Escola De Economia E Gestão Karolina Magdalena Ryniak The

Escola de Economia e Gestão

Karolina Magdalena Ryniak

The Europeanization of Polish and Portuguese Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Perspective

Dissertação de Mestrado

Mestrado em Relações Internacionais

Trabalho realizado sob a orientação de:

Professora Doutora Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira

Professora Doutora Laura Cristina Ferreira-Pereira

abril de 2017

DECLARAÇÃO

NOME: Karolina Magdalena Ryniak

ENDEREÇO ELETRÓNICO: [email protected]

TELEFONE: +351939537099

NÚMERO DO PASSAPORTE: ARS196074

TÍTULO DA DISSERTAÇÃO: The Europeanization of Polish and Portuguese Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Perspective

ORIENTADORES: Professora Doutora Alena Vysotkaya Guedes Vieira

Professora Doutora Laura Cristina Ferreira-Pereira

ANO DE CONCLUSÃO: 2017

DESIGNAÇÃO DO MESTRADO: Mestrado em Relações Internacionais

1. É AUTORIZADA A REPRODUÇÃO INTEGRAL DESTA TESE/TRABALHO APENAS PARA EFEITOS DE INVESTIGAÇÃO, MEDIANTE DECLARAÇÃO ESCRITA DO INTERESSADO, QUE A TAL SE COMPROMETE;

2. É AUTORIZADA A REPRODUÇÃO PARCIAL DESTA TESE/TRABALHO (indicar, caso tal sejanecessário, nr máximo de páginas, ilustrações, gráficos, etc.), APENAS PARA EFEITOS DEINVESTIGAÇÃO, MEDIANTE DECLARAÇÃO ESCRITA DO INTERESSADO, QUE A TAL SE COMPROMETE;

3. DE ACORDO COM A LEGISLAÇÃO EM VIGOR, NÃO É PERMITIDA A REPRODUÇÃO DE QUALQUER PARTE DESTA TESE/TRABALHO

Universidade do Minho, __/__/____

Assinatura: ______

Acknowledgments

I would love to express my sincere gratitude to all those people who supported and inspired me in writing this thesis.

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors: Prof. Alena Vieira and Prof. Laura Ferreira- Pereira for their beneficial comments, remarks and engagement through the investigation work at every stage of the thesis. Their guidance was significant to me during the writing process, especially their expertise, commitment and patience.

My obrigada goes to all of the teachers that I met at Universidade do Minho for their support and help during my academic subjects.

I would like to thank all of my friends that I met during my stay in Porto who made this place unforgