gas), which were mostly informal grassroots organizations. A councilor belonging to the 5 Stars1 party presented a law to regulate zero- kilometer products, while a member of the Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL)2 party drafted a law about Gas. These law proposals envisaged two main points: giving financial support to solidarity purchasing groups and creating a record wherein all the Gas in Emilia-Romagna had to register themselves (interview 11). Since one of the councilors was part of a Gas himself, he had become interested in the AFNs. Thus, I can assume that it is because of this reason that he

1 5 Stars Party (‘Partito 5 Stelle’ in Italian): It is a political party founded by Beppe Grillo, a comedian, and Gainroberto Casalegggio on the 4th October 2009. Before that, since 2004, the movement was a free citizens- association. This party revolved around ecological and anti-party-politics ideals. The movement came into politics when its participants started to present and organize themselves in civic lists in 2009. Resounce: https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/movimento-5-stelle (Retrived on May 5, 2021) 2 Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL) party (literal translation: Left for the Ecology and Freedom): political party funded in 2009. This party defended the secularity of the State (Italy), advocated for social justice, and declared itself sensible to environmental issues. In 2012, the party joined the center-left (centrosinistra) coalition. Resource: https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/sinistra-ecologia-e-liberta/ (Retrived on May 5, 2021).

got the idea to create a regulation for Gas. Nonetheless, the political reasons behind the law proposals remain unclear.

As soon as a group of about 15 Gas members heard about these law proposals, they came together. They contacted the councilors and asked them for a meeting. Andrea, a Gas member from Casalecchio, told me that they were trying to understand whether these politicians were willing to help the Gas because they had a strategy in mind or for some other reason (interview 15). Hence, on 15 October 2011, five representatives of the 5 Stars and SEL party met this group of Gas members in Parma. Riccardo, who took part in this meeting, stated that Gas representatives did not agree to the way the law proposals wanted to classify solidarity purchasing groups (interview 12).

To understand his opinion, one must see solidarity purchasing groups as informal associations of people who spontaneously create food networks. Gas are free forms of civil society engagement (Grasseni et al., 2015). They are autonomous grassroots organizations that do not follow any legal obligation or fixed organizational structure. Accordingly, Gas members wanted to preserve their self-determination. They feared a regulation that could have constrained their practices by introducing a set of standards or requirements. Their underlying fear was to get AFNs incorporated in the market’s rules and state policies by getting formalized. This concern connects to an issue raised in the theory: by being incorporated into state policies (i.e., being regulated) the solidarity economy risks losing its autonomy and becoming neoliberal governance tools (Dinerstain, 2014). Indeed, the literature emphasizes how solidarity economy movements have to negotiate with and challenge state policies to maintain their transformative potential. Ultimately, Gas members were defending the autonomy of AFNs from both state and market logic.

Therefore, Riccardo explained that the meeting ended with an agreement: the councilors would have withdrawn the law as long as the civil society groups would have come up with a counter-proposal (interview 12). Here, Gas members wished to negotiate how to be included in policy frameworks while preserving their independence. Indeed, the strategy behind this negotiation (i.e., how Gas members wanted to keep their autonomy but still take advantage of policy frameworks), slowly took shape in the process leading to the solidarity economy law.

Andrea described how, later that month, a Democratic Party (PD)3 councilor summoned all the Gas he could get in touch with, inviting them to a meeting at the Regional Administrative Palace in Bologna (interview 15). Whilst 50 different groups attended the meeting, they unanimously rejected the law proposals which included some financial support targeted to Gas. Luca argued that they did not accept any kind of financial support because they perceived it as a consolation prize (‘contentino’ in Italian) (interview 11). As to say, something that the government was willing to give them to make them content and then brush them aside. Besides, Federico pointed out that they rejected the money because they did want to fall into an economic approach that divides people and makes them fight about “who gets which piece of the cake” (Interview 7).

Instead, the people joining this meeting realized that they aspired for something more meaningful than just money. Federico clearly states that they were looking for a law that could facilitate and benefit the solidarity economy initiatives (interview 7). Interestingly, Elena told me that they intended to “contaminate” the regional policies with principles of social, economic, and environmental sustainability (interview 8). “Contamination” for her meant introducing the solidarity economy ideas and principles into the regional law-making landscape. This idea of contamination is very interesting: it expresses a way to mainstream the solidarity economy principles and practices.

When I interviewed Emanuele, a man in his late sixties, living in an elegant house in the suburbs of Bologna, he passionately explained to me that he, together with the other Gas members, wanted to enlarge the subject of the law proposal (interview 5). He said that they wished to move away from a law exclusively aimed at Gas towards a law that could support all the different actors involved in the solidarity economy (i.e., farmers groups, ethical banks, etc.) (interview 5). These grassroots organizations knew that if they wanted to encourage a solidarity economy pathway, they needed to embrace a cross-sectoral approach, including different economic sectors (i.e., agriculture, financing, fair trade, energy, etc.). Some of them

3 Democratic Party, also known as PD (Partito Democratico in Italian): it is a political party funded in 2007 as the result of two parties converging together, namely, the Leftist Democrats (‘Democratici di Sinistra’ in Italian) and the Margherita Party. Throughout the years, it has participated in different Left-Wing coalitions. For example, in 2013, it joined a coalition with Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL) and the Italian Socialist party. Rescource: https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/partito-democratico/

mentioned that they knew that it was risky to create an overarching solidarity economy law, especially one encompassing different themes and government departments. Indeed, government departments tend to be compartmentalized and rarely collaborate in policymaking (chapter 6.1 elaborates further on this critical issue). However, the civil society representatives saw these sectors as interconnected. Thus, they felt the urge to include a wide array of themes in the law (interview 5). That day at the regional palace in Bologna, the councilor who had summoned the meeting agreed to start a collaboration for writing a new law for the solidarity economy (interview 5).

15 October 2011: 5 political Thereafter: Creser 2011: 2 Emilia- representatives was born to Romagna meet 15 GAS elaborate the law; councillors members; the coucillors decide to make counter law started a law for GAS. proposal request. collaborating.

Later in In the Octorber 2011: a meanwhile: 15 PD councillor GAS members summon 50 SE ask the groups to disucss coucillors for a the law idea. meeting.

Figure 4: Timeline showing the Solidarity Economy law-making process.

Two Parallel Journeys: solidarity economy assemblies & institutional dialogue

Two important pathways emerged as a result of this meeting. Firstly, a network started to take shape. Some Gas members from Bologna, Parma, Reggio-Emilia, and Imola, who were already organized in Gas networks at the city level such as Solidarity Economy District (DES), reached out to other groups they knew. The word spread across Emilia-Romagna. As a consequence, the civil society organizations that had an affiliation with the solidarity economy learned about this project and joined in.

Secondly, that meeting in Bologna set in motion a state-civil society dialogue about the stipulations of the solidarity economy law. Interestingly, the literature about the solidarity

economy highlights the importance of establishing channels for social dialogue. These allow the movement to voice its demands in front of institutional actors and gain institutional support (Laville, 2009). Here, the councilors involved belonged to three different parties, namely: the 5 Stars Party, Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (SEL), and Democratic Party (PD) (interview 12). Accordingly, this group of people began to come together and discuss the law content. There was a total of 19 meetings. During the first three meetings, the civil society groups tried to make the councilors understand that they did not want to work with each of their parties separately (interview 12). Instead, they demanded that the politicians worked on this law as one group.

So, two parallel journeys were created. The first one saw the grassroots organizations interested in the law working together democratically, applying the consensus method (chapter 7.2 explains Creser democratic values and decision-making method more in detail); the second journey saw these groups collaborating with the councilors to find a common route.

Creser: how was it born and structured?

Elena recalls that, during the first meetings among the civil society groups, everybody shared their experiences and what they were doing in their separate organizations (interview 8). She called it a moment of ‘epiphany’, as everybody started showing each other the strength of this emerging group (interview 8). Afterwards, these solidarity economy members started to meet in assemblies about once a month.

Figure 5: The picture was taken at a monthly Creser assembly on the 17th of October 2020. Source: Author.

Elena described these moments in a picturesque manner (interview 8). She told me that, during the first three months of assemblies, they used to meet in a dark basement in via San Domenico, in Bologna. They would climb down the stairs and enter this dark cellar with no windows. She recalled how the air would get thick after hours and hours of slow discussions, and how people’s minds would get foggy. She felt as if magnetic fields of energy and trust permeated the space, fluctuating and linking each person in the room. She remembered that, when their meetings would finish, they would come out in the darkness of winter nights.

Since it was the first time these different solidarity economy groups came together and got to know each other, all my informants talk about this initial period as very exciting. During my observation, I noticed how people lit up when talking about this time; people felt close-knit and passionate because they shared a common mission. As we will see later, this strong engagement, participation, and passion decreased after the law was issued. Elena kept narrating that, at one of these initial meetings, she suggested the idea of forming a regional coordination network with the people present (interview 8). She saw it as a way to give themselves a sort of identity in face of the scattered solidarity economy groups participating. On this occasion, she came up with the idea of the name Creser, standing for ‘Coordinamento Regionale dell’Economia Solidale dell’Emilia-Romagna’ in Italian (‘Regional Coordination of the

Solidarity Economy of Emilia-Romagna’ in English) (interview 8). Hence, Creser was born. The latter involved not only alternative food networks (i.e., Gas), but also other interest groups, such as ethical banks, co-housing communities, social cooperatives, time banks, and renewable energy initiatives (ART-ER., 2019).

Once, I spoke with Luca, who was the founder of the first Italian Gas in the 1980s, and therefore a veteran of the solidarity economy. He conveyed that the idea behind Creser was to coordinate different organizations to create a joint path (interview 11). He told me to always keep in mind that: “it is better to do wrong together rather than to do right alone” (interview 11). He continued by saying that:

“You do not find the truth, the right path alone; together you can make mistakes, but only if there is a relationship of solidarity between people, then the mistake becomes an instrument to steer the route…not making mistakes is not the important thing…. who does not make mistakes? Only those who do not do anything do not make mistakes. Making mistakes together is the only way to find an alternative path” (interview 11).

This quote shows how experimentation and creating relationships of solidarity between people lays at the core of Creser work and purpose. Later on, Creser participants discussed the contents they wished to include in the law, namely: solidarity and mutualistic financing, agriculture, co- housing, energy, and community services. These themes emerged naturally as they aligned with the interests and activities of the different solidarity economy groups partaking in the assemblies (interview 11 & 14). Since each organization already came with some sort of ‘know-how’ of a specific area (i.e., agriculture, ethical finance, etc.), participants just had to follow their ‘know-how’ and make it available to the others during the group formation (interview 12). Accordingly, people would explain to each other how to promote local organic producers by creating farmers' markets, or how to set up cooperative financing groups that would cut off interests on loans, or again, how to create co-housing groups.

Therefore, people naturally divided themselves into six thematic working groups according to different topics, namely: agriculture & participatory guarantee systems; ethical and mutualistic finance; co-housing; energy; fair trade; and communication & networking (see Table 2 above and Figure 6 below). Afterwards, they started reading up to get familiar with the state structure and the existing policies. Indeed, to understand how to articulate their requests, they needed to get a picture of the legislative landscape already in place (interview 8 & 12). Thus, they collected the existing laws and regulations that were administering their fields. As

a result, each thematic group elaborated a document declaring the group objectives and the obstacles in achieving them (i.e., hindering bureaucracy and regulations or new regulations necessary to proceed) (interview 12).

The Law Formulation

Meanwhile, the three councilors invited different technicians to discuss the law and check the articles’ compatibility with existing laws (interview 5 & 12). The regional councilors are a political entity. Then, each department (i.e., agriculture, energy, transport, etc.) has its specialized personnel that deals with legal and technical matters: the technicians. Moreover, the councilors had appointed a secretary to facilitate the communication with Creser (interview 5). This role was taken up by ERVET, a regional development agency. This development agency is under the control of the regional government which decides both its plan of activities and designates its budget (interview 1). Here, the regional government decided that ERVET would have provided operational support in the interaction between Creser and the councilors, assessors, and technicians (interview 1). ERVET, now named ART ER after 2019, still upholds this intermediary role.

