Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 72(3-4), 291-318. doi: 10.2143/JECS.72.3.3288669 © 2020 by Journal of Eastern Christian Studies. All rights reserved.
CHRISTOLOGY IN NINTH-CENTURY CONSTANTINOPLE
Nicetas of Byzantium’s Treatise Against the Armenians 1
Dirk Krausmüller (University of Vienna)
When in 451 the Council of Chalcedon declared that the incarnated Word had to be conceptualised as two natures united in one hypostasis its conveners hoped to have put an end to decades of fierce controversy. This hope, how- ever, was soon dashed. In the Eastern provinces of the empire the response was overwhelmingly negative. There, religious leaders claimed that the formula of Chalcedon signalled a return to the position of Nestorius, which had been condemned two decades earlier at the Council of Ephesus. They maintained that those who acknowledged the existence of two natures separated the Word and the flesh from one another and thus nullified the effects of the incarnation on fallen humankind.2 According to them this danger could only be obviated when one believed that Christ was not only one hypostasis but also one nature.3 Christians who accepted the formula of Chalcedon were slow to respond to the attacks of the ‘Monophysites’. Only in the first half of the sixth century did they start to defend their position with arguments and to develop ontological frameworks that suited their purpose. As far as we can tell from the surviving evidence, theological speculation was largely confined to two places, Constantinople and Palestine. The conceptually most interest- ing Christological treatises of the time were written by Heraclianus, a deacon
1 This article is part of the project ‘Reassessing Ninth Century Philosophy. A Synchronic Approach to the Logical Traditions’ (9 SALT) that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innova- tion programme (grant agreement No. 648298). 2 See W. H. C. Frend, The Rise of the Monophysite Movement. Chapters in the History of the Church in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries (Cambridge, 1972). 3 See J. Lebon, ‘La christologie du monophysisme syrien’, in Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart, I: Der Glaube von Chalkedon, eds. A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (Würzburg, 1951), pp. 425-580. 292 Dirk Krausmüller of St Sophia who served as adviser of Emperor Justinian and was later rewarded with the bishopric of Chalcedon,4 and by Leontius of Byzantium, a monk of the Lavra of St Sabas near Jerusalem who was influenced by the teachings of Origen and Evagrius Ponticus.5 In Palestine the Christological discourse continued incessantly into the eighth and early ninth centuries when John of Damascus, Theodore Abu Qurrah and other less well-known figures made important contributions.6 In Constantinople the situation was starkly different. No anti-Monophysite treatise seems to have been written after the middle of the seventh century.7 The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is the Arab conquests. As is well known this political event led to impoverishment and consequently to a decline in literary production in the capital.8 Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that after the loss of the Eastern provinces there were few Monophysite communities left on
4 See A. Grillmeier and Th. Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition, II.3: The Churches of Jerusalem and Antioch from 451 to 600, tr. M. Ehrhardt (Oxford, 2013), pp. 130-147; and D. Krausmüller, ‘Aristotelianism and the Disintegration of the Late Antique Theological Discourse’, in Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle. Christian and Late Platonist Commentary between Rome and Bukhara, eds. J. Loessl and J. W. Watt (Aldershot, 2011), pp. 151-164, on pp. 157-160, where it is argued that Heraclianus attempted to merge the Cappadocian ontology with its Aristotelian hylemorphic counterpart. 5 See D. Hombergen, The Second Origenist Controversy. A New Perspective on Cyril of Scythopolis’ Monastic Biographies as Historical Sources for Sixth-Century Origenism (Rome, 2001), pp. 133-138; B. E. Daley, ‘A Richer Union: Leontius of Byzantium and the Rela- tionship of Human and Divine in Christ’, Studia Patristica, 24 (1993), pp. 239-256; and D. Krausmüller, ‘Making Sense of the Formula of Chalcedon: the Cappadocians and Aris- totle in Leontius of Byzantium’s Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos’, Vigiliae Christianae, 65 (2011), pp. 484-513, where it is argued that Leontius made use of Neoplatonic commen- taries on Aristotle’s works. 6 On John of Damascus see A. Louth, St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford, 2002); on Theodore Abu Qurrah see S. H. Griffith, The Intellectual Profile of an Arab Christian Writer of the First Abbasid Century (Tel Aviv, 1992); and J. C. Lamoreaux, Theodore Abu Qurrah, Library of the Christian East, 1 (Provo, Utah, 2005). 7 Maximus the Confessor (d. 662) who wrote several treatises against the Monophysites, cannot be counted as a Constantinopolitan. See P. Allen and B. Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions. Documents from Exile (Oxford, 2013), pp. 88-101; and S. Brock, ‘An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor’, Analecta Bollandiana, 91 (1973), pp. 299- 346. 8 For an overview of the topic see J. Haldon, ‘Dark-Age Literature’, in Byzantine Culture. Papers from the Conference ‘Byzantine Days of Istanbul’, May 21-23, 2010, ed. D. Sakel (Ankara, 2014), pp. 71-82. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 293
Byzantine territory.9 Thus there was no longer a need to justify one’s own beliefs. The situation changed only in the late ninth century when the Byzan- tines sought closer relations with the Monophysite Armenians.10
1. the Correspondence between the Byzantines and the Armenians
In the year 877 Patriarch Photius of Constantinople sent a letter to the Armenian prince Ashot in which he proposed a union between the Byzantine and the Armenian churches.11 Five years later there came a response, penned by the Armenian bishop Isaac Mrut, in which the offer was declined.12 In this exchange mention was made of doctrinal differences. Photius sought to show that as a theological position Monophysitism was both absurd and blasphe- mous. He declared that the supposed one nature of Christ would have to be either simple or composite. In the former case either the humanity or the divinity would have disappeared whereas in the latter case the humanity and the divinity would be mixed and thus lose their respective properties.13 Isaac denied the validity of these objections. He insisted that the one nature was composite and that the mixture was of such a kind that it did not destroy the two components.14 In addition, he put forward many more arguments that were to show the error of Chalcedonian Christology. This material has been studied in depth by Igor Dorfmann-Lazarev who also translated the two texts, which have only survived in Armenian.15 By contrast, the Byzan- tine response to Isaac’s letter has as yet received little attention from scholars. Two texts are extant, which refute Isaac Mrut’s arguments point by point. One is a lengthy letter by Photius written in fiendishly difficult Greek and
9 See J. Haldon, Byzantium in the Seventh Century. The Transformation of a Culture (Cam- bridge, 1990), pp. 338-339. 10 On Byzantine-Armenian relations see T. W. Greenwood, ‘Chapter 8: Armenian Neigh- bours’, in The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire, c. 500-1492, ed. J. Shepherd (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 333-364. 11 I. Dorfmann-Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins à l’époque de Photius: Deux débats théo- logiques après le triomphe de l’Orthodoxie, CSCO. Subsidia, 117 (Leuven, 2004), pp. 82- 83. 12 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 13 Ibid., pp. 25-32, esp. pp. 29-30. 14 Ibid., pp. 33-53, esp. 44-52. 15 See note 12. 294 Dirk Krausmüller containing many rhetorical flourishes and classical allusions.16 The other is a treatise in a workman-like style, which does not eschew technical termi- nology.17 Dated to the years 882 or 883, it gives the impression of having also been composed by Photius himself.18 Yet the lemma shows clearly that the patriarch had delegated this task to Nicetas Byzantius, a specialist in doc- trinal polemics who is best known for his writings against Islam and against the Latins.19 Both Photius and Nicetas quote passages from Isaac’s letter, which they then refute. Given the similarity of the subject matter it is not surprising that their counter-arguments are at times quite similar.20 Yet this does not mean that one is a calque of the other. This can be seen quite clearly in one context. Isaac Mrut seeks to brand Pope Leo a heretic by juxtaposing passages from his writings with similar passages in Nestorius’ oeuvre.21 Photius responds by quoting statements from the works of Cyril of Alexandria, where the same terminology was used.22 This was a tactical masterstroke since the Monophysites regarded Cyril as the highest authority in Christological mat- ters. By contrast, Nicetas laboriously analyses the wording of the passages in order to show that Leo’s statements do not resemble those of Nestorius.23
16 Photius, Epistula 284, eds. B. Laourdas and L. G. Westerink, Photius, Epistulae et Amphi- lochia, III: Epistularum pars tertia (Leipzig, 1985), pp. 1-97, partially edited with a French translation by J. Darrouzès, ‘Deux lettres inédites de Photius aux Arméniens’, Revue des Études Byzantines, 29 (1971), pp. 137-181, on pp. 141-153. See the comments in Dorfmann- Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins, pp. 87-91 (see n. 12). 17 Refutatio epistolae regis Armeniae, PG 105, 588-656. 18 See especially the beginning of the treatise, Nicetas Byzantius, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 587A1-5. For the date, see Dorfmann-Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins, pp. 86-87 (see n. 12). 19 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, coll. 587-588. On Nicetas’ anti-Islamic writings see B. D. de Lee, Letters, Diplomacy, and Religious Polemic in Ninth-Century Byzantium: Niketas Byzantios and the Problem of Islam (Los Angeles, 2011); M. Ulbricht, Coranus Graecus: Die älteste über- lieferte Koranübersetzung in der Ἀνατροπὴ τοῦ Κορανίου des Niketas von Byzanz (Ph.D. thesis, Freie Universität Berlin, 2015); and D. Krausmüller, ‘“Murder is good if God wills it”. Nicetas Byzantius’ Polemic against Islam and the Christian Tradition of Divinely Sanctioned Murder’, Al-Masaq (Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean), 16 (2004), pp. 163-176. On the anti-Latin treatise see P. Gemeinhardt, Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und West- kirche im Frühmittelalter (Berlin and New York, 2002), pp. 302-307. 20 See below note 55. 21 Dorfmann-Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins (see n. 12), pp. 36-38. 22 Photius, Epistula 284, ed. Westerink (see n. 17), pp. 28-39. 23 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, 612-624. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 295
At this point we must ask: why were two responses produced?24 It seems most likely that Photius sent Nicetas’ treatise to the Armenians and composed his text for domestic consumption. Indeed, one may wonder whether members of Ashot’s court would have had the linguistic and literary wherewithal to cope with Photius’ ‘letter’.
