Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n’a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s’appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada, vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « Contactez-nous ».

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 35 / PCEMI 35

EXERCISE/EXERCICE: MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

TITLE/TITRE: PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CANADA AND JAMAICA POST 9/11

By/par Maj Orley A. Powell

This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour of the requirements of the Course of Studies. satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude The paper is a scholastic document, and thus est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contains facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul alone considered appropriate and correct for l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la policy or the opinion of any agency, including politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme the Government of Canada and the Canadian quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Department of National Defence. This paper Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale may not be released, quoted or copied, except du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou with the express permission of the Canadian de reproduire cette étude sans la permission Department of National Defence. expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

i

ABSTRACT

The aim of this research paper is to prove that there are important lessons that can be learned from a comparison of Canada and Jamaica in the new security environment since 11

September 2001 (9/11). This research encapsulates the magnitude of the threats faced by both countries that have changed the security landscape across the globe, ushering in a new dimension of terror. These threats of terrorism for developed and developing countries are many and varied, and continue to multiply as the world embraces the idea of being a global village. This situation has become increasingly complex, as seen in the examples of Canada and Jamaica, where issues such as the transfer of conflicts facilitated by migration and organized crime have contributed to the growth and development of threats to both nations.

This discussion also focuses on the impact of 9/11, with its ripple effects being felt on the social, economic and political frameworks of both countries. The comparison of the impact on

Canada and Jamaica gives the reader a broad perspective on the impact of this situation on a developed and developing nation. Also evident in this research are the responses of both countries to a post 9/11 environment, including the changes they have made to their legislative and national security policies.

The lessons learned from this comparison of Canada and Jamaica are informative and will set the stage for further studies and valuable discourse. The campaign against terrorist activities has to be a concerted effort not only on the part of developed countries, but also developing nations.

ii

CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ------ii

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ------1

2. THE THREAT ------5

Sikh Extremism ------9 The Tamil Tigers ------10 Islamic Extremism ------11 Other Potential Threats ------17 Biological and Chemical Terrorism ------17 Cyber Terrorism ------19 Narco Terrorism ------21 Analysis and Conclusion ------23

3. THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON CANADA AND JAMAICA ------28

The Social Impact ------28 The Economic Impact ------33 The Political Impact ------38 Analysis and Conclusion ------44

4. THE RESPONSE TO 9/11 ------49

The Legislative Response ------51 The Military Response ------55 Analysis and Conclusion ------64

5. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION ------67

Conclusion ------68

6. BIBLIOGRAPHY ------70

1

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Here is America struck by Allah in its most vulnerable point, destroying, thank Allah, its most prestigious buildings and we thank Allah for that. Here is America filled with terror from the north to the south and from the east to west, and we thank Allah for that. Allah has guided the footsteps of a group of Muslims, a vanguard that has destroyed America and we implore Allah to elevate their rank and receive them in Paradise.

Osama bin Laden speaking on Aljazeera TV, November 20011

Up until the late 1960s, states generally treated terrorism as localised and conflict- specific; however, over the last 40 years the advent of revolutionary terrorist organisations has overwhelmed the industrialised world.2 The threat of terrorism exists, and the attacks that occurred in the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11) have highlighted a serious change in the international security environment. A number of developed countries, including the United

States, had ignored the indicators of the imminent threat of terrorist activities. This research being conducted will prove that there are important lessons that can be learned from comparing the responses of Canada and Jamaica to the increased threat of terrorism since 9/11.

In conducting this research, Canada and Jamaica were chosen as case studies because of their similar historical backgrounds as former British colonies, with similar forms of government and judicial systems. The research will also broaden the perspective of the reader by comparing the preventative measures being undertaken to combat terrorism since 9/11 by a developed and developing country. The bond between Jamaica and Canada has also influenced this research, due to the fact that there is a large influential Jamaican Diaspora residing in Canada with strong ties to Jamaica. Canadians of Jamaican origin make up one of the largest non-European ethnic

1 Osama Bin Laden, quoted in Matthew Carr, The Infernal Machine (New York: The New Press, 2006), 291.

2 Ibid.,197. 2

groups in Canada. For example, in 2001, the Jamaican community was the fourth largest non-

European ethnic group in Canada after the Chinese, East Indian and Filipino communities.3 With this in mind, one can surmise that the impact of 9/11 on either country could have an effect on the other.

Chapter two of this research will take into consideration the perceived terrorist threats faced by Canada and Jamaica. Chapter three will highlight the impact of 9/11 on both countries.

Chapter four explains the changes in each country’s legislation in adapting to the new security environment since 9/11 and also gives a brief overview of Canada and Jamaica’s national security policies. The manner in which the two militaries (The Canadian Forces and Jamaica

Defence Force) have adapted to this new environment will also be considered. Chapter five compares the lessons learned from the analysis of both countries as they relate to their state of readiness and what has been implemented in combating terrorism. The discussion will conclude with recommendations and a summary of the factors that were discussed.

It should be noted that there is no clear agreement on the definition of terrorism.4 In a 2

December 2004 document, The United Nations Secretary General and a high-level panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change noted that:

Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse … and profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order.5

3 Canada, “The Jamaican Community in Canada,” Statistics Canada, Available from; http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007012-eng.htm; accessed 19 March 2009.

4 Isabel Jaramillo Edwards, “Coping with 9/11: State and Civil Society Responses,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 371-390 (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 393.

5 United Nations General Assembly, “Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change”; available fromhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.565_En.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 February 2009. 3

Canada’s Criminal Code6 did not include a definition of terrorism until the enactment of

the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 (ATA),7 which took into consideration the definition of “terrorist activity.” A terrorist activity is an act or omission that is committed in or outside of Canada, in whole or part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security (including economic security), or compelling a person, a government, domestic or international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act that intentionally causes death or seriously harms or endangers people, or

substantially damages property or disrupts essential services.8 The Act also created offences of

participation in, facilitating of, instructing or support of terrorist activities.9 Jamaica’s Terrorism

Prevention Act, 6th June, 2005 10 mirrors the definition of “terrorist activity” that is used by

Canada. Both countries were inspired by the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 which requires proof of religious, ideological or political motives and the commission of a broad range of harms that go well beyond just violence against civilians.11

6 Department of Justice Canada, Criminal Code, R. S., 1985, c. C-46, SC 2001; available from http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/C-46/bo-ga:1_II_1::bo-ga:1_III//en?page=3&isPrinti; Internet; accessed 8 February 2009.

7 Department of Justice Canada, Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c.41; available from http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDocs/cs/A-11.7///en; Internet; accessed 8 February 2009.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ministry of Justice, Legislation Jamaica: Terrorism Prevention Act 2005; available from http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwejam.htm; Internet; accessed 16 October 2008.

11 Kent Roach, “Canada’s Response to Terrorism,” in Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, eds. Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach, 511-533 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 513 4

According to Dr. G. Davidson (Tim) Smith, Strategic Analyst in the Analysis and

Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS:

Although not readily susceptible to precise definition, terrorism is widely identified as the deliberate and systematic threat or use of violence to achieve an objective. In the modern context, the expression is generally associated with politically motivated coercion.12

The CSIS 2002 Public Report explains that terrorism in Canada can be divided into

roughly four categories: religious extremism, with various Sunni Islamic groups being the most

serious threat at present; state sponsored terrorism; secessionist violence which encompasses

Sikh extremism and separatist movements in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ireland and the Middle East;

and domestic extremism, including some anti-abortion, animal rights, anti-globalization and

environmental groups.13

Overall, this research aims to give a broader perspective on the future security

environment created by 9/11, and the manner in which countries (developed and developing)

have coped and continue to deal with this situation. With these factors in mind, the definitions of

terrorist activity and terrorism are evidence that they are threats facing Canada and Jamaica. For

a more in-depth look at the threats facing these countries, chapter two will be utilized to facilitate

this discussion.

12 G. Davidson Smith, “Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise in Columbia”, Commentary No.13; available from; http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm13-eng.asp; Internet; assessed 17 February 2009.

13 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “2002 Public Report,” Available form; http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2002-eng.asp#3b; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009. 5

CHAPTER 2 – THE THREAT

The threats from terrorism in the present international security environment are many and

varied. Examples include acts of sabotage, bio-terrorism, Islamic extremism, agro-terrorism,

cyber-terrorism and narco-terrorism. Avi Dichter, Israel’s Minister of Public Security, states that

“… terrorist groups have no strategic plan. They simply execute an attack as soon as capability

and opportunity meet.”14 Both Canada and Jamaica are aware of this growing concern and are

preparing to face the challenges posed by this imminent threat. This chapter will analyze the

specific threats to each country and highlight the complexity of the problems faced by both

Canada and Jamaica in their attempts to deal with potential terrorist activities.

Reports by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and officials in the

Department of National Defence have indicated that the major threat to Canada at this time is domestic terrorism in most cases influenced by international terrorist organizations.15 According

to Bob Paulson, head of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Security Criminal

Investigations (NSCI) in Ottawa, “domestic terrorism is probably a bigger threat to Canada now

than it has ever been.”16 There are Canadians presently in Northwest Pakistan, at training camps,

who are intent on carrying attacks in North America. This has been compounded by Canada’s

proximity and close ties with the United States, and especially its support in Afghanistan; the

openness of its society to the movement of people and money; and its multiethnic population, all

of which make it attractive to terrorists as a safe haven. It should also be noted that besides being

14 Paul Lungen, “Canada joins Israel in discussing terror threat”, Canadian Jewish News, 12 June 2008, 3.

15 Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 18.

16 Caroline Ross, “Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Protecting Canadians from domestic terrorism,” available from http://.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol70n3/threat-menace-eng.htm; Internet; assessed on 6 February 2009. 6

a safe haven for terrorists, there are also a number of American assets in Canada that would be

prime targets for terrorist attacks. Of note, however, is the fact that Canada is being used not only

as a means of funding terrorism but also as a staging area for terrorist acts.

A terrorist activity that was seen in Canada before the 9/11 attacks occurred in 1999, where Ahmed Ressam, a member of a Montreal based terrorist cell, was arrested because he tried

to enter the United States with explosives for the purpose of carrying out a terrorist attack. He

was accused by United States of working on behalf of Al Qaeda. It was alleged that he had

illegally acquired a Canadian passport as well as other identification including a driver’s licence.

Ressam also acquired and partially assembled bomb-making components and planned to

transport them to an unknown U.S. destination.17

The list on the CSIS website entitled, “Current List of Terrorist Entities,” indicates that

there are forty active terrorist groups operating in Canada with links to supporters both within

and without the country.18 The major terrorist entities that presently pose a threat to Canada will

be highlighted later in this discussion to give the reader an in-depth understanding of the level of

threat that this country now faces.

This threat is not unique to developed countries such as Canada, the United States and

United Kingdom, but is also a real and present danger for Caribbean nations, including Jamaica.

Some 391 Caribbean persons died in the tragic events of 9/11, 22 of whom were Jamaican

17 Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era … 18.

18 Public Safety Canada, “Current List of Terrorist Entities,” http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle- en.asp ; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

7

nationals.19 This confirmed in the minds of persons in the Caribbean, including Jamaicans, that

the threat is real and ‘closer to home’ than was previously perceived.

The weak economies and organs of state that are evident in a number of Caribbean

nations, including Jamaica, have created the conditions for the breakdown of the rule of law and

development of numerous parallel (informal) economies. This situation, compounded by the

issues of illicit funds from drug trafficking, arms smuggling, organized crime, corruption and

money laundering have placed Jamaica and the wider Caribbean at risk from various threats,

including terrorism.20

The combination of organized crime and terrorism is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the global security environment, conducive to the rapid growth and new operations that a

globalized world has furnished for these illicit activities. Despite having positive influences,

globalization has created a potential conduit for organized crime and terrorism in Jamaica to

expand and operate more efficiently and fluidly. It has also created avenues for potential

terrorists to procure weapons, spread their intended messages (if any), and easily elude

enforcement authorities.21 On a number of occasions, the instruction to assassinate individuals,

corrupt members of the civil power or authority, or even create mayhem especially during national elections has originated from sources overseas. Globalization has created more

19 Norman Girvan, “Agenda Setting and Regionalism in the Greater Caribbean: Responses to 9/11,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 310-333 (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 313.

20 Isabel Jaramillo Edwards, “Coping with 9/11: State and Civil Society Responses,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 371-390 (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 373.

21 Kimberley L. Thackuk, “The Sinister Underbelly: Organized Crime and Terrorism” in The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, Volume II, eds. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, 743-760 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), 743.

8

sophisticated methods and means of undertaking these transnational criminal activities which, if

not curtailed, will be a force to reckon with when compounded by the threat of terrorist activities.

Kimberley L. Thackuk, Professor at the National Security Affairs Center for Hemispheric

Studies at the National Defense University, Washington D.C., explains that:

Added to organized criminal activity are mutating and metastasizing forms of terrorism that are spreading in unforeseen ways. Criminal organizations and terrorist groups are flourishing as a result of the conditions that have allowed for heightened worldwide interdependence, increased global commerce, and rapid communications and transportation.22

Jamaica exists in a global environment where the actions of non-state actors can create

instability and insecurity. Based on the country’s close proximity to such countries as the United

States, the potential for terrorist incidents to originate in Jamaica cannot be discounted. Groups

with terrorist intent could seek to use Jamaica as a training or staging area from which to fine-

tune and launch assaults. Other means that could be possible conduits for terrorist attacks include

overseas economic interests in Jamaica such as investment by multi-national corporations, and

foreign states’ interests, including diplomatic missions and international organizations. These

factors could indirectly make Jamaica susceptible to terrorist activities.23

Jamaica’s reliance on tourism as a major foreign exchange earner cannot be overemphasized. The presence of visiting foreign nationals and other persons make them likely targets for terrorists, and increases their vulnerability in an area where attacks are least expected.

It should be noted that Jamaica’s ability to identify and monitor individuals entering the country

22 Ibid., 743.

23 Ministry of National Security, Government of Jamaica, National Security Policy for Jamaica, available from http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/4139;/national-security-policy-for-jam; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.

9

with intent to conduct acts of terrorism is limited. The threat is more evident with the movement

of large numbers of persons through the two major airports. Jamaica’s tourist industry,

particularly the resort areas and cruise shipping, has been expanding and could be regarded as a

soft target for terrorist attacks aimed at nationals of the western powers.24

This discussion will now take an in-depth look at some major threats facing Canada. Not

surprisingly, Jamaica is also facing some of these threats, especially as they relate to Islamic

extremism, and it will be helpful to learn how Canada has dealt with this problem over the years.

