KVÜÕA TOIMETISED 13/2010 ■ CONTRIBUTORS 3 KAITSEVÄE ÜHENDATUD ÕPPEASUTUSED KVÜÕA TOIMETISED 13/2010 ■ Tartu 2010 TEGEVTOIMETAJA (executive editor): Andres Saumets (Estonia) TOIMETUS (editorial board): Ken Kalling (Estonia) Alar Kilp (Estonia) Peeter Kukk (Estonia) Rain Liivoja (Finland) Enno Mõts (Estonia) Erik Männik (Estonia) Andreas Pawlas (Germany) Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Germany) Volker Stümke (Germany) KEELETOIMETAJAD (language editors): Karen Kuldnokk (Estonia) Epp Leete (Estonia) Roy Lowthian (United Kingdom) Reet Hendrikson (Estonia) Kristiina Haug (Estonia) David W. E. Thomas (United Kingdom) KOLLEEGIUM (editorial council): Aarne Ermus (Estonia) Wilfried Gerhard (Germany) Rudolf Hamann (Germany) Jakob Kübarsepp (Estonia) Ants Laaneots (Estonia) Raul Mälk (Estonia) Ago Pajur (Estonia) Eric Allan Sibul (USA) Villu Tamul (Estonia) Peeter Tulviste (Estonia) Matti Turtola (Finland) ISSN 1736–0242 Autoriõigus: Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused, 2010 Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus www.tyk.ee SISUKORD ■ Toomas Möls Critical and Creative Thinking: Are Innovation and Initiative Welcome in the Military? ........................................................................................ 7 Jaan Murumets Võimepõhise planeerimise alused ........................................................... 18 Toomas Tõniste Taktikaliste otsustusmängude kasutamine jalaväekompanii lahingutegevuse juhtimise õpetamiseks ................................................... 34 Merle Parmak Adverse Effects of Tobacco Use in Deployed Military Units ................. 62 S. Ganina, H. Voolaid The Influence of Problem Solving on Studying Effectiveness in Physics 80 Andres Parve Koguva maavabad Liivimaa vasalliteenistuse ja 16. sajandi sõdade kontekstis ................................................................................................. 93 Andres Seene Vabariigi sõjakooli asutamine ja selle esimese, vabadussõja-aegse lennu lõpetajad .................................................................................................. 123 Eve Kubi Eesti Vabariigi ja NSV Liidu vaheline vastastikuse abistamise leping ning sellest lähtuvad hilisemad kokkulepped .......................................... 167 Wilfried Gerhard Patterns of American Foreign and Security Policy .................................. 197 Alar Kilp Protestantism rassismi õigustajana Ameerika Ühendriikide, Lõuna-Aafrika vabariigi ja Austraalia näitel ........................................... 211 Andres Saumets Riigi ja kiriku suhete ideed ning praktika ameerikaliku vabakirikliku paradigma taustal ..................................................................................... 235 SUMMARIES ......................................................................................... 285 CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING: ARE INNOVATION AND INITIATIVE WELCOME IN THE MILITARY? TOOMAS MÖLS ■ INTRODUCTION The purpose of this paper is to discuss the direction in which the command philosophy of the Western militaries is moving. We live in a time of rapid change. The developed world has been living in an information society for some time now, the nature of post-Cold War conflicts seems to be different from previous conflicts, and since 11 September 2001, we have been facing a new and very serious enemy – international terrorism on a truly devas- tating scale. All of these factors influence the development of the military and pose new requirements for the command structures and arrangements. This paper attempts to provide some insight into the factors influencing the development of modern armed forces. It begins with an outline of the nature of war, especially its unchanging features followed by a description of different command philosophies. The study then turns to the question of how the different aspects of modern warfare and the present armed forces influen- ce the command philosophy used. An insight is provided through looking at the nature of joint planning, personnel policies, evolving leadership styles and the influence of modern technological developments. The article con- cludes with a summary and conclusions. THE PHENOMENON OF WAR Human history, the evolution of societies and their technological develop- ment have been closely interrelated and influenced by the need to achieve success and survive in armed conflict. So far it seems to be the permanent tragedy of human history and man seems to be unable to free himself from the menace of war1. Nowadays, centuries later, the nature of war is still as described by Clausewitz in his famous book “On War”. It is the realm of ultimate 1 Hooker, R. D. 2005. Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War. – Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, June 22, 2005, p. 4. 