2. Nicetas of Byzantium’s Indebtedness to Chalcedonian Theology
In his treatise Nicetas does not content himself with quoting and then refut- ing passages from Isaac’s letter. He also adds arguments of his own, which are meant to justify the Chalcedonian position that Christ is two natures in one hypostasis. Thus one gets the impression that Nicetas wished to give an exhaustive treatment of the topic. This raises the question: what sources did he use and how did he adapt them for his purposes? The best starting point for the discussion is the beginning of the text. The first paragraphs were undoubtedly written by Nicetas himself. Speaking in Photius’ name, he complains that the Armenians had not accepted the patriarch’s invitation but rather attempted to refute his arguments.25 Then, however, immediately follows a passage, which has a close counterpart in an older text, a Chalce- donian treatise against the Armenians, composed by Theodore Abu Qurrah in the early ninth century.26
Nicetas: Theodore: Διὸ εἰσαχθήτω ὁ κορυφαῖος τῶν ἀποστόλων Πέτρος διὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας ψευδη- γοροῦντά σε δεικνύων, καὶ δι᾽ ἐκείνου ἅπας ὁ τῶν ἀποστόλων σύλλογος. Καὶ γὰρ Χριστὸς ὁ Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν τῷ Χριστὸς ὁ Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν τῷ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἔφη κορυφαίῳ Πέτρῳ· τῶν ἀποστόλων ἔφη κορυφαίῳ Πέτρῳ· Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ πύλαι ᾅδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτῆς. πύλαι ᾅδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτῆς. Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ὁ Κύριος ἔφη τῷ Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον ὁ Κύριος ἔφη τῷ
24 This question was already posed by J. Darrouzès, ‘Deux lettres inédites’ (see n. 17), pp. 138-139. See Dorfmann-Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins (see n. 12), pp. 87-88. 25 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 589C10-D3. 26 See Lamoreaux, Theodore Abu Qurrah (see n. 7), pp. 83-95. 296 Dirk Krausmüller
Πέτρῳ, ἡνίκα πρὸς τὸν Κύριον, ἑαυτὸν Πέτρῳ, ἡνίκα πρὸς τὸν Κύριον, ἑαυτὸν Υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου κεκληκότα Πέτρος Υἱὸν ἀνθρώπου κεκληκότα Πέτρος εἴρηκε· Σὺ εἶ Χριστὸς ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ εἴρηκε· Σὺ εἶ Χριστὸς ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος. Καὶ συνήχθησαν ἐπὶ Χρι- τοῦ ζῶντος. Καὶ συνήχθησαν ἐπὶ Χρι- στοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν ἀμφό- στοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν ἀμφό- τεροι οἱ λόγοι, καὶ πεπίστωται ὅτι καὶ τεροι οἱ λόγοι, καὶ πεπίστωται ὅτι καὶ Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι. Εἰ οὖν ἀμφότε- Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι. Χρὴ τοίνυν, ροι οἱ λόγοι, τῆς θεότητός φημι καὶ ἀνθρω- ἀγαπητοί, πάντα τὸν Χριστιανισμὸν οἰκει- πότητος τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος Χριστοῦ καὶ Κυρίου ούμενον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δοκιμάζειν καὶ διασκέ- καὶ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν, μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐτοῦ πτεσθαι πίστιν.28 κατηγοροῦνται, καὶ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀΐδιος Υἱός.27 Therefore let us introduce Peter, the chief of the apostles, who shows through his confession that you tell lies, and through him the entire congregation of the apostles. For Christ our Lord and God said to Peter Christ our Lord and God said to Peter the chief of the apostles, ‘You are Peter, and the chief of the apostles, ‘You are Peter, and on this rock I shall build my church, and on this rock I shall build my church, and the gates of hell will not prevail against it.’ the gates of hell will not prevail against it.’ The Lord, having just referred to himself The Lord, having just referred to himself as ‘the Son of Man’, said this to Peter after as ‘the Son of Man’, said this to Peter after Peter said to him, ‘You are Christ, the Son Peter said to him, ‘You are Christ, the Son of the Living God’. Both acounts
From the comparison it is evident that Nicetas inserted into his text a pas- sage from Theodore’s treatise without introducing any changes. After a few sentences, which were most likely written by Nicetas himself, two further quotations from Theodore’s text appear in which the incarnated Word is compared with a heated gold coin,30 and the existence of two hypostases in
27 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 592Β9-C11. 28 Theodore Abu Qurrah, Epistula ad Armenios, PG 97, coll. 1504D13-1505A10. 29 Translation after Lamoreaux, Theodore Abu Qurrah (see n. 7), pp. 83-84, with slight changes. 30 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 593A1-B3, and Theodore Abu Qurrah, Epistula, PG 97, col. 1508C10-D8, coll. 1508D12-1509A6. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 297
Christ is rejected.31 At this point, however, the two texts part ways. Nicetas does not quote Theodore’s lengthy discussion of Christ’s properties, opera- tions and wills but instead proceeds to claim that the formula of Chalcedon is the happy medium between two equally heretical extremes.32 This does not mean that all that follows is an original contribution by Nicetas. Having defended the Council of Chalcedon against the attacks of the Armenians, he presents three arguments against the view that the num- ber ‘two’ creates division. The first argument has a counterpart in Leontius of Byzantium’s treatise Solutiones from the middle of the sixth century.33 How closely the two texts resemble one another can already be seen from the first sentence.
