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Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006

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Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 October 2006 ABBREVIATIONS ANP Afghan National Police CPEF Central Poppy Eradication Force GPS Global Positioning System ICMP UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme MCN Ministry of Counter Narcotics MoI Ministry of Interior RAS UNODC Research and Analysis Section UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The following institutions and individuals contributed to the implementation of the 2006 opium survey in Afghanistan, and to the preparation of the present report: Survey and Monitoring Direcotorate of the Ministry of Counter- Narcotics, Afghanistan x Mohammad Ibrahim Azhar (Director) x Thasbeehullah (Deputy Director) x Sher Mohd Walizada (Deputy Director Annual Survey) x Survey Coordinators: Khalili Jan (Central Zone); Abdul Mateen (Nangarhar Zone); Ishaq (Badakshan Zone); Hashmatullah (Kandarhar Zone); Fida Mohammad (Balkh Zone); Latif (Herat Zone) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Kabul) x Doris Buddenburg (Representative) x Hakan Demirbuken (Survey Project Manager, RAS/ICMP) x Shirish Ravan (Remote Sensing Expert, RAS/ICMP) x Nazir Ahmad Shah (National Project Coordinator) x Ziuddin Zaki (Data Analyst) x Patrick Halewood (Consultant) x Abdul Mannan Ahmadzai (Administrative Assistant) x Zia Ulhaq (Data Entry Clerk) x Regional Coordinators: Mohammad Alam Ghaleb (Nangarhar Zone), Fazal Mohammad Fazli (Kandahar Zone), Lutfurahman Lutfi (Balkh Zone), Mohammad Alem Yaqubi (Badakhshan Zone), Altaf Hussain Joya (Herat Zone) x Survey Coordinators: Abdul Basir (Nangarhar Zone); Fawad Alaei (Herat Zone); Mohammad Rafi (Badakshan Zone); Abdul Jalil (Balkh Zone); Palwal (Kandarhar Zone) x Segment data collection experts: Sayed Ahmad, Abdul Rahim Marikh United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna) Anja Korenblik (Manager, RAS/ICMP), Thibault le Pichon (Chief, RAS), Thomas Pietschmann (Research Officer, RAS), Martin Raithelhuber (Programme Officer, RAS/ICMP), Patrick Seramy (Database Management, RAS/ICMP). The implementation of the survey would not have been possible without the dedicated work of the field surveyors, who often faced difficult security conditions. The implementation of UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme and the opium survey in Afghanistan in 2006 was made possible thanks to financial contributions from the Governments of the United Kingdom, Finland, and the United States of America. This report, and other ICMP survey reports can be downloaded from: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop_monitoring.html Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 CONTENTS PREFACE..................................................................................................................................... III FACT SHEET - AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2006........................................................1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.............................................................................................................3 1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................21 2 FINDINGS ..................................................................................................................................22 2.1 OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION ........................................................................................................ 22 2.2 OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION DENSITY ...................................................................................... 44 2.3 CANNABIS CULTIVATION.............................................................................................................. 45 2.4 OPIUM YIELD .................................................................................................................................... 45 2.5 ERADICATION................................................................................................................................... 52 2.6 POTENTIAL OPIUM PRODUCTION................................................................................................ 66 2.7 SECURITY........................................................................................................................................... 68 2.8 OPIUM FARMERS.............................................................................................................................. 68 2.9 REASONS FOR NON-CULTIVATION, STOPPING OR GROWING OPIUM POPPY ................... 72 2.10 LOANS................................................................................................................................................. 74 2.11 EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AND FARMERS EXPECTATIONS..................................................... 76 2.12 INCOME GENERATION FOR FARMERS........................................................................................ 78 2.13 ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION................................................................................................................... 81 2.14 OPIUM PRICES................................................................................................................................... 83 2.15 MIGRATION ....................................................................................................................................... 88 2.16 POTENTIAL VALUE AND INCOME TO FARMERS...................................................................... 90 2.17 OPIUM AND HEROIN TRAFFICKING............................................................................................. 93 2.18 POTENTIAL VALUE AND INCOME TO THE AFGHAN ECONOMY .......................................... 95 3 METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................................99 3.1 OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION ........................................................................................................ 99 3.2 AREA FRAME SAMPLING TOOLS (FST) METHODOLOGY FOR CULTIVATION ESTIMATION (TRIAL) .................................................................................................................... 111 3.3 VILLAGE SURVEY METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 113 3.4 OPIUM YIELD AND PRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 117 3.5 OPIUM PRICE................................................................................................................................... 118 3.6 OPIUM GROWING FAMILIES........................................................................................................ 118 3.7 VALUE OF OPIUM PRODUCTION AT FARMGATE LEVEL...................................................... 120 3.8 VALUE OF AFGHAN OPIATES IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES .......................................... 122 4 ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................135 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 ANNEX 1: OPIUM CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN PER PROVINCE, 2002-2006 (HECTARES)..... 137 ANNEX 2 INDICATIVE DISTRICT LEVEL ESTIMATIONS OF OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION,1994- 2006 (IN HECTARES) ..................................................................................................................................... 138 ANNEX 3: ERADICATION VERIFICATION ESTIMATES BY DISTRICT (HECTARES)........................ 146 ii Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 PREFACE This is the full report of the opium survey of Afghanistan that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime made public in September 2006. There was considerable alarm when it was announced that opium cultivation in Afghanistan rose to 165,000 hectares in 2006, a 59% increase over 2005. This 6,100 tons of opium gives Afghanistan the dubious distinction of having nearly a monopoly of the world heroin market. Major traffickers, warlords and insurgents are reaping the profits of this bumper crop to spread instability, infiltrate public institutions, and enrich themselves. Afghanistan is moving from narco- economy to narco-state. While criminals prosper, the rest of society suffers. In Afghanistan, opium is choking development and democratization. The rule of the bullet and the bribe exists where there is no rule of law. In countries neighbouring Afghanistan, there is a serious risk of a worsening HIV/AIDS epidemic spreading through intravenous heroin injection. Downstream, in traditional Western European markets, health officials should brace for a rise in the number of deaths from drug overdoses as this year’s bumper opium crop will lead to higher-purity doses of heroin. I have written to health officials and mayors, warning them of the dangers. More should be done – particularly in rich countries – to improve drug prevention and treatment. I suspect that in years to come this opium survey will be regarded as a key document in mapping the fate of Afghanistan. Either it will demonstrate the peak of Afghanistan’s opium problem, or the tipping point at which the country descended into chaos. In the months ahead we must redouble our efforts to ensure that it is the former and not the latter. Antonio Maria Costa Executive Director UNODC iii Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 iv Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 FACT SHEET - AFGHANISTAN OPIUM SURVEY 2006 2005 Difference on 2005 2006 Net opium poppy cultivation 104,000 ha 59% 165,000 ha In percent of agricultural land 2.30% 3.65% In percent of global cultivation 62% 82% Number of provinces affected 26 28 Eradication
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