Interestingly, Emanuele told me that he was the one who personally drew up the law (interview 5). Since he was a law graduate and worked in a legal office, he designed the law structure taking inspiration from similar laws. His role appears key in the law formulation and it can be related to the idea of institutional entrepreneurs emerging from the literature. Namely, actors within the network that can mobilize knowledge, expertise, and contacts to scale up (Westley et al., 2014). Chapter 5.2 further explores this concept. Also, Emanuele highlighted how the law content reflected an idea of development based on social, ecological, and economic sustainability (ART-ER., 2019; interview 5). Indeed, the law articles took inspiration from the solidarity economy principles (interview 5 & 12).

After Creser members wrote the Regional Law/n.19: “NORME PER IL SOSTEGNO E LA PROMOZIONE DELL’ECONOMIA SOLIDALE” (2014) (‘Norms for the support and promotion of the Solidarity economy Law’), they submitted it to the legislative office and received its approval (interview 5). Then, on the 23rd of July 2014, the Emilia-Romagna Legislative Assembly (composed of the 50 regional councilors) passed the law (interview 12). The law aims at promoting the solidarity economy; it recognizes all the actors, instruments, and circuits that make up this alternative development model (ART-ER., 2019). In Italy, it was

the first law that gave a voice to the solidarity economy. Thus, all my interviewees acclaimed the law as a great and important achievement.

4.6. THE INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL FORM

The 19/2014 law envisioned the creation of three institutional bodies: a Solidarity Economy Forum (‘Forum dell’economia solidale’); Permanent Roundtables (‘Tavoli parmanenti’); and a Solidarity Economy Observatory (‘Osservatorio dell’economia solidale’) (see Figure 6).

Visualizing the Layers of Representation

The Regional Govenment Agency: an assessor with the mandate for the Solidarity Economy

the Solidarity Economy Law created:

Observatory: supervision • GLT Agriculture role Permanent Roundtables: Solidarity Economy • GLT Ethical Finance GLT ‘s representatives Forum: yearly meeting • GLT Ernergy and gevenrment between GLT’s members • GLT Fair Trade tecnicians work on two and Regional • GLT Co-housing sectorial projects Governement Assessor • GLT Commmunication

Ø representatives of civil society organizations divided in CRESER: informal network coordinating the actors beloning to the Forum and the GLTs thematic working groups (GLTs)

Individual GAS, food DES (Solidarity Economy District): coooperatives,CSA Supporting networks linking the GAS and cohousing groups; ethical financing farmers groups. producers at a city level. groups; fair trade shops; and civil society volutaristic assoications. SMALL ORGANIC PRODUCERS

Figure 6: Visualizing the Organizational Form and the Layers of Representation.

Solidarity Economy Forum

The Forum is the official channel and site wherein the solidarity economy subjects can dialogue with the regional government agencies (interview 1 & 15). Here, the civil society representatives can bring their ideas for implementing the law (interview 1 & 15). In 2017, after two years of work between the government agencies and Creser, the Forum was legally set up and approved by the “Regulation for the Solidarity Economy Forum”. The latter regulation declares the functioning of the Forum (i.e., its aim, its participation rules, its bodies and their functioning, and its decision-making method) (Regolamento del Forum Regionale dell’Economia Solidale, 2017).

Thematic Working Groups (GLTs)

As mentioned above, during the law-making process, Creser members got divided into six working groups. As a consequence, Creser transferred this working structure into the Solidarity Economy Forum (interview 5 & 14). Accordingly, the Forum is organized in six thematic working groups which take the name of GLTs (‘Gruppi di Lavoro Tematici’ in Italian) (interview 9). At the Forum meetings occurring once a year, each GLT chooses two representatives as the spoke persons of the group (Regolamento del Forum Regionale dell’Economia Solidale, 2017). Each GLT is entitled to bring two projects aimed at implementing the law in a specific area (Regolamento del Forum Regionale dell’Economia Solidale, 2017). Afterwards, all forum members have to vote to approve or dismiss the two projects presented by each GLT.

Permanent Roundtables

Once approved, these implementation proposals go further on to the Permanent Roundtables (Regolamento del Forum Regionale dell’Economia Solidale, 2017). Permanent Roundtables include the GLT representatives and the regional technicians who are sent by their respective regional government departments (interview 9). Therefore, the Permanent Roundtables are audit commissions wherein the technicians collaborate with the GLT spokesmen to work out a way to realize in practice the policy implementations proposed by the GLT (interview 8).

Solidarity Economy Observatory

Instead, the Observatory of the Solidarity Economy was born out of the need to monitor the law-implementation process and assess the developments of the solidarity economy on the regional territory (interview 7). Nevertheless, the Observatory is not functioning yet and still has to be set in motion (interview 7). Figure 4 below portrays the organizational form envisioned by the 19/2014 law and the different layers of representation at play.

4.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter focuses on reconstructing the history of Creser. It locates the latter in the Italian agricultural context and Emilia-Romagna's specific circumstances. It explains how a group of Gas members kick-started this movement because they wanted to reject two law proposals

aimed at regulating Gas. These people did not want Gas to lose their autonomy by being integrated into state policies. Thus, they asked to meet the two regional councilors responsible for the laws. During this meeting, the councilors agreed to accept a law counter-proposal from these Gas members. Consequently, the Gas members reached out to multiple solidarity economy groups on the territory; they intended to make an overarching law for promoting the solidarity economy. Thereafter, since more and more solidarity economy groups joined the discussion, Creser was born to coordinate the law formulation process. Its members decided to divide themselves into six thematic groups, embracing the different solidarity economy topics. After gathering all the knowledge about the laws and regulations in place, Creser wrote the law. In July 2014 the Legislative Assembly passed the 19/2014 law. After two years, in 2017, the Solidarity Economy Forum – the body allowing the dialogue between the solidarity economy groups and the regional representatives – was set up. As illustrated above, Creser members talk about this law elaboration phase as a very enriching and exciting journey.

Chapter 5: Factors Enabling and Constraining the Scaling-up

One of the knowledge gaps this research tackles is how scaling up factors – borrowed from social innovation theory but often applied to agroecological and sustainable food movements – unfold in practice. Capacity building, network building, a favorable socio-political context, and the presence of key actors, are key facilitators of scaling-up processes (Omann et al., 2019). Therefore, the following section answers the first sub-question: “what are the most important enabling factors in the scaling-up process of Creser, and how do they unfold in practice?”. The operationalization table (figure x) shows how I apply this ‘scaling-up factors’ framework in a deductive fashion. As a consequence, this chapter looks at whether the scaling-up factors emerge in the Creser context (if they reveal themselves during interviews and participant observation) and if they enable support or any member activities.

5.1. A PROGRESSIVE REGION WITH CONSTRAINING REGULATIONS

The socio-political context in which Creser scales up is not the most favorable one, although, it is also not the worst. Whilst theory stresses how a favorable socio-political context can facilitate the scaling-up process (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Omann et al., 2019), few interviews mention Emilia-Romagna socio-political context as decisive in Creser upscaling.

First, Creser lacks financial support from the state. A favorable political context implies that government agencies financially support the grassroots organizations willing to scale up (Omann et al., 2019). Through participant observation and document analysis (i.e., looking at previous meeting briefs), I discovered that Creser has no paid members (and never had), does not apply for funds, and does not receive any sort of institutional support. The ‘Solidarity Economy Regional Fund’4 is the only state-financing Creser was able to grant; it is directed to

4 The Solidarity Economy Regional Fund for the Deduction of Passive Interests (‘Fondo Regionale Economia Solidale per l’Abbattimento Degli Interessi Passivi’ in Italian) was created on 01/07/2019 through the resolution

individual solidarity economy actors. It covers the passive interests on loans that a solidarity economy activity takes to support its business.

Secondly, the bureaucracy and regulations in place in Emilia-Romagna (especially for small farmers and food cooperatives) are rather constraining. On the one hand, the literature highlights the key role of favorable policies and regulations, as they can facilitate the scaling up of AFNs (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Rosset, 2015). On the other hand, the interviews do not refer to any favoring regulation nor policy. Instead, they indicate how the regional regulatory framework obstructs both the scaling-out (i.e., territorial expansion) and scaling-up of Creaser groups (interview 5; 6; 15; 17; 20; 23; 28; 33 A; 35; 37; & 38). For instance, there is no statute or charter for regulating and legally registering food cooperatives and co-housing groups (interview 5; 23; & 37). This lack of regulations hinders their development. Indeed, when people want to start a food cooperative, they have to set it up in a way that is legal although there are no specific regulations in place to do so (interview 5; 23; & 37). Alberto, an active Creser member from the FairTrade Cooperative Oltremare, summarizes this point by saying that the solidarity economy needs an overall simplification of the regulations hindering the spread and expansion of solidarity economy initiatives (interview 28).

However, as the contextual chapter points out, the region Emilia-Romagna distinguishes itself for its cooperative history embedded in community and solidarity values (Corbino, 2010; Fonte & Cucco; 2017). On that note, the interviewees remark how Emilia- Romagna’s historically woven cultural fabric positively contributes to the reception of the Solidarity Economy values by the institutional representatives. Martino (interview 4), Luca (interview 11), and Emanuele (interview 4) highlight the region’s legacy of collaboration, community inclination, and social cohesion, stressing how cooperatives were historically born in this territory. This recalls Omann et al. (2019) argument claiming that a place’s cultural

of the regional council number 1058. Accordingly, a solidarity economy actor (small business or initiative) can take a loan from a mutualistic and solidarity financing group while the Solidarity Economy Regional Fund will cover the payment of the passive interests on these loans. Resource: http://www.economiasolidale.net/emilia- romagna/fondo-regionale-per-economia-solidale (Retrieved on May 6, 2021)

values (i.e., social context) – if aligned with the movement’s principles and ideas – can encourage its upscaling process.

Lastly, in Emilia-Romagna, left-wing and progressive governments – belonging to different parties of the Italian left – have followed one another5 after WWII. Interestingly, the participants comment on these political tendencies; they perceive them as favorable while interacting with the regional bodies (interview 4; 5; 9; & 27). This point aligns with the literature (Giraldo & McCune, 2019; Rosset, 2015) – and contextual chapter insights – suggesting that having a leftist and progressive political environment, attentive to social issues, contributes to scaling up. To depict the political context of the region and its influence on scaling-up, Martino, a veteran and central actor in Creser, compares Emilia-Romagna to Calabria (interview 4). He states that,

“It is not like in Calabria, where some friends from EquoSud have tried to get in contact with the regional institutions and they got the impression of being from another planet, almost aliens. Yes, here [in Emilia-Romagna] things develop fairly well, it is always being a leftist region; historically, the left-wing has always experimented with and evaluated certain arguments and social issues” (interview 4).

This quote shows how the political context, changing widely from region to region (i.e., Emilia- Romagna versus Calabria), can give a different enabling ground – depending on whether it is progressive or not – on which civil society can act.

Therefore, the presence of a favorable socio-political context unfolds into a) a favoring political context that stems from the leftist orientation and openness of Emilia-Romagna political administration (as shown also in the contextual chapter); b) some encouraging cultural values linked to the cooperative history of the region. Nevertheless, the analysis displays a lack of financial support and an obstructive regulatory framework, hindering the group's capacity to scale out and up. Overall, one can assert that the socio-political context in Emilia-Romagna

5 Since 1970, the following political parties have been elected in Emila-Romagna: Italian Socialist Party with Silvano Armaroli (1970-1975) as the regional council president; Cristian Democracy party with Natalino Guerra as the regional council president (until 1980); Italian Socialist Party (1980-1890); Communist Party (until 1995); Democratic Party (PD) which has ruled until nowadays. Current presidency of the regional council: Stefano Bonaccini (Democratic Party). Resource: https://www.regione.emilia-romagna.it/storia/presidenti/presidenti-del- consiglio-regionale-assemblea-legislativa (Retrieved on May 6, 2021)

is not completely supporting Creser scaling-up. Hereafter, the analysis deals with the next enabling factor that emerges from the literature about scaling-up, namely, the presence of key actors.