Nicetas: Leontius: Οὐκοῦν διορισώμεθα διὰ βραχέων, πῶς δεῖ Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν περὶ δυάδος καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ ἀκριβῆ ἰδιωμάτων ἐμνήσθης, ἀναγκαῖον ἐκεῖνο ἔννοιαν ἔχειν. Ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς διττῶς λέγε- εἰπεῖν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς διττῶς λέγεται, ὁ ται, ὁ μέν τις ἁπλῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν, ὁ μέν τις ἁπλῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν, ὁ δὲ δὲ ἐν σχέσει καὶ πράγματι θεωρούμε- ἐν σχέσει καὶ πράγμασι θεωρούμενος, νος, ὥσπερ λευκὸν ἥ τε λευκότης καὶ τὸ ὥσπερ λευκὸν ἥ τε λευκότης καὶ τὸ λελευκασμένον.34 λελευκασμένον.35 Therefore let us briefly define how one must Therefore since you have mentioned number think correctly about twoness and any con- and the idioms pertaining to it, it is neces- ceivable number. For one speaks of ‘num- sary to say this, that one speaks of ‘number’ ber’ in two ways, one seen absolutely and by in two ways, one seen absolutely and by itself and the other
Nicetas then reproduces the entire section from Leontius’ treatise with only minor changes.36 The third argument also has an exact counterpart in an
31 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 593B3-7, and Theodore Abu Qurrah, Epistula, PG 97, col. 1509A7-10. 32 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 597B9-601A7. 33 On Leontius of Byzantium’s works see B. E. Daley, Leontius of Byzantium. Complete Works, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford, 2017), pp. 1-78. 34 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 604C4-9. 35 Leontius of Byzantium, Solutiones, ed. Daley (see n. 33), p. 274. 36 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, 604C9-605B8, and Leontius, Solutiones, ed. Daley (see n. 33), p. 274.1-4. 298 Dirk Krausmüller older text, a Christological treatise by Heraclianus of Chalcedon, which dates to the first half of the sixth century.37 It begins as follows: 38
Nicetas: Heraclianus: Καὶ ἄλλως εἰς τὸ αὐτό· ὅτι οὐχὶ πᾶς ἀριθ- μὸς τῶν ἰδιοσυστάτων πραγμάτων ἐστὶ δηλωτικός· καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐντεῦθεν. Εἴ τι μὲν γὰρ ἰδιοσύστατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο Ἰστέον ὅτι εἴ τι μὲν γὰρ ἰδιοσύστατόν πάντως ἐν ἀριθμῷ τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πᾶν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάντως ἐν ἀριθμῷ τυγχάνει δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ τυγχάνον ἰδιοσύστα- ὄν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ τυγχάνον τον ἂν εἴη.39 ἰδιοσύστατον ἂν εἴη.40 And in another way about the same: That not every number is indicative of things that have a constitution of their own. For if something One must know that if something has a has a constitution of its own, it is definitely constitution of its own, it is definitely num- numbered, but not all that is numbered bered, but not all that is numbered would would have a constitution of its own. have a constitution of its own.
Heraclianus’ treatise is lost and his discussion of the number ‘two’ is only known to us because it was later excerpted by the compiler of the Doctrina Patrum.41 Thus there are two possible scenarios. The argument in Nicetas’ treatise may have been quoted either from the excerpt or from the original text, which may still have been extant at the time.42 The second argument confronts us with an even more complicated case. It is also found in John of Damascus’ Expositio Fidei. Yet in this case the match is not complete. The introduction and conclusion differ from one another. John speaks about continuous quantities whereas in Nicetas’ text the focus is on actual division.
37 On Heraclianus see above note 5. 38 For the entire passage see Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, coll. 605D8-608A1, and F. Diekamp, Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi. Ein griechisches Florilegium aus der Wende des 7. und 8. Jahrhunderts (Münster, 1907), pp. 216.20-217.8. 39 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 605D3-8. 40 Doctrina Patrum, ed. Diekamp (see n. 38), p. 216.18-20. 41 On the author of this text, see J. Stiglmeyr, ‘Der Verfasser der Doctrina Patrum de Incarnatione Verbi’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 18 (1909), pp. 14-40, who attributes the work to Anastasius Apocrisiarius, a companion of Maximus the Confessor. See also Allen and Neil, Maximus the Confessor, pp. 172-175. 42 Photius still read a treatise of Heraclianus against the Manicheans, see Photius, Biblio- theca, cod. 85, ed. R. Henry, Photius, Bibliothèque, II (Paris, 1960), pp. 9-10. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 299
Nicetas: John: Εἰ δέ τις ἐρωτῶν περὶ τῶν τοῦ κυρίου φύσεων, εἰ ὑπὸ τὸ συνεχὲς ποσὸν ἀναφέροι- ντο ἢ ὑπὸ τὸ διωρισμένον, ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι αἱ τοῦ κυρίου φύσεις οὔτε ἓν σῶμά εἰσιν οὔτε μία Καὶ ἄλλως, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἀριθμοῦμεν τὰς τοῦ ἐπιφάνεια οὔτε μία γραμμή, οὐ χρόνος, οὐ Χριστοῦ δύο φύσεις, δύο ταύτας λέγοντες, οὐκ τόπος, ἷνα ὑπὸ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀναχθῶσι ποσόν· εἰσάγομεν διαίρεσιν, ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν φύσεων καὶ ταῦτα γάρ εἰσι τὰ συνεχῶς ἀριθμούμενα. τῶν ἰδιοτήτων. Πᾶς γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τῶν δια- Ἰστέον δέ, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν διαφερό- φερόντων ἐστί, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἀριθμεῖσθαι ντων ἐστί, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τὰ τὰ κατὰ μηδὲν διαφέροντα, καθ᾽ ὃ δὲ δια- κατὰ μηδὲν διαφέροντα, καθ᾽ ὃ δὲ δια- φέρουσι, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται. φέρουσι, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται. ... Τῷ τρόπῳ τοιγαροῦν τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ ... Τῷ τρόπῳ τοιγαροῦν τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ μόνῳ ἀριθμούμεναι ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, οὐ διαιροῦ- μόνῳ ἀριθμούμεναι ὑπὸ τὸ διωρισμένον νται ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ὑπάρξει καὶ ὡς σὺ ὑπονοεῖς.43 ποσὸν ἀναχθήσονται.44 But if somebody asks about the natures of the Lord, if they fall under continuous quantity or under distinguished
This suggests that the argument in Nicetas’ text is adapted from a now lost source from which John of Damascus quoted. At this point we must ask: who created the sequence of arguments? It seems unlikely that Nicetas him- self scoured different sources in search for suitable material. A more plausible scenario is that he adapted an older text where the three passages were already combined. Such compilations had been popular from the second half of the sixth century onwards when the Christological discourse began to fossilise.45
43 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 604B9-13, D1-3. 44 John of Damascus, Expositio Fidei, 52, cf. Die Werke des Johannes von Damaskos, II, ed. B. Kotter, PTS, 12 (Berlin and New York, 1973), pp. 126-127.1-10, 22-23. 45 An early example is the treatise of Pamphilus, in Diversorum Postchalcedonensium Auc- torum Collectanea, I: Pamphili Theologi Opus, ed. J. H. Declerck, Eustathii Monachi Opus, ed. P. Allen, Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 19 (Turnhout, 1989), pp. 127-261. 300 Dirk Krausmüller
3. Nicetas’ and Isaac Mrut’s Arguments and their Provenance
Nicetas’ discussion of the number ‘two’ is not prompted by a statement of his adversary. Yet this does not mean that he does not engage with the con- tent of Isaac’s letter. One example may illustrate how he responds to criticism of the Chalcedonian position. Isaac had declared that one can speak of one nature of Christ because the human being is also one nature and then sought to disprove the Chalcedonian position that both Christ and the human being consist of two natures.
Καὶ γίνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος παράδειγμα, καθὼς καὶ οἱ Πατέρες ἐλάλησαν καὶ διήγ- γειλαν, τί ἐστι τοῦ σώματος, καὶ τί ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται δύο φύσεις ἔχειν. Εἰ δὲ ἀνθίσταταί τις καὶ λέγει δύο φύσεις ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου, λοιπὸν καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς τρεῖς φύσεις ἔχει, δύο τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, καὶ μίαν τῆς θεότητος.46 And the human being becomes a paradigm, as the Fathers, too, have said and proclaimed, what belongs to the body and what belongs to the soul. But the human being is not said to have two natures. And if someone objects and speaks of two natures in the human being, then Christ consequently has three natures, two of the humanity and one of the divinity.
