Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda the Role of the International Community
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86$*(1&<)25,17(51$7,21$/'(9(/230(17 A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study Report No. 76 Center for Development and Evaluation July 1996 Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda The Role of the International Community PN-ABY-212 USAID Evaluation Special Study No. 76 Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda The Role of the International Community by Krishna Kumar, team leader Center for Development Information and Evaluation U.S. Agency for International Development David Tardif–Douglin Development Alternatives, Inc. with Carolyn Knapp, Kim Maynard, Peter Manikas, and Annette Sheckler* Center for Development Information and Evaluation U.S. Agency for International Development July 1996 * Respectively, staff, Development Alternatives, Inc.; independent consultant; fellow, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University; senior analyst, Refugee Policy Group. Table of Contents Page Page 5. Rehabilitating Health and 30 Summary v Education International Intervention in Health 30 Introduction xii and Sanitation International Interventions in Education 31 Glossary xv Problems and Prospects 33 1. Political and Economic Background 1 6. Assistance to Vulnerable Groups 35 Economic Context 1 and Initiatives for Healing Ethnic Composition and Relations 2 International Interventions for Vulner- 35 Political History 2 able Groups Genocide and Killings of Moderate 3 Problems and Prospects 39 Hutu Migration of Refugees 4 7. Return of Refugees and Internally 42 Composition of the New Government 5 Displaced Persons Old-Caseload Refugees 42 2. An Overview of Assistance to 6 New Caseload Refugees 43 Rwanda Internally Displaced Persons 48 Prewar Development Assistance to 6 Problems and Prospects 49 Rwanda 8. Crosscutting Issues and a Vision 53 Postwar Humanitarian Assistance 7 for the Future Problems and Prospects 9 Consequences of Genocide 53 3. Promoting Human Rights and 11 Relationship Between NGOS and the 54 Building a Fair Judicial System Government International Interventions 12 Unrealistic Expectations for Repatriation 55 Problems and Prospects 21 Long-Term Development of Rwanda 56 9. Recommendations and Lessons 58 4. Support to the Economic Sector 23 Learned Macroeconomic and Public Management 23 Recommendations for Rwanda 58 Assistance to Agriculture 25 Lessons Learned for Future Complex 61 Problems and Prospects 27 Emergencies Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda iii Summary WANDA IS A SMALL, mountainous, continued negotiations, in August 1994, 5densely populated country in Cen- that unknown forces shot down the plane tral Africa whose history has been marked carrying the Rwandan president as he was by ethnic violence. The economy is based returning from Arusha. Relative to the force on the largely rain-fed agricultural produc- it could have brought to bear on the situ- tion of small, semisubsistence, and increas- ation, the international community stood by ingly fragmented farms. The ethnic makeup silently and watched in horror as Rwanda of Rwanda before the recent civil war was erupted into a grim civil war: the RPF ad- 90 percent Hutu, 8 percent Tutsi and less vancing to stop annihilation of Tutsi; the than 1 percent Twa (an aboriginal group). Hutu extremist-controlled army and militia For 500 years the traditionally cattle-herd- bent singlemindedly on exterminating their ing Tutsi dominated the agriculturalist Hutu enemy. and hunter–potter Twa. In May 1995 a team from the Center for In 1962 the Hutu revolted against their Development Information and Evaluation increasing marginalization on ethnic (CDIE) of the U.S. Agency for International grounds. The revolt succeeded, largely be- Development (USAID) visited Rwanda for cause Belgian administrators shifted their a firsthand assessment of international as- support from the Tutsi aristocracy to the sistance to that country in the wake of the Hutu majority in response to the democratic civil war. This report synthesizes the team’s fervor sweeping across Africa. The recently findings. exiled regime, which came to power by coup in 1973, appeared to make important Assistance to Rwanda economic and social gains. But the apparent tranquillity and progress concealed unre- Helping the people of a war-torn nation solved social and political tensions as well rehabilitate and reconstruct their society is a as structural weaknesses within the econ- politically delicate process requiring sub- omy. stantial financial commitment and program- matic coherence from the international This was the context when, in October community. With Rwanda, the challenge 1990, the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front has been especially daunting because of the (RPF) launched from Uganda an offensive genocide, which