5.2. LEADERS, INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS, & INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS

Leaders, institutional entrepreneurs, and engaged political actors play a fundamental role in Creser upscaling. The interviews and my participant observation align with the literature arguing that key actors, both inside and outside a network, are vital during the process of scaling up (Omann et al., 2019; Westley et al., 2014). Social innovation theory stresses how leaders and pioneers can steer and push the group beyond its limits to pursue what is needed to scale up (Omann et al., 2019; Westley et al., 2014). Also, the literature refers to institutional entrepreneurs; the latter are people who have a strong intention to reach up to institutions and cross scales (Westley et al., 2014). Westely et al. (2014) argue that institutional entrepreneurs are characterized by good social and political skills. These skills serve the purpose of seizing the scaling-up momentum (Westley et al., 2014). On the other hand, the literature underlines the importance of institutional figures that support and facilitate AFNs upscaling (Omann et al., 2019).

In this regard, the analysis unveils a nuanced picture. Claudio (interview 13), Emanuele (interview 5), and Pasquale (32) emphasize the importance of a core unit of people who heartily believe in Creser and have been committed to its cause throughout the years. They claim that these people with leadership roles have always held a strong motivation for promoting the solidarity economy of the whole region (interview 5; 13; & 32). It is fascinating how Giulia (interview 39) talks about these chief actors, who have led Creser work, as ‘illuminated minds’ (‘menti illuminate’ in Italian). This links to the theory about movement leaders. The latter underlines how leaders can mobilize people and attract third-party support. Thanks to their cultural, social, and symbolic capital, leaders can steer the movement’s trajectory, and define its strategies and goals (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). Due to their charisma (i.e., symbolic capital) and their strong and weak ties (i.e., social capital), these people can guide new and former members into the movement. They can shape coherence and harmony in the movement’s actions (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). The textbox below gives a description – based on my participant observation – of two members often referred to as leaders.

Moreover, multiple informants express the importance of what the literature (Westley et al., 2014) calls institutional entrepreneurs (interview 1; 4; 5; 8; & 39). The latter are professional figures who are skilled in specific fields (i.e., lawyers, finance employers, bankers; etc.) and hold previous knowledge about the solidarity economy (Interview 4; 5; & 39). An example of these institutional entrepreneurs appeared in the previous chapter. Here, I explained how Emanuele (interview 5) was able to write and design the solidarity economy law due to his professional knowledge as a lawyer. He employed his professional and political skills – as his status as a lawyer gave him political credibility – to contribute to Creser upscaling. In addition, Sandro (interview 1), Elena (interview 8), and Amedeo (interview 16) reflect upon the importance of key figures in the network already working within the institution (for example at the city hall). These people know the bureaucracy, how to speed up procedures, and formulate demands properly (interview 1; 8; & 16). These characteristics belong to institutional entrepreneurs and mirror what the literature refers to as social, professional, and political skills (Westley et al., 2014).

Textbox 1: Leader figure example.

When it comes to external political actors, the interviews reveal the importance of having political actors that are willing to engage with the solidarity economy, such as the three

councilors that initiated the 19/2014 law process (interview 5; 7; 8; 10; & 39). Furthermore, it emerges that Creser political influence depends a lot on the assessor or institutional figure who is given the solidarity economy mandate (interview 1; 2; & 9). Emma (interview 9) and Sandro (interview 1) state that a lot of Creser scaling-up success relies both on the assessor’s capacity to find the right technicians that can develop the Creser projects, and on the assessor’s goodwill to interact with different departments. Accordingly, Emanuele claims that: “politicians have to give the input, and then the administrative machine moves” (interview 5). This quote shows a relatively high state dependence of Creser in its scaling-up process. One can understand this considering that scaling-up is intrinsically a process wherein the state does half of the deal. If civil society members do not find political actors who support them, their power to influence policy-making gets weakened. Therefore, the analysis pinpoints that it is very important for Creser upscaling to find institutional actors who know about the law, who are interested in it, and push for developing it (interview 1; 2; 5; 9; 10; 16). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind the risk the solidarity economy runs while being too dependent on the state (Dinerstein, 2014). This can cause these civil society groups to be co-opted and translated into the state governance tools if they do not keep their autonomy (Dinerstein, 2014).

Textbox 2: Chief figure example.

Thus, the analysis sheds light on the importance of a) leaders, intended as a core unit of people working hard for Creser development and steering its journey; b) institutional entrepreneurs, namely, Creser members who stand out for their professional skills and often have experience working within the institutional machine; c) key institutional actors who believe in the solidarity economy and are interested in supporting the law 19/2014 implementation.

5.3. KNOWLEDGE-SHARING & CO-CREATION

Sharing knowledge between Creser groups is not always easy, but it is necessary. Creser communication capacity appears constrained; it does not meet the information demand of its members. Hence, Creser must strengthen its knowledge-sharing ability. Indeed, when a movement wants to reach up to institutions, sharing best practices, mistakes, and lessons learned is key (Omann et al., 2019). The literature refers to capacity building as the exchange of “know-how” and skills within an organization (Omann et al., 2019). This includes the

process and outcome of mutual learning among network members (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001). Thus, a movement should have platforms for knowledge circulation and organize workshops and training (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001). These instruments aim to enrich and strengthen the organization’s social capital (Brown, LaFond, & Macintyre, 2001). As we have seen in the theoretical chapter, spreading social innovations (scaling up and out) is not easy. To start a new initiative and make it work on the ground, people must share how to do so (Rosset, 2015). Best practices need to travel fast (Rosset, 2015). Also, scaling up means that lay people have to develop advocacy skills for negotiating with institutional actors. Hence, capacity-building is how social movements can encourage the spread of information and strengthen their negotiation strategies (Omann et al., 2019).

Overall, participants voice the need of enhancing Creser knowledge-sharing (Interview 1; 4; 5; 7; 8; 10; 17; 19; 25; 32; 33A; & 39). Both the interviews and my participant observation reflect how Creser members no longer see the network as a place for exchanging best practices. This contrasts with the picture that I got from the time the network was born. Here, the different subjects joining shared their histories and innovative projects. Nowadays, Creser members tend to engage in knowledge exchange mostly at the group level (interview 10; 33 A). This means that Creser members partake in mutual events. However, they tend to exchange their practices in narrow circles, mostly involving one or two groups often at the city level.

During my participant observation, I discovered some clusters of groups often engaging in peer-to-peer learning. These groups keep each other updated about their developments and organize mutual events. For instance, in Bologna, Arvaia (CSA), Camilla (food cooperative), and Campi Aperti (a producers’ group) work intertwined and co-create projects daily. Campi Aperti's producers sell to Camilla and collaborate with Arvaia for setting up marketplaces. Another example is that of Des Parma (Solidarity Economy District of Parma). In October, I went to Parma to attend a workshop organized by OltreFood (a food cooperative belonging to Des Parma); I recall that the hosts explained OltreFood’s concept and its history. Here, I saw that many other members of Des Parma – like people I knew from Parma Sostenibile – were present. Thus, these knowledge exchange cluster themselves mostly at the city level and within solidarity economy districts.

Also, different participants have participated in knowledge exchange and co-creation projects at their group level (interview 8; 17; & 33 A). For instance, Elena (interview 8)

illustrates how Gas Imola once organized a meeting with Campi Aperti to talk about seeds. The two groups exchanged information about how to preserve, collect, and employ seeds (interview 8). Moreover, on a Sunday morning in late October, I went to Reggio-Emilia to meet Angelo, a kind man in his late forties. He told me about a project called “Open a Gas in 5 steps” (“Apri Un Gas in 5 Mosse” in Italian), promoted by Des Reggio-Emilia (interview 17). Angelo proudly stated that the project aimed at explaining how to create a Gas from scratch (interview 17). Here, the organizers made a PowerPoint presentation. They made available the IT platform they were using to make orders and the list of their producers (interview 33A). With this project, they were able to make the Gas format appealing and easy to access (interview 33A). Notwithstanding, these knowledge-sharing initiatives remain bound to the city-level and the solidarity economy niche.

Knowledge-sharing with peripheral organizations

Furthermore, I discovered that Creser struggles to share information about the solidarity economy law with groups not yet belonging to the network (interview 1; 5; & 7). Emanuele unveils how Creser organized some ‘dissemination events’ after it had passed the 19/2014 law (interview 5). These are workshops wherein different organizations on the ground can learn about the law and its tools (interview 5). In this context, Federico stresses Creser limit in reaching out to groups that did not partake in the law-making process. Therefore, limited knowledge-sharing within Creser matches a constrained information exchange with groups external to Creser. In this respect, Martino, a very engaged Creser member from Modena, highlights how Creser has very few links with external networks (interview 4). Consequently, he is now partaking in a large network called “Climate Emergency Network Emilia-Romagna” (interview 4). The latter shows a wide composition, counting actors such as Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, WWF groups, etc. (interview 4).

In light of the above, one can claim that Creser lacks a far-reaching praxis of knowledge exchange. Accordingly, Sergio mentions,

“There are some small collections/archipelagos of solidarity economy subjects that carry out initiatives that yet remain a bit confined in their restricted and specialistic circle. [Those are] to some extent niche initiatives which do not contaminate much. We can say that we know each other, we invite each other to speak at our mutual events […]. Nevertheless, everybody just does his/her things, which is

somehow the limit of all the groups that are so small and self-managed. Our energies are limited and we get pressed down onto our everyday tasks and we struggle to…lift our eyesight. This is a weakness characterizing a little both Creser and the Solidarity Economy Forum” (interview 10).

This quote demonstrates how Creser members want to share more knowledge among each other and with external actors. However, they find themselves constrained by their small and self-managed structure. Indeed, Creser faces challenges common to the solidarity economy – small size, few human resources available (Moulaert & Ailenei, 2005; Utting, 2015). As a consequence, Creser members are likely to focus their energies mostly on individual projects instead of creating Creser collaborations.

“We are not very well prepared when it comes to communication”

Moreover, a clear communication deficit emerges in the researched context. Both the interviews and participant observation reveal how the movement’s online platform does not satisfy the communication needs of its members. There is an official webpage, called economiasolidale.net/emilia-romagna, which the regional institution has sponsored as a result of the 19/2014 law. Anyhow, many participants express their dissatisfaction with it (interview 5; 10; 25; 32; & 39). Interestingly, Emanuele argues that “we [Creser members] are not very prepared when it comes to communication” (interview 5). Likewise, Sergio states that “[the website] maybe it is not the right and most appropriate communication instrument” (interview 10). Elena claims that “the website, as it is now, is not a good communication platform… it is sad somehow” (interview 8). These utterances show a gap between Creser communication demand and its supply.

One can conclude that, in general, little knowledge exchange occurs in Creser (Interview 4; 10; 32; & 33A). Pasquale, a talkative Gasista from Faenza, demonstrates this point when he says that,

“Up until now, [Creser] is not a platform for sharing the ‘know-how’, because there is a historical matter at stake. Maybe [Creser] was born as such, but, since people have been knowing each other for twenty years, they will not tell each other what they already know every Saturday. And, it is you who is the newcomer, who comes in during the work-in-process; the others will not all come to you to present themselves […] And you gather there to talk about the themes on the agenda. You are there neither to tell each other if someone has opened

a new association nor to ask if someone is interested in the laws you are developing at a communal level, or to organize a visit to get to know new organizations. Nevertheless, this is what I like.” (Interview 32).

This shows how some members of the network find it relevant to share information about the actors participating, their stories, and their practices, even if they already know each other. They want to learn from each other’s skills, accomplishments, and mistakes. Indeed, exchanging knowledge improves people’s skills; it allows people to get inspired by each other’s work (Omann et al., 2019; Rosset, 2015). This statement also outlines how solidarity economy members can have different meanings, goals, and demands as regards the solidarity economy movement’s role and activity (Utting, 2005).