In the following paragraph Isaac plays the heresiological card. He claims that in order to maintain their position that there are two natures in Christ the Chalcedonians would have to eliminate one of the three natures. This could be either the human soul, the human body or the divinity. In the first case they would be Apollinarians, in the second case Eutychian docetists, and in the third case Jews.47 This argument is by no means new. It was first formulated in the early sixth century as is evident from Leontius of Byzantium’s treatise Contra Nesto- rianos et Eutychianos. There the Monophysite interlocutor raises the following objection.
46 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 629C1-7. For the Armenian original see the French translation of Dorfmann-Lazarev, Arméniens et Byzantins (see n. 12), 41: ‘Que l’homme nous serve donc d’exemple. Comme je l’ait dit ci-dessus, il y a ce qui relève de corps et ce qui correspond à l’âme, mais l’homme est dit non pas deux natures, mais une seule. Et si quelqu’un vient s’y opposer et dit “deux natures du Christ”, alors, c’est trois
Καθώς σοι ἔδοξε προδιεστείλω ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀνθρώπου, δύο λέγεσθαι καὶ <οὐ> μίαν, ἐξ οὗ τί ἀκολουθεῖ; Τὸ ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ μὴ δύο μόνον φύσεις ὁμολο- γεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρεῖς.48 You have decided beforehand, as you saw fit, concerning the particular human being that it is said to be two and
At first sight this argument appears to be less developed than the one found in Isaac’s letter. Yet when Leontius later insists that the two natures include the soul, we can see clearly that accusations of Apollinarianism were already made at this early stage.49 When we turn to Nicetas’ response we find that it is equally traditional. It reads as follows.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα σύνθεσις μὴ ἐκ τῶν προσεχῶς συντεθέντων συντεθεῖσθαι ἐλέ- γετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν πόρρω, τάχα ἂν εἶχε χώραν τὸ παρὰ σοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμῶν γραφόμενον. Εἰ δ᾽ οὐδεὶς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων φήσειεν, ἐκ τῶν πόρρω ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν προσεχῶς καὶ ἀμέσως, καὶ οἱονεὶ μερῶν ἢ στοιχείων τάξιν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐχόντων συντεθεῖσθαι τὸ συντεθειμένον λέγεται, ἀνίσχυρον καὶ μάταιον τὸ παρὰ σοῦ γραφόμενον.50 For if every composition were not said to be composed of nearer components, but from more distant ones, what you have written against us would have a point. But none of those who are in their right mind would say ‘from the more distant ones’ but that which is composed is said to be composed from nearer and immediate ones and those that so-to-speak play the role of parts or elements in the whole.
This argument has a very close parallel in the Christological treatise of Heraclianus of Chalcedon, where we read:
Πᾶν σύνθετον ἐξ ἐκείνων λέγεται συντεθεῖσθαι, ἐκ τῶν προσεχῶς εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ σύνθεσιν παραλαμβανομένων ἁπλῶν τινων καὶ στοιχείων λόγον ἐπεχόντων ἐν τῇ συνθέσει τῶν ὅλων καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν συγκρίσει, κἂν τύχῃ αὐτὰ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν σκοπούμενα σύνθετα εἶναι.51
48 Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, ed. Daley (see n. 33), 158.4- 11. The same argument was used by Nestorians in their polemic against Chalcedonians, see Leontius of Jerusalem, Contra Nestorianos, II.14, PG 86, col. 1565A10-C1. 49 Leontius, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, ed. Daley (see n. 33), p. 158.24-31. 50 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 633A13-B6. 51 Doctrina Patrum, ed. Diekamp (see n. 38), pp. 207.19-208.3. 302 Dirk Krausmüller
Every composite is said to be composed from those, from the nearer ones that are subsumed into its composition, which play the role of some simple ones and elements in the composition of the wholes and the comparison with the whole, even if they happen to be composite when they are seen by themselves.
In order to support his point of view Nicetas then presents two arguments. Since the body is composed of four elements one would have to say that there are at least five components in the human being. Likewise, the metal electrum would not be composed of gold and silver but of the four elements, which would make no sense.52 These two examples are not found in the excerpt from Heraclianus’ treatise in the Doctrina Patrum. Yet at least the former one is also traditional. In his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos Leontius of Byzantium makes brief mention of the division of the body into the four elements.53 Thus we can conclude that both Isaac and Nicetas make use of stock arguments that were at the time already more than three hun- dred years old.54
4. Nicetas’ Chalcedonian Terminology: Nature and Substance
Nicetas’ dependence on older texts is also obvious in other parts of his trea- tise. One example is a discussion of the terms that were being used in the Christological discourse. Such passages are customarily found in Chalcedo- nian texts from the sixth century such as the treatise of Patriarch Eutychius.55 Like Eutychius, Nicetas begins with a reference to the Fathers, declaring that for them nature, substance and form were synonyms since they all denoted the universal.56 Then, however, he proceeds to set out the views of pagan philosophers.
52 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 633B6-C2. 53 Leontius, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, ed. Daley (see n. 33), p. 160.14-18. 54 A similar argument is found in Photius, Epistula 284, ed. Westerink (see n. 17), pp. 65-68. 55 On Eutychius see A. Cameron, ‘Eustratius’ Life of the Patriarch Eutychius and the Fifth Ecumenical Council’, in Kathegetria. Essays Presented to Joan Hussey for her 80 th Birthday, ed. J. Chrysostomides (Camberley, 1988), pp. 225-247. 56 P. Ananian, ‘L’opuscolo di Eutichio patriarca di Constantinopoli sulla “Distinzione della natura e persona”’, in Armeniaca. Mélanges d’Études Arméniennes, publiées à l’occasion du 250 e anniversaire de l’entrée des Pères Mekhitaristes dans l’Île de Saint-Lazare (1717-1967) (Venice, 1967), pp. 316-382, on p. 357. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 303
Οἱ δὲ ἔξω τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς λόγου τὸ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα ὁμοίως τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐπὶ καθολικοῦ τινος πράγματος ὁρίζονται, ... τὸ δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ἐπί τε κοινοῦ καὶ ἰδικοῦ, ἤγουν καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, οἷς Ἰωάννης ὁ ἐπίκλην Φιλόπονος κατακολουθήσας τριθεΐτης ἀναδέδεικται. Ὁ δὲ Σεβῆρος τὸ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ὄνομα ταυτοτρόπως τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὀνομάζει ἐπὶ κοινοῦ πράγματος εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς φύσεως ἰδιορρύθμως ἐν τούτῳ γενόμενος, οὔτε τῇ συνηθείᾳ οὔτε τοῖς ἔξω κατακολουθῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναντίως ἐπί τε κοινοῦ καὶ ἰδικοῦ πράγματος, ἤγουν καθόλου <καὶ> ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδόξασε, καὶ κοινὴν καὶ ἰδικὴν φύσιν εἰπὼν πολλοῖς ἀτόποις περιπέπτωκεν.57 Those who are outside our discourse define the term ‘nature’
The purpose of this passage is to show that both John Philoponus and Severus of Antioch are heretics. Yet the charges levelled against them are subtly differ- ent. It is claimed that Philoponus followed the pagan philosophers in speak- ing not only of secondary but also of primary substances, which went against theological tradition, whereas Severus’ understanding of the term nature was at odds both with the Fathers and with the philosophers. The two arguments are already found in earlier Chalcedonian literature. The anonymous treatise De Sectis, which was composed in the later sixth century, claims that Philo- ponus had taken his inspiration from Aristotle.58 The criticism of Severus is found in an even older text, Heraclianus’ Christological treatise.
