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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY of OPIUM REDUCTION in BURMA: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES from the WA REGION Mr. Sai Lone a Thesis Submitted in Part
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OPIUM REDUCTION IN BURMA: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WA REGION Mr. Sai Lone A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Program in International Development Studies Faculty of Political Science Chulalongkorn University Academic Year 2008 Copyright of Chulalongkorn University เศรษฐศาสตรการเมืองของการปราบฝนในประเทศพมา: มุมมองระดับทองถิ่นในเขตวา นายไซ โลน วิทยานิพนธน ี้เปนสวนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลกสั ูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต สาขาวิชาการพัฒนาระหวางประเทศ คณะรัฐศาสตร จุฬาลงกรณมหาวิทยาลัย ปการศึกษา 2551 ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณมหาวิทยาลัย Thesis title: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OPIUM REDUCTION IN BURMA: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WA REGION By: Mr. Sai Lone Field of Study: International Development Studies Thesis Principal advisor: Niti Pawakapan, Ph. D. Accepted by the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master’s Degree ___________________________ Dean of the Faculty of Political Science (Professor Charas Suwanmala, Ph.D.) THESIS COMMITTEE ___________________________ Chairperson (Professor Supang Chantavanich, Ph.D.) ___________________________ Thesis Principal Advisor (Niti Pawakapan, Ph.D.) ___________________________ External Examiner (Decha Tangseefa, Ph.D.) นายไซ โลน: เศรษฐศาสตรการเมืองของการปราบฝนในประเทศพมา: มุมมองระดับ ทองถิ่นในเขตวา (THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OPIUM REDUCTION IN BURMA: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WA REGION) อ. ทปรี่ ึกษา: ดร.นิติ ภวัครพันธุ. 133 หนา. งานวิจัยชิ้นนี้เนนศึกษาผลกระทบดานเศรษฐกิจสังคมของโครงการพัฒนาชนบทที่ดําเนินงานโดยองคกร -
Conflict of Interests CMYK
Part Two: Logging in Burma / 19 The China-Burma Border processed here originates in Burma. Workers in the increasing presence of the SPDC had led to more Yingjian told Global Witness that the Tatmadaw had taxation. Both accounts suggest that logging was held Chinese loggers hostage in Burma until the becoming less profitable. Local people told Global companies paid ransoms of approximately 10,000 yuan Witness that both the KIO and the SPDC controlled the ($1200) per person.327 forests and border crossing.327 19.5.3.3 Hong Bom He 19.5.3.5 Xima Hong Bom He Town is situated on the Hong Bom There was no indication that the small town of Xima River inside the Tonbiguan Nature Reserve. The town had anything to do with logging although it is well was built in 1993 after private companies illegally built a connected to the border.327 logging road to the Burmese border ostensibly with the consent of local Chinese authorities.327 The town is 19.5.3.6 Car Zan illegal insofar as it was built after the area was Car Zan is a busy logging town with two large designated a nature reserve. stockpiles of logs and approximately 30 sawmills in In 2000 there were 2,000 people working in the 2001.327 The town has been associated with logging for town and in the forests across the border in Kachin 10 years and is opposite KIO controlled areas.327 Global State, although by early 2001 the town appeared to be Witness investigators saw more than 20 log trucks, each closing down and was effectively working at 20% carrying nine m3 of logs, entering the town in a period capacity or less.327 There was still some log trading of an hour and a half, suggesting that the town is more activity with Chinese logging trucks and stockpiles of important for the timber trade than the number of wood present on the Burmese side of the river. -
NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE the FUTURE of the CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS in BURMA Main Armed Groups in Nothern Burma
TRANSNATIONAL I N S T I T U T E NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE THE FUTURE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS IN BURMA Main armed groups in nothern Burma. Areas are approximate, status of some groups changed groups some of status approximate, are Areas Burma. in nothern groups armed Main Author Printing Contact: Tom Kramer Drukkerij PrimaveraQuint Transnational Institute Amsterdam De Wittenstraat 25 Copy editor 1052 AK Amsterdam David Aronson Financial Contributions Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tel: 31-20-6626608 Design (Netherlands) Fax: 31-20-6757176 Guido Jelsma [email protected] www.tni.org Photo credits Tom Kramer The contents of this document can be quoted or reproduced as long as the source is mentioned. TNI would appreciate receiving a copy of the text in which this document is used or cited. To receive information about TNI’s publications and activities, we suggest that you subscribe to our bi-weekly bulletin by sending a request to: [email protected] or registering at www.tni.org Amsterdam, July 2009 Contents Introduction 2 Burma: Ethnic Conflict and Military Rule 4 The Cease-fire Economy 24 Conflict Actors 4 Infrastructure 24 Independence and Civil War 5 Trade and Investment 25 Military Rule 6 Mono-Plantations 25 Cold War Alliances 7 Investment from Abroad 25 The Democracy Movement 7 Logging 26 Mining 27 The Making of the Cease-fire Agreements 8 Drugs Trade 27 The Fall of the CPB 8 The First Round of Crease-fires 9 International Responses to the Cease-fires 30 The NDF and the Second Round of Cease-fires 9 The Role of Neighbouring Countries -
The Future of Opium Bans in the Kokang and Wa Regions
Drug Policy Briefing Nr 29 July 2009 From Golden Triangle to Rubber Belt ? The Future of Opium Bans in the Kokang and Wa Regions By Tom Kramer In the Kokang and Wa regions in northern Conclusions & Recommendations Burma1 opium bans have ended over a century of poppy cultivation. The bans have • The opium bans have driven had dramatic consequences for local communities into chronic poverty and communities. They depended on opium as a cash crop, to buy food, clothing, and have adversely affected their food medicines. The bans have driven poppy- security and access to health care and growing communities into chronic poverty education. and have adversely affected their food security. Very few alternatives are being • The Kokang and Wa authorities have offered to households for their survival. promoted Chinese investment in mono- plantations, especially in rubber. These The Kokang and Wa cease-fire groups have projects are unsustainable and do not implemented these bans following significantly profit the population. international pressure, especially from neighbouring China. In return, they hope to • Ex-poppy farmers mainly rely on casual gain international political recognition and labour and collecting Non-Timber Forest aid to develop their impoverished and war- Products as alternative source of income. torn regions. The Kokang and Wa authorities have been unable to provide alternative • Current interventions by international sources of income for ex-poppy farmers. Instead they have promoted Chinese invest- NGOs and UN agencies are still limited in ment in monoplantations, especially in scale and can best be described as “emer- rubber. These projects have created many gency responses”. -
Military Confrontation Or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar
Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 15 July 2015 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue: Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and Democracy in Myanmar The renewed violence in the Kokang region after Pheung’s MNDAA had refused to of the northern Shan state in February 2015 accept the demand of the previous military has had serious repercussions for efforts to government to transform into a Border solve ethnic conflict in Burma/Myanmar1 and Guard Force (BGF).2 end the decades-old civil war. The fighting started when troops led by the veteran The outbreak of renewed conflict in the Kokang leader Pheung Kya-shin (Peng Kokang region has, in turn, clouded Jiasheng) resurfaced in the Kokang region the prospects of achieving a nationwide and attacked government and army positions ceasefire agreement (NCA) in Myanmar. after an interval of nearly six years. Pheung Battles broke out while negotiations were Kya-shin’s Myanmar National Democratic ongoing in Yangon. For while other ethnic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a former ceasefire armed organisations have called for peace group and government ally, was ousted talks and a halt to the renewed fighting, the from the Kokang region in 2009 by a rival quasi-civilian government under President Kokang leader with the help of the Tatmadaw Thein Sein has so far refused to address (national armed forces). This coup happened the Kokang crisis by political means. The Recommendations The humanitarian consequences of the renewed fighting in northeast Myanmar The renewed violence in the Kokang region are profound. Since 2011, around 200,000 has serious repercussions for efforts to solve civilians have been displaced in the Kachin ethnic conflict in Myanmar and clouded and northern Shan states, many of whom the prospects for achieving a nationwide have fled towards the China border. -
Undercurrents Monitoring Development on BurmaS Mekong Issue 2
Undercurrents Monitoring Development on Burmas Mekong Issue 2 En people threatened by manganese mining Logging out eastern Shan State What Opium Ban? Changes on the Mekong prove deadly A publication of the Lahu National Development Organization (LNDO) Greetings from the Lahu National Development Organization (LNDO), Who are the Lahu? We are pleased to welcome you to this second issue of The Lahu are highland people that Undercurrents, in which we continue to monitor development subsist primarily on hunting, fishing, along Burmas Mekong and report on related social, and upland swidden agriculture. economic, and political realities in eastern Shan State. Their fondness for and skill at hunting are well known. In our first issue we focused on the Mekong Navigation Improvement Project and its impacts on local travel, There are nearly one million Lahu livelihoods, and illicit cross-border trade. As part of this issue people in the world. There are we update you on recent changes to the rivers flow and now approximately 500,000 in describe resulting incidents that have left local people afraid of China, 300,000 in Burma, the revered Mekong. 100,000 in Thailand, 50,000 in Laos, 6,000 in Vietnam, 5,000 The long time lapse since our last issue is a reflection of the residing in the USA as refugees, difficulty and danger of gathering information inside military- and an estimated 1,000 scattered ruled Burma. Most of Shan State remains sealed off from the in countries such as Australia, outside world, and border crossings closely watched. Even so, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Lahu we collect information from local people in remote areas so are divided into five groups: the that their true situation can be understood. -