Overall, the interview results uncover a) little knowledge exchange and co-creation in Creser as a whole (especially due to limited human resources); b) a tendency to co-create projects and exchange knowledge at the city level, mainly among Des or few groups; c) lack of knowledge-exchange with external actors; c) a communication deficit also due to an outdated website as the online communication channel. In light of the above, the next scaling- up factor the analysis touches upon is network building.

5.4. NETWORK-BUILDING

If alternative food networks want to move from the locality to the trans-locality, they must engage in network-building (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017; Marsden et al., 2018; Santo & Moragues-Faus, 2019; Sonnino et al., 2016). Whilst building a network, people must ensure that its members have a common vision (Omann et al., 2019). This translates into having a shared political vision for change. A common political vision for change allows the group to set its targets (Omann et al., 2019). Besides, Omann et al. (2019) appoint collaboration and co- creation as key elements for creating a network, as they increase the network social capital. Accordingly, this section of the analysis sheds light on the importance and practical unfolding of network-building in Creser. First, it starts by considering the ‘vision for change’ concept. Here, the analysis seeks to understand if Creser holds a vision for change and its role in network-building. Second, it explores the meaning of network-building. Third, it sheds light on the “how” of network-building, investigating Creser on-the-ground-work practices. Here, the analysis unravels the strategies and difficulties that emerge while Creser works on the ground.

Vision for change

One can argue that Creser holds, to some extent, a common vision for change: critical consumerism. According to the latter, critical consumers can make the economic system fairer and more sustainable. Critical consumerism is an umbrella term under which the network captures the diverse interests of the solidarity economy. Interestingly, Amedeo, a man in his seventies from Casalecchio, specifies how critical consumerism – as Creser common vision for change – is a common denominator among the movement’s different members (interview 16). Likewise, Cristina believes that actively creating new ways of consuming (i.e., by setting up food cooperatives) is much more effective than passively resisting the conventional agri-food system (i.e., through boycotts) (interview 37). In other words, the idea behind Creser is to offer, through critical consumerism, a solution to the problems stemming from our consumerist society. This mirrors the concepts presented in the literature. Accordingly, the solidarity economy focuses on environmental and social justice issues; it suggests an alternative economic model prioritizing ethics and sustainability (reflected in critical consumerism) over profits (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015).

Nonetheless, I noticed that Creser vision for change appears sporadically, mainly when speaking to the network’s leaders. Indeed, Giulia, a member of GasBo (a Gas from Bologna), highlights how a vision for change may stem from key leaders (interview 39). This idea remarks on the importance of leaders and pioneers, as we have seen above. In this case, leaders can instill the movement’s vision for change into the other members (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). Furthermore, I observed that this vision for change lacks the urgency it should have – since climate change and food poverty are very urgent issues – and a clear definition, a manifesto for change. After having explored the idea of a common vision for network-building, the next part delves deeper into the practices and meanings of networking.

Networking

The number of people involved in a network determines the political influence a movement can exert (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). This demonstrates how relevant network-building is for impacting policy-making, thus, for scaling-up (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017; Marsden et al., 2018; Santo & Moragues-Faus, 2019; Sonnino et al., 2016). Thus, Creser networking ability dictates its political impact. Accordingly, multiple participants declare that creating a critical mass is key to gain political weight (interview 8; 10; 13; & 32). However, they stress

that Creser not having achieved a critical mass is one of its major limits (interview 8; 10; & 13).

Nevertheless, what are the meanings attached to network building expressed by the participants? Emma states that creating a network makes people realize that they are not alone in their fights, that they are doing something similar and important (interview 9). For Emma, Creser is empowering all its members, normally just working in groups at the local level (interview 9). Emma’s perception connects to the idea of trans-locality emerging from the literature about AFNs. Accordingly, AFNs must create links among themselves; they must move beyond their locality to become more powerful and scale-up (Marsden et al., 2018; Sonnino et al., 2016). As expressed by Emma, what is powerful about moving beyond the locality is to find out that you are not alone (interview 9). This enables people to start thinking collectively as a movement. Also, participants see networking as important because it allows entering the political dialogue with institutional actors (interview 7; 9; 13; 19; & 21). Hence, the analysis reveals how a network can have different functions. It can start as a meeting place for sharing practices and values and then turn into a leverage point for political action. When it comes to the “how” of network-building, the data shows that Creser practices involve engaging with the communities on the ground. Therefore, the following section explores this idea of on-the-ground work in further detail.

Working on the ground (‘lavoro sui territori’)

When the interviewees talk about networking practices, they widely elaborate on the concept of “on-the-ground work” (“lavoro sui territori” in Italian). This concept recalls the solidarity economy idea of connecting multiple non-market economies on the ground in a powerful social movement (Miller, 2009; Grasseni et al., 2015). Therefore, this part of the analysis sheds light on the meaning and challenges of working on the ground.

On the one hand, working on the ground means a) spreading information about the solidarity economy law and its achievements, b) letting organizations in Emilia-Romagna know about Creser (interview 7; 21; & 31). On the other hand, Antonio, a member of the ethical bank ‘Banca Etica’, defines working on the ground as the network capacity of involving new groups, paying attention to local events, developing relationships between people, and providing services to the territorial communities (interview 24).

In general, working on-the-ground emerges as a hard and difficult task for Creser (interview 2; 4; 5; 7; 15; 16; 24; & 33 A). Many of my informants link this difficulty with the limited amount of time, energy, and human resources the network has available (interview 5; 14; 17; 19; 30; 39). One of my informants claims that: “it is not due to a lack of interest that human resources are low, but it is because people do not have the time” (interview 6). Overall, the interviews show that people are very overwhelmed by work and their life matters (interview 10; 17; 19, 33 A; 30; 38). Giorgio lively describes these circumstances by saying,

“It is hard because in life everybody has his/her aches and pains…we have our activities, time is always little; people are doing a lot of things, dedicating themselves to many associations, and then there is family, children’s school and sports, work, etc.” (interview 30)

This quote shows how volunteers can usually dedicate a small amount of time to Creser. Normally, they already have full-time jobs, maybe kids to look after, and volunteer work in other associations. Thus, every month, the typical volunteer, besides taking care of his/her organization (e.g., Gas, cooperative, etc.), can devote one Saturday morning to attend Creser meetings (usually from 9,30 to 12,30 am) and around four hours to meet up with the respective working group (GLT). The literature also underlines the voluntaristic base of the solidarity economy as a weakness sometimes (Grasseni et al., 2015; Muleart & Ailenei, 2005). Indeed, having to rely on volunteers can cause a movement to lack the human resources needed to connect the constellation of actors on the ground (Grasseni et al., 2015).

Consequently, a lack of human resources determines little work on the ground. As a result, little work on the ground causes a decrease in Creser participation. Therefore, there is a big interest on behalf of Creser members to get more in touch with the groups on the ground and become more widely spread. Interestingly, the next section deals with the strategies Creser employs in working on the ground emerging from my qualitative data.

On-the ground-work strategies

Few strategies underlie Creser on-the-ground work. Matteo (interview 14) and Sergio (interview 10) suggest a practical approach, whereby new groups are drawn into Creser by partaking in projects. Therefore, the best way to create a network is by bringing people together around concrete issues and pragmatic ideas (interview 8; 9; 14; & 24). The latter means: gathering the people from a certain place who have a problem and start a discussion about how

to solve it. Thus, as reflected in the literature, network-building is the result of different organizations collaborating around a pragmatic enterprise (Omann et al., 2019).

Moreover, the importance of establishing personal relationships emerges. Accordingly, connecting on a personal level with people is vital for getting them involved (interview 9; 12; 39). This implies going in person to talk with a group, inviting people to events by phoning them privately and drawing on one’s social network (interview 9; 10; 12; 39). Also, the analysis unveils the power of word of mouth as a way to learn about Creser. Lucia (interview 21), Emma (interview 9), Federico (interview 7), and Lapo (interview 31) explained to me that they got to know about Creser through mutual friends. Overall, word of mouth – meaning drawing on friendships and personal contacts – surfaces as the underlying force for creating individual solidarity economy groups.

5.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter answers the following research question: “what are the most important enabling factors in the scaling-up process of Creser, and how do they unfold in practice?”. Here, key actors (i.e., leaders, institutional entrepreneurs, and engaged political actors) and network building are the most important scaling-up factors for Creser. Especially, leaders who can steer the movement’s activities and institutional entrepreneurs with expertise in the institutional field are key for Creser upscaling. Network-building is essential for linking groups at a trans- local level, yet achieving political weight requires a critical mass. Nonetheless, attaining a critical mass unfolds as a difficult task for Creser; a lack of human resources constrains this endeavor. Networking means engaging communities on the ground around practical issues. Thereby, few working on-the-ground strategies unravel, namely: networking around concrete projects; establishing personal relationships; and getting in contact with people by word-of-mouth. In this process, critical consumerism works as a common denominator for Creser members. However, since Creser does not show a clear manifesto for change, its common vision for change seems hazy and lacking urgency. In addition, Emilia- Romagna's socio-political context does not play a central role in Creser upscaling. Even if the region features a progressive political context and an encouraging cultural legacy, the regulatory framework in place and no financial support hampers the scaling-up process. Lastly, capacity-building is deemed important; yet Creser lacks an overarching praxis for knowledge exchange. Its members share best practices and co-create projects mainly at the city

level, involving few groups. Also, a communication deficit reveals that Creser should develop better online platforms to meet its member’s information demand.

Chapter 6: Scaling-up Strategies & Challenges

The following chapter answers the following sub-questions: “How does scaling-up unravel in the Creser context, and what are the struggles and strategies at play in this process?”. Since the previous chapter sheds light on the most important factors enabling Creser upscaling, this section briefly considers the insights directly surfacing from the analysis. Thus, it portrays how Creser upscaling unfolds in practice. First, this chapter starts by outlining the difficulties that appear in the dialogue between Creser and the regional government agencies. Secondly, it unearths the practical scaling-up strategies that Creser employs to reach up to institutions.

6.1. CRESER UPSCALING DIFFICULTIES

Creser and the institutional bodies: a complex relationship

The relationship between Creser and the regional institutional bodies is a rather complex one. Indeed, institutional procedures are slow and institutional support towards the solidarity economy fluctuates (Utting, 2015). Interestingly, when Laville (2009) talks about the importance of institutional support for the solidarity economy, he mentions that,

“To ensure that target groups remain genuinely and actively involved, public authorities must place themselves in a situation where they can listen to and enter into a dialogue with the society that they claim to serve” (p. 240).

Therefore, institutions should be open for dialoguing and negotiating with civil society; they should bring together different local politicians and solidarity economy representatives (Laville, 2009). Nevertheless, while my informants speak about Creser dialogue with institutions, they express the difficulty of this relationship (interview 6; 8; 13;16; & 39). On the one hand, Creser members aspire to build a meaningful relationship with the institutions. They wish to construct a feeling of unity and reciprocity between civil society and the institutional representatives (‘costruire un noi’ in Italian) (interview 9; 12). This idea resonates with the literature envisioning the solidarity economy as a space for experimenting with different types of political participation, representation, and contamination of the political landscape (Utting, 2015).

On the other hand, the institutional bodies show reluctant interest and responsiveness towards Creser. Indeed, it took two years before the regional government gave an available date to organize the Forum (participant observation). Accordingly, Luciano, a member of the solidarity financing group MG6, states that “institutions do not show a collaborative approach to civil society groups” (interview 6). Thus, he emphasizes how institutions do not display great openness and availability to listen to the solidarity economy groups (interview 6). This perception of little institutional support is widely shared among Creser members (interview 3; 9; 12; 13). In addition, the slowness of institutional procedures hinders Creser upscaling (interview 5; 6; 10; 12; 32; & 33 B). Many of my informants argue that this scaling-up process takes ‘biblical times’ to bring its fruits (interview 5; 6; 10; 12; 32; & 33 B).