SIKH EXTREMISM

The problem of Sikh extremism in Canada was overlooked for some time. In 1984-85,

Sikh extremists in Canada were operating with near impunity while financing and supporting the fight for the establishment of a Sikh nation they coined as Khalistan, out of India’s Punjab. The group, Babbar Khalsa (Tigers of the True Faith), founded by Talwinder Singh Parmar a former

British Colombia sawmill worker, was instrumental in the fight for Khalistan. It should be noted that in India, Babbar Khalsa was a terrorist organization while in Canada, it was a registered charity. Parmar was a wanted murderer and terrorist in India while in Canada he was a charismatic speaker who was loved by the media and spoke in a number of Indian temples in

Canada, known as gudwaras. Despite clear warnings and various indicators, it was discovered too late that he was the mastermind behind the Air India bombings of June 1985 which claimed the lives of 331 persons, most of them Canadians.25

24 Ibid.

25 The Canadian Encyclopedia: Historica, “Air India Inquiry Reveals Intelligence Faults,” http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTMOO... ; Internet; accessed 21 January 2009. 10

William Warden, Canada’s high Commissioner in India from 1983 to 1986 had warned

about the emerging Sikh terrorist danger in Canada and stated that, “moderates among Sikhs in

Canada were losing out to extremists” and Indian officials were telling him about “the strong

possibility that Canadian Sikhs might engage in international terrorism activities.” This all fell on

“deaf ears” which ultimately led to Canada’s “mini 9/11,” the bombing of Air India, Flight

182.26 Sikh extremists still pose a threat to Canada today.

THE TAMIL TIGERS

One cannot discuss terrorist organizations and their supporters in Canada without

mentioning the Tamil Tigers, or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Between 1983

and 2002, the armed conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE claimed

approximately 60,000 lives. A number of human rights abuses and violations of the laws of war

on both sides were evident during this conflict. The Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils have

been at odds and fighting an ethnic battle. Both ethnic groups feel they have a legitimate claim

on the region. The war prompted nearly one-quarter of Sri Lanka’s Tamils to leave that country,

creating a Tamil diaspora worldwide. This diaspora has established itself in Canada, the United

Kingdom, and other Western countries and is a major source of financial and political support for

the LTTE in its effort to create the proposed independent state, “Tamil Eelam,” for the Tamil

minority in Sri Lanka’s North and East.27

Between 1996 and 2001, the Tamil community in Canada grew by 38 percent, making it

the country’s fastest growing ethnic population. The majority of this Tamil community live in

26 Ibid., 2.

27 Jo Becker, “Funding The ‘Final War ’: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora,” Human Rights Watch Volume 18, no. 1 (c ), (February 2006), 1.

11

Toronto and have created a larger urban Tamil population than is found in any city in Sri Lanka itself.28 The LTTE maintains computer records to keep track of financial contributors, including

their addresses and telephone numbers. Monthly pledges are encouraged in Canada and other

countries as part of this funding in support of the LTTE. By the early 2000s, the system had

become more sophisticated and fundraisers in Toronto were even asking Tamils to sign forms

authorizing automatic monthly bank transfers from their bank accounts. Despite the efforts of the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and CSIS, the influence and activities of the Tamil

Tigers are still a major threat to Canada.29

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

The threat of religious extremists such as Sunni Islamic groups is a clear and present

danger to Canada. Overall, Islam is a peaceful religion which prides itself on its specific codes of

conduct that guide followers; however, terrorist groups have used the Islamic faith to disguise

their evil intentions and deeds. After 9/11 the first public report concluded that Canada is at risk

of being targeted directly or indirectly by Sunni Islamic terrorists.30 The seriousness of this threat

is echoed in the words of a man living in Quebec who uses the pseudonym “Altar,” and since

September 2008, has been posting messages on the internet encouraging Al-Qaeda to attack

Canada. The messages have praised terrorist leader Osama bin Laden and ask why Al-Qaeda is

focusing its efforts only in Europe instead of Canada. He wrote in a 25 September 2008 posting

that, “Allah is great and may Allah bless Sheikh bin Laden. May the sword held by the hand of

Al-Qaeda hit not only Europe, but hit all our enemies wherever they are.” He added, “Me, I live

28 Ibid., 10.

29 Ibid., 12.

30 Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era …, 18. 12

in Canada and the Canadian government supports the Americans. The government of Canada

supports Israel. Canadian soldiers are sent to Afghanistan and Iraq, …now its Canada’s turn [for a serious terrorist attack].” Stewart Bell, an award winning journalist and author, notes that this and other similar rhetoric have been appearing increasingly on the internet, often the work of young radicals who join online forums that promote Al-Qaeda.31 Through his Al Qaeda

movement, Osama bin Laden has increased his influence and power by mobilising Islamic

extremists in his reign of terror. He has also recruited new members who are attracted to his

notoriety, which has increased even more since 9/11. Canada cannot take things for granted because examples of Al Qaeda’s activities have been seen in this country. It should be noted that the November 2002 statement by Osama Bin Laden named six Western countries, including

Canada, as targets of retribution because of their military support in Afghanistan.32

A Muslim Canadian family, the Khadrs, has been associated with the activities of Osama

Bin Laden because of its open support for the terrorist leader and Al Qaeda. Ahmad Khadr has

been described as the highest ranking of Al Qaeda’s 75 Canadian operatives. Ahmad’s wife

Maha Elsamnah, took her then 14 year old son from Canada to Pakistan in 2001 and enrolled

him for Al Qaeda training. Daughter Zaynab, 23, married a terrorist, with Osama bin Laden

himself present at the nuptials. It is said that Zaynab endorses the 9/11 atrocities and hopes her

infant daughter will die fighting Americans. Son Abdullah, 22, is an Al-Qaeda fugitive

constantly on the move to elude capture. He and sister Zaynab are suspected of running an Al-

Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Son Omar, 17, stands accused of hurling a

31 Stewart Bell, “Quebec man’s web messages urge Al-Qaida to attack Canada: Praises bin Laden and blasts Ottawa for sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq,” The Gazette. Montreal, Quebec. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=47&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&s; posted 17 October 2008, accessed 14 January 2009.

32 Elinor C. Sloan, Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era …, 19. 13

grenade in July 2002, killing an American medic in Afghanistan. Omar lost sight in one eye in

the fighting and is now a U.S. detainee in Guantanamo. Son Abdul Karim, 14, is in Pakistan half-

paralyzed by wounds sustained in the October 2003 shoot-out that left his father dead.33 Son

Abdurahman, who trained with Al Qaeda was captured by coalition forces and consented to be an operative for the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIA).34

Terrorist groups such as Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and

Hezbollah are determined to push their political agenda of destroying Israel and creating an

Islamic state. These groups are presently operating out of Canada which they use as a support

base to raise money to fund terrorist activities in other areas. In a report entitled, “Hezbollah

sleeper cells in Canada: ABC News,” by Adrian Humphreys and Stewart Bell in the Calgary

Herald, the authors note that intelligence agencies have cautioned about attacks against Jewish

targets by Canadian-linked supporters of Hezbollah. The report also mentions that suspected

Hezbollah operatives have conducted recent surveillance on the Israeli Embassy in Ottawa, and

on several synagogues in Toronto.35

The world is presently focused on the Middle East, in a “war” that has been waged to

counter Islamic terrorist groups; however, it has been observed that other regions vulnerable to

Islamic terrorist activities such as Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, have been ignored

despite the growing influence of Islamic beliefs in these regions. The statistics for the Islamic

33 Ibid.

34 Daniel Pipes, “The Khadrs: Canada’s First Family of Terrorism” New York Sun, available from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1639 ; Internet; posted 16 March 2004, accessed 26 August 2008.

35 Adrian Humphreys, Stewart Bell, “Hezbollah ‘sleeper cells’ in Canada: ABC News”, Calgary Herald, available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=128&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3& ; Internet; posted 20 June 2008, accessed 14 January 2009.

14

support in Jamaica estimate a total Muslim population of 5,463. There are many Islamic

organizations and mosques in Jamaica, including the Islamic Council of Jamaica and the Islamic

Education and Dawah Center, both located in Kingston, the nation’s capital city. There are also

other Islamic organizations in other areas of the island.36

Individuals of the Islamic faith in Jamaica are peaceful persons who are not considered a

threat; however, the influence of Islamic extremism across the Caribbean has begun to create

concerns. There has been a dramatic increase in Islamic fundamentalism worldwide especially

among radicals. This increase is attributed to a wave of radicalism, driven by the global Salafi

jihad, which is presently a worldwide religious revivalist movement, aimed at re-establishing

past Muslim glory in a great Islamic state. This Muslim glory is expected to be obtained through

a strategy of violent jihad to restore “authentic Islam.”37 According to Angela Gendron, Senior

Fellow at The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Carleton University:

The loose affiliation of Islamist groups which broadly share Al Qaeda’s ideology, aims and objectives gives it global reach and reputation beyond any that its own core member-ship would otherwise warrant. Salafi ideology determines the mission, sets the goals and guides the tactics.38

To compound this issue, a radical Jamaican – born Islamic cleric, Sheikh Abdullah el

Faisal, convicted in Britain for soliciting murder and inciting racial violence, was deported back to Jamaica on 25 May 2007. El-Faisal was the first person in more than a century to be convicted

36 Nation Master – Encyclopedia: Islam in Jamaica; available from http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Islam-in-Jamaica; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.

37 Angela Gendron, , “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” Trends in Terrorism Series, volume 2006-4 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Carleton University,2006), 3.

38 Ibid., 4. 15

under Britain’s 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, after he was found guilty of soliciting

murder and fuelling racial hatred in 2003. During this trial, tapes of his sermons were played where he extolled his listeners to “kill Hindus and Jews and other non Muslims, like cockroaches.” During his four-week trial in 2003, followers watched as the court heard El-Faisal exhorting young Muslims to accept the deaths of women and children as “collateral damage” and

to “learn to fly planes, drive tanks, load guns and to use missiles.”39

This extremist Muslim cleric was even said to have influenced 19 year old Jamaican-born

Briton Lindsay, who was responsible for the bomb blast at King’s Cross in Britain in July 2005

that killed 27 people. The official Home Office report on this and other events of 7 July 2005

from bomb blasts across Britain noted that a total of 52 persons were killed. Presently, el-Faisal

is being monitored by the Special Branch of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. Precautions have

been taken to ensure that the influence of this extremist Muslim cleric and others like him are not

transmitted to Islamic believers in Jamaica.40

This was not the only terrorist activity that involved an individual affiliated with Jamaica.

In December 2001, United States FBI agents had launched an extensive search for terrorists

suspected of training the alleged suicide bomber, Richard Reid (the shoe bomber) for his attempt

to blow up a US-bound flight. The bureau believes that Reid was trained and financed by

terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden during visits he made to the Middle East, Pakistan and

Afghanistan. It is also alleged that Reid was well known to have attended Al Qaeda training

camps in Afghanistan before 9/11. FBI agents have explained that Reid is of English and

39 BBC News Channel, Race Hate cleric Faisal deported; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6691701.stm.; Internet; accessed 29 January 2009.

40 Ibid. 16

Jamaican parentage, and is associated with an Al-Qaeda member, Zacarias Moussauoi, and

several radical clerics in London including Abu Qatada, who is accused of being bin Laden’s

“key Lieutenant” in Western Europe.41

In another example, British police conducted several counterterrorism raids in April 2007

and arrested six men including Abu Izzadeen who is said to be a well-known advocate of radical

Islam, who once called the London bombings of 2005 “praiseworthy.” Izzadeen, originally

named Trevor Brooks, was born into a Christian family from Jamaica before converting to Islam.

He was arrested and released on bail in February 2007 on charges relating to counterterrorism

laws forbidding encouragement of terrorism. That arrest followed a speech he gave in

Birmingham, calling for the beheading under Muslim law of Muslims who joined the British

Army. These examples highlight the need for Jamaica to increase its vigilance because the

influence from individuals such as these Islamic extremists is a clear and present danger. The

problem has been further compounded by the number of deportations that occur each day

returning individuals such as these back to the Island.42

41 Severin Carrell and Paul Lashmar, “The Independent,” F.B.I. steps up hunt for men who funded shoe bomber; available from; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/fbi-steps-up-hunt-for-men-who-funde; Internet; accessed 29 January 2009.

42 Alan Cowell, “International Herald Tribune: The Global Edition of the New York Times ,” British police arrest six men in counterterrorism raids; available from; http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/24/america/london.php; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009. 17

OTHER POTENTIAL THREATS

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM

The threat of biological and chemical terrorism has been the concern of many nations

since the First World War. The most notable characteristic of biological agents that makes them

attractive to terrorists is their toxicity. There are a number of biological agents presently

available that could have a fatal effect on the population of any country.43 Examples of these

include the Type-A botulinal toxin, which has been described as the most lethal substance known

and is even more deadly than nerve agents. Anthrax is another example of a deadly agent. If its

spores were distributed appropriately, it could have a devastating effect.

The threat of biological and chemical terrorism for Canada and Jamaica cannot be

overlooked because the perpetrators are constantly devising ingenious methods to create

mayhem. In April 1993, Canada Customs at the Alaska-Yukon border seized 130 grams of the

deadly poison, ricin, from an American who had in his possession neo-nazi literature and was

linked to “survivalist” groups. Three years later, gas masks and chemical protection suits were

among the items seized from the British Columbia cache of a US right-wing militia group.44

In March 1977, the US Law Enforcement Assistance Administration reported that a single ounce of anthrax introduced in the air-conditioning system of a domed stadium could infect 70-80,000 spectators within an hour. The report further explained that it cannot be denied that in terms of sheer lethality, biological agents in theory appear to offer a “bigger bang for the

43 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the open literature; from; http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/thr/cbtrrrsm02-eng.asp ; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

44 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Report No. 2000/04: International Terrorism: The Threat to Canada; from; http://www.ccsis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200004-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009. 18

buck.”45 This fear is not far-fetched, especially with major events in venues containing large

crowds that could be targeted. In the Caribbean, the concern of terrorist activities including a

biological and chemical threat was considered in hosting of the International Cricket Council’s

Cricket World Cup 2007 (ICC CWC 2007). A number of security measures had to be put in

place to curtail any eventuality. The 2006 Treaty on Security Assistance among Caribbean

Member States and its subsequent Protocol (2006) established the CARICOM Operations,

Planning and Coordination Staff (COPACS)46 aimed at guaranteeing security during the ICC

CWC in the region, which is the third largest sporting event in the world, second only to World

Cup Football (soccer) and the Olympics.47

Toxic chemical agents are among the more deadly terrorist threats. According to the

CSIS report on toxicity, chemical agents generally fall somewhere in-between that of the more

deadly biological agents and that of conventional weapons, or at the lower end of the scale for

weapons of mass destruction.48 Similar to biological agents, chemical agents vary considerably

in their lethality. Nerve agents are credited with being capable of causing casualties in the range

of hundreds to a few thousand. Chemical agents, in contrast to biological agents, can have more

45 Ibid.

46 The militaries of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states activated the COPACS cell in September 2006, to plan and supervise the execution of military involvement in the overall security plan for the Cricket World Cup. A joint military force consisting of troops from Jamaica, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, St. Kitts & Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago contributed to security in host countries during the tournament.