resulted in the deaths of that had been in preparation for years. Con- 600,000–800,000 people and the sub- certed peace negotiations led ultimately to sequent exodus of 2 million. From April the August 1993 signing of the Arusha 1994 through the end of the year, the inter- (Tanzania) peace accords. It was during national community directed efforts largely Rebuilding Postwar Rwanda v at saving lives by providing food, shelter, Promoting Human Rights and and medical and sanitary services to refu- Buidling a Fair Judicial System gees and internally displaced persons. Emergency food aid was and continues to USAID and other donors have sup- be massive. It has prevented large-scale ported human rights initiatives in three key starvation and malnutrition. areas to promote national rebuilding: 1) es- tablishment of the International Tribunal for Attention began to shift toward reha- Rwanda, 2) reconstruction of the justice bilitation and reconstruction in September system, and 3) assistance to the UN Human 1994, when the international community Rights Field Operation. By May 1995, six grasped the enormity of the devastation. As months from its establishment, the tribunal the year progressed, the level of pledged had made only limited progress. From the assistance grew to slightly more than $1 outset, it had been facing problems of logis- billion. The United States, largely through tics, funding, and staffing, causing long de- USAID, has been a major provider of funds lays. With staffing changes in October 1995, the pace of investigations stepped up. and other resources. Thirteen months from its establishment, the Disbursing financial assistance to the tribunal issued its first indictments of sus- new Tutsi-led government raises a range of pected war criminals, four alleged leaders of problems, such as absorptive capacity and the genocide. Despite recent progress, de- issues of legitimacy and accountability. In lays in establishing the tribunal and making light of potential social, political, and eco- it operational have postponed reconcili- nomic costs of delays, financial support for ation, which can hardly be expected to oc- national recovery has been painfully slow. cur in the absence of justice. According to the UN Development Pro- If Rwanda is to establish a legal system gram, by September 1995, nine months that helps ensure the rights of all citizens, it from the initial pledging conference, about must construct a justice system that substan- one third (US$245 million) of the initial tially improves on that which previously funds pledged had been disbursed. By existed. Several assistance initiatives are year’s end, roughly half the funds initially under way. But these programs do not ap- pledged had been disbursed. proach the level of assistance that was broadly recognized as being required to re- Of the more than US$2 billion spent on start the justice system. The real challenge, the Rwandan crisis since April 1994, the however, is not so much one of marshaling vastly larger share has gone to maintenance sufficient human and technical resources as of refugees in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. of putting into place a new political culture Although such a disproportionate allocation in which differences are settled through dis- is understandable—refugees must be sup- cussion and accommodation and not ported—it appears to Rwandans who have through violence and bloodshed. lived through the horror of genocide that the The UN commissioner for human international community is more concerned rights and the Government of Rwanda about the refugees than the survivors. agreed to deployment of 147 human rights vi USAID Special Study No. 76 field officers, one for each of the country’s of growth and development 2) and keeping communes. The Human Rights Field Op- public recurrent expenditure under control. eration for Rwanda aims to investigate the USAID and others have been largely genocide, monitor the human rights situ- responsible for funding agriculture rehabili- ation, help reestablish confidence, and pro- tation programs. The most notable of these vide technical assistance in administration have been providing seeds and tools to farm of justice. Informed observers feel the households, multiplying local varieties of human rights operation has failed to accom- major crops, and assisting the Ministry of plish its stated mission. Its impact in Agriculture. In particular, over two seasons, preventing human rights violations and pro- each household received a “package” of moting human rights has been minimal. It bean, maize, sorghum, and vegetable seeds should, however, be recognized that many and one or two hoes. Fifty percent of farm- factors, some of which were beyond the ers were reached in the first season, 80 per- control of the field operation, have contrib- cent in the second. But some relief person- uted to its poor performance. Clearly the nel