Different decision-making methods & intentions

Moreover, Creser encounters some difficulties while dialoguing with the regional government institutions. It emerges that the two parties differ in multiple ways, namely: in their decision- making methods and intentions. Creser employs the consensus method for decision-making while the institutional bodies do not (interview 1; 6; & 21). Whilst the next chapter further elaborates on the Creser consensus method, one can argue that government bodies are not used to this decision-making method (interview 21). This difference in methods causes hardships in establishing horizontal relationships with the institutions. At the same time, Sandro (interview 1) believes that Creser members cannot pretend to translate this decision-making method into the institutional realm. He asserts that, opposite to Creser, institutions must work with very defined time frameworks (interview 1). As to say, Creser fluid decision-making method does not match the institutional environment marked by strict deadlines. Secondly, it emerges that Creser encounters a difficult dialogue with institutions due to a difference in intentions between the two parties (interview 7; 16; 21; & 39). Lucia claims that institutions intend to defend the status quo, while civil society groups want to innovate and bring change (Interview 21). This idea aligns with the solidarity economy’s purpose of moving beyond the capitalist system (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). Also, Amedeo (interview 16) stresses this difference in intentions by considering the allocation of Emilia-Romagna public investments. He declares that,

“All the interventions that the region executes contrast the solidarity economy law contents. Thus, it is a contradiction in terms: on one hand, all the public funding aimed at the productive sectors follows consumeristic logic; on the other hand, they [the institutions] launch a

solidarity economy law that follows opposite principles. Thus, I do not think they understood what they have voted” (interview 16).

This quote underscores how the solidarity economy and the government bodies do not share the same development intentions. On the one hand, the solidarity economy seeks to build an economy promoting social, cultural, and environmental objectives (Kawano, 2009; Utting, 2015). On the other hand, government institutions seem to continue advocating for a growth- led development model.

Difficult dialogue: bureaucracy & professionalism

Furthermore, a difference in structures hinders the dialogue between Creser and the institutional actors. The division of roles within the institutional landscape is complex; the communal, regional, and national levels intertwine (interview 27 & 28). Accordingly, Emanuele advocates that it is difficult to understand the complex mechanisms steering the regional institutions (interview 5). Since the institutional and bureaucratic system in place (i.e., the division of jurisdictions and interplay between different regulations) is intricate (interview 27 & 28), Creser finds it hard to understand how to change regulations. Thus, a complex institutional realm – in terms of understanding the division of institutional roles and the intertwined regulatory frameworks – hampers Creser upscaling.

In addition, Franco (interview 2) and Claudio (interview 13) underline the different degrees of professionalism of the two parties involved in this dialogue. This influences Creser lobbying capacity (interview 2). Indeed, Claudio claims that an asymmetry in professionalism occurs,

“Because you have in front of you politicians, who are professionals, and directors and technicians, who get paid, so they are also professionals. Politicians are professionals in talking and making decisions, and the others [technicians] in doing stuff…when it comes to us, we struggle to enhance professionalism within our group. From their [politicians’] perspective, we are a gang of…a ragtag army that nobody understands what it wants.” (interview 13)

This quote illustrates how a lack of professionalism in the solidarity economy ranks can raise distrust among local authorities (Laville, 2009). Local state authorities tend to discard civil society groups more easily if the latter movements show little professionalism (Laville, 2009).

Institutional turn-over

Lingering over Creser scaling-up challenges, many informants pinpoint the institutional turn- over that happens every 5 years (i.e., every new legislature) as a problem for Creser upscaling (interview 5; 6; 8; 9; 10; 12; & 13). This is a common struggle for solidarity economy movements securing institutional support (Laville, 2009). Institutional turn-over means that each time a legislature starts new politicians get elected regionally. Afterwards, a new institutional actor (i.e., an assessor, or, as in the current case, the vice-president of the region) gets the solidarity economy mandate. This implies that Creser members have to start over by explaining to the new solidarity economy delegate the 19/2014 law and its purpose (interview 6 & 13). Also, the newly-elected delegate has to choose and send new technicians to the Permanent Worktables. Luciano emphasizes what this institutional turn-over causes by stating that,

“Due to a series of vicissitudes, it [the law implementation] took longer, because new people took over…because, unfortunately, this is the relationship with politics: today you have some spokesmen and players that are different tomorrow, and you have to start from scratch every time. Thus, this is exhausting.” (interview 6).

This illustrates how the political turnover wears out Creser members and slows down the law implementation process. Moreover, Emanuele (interview 5), Elena (interview 8), and Riccardo (interview 12) stress how the incoming politicians have a hard time understanding the law and carrying on its implementation. They claim that each institutional turn-over brings the scaling- up process to a halt (interview 5; 8; & 12). Interestingly, the importance of key institutional actors for upscaling emerges once again. At each institutional turn-over, Creser upscaling highly depends on the people given the responsibility for the solidarity economy. This point can be analytically linked to the idea that having relations with the state and other external actors can sometimes constrain the scaling up of the solidarity economy (Utting, 2015). In this case, aligning oneself with the state means disrupting the movement’s continuity in pursuing its objectives (i.e., implementing the 19/2014 law).

So far, the analysis has revealed that Creser, in its dialogue with the government institutions, faces hardships due to a) fluctuating institutional support; c) the slowness of institutional proceedings; d) a difference in decision-making methods, intentions, and professionalism between Creser and the institutional bodies; e) a complex division of roles in

government agencies and intricate regulatory framework in place; d) the turnover of politicians and technicians happening every five years. In light of the above, the next part sheds light on Creser scaling-up strategies.

6.2. SCALING-UP STRATEGIES

My qualitative data unravel different strategies Creser members employ to enhance their scaling-up capacity. First, the establishment of the 19/2014 law and the creation of the Forum surface as important scaling-up strategies. Secondly, the analysis illuminates the practical strategies Creser members have developed through their experience with the institutional bodies.

The Solidarity Economy Forum and the 19/2014 Law

The interviews address the 19/2014 law as an important scaling-up strategy. They remark how the law has allowed Creser to set up mechanisms (i.e., the Solidarity Economy Forum and the Permanent Worktables) to systematically interact with the regional government bodies (interview 2; 5; 6; 7; 9; 12; 14; 16; 19; 21; & 22). The participants perceive the Forum as a scaling-up strategy because it represents the institutional channel for dialogue with state representatives (interview 2; 5; 6; 7; 9; 12; 14; 16; 19; 21; & 22). Indeed, the Forum officially enables Creser to bring two projects for implementing the law in front of the political spokesmen. Whilst Franco talks about the importance of the Forum, he declares that,

“This is the interesting thing about the Solidarity Economy Forum…that is, having direct contact with the institutional bodies to try to develop different things. To try to interact directly with the regional political forces, to try to interact with those people […].” (interview 2)

This quote shows how the Solidarity Economy Forum is a useful platform for social dialogue (Laville, 2009) wherein Creser groups can reach up and talk to the regional state representatives. Correspondingly, the literature about the solidarity economy emphasizes the importance of having such channels and platforms to spark the dialogue between civil society and political parties (Laville, 2009; Varghese & Hansen-Kuhn, 2013). Indeed, thanks to the Forum, the AFNs in Creser can influence ‘the rules of the game’, pushing for regulations and policies to mainstream their practices (Omann et al., 2019; Pitt & Jones, 2016; Westley et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, since there have been few law implementations, the analysis shows that Creser should strengthen its scaling-up strategies (interview 6; 16). Hereafter, the interview data sheds light on few practical strategies for dialoguing with institutions.

Practical strategies: bring examples and be well prepared!

To become ‘a credible interlocutor’ in the eyes of the regional institutions, Creser members have to provide concrete examples. A ‘credible interlocutor’ is a person with a degree of authority – a form of symbolic capital (Nepstad & Bob, 2006) – and with social skills and knowledge about the matter of discussion – cultural capital (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). While Nepstad and Bob (2006) describe these different forms of capital as attributes of leadership figures, they argue that these features do not necessarily belong to leaders only but often to other people within a movement as well. Thus, having these characteristics can make a person credible, trustworthy, and influential in politicians’ eyes. But, how to gain this capital and become a ‘credible interlocutor’? Here are some practical examples emerging from the interviews.

Lucia explains to me how SLIT, her civil society group, had to offer legislative loopholes to the administrative bodies to meet its goals at the town level (interview 21). These loopholes are technicalities about how to change or create regulations and policies that would help to solve issues on the ground (interview 21). Hence, Creser representatives should supply the documents needed to intervene in the regulatory or policy framework at stake (interview 21). Here, Lucia emphasizes how important it is to gather knowledge and documentation about other cities that have achieved the same thing one is asking for. She explains this point by stating,

“Then you have to go and bring the documents. And, you [emphasis in the original] have to bring them, to make the functionary understand that you are not asking impossible things…but that other municipalities have already done these things. The technicians are interested in knowing where the legal loopholes are, because, when they make a deliberation, they need to understand the loopholes at play” (interview 21).

Moreover, the strategy of bringing concrete examples, documents, and legal loopholes to become ‘credible’, connects with another point surfacing in the analysis, namely, the importance of being ‘well prepared’. My informants show that to scale up, Creser members must be well prepared. They must gain knowledge about the public administration and

especially the regulations already in place (interview 1; 21; 27; & 39). The literature refers to this knowledge about the legislative and administrative context as constituting people’s cultural capital (Nepstad & Bob, 2006). Therefore, to become trustworthy voices, civil society groups must provide feasible solutions (interview 1; 21; 27; & 39). Interestingly, Carla, a technician from the agriculture department, affirms that her collaboration with the Agriculture Roundtable has been fruitful (interview 27). Indeed, she positively depicts how the civil society groups have come well prepared to the Roundtable meetings and with the necessary documents at hand (interview 27).

Some interviews further elaborate on this idea of bringing concrete examples to the institutional dialogue (interview 11; 13; & 35). Ludovico, a sociology professor and supporter of the producer group Campi Aperti, expands on this during our conversation (interview 35). He argues that one of Creser scaling-up strategies is to present practices that the network has already performed for a long time (interview 35). Claudio (interview 13) and Luca (interview 11) share the same belief; they hold that to scale up, Creser must start from the concrete projects happening at the local level. Therefore, besides bringing documents, loopholes, and knowing the laws in place, people have to bring examples of social innovations occurring on the ground to become credible interlocutors. They must show that these are working well, that they are feasible solutions. Lastly, as illustrated in the previous chapter, the data reveals how institutional entrepreneurs and skilled facilitators in the network are key for scaling up (interview 1; 8; 39). Intermediary actors help to adjust the language for the two parts to understand each other (Bush et al., 2017 in Omann et al., 2019, p. 13). Talking about intermediaries, Emma (interview 9) and Sandro (interview 1) stress the strategic importance of having ARTER, the secretary, facilitating the communication and mediating between the two parties.

6.3. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In light of the above, this chapter seeks to clarify both the challenges and the strategies that Creser faces while interacting with the regional institutions. The analysis portrays a difficult dialogue between Creser and the institutional bodies due to a) the slowness of the institutional machine and its complexity, b) different approaches and methods for dialogue. On the other hand, the data unravels some scaling-up strategies at work. First, the solidarity economy law, envisioning the Forum set-up, constitutes a strategy. Indeed, the Forum is an

example of how a platform for social dialogue can facilitate the scaling-up process (Laville, 2009; Varghese & Hansen-Kuhn, 2013). Secondly, providing the institutional actors with documents, legal loopholes, feasible solutions, and concrete examples appears as an asset. Coming well prepared to the meetings emerges as an advantage too. Both enhance the cultural capital of the movement's members. The latter means coming through as more credible actors in politicians' eyes. At the same time, the analysis highlights once more how having institutional entrepreneurs (with great cultural capital) and a mediating actor is a good asset for scaling-up (Westley et al., 2014).