57 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 632B11-13, C9-D4. 58 De Sectis, PG 86, col. 1233B1-6. See Ch. Erismann, ‘The Trinity, Universals, and Particular Substances: Philoponus and Roscelin’, Traditio, 63 (2008), pp. 277-305, on pp. 285-294. On the date of De Sectis see U. M. Lang, ‘The Date of the Treatise De Sectis Revisited’, Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica, 29 (1998), pp. 89-98. On content and structure see B. Gleede, ‘Der Traktat “De sectis” des Abbas Theodor. Eine unvollendete Handreichung zur Widerlegung der διακρινόμενοι’, in Christliches Ägypten in der spätanti- ken Zeit. Akten der 2. Tübinger Tagung zum christlichen Orient (7.-8. Dezember 2007), ed. D. Bumazhnov (Tübingen, 2013), pp. 179-216. 304 Dirk Krausmüller
Οἱ δὲ αἱρετικοί, οἱ Εὐτυχοῦς καὶ Σεβήρου τοῦ Ἕλληνος μαθηταί, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν ἀκολουθοῦσι λέγουσιν οὐσίαν καὶ φύσιν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἄτομον καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὔτε τοῖς ἔξω φιλοσόφοις πρώτην καὶ κυριωτάτην οὐσίαν τὸ ἄτομον καλοῦσιν, οὐ πρώτην τὴν φύσιν.59 But the heretics, the disciples of Eutyches and Severus the Pagan, follow neither the holy Fathers who say that substance and nature are the same, and that indi- vidual and hypostasis are something else beside them, nor the outside philosophers who call the individual a primary and strictest substance,
This suggests that Nicetas made use of a source whose author had combined the two criticisms in order to create one coherent argument. This source would have been written after the middle of the sixth century when Philo- ponus first set out his views on the Trinity.
5. Nicetas’ Chalcedonian Terminology: Hypostasis, Hypostatikon and the Individuated Universal
In his discussion of the terms nature and substance Nicetas tries to show that the Christology of the Monophysites is heretical. He claims that when one applies these terms to individuals and not to species one severs the ontologi- cal bond between the three divine persons. By contrast, his remarks about the complementary concepts hypostasis and hypostatikon constitute an attempt to justify the formula of Chalcedon. According to Nicetas the Fathers distin- guished the two terms in the following manner.
Τό γε μὴν ὑποστατικὸν διάφορον παρὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν τιθέασιν· ὁριζόμενοι γὰρ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔφασαν· ὑπόστασίς ἐστι μετὰ ἰδιώματος ἢ καὶ ἰδιωμάτων ἰδιο- συστάτως θεωρουμένη καὶ ὅλον τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν οὖσα, ὑποστατικὸν δ᾽ αὖ πάλιν οὐσία μετὰ ἰδιώματος ἢ καὶ ἰδιωμάτων μὴ ἰδιοσυστάτως καὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ ὡς ὅλον τι ὑπάρχον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλου τινὸς εἶναι μέρος.60 They indeed consider hypostatikon to be different from hypostasis, for when defining hypostasis they said: ‘Hypostasis is seen in its own constitution with
59 Doctrina Patrum, ed. Diekamp, p. 44.14-19. 60 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 632B4-11. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 305
an idiom or also idioms and is a whole by itself’, whereas hypostatikon is again substance with an idiom or also idioms, which does not exist in its own consti- tution and by itself as a whole but is part of a whole.
In order to understand this distinction we need to consider the development of Patristic theology. Hypostasis had a firm place in the theological discourse from the late fourth century onwards. Denoting concrete and independent being, it was applied first to the Trinity and later also to the incarnation. The Council of Chalcedon declared that Christ was two natures but only one hypostasis, thereby excluding the possibility that Christ’s humanity was a separate subject. By contrast, hypostatikon reflects a later stage in the debate. It is a synonym for enhypostaton, a term that had long been used by Christian authors in the vague sense of ‘real’ but was given a more technical meaning in texts from the early sixth century.61 At that time, Monophysite theologians argued that a nature, which does not have its own hypostasis, is inexistent, and that the formula of Chalcedon thus amounted to a denial of the real- ity of the incarnation.62 Chalcedonian authors responded by declaring that Christ’s human nature had the ontological status of enhypostaton, which was equally distant from inexistence and concrete and independent existence. When they took this step, however, they became mired in conceptual prob- lems. According to tradition, a hypostasis came into existence when charac- teristic idioms were added to a common substance or nature.63 If one accepted this point of view and yet attributed such idioms to Christ’s human nature one automatically conceded that it had a hypostasis of its own. Chalcedonian theologians of the sixth and early seventh century, such as John of Caesarea and Leontius of Jerusalem, sought to solve the problem by denying that the human nature had any individualising features.64 Such a position was difficult
61 On this shift see B. Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, 113 (Leiden and Boston, 2012). 62 See Ch. Erismann, ‘Non est natura sine persona. The issue of uninstantiated universals from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages’, in Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500, ed. M. Cameron and J. Marenbon (Leiden, 2011), pp. 75- 91. 63 Pamphilus, Opus, ed. Declerck (see n. 45), p. 129.29-34). 64 See A. Grillmeier and Th. Hainthaler, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche, II.2: Die Kirche von Konstantinopel im 6. Jahrhundert (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna, 1989), p. 69 and pp. 326-327; and Gleede, Development of the Term (see n. 61), pp. 136-137. 306 Dirk Krausmüller to defend since it could not be reconciled with the Biblical stories about Jesus. It therefore comes as no surprise that the defenders of Chalcedon eventually changed their mind. In the middle of the seventh century Maximus aban- doned the traditional definition of hypostasis and declared that the enhy- postaton included idioms but was nevertheless no fully-fledged hypostasis.65
Ἡ γὰρ ἀληθὴς καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσις ... τὸ ἀφορίζον ἑκάτερον τῆς κατ᾽ οὐσίαν κοινότητος ἰδίωμα τῷ κοινῷ συμπαραλαβοῦσα δείκνυσιν ἐνυπόστατον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑπόστασιν, ὅτι μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ διωρισμένως ὑπέστη.66 The true hypostatic union … having received the idiom that separates either one from the commonality in substance together with that which is common shows
In this Maximus was followed by John of Damascus who routinely accords Christ’s humanity individualising features.67 Analysis of Nicetas’ argument shows that he adopted this latter point of view. Both hypostasis and hyposta- tikon are defined as ‘substance with idioms’, which was the traditional defini- tion of hypostasis, but only hypostasis is said to denote concrete and inde- pendent existence.68 This did, of course, require a new criterion by which one could distinguish the two concepts. Nicetas finds it in the fact that an ordi- nary human being is a whole whereas the humanity of Christ is only a part of a whole. This argument, which does not appear in earlier texts, does not carry much weight since it is tailored to the specific case of Christ. It is, however, not Nicetas’ last word on the topic. In the following section he has this to say:
Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἀΐδιος Υἱὸς ὁ Κύριος καὶ Θεὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος γεγονὼς οὐ τὸν καθέ- καστα ἄνθρωπον ἀνειληφέναι λέγεται, ἵνα μὴ ἡ Νεστοριανὴ λύττα συνεισφρήσῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸν καθόλου, ὃν καὶ ἠτόμωσεν ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει.69
65 For the implications of this development see J. Zachhuber, ‘Universals in the Greek Church Fathers’, in Universals in Ancient Philosophy, eds. R. Chiaradonna and G. Galluzzo (Pisa, 2013), pp. 425-470, esp. p. 468. 66 Maximus, Letter 15, PG 91, col. 557D3-9. 67 See e.g. John of Damascus, De duabus in Christo voluntatibus, cf. Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, IV, ed. B. Kotter, PTS, 22 (Berlin and New York, 1981), pp. 174- 175.15-25. 68 Pamphilus, Opus, ed. Declerck (see n. 45), p. 128.7. 69 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, 636B5-9. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 307
Thus the eternal Son, our Lord and God, when he had become a human being, is said not to have assumed the particular human being, lest the Nestorian rabies break in, but the universal one, which he individuated in his own hypostasis.
