'Framing' the European Union

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'Framing' the European Union ‘FRAMING’ THE EUROPEAN UNION: EXPLAINING THE 2005 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDA RESULTS Ece Ozlem Atikcan Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal June 2010 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Ph.D. in Political Science © Ece Ozlem Atikcan, 2010 ABSTRACT The 2005 European Union (EU) constitutional referenda results reflected growing Euroscepticism. While the referenda in Spain and Luxembourg approved the European Constitution (TCE), the ones in France and the Netherlands rejected it. Polls show that public opinion in all four countries originally favored the TCE several months before the referenda. Why could this initial positive public opinion not be sustained in the French and Dutch cases? I argue that the stronger a state’s No campaign relative to its Yes campaign – that is, the better the No campaigners linked existing contentious issues to the European Constitution – the greater the increase in the magnitude of the No vote. Based on 96 in-depth interviews with campaigners, media content analyses and public opinion data from all cases, I show that the initial favorable public opinion in the French and Dutch cases fell dramatically due to strong No campaigns because the French and Dutch No campaigners framed the issue effectively. The framing literature argues that politicians encourage voters to think along particular lines, by using frames that emphasize certain features of the subject. Vivid, concrete, image-provoking, emotionally compelling frames that contain negative information are more successful in influencing individuals’ opinions. In the French and Dutch cases, the No frames argued that the TCE would increase immigration, lead to market- friendly reforms, and cause rising unemployment. In contrast, the Yes campaign frames sounded overly technical, presenting the TCE as an institutional step towards a better Europe. Negative, immediate linkages to existing problems won over abstract, non-immediate benefits. Strong No campaigns successfully countered the initial favorable public opinion in these referenda. Nevertheless, I also argue that the temporal sequencing of the referenda could affect the relative strength of the No campaign in second-mover states; all campaigns were therefore not created equal. The later a state held its referendum, the more the previous referenda campaigns could influence campaign dynamics. However, this diffusion effect was not automatic and depended on channels such as shared language/culture, common media sources, and collaborative networks/transnational linkages. Where these channels were present and the campaign of the first-mover state was intense, diffusion amplified the strength of referenda campaigns in second-mover states. RÉSUMÉ Les résultats des référendums constitutionnels de l'Union européenne de 2005 ont reflété un euroscepticisme croissant au sein de l’Union. Bien que les référendums en Espagne et au Luxembourg aient approuvé la Constitution européenne (TCE), ceux de la France et des Pays-Bas ont rejeté la proposition de réforme. Les sondages de l’époque montrent que l'opinion publique dans ces quatre pays favorisait le TCE quelques mois avant les référendums. Pourquoi cette opinion publique favorable ne s’est pas maintenue dans les cas français et néerlandais? Je soutiens que plus forte était la campagne du Non par rapport à celle du Oui – c’est à dire plus il existait des liens entre le référendum et des enjeux locaux controversés – plus élevé s’en trouvait le support pour le Non le jour du vote. Cette analyse se base sur une série de 96 entrevues en profondeur menées auprès de militants, des analyses de contenu média et des données d’opinion publique. Dans les cas français et néerlandais, l’opinion favorable du public a considérablement diminué suite à l’usage d’un meilleur cadre cognitif durant la campagne par le camp du Non. La littérature sur le cadrage cognitif suggère que les politiciens encouragent les électeurs à garder en tête un ordre d’idées particulier, grâce à un argumentaire qui met l'accent sur certaines caractéristiques de l’enjeu. Des images vives et concrètes, en plus de messages négatifs sont plus efficaces pour agir sur l’opinion des individus. Dans les cas français et néerlandais, le cadrage cognitif du Non a soutenu que le TCE augmenterait l'immigration, conduirait à des réformes favorables au marché, et provoquerait la montée du chômage. Par contre, le cadrage cognitif de la campagne du Oui s’est montré trop technique en présentant le TCE comme une étape institutionnelle vers une Europe meilleure. Des liens négatifs et immédiats avec les problèmes locaux existants ont donc remporté la bataille contre les avantages abstraits et non immédiats présentés par le camp du Oui. Les fortes campagnes du Non ont neutralisé la première opinion favorable du public dans ces référendums. De plus, je soutiens que l’ordre chronologique des référendums peut influencer la force relative des campagnes nationales. Toutes les campagnes ne sont donc pas créées égales. Cependant, cet effet de diffusion n'est pas automatique et dépend de facteurs tels que la langue et/ou culture communes, des sources médiatiques partagées et des réseaux de collaboration transnationaux. Lorsque ces facteurs sont présents et les campagnes précédentes intenses, la diffusion amplifie la force des campagnes au sein des référendums ultérieurs. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments vi List of figures and tables ix List of abbreviations xiv Chapter 1: The Puzzle of EU Referenda 1 Understanding Attitudes towards the EU 3 Understanding the EU Referenda Results 5 Understanding the 2005 Constitutional Referenda Results 10 The Comparative Framework: Ruling out Existing Explanations 14 The Argument 19 Dependent Variable: The Magnitude of the No Vote 20 Independent Variable: Relative No Campaign Strength 20 Conditioning Variable: Diffusion 21 Analytical Framework 23 Cases 24 Methodology 30 Interviews and campaign materials 31 Media content analysis 33 Public opinion data 34 Structure of the Dissertation 37 Chapter 2: Analyzing EU Referendum Campaigns 38 Relative No Campaign Strength 38 Campaigns in the Public Opinion Literature 39 Agenda-setting and Priming Theories 40 Framing 42 Framing in the public opinion literature 43 i Framing in the social movements literature 50 Strength of Political Campaigns 54 Referendum Campaigns 55 2005 EU Constitutional Referendum Campaigns: The Analytical Framework 63 Diffusion 67 Shared Language/Culture 72 Common Media Channels 73 Collaborative Networks/Transnational Linkages 73 Institutional networks 73 Personal connections 76 Preview of the Case Findings 78 Chapter 3: Spain: The Quiet Case 82 Evolution of the Public Opinion 85 Discontent with Domestic and EU Governance 86 Contention concerning domestic politics 86 Contention concerning the EU 92 Political Party Attitudes towards Europe 96 The Long Campaign 98 Agenda-setting 100 Priming and Framing 101 Content of the campaign frames 101 Relative strength of the campaign frames 106 Credibility of the Speakers 114 Mobilizational Structures 115 Analysis of the Vote 119 Shifts over Time 119 Media Content Analyses 119 ii Public Opinion Data 122 Diffusion 128 The Quiet Campaign 132 List of Personal Interviews 134 Chapter 4: France: The Momentum Case 135 Evolution of the Public Opinion 137 Discontent with Domestic and EU Governance 138 Contention concerning domestic politics 138 Contention concerning the EU 144 Political Party Attitudes towards Europe 146 The Long Campaign 151 Agenda-setting 153 Priming and Framing 155 Content of the campaign frames 155 Relative strength of the campaign frames 159 Credibility of the Speakers 165 Mobilizational Structures 168 Analysis of the Vote 172 Shifts over Time 173 Media Content Analyses 175 Public Opinion Data 178 Diffusion 186 The Momentum Campaign 190 List of Personal Interviews 191 Chapter 5: The Netherlands: The Turmoil Case 192 Evolution of the Public Opinion 194 Discontent with Domestic and EU Governance 195 iii Contention concerning domestic politics 196 Contention concerning the EU 203 Political Party Attitudes towards Europe 206 The Long Campaign 209 Agenda-setting 211 Priming and Framing 212 Content of the campaign frames 212 Relative strength of the campaign frames 215 Credibility of the Speakers 227 Mobilizational Structures 229 Analysis of the Vote 232 Shifts over Time 232 Media Content Analyses 233 Public Opinion Data 235 Diffusion 247 The Turmoil Campaign 252 List of Personal Interviews 255 Chapter 6: Luxembourg: The Diffusion Case 256 Evolution of the Public Opinion 259 Discontent with Domestic and EU Governance 259 Contention concerning domestic politics 260 Contention concerning the EU 268 Political Party Attitudes towards Europe 271 The Long Campaign 274 Agenda-setting 275 Priming and Framing 276 Content of the campaign frames 276 iv Relative strength of the campaign frames 279 Credibility of the Speakers 288 Mobilizational Structures 290 Analysis of the Vote 293 Shifts over Time 293 Media Content Analyses 295 Public Opinion Data 296 Diffusion 303 The Diffusion Campaign 319 List of Personal Interviews 322 Chapter 7: Conclusion 323 Contribution to the EU Literature 330 The Double EU Referenda 332 Broader Theoretical Implications 337 Policy Implications for Europe 339 Bibliography 342 Appendix: Research Ethics Approval 360 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is a great pleasure to express my gratitude to those who made this dissertation possible. I owe my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Juliet Johnson.
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