Chapter 7: Creser Alliance-Building

This chapter focuses on answering the following research question: “How are Creser members able to build alliances within the expanding solidarity economy movement?”. According to theory, the creation of trans-local networks is key in scaling up processes. Here, the concept of forging alliances expands on the idea of a network, lingering over the discursive aspect of creating an alliance. The literature shows that building alliances implies two elements: picking an organizational form (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017) and creating a common discourse (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018). Thereafter, the analysis seeks to unveil how these two elements play out in Creser. Also, it pays attention to how alliance-building emerges from the data as a practice that involves struggles and strategies. Thus, to understand Creser alliance- building strategies and practices, the following section elaborates on: a) Creser organizational form; b) Creser decision-making method; c) the practice of alliance-building, its struggles, and its strategies; e) Creser common discourse.

7.1. ORGANIZATIONAL FORM

According to Duncan & Pascucci (2017), four types of relations can describe AFNs and trans- local networks, namely: community-based, market-based, democratic, and bureaucratic relations. As viewed in the theoretical framework, the presence of assemblies, knowledge- sharing, and common values among AFNs participants characterize community-based relations (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). When an organization presents a horizontal structure wherein people share the same decision rights in elections, it features democratic relations (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Instead, as alternative food networks formalize their memberships with rules, define their different roles, and set up regulations for their inner-workings, they acquire bureaucratic relations (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Duncan & Pascucci (2017) correlate the AFNs’ transformative potential to their organizational design. They classify AFNs relations as either isomorphic or polymorphic to the agri-food system. The former mime the dominant food-regime relations; the latter divert completely from the mainstream market relations. The literature concludes that the AFNs which structure themselves around isomorphic relations (i.e., with prevailing market-based and bureaucratic relations) “may gain in terms of incrementally shifting the regime towards their goals, but are unlikely to support pathways that

present alternatives to the dominant regime” (Ducan & Pascucci, 2017, p. 335). The authors assume that if AFNs get an organizational structure with predominantly bureaucratic and market-based relations, they have less transformative potential. Hence, they are more likely to get co-opted by the mainstream food system (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Instead, when AFNs organize around polymorphic structures (i.e., community-based and democratic relations), they can have a radical impact on the food system (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). These AFNs might need more persistence for scaling-up; yet, in the long run, they can be truly transformative of the regime in place (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017).

Community-based relations

The analysis reveals how Creser holds an informal organization and a non-hierarchical structure (interview 9; 8; 11; 12; 13; & 39). Creser members like to discuss together as equals (interview 8). Hence, they uphold a horizontal organization without many defined roles (Interview 8). These characteristics create a sense of community wherein people can freely express and share knowledge and opinions (interview 39). It emerges that creating community relations shapes a sense of belonging; it allows people to actively take part and ownership in the group. Also, since the solidarity economy seeks to transform society (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009), multiple participants acknowledge that an economic transformation must influence all sectors of society (interview 5; 15; 19; 22; & 39). Hence, Creser displays a transversal nature: it works crossing many fields (e.g., agriculture, ethical financing, co- housing, fair trade, etc.) (interview 15 & 39). The latter aligns with the literature arguing that the solidarity economy touches upon intertwining themes (Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). While the interviews pinpoint this transversality as a strength, I observed that it sometimes scatters the movement’s focus and dissipates its energy. Especially, during assemblies, participants bring a large array of topics to the table. As a result, sometimes some depth is missing in a discussion; it is harder to come to conclusions.

Moreover, the network organizational form mirrors this transversality in the way its members divide themselves into different thematic working groups (interview 5; 15; 19; 22; & 39). Nevertheless, I noticed that this division is flexible and informal; it allows Creser members to partake in as many thematic groups as they want to. Hence, the analysis and my participant observation reveal that community-based relations characterize Creser organizational structure. The next subchapter discusses whether Creser employs some degree of bureaucratic relations in its structure.

Creser Formalization: risk of bureaucratic relations

As seen in the earlier chapters, Creser structured itself during the process that led to the 19/2014 law. Creser members agreed on meeting in monthly assemblies (textbox 3 below) and created a Secretary and Commission body. As I have observed while participating in some Secretary and Commission meetings, the Secretary meets once a week to discuss the practical and organizational matters (i.e., website publications, emails for the regional government bodies, etc.). The Commission meets regularly before the monthly assembly. It sets the agenda and arranges who should facilitate the upcoming session (participant observation). Here, Matteo (interview 14) and Giulia (interview 39) stress the importance of the organization achieved so far (i.e., the Secretary, the Commission, and the monthly assemblies) to distribute the network workload and power. Therefore, this more well-defined structuring seems helpful; nevertheless, it appears on the edge of representing bureaucratic relations.

Textbox 3: Creser typical meeting.

The literature warns AFNs against organizing their inner structure around bureaucratic relations, meaning, defining the different bodies of the organization, getting standardized procedures, and establishing membership and participation rules (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Duncan & Pascucci (2017) underline how these relations hinder the transformative capacity of a network. They argue that whilst AFNs organize around bureaucratic relations, they risk getting co-opted by the agri-food regime (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Interestingly, when Creser tried to give itself a structure (i.e., define its different roles and bodies) in 2018, a lot of people dropped out of the network (interview 8; 11; 13; & 33C). Elena argues that since Creser work focused more on its internal organization, it partially neglected to work on the problems and issues on the ground (interview 8). Thus, this formalization implied that during Creser

meetings, people mostly talked about structural matters. This bored people; it ran the risk of emptying the movement of its contents, dynamism, and transformative spark. People no longer perceive Creser as a space to share practices and initiate alternative economic projects on the ground. Claudio explains this moment as it follows,

“We went on a journey all together as we tried to clarify: “how do we structure Creser?”; “what is the Secretary?”; “what is the Commission?”; “which is the Working Table that does that and that?”; “what kind of relationships do we have with that person or that theme?”. And we made a path that lasted almost two years, very extensive and interesting If you want. Nevertheless, we arrived at the end that maybe 7, 8, or 9 people would attend the meetings, because…it became too complex being able to maintain and absorb such a structure in such an informal organization as we are” (interview 13).

This quote shows how introducing bureaucratic relations meant changing Creser free and autonomous organization by getting a more formal structure – which resembles that of the state (i.e., a commission, a secretary, etc.). Thus, this structural complexity and formal focus cut some of the movement’s autonomy. It made people lose interest because it weakened the movement’s creativity (i.e., creating new projects) and transformative potential (i.e., liking issues on the ground and finding common solutions). According to the literature about scaling- up, a movement must show a degree of compatibility with the state and the institutions it tries to influence while preserving its autonomy (Giraldo & McCune, 2019; Ilieva & Hernandez, 2018). Also, as shown above, bureaucratic relations decrease the movement’s transformative potential (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Therefore, the Creser case illustrates how formalizing the movement’s structure (ailing to state structure) can diminish people’s participation as the movement loses some of its autonomous and free inventiveness. Additionally, considering the network drop in participation and shift in contents, one can argue that Creser community-based relations weakened during that structuring time. Hereafter, the next part focuses on the Creser decision-making method.

7.2. DECISION-MAKING METHOD

Democratic relations: enriching but slow consensus method

Creser employs the consensus method – adopted by Creser members since the law formulation process in 2011 – to make decisions (interview 2; 4; 9; & 22). Franco argues that this method

brings high levels of sharing and radical democracy (interview 2). Thereby, opposing positions get aligned through discussion. Elena explains how people in Creser sit in a circle, avoid any type of hierarchical structure, and show respect to other people's opinions (interview 8). She claims that the Creser decision-making method is inclusive and respectful (interview 8). Accordingly, Pasquale asserts that “we do things when we all agree on them” (interview 32). Also, Antonio (interview 24) refers to the consensus method as a participatory democratic method. The literature defines democratic relations as the wide allocation of ownership and representation rights (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). In light of the above, one can affirm that Creser strongly structures itself around democratic relations.

Moreover, Creser members responded differently as regards the movement’s decision- making method. On the one hand, multiple participants point out the slowness of this method (interview 5; 8; 28; & 32). Especially, Alberto addresses how Creser meetings tend to take long and the decision-making is often slow (interview 28). Slowness is because Creser is a complex body; it takes time to make everybody agree on one point (interview 5; 8; 28; & 32). This idea unfolds in Pasquale’s statement,

“If you already have participated in Creser meetings, you have noticed that Creser is a very complex organization, there are a lot of souls. It is always slow in its actions because it tries to make everyone agree before taking action.” (Interview 32).

This utterance expresses how involving everybody in the decision-making, wherein people have different ideas, is sometimes time demanding. At the same time, I noticed that since the group is quite small-sized – Creser has a small size counting a maximum of 40 active participants per meeting – the consensus method is applicable although slow.

On the other hand, multiple participants acknowledge that the consensus method is very useful and enriching (interview 9; 19; 21; 24; & 39). It keeps people engaged and participation levels high (interview 4; 9; 13; 24; & 39). Likewise, Alberto emphasizes how, despite the slowness, participating in Creser is a fruitful journey to embark on (interview 28). This connects with the literature arguing that since participatory methods and horizontal relationships kick start a process of social learning and empower their members, they allow movements to scale up (Altieri & Nichols, 2012; Paramitier, 2014; Rosset, 2015).

Therefore, my findings align with the argument that AFNs organized around community-based and democratic relations might struggle to scale up. Indeed, these AFNs

might take a longer time to scale up also due to their focus on democratic practices (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). However, these organizational forms are the only ones that can offer an alternative path to the mainstream food system (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Also, the literature about scaling up underlines how participatory methods (i.e., the consensus method) are key for social learning and thus for scaling up (Altieri & Nichols, 2012; Paramitier, 2014; Rosset, 2015).

The data shows how people’s engagement and participation lowers when Creser introduces internal bureaucratic relations (i.e., attention towards defining roles and bodies) and aligns with state structures. Nonetheless, Creser organizational form mainly implies community-based and democratic relations. Afterwards, the focus turns towards the practice of alliance-building. The analysis considers first what alliance-building means and the difficulties involved in it. Secondly, it touches upon the alliance-making strategies at stake in Creser.

7.3. ALLIANCE-BUILDING DIFFICULTIES

The interviews unravel that alliance-building is difficult (interview 7; 10; 11; & 18). Indeed, building alliances is not an easy task because civil society groups tend to highlight the differences among themselves instead of focusing on the commonalities. Also, Lorenza underlines how it has always been difficult to create alliances in Italy due to a generalized sense of anarchism, political divisions, and personal conflicts (interview 7). Interestingly, when she speaks about the difficulty of involving groups from Romagna (i.e., the Southern part of the region Emilia-Romagna), she declares,

“Romagna has always demonstrated a certain degree of anarchism compared to Emilia. They [people from Romagna] have always felt as if they were the periphery of the empire, thus, they perceived coming to Bologna as a form of vassalage.” (Interview 7).

Besides this underlying assumption about alliance-building being a hard task in Italy, the interviews reveal that one of the main obstacles in alliance-building is that people are different. People have different approaches and ideas (interview 8; 13; 18; 19; 32; 36 A; 36 B; & 36 C). During the focus group in Reggio-Emilia, it emerges that there are various sensibilities and ideas within Creser. Likewise, Claudio talks about “extreme diversity” within the network, when he says,

“Within Creser, there are organizations and subjects that are very different from each other. As you have already understood, the solidarity economy world is composed of people who can think very differently from each other, who come from very different worlds…from different cultural worlds. They come from political choices not always alike…there is an extreme diversity” (interview 13).

This statement displays how Creser members have different political ideas and positions (textbox 4 below provides examples). This relates to the theory portraying AFNs as having different political and ideological strands, namely the progressive and the radical (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). The progressive trend seeks change within the political and economic framework in place focusing on public policies (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). At the same time, the radical trend aims at radical market reforms (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). Yet, the literature does not perceive these two stands as incompatible. Instead, pooling together the two trends and creating an alliance is key to generate a change in the food system (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011). The next section elaborates this idea further, as it deals with the practicalities of how to negotiate a common ground between these different views.

Lastly, the analysis has demonstrated how working on the ground is fundamental to build alliances. Nevertheless, as shown above, few human resources are available in the network, which constrains the movement’s work on the ground. Therefore, some alliance- building difficulties emerge, namely, a) a wide diversity of people and ideas and b) few human resources. Notwithstanding, Creser members expose ways to find a middle ground between their diverging opinions. Thereafter, the analysis brings to light some interesting alliance- building strategies at play.