Here Nicetas determines the ontological status of the human being that is assumed by the divine Word, declaring that it is not a hypostasis but an individuated universal nature. In order to understand the significance of this argument we need to turn to an anonymous Chalcedonian treatise that was edited by Marwan Rashed. 70 This treatise, which was most likely composed in Palestine and may date to the eighth century, teaches its readers how to respond to Monophysite arguments.71 The fourth paragraph reads as follows:
Ὅταν λέγῃς ὅτι ὁ Πέτρος ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, ποῖον ἄνθρωπον κατηγορεῖς, τὸν καθόλου ἢ τὸν μερικόν; Οὐδέτερον. Οὔτε τὸν καθόλου μόνον κοινὸν οὔτε τὸν μερικὸν μόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐν τῷ νῷ μόνον θεωρούμενον καθόλου, ὑπάρχοντα δὲ ἐν τῷ Πέτρῳ ἀτομωθέντα.72 When you say that Peter is a human being, which human being do you predi- cate, the universal one or the particular one? Neither, nor the universal common one alone nor the particular one alone, but the universal one who is seen by the mind alone, but exists individuated in Peter.
The Monophysite interlocutor asks whether the humanity in an individual is a universal nature or a particular nature. In his response the anonymous Chalcedonian author rejects both scenarios and instead introduces a third option, the individuated universal nature. It is evident that this argument bears a strong resemblance to Nicetas’ statement. There is only one difference: Nicetas speaks about the humanity of Christ whereas in the anonymous treatise the focus is on ‘ordinary’ individuals such as the Apostle Peter. Yet this does not mean that the latter text does not have a Christological dimension. In two further paragraphs it is claimed that Christ’s humanity, too, is an indi- viduated common nature and that it cannot be a particular nature because this would result in a Nestorian position.73
70 M. Rashed, Un texte proto-byzantin sur les universaux et la Trinité, in L’héritage aristo- télicien. Textes inédits de l’Antiquité (Paris, 2007), pp. 345-371. 71 On the date and place of composition see ibid., pp. 360-362. 72 Paragraph 4, ed. Rashed (see n. 70), p. 367.28-31. 73 Paragraphs 2 and 3, ed. Rashed (see n. 70), pp. 366-367. 308 Dirk Krausmüller
The exchange of arguments that we find in the anonymous treatise is the final result of an extensive debate, which began in the early sixth century. At that time the Monophysite theologian Severus of Antioch had claimed that the humanity assumed by the divine Word was a particular nature.74 He could do so because for him this particular nature was absorbed into the one nature of the divine Word and thus lost its independence. For Chal- cedonian theologians who believed that the human nature continued to exist even after the union the situation was more complicated. If they accepted the existence of particular natures, they could be accused of teaching that the humanity of Christ was a separate hypostasis.75 For this reason, John of Caesarea, Severus’ Chalcedonian adversary, claimed that the humanity in Christ was a universal nature.76 Such a position, however, was also not without problems. As we have already seen the Monophysites argued that a nature without a hypostasis of its own had no existence. In his treatise John brushed off this objection. Such a nonchalant approach, however, became increasingly more difficult to maintain. In the middle of the sixth century the Monophysite theologian John Philoponus turned to Aristotelian phi- losophy in order to prove that universals were mere concepts that only existed in the human mind. In the ensuing decades this conceptual frame- work was widely accepted, not only by Monophysites but also by Chalcedo- nians.77 Accordingly, the Monophysites could claim that those who defined the assumed human being as a universal denied the reality of the incarna- tion. The anonymous author of the treatise edited by Rashed seeks a way out of this quandary. He, too, chooses the second option, yet introduces an important qualification: the universal that is assumed by the divine Word is individuated.
74 See J. Zachhuber, ‘Individuality and the Theological Debate about “Hypostasis”’, in Individuality in Late Antiquity, eds. A. Torrance and J. Zachhuber (Farnham and Burling- tom, VT, 2014), pp. 91-110, on pp. 105-106. 75 This danger was all the greater as Severus considered particular nature and hypostasis to be synonymous. See Grillmeier and Hainthaler, Jesus der Christus (see n. 64), II.2, p. 56. 76 Ibid., pp. 56-58. 77 See D. Krausmüller, ‘Under the Spell of John Philoponus: How Chalcedonian Theo- logians of the Late Patristic Period Attempted to Safeguard the Oneness of God’, Journal of Theological Studies, 68 (2017), pp. 625-649. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 309
The anonymous author clearly believed that his concept of the individu- ated universal could safeguard the reality of the human nature in Christ. Unfortunately, he does not tell us how individuation is effected. By contrast, Nicetas is much more explicit. In a third passage he has the following to say:
Ἡμεῖς γάρ φαμεν τὸν Θεὸν Λόγον τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τελείαν ἔχοντα, εἶτα τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν μετὰ τῶν ἀφοριστικῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑπο- στάσει ἀτομώσαντα, καὶ ὑποστατικὸν τὸν κυριακὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιήσαντα, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συλλήψεως ἑνωθέντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μὴ προδιαπλασθέντα ἐν τῇ νηδύϊ τῆς Παρθένου.78 For we say that the God Word had the divine nature complete in himself, and that he then individuated the human nature with the separating idioms in his own hypostasis, and made the lordly human being hypostatikos, united with him- self from the very conception, and not fashioned beforehand in the womb of the Virgin.
Here the two aspects of Nicetas’ Christology are combined. Individuation is achieved through the characteristic idioms of the flesh, which establish the hypostatikon. To the question why a hypostatikon should differ from a hypostasis Nicetas gives the answer that the humanity of Christ never existed independently. This was a traditional argument of both Chalcedonian and Monophysite theologians, which was directed against the Nestorian claim that the body of Christ was created before the union and thus constituted a hypostasis of its own.79 Significantly, this argument presents the incarna- tion as a singular case. No attempt is made to find parallels in created being, which would make the ontological status of Christ’s humanity rationally comprehensible.
6. Nicetas’ Use of Syllogistic Reasoning
Nicetas’ definition of the hypostatikon must have been taken from one of the latest contributions to the Christological discourse. Unfortunately, we do not know whether this is a coincidence or whether Nicetas deliberately chose an
78 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 660A5-14. 79 On the latter see Leontius of Byzantium, Solutiones, ed. Daley (see n. 33), pp. 306.19- 307.12. 310 Dirk Krausmüller up-to-date position. We encounter a similar situation when we turn to a series of syllogisms, which were undoubtedly taken from a now lost earlier treatise. There we read the following:
Εἰ πᾶν τὸ μιᾶς φύσεως μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀποτελούμενον, εἴτε κατ᾽ ἀνάχυσιν ἀποτελεῖται, εἴτε καθ᾽ ἕνωσιν ἀσύγχυτον, συνυπόστατά εἰσι τὰ τούτου μέρη· οἷόν φημι· Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποτελούμενος μιᾶς φύσεως, τὰ μέρη ἔχει συνυπό- στατα, ὁ δὲ Χριστὸς οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὑπέστη ἑτεροϋποστάτως, οὐχ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἄπαγε· τὰ γὰρ συμβεβηκότα πανταχοῦ ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπότης ἐν ἄλλῳ, οἷόν φημι, τῷ Πέτρῳ ἢ τῷ Θωμᾷ ἰδιοσυστάτως θεωρεῖται. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ κυρια- κὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει ὑπέστη ὡς συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οὐσία μετὰ προσλήψεως ἰδιωμάτων τῶν χωριζόντων τὸν Χριστὸν ἐκ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποστατικῶς γενόμενον, καὶ οὐχ ὑπόστασις.80 If all that results in one nature after the union, regardless of whether it results through confusion or through union without confusion, has parts that are syn- hypostatos (i.e. share the same hypostasis), as when I say: ‘The human being, resulting in one nature, has parts that are synhypostatos’, whereas Christ is not thus, but the lordly human being gains subsistence in the hypostasis of the God Word in a heterohypostatos manner (i.e. existing in another hypostasis), not as the accident, far be it, because the accidents are always as if in a subject, whereas the humanity is seen in another, as when I say, in Peter or Thomas, in its own constitution, it follows that the lordly human being has not gained hypostasis in the hypostasis of the God Word as an accident, but as a substance with addition of idioms, which separate Christ from the others, having become hypostatikos and not hypostasis.