47 Jamaica Information Service, Office of the Prime Minister, Members of Northern Task Force Leave for St. Kitts and Nevis; from http://www.jis.gov.jm/officePM/html/20070312T100000-0500_11436_JIS_MEMBERS_; Internet; assessed 15 February 2009.

48 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the open literature http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/thr/cbtrrrsm02-eng.asp ; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

19

instantaneous effects. This gives would-be terrorists a major advantage over their victims,

especially in enclosed and crowded areas. Despite not being as toxic as the most lethal biological

agents, it should be noted that chemical agents are also attractive to terrorists because they are

often cheaper to purchase. 49

CYBER TERRORISM

With improvements to technology and the world now being seen as a global village,

cyberspace has become a target for terrorist organisations. Cyber terrorism includes hacking into

a system to wreak havoc or combining a digital attack with a more conventional activity. The

activities of cyber-terrorists can be catastrophic and involve the unauthorized disclosure of

sensitive data, corruption of data, denial of service and disruption of communication. In Canada,

Jamaica and other parts of the world, the risk to public safety has to be paramount. The shutdown

of electric grids could be paralyzing, especially in temperate countries which are dependent on the heat that is being generated from these electric turbines. Classified government documents, codes and passwords could render security installations ineffective, be used as tools to corrupt

government officials, or could facilitate sabotage, espionage and other major terrorist activities.

According to Gary O’Bright, Canada’s Director of Operations for the Office of Critical

Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP):

This thoroughly interconnected ‘network’ of systems upon which contemporary daily life depends, a network which is entirely reliant upon the efficient and uninterrupted communication of ‘legitimate’ and ‘clean’ information streams through this pervasive cyber environment, is what the Government of Canada considers to be our country’s ‘critical information infrastructure.’50

49 Ibid.

50 Gary O’Bright,, “Cyber Incident Management by the Government of Canada,” in After 9/11: Terrorism and Crime in a Globalised World, ed. David A. Charters and Graham F. Walker, 124 – 160 (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies & Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004), 124. 20

In Jamaica, and to a greater extent Canada, the threat of information warfare is evident.

The dependence of both countries on computer networks for the efficient operation of critical infrastructure has created a great cause for concern. The matter of securing this infrastructure cannot be taken lightly and must be seen as a matter of national security. Cyber-terrorism is extremely difficult to detect and deter, as terrorists are well educated and in most cases have the experience and equipment to be one step ahead of advances in the security of computer networks. One can only imagine the outcome if Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) which are manoeuvred by remote control and have the ability to launch missiles were in the wrong hands, or manipulated by hacking into their computer systems. O’Bright notes, “The landscape of public safety shifted dramatically with the tragic events of 9/11. This new security environment is different from what existed prior to 9/11, not only in terms of physical security but also in terms of cyber security.”51

The number of cyber-incidents and their increasingly costly and disruptive ramifications

should act as a warning to responsible governments or authorities. If one observes the cyber

incidents even before 9/11, it should be apparent that there has been a significant increase in

these attacks. An example of this was seen in January 2003, when a ‘memory-resident worm,’

nicknamed Slammer, spread around the world’s cyber infrastructure in less than twenty minutes,

causing damage ranging from disrupted ATM transactions to the loss of 911 services, and even

the complete collapse of the internet in some countries. The infamous Code Red computer virus

is another example, which cost the world economy an estimated two billion USD.52

51 Ibid., 127.

52 Ibid., 127 21

These viruses have exploited design flaws and poor software engineering, and similar incidents are getting worse based on evidence of a rapid rise in politically motivated activities such as rivalry between Chinese and Taiwanese hackers. A major example of this cyber activism involved a vicious exchange between Israeli and Palestinian ‘hacktivists’ who wage cyber-war on each other almost on a daily basis. This includes web defacements, denial of service attacks and viruses against governments, businesses and infrastructure across the Middle East.53

NARCO TERRORISM

Narco- terrorism has become a matter of concern with the rise in organized crime

worldwide. Dr. G. Davidson (Tim) Smith explains that former President Belaunde Terry of Peru

coined the term ‘narco-terrorism’ in 1983 when describing terrorist-type attacks against his

nation’s anti-narcotics police. Now a subject of definitional controversy, he states that

“narcoterrorism is understood to mean the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the

policies of government by the systematic threat or use of violence.”54

The geo-strategic location of Jamaica and rest of the Caribbean has created an ideal trans-

shipment point between North and South America, and various markets for illicit drugs that are

used to fund criminal organizations worldwide. Caribbean leaders and citizens have, on

numerous occasions, voiced their concerns of the need to address the problem of narco-

trafficking while almost completely ignoring the issue of terrorism and its link to the illicit drug

trade. A number of meetings were held, including in May 1997, the first ever summit in the

Caribbean, between a US President and Caribbean Heads of Government, endorsing a Plan of

53 Ibid., 129.

54 G. Davidson Smith, “Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise in Columbia”, Commentary No.13; available from; http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm13-eng.asp; Internet; assessed 17 February 2009.

22

Action for Drug Control Coordination and Cooperation in the Caribbean (The Barbados Plan).

This plan also included new areas of joint US-Caribbean action in the regional anti-drug

initiative.55

Despite these initiatives, on the eve of 9/11, the Caribbean remained at the centre of

major aspects of the global illicit narcotics trade. In 2000, approximately one-third of the global

supply of cocaine was intercepted and the Caribbean/Central American zone ranked number four

in the world in terms of cocaine seizures. Three Caribbean territories (Bahamas, Cayman Islands

and Jamaica) were among the top twenty countries in terms of cocaine interdiction.56

The reaction of the CARICOM states to the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a meeting of the

Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers on 21 September 2001, where the

region unanimously condemned the attacks of 9/11 and expressed a firm commitment to

individual and collective obligations under the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) and

UNSC 1373 (2001), adopted by the UN in the fight against terrorism. Two things are noteworthy from this meeting. First, the close connection between international terrorism and transnational

organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering and illegal arms trafficking was highlighted.

Second, the war against drugs was integrally linked to the fight against international terrorism.57

Narco-terrorism for financial gain is no more or less terrorist than narco-terrorism for

political objectives. The targeting and suffering of the innocent individuals is the same, despite

the motivation or purpose of terrorism. The tentacles of this type of terrorism extend globally and

continue to be a major concern worldwide. Not only does it pose a socio-economic threat to

55 Trevor Munroe “The Menace of Drugs” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 154-175 (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 154.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid. 23

developed countries such as Canada, US and UK but also supports attacks against the judicial

system of countries such as Mexico. It funds terrorism in Colombia and overall, destabilizes

governments from Afghanistan to Thailand. The Canadian Forces are presently assisting in

efforts to create a stable society in Afghanistan which is a challenge in itself, especially with the

dependence of many Afghan nationals on the production of opium.58

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The chapter has laid out a number of factors that are either present or imminent threats to

the security of Canada and Jamaica. The first factor noted that domestic terrorism is the major

threat to Canada. This threat is also present in Jamaica, but is more prominent in Canada because

of its larger population and greater multicultural immigration pattern. This has helped to facilitate not only attracting the best and brightest persons worldwide, but also, in some cases, the worst individuals. Battles fought in various regions across the globe are transferred, to some

extent, by the migration of individuals who are sympathetic to the cause of opposing sides. An

example of this is seen in the case of the Tamil Tigers. As a developing nation, Jamaica attracts

migrants but not to the extent that is seen in Canada; therefore, conflicts are more likely to

originate internally than be imported from other areas. The threat of terrorist activities in Jamaica

due to immigration would therefore tend to be lower than that of Canada. An example of this was

highlighted earlier in the CSIS website showing the current list of terrorist entities in Canada.59

58 Asa Hutchinson, Director, Drug Enforcement Administration Heritage Foundation, “Narco-Terror: The International Connection Between Drugs and Terror;” available from http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s040202.html; Internet; assessed 29 January 2009.

59 Public Safety Canada, “Current List of Terrorist Entities,” available from; http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp ; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

24

Canada has approximately forty of these groups compared to Jamaica that has individuals who

are being monitored, but no established group.60

Presently, the emergence of terrorist groups in the Caribbean, specifically Trinidad and

Tobago along with Guyana, is a major concern for Jamaica. Groups such as the Jamaat Al

Muslimeen in Trinidad, led by Yasin Abu Bakr and the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah (Islamic Front)

led by extremist Omar Abdullah, have a powerful influence across the Caribbean.61 Unlike

Canada, Jamaica has to form alliances with other Caribbean nations to curtail this threat within

the Caribbean Basin,62 and this in itself has its own challenges with each country having

different rules and regulations, as well as economic, culture, racial and ethnic differences.

The chapter has also shown that geography plays a major role in the new security dispensation since 9/11. The shared Canadian-US border is a major factor that cannot be ignored and will constantly drive the policies of each country in terms of future security endeavours.

Compared to Jamaica, Canada is more exposed and faces a higher risk of terrorist activities due to this shared border and terrorists seeing it as a part of the US’s layer of defence. The shared border has also had an impact on shaping Canadian foreign policy and its military commitment overseas. Terrorists, in the “war against terrorism,” are now seeing not only the US as the enemy, but Canada and other allies as well. The major advantage for Canada, however, is that the US is committed to taking Canadian security more seriously than potential “soft targets” in Jamaica.

60 Terrorism Research Center, “Country Profiles: Jamaica,” available from; http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=Countries&file=index&view; Internet; accessed 17 March 2009.

61 Chris Zambelis, “Al-Queda inroads into the Caribbean,” Mexidata.Info; Available from http://mexidata.info/id652.html; Internet; accessed 18 March 2009.

62 The Caribbean Basin is defined as the area running from Florida, Westward along the Gulf Coast, then south along the Mexican coast through Central America and then eastward across the northern coast of South America. This region includes the islands of the archipelago of the West Indies. Bermuda is also included due to its common cultural history as a European colony although it is in the west-central Atlantic. 25

In this sense, Jamaica, which is woefully lacking in resources and funding to properly monitor terrorist threats, will continue to experience this problem because of its low priority threat status from which the US could be seriously affected.

Although Canada and Jamaica both have a number of American assets that could be prime targets for terrorists, with limited resources and lack of trained expertise, the negative implications for Jamaica would be more far-reaching than for Canada. Jamaica’s dependence on the US cannot be overstated, especially with the country’s major foreign exchange earner being tourism. The destabilizing of an already ailing economy would be catastrophic.63

Another factor that was highlighted in this chapter is the manner in which certain threats are evident in Canada and Jamaica, while others (threats) are more prominent in one or the other.

As shown earlier, an example of a threat that is similar in both countries is Islamic extremism.

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism around the world has been phenomenal, and the growth and development of its extremist group has become a significant force.

The major difference with this threat when looking at Canada and Jamaica’s situation is the fact that although migration has had an influence on the growth and development of Islamic extremism in each region, spurred by the influence of 9/11 and the Al-Queda movement,

Jamaica’s problem has been further compounded by increased deportations from developed countries. The lingering problem of organized crime and increase in criminal deportations has further stretched law enforcement resources and manpower. The added problem of monitoring terrorist networks nationally, regionally and internationally, that could have an impact on

Jamaica, has proven to be a tremendous challenge for this small nation. Another difference is the

63 Robert Buddan, “Caribbean ‘terrorism?’: Implications for US-regional relations,” Jamaica Gleaner Newspaper, published 10 June 2007; Available from; http://www.jamaica- gleaner.com/gleaner/20070610/focus/focus1.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2009. 26

fact that Islamic extremists in Jamaica and the Caribbean are more likely to use this area for recruiting and training its followers than for funding in the case of Canada. A better system of monitoring the cash flow of these terrorist networks from financiers in more developed countries would go a long way in assisting Jamaica and the remainder of the Caribbean in curtailing this problem.

Other common potential threats to both countries include biological and chemical terrorism and cyber terrorism that need serious consideration and monitoring. Both countries are seen as safe and neutral areas for vacationing, and holding major events and summits; therefore, they would be attractive targets for terrorists.

Threats that are more prominent in Canada when compared to those facing Jamaica include Sikh extremism and the LTTE, which, as mentioned before, is caused by the transfer of conflicts and threats due to migration. Canada is seen as not only an area for recruitment but also funding for these groups. In the case of Jamaica, however, the prominent potential threat besides

Islamic extremism is narco-terrorism. One has to remember that narco-terrorism thrives where there is a high level of crime, weak economies and lack of resources and manpower for proper law enforcement. These factors, plus Jamaica’s geo-strategic location, have facilitated this threat

because the Caribbean, including Jamaica, is being used as a major transhipment area for illicit

drugs to developed countries.

The corruption of state authority and state power through narco-terrorism is more likely in Jamaica than would be expected in Canada. In a similar manner, Jamaica would be more vulnerable to maritime terrorism due to its geo-strategic location and the influence of narco- trafficking in the region. This facilitates not only narco-terrorism but also maritime terrorist activities. There is a real and present danger of corruption at all levels, and with narco- 27

trafficking, plus the imminent threat of narco-terrorism, much more has to be done before the problem spirals out of control. This threat would be less evident in Canada, because like the US and the UK, it is a major market and not a transhipment point for illicit drugs.

In summary, this chapter has highlighted the general threats posed by terrorist entities and specific terrorist threats to Canada and Jamaica. These include Sikh extremism, Islamic extremism, the activities of the Tamil Tigers and other potential threats such as biological and chemical terrorism, cyber terrorism and narco-terrorism. These threats show that there is reason for Canada and Jamaica to be vigilant against not only Islamic extremists, but also other terrorist groups and multiple forms of terrorism. The list of terrorist threats is inexhaustible; therefore, both countries must be cognizant of the magnitude of the threat they have to face. As a follow-up to this discussion, the impact of 9/11 on Canada and Jamaica will be discussed in chapter 3.

28

CHAPTER 3 - THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON CANADA AND JAMAICA

The events of 9/11 were not only catastrophic, but also had a life-changing impact on

individuals internationally. The global security environment was completely changed in less

than an hour and the world has not been the same since. The impacts have been many and varied,

and can be seen on the social, economic and political “landscapes” of many nations. This chapter

will take an in-depth look at the impact of 9/11 on Canada and Jamaica, and analyze the social, economic and political consequences that have arisen because of this act of terrorism. It should also be noted that this chapter will also be a good segue for the discussion that will follow in chapter 4 on the response of Canada and Jamaica to the events of 9/11.