Textbox 4: Example of Creser members different positions.

7.4. ALLIANCE BUILDING STRATEGIES

The following section aims to present the different strategies Creser employs to make alliances. The analysis reveals that it is key to find common goals and priorities (interview 13; 18; 36 A; 36 B; 36 C; & 39). This means having concrete targets and projects to develop together – which remarks the importance of working-on-the ground. As we have seen above, the latter involves reaching out to local communities and building personal relationships (interview 2; 9; 17; 36 A; 36 B; 36 C; & 39).

Moreover, Emma (a member of Des Parma), Claudio and Federico (members of Des Reggio-Emilia, Lucia (a representative of San Lazzaro’s Transition), and Lapo (part of Gas

Cesena), express how Creser informal and flexible organization represents an alliance-building strategy (interview 9; 13; 18; 21; & 31). They stress the ease by which they initially partook in the network because they knew someone or felt free to join. This shows how the inclusive and participatory structure of this movement facilitates the entry of new groups (Rosset, 2015).

Additionally, Arvaia, a Community Supported Agriculture project, was usually discussed as a good example of alliance building. According to Gianna and Maria (Arvaia’s members), you must have a degree of openness, experimentation, and accessibility to create an alliance between different groups (interview 34 A & 34 B). Thus, people need to focus on what they have in common (interview 11; 12; 34 A; & 34 B). Likewise, Pasquale emphasizes the importance of being open to different ideological positions (interview 32). He asserts that it is important: “not to exclude those who are not hard-core-radicals” (interview 32). This relates to the before-mentioned idea of grouping together different ideological strands (i.e., the progressive and radical one) to provoke change (Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011).

Therefore, staying open towards different ideas, showing mutual respect and trust, emerges as another alliance-making strategy (interview 11; 12; 32; 34 A; & 34). Interestingly, being open and building relationships based on trust lays at the core of a movement’s social infrastructure (Beckie & Connelly, 2016). A social infrastructure consists of the human relationships present in an organization that can prompt coalitions. Indeed, having a social infrastructure (i.e., developing human relations based on trust) is key to scale up (Beckie & Connelly, 2016). Hence, one can argue that the openness, mutual respect, and trust among Creser members, foster the movement’s social infrastructure.

Lastly, to navigate the network’s different ideas and positions, flexibility emerges as an important strategy for keeping the group together and making alliances (interview 12). This resonates with the literature stressing the inclusive and flexible dimension of the solidarity economy (Grasseni et al., 2015). Indeed, this movement’s features – being an open space for cross-fertilization among different people – inherently ascribe a sense of open-mindedness and flexibility to its members (Grasseni et al., 2015; Utting, 2015). Being flexible implies accepting other people's positions and ideas. It means going beyond one’s position and thinking in community terms (interview 12 & 13). Riccardo expresses this concept by stating,

“It is the ability to think of yourself as one entity with others, to be united, even if what the group decides is not what I would have decided” (interview 12).

Therefore, Creser members display the following alliance-building strategies, namely: a) finding common goals and priorities between solidarity economy groups; b) having a flexible and informal organization that gives people easy access to the alliance; c) showing openness and respect to people’s opinions; d) being flexible about one’s own ideas.

Furthermore, Riccardo’s quote above (interview 12) mirrors the importance of creating a common discourse about Creser identity. Also, Claudio (interview 13) and Fabio (interview 23) emphasize how having a common identity based on shared values is an essential ingredient for alliance-making. According to the theory of collective action (Touraine 1994 in Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018), having a common discourse is key for social mobilization because it enables people to define a common problem, struggle, identity, and values (Touraine 1994 in Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018). Indeed, a shared discourse serves to frame and promote social action. Also, whilst Rosset (2015) talks about bringing agroecology to scale, he identifies a ‘motivating discourse and framing’ as an important element for scaling- up. Here, to understand the discourse framing Creser, the movement’s mission is analyzed. At the same time, the analysis focuses on people’s personal motivation to join the network to unpack Creser common values.

7.5. COMMON DISCOURSE

Why do people join Creser? What is their mission?

This section analyzes the respondents’ answers about Creser mission and their motivation to join the network. Understanding whether people share a common motivation that encourages them to participate in Creser is key. It reveals the values that link Creser members and contribute to the network’s common discourse. Here, four main missions emerge defining Creser identity: a) building a network of networks; b) experimenting with the setting up of a parallel economy; c) monitoring and coordinating the 19/2014 law. Here, the analysis elaborates on these three topics.

First, many participants discursively frame Creser as being a network of networks. Thus, they pinpoint that Creser goal is to make the regional solidarity economy actors collaborate and exchange products and services (interview 3; 5; 9; 11; 13; 15; 18; 19; 31; & 33 A). Secondly, several informants claim that Creser is a community experimenting to change and transform the economy (interview 2; 12; 16; 28; 31; & 39). Indeed, one of the most

recurring motivations leading people to partake in the network is the will to stimulate a change. Creser members want to provoke a change, although they recognize that it is a hard endeavor (interview 14; 16; 17; 24; 25; 28; 29; 34 A; 34 B; & 38). Here, I give the interviewees some space to speak for themselves. Margherita, a confident employee of an organization called ARESS, explains to me, in a very powerful way, why she seeks to enact a change through Creser,

“I am far from being right that things would go as I wish, but I cannot avoid doing something. Not doing anything would be more painful than trying to do something without being sure [that things will go as I wish].” (Interview 25).

Likewise, Antonio argues that,

“Acknowledging the context [the society we live in], just having the sensation that you are doing something to free yourself from those chains is not little” (interview 24).

It is interesting how people, without ever calling themselves activists, perceive their presence in Creser as a form of rebellion against the market economy and consumerist society. Similarly, Felice, a Gasista from Lugo, mentions that he decided to get involved in the solidarity economy because he wanted to move away from an individualistic life approach towards a more community one (interview 38). Accordingly, he states,

“Either we are all doing good in this world or nobody is doing good…sharing things with others [is important] …otherwise where can we go alone? Nowhere. If we are not doing good all together and we all resist together, what else can we do?” (interview 38).

Many of the participants feel the urge to stimulate a change. They believe that creating new economic circuits and alternative food networks will provoke such a change (interview 14; 17; 29; 34 A; & 34 B). Correspondingly, Alberto argues that he decided to partake in the network,

“To try and build valid projects that are sustainable, have a great social impact, and have an economic sustainability” (interview 28).

Besides people personal motivation, Lapo emphasizes this aspect of stimulating change when he talks about Creser mission,

“I think that the mission is…if I understood it correctly…changing something. It is a bottom- up change…a change that answers the requests and needs of those people who often do not have a voice, because the interests of the big players, who hold a stronger voice, are usually more listened to” (interview 31).

This quote pictures how the notion of being an actor for bottom-up socioeconomic transformation frames Creser action. Overall, the interviews point out that Creser takes on a transformative approach (interview 2; 6; 10; 13; 16; & 32). Accordingly, Claudio – one of Creser main coordinators – believes that this transformative approach aims at changing the social and economic mechanisms from within the economy, especially, by “starting from concrete experiences and praxis at the local level” (interview 13). This aligns with the solidarity economy theory arguing that this movement seeks to transform the economic system (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). Additionally, Emanuele (interview 5) and Claudio (interview 13) assert that Creser transformative approach means transforming the current economic system by contaminating the political landscape with the solidarity economy ideas. This aspect links up with the idea of “contamination” that motivated the 19/2014 law. Thus, “contamination” implies mainstreaming – in the institutional realm – economic activities, practices, and values alternative to the ones featuring the growth-led economy. Interestingly, “contamination” appears as how the people participating in Creser understand and articulate the idea of scaling up.

Also, Creser discourse revolves around what my participants call “the experimentation of a parallel economy” (interview 2; 16; & 28). Amedeo elaborates on this concept (interview 16). He declares that Creser is a space wherein people can discuss and experiment with how to exit market dynamics and rules (interview 16). This will of experimenting with alternative economic practices matches the theory about the solidarity economy. Indeed, the solidarity economy presents economic initiatives that go beyond the business-as-usual mentality of capitalism (Kawano, 2009; Miller, 2009; Utting, 2015). This mission mirrors some people’s motivation to partake in the movement. Accordingly, Matteo affirms that he joined Creser because the latter sets in motion and experiments with a plan B for when the global ecological and economic situation would get worse (interview 14).

Lastly, many interviewees assign Creser with the role of coordinating and monitoring the developments of the solidarity economy law (interview 5; 6; 7; 10; 15; 18; 19; 21; 24; & 32). Therefore, the analysis displays how Creser holds a common discourse about its identity

while people give similar personal motivations for joining. Creser is discursively depicted as a solidarity economy network of networks. Then, two main missions articulate Creser discourse, namely: a) experimenting with a parallel economy to stimulate a bottom-up change and transform the economy; b) being responsible for coordinating the 19/2014 law implementation. In line with Creser mission, Creser members show a common will to change society and divert from the market economy through a transformative approach. Also, they seem to share the value of creating a socioeconomically sustainable community. Indeed, the people who decide to take part in Creser adhere to the solidarity economy principles. Therefore, these common missions, values, and motivations advance Creser common discourse. Doing so, they are vital elements for alliance-building, which would be impossible without its discursive dimension (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Rosset, 2015).

7.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter aims at answering the research question mentioned above, namely: “which kind of strategies and practices of alliance-building are at work in Creser?” Following the literature, I conceptualize the practice of alliance-building into two dimensions. First, the chosen organizational form determines people’s relations in a network. Second, a common discourse frames the movement action, giving the latter a discursive identity. Following Duncan & Pascucci’s (2017) theory, Creser organizational form mainly revolves around community- based and democratic relations. Indeed, Creser holds an informal and horizontal structure. It employs the consensus method to make decisions, which is a radically democratic method. The literature stresses that when AFNs organize themselves around community-based and democratic relations, they hold a strong potential to transform the mainstream agri-food system (Duncan & Pascucci, 2017). Although, these organizations might take longer to make such a transformation happen. Thus, even if Creser may struggle to make the change it is aiming at, it has the potential to be transformative due to its organizational form. On the other hand, the analysis highlights how the practice of alliance-building is difficult due to people’s wide spectrum of ideas and insufficient human resources.

Nonetheless, the findings reveal some interesting alliance-building strategies, namely: finding common goals and priorities with potential allies; having a flexible organizational form that encourages people to join in; being open towards other people’s opinions; being flexible about one’s ideas. When it comes to the discursive dimension of alliance-building, the literature

emphasizes the importance of having a common discourse (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Rosset, 2015). The latter determines the shared identity and values behind the network actions (Mier y Terán Giménez Cacho et al., 2018; Rosset, 2015). The analysis unveils how Creser participants share a similar idea about Creser identity. Indeed, the participants see Creser as a network of networks experimenting with a parallel economy and coordinating the 19/2014 law implementation. Besides, Creser members show a shared set of ideas and values that motivates them to partake in the network (i.e., transforming the market-based economy into a more socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable community). Therefore, having a common discourse emerges as a key practice in Creser alliance-building, as the literature suggests.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This thesis has explored the scaling-up process of alternative food networks while they build alliances among themselves and with solidarity economy groups. The research contributes to both social innovation theory and the literature about sustainable food production in rural sociology. The former claims that AFNs should undergo a process of upscaling to influence policymaking. Instead, the latter argues that AFNs should create trans-local alliances and join wider movements to mainstream their practices. Thus, this investigation focuses on Creser – a solidarity economy movement enclosing multiple AFNs – and its experience dialoguing with the regional institutional bodies, trying to contaminate the political landscape (i.e., scaling up).