Strategic Programme Framework UN Drug Control Activities in Myanmar
Strategic Programme Framework UN Drug control activities in Myanmar “The proliferation of drugs over the past 30 years is an example of the previously unimaginable becoming reality very quickly. … It is my hope that they will record this as the time when the international community found common ground in the mission to create momentum towards a drug-free world in the twenty-first century.” n Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General (New York, June 1998) October 2002 This document has not been formally edited. It is meant for discussion and is not an official document of the United Nations. The designations employed and presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations. Table of contents List of acronyms 2 Executive Summary 3 Drug control overview and situation update 4 The role of the UN and drug control 9 Past and present activities 12 I. Internal fighting hinders effective drug control (1976 to 1988) II. National unification dominates drug control (1988 to 1996) III. Drug control successes (1996 to 2001) IV. Funding shortfall (2001 to 2003) Discussion 17 I. Drug control fits within the wider UN agenda for Myanmar II. Financial constraints hold back the ongoing interventions III. Strategic alliances IV. Innovation through involvement of the civil society Proposed strategy 23 Resource requirements 25 Annexes A Map of Myanmar B Map of ongoing UN drug control interventions in Myanmar C Map of Shan State – Special regions D Map of Shan State – Opium cultivation E Map of alternative -
Myanmar's Ethnic Insurgents
Myanmar’s Ethnic Insurgents: UWSA, KNU and KIO Christopher O’Hara & Niels Selling ASIA PAPER February 2012 Myanmar’s Ethnic Insurgents: UWSA, KNU and KIO Christopher O’Hara & Niels Selling Institute for Security and Development Policy Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden www.isdp.eu Myanmar’s Ethnic Insurgents: UWSA, KNU and KIO is an Asia Paper published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy. The Asia Papers Series is the Occasional Paper series of the Institute’s Asia Program, and addresses topical and timely subjects. The Institute is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and cooperates closely with research cent- ers worldwide. Through its Silk Road Studies Program, the Institute runs a joint Trans- atlantic Research and Policy Center with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. The Institute is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse com- munity of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. It is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Security and Development Policy or its sponsors. © Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2012 ISBN: 978-91-86635-26-8 Printed in Singapore Distributed in Europe by: Institute for Security and Development Policy Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden Tel. -
Note: in March 2003, a Joint Assessment Team Comprising
Note: In March 2003, a joint assessment team comprising international NGOs and UN agencies operating in Myanmar traveled to the Kokang and Wa Special Regions in north-eastern Shan State. Their purpose was to assess the humanitarian impact of the opium ban in the Kokang region, and the potential impact of a similar ban due to go into effect in the Wa region in June 2005. The following is the report submitted by this team after their mission. It is unedited and unabridged. Maps used in the report have been removed to reduce the file size. They are available from the UNODC Myanmar Office upon request. REPLACING OPIUM IN KOKANG AND WA SPECIAL REGIONS, Shan State, Myanmar By the Joint Kokang-Wa Humanitarian Needs Assessment Team Poppy cultivation is ending in the heart of the opium producing areas of Myanmar. The Kokang Authority banned the substance as of last year. They did this to conform to international standards and be “modern”1, to subscribe to Myanmar Government desires, and to generate the long-term development of the Kokang Special Region No 1. The Wa Authority has pledged to ban poppy use and cultivation by 2005. Poppy growers throughout the Wa Region have received the message and know they will have to change their way of life in two years. Kokang and the Wa Region were long major poppy growing areas in Shan State, which as a whole produced 70 per cent of Myanmar’s opium output. According to the UNODC 2002 Opium Survey, Kokang and the Wa Region’s output constituted about 40 per cent of the total opium production.