THE SOCIAL IMPACT

The social impact of 9/11 on Canada and Jamaica has been evident especially because of

the proximity of each country and close ties that have been maintained with the US over the years. The first major social impact was its effect on human rights and the perpetuating of racial, ethnic and religious profiling. Since 9/11, terrorism has been linked with Canada’s immigration

and refugee policies despite the fact that none of the terrorists involved in the attack entered the

US through Canada. Kent Roach, professor of law at the University of Toronto notes, “There are

legitimate fears that September 11 is driving Canada towards Americanized criminal justice,

immigration, military and foreign policies that depart from such Canadian values as

multiculturalism, peacekeeping, and respect for international laws and institutions.” Roach also

explains that before and after 9/11, Canada faced the danger of American criminal justice

policies in which groups stereotypically associated with crime were exposed to increased

incarceration and surveillance. However, the Canadian Federal government has stated that this

insinuation is baseless and the Anti-Terrorism Act was formulated to promote human rights and 29

protect racial and religious minorities from hate crimes. It resisted calls to commit itself in the

act to non-discrimination in the administration of the many new powers given to police and prosecutors.64

Racial and religious profiling has become a serious issue since 9/11 and innocent

individuals have been victims of it in Canada and Jamaica. It has created a negative impact in

Jamaica where persons of middle-eastern descent or phenotype who wear the traditional turbans,

are stereotypically labelled as terrorists. The Islamic movement in Jamaica has also come under

more intense scrutiny and in some instances been equated with Islamic extremism, thereby

categorizing all Islamic movements under one group. The deportation of the Muslim cleric

Abdullah Faisal to Jamaica has compounded the issue further with persons seeing him as a threat

because of his ability to garner support and incite violence against state authorities.

The threat to equality was a major issue even before 9/11; however, the terrorist attacks

and new security environment have now placed this situation in the spotlight.65 The Anti-

Terrorism Act, like the Patriot Act66 in the US, has created much controversy among Canadian

domestic minority groups, especially Canadian Muslims who are fearful that the legislation will

erode civil liberties.67 The undue targeting of religious groups is a major concern; however, an

64 Kent Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 14 & 17.

65 Ibid., 17.

66 The US Congress passed the USA PATRIOT ACT (The Act) in response to the terrorists’ attacks of 9/11. The Act gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications, for both law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. It vests the Secretary of the Treasury with the regulatory powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial institutions for foreign money laundering purposes, seeks to further close US borders to foreign terrorists, and detain and remove those within US borders.

67 Douglas Ross & Anil Hira, “Canada, A Land of Ambivalence: Understanding the Divergent Response to US Primacy after 9/11,” Canadian – American Public Policy, Proquest Military Collection, No 68 (Dec 2006): 19.

30

additional point that should not be overlooked is that the Act’s preventative arrest and

investigative hearings provisions may, as in the US, impinge on privacy protection.68

The case of Maher Arar, a Syrian Canadian in 2002, was an embarrassing situation which

highlighted the unlawful intrusion of civil liberties of many individuals under the guise of

combating terrorists by enforcing the newly formed “Acts.” Arar was wrongly deported by the

US to Syria with the blessing of the Canadian authority, in response to US concerns about

potential terrorist activity. In January 2007, to make up for the abuse of his civil liberty, Arar

received a formal apology from Prime Minister Harper and compensation of approximately Cdn

$10.5 million, plus legal costs, because of the RCMP’s actions that led to his torture.69

The second issue is the curtailing in the relative freedom of movement through the US borders and borders of various countries, which has had a significant impact on immigration and

refugee policies worldwide. The most important aspect of the US immigration debate since 9/11 is the significant negative impact on freedom of movement, especially between the US and

Canada. The present border restrictions and hardening of the border have been seen in some quarters as something of a national insult by many Canadians, a reflection of an unjustified US perception that Canada is a weak link in US security. It has also been concluded by some that these stringent measures that have been implemented at the US-Canadian border has bred a sense of inferiority on the part of some Canadians to their US neighbours.70 More than 200 million

people and 14 million vehicles cross the border every year.

68 Kent Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada …, 48-50, 90-92.

69 Douglas Ross & Anil Hira, “Canada, A Land of Ambivalence …, 20.

70 Ibid., 39.

31

In the months after 9/11, John Manley, who was Canada’s Foreign Minister at that time, was integral in the implementation of “smart border” improvements that would ensure sustained movement of goods and services across the border, even in crisis circumstances.71 Kent Roach, professor of law at the University of Toronto, shares a sceptical view of the optimism that has been predicted for the future of the smart border agreements. He highlights the fact that besides ensuring a safer and more efficient flow of people, it led to the “safe third country” agreement between Canada and the US, which had the negative effect of prohibiting most refugees from applying to Canada if they reached the US first.

The third issue of the right to privacy for many nations, including Canada and Jamaica, has been eroded by the enacting of the Patriot Act and various measures that have been put in

place. The US-VISIT biometric procedure has not found favour with a number of Jamaicans who

have seen this as a major infringement of the right to privacy. The issue sparked much debate;

however, the screening was introduced in January 2004 at major points of entry to the US despite

numerous protests. The biometric procedure includes digital inkless finger scans and digital photographing upon entry to the US.

It is interesting to note that Canada is presently considering a similar biometric procedure. Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart, who was appointed on 1 December 2003, raised questions about biometrics in the context of broader post 9/11 concerns about how the personal information of Canadians could be distributed, often without their knowledge, to

governments, corporations and even US security agencies through the powerful and intrusive

Patriot Act. In an interview in 2006, Florence Nguyen, a media spokeswoman at Stoddart’s

office, reported that from polls that were taken, numerous Canadians feared who may have

71 Ibid., 40 32

access to it, and viewed their physical characteristics as “extremely personal.”72 Canada’s

biometric system is scheduled to be in full operation by fall 2009.73

The US Patriot Act was also perceived by most developing countries as an excuse for the

US to deport various individuals who were deemed to be in that country illegally or posed a

threat to national security. This issue has been given serious consideration especially amongst

Jamaican and other Caribbean security officials who are faced with the daunting task of not only

receiving these individuals but trying to reintegrate them into a society which some have left

since they were toddlers. To compound the issue, criminal deportees to Jamaica have made the

situation even more untenable with their influence on the already problematic criminal

underworld.

An example of this was seen in one of many controversial immigration related initiatives

of the US government since 9/11 that was announced by the Department of Justice on 8 January

2002. It prioritized the apprehension and removal from the US, 4,000-6,000 men out of more

than 300,000 “absconders” from particular countries of origin, whose deportability had been

finalized, and who had exhausted their administrative and judicial appeal rights.74 Many saw this

situation as a clear violation of human rights and civil liberties, where the 9/11 attacks were used

as an excuse to conduct these intrusive actions.

72 Peter O’Neil, “Biometric Screening Programme Planned,” The Vancouver Sun, available from; http://www.2.canada.com/vancouversun/voices/story.html?id=ad0baf92-0f29-41a2-ae90-8a; Internet; accessed 22 February 2009.

73 Qinghan Xiao, “Applying Biometrics”, Defence Research and Development Canada, available from, http://www.ottawa.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/html/biometrics-eng.html; Internet; accessed 23 February 2009.

74 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Sixth Public Hearing, available from; http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing6/witness_ting.htm; Internet; accessed 23 February 2009. 33

From what has been discussed it is evident that the social impact of 9/11 on Canada and

Jamaica has been far-reaching, from racial, ethnic and religious profiling; freedom of travel to

and from the US and other countries; and finally to the intrusion on civil rights and liberties. This

issue continues to be a major concern for both governments.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

The economic impact of 9/11 on Canada and Jamaica is an issue that is worth examining,

in that the US is the largest market for both countries. Before 9/11, Canada and the US had a

close trading relationship that had been established over many decades. This relationship is still

evident today. Post 9/11 economic effects on Canada were most acutely felt at the long delays at

border points for both people and goods. The tremendous pressure to upgrade border

harmonization to ease the obstacles to the free flow of goods, services and persons on legitimate

business between Canada and the US had never appeared more crucial, and this freedom of

crossing the border unimpeded seemed more important to most Canadians than the security

issue itself. The Canadian business sector’s reaction to 9/11 was instantaneous. More than forty

business associations and individuals founded the Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient

Borders to push Canadian policymakers towards reassuring the US on border security.75

A major objective of Canadian leaders has been the issue of maintaining and enhancing secure, predictable, barrier-free access to the United States economy. This has been a long- standing objective of Canadian leaders and has led Canada to pursue a bilateral free trade agreement with the US, followed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This trade objective drove Canada’s response to the new US security environment as a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. On that day, the US effectively embargoed its own economy by virtually

75 Douglas Ross & Anil Hira, “Canada, A Land of Ambivalence …39. 34

shutting down its borders. A report that was done for The Conference Board of Canada, entitled,

Reaching a Tipping Point? Effects of Post – 9/11 Border Security on Canada’s Trade and

Investment, gives a clear indication of the impact of 9/11 on the major aspects of the Canadian economy. 76

The Board interviewed or surveyed almost 60 Canadian companies and associations that

used the border regularly or whose members cross regularly.77 The report discovered that the

cumulative effect of post 9/11 border security policies has not reduced Canadian export volumes

to the US; however, the post-9/11 security environment has resulted in important new costs of

crossing the border for many companies. The report further explained that in the long term, these costs could make Canada a less attractive location from which to buy parts or in which to invest.78

To understand the effect of the post-9/11 environment on Canadian interests, it is

important to understand the importance of access to the US market. Access to the US provides

Canada with far greater growth prospects than if the country were confined to selling to its

relatively small domestic market. An example of this was seen in 2006 when goods exported to

the US accounted for a quarter of Canada’s gross domestic product. Many manufacturing

industries manage their inventories using just-in-time systems in which within hours of an order,

inputs or final goods made in Canada enter supply chains on the US side of the border are

76 Danielle Goldfarb, Reaching a Tipping Point? Effects of Post-9/11 Border Security on Canada’s Trade and Investment, Report prepared for The Conference Board of Canada, International Trade and Investment Centre (ITIC), (June 2007), 1.

77 Ibid., 11.

78 Ibid., i. 35

delivered to US customers. Uncertainty at the borders would force companies to carry more inventory, reversing an increased competitiveness of just-in-time logistics.79

In looking at the trade cost and benefits since 9/11, the survey showed that for many

companies, the costs of trading across the Canada-US border have increased as a result of the

post-9/11 border security environment. Exporters dependent on access to the US have had to

absorb at least part of the extra costs to do border crossings. Some companies have viewed the chance to be fast-tracked across the border in exchange for security improvement as a competitive advantage, although the benefits are not yet fully commensurate with the upfront costs.80

This problem of tightened security has been felt not only on the movement of goods and

services by land, but also by sea and air. These stringent security stipulations by the US have led

to costly measures being put in place by Canada, Jamaica and other nations. Immediately after

9/11 new US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules were enforced which caused many

nations, especially developing nations such as Jamaica, to scramble to meet the new rules and

required certification.81 Changes that occurred include upgrading of the aircrafts cockpit for the

security of crew members, refurbishing of the country’s two international airports to comply with

measures to alleviate security concerns,82 and changes in weight limits of goods and luggage.

79 Ibid., 4.

80 Ibid., 11.

81 US Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transport, Part 119-Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators, available from; http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text- idx?c=ecfr&sid=ba5eb25c8e5218e43dc3f8e917cfe8; Internet; accessed 1 March 2009.

82 Kingston’s Norman Manley International Airport handled 1.6 million travellers in 2005 and expects 1.9 million passengers by 2013 and 2.5 million by the year 2022. Overall refurbishment is estimated to cost $130mil. Source: http://www.airport-technology.com/projects/jamaica/; Internet; accessed 1 March 2009.

36

The new regulations also caused the Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority (JCAA) to insist on

additional supervision and monitoring of training activities for not only staff, but also other

agencies that are involved in aviation related activities, emergencies or incidents.

These changes have proven costly, and the negative economic effect on travellers has

affected the airline industry in more ways than one. This has caused downsizing, layoffs and

pending sale (privatization) of Jamaica’s national airline. The airline industry has suffered since

9/11, and in looking specifically at the days following the attacks, Air Jamaica lost Ja $11

million. Since then, airfares have climbed dramatically because of the new aviation measures put

in place because of 9/11, and travellers have had to absorb this additional cost.83

For Canadians, the most important aspect of the US’s new immigration policies since

9/11 is its negative impact on US tourism and convention business in Canada. The imminent

stipulation for all returning Americans to have passports has had a negative effect on Canadian tourist-related industries. Jamaica, whose tourist industry is the number one foreign exchange earner, has also felt the impact of the new post 9/11 policies in a significant way. This caused the

Jamaican government to approach its US counterpart, for an extension on the implementation

date (2004) for mandatory passports to be used by all returning US citizens through US ports of entry. This extension was granted, however, if this had not been done to allow Jamaica enough time to deal with the new security policies of the US government, the nation’s tourist industry would have “buckled” under the pressure. An immediate implementation of the new rules and

regulations would have destabilized Jamaica’s already ailing economy.

83 Norman Girvan, “Terrorism, Tourism and Trade,” The Greater Caribbean This Week, available from; http://www.acs-aec.org/PressCenter/PressCenter/column/index2.htm; Internet; accessed 15 February 2009.

37

The events of 9/11 occurred when the American economy was on a decline after nearly

eight years of sustained growth. The spin-off to this decline was a decline in US international

travel which followed a similar pattern that was seen after the war in Iraq in 1991. Like 1991, US

citizens were afraid to travel overseas, and Caribbean tourism suffered because of this. Some

hotel industry sources have explained that there has been a decline in tourist arrivals and

hoteliers around the Caribbean have reported steep falls in occupancy rates.84 Travel advisories

that have been issued complicate the problem because of the warning to US citizens that they can

be potential “soft targets” for terrorists whilst vacationing at various resorts worldwide. The hotel

industry has been affected in such a significant way that hotel rates have been reduced as an

incentive to attract tourists. The negative economic effect on the Caribbean is serious cause for

concern.85

From the factors that have been highlighted, the economic impact of 9/11 on Canada and

Jamaica has been evident from the various costs that have been incurred due to new security

policies implemented by the US which is both countries major market. The downturn in trade

profits, plus the negative effect on the travel industry has also compounded the issue. With these

factors in mind that were previously highlighted, it can be concluded that the negative economic

impact of 9/11 has affected the economies of Canada and Jamaica.