Accordingly, the study has examined the practices allowing AFNs to build alliances and move to a trans-local level. Hence, it adds to the conceptualization of alliance-building. It sees the latter as determined by the organizational form and the discourse framing the movement’s activities. Consequently, the research illustrates how community-based and democratic relations allow for inclusiveness and participation in the network. Instead, getting organized around more bureaucratic relations (resembling those of the state) lowers the movement’s autonomy and people’s sense of ownership in it. The results align with Duncan and Pascucci’s (2017) theory. This claims that whilst community-based and democratic relationships can slow down the scaling-up process, they can make the movement truly transformative. At the same time, having a common discourse proves to be a key element for alliance-building. The research shows how a shared mission (giving the movement a discursive identity) and people’s similar motivation for joining the network (portraying a set of shared values and a common will to transform the economy) provide Creser with a coherent discourse.

Furthermore, scaling-up unfolds as a complex and slow process. It is hard to secure steady institutional support and establish a collaborative relationship with the regional institutional representatives. In the Creser context, the two parties in dialogue seem to differ on multiple aspects. They hold different goals; the solidarity economy wants to divert from the status quo while the institutions do not. They have different decision-making methods, organizational structures, and degrees of professionalism. Creser uses the consensus method, an informal structure, and shows a low degree of professionalism. Instead, the institutional

party takes the stage with a highly professionalized and rigorously articulated structure, which is hard to decipher by Creser members. Overall, establishing a fruitful relationship with the institutions is not an easy task. Institutional support is usually fluctuating; it depends on the institutional actors entitled to the solidarity economy mandate at each institutional turn- over and their will to engage with Creser. Nonetheless, having a platform for social dialogue in place (i.e., the Forum) and coming well prepared to the meetings with the institutional representatives (i.e., having gathered documents and knowledge about existing regulations and legal loopholes) certainly is an asset for scaling up.

Besides studying how the dialogue with the institutional bodies articulates itself, this research contributes to social innovation theory. Indeed, it explores the scaling-up factors suggested by the latter. The investigation concludes that the presence of key actors and network building are the most important factors enabling Creser upscaling. First, leaders play a central role in guiding the movement’s line of action, attracting new members, and propagating a vision for change. Due to their expertise in the institutional and regulatory framework, institutional entrepreneurs strategically facilitate the movement’s scaling-up process. Second, network building is essential for connecting the different solidarity economy communities and AFNs on the ground. However, it is an expensive endeavor in terms of time and energy. Indeed, the solidarity economy volunteer base and few human resources undermine the movement's networking ability. At the same time, this research demonstrates how networking around practical projects and issues (i.e., problems to solve) and building ties on personal relationships and word-of-mouth, are recurrent networking strategies.

Moreover, the study illustrates the importance of knowledge-sharing in a network comprising many different people, histories, and experiences, such as the solidarity economy. The Creser law formulation process displays how this exchange enriches and inspires all the participants. However, today, this praxis appears limited. Creser members show a tendency to exchange best practices in small clusters of groups at their local (mostly city) level. Also, an inadequate online communication platform seems to constrain Creser knowledge sharing. Therefore, while movements scale up, they should strengthen their communication channels to meet their members' information demands. In addition, knowledge-sharing and the co-creation of events should move beyond the local level, to a wider network level, allowing the solidarity economy experiences to reach broader audiences and escape their niche confinement. Considering the last scaling-up factor suggested by the literature, the research demonstrates how a socio-political context can be as enabling as hindering the scaling-up. On the one hand,

the study confirms that having a progressive regional government and encouraging cultural values (i.e., the history of cooperation and solidarity in the Emilia-Romagna) can enhance the scaling-up results of AFNs and larger solidarity economy movements. On the other hand, the regulatory framework in place (i.e., public policies, law, and regulations) can easily hamper the scaling up efforts of AFNs and associated movements.

Therefore, this research contributes to understanding the practices and processes allowing alternative food networks to achieve an impact on the food system by reaching up to institutions. Indeed, the research insights can help other AFNs to scale up. Also, they shed light on the possible struggles such movements might encounter (i.e., few human resources); yet, they show how to overcome some obstacles (e.g., reinforcing communication and knowledge exchange at the network level, leveraging key actors, building good personal relations, gathering documents and legal loopholes to present to the institutions).

Recommendations

Since this study has been focused on the practical unfolding of scaling-up, further research should delve deeper into the theoretical implications of scaling-up. It should link the scaling- up of AFNs (and the solidarity economy movement) to questions of citizen participation, representation, and democracy. Further research should interrogate the transformative potential of such scaling-up processes; it could examine how government institutions recognize and acknowledge these forms of citizen participation. Thus, it would be interesting to explore further both the outcomes (e.g., what are the results of citizen involvement in the law-making process?; do the outcomes differ when introducing new forms of participation or new types of platforms for social dialogue?) and the institutional perspective in scaling-up processes.

Moreover, a recommendation for Creser – and all the AFNs and solidarity economy movements rising on the ground – would be to focus on joining forces, increasing its numbers by showing viable economic activities, and improve its social media communication to speak to wider publics and engage more with the youth. Since there is a noticeable lack of youth participation in Creser, some workshops or events could be targeted specifically to raising awareness among the youth. Also, even if providing policy recommendations is beyond the scope of this research, policymakers should acknowledge that AFNs and solidarity economy movements are already formulating many policy recommendations. Thus, this research recommends that regional governments engage in dialogue with these groups, giving more

space to their voices, and listening carefully to their innovative ideas. Indeed, governments should include the well-established principles and ideas behind AFNs and the solidarity economy in policymaking

This thesis wishes to support alternative food networks and solidarity economy movements in their scaling-up endeavor. The research actively encourages the mainstreaming of alternative food networks, providing practical examples and strategies of how to do so. Also, it recognizes the vital importance of building alliances among alternative food networks and larger movements to transform our food system into a more sustainable one. Ultimately, this thesis hopes to make people notice and appreciate the many grassroots organizations inhabiting our territories and nurturing our people and planet.

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Appendix

The following appendix displays the interview guidelines employed in this research, while Table 1 shows the interview list of participants.

Interview guidelines (in the original language, Italian)

The researcher employed this interview guide during semi-structured and in-depth interviews. Since these are only guidelines, not all the following questions were asked in all the interviews. Indeed, the researcher often elaborated follow-up questions on the spot or other open questions depending on the interview context, to prompt the participants.

1) In relazione agli esordi: a. Breve racconto del proprio vissuto durante il processo che ha portato alla legge sull’economia solidale; b. Come è nata l’idea dei GLT? Qual è la logica che sta dietro la costituzione di questi gruppi?

2) In relazione alla rete, al suo funzionamento, e alle strategie formare alleanze: a. Qual è (a parole tue) la missione del Creser? b. Per quale motivo hai deciso di partecipare al Creser? c. Com’è che secondo te questa rete opera sul territorio?

3) In relazione alle strategie e difficoltà del Creser: a. Quali sono, secondo te, gli ostacoli e le difficoltà che una rete come il Creser ha dovuto affrontare nel passato (durante il passaggio della legge) e tutt’ora affronta al giorno d’oggi? Sia nel suo contatto con gli enti regionali, che con gli attori che attuano sul territorio/organizzazioni della società civile. b. Quali sono, secondo te, le strategie che il Creser ha messo in atto nel dialogo con le istituzioni (quando ha passato la legge), e che continua ad usare ancora oggi?

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Interview guidelines translated into English

1) Concerning the history of the groups and of Creser: a. What is the history behind your group? How long have you participated in it? b. A brief story of one’s experience of the solidarity economy law-making process; c. How were the GLTs born? What is the logic behind the construction of these groups?

2) Concerning the network, the network’s functioning, and alliance-building: a. What is (in your words) Creser mission (in your words)? b. Why did you decide to join the network? c. How do you think this network works on the ground?

3) Concerning Creser strategies and difficulties: a. What are, in your opinion, the obstacles and difficulties that a network like Creser had to face in the past (during the law formulation process) and is still facing nowadays? Both in its contact with the regional institutional bodies and in its contact with the civil society organization on the ground. b. What kind of strategies do you think Creser employed while formulating the law and nowadays still employs while dialoguing with the institutional parties?

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Table 3: List of participants indicating the interview number (used in the thesis), date,

location, and the interviewees’ gender, pseudonym, and organization name.

Interview Gender Pseudonym Organization Date Location Number

1 18 November 2020 Male Sandro Art-ER, Bologna Online at h: 9,30

2 Campi Aperti, 18 November 2020 Male Franco Online Bologna at h: 17,00

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3 Ex Aequo, 13 October 2020 at Female Laura Bologna Bologna h: 9,00.

4 Mio Gas & Des 14 October 2020 at Male Martino Modena Modena, Modena h: 15,30

5 GasBosco, San 23 October 2020 at San Lazzaro Male Emanuele Lazzaro (BO) h: 16,00 (BO)

6 Mag6, Rebbio- 18 November 2020 Male Luciano Online Emilia at h: 15,30

7 20 November 2020 Female Lorenza Nexus, Bologna Online at h: 15,30

8 25 November 2020 Female Elena Gas Imola, Imola Online at h: 15,00

9 4 November 2020 at Female Emma Des Parma, Parma Parma h: 12,30

10 Campi Aperti, 30 December 2020 Male Sergio Online Bologna at h: 16,30

11 Gas Fidenza, 4 November 2020 at Male Luca Online Fidenza h: 9,45

12 28 October 2020 at Male Riccardo GasBo, Bologna Granarolo (BO) h: 14,30

13 Des Reggio- 22 December 2020 Male Claudio Emilia, Reggio- Online at h: 15,00 Emilia

14 Cooperativa Sociale lo 2 December 2020 at Male Matteo Online Scoiattolo, h: 10,00 Bologna

15 Associazione 12 November 2020 Casalecchio Male Andrea Percorsi di Pace, at h: 15,00 (BO) Casalecchio (BO)

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16 Associazione 12 November 2020 Male Amedeo Percorsi di Pace, Online at h: 12,15 Casalecchio (BO)

17 Des Reggio- 7 November 2020 at Male Angelo Emilia, Reggio- Reggio-Emilia h: 9,40 Emilia

18 Des Reggio- 17 November 2020 Male Federico Emilia, Reggio- Bologna at h: 10,00 Emilia

19 Mio Gas & Des 11 January 2021 at Male Martino Online Modena, Modena h: 16,00

20 Parma 16 October 2020 at Female Not used Sostenibile, Parma h:17,00 Parma

20 B Parma 16 October 2020 at Female Not used Sostenibile, Parma h:17,00 Parma

21 San Lazzaro in Transizione 17 December 2020 Female Lucia Online (SLIT), San at h: 10,00 Lazzaro (BO)

22 17 December 2020 Male Luigi Gas Filò, Parma Online at h: 12,30

23 26 November 2020 Male Fabio Camilla, Bologna Online at h: 18,30

24 Banca Etica, 14 January 2021 at Male Antonio Online Bologna h: 15,30

25 Luoghi Comuni & 18 December 2020 Female Margherita Online ARESS, Bologna at h: 9,30

26 Employee at 11 January 2021 at Male Not used Online Regione Emilia- h: 10,00

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Romagna, Bologna

27 Employee at Regione Emilia- 14 January 2021 at Female Carla Online Romagna, h: 17,00 Bologna

28 Cooperativa 15 January 2021 at Male Alberto Oltremare, Online h: 15,00 Modena

29 InGasAti, 14 December 2021 Male Not used Meldola (Forlì- Online at h: 16,30 Cesena)

30 16 November 2020 Male Giorgio Ri-Gas, Rimini Online at h: 21,00

31 Gas Cesena, 12 January 2021 at Male Lapo Online Cesena h: 10,00

32 Gas Faenza, 16 November 2020 Male Pasquale Online Faenza at h: 19,00

33 A Focus Group Gas 14 December 2020 Male Gianluca Le Giare, Reggio- Online at h: 21,30 Emilia

33 B Focus Group Gas 14 December 2020 Female Not used Le Giare, Reggio- Online at h: 21,30 Emilia

33 C Focus Group Gas 14 December 2020 Female Not used Le Giare, Reggio- Online at h: 21,30 Emilia

34 A Focus Group CSA 25 November 2020 Female Gianna Online Arvaia, Bologna at h: 17,00

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