8 TOOMAS MÖLS uncertainty. Almost three quarters of the factors on which action in warfare is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty2. It is highly ironic that of all human activities war most closely resembles a game of cards3. Battle is chaos on a grand scale, with chance playing an important role continually4. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events5. After 2001 the enemy has also been changed, gone is the reassurance and safety of a well-known, predictable and easily-contemplated enemy. The conclusion is that, the individuals, units and formations have to be agile flexible and capable of responding to the unforeseen and unexpected6. Presently, the conduct of war in the Western world seems to be changing. Modern democratic states employ extremely advanced means of waging armed conflict. Technology has increased the distance at which the targets may be effectively engaged, it has enhanced the precision and lethality of weapons used, and reduced the time needed to train for war. For developed and wealthy states, cutting-edge technology supports trend towards main- taining smaller, more professional, and more expensive militaries equipped with precision weaponry and networked sensors. However, there are other factors that are as crucial as technology to the outcome of armed combat7. In addition, modern democratic states seem to have different war aims than they used to have in the past. Strategist Colin Cray asks with reasonable justification: “What defines success? Is it displacing Osama Bin Laden?” But anyway, all the solutions have to be politically and morally tolerable, he concludes8. This means that for commanders in the XXI century the options of using force are always restricted. Traditionally, an attack has been expected to lead to dominance over an opposing force, and the desired end- state of war has been the comprehensive defeat of the enemy. Yet even Clausewitz pointed out that the conquest of the whole territory of an oppo- nent is not always necessary, and on the other hand – total occupation of his territory may not be enough9. The lack of desire to occupy the territory of an opponent is very visible in modern conflicts. It underlines the growing 2 Clausewitz, Carl von. 1976. On War. Ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, p. 101. 3 Clausewitz 1976, p. 86. 4 Clancy, Tom; Franks, Frederick M. 1997. Into the Storm: A Study in Com- mand. Kirkwood, N.Y.: Putnam Publishing Group, p. 129. 5 Clausewitz 1976, p. 101. 6 Horn, Bernd. 2003. Complexity squared: Operating in the Future Battlespace. – Command and Control, Autumn 2003, p. 8. 7 Hooker 2005, p. 11. 8 Gray, Colin. 2002. Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror. – Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 2002, p. 9. 9 Clausewitz 1976, p. 595. CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING 9 importance of political settlement as the desired end-state of conflict. Milita- ries should, then, plan carefully and act flexibly to achieve such an elusive goal. The Human Resource Management theorists state that our future strength, and often survival, will depend less on physical or financial assets and increasingly on our adaptation and lifelong learning10 and because of the rapid technological advances the “chaos” of battle and “fog of war” can be presently managed only by very qualified personnel. The level of experience of personnel involved in conducting armed combat operations is crucial. It seems to be the reality of life that if one is not personally experienced in war, it is hard to understand what the actual difficulties associated with war are, and why a commander must have intellectual brilliance and exceptional ability to lead11. THE COMMAND PRINCIPLES How does the commander fulfill his duties then? How can he lead and direct his forces under the conditions of utter uncertainty? To introduce the topic, I would like to make a brief review of command and control methods. Using the typology suggested by Czerwinski, we can reduce the com- mand philosophies to three basic options – command by direction, command by plan and command by influence12. Command-by-direction is claimed to be the oldest method of leading forces. It is neither centralized nor decentralized, but highly commander- dependant. This method is the so-called “play with one card” approach, which means that if the commander is a genius we win, otherwise we lose. Command-by-plan was implemented by Frederick the Great. He tried to plan every move in advance, relying on highly trained troops and strict discipline to carry out the (battle) scheme as ordered13. The most important legacy of that time for modern militaries is the tendency to do everything by the plan and to have highly centralized decision-making. ‘If