84 Ibid.

85 Emilio Pantojas-Garcia and Thomas Klak, “Globalisation and Economic Vulnerability: The Caribbean and the ‘Post-9/11 Shift’, ” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 176-198 (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 177.

38

THE POLITICAL IMPACT

To curtail the threat of terrorism the Canadian government along with other allies made

the decision to join the ranks of “the coalition of the willing” in Afghanistan. On 8 October

2001, Defence Minister Eggleton announced the first Canadian Forces (CF) commitments to its allies and international security under Operation Apollo. In February 2002, Canada deployed the

3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group, under the

leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, to Afghanistan.86 This was the beginning of many

Canadian operations in that area. The details of the military’s involvement will be discussed in

chapter 4.

As discussed earlier, the Canadian-US border has had serious social and economic

implications since 9/11. This concern of a post 9/11 border can also be transmitted to political

implications that have had an effect on governance in Canada. The Canadian Government has been challenged on a number of occasions to be proactive in its relations with the US. One of the main arguments is that Canada has to deal with Washington’s increasingly unilateral approach to foreign policy. North America’s strategic and geopolitical reality has meant that constitutional ramifications of the US’s Office of Homeland Security have become ingrained into Canada in the Canadian psyche.87

86 Department of National Defence, Canada, “Canadian Forces Commitment in Afghanistan to Date,” available from; http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=1661; Internet; accessed 4 March 2009.

87 Carolyn James, reviewing, Daniel Drache’s, “Borders Matter: Homeland Security and the Search for North America,” The American Review of Canadian Studies; (Spring 2006) 185. 39

According to the US Department of Defence’s National Defence Strategy88 and

Homeland Defence and Civil Support Strategy89 in 2005, the United States is engaged in an

“active, layered defence” of the American homeland. The first layer is global, as seen in Iraq and

Afghanistan (Preventative Security). The approaches to the US form the second layer, which

includes approaches through the homeland of American allies. The third layer would be the

American homeland. The US sees Canada as part of the second layer and regardless of the measures taken by Ottawa to assure the US that Canada is a reliable security partner;

Washington will do what it must to counter threats before they infiltrate the US’s national boundaries. It can even be argued that if the US is harmed or perceives any imminent threat from the ‘Canadian approach,’ the US government will do whatever it is that seems necessary to protect the homeland, either by closing the Canada-US border or unilaterally deploying military forces into Canadian waters, airspace or territory.90

Ottawa cannot prevent Washington from closing the Canada-US border; therefore, the

Canadian government must be selective in the type of policies it adopts to improve North

American security. With this in mind, the Canadian government has to consider which

sovereignty concessions are necessary to keep the border open and secure, and those that are

futile based on the US’s layered defence strategy.91

88 United States, Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005. 89 United States, Department of Defence, Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support, June 2005.

90 Philippe Lagasse (Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario) and Joel J. Sokolsky (Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario); “Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Security in U.S. - Canada Relations,” Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, D.C.: 2005), 9.

91 Ibid., 10.

40

The Caribbean scenario as it relates to the political impact of 9/11 is quite alarming.

Jamaica has always had a good relationship with the US over the years with various agreements

that have benefited both countries. In 1990 the US President, George Bush (Senior) made an

announcement that had a major impact on US-Caribbean relations. NAFTA was formalized

between the US, Canada and Mexico. This left the Caribbean basin scrambling to find alternatives to the new preferential arrangement initiated by the US. This unilateral approach by

the US created much controversy, as Caribbean nations highlighted a number of problems related to this preferential trade treatment. Other controversial issues included US deportation of criminals to the Caribbean, and the Shiprider Agreement92 intended to develop international drug

cooperation between the US and the Caribbean. Jamaica and Barbados initially refused to sign

this agreement because of concerns of the US impinging on their sovereignty.93

The impact of 9/11 compounded the need for cooperation between the US and Caribbean

that took into account democratic principles and respect for sovereignty. Because of 9/11, the

administration of President George Bush Jr. reconfigured US foreign policy and proclaimed an

emerging grand strategy that altered the relationships and nature of international relations

worldwide. Jamaica was affected by this in a number of ways. The new strategy of the US has

maintained and further manifested its unipolarity, and its claims of threats, whether perceived or

evident, have impinged on the sovereignty of many nations on a number of occasions. An

92 The Shiprider Agreement is a US initiative as part of its prosecution on the “war on drugs.” The US Navy and Coast Guard have the authority to move at will through territorial waters of Caribbean nations that are signatories of this agreement, in order, it is claimed, to better contain an endemic traffic in narcotics. It is named the Shiprider Agreement because local officials are posted aboard US vessels to provide them (the US) with immediate authorization to enter the territorial waters of the participating nation.

93 Dorith Grant-Wisdom, “United States-Caribbean Relations: The Impact of 9/11,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 252-272 (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 256.

41

example of this is the problem in Jamaica and remainder of the Caribbean, of “drug lords” who

have been a problem to law enforcers. The Bush administration has identified narco-trafficking

as a main sponsor of acts of terrorism and the impetus for narco-terrorism. The US, on a number

of occasions has requested the extradition of Jamaicans, and rightly so, who are key players

involved in trafficking illicit drugs through that country. The disadvantage with this arrangement

however, is the abuse of power and influence by the US. An example was seen in one instance

where the US President indirectly manipulated his power through the media. Before sentence

was handed down to decide the faith of two suspected narco-traffickers, on 1st June 2004, the

President announced94 that these individuals were major “Drug King Pins.”95

This created quite a stir in Jamaica where many saw justice as being prejudiced by the

statement of the President. Although there was overwhelming evidence to prove the guilt of these individuals and due process was followed, the interference in a country’s sovereignty

cannot be taken lightly. One has to remember that justice must not only be done, but also appear

to be done. The US policy after 9/11 emphasized taking the fight to the enemy through

“preventative security” and if necessary, acting pre-emptively, but this should not be at the cost

of impinging on the sovereignty of other nations. The US, in looking at developing countries,

failing and failed states, sees these areas as potential conduits for terrorism. Failed states that

lack sovereign capacities can be breeding grounds for extremism and havens for criminals, drug

94 Lloyd Williams, Senior Associate Editor, “Bush names Ja ‘Kingpins’ – Jamaica Gleaner, published Wednesday 2 June 2004; Available from; http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040602/lead/lead1.html; Internet; accessed 8 March 2009.

95 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, An overview of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. ‘1901-1908, 8 U.S.C. ‘1182) and Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995 (Washington, D.C: 1995). 1& 2.

42

traffickers and terrorists. In essence, the US argues the need to be proactive. Today’s troubled

countries must be prevented from deteriorating into becoming tomorrow’s failed states.

Globalization also creates alliances, and as such, multilateral cooperation among certain

regions can be deemed as a security threat in itself to the US.96 Venezuelan President, Hugo

Chavez’s Petrocaribe Pact,97 of which Jamaica is a participating nation, has been frowned upon by the US, especially because of the strained relationship between Chavez and the US. 9/11 has created a new paradigm, where developing countries that were once dependent on the US are now seeking alternative means to survive the US stringent unilateralism.

Venezuela has signed this energy co-operation pact with 13 Caribbean states, including

Jamaica, in a move to supply cheaper oil to its neighbours. This move will also galvanize relations between countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Former Prime Minister at that time, The Right Honourable P. J. Patterson, speaking at a meeting of Caribbean leaders in

2005 stated, “For the countries of the Caribbean, Petrocaribe represents a welcome lifeline.”98

On numerous occasions, Chavez has been criticized by the US about the “ulterior motive” of this

Pact and his anti-US rhetoric. News reports have stated that Chavez is trying to counter US influence in Latin America and the Caribbean by calling on these states to join the fight against

US imperialism.99 There are also reports that the Hezbollah terrorist organization has been given

96 Dorith Grant-Wisdom, “United States-Caribbean Relations: The Impact of 9/11,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror …, 262.

97 Upstream, “Chavez unveils Petrocaribe Pact,” Upstreamonline, published Thursday 30 June 2005; Available from; http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article70873.ece; Internet; accessed 8 March 2009.

98 Ibid.

99 U.S.A. TODAY, “Stories About: Petrocaribe,” USATODAY.COM; Available from; http://asp.usatoday.com/community/tags/topic.aspx?req=tag&tag=Petrocaribe; Internet; accessed 8 March 2009.

43

refuge in Venezuela100 and also that Hugo Chavez has links with Colombia’s left wing guerrillas,

the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), which are renowned for drug

trafficking, racketeering, kidnapping for ransom and murder.101

Another alliance that is noteworthy is the renewed Caribbean- China relations. This has

gained strength in recent years with closer diplomatic ties, grants, loans and other forms of aid.

An example of this was seen in China’s assistance with labour and funding to construct a number

of stadiums across the Caribbean that were utilized in hosting the ICC CWC Cricket World Cup

in 2007.

A research report, Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A

Canadian Perspective, it highlights the fact that there appears to be some tension between those

who adhere to the theory of benign expansion of Chinese activities in the Americas. This conflict

see persons on side who think this expansion is just to seek out trade and investment

opportunities and others who believe China is using Latin America to challenge United States

supremacy in the Western Hemisphere and to build a third world coalition of nations with

interests that may well be hostile to American interests and values.102

The report goes on to note that from Canada’s perspective, a “watch-for-now” approach

seems fitting. It explains that while Canada may on the surface follow the example of the US, it

100 Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Hezbollah presence in Venezuela feared,” Los Angeles Times, printed 27 August 2008, Available from; http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/27/world/fg-venezterror27; accessed 19 March 2009.

101 Joshua Goodman, “Uribe seeks Chavez charges at international court,” Bloomberg.com, 4 March 2008, Available from; http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aIAvhvhWsqMQ&refer=latin; accessed 19 March 2009.

102 Florencia Jubany and Daniel Poon, Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective, FOCAL, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, Research Report, (Ottawa: FOCAL.CA, 2006), 13. 44

is in Canada’s interest to differentiate itself from the US and avoid the conflict of viewing China

as a friend or foe. The report advises that Canada’s interest would best be served by continuing

with the Canadian tradition of engaging with China on a broad agenda and creating an

environment suitable to joint action.103

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In looking at the social, economic and political impact of 9/11 on Canada and Jamaica, a number of factors were highlighted that should be given serious consideration. First, the social

impact on human rights and the perpetuating of racial, ethnic and religious profiling is a big issue

which even pervades today. From what has been discussed, it can be seen that Canada and

Jamaica share a similar problem of individuals being targeted or stereotyped because of ethnicity

or religious beliefs, due to 9/11. Both countries have established laws, for example the ATA in the case of Canada and the Terrorism Prevention Act104 as it relates to Jamaica, but more effort

is needed to ensure that these Acts promote human rights and protect religious minorities from hate crimes.

In some cases, one has to wonder who or what is dictating the method and manner in which these Acts are being utilised. Canada and Jamaica have to be reminded that if care is not taken, sovereignty can be eroded by overcompensating to maintain a “good” relationship with the US. The examples given earlier of the forced deportation of Syrian Canadian Maher Arar and the utterances of the US president before sentence was handed down for two suspects in Jamaica,

have shown that this situation could lead to much embarrassment if not handled properly.

103 Ibid., 14.

104 Legislation Jamaica (Lexadin), “Legislation Jamaica,”; Available from; http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwejam.htm; Internet; accessed 16 October 2008. 45

To compound the issue, the difference between the problems of racial, ethnic and

religious profiling in Jamaica, compared with Canada, is that Jamaica has to deal with an influx

of criminal deportees which further exacerbate the problem. Jamaica does not have the means of

properly monitoring these individuals therefore the country is at risk from their influencing an

already mounting problem of criminality. Although Canada does not have a similar problem of

massive deportation, it would be beneficial to monitor the networks and associates of these

persons being deported, especially from known criminal “hotspots” in Canada. Some of the

individuals being deported are relatively insignificant in comparison to other associates in the

underworld.

Jamaica is at an even greater disadvantage, in that once the US is not pleased with the

manner in which any country (especially developing countries) handles issues of organized crime

or acts of terrorism, assistance to these countries tends to decrease. Evidence of this was seen in

the US’s reaction to a number of Caribbean nations ratifying the Rome Statute that created the

International Criminal Court (ICC). Under the 2005 Nethercutt Amendment and 2003 Service-

members’ Protection Act, sanctions have been placed on a number of Caribbean nations by the

US for ratifying the formation of the ICC, of which the US is in total disagreement and has

refused to recognize. To please the US, a country had to have Bilateral Immunity (Article 98)

Agreements to exempt Americans from ICC prosecution.105 Canada, to some extent, would stand

a better chance of surviving these sanctions, but under the current “US blackmail” as some critics

105 Clare M. Ribando, “CRS Report for Congress: Article 98 Agreements and Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin America,” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 10 April 2006.

46

have coined this situation,106 developing countries in the Caribbean, have had to seek other

alternatives to remain viable.

Canada’s resources and stable economy gives it more autonomy; however, its shared

border with the US dictates an inextricable link that creates an unavoidable symbiotic

relationship between both countries. Jamaica and the rest of the Caribbean could learn from

Canada’s peculiar situation in that although it is geographically linked to the US and dependent

on good trade relations (NAFTA), Canada is not totally dependent on the US. Jamaica and the

rest of the Caribbean are now learning to be less dependent on the US and, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, they are now forming new alliances with China, Spain and Venezuela.

The issue of privacy versus security is another challenge that was discussed, that has to be faced by both Canada and Jamaica. The bio-metric system is important and will soon be implemented by Canada; however, Jamaica still has some way to go before it is established. The right to privacy still lingers as a big issue, but like Canada, a nation’s security has to be paramount. Due to security threats highlighted by 9/11, privacy in many nations has been eroded in a bid to prevent acts of terrorism. Broad new powers of surveillance, search and wiretapping were introduced not only in the US, but also in Europe, Australia, and Canada. The deployment of video cameras surveying public spaces is also evident and Jamaica has recently begun to utilize this technology.107

Private collection of personal data has increased in response to perceptions of insecurity

and also influenced by showing compliance with the new laws on aiding terrorist activity,

however, the question can be asked, is this additional surveillance and collection of personal data

106 Ibid.

107 Dinah PoKempner, “Terrorism and International Law,” in Understanding Global Terror, ed. Christopher Ankersen, 151-170 (Cambridge: Polity Press. U.K., 2007), 163. 47

actually producing a serious increment in security in the form of deterrence or prevention of

terrorist acts? A lesson Jamaica can take away from the Canadian experience is the level of

dialogue that occurs at all levels before these security measures and laws are undertaken. Since

9/11, Jamaica has tended to adopt certain laws and security measures from developed countries.