The meaning of this passage does not reveal itself immediately. Not only is the syntax clumsy but two different arguments are fused with one another in a rather inexpert manner. The first argument seeks to establish that the incarnated Word is not one nature. It can be summed up as follows: In all compositions that result in one nature the parts are synhypostatos. In Christ, however, one part is heterohypostatos in the other. Therefore, the composition of the Word and the ‘lordly human being’ has not resulted in one nature. Rather than spelling out this conclusion, however, Nicetas proceeds to explain
80 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 637A1-B1. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 311 what he means by heterohypostatos. He distinguishes two meanings, accident and substance, and concludes that the ‘lordly human being’ is the latter.81 By indicating that the substance is accompanied by idioms he makes it clear again that he regards the ‘lordly human being’ as a fully individualised entity, which has however no independent existence. The two parts of the argument are best discussed in sequence. By synhy- postatos Nicetas means that two parts share the same hypostasis, which comes into existence when they are composed. This model is exemplified by the human being, where body and soul do not exist before the composition and the coming-to-be of a common hypostasis. The term heterohypostatos, on the other hand, indicates that one part is somehow integrated into another part, which is already in existence. This juxtaposition is of great interest since the two models were for a long time not considered to be mutually exclusive. They had appeared side by side in the writings of Cyril of Alexandria who conceptualised the incarnation either as the assumption of the flesh by the Word or as the composition of flesh and Word and who in the latter case adduced the human being as a parallel.82 This second model proved to be very popular among Chalcedonian theologians of the sixth to eighth centuries. In his treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, Leontius of Byzantium juxta- poses body, soul and the human being as the composite of body and soul, on the one hand, and Word, flesh and Christ as the composite of Word and flesh, on the other, as if they were perfectly equivalent.83 The same frame- work recurs in definitions of the enhypostaton. In the anonymous treatise De Sectis and in Maximus’ Letter 15 it is claimed that not only the human nature of Christ but also his divine nature is enhypostatos, without consideration of the fact that the divine nature has a pre-existing hypostasis.84 Significantly, Maximus uses in this context the verb συνυφεστάναι from which synhypostatos is derived.85 This conceptual framework was still current in the early eighth
81 On this term see Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus (see n. 65), II.2, pp. 80-81, and pp. 326- 327. 82 See R. Norris, ‘Christological Models in Cyril of Alexandria’, Studia Patristica, 13, ed. E. A. Livingstone (Berlin, 1965), pp. 255-268; and Th. Weinandy, ‘The soul/body analogy and the incarnation: Cyril of Alexandria’, Coptic Church Review, 17 (1996), pp. 59-66. 83 Leontius, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, ed. Daley (see n. 33), pp. 146.5-148.18. 84 See De Sectis, PG 86, col. 1240C1-8, and above note 39, with the quotation from Letter 15. 85 Maximus, Letter 15, PG 91, col. 557D11. 312 Dirk Krausmüller century as can be seen from John of Damascus’ treatise De natura composita sive Contra acephalos:
Τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον … σημαίνει … ἕκαστον τῶν εἰς σύνθεσιν μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως συνερχομένων, ὡς ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἔχει καὶ σώματος. Καὶ ἡ θεότης τοίνυν καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνυπόστατός ἐστιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἑκατέρα κοινὴν τὴν μίαν σύνθετον αὐτοῦ ὑπόστασιν.86 The term enhypostaton … denotes … each of the things that come together for the composition of one hypostasis, as is the case with a soul and a body. The divinity, too, then and the humanity of Christ are enhypostatos, for each has as common its one composite hypostasis.
Nicetas rejects this entire tradition and only recognises the assumption- model as orthodox. According to him the human nature gains its existence in the hypostasis of the Word. The closest earlier parallel to this view is found in Maximus’ Letter 15.
Ἐνυπόστατον δέ, τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ μὲν οὐδαμῶς ὑφιστάμενον, ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ θεωρού- μενον, ὡς εἶδος ἐν τοῖς ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις.87 Enhypostaton is that which does not subsist by itself at all, but is seen in another as the species in the individuals.
Here Maximus declares that species or natures gain existence in individuals or hypostases. However, unlike Nicetas, he does not apply this model to the incarnation. Moreover, he does not let go of the composition-model. He refers to it in the same context and quite unselfconsciously uses it to explain how the Word united itself with the flesh. It seems likely that Maximus drew on a number of older sources without making an attempt to harmonise them. One of these sources would then have been much more consistent in its rejection of the composition-model. It is possible that this source or a later adaptation of it was used by Nicetas. Such a theological position was not without problems. This can be seen from the fact that Nicetas excludes the possibility that the heterohypostaton
86 John of Damascus, De natura composita, 6, ed. Kotter, IV, p. 50 (see n. 44, 67). 87 Maximus, Letter 15, PG 91, col. 557D15-560A2. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 313 could be identified with accidents. Indeed, the explanation of the enhypostaton as species in individuals was a deviation from the mainstream. In texts from the sixth century ‘being-in’ is explained as the relation between accidents and their substrate. Anastasius of Antioch, for example, states.
Ἐνυπόστατός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ σώματι ποιότης, οἷον λευκότης ἢ μελανία, ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑποστῆναι οὐ δύναται, οὐ λέγεται ὑπόστασις.88 Enhypostaton is also the quality in the body, for example, whiteness or blackness, for it exists in the body, but since it cannot gain subsistence by itself it is not called hypostasis.
Even the term heterohypostatos itself was ambiguous. In the so-called Leontius- Scholia, which are preserved in the Doctrina Patrum, it denotes the ontological status of accidents.
Τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἐνυπόστατα λέγομεν, κἂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχωσι τὸ εἶναι, τουτέστιν ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καί εἰσιν κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν ἑτεροϋπόστατα.89 We call the accidents enhypostatos, even if they have their being in something else, that is, in the substance, and can in a stricter sense be called heterohypostatos.
Nicetas’ treatise thus gives us an insight into the latest stages of the Christo- logical discourse, which are otherwise badly documented. The reinterpreta- tion of ‘being-in’ as referring not to accidents but to secondary substances made it possible to use the assumption-model without having to fear that the human nature in Christ was reduced to a bundle of accidents.90 Thus there was no longer need for the composition-model whose great advantage had always been that it did justice to the human nature. As a consequence, it also became possible to jettison the anthropological paradigm.
88 Anastasius of Antioch, Dialogue with a Tritheite, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, ‘Des Patriarchen Anastasius I. von Antiochien Jerusalemer Streitgespräch mit einem Tritheiten’, Traditio, 37 (1981), p. 104. 89 Doctrina Patrum, ed. Diekamp (see n. 38), p. 192.3-5. 90 See D. Krausmüller, ‘Enhypostaton: Being “in Another” or Being “with Another”? How Chalcedonian Theologians of the Sixth Century defined the Ontological Status of Christ’s Human Nature’, Vigiliae Christianae, 71 (2017), pp. 433-448. 314 Dirk Krausmüller
Further analysis of the text reveals another innovative feature. As we have seen Nicetas claims that the human being is one nature resulting from the union of soul and body and further insinuates that that this union does not lead to a confusion of the components. The parallel that he creates between the human being and Christ as the result of a union of humanity and divin- ity suggests that the human being is also conceived of as an individual. Such a view would be irreconcilable with the traditional Chalcedonian position according to which the human being is two natures and not one because otherwise body and soul would lose their integrity. One could argue that this new approach became possible after the rejection of the anthropologi- cal paradigm, which finds its expression in the juxtaposition of synhypostatos and heterohypostatos. This interpretation, however, is not without problems because in the same series of syllogisms we encounter a much more conven- tional conceptual framework.