Jamaica being a developing country, for example, in the case of the collection of personal data,

needs to ensure that there is a proper system of checks and balances. This information, in the

wrong hands, could be exploited for various reasons.

Jamaica and Canada have both felt the economic effect of the new security initiatives

after 9/11. Governments and consumers alike have had to absorb these additional costs in trade

and domestic infrastructure to meet the needs of the new security environment. The difference

between Canada and Jamaica, however, is that outside of the NAFTA “umbrella,” Jamaica has

had to forge new alliances to remain viable. Although Canada has a good relationship with the

US, it would be prudent for Canada to look not just within North America, but also without for

prospective trade links, to ensure that the level of dependency on the US is not an overarching

factor in Canadian economic viability. Canada should learn from the harsh realities Jamaica and

the remainder of the Caribbean now face, when the US stops “playing” and decides to take away its “toys.” The immediate closure of the Canadian-US border, the pronouncement by the US of the new passport requirement and border security changes, with little or no consultation with

Canada, are clear indicators of whose interest is first and foremost. Political ties, decisions and

implications are inextricably linked to economic dependence and viability, therefore serious

analysis has to be the order of the day with regards to each country’s domestic and foreign

policies.

48

The isolationist or stringent unilateral US foreign policy after 9/11 has in some cases drawn countries closer, or created a chasm. The US needs to realise that this “war against terrorism” as President Bush coined it, cannot be curtailed unilaterally, but must be the concerted effort of all nations. In looking at how a developed nation (Canada) and developing nation

(Jamaica) have dealt with a post 9/11 security environment, Chapter 4 will focus on the efforts of both countries in their responses to 9/11.

49

CHAPTER 4 – THE RESPONSE TO 9/11

As highlighted in chapter 3, the impact of 9/11 created a number of changes which were

ripple effects of the terrorist attacks. This chapter will highlight the responses of Canada and

Jamaica to 9/11, looking specifically at the legislative and military responses to these attacks.

The Canadian and Jamaican experiences will inform the discussion and facilitate an

understanding of the lessons that each country can garner from the response of the other. The

chapter will conclude with a comparative analysis of the factors that were discussed to see how

Canada and Jamaica have met the demands of the new security environment.

In conducting this research it was interesting to note that both countries approached the

tragedy of 9/11 in a similar manner. They laid out meaningful objectives that would guide their

conduct in responding to the new security environment. The Government of Canada

implemented its Anti-Terrorism Plan with five objectives. These objectives are:

1. To prevent terrorists from getting into Canada.

2. To protect Canadians from terrorist acts.

3. To bring forward tools to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists.

4. To keep the Canada-U.S. border secure and open to legitimate trade.

5. To work with the international community to bring terrorists to justice and address the

root causes of terrorism.108

In a similar manner to Canada, Jamaica also has five objectives. These are:

1. To make Jamaica’s intelligence apparatus more effective by instituting measures to

improve coordination amongst national, regional and international agencies with regard

108 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Backgrounder: Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11,” Available from; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/Canadaactions-en.asp; Internet; accessed 19 March 2009. 50

to terrorism-related intelligence, and by establishing a State intelligence agency to handle

strategic intelligence needs.

2. To strengthen systems and mechanisms for border control and national identification.

3. To assess the new anti-terrorism legislation and determine its effectiveness and

conformity with international obligations.

4. To establish and maintain contingency plans for responding to terrorist incidents, as well

as improving public awareness and knowledge of the potential dangers of terrorism.

5. To maintain an effective local and international communications system to mitigate the

impacts of terrorist incidents.109

For both countries, most, if not all of these objectives have been implemented or are in progress, with millions of dollars being spent to ensure that they are realized. For example,

Canada invested $280 million in immediate measures after 9/11, including enhanced policing, security and intelligence. Canada’s key initiatives included: fast tracking a fraud-resistant

Permanent Resident Card for new immigrants; more front-end security screening for refugee

claimants; increased detention capacity; increased deportation activity; hiring of new staff to

enforce upgraded security at ports of entry; the redeployment of over 2000 federal police officers to national security duties; technology upgrades, equipment purchases and training to increase

capacity to prevent, detect and respond to existing and emerging threats to national security; the

purchase of antibiotics to increase the national emergency stockpile system and purchases of

109 Ministry of National Security, “National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure & Prosperous Nation,” (Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 2007), 53-56.

51

sensors, detection and other equipment, and enhancements to the national network of

laboratories.110

Jamaica has also started a number of initiatives similar to Canada including: improving its

intelligence gathering capabilities and improving its intelligence network worldwide;

establishing a compulsory national registration system for Jamaican citizens and a requirement

for all Jamaicans to have machine readable passports; the complete computerization of the

immigration system and conducting a comprehensive review of requirements for citizenship.111

This review of requirements for citizenship was done because persons from countries that were

deemed “high risk” by the US, Canada and the UK, were utilising the Caribbean in order to

obtain citizenship and travel documents in the region as a “gateway” to the developed nations.

This was seen as a potential avenue for terrorists to the developed regions, so more stringent measures were put in place to curtail this flow and allay the fears of the larger nations.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The legislative responses of Canada and Jamaica reflected the extent of the impact of the

attacks. According to Dinah PoKempner, a lecturer and also General Counsel at Human Rights

Watch:

The law is not designed by or for terrorists, but by and for the rest of us, who have some stake in things as they are. It articulates… not a society built on terror and violence, but humanistic values including rights, predictability, and tolerance. There is a [sic] value in criminalizing terrorist acts beyond deterrence, for to do so is to socially repudiate terrorism, as well as to provide socially acceptable means of incapacitating terrorists.112

110 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Backgrounder: Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11,” Available from; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/Canadaactions-en.asp; Internet; accessed 19 March 2009.

111 Ministry of National Security, “National Security Policy for Jamaica … , 53 & 54.

112 Dinah PoKempner, “Terrorism and International Law,” in Understanding Global Terror, ed. Christopher Ankersen, 151-170 (Cambridge: Polity Press. U.K., 2007), 151 & 152. 52

9/11 created a new paradigm which emphasized that the magnitude of the threat posed by

terrorist networks was beyond what the laws of Jamaica and Canada were designed to handle.

Because of the new global security environment, the need for legislative changes became

apparent. The Canadian government introduced key pieces of legislation, the main one being the

ATA, as mentioned in chapter one. This Act received Royal Assent on 18 December 2001 as Bill

C-36 and included measures such as defining and designating terrorist groups and activities;

tougher sentences for terrorism offences; making it a crime to knowingly participate in, facilitate

or contribute to a terrorist group; making it a crime to knowingly collect or give funds in order to

carry out terrorism; making it easier to use electronic surveillance against terrorist groups; and

within carefully defined limits, allowing the arrest, detention and imposition of conditions of

release on suspected terrorists to prevent terrorist acts and save lives.113 Bill C-36 amended the

Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the National Defence Act, the

Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act, and other pieces of public security and human rights legislation.114

In the case of Jamaica, similar measures were undertaken and the country was even

criticized for following Canada’s example. The human rights group, Privacy International,

criticized Jamaica by stating:

113 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Backgrounder: Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11,” Available from; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/Canadaactions-en.asp; Internet; accessed 19 March 2009.

114 David A. Charters, “Defence Against Help: Canadian-American co-operation in the war on terrorism,” in After 9/11:Terrorism and Crime in a globalised World, ed. David A. Charters and Graham F. Walker, 288-305 (New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies & Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004), 289.

53

In some cases, policies have been adopted from other countries with little consideration to the variances in political dynamics. South Africa and Jamaica’s draft anti-terrorism laws copy Canada’s proposed definition of “terrorist activity,” … 115

Despite this and other criticisms, both locally and internationally, the government of

Jamaica actively pursued the preparation of legislation to implement UN Security Council

Resolution 1373 on Terrorism that the Security Council had unanimously adopted following the

9/11 terrorist attacks. Instructions were also issued for the drafting of legislation to facilitate the

ratification of several other international conventions on terrorism to which Jamaica was not yet

a party.116 As mentioned in chapter one, Jamaica’s Terrorism Prevention Act, was a major step in the formulation of laws to combat terrorism. The Act addresses such issues as offences of participation in the activity of a terrorist group, carrying out terrorist activity, facilitating terrorist activity, instructing to carry out terrorist activity, making property or services available for terrorist purposes, using or possessing property for terrorist purposes and financing terrorist activity.117 With Jamaica’s reputation of being in the top five murder capitals of the world, it

does not take much, combined with the illicit drug trade, for the country to be a major player in

terrorist activities. To counter this, legislation has been put in place or fine-tuned to augment the

Terrorism Prevention Act. This has been particularly evident in Jamaica’s financial sector.

115 Privacy International, “Threats to Privacy,” 12 November 2004, PHR2004, Available from; http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-82586&als[theme]=Pri; Internet; accessed 24 March 2009.

116 Isabel Jaramillo Edwards, “Coping with 9/11: State and Civil Society Responses,” in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror …, 378.

117 Ministry of Justice, Legislation Jamaica: Terrorism Prevention Act 2005; available from http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwejam.htm; Internet; accessed 16 October 2008 54

The banking sector in Jamaica has taken the issue of terrorist activities and organized

crime seriously, as seen in the Bank of Jamaica’s 2004 (Revised 2008) Guidance Notes118 to all registered financial entities, focusing specifically on the detection and prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. These guidance notes instruct financial institutions to pay particular attention to: the nature of transactions being conducted, the parties involved in the transactions, and patterns of transactions or activities on an account over time. The guidance also highlighted the new governing legislation, the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2007, which gave more “teeth” to these financial institutions and law enforcement agencies to deal with money laundering and general proceeds of crime. This Act repealed and thereby replaced the

Money Laundering Act (MLA) and Drug Offences (Forfeiture of Proceeds) Act.119 The Financial

Services Commission, another major financial regulatory body in Jamaica, has also issued similar guidelines to entities regulated under the Insurance, Unit Trust, Pensions and Securities

Acts and Regulations, in its publication entitled, Guidelines on Anti- Money Laundering and

Counter-Financing of Terrorism.120

These new laws that have been drafted to combat the threat of terrorism are major steps

that have been taken by Canada and Jamaica. The following section of this chapter will give a brief overview of the national security policies of both countries, focusing on the role of the military in curtailing terrorist activities since 9/11.

118 Bank of Jamaica, 2004 (Revised 2008) Guidance Notes on The Detection and Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Activities, (Kingston, Jamaica: Bank of Jamaica, 2008)

119 Ibid., 12.

120 Financial Services Commission, Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism, (Kingston, Jamaica: Financial Services Commission, 2007). 55

THE MILITARY RESPONSE

Instrumental to the fight against terrorist activities is the multi-dimensional approach that

Canada and Jamaica have both taken in their response to this growing threat. Included in this

approach is the response of the military forces of both countries. One may argue that terrorism is a law enforcement issue and not the purview of the military; however, in curtailing terrorist activities, the role of the military cannot be underestimated. On the 9 December 2002, in a speech entitled, “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism,” NATO Secretary General

Lord Robertson explained that the military has to play its part in combating terrorism because the distinction between terrorism and warfare was fading and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda were operating at a higher level in the spectrum of violence, ultimately causing greater number of casualties and economic damage. Furthermore, the distinction between internal and external security was fading. Finally, militaries were needed because in some instances it would be impossible to protect populations against terrorist attacks using defensive measures only.121

Robertson noted that the military has three main roles: Anti-terrorism that looks at

defensive measures to reduce the risk of attacks on our populations, territory, infrastructure, and

information and communications systems. The second measure, counter-terrorism, utilizes

offensive measures to track down, prevent, deter and interdict terrorist activities. Third,

consequence management limits the consequences of terrorist attacks, and stabilizes the situation

in the aftermath of such attacks, in support of civilian authorities.122

121 NATO, “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism,” Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, NATO-Russia Conference, Moscow, 9 December 2002. Available from; http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021209b.htm; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

122 Ibid. 56

As previously mentioned, one of the five major objectives of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism

Plan, is the protection of Canadians. Presently, the CF has six core missions within Canada, in

North America and globally with the capacity to:

1. Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and

through NORAD;

2. Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;

3. Respond to a major terrorist attack;

4. Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;

5. Lead and /or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and

6. Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.123

Chapter 2 highlighted that the major threat to Canada at this time is domestic terrorism. It is understandable that one means of protecting Canadians from terrorist attacks would be confronting the terrorist threat abroad. The CF has been deployed to Afghanistan in a bid to counter this threat and the focus has been in that region, but one can be argue that there has to be greater focus on Canada’s local defence and security. Terrorism is a form of criminality, not war; therefore it is a law enforcement issue. Nevertheless, there is evidently a blurring of the line of demarcation as it relates to this issue.

To address this problem, on 1 January 2006, the CF was reorganized to meet the challenges of the new security environment. This process was designed to ensure that Canada’s military was more relevant, responsive and effective domestically and abroad. The command of all CF operations was transferred from the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) to Canada

123 Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008), 3.

57

Command (CANCOM), Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Canadian

Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and Canadian Operational Support

Command (CANOSCOM).124

The CF established a single integrated national command structure (CANCOM) to

respond to national contingencies. As mentioned earlier, this was a major weakness in Canadian

military operations, in that domestic operations were seen as secondary consideration. However,

with growing terrorist threats that are now evident, specifically on the domestic front,

contingencies to counter this problem have to be given serious consideration. The creation of

CANCOM signalled that for the first time, a unified and integrated chain of command at the

national and regional levels has the immediate authority to deploy maritime, land and air assets in support of domestic operations.125

The other joint task force commands that make up Canada Command are Joint Task

Force Pacific (JTFP) with a headquarters in Esquimalt, Joint Task Force Western (JTFW) with a

headquarters in Edmonton, Joint Task Force Central (JTFC) with a headquarters in Toronto,

Joint Task Force East (JTFE) with a headquarters in Montreal, and Joint Task Force Atlantic

with a headquarters in Halifax. All joint task forces have been mandated to promote a secure

environment and protect Canada through domestic and continental operations.126

This vision for transformation of the CF to meet the needs of the new security

environment was seen in the Canadian Government’s Canada First Defence Strategy. This

124 CANCOM-JTFN, “Canadian Forces operational commands take charge of domestic, special and international operations,” Joint Task Force (North) News Room, News Release, 1 January 2006, Available from; http://www.cfna.dnd.ca/press/pressdetail.asp?recordid=134&langid=english; Internet; accessed 29 March 2009.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

58

comprehensive strategy for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces has

grown and developed from a proposal of the Canadian Government since taking office in

January 2006. According to the Minister of National Defence, The Honourable Peter MacKay,

“The Canada First Defence Strategy represents a major milestone. It fulfills the Government’s

commitment to provide enhanced security for Canadians and gives the military the long-term

support it so critically needs and deserves, now and in the future.”127

The Canada First Defence Strategy was a bold move in addressing this issue of changes

in the new security environment. This strategy provides a detailed road map with regards to the

modernization of the CF with clearly defined missions and capabilities. To accomplish these tasks, the CF has been mandated to deliver excellence at home, be a strong and reliable partner in the defence of North America, and project leadership abroad by making meaningful

contributions to international security.128

For the period 2008-09 to 2027-28 the Government of Canada has committed a total

defence spending of Cdn $490 billion towards rebuilding the CF, focusing on personnel,

equipment, readiness and infrastructure which the government sees as the four pillars that form

the foundation of military capabilities. In accomplishing this, National Defence will increase the

number of military personnel to 70,000 Regular Forces and 30,000 Reserve Forces by 2028;

replace the forces’ core equipment fleets, strengthen the overall state of the Forces’ readiness to deploy and their ability to sustain operations once deployed; and improve and modernize defence infrastructure.129

127 Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy … 2.

128 Ibid., 3.

129 Ibid., 4 & 12. 59

The CF has played a major role with regards to international security. Since 9/11, the

government of Canada has reaffirmed its commitment to both NATO and the United Nations.

The highest priority has been placed on countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting failed and failing states, and defusing

intra and interstate conflicts that are threats to Canada’s national security.130 Canada’s continued

commitment to countering international terrorism has been highlighted in the report of the

Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, also coined The Manley Report,

which assessed Canada’s military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan. The report

highlighted that one of the major objectives of Canadian engagement in that region, is

foreclosing the regression of Afghanistan as a haven for terrorists.131

The Panel members were presented four strong reasons for Canada’s involvement in

Afghanistan: First, Canada has military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan as part of an international response to the threat to peace and security which is inherent in Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks. Second, Canadians are in Afghanistan in support of the United Nations, contributing to the UN’s capacity to respond to threats to peace and security and to foster better futures in the

world’s developing countries. Third, the military mission in Afghanistan is chiefly, though not

exclusively, a NATO endeavour (26 of the 39 ISAF132 partners are NATO members). The

130 Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 2004), 48.

131 Minister of Public Works and Government Services, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, (Ottawa: Report to The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, 2008), 20.

132 In December 2001, the United Nations authorized a new International Security Assistance force (ISAF) to prosecute the campaign in Afghanistan and help the interim authority secure Kabul and surrounding areas. The first ISAF troops arrived in Kabul in January 2002. 60

Canadian presence also facilitates the promotion and protection of human security in this

region.133

The Panel’s recommendations include: Canada asserting a stronger and more disciplined

diplomatic position regarding Afghanistan and the regional players; continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond 2009 (The Government of Canada has announced a 2011 military withdrawal); give a higher priority to the reconstruction and development of

Afghanistan than at present to direct bilateral project assistance that addresses the immediate practical needs of the Afghan people, especially in Kandahar province, as well as long term capacity-building. The Panel also recommended that the government systematically assess the effectiveness of Canadian contributions and the extent to which benchmarks and timelines of the

Afghanistan Compact have been met. The final recommendation highlights that the government should provide the public with franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan, offering more assessments of Canada’s role and giving greater emphasis to the diplomatic and reconstruction efforts as well as those of the military.134

On 19 November 2008 in the “Speech From The Throne” Governor General Michaelle

Jean reiterated Canada’s commitment to the campaign against terrorism. She stated:

National security is the most fundamental duty of any national government to its citizens. Our national security depends on global security. Our government believes that Canada’s aspirations for a better and more secure world must be matched by vigorous and concrete actions on the world stage.135

133 Minister of Public Works and Government Services, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan … , 20 to 22.

134 Ibid., 37 & 38.

135 Canada. Governor General, “Protecting Canada’s Future,” Speech From The Throne, 19 November 2008, Available from; http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364; Internet; accessed 8 April 2009. 61

The Governor General further emphasized that security ultimately depends upon a

respect for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. She further noted that where

these values are imperilled, the safety and prosperity of all nations are imperilled, and Canada

must have the capacity and willingness to stand for what is right and to contribute to a better and

safer world. The Governor General also echoed the vision of the Canadian Government in

transforming Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan to focus on reconstruction and development,

and to prepare for the end of the CF’s military engagement in Afghanistan in 2011. The

rebuilding and arming of the CF with the best possible equipment, and renewal of surface fleets

over the next two decades was also highlighted in the speech.136

The Government of Jamaica had also seen the urgency of restructuring its national

security capability based on the new security environment. In 2005, the government approved a

National Security Strategy (NSS) for Jamaica entitled Towards a Secure and Prosperous Nation.

The NSS allowed the Jamaican government to adopt a holistic approach to security, taking into

consideration its non-military dimensions. Consideration was also given to classifying the

institutional framework within which the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and civil institutions of

the state should coordinate to create an effective national security framework.137

In light of this, the JDF was given a mandate to conduct a comprehensive Strategic

Defence Review (SDR) that explains how the military would contribute to the overall security

policy objectives of the Government of Jamaica. The review addressed issues such as the manner

in which the JDF’s mission, tasks, capabilities and structure could be streamlined to meet the

136 Ibid.

137 Jamaica Defence Force, Strategic Defence Review 2006: A Transformed JDF Enhancing Jamaica’s Security, (Kingston, Jamaica: JDF, 2006), 3. 62

new strategic security realities that have been evident since 9/11. The JDF’s major

responsibilities include:

1. Defending Jamaica against military or paramilitary threats.

2. Military aid to the civil authorities (this may be emergencies or a standing

commitment).

3. Monitoring the integrity of Jamaica’s waters and airspace.

4. Conducting counter terrorism operations by monitoring and analysing potential

terrorist activities, and preventing or responding to terrorist incidents, including nuclear

biological chemical detection (NBCD) and explosive ordnance disposal/improvised

explosive device disposal (EOD/IEDD).138

With regards to interagency cooperation and coordination, the Jamaica Constabulary

Force (JCF) launched its Corporate Strategy 2005 – 2008, which indicated its security priorities

and strategies. To deal with the high incidents of crime, the JDF has been deployed to assist the

police in the maintenance of law and order. The JDF and JCF are in the process of establishing

protocols covering such issues as indication of lead roles, delimitation of levels of JDF assistance to the JCF, response to terrorist threats and responsibility and delimitation of responsibility for

maritime space. The JDF is also seeking to establish Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with

other agencies such as the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management

(ODPEM), The Ministry of Health (MOH), and Port Authority of Jamaica (PAJ). These MOUs

will facilitate better liaison at all levels and more effective operations.139

138 Ibid., 6 & 7.

139 Ibid., 19 & 20 63

For transformation to be realized, the JDF has followed a similar path to the CF. An

implementation plan was drafted to facilitate the process. This plan has six broad objectives

which include: drafting or updating of policies, acquiring capital equipment, rationalizing

manpower distribution, reorganizing the JDF structure, refurbishing and constructing

infrastructure to support the capital acquisitions and reorganized JDF, and implementing or improving processes to enhance operational efficiency.140

The JDF currently comprises a Regular Force and a Reserve Force. The Regular Force has seven major units with just over 2,500 officers and soldiers. They constitute the Force’s combat arms (two Regular Infantry Battalions); combat support arms (an Air Wing, a Coast

Guard and an Engineer Regiment); and the combat service support arm – a Logistics

Battalion.141

In keeping with the new mandate, The Defence Board approved the transformation of

Headquarters JDF (HQ JDF) in December 2007. HQ JDF’s staff and responsibilities have been

made more separate and the positions restructured. The designations and functions have been

standardized in keeping with NATO and the major armed forces with whom the JDF is allied.142

There is a need for this standardization in keeping with NATO, because the fight against

terrorists is a collaborative effort, therefore all allied countries have to be in sync with the

operational procedures of participating nations.

140 Ibid., 28.

141 Jamaica Defence Force, “Overview: Background,” Web Site of the Jamaica Defence Force, Available from; http://www.jdfmil.org/overview/background/background3.php; Internet; accessed 5 January 2009.

142 Maj Charlene Steer, “The Restructured Force Headquarters,” All Arms: The Quarterly Newsletter of the JDF Vol.7, Issue 1 (March 2008): 3.

64

Of note, however, are the changes that are materializing that are focused even more

specifically on organized crime, counter narcotics operations and counter terrorism. For the force

to be effective, it is envisaged that the manpower and equipment requirements of the various

units have to be addressed to meet the need of the present threat. There has been a newly created

Combat Support Battalion that will form the nucleus of the existing JDF Training Depot, to not

only conduct basic training, but also develop training and capability in counter terrorism

operations. This counter terrorism training and capability development is being conducted in

conjunction with The HQ JDF Intelligence Unit and external intelligence and law enforcement

agencies, regionally and internationally.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The factors discussed in this chapter have highlighted a number of issues that are noteworthy. The first issue is that unlike the previous chapters of this research paper, the points that have been raised show an even greater similarity in the approaches taken by Canada and

Jamaica. This similarity is first seen in the Legislative amendments of both countries, namely the

ATA in the case of Canada and Terrorism Prevention Act in the case of Jamaica. These acts have been streamlined to address the “campaign against terrorism,” domestically and internationally.

Canada and Jamaica are also members of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism

(CICTE) which is the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security (SMS), Organization of

American States (OAS). This committee has assisted OAS countries in collaborating and streamlining their efforts in dealing with acts of terrorism in the region and worldwide.143

143 Information with regards to the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) is available from www.cicte.oas.org . 65

This transition has caused a number of critics to wonder about the manner in which

developing nations have adopted these changes, but despite of this, much progress has been seen.

The link between Canada and Jamaica was evident in the criticism being made about Jamaica

copying Canada’s definition of terrorist activity. This argument, although being a criticism, may

have an element of truth, in that the close ties that both countries share as a developed and developing nation are quite profound. This close relationship still prevails at present. Both countries can not ignore the fact that they have ties in various ways, based on the influential

Jamaican diaspora in Canada, similar historical background and other socio-economic and political linkages. Other similar changes include renewed national security policies focusing on integration of military and non-military agencies, monitoring and seizing proceeds and assets contributing to terrorist activities, and the restructuring of the CF and JDF.

In conducting this research, a major difference has been identified by the manner in

which both militaries conduct domestic operations. As mentioned earlier, Canada treated

domestic operations as secondary while the emphasis was placed on international operations.

Jamaica on the other hand has concentrated on domestic operation focusing on its mandate in

aiding the Civil Power (The JCF). The Defence Act (1962) charges the JDF with “the defence

and maintenance of order in Jamaica, and with such duties as may from time to time be defined

by the Defence Board.” According to the Act, the force may also be employed outside Jamaica.

This has been the case on a few occasions, for example as part of the coalition of regional forces

which restored democracy to Grenada from 1983-85. It was also a part of the US-led force which

entered Haiti in 1994 to assist in the stability of that nation. In other operations in Haiti, the JDF

subsequently provided a contingent for peace keeping duties, serving for the first time under the

flag of the United Nations. 66

The JDF has conducted a number of internal security operations over the years to assist

the JCF in fighting criminal gangs and curtailing organized crime. The threat of terrorist

activities, along with narco-trafficking and potential narco-terrorism, has given the JDF greater

impetus to give the JCF and other agencies its full support in monitoring and dealing swiftly with terrorist activities. Jamaica can learn from the Canadian model, in which its military forces concentrate on defence of the country leaving law enforcement in the hands of the RCMP.

Although the JDF has been effective in assisting the JCF in internal security operations, the disadvantage with this extended assistance has watered down the shock effect of the military.

The JDF could concentrate less on routine patrolling and focus more on organized crime, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations, focusing on these major threats to national security.

In analyzing Canada’s systems of defence and security, a few lessons could be learned from the Jamaican model. Every country needs layers of defence and security, and Canada’s readiness to meet especially acts of terrorism is progressing; however, the overlap that is needed between defence and security still needs to be streamlined. There are still gray areas in identifying agencies that are responsible for specific security responsibilities. If terrorism is a law enforcement matter what happens when the scale of the threat moves beyond the scope of law enforcement? There is no doubt that the CF will be called on to play a greater role in law enforcement efforts, especially with the threat of terrorist activities and networks throughout

Canada, with linkages both locally and internationally.

67

CHAPTER 5 - LESSONS LEARNED & CONCLUSION

This research has given the reader an in-depth look at terrorism from Canadian and

Jamaican perspectives. It also promoted an informed discussion with regards to the present threat

since 9/11 and the response of both countries to specific challenges faced by each nation. The

comparison was done for a variety of reasons including the fact that both countries are likely

staging areas for attacks against the US, therefore the intricacies of monitoring and preparing for

any terrorist eventuality highlighted the similarities and differences in the approaches of both

nations to this problem. It was also interesting to compare the similarity in laws adopted by both

countries from the British judicial system to address terrorist activities and highlight the

implication of these laws on the sovereignty of both nations.

Comparing the types of terrorist threats affecting both countries proved important.

Although each country had distinct threats that were more prominent and others that overlapped, there were potential threats in one country that could ultimately lead to problems in the other. An example of this is the threat of narco-terrorism which is presently seen as a Latin America and

Caribbean problem. However with migration and terrorist networks becoming more organized and sophisticated, it is just a matter of time before Canada is faced with this problem. With the large diaspora from Latin America and the Caribbean, including Jamaica, Canadian authorities cannot ignore the possibility of this threat being transferred to Canada. Areas such as Vancouver and Toronto are experiencing problems of gang violence, which could escalate outside of the

realm of organized crime to involve terrorist activities with colossal consequences. Canada has to

combine its effort with developing nations such as Jamaica to curtail the growth and

development of this and other threats. 68

The different approaches to threats of domestic terrorism were also noteworthy.

Canadian authorities see domestic terrorism as a law enforcement matter for the RCMP although some assistance is given by the CF. In contrast, Jamaica combines its efforts with the military and law enforcement working together in a law enforcement role. The CF will see itself taking on more roles in assisting law enforcement and intelligence agencies in domestic operations, therefore much can be garnered from the JDF’s wealth of experience in this matter.

Canada being a developed country has more infrastructure, laws and best practices; therefore, the utility in comparing the operational procedures of both countries has highlighted a number of weaknesses in the Jamaican system that the Jamaican authority could improve its mechanisms for curtailing terrorist activities.