Εἰ πᾶν ὃ κοινῶς καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖται, οὐ τινὶ μὲν πλέον, τινὶ δὲ ἔλαττον ὑπάρχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξίσης καὶ συμπληρωτικὸν γινόμενον, ἐφ᾽ ὧν λέγεται οὐσία ἐκεί- νων κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ὁ δὲ δὴ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματός ἐστι συντεθειμένος, καὶ οὐ διαλλάττει ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, καθὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος σύγκειται, κατά τινα φύσεως διαφοράν, ἀλλὰ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχο- ντες πάντες ἄνθρωποι ὑφ᾽ ἕνα ἅπαντες ὁρισμὸν ἀναγόμενοι, κατὰ τοῦτο μιᾶς φύσεως λέγεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Χριστοῦ οὐ λέγειν δυνάμεθα μίαν φύσιν· αἵ τε γὰρ φύσεις σώζονται καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν καὶ εἶδος Χριστῶν οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο ἄλλος Χριστὸς ἐκ θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος, θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτός· οὐκ ἄρα μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν μιᾶς φύσεως ὁ Χριστὸς ἀπο- τελεῖται.91 If all that is seen commonly and in many and is not more in one and less in another, but is identical and completive of those, which are called substance, according to the church, and each human being is composed of soul and body, and a human being does not differ from a human being, insofar as it is composed of soul and body, according to some difference of nature, but all human beings have their constitution as being subsumed under one definition, insofar as it is called ‘of one nature’, but we cannot speak of one nature in the case of the hypostasis of Christ, because the natures are preserved even after the union and
91 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 637B8-C10. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 315
one cannot find a species of Christs, for no other Christ came to be from divin- ity and humanity, the same both God and human being, it follows that Christ did not result in one nature after the union.
Here Nicetas asserts that an individual human being is not one nature but two, soul and body, in the same way as Christ is divinity and humanity, and then explains that only the universal human being or species can be called ‘one nature’ because it is the collective of all individuals that share the same definition, namely being composed of two natures, soul and body. In this sense, however, one cannot speak of one nature of Christ because there are no other Christs who could be defined as being composed of divinity and humanity. This is an entirely traditional argument. An almost identical pas- sage can be found in Leontius of Byzantium’s treatise Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos:
Τῆς γὰρ φύσεως τῆς μιᾶς τὸ ὅλον τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου εἴδους παριστώσης, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀριθμουμένων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἑτεροούσιον, εἰκότως τῇ τοῦ κοινοῦ προσηγορίᾳ τὸ μερικὸν ἐπονομάζεται. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν τόν τινα ἄνθρωπον ἑτεροειδῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον, ἐπὶ δὲ Χριστοῦ τοιαύτη τις τάξις σχέσεως οὐκ εὑρίσκεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἴδους ὄντος Χριστῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀνθρώπων.92 Since the one nature constitutes the whole of the human species, as none of those that are numbered under the same species is of a different substance, the particular is rightly called with the appellation of the common. For it is not possible to find a certain human being that is of a different species from the universal human being, but in the case of Christ such an order of relation is not found, for there is no species of Christs as there is of human beings.
This means that the same series of syllogisms contains two arguments that seem to be mutually exclusive. One the one hand it is claimed that the individual human being is two natures and that only the human spe- cies as a collective can be called ‘one nature’ whereas on the other hand the individual human being itself appears to be one nature, which comes
92 Leontius, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, ed. Daley (see n. 33), p. 152.20-25. 316 Dirk Krausmüller into existence when a body and a soul are composed with one another. Another passage in Nicetas’ treatise shows how it was attempted to square the circle:
Ὁ δὲ δὴ γενικὸς ἤγουν καθόλου ἄνθρωπος, ὅταν τις εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη ἀποκοπῇ, φημὶ δὴ ψυχήν τε καὶ σῶμα, καὶ ταῦτα γενικὰ ὄντα καὶ καθόλου, ὅτι μηδὲ δυνατὸν ἐκ δύο ἀτόμων καὶ μερικῶν γενικόν τι ἀποτελεῖσθαί ποτε, †δύο φύσεις ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον φήσειεν†.93 The generic or universal human being, when it is divided into its components, I mean soul and body, which are equally generic and universal, because it is not possible that something generic results from two individual and particular ones, †one would say that the universal human being has two natures†.
The starting point for this argument is the traditional Chalcedonian view that the human nature is a universal. It is then claimed that in such a case the components must also be universals. There can be no doubt that Nicetas and his source were of the opinion that they were not speaking of particular natures but of common natures when they asserted that the human being became one nature through the union of body and soul. In Nicetas’ treatise the characteristic juxtaposition between synhy- postatos and heterohypostatos is also found in another syllogism of the same series.
Εἰ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἐκ διαφόρων φύσεων συντεθειμένων καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν μὴ συνυποστάτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρως, ἤγουν ἑτεροϋποστάτως ἡνωμένων, μία ὑπόστασις ἀποτελεῖται, οὐχὶ μία φύσις, φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἑνωθεὶς τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει μὴ συνυποστάτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει τοῦτον ὑφεστῶτα ἔχων, οὐ μιᾶς φύσεως ἀποτελεῖται.94 If in the case of all that is composed from different natures in a hypostasis, which are not in synhypostatos fashion, but otherwise, that is, in heterohypostatos fashion, results in one hypostasis, not one nature, it is evident that the God Word when he was united with the human nature since he did not have it in
93 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 636A5-11. 94 Nicetas, Refutatio, PG 105, col. 638B1-7. Christology in Ninth-Century Constantinople 317
a synhypostatos fashion, but had it as existent in his own hypostasis, he does not result in one nature.
Here it is claimed that the incarnated Word is merely one instance of a general rule but no other example is given. This is no mere oversight. It is rather the case that the author of Nicetas’ source could not come up with a parallel in the created order. The form of the argument shows that he still pays lip-service to the conventions of the Christological discourse according to which one needed to show such parallels in order to make one’s under- standing of the incarnation rationally comprehensible, even though he now treats Christ as an exceptional case.
7. conclusion
Nicetas Byzantius’ refutation of Isaac’s letter is a patchwork of passages lifted from older Chalcedonian texts. One of these texts, Theodore Abu Qurrah’s invective against the Armenians, had been written only a few decades earlier. There can be no doubt that Nicetas had it in front of him when he com- posed his treatise. The situation is different in the case of two other texts, treatises written by Leontius of Byzantium and by Heraclianus of Chalcedon, which date to the first half of the sixth century. Here it is likely that Nicetas did not consult the original works but relied on later compilations. Such dependence on tradition is evident even when Nicetas responds to Isaac’s criticisms. In these cases, he has recourse to older Chalcedonian texts where his opponent’s arguments had been quoted and then refuted. The impor- tance of Nicetas’ treatise lies in the fact that it preserves arguments from older texts, which have not come down to us. These texts tend to date to the latest phase of the Christological debate. It is difficult to say why this is so. One could argue that it was a conscious choice to present up-to-date material but it is equally possible that Nicetas had no other material at hand. Analysis of the arguments found in these texts shows that in the seventh and eighth centuries the Christological discourse underwent radical changes. Now it was accepted that Christ’s human nature had to be individualised through characteristic idioms, and it was claimed that the human being could not be used as a paradigm for the incarnation. 318 Dirk Krausmüller
Abstract
The topic of this article is the so-called Refutatio epistolae regis Armeniae, which was written in the last quarter of the ninth century by Nicetas Byzantius at the behest of Patriarch Photius. This text contains a wide range of Christological arguments. Comparison shows that Nicetas relied heavily on earlier writings, both extant and lost. Study of these borrowings helps us better to understand the last stages of the Chalcedonian Christological discourse. Keywords: Nicetas Byzantius, Photius, Armenia, Chalcedonian Christology, Isaac Mrut, enhypostaton.