Another lesson for Canada and Jamaica from the comparative analysis is the issue of sacrificing a citizen’s right to privacy, human rights and civil liberties for national security. This issue must be at the forefront of the minds of government officials and other stakeholders of both countries. The extradition of “drug kingpins” from Jamaica was an issue that caused some concern based on the utterance of the US president. The saving grace is that these men were guilty therefore the issue was laid to rest. The embarrassment however that faced Canada in the case of Maher Arar in 2002, who was deported based on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities, should be a lesson for both nations. A person is presumed innocent until proven guilty; therefore, the “influence” of an allied nation should not be the impetus to sacrifice the rights of ones citizens.

CONCLUSION

A wealth of information was obtained by conducting this comparative analysis and the

lessons learned have been very helpful for future studies. The research paper has highlighted the 69 ongoing problem of explaining the definition of terrorism, and the various approaches that have been taken in explaining this activity. The threats that are unique to Canada and Jamaica were highlighted and those that overlapped such as Islamic extremism were also discussed. The social, economic and political impact of 9/11 on both countries proved to be informative. This information ranged from freedom of movement and issues of privacy, additional expenses based on new border crossing stipulation and infrastructure development, and the creation of new alliances based on US unilateralism. The research paper also looked at the response of Canada and Jamaica to 9/11, including the adjusting of laws and restructuring of the security forces to meet the needs of the new security environment.

The lessons learned from the comparison will be important if both countries are to be effective in curtailing the growth and development of terrorist activities in both regions. It is hoped that this research has taken the reader a step further in understanding the magnitude of the threat that faces not only Canada and Jamaica, but the world in general. The manner in which each country continues to address this problem is also important if any success is to be achieved.

The campaign against terrorist activities has to be a concerted effort. Each country has to understand that no nation should be a proverbial “island” in this fight against terrorist activities, and no nation should stand alone.

70

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Carr, Matthew. The Infernal Machine. New York: The New Press, 2006.

Charters, David A. “Defence Against Help: Canadian-American co-operation in the war on terrorism.” In After 9/11:Terrorism and Crime in a globalised World, edited by David A. Charters and Graham F. Walker, 288-305. New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies & Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004.

Edwards, Isabel Jaramillo. “Coping with 9/11: State and Civil Society Responses.” In Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 371- 390. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

Girvan, Norman. “Agenda Setting and Regionalism in the Greater Caribbean: Responses to 9/11.” In Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 310-333. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

Grant-Wisdom, Dorith. “United States-Caribbean Relations: The Impact of 9/11.” In Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 252- 272. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

Gray, Jim, Mark Monday and Gary Stubblefield. Maritime Terror, Protecting Yourself, Your Vessel and Your Crew Against Piracy. Boulder, Colorado: Sycamore Island Books, 1999.

Munroe, Trevor. “The Menace of Drugs.” In Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 154-175. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

O’Bright, Gary. “Cyber Incident Management by the Government of Canada.” In After 9/11: Terrorism and Crime in a Globalised World, edited by David A. Charters and Graham F. Walker, 124 – 160. New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict Studies & Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004.

Pantojas-Garcia, Emilio and Thomas Klak. “Globalisation and Economic Vulnerability: The Caribbean and the ‘Post-9/11 Shift’.” In Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, edited by Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, 176-198. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.

PoKempner, Dinah. “Terrorism and International Law.” In Understanding Global Terror, edited by Christopher Ankersen, 151-170. Cambridge: Polity Press. U.K., 2007.

71

Roach, Kent. “Canada’s Response to Terrorism.” In Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, edited by Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach, 511-533. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Roach, Kent. September 11: Consequences for Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003.

Sloan, Elinor C. Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005.

Thackuk, Kimberley L. “The Sinister Underbelly: Organized Crime and Terrorism.” In The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, Volume II, edited by Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, 743-760. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001.

ARTICLES

Becker, Jo. “Funding The ‘Final War ’: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora,” Human Rights Watch Volume 18, no. 1 (c) (February 2006): 1-47.

Bell, Stewart. “Quebec man’s web messages urge Al-Qaida to attack Canada: Praises bin Laden and blasts Ottawa for sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq,” The Gazette. Montreal, Quebec. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=47&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD& fmt=3&s; posted 17 October 2008, accessed 14 January 2009

Gendron, Angela. “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” Trends in Terrorism Series, volume 2006-4. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, Carleton University, 2006.

Girvan, Norman. “Terrorism, Tourism and Trade,” The Greater Caribbean This Week, available from; http://www.acs-aec.org/PressCenter/PressCenter/column/index2.htm; Internet; accessed 15 February 2009.

Goodman, Joshua. “Uribe seeks Chavez charges at international court,” Bloomberg.com, 4 March 2008, Available from; http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aIAvhvhWsqMQ&re fer=latin; accessed 19 March 2009.

Hutchinson, Asa. Director, Drug Enforcement Administration Heritage Foundation, “Narco-Terror: The International Connection Between Drugs and Terror,” available from http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s040202.html; Internet; assessed 29 January 2009.

72

Jamaica Information Service, Office of the Prime Minister, Members of Northern Task Force Leave for St. Kitts and Nevis; from http://www.jis.gov.jm/officePM/html/20070312T100000- 0500_11436_JIS_MEMBERS_; Internet; assessed 15 February 2009.

James, Carolyn. Reviewing, Daniel Drache’s, “Borders Matter: Homeland Security and the Search for North America,” The American Review of Canadian Studies; (Spring 2006): 185-187.

Nation Master – Encyclopedia: Islam in Jamaica; available from http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Islam-in-Jamaica; Internet; accessed 12 February 2009.

Ross, Caroline. “Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Protecting Canadians from domestic terrorism,” available from http://.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/gazette/vol70n3/threat-menace-eng.htm; Internet; assessed on 6 February 2009.

Ross, Douglas & Anil Hira, “Canada, A Land of Ambivalence: Understanding the Divergent Response to US Primacy after 9/11,” Canadian – American Public Policy, Proquest Military Collection, No 68 (Dec 2006): 1-58.

Smith, G. Davidson. “Terrorism and the Rule of Law: Dangerous Compromise in Columbia”, Commentary No.13; available from; http://www.csis- scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm13-eng.asp; Internet; assessed 17 February 2009.

Steer, Maj Charlene. “The Restructured Force Headquarters,” All Arms: The Quarterly Newsletter of the JDF Vol.7, Issue 1 (March 2008): 3 & 8.

The Canadian Encyclopedia: Historica, “Air India Inquiry Reveals Intelligence Faults,” http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTMOO... ; Internet; accessed 21 January 2009.

Xiao, Qinghan. “Applying Biometrics”, Defence Research and Development Canada, available from, http://www.ottawa.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/html/biometrics-eng.html; Internet; accessed 23 February 2009.

Zambelis, Chris. “Al-Queda inroads into the Caribbean,” Mexidata.Info; Available from http://mexidata.info/id652.html; Internet; accessed 18 March 2009.

73

REPORTS

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “2002 Public Report,” Available form; http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2002-eng.asp#3b; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Report No. 2000/04: International Terrorism: The Threat to Canada; from; http://www.ccsis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200004-eng.asp; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

Clare M. Ribando, “CRS Report for Congress: Article 98 Agreements and Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin America,” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 10 April 2006.

Danielle Goldfarb, Reaching a Tipping Point? Effects of Post-9/11 Border Security on Canada’s Trade and Investment, Report prepared for The Conference Board of Canada, International Trade and Investment Centre (ITIC), June 2007.

Jubany, Florencia and Daniel Poon, Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Canadian Perspective, FOCAL, Canadian Foundation for the Americas, Research Report. (Ottawa: FOCAL.CA, 2006.

Minister of Public Works and Government Services, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan. Ottawa: Report to The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, 2008.

NEWS ARTICLES

BBC, “Craft ‘rammed’ Yemen oil tanker,” BBC News World Edition, Sunday 6 October 2002, Available from; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2303363.stm; Internet; accessed 23 March 2009.

BBC News Channel, Race Hate cleric Faisal deported; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6691701.stm.; Internet; accessed 29 January 2009.

Buddan, Robert. “Caribbean ‘terrorism?’: Implications for US-regional relations,” Jamaica Gleaner Newspaper, published 10 June 2007; Available from; http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20070610/focus/focus1.html; Internet; accessed 17 March 2009.

Carrell, Severin and Paul Lashmar, “The Independent,” F.B.I. steps up hunt for men who funded shoe bomber; available from; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/fbi-steps-up-hunt-for-men- who-funde; Internet; accessed 29 January 2009.

74

Cowell,Alan. “International Herald Tribune: The Global Edition of the New York Times,” British police arrest six men in counterterrorism raids; available from; http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/24/america/london.php; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

CBC News, “The Khadr Family,” CBC News Online, 30 October 2006, Available from; http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/khadr/; accessed 25 March 2009.

Humphreys, Adrian and Stewart Bell, “Hezbollah ‘sleeper cells’ in Canada: ABC News”, Calgary Herald, available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=128&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD &fmt=3& ; Internet; posted 20 June 2008, accessed 14 January 2009.

Kraul, Chris and Sebastian Rotella, “Hezbollah presence in Venezuela feared,” Los Angeles Times, printed 27 August 2008, Available from; http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/27/world/fg-venezterror27; accessed 19 March 2009.

Lungen, Paul. “Canada joins Israel in discussing terror threat”, Canadian Jewish News, 12 June 2008, 3.

O’Neil, Peter. “Biometric Screening Programme Planned,” The Vancouver Sun, available from; http://www.2.canada.com/vancouversun/voices/story.html?id=ad0baf92-0f29-41a2-ae90- 8a; Internet; accessed 22 February 2009.

Pipes, Daniel. “The Khadrs: Canada’s First Family of Terrorism” New York Sun, available from http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1639 ; Internet; posted 16 March 2004, accessed 26 August 2008.

The Washington Post, Text of President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address, 28 January 2003; Available from; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext_012803.html; Internet; accessed 7 March 2009.

Upstream, “Chavez unveils Petrocaribe Pact,” Upstreamonline, published Thursday 30 June 2005; Available from; http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article70873.ece; Internet; accessed 8 March 2009.

U.S.A. TODAY, “Stories About: Petrocaribe,” USATODAY.COM; Available from; http://asp.usatoday.com/community/tags/topic.aspx?req=tag&tag=Petrocaribe; Internet; accessed 8 March 2009.

Williams, Lloyd. Senior Associate Editor, “Bush names Ja ‘Kingpins’ – Jamaica Gleaner, published Wednesday 2 June 2004; Available from; http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040602/lead/lead1.html; Internet; accessed 8 March 2009. 75

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SOURCES

Bank of Jamaica, 2004 (Revised 2008) Guidance Notes on The Detection and Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Activities. Kingston, Jamaica: Bank of Jamaica, 2008.

Canada. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the open literature; from; http://www.csis- scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/thr/cbtrrrsm02-eng.asp ; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

Canada. Department of National Defence, Canada, “Canadian Forces Commitment in Afghanistan to Date,” available from; http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view- news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=1661; Internet; accessed 4 March 2009.

Canada. Department of National Defence, Canada First Defence Strategy. Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2008.

Canada. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Backgrounder: Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11,” Available from; http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/Canadaactions-en.asp; Internet; accessed 19 March 2009.

Canada. Governor General, “Protecting Canada’s Future,” Speech From The Throne, 19 November 2008, Available from; http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1364; Internet; accessed 8 April 2009.

Canada. Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 2004.

Canada. Public Safety Canada, “Current List of Terrorist Entities,” available from; http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp ; Internet; accessed 15 January 2009.

Canada. “The Jamaican Community in Canada,” Statistics Canada, Available from; http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007012-eng.htm; accessed 19 March 2009.

CANCOM-JTFN. “Canadian Forces operational commands take charge of domestic, special and international operations,” Joint Task Force (North) News Room, News Release, 1 January 2006, Available from; http://www.cfna.dnd.ca/press/pressdetail.asp?recordid=134&langid=english; Internet; accessed 29 March 2009.

Financial Services Commission, Guidelines on Anti-Money Laundering and Counter- Financing of Terrorism. Kingston, Jamaica: Financial Services Commission, 2007. 76

Jamaica. Ministry of National Security, Government of Jamaica, National Security Policy for Jamaica, available from http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/4139;/national-security- policy-for-jam; Internet; accessed 10 February 2009.

Jamaica. Ministry of National Security, “National Security Policy for Jamaica: Towards a Secure & Prosperous Nation.” Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 2007.

Jamaica Defence Force, “Overview: Background,” Web Site of the Jamaica Defence Force, Available from; http://www.jdfmil.org/overview/background/background3.php; Internet; accessed 5 January 2009.

Jamaica Defence Force, Strategic Defence Review 2006: A Transformed JDF Enhancing Jamaica’s Security. Kingston, Jamaica: JDF, 2006.

Lagasse, Philippe. (Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario) and Joel J. Sokolsky (Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario); “Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Security in U.S. - Canada Relations,” Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C.: 2005.

NATO. “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism,” Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, NATO-Russia Conference, Moscow, 9 December 2002. Available from; http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021209b.htm; Internet; accessed 27 January 2009.

Privacy International, “Threats to Privacy,” 12 November 2004, PHR2004, Available from; http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347- 82586&als[theme]=Pri; Internet; accessed 24 March 2009.

Terrorism Research Center, “Country Profiles: Jamaica,” available from; http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=Countries&file=index&view; Internet; accessed 17 March 2009.

United Nations General Assembly, “Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change”; available from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.565_En.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 February 2009.

United States. American Rhetoric, George W. Bush: Address to a Joint Session of Congress following 9/11 attacks; Available from; http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm; Internet; accessed 7 March 2009.

77

United States. Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005.

United States. Department of Defence, Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support, June 2005.

United States. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Sixth Public Hearing, available from; http://www.9- 11commission.gov/hearings/hearing6/witness_ting.htm; Internet; accessed 23 February 2009.

United States. US Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transport, Part 119- Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators, available from; http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text- idx?c=ecfr&sid=ba5eb25c8e5218e43dc3f8e917cfe8; Internet; accessed 1 March 2009.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

Canada. Department of Justice Canada, Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c.41; available from http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDocs/cs/A-11.7///en; Internet; accessed 8 February 2009.

Canada. Department of Justice Canada, Criminal Code, R. S., 1985, c. C-46, SC 2001; available from http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowDoc/cs/C-46/bo-ga:1_II_1::bo- ga:1_III//en?page=3&isPrinti; Internet; accessed 8 February 2009.

Jamaica. Legislation Jamaica (Lexadin), “Legislation Jamaica,”; Available from; http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwejam.htm; Internet; accessed 16 October 2008.

Jamaica. Ministry of Justice, Legislation Jamaica: Terrorism Prevention Act 2005; available from http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxwejam.htm; Internet; accessed 16 October 2008.

United States. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, An overview of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (21 U.S.C. ‘1901- 1908, 8 U.S.C. ‘1182) and Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995. Washington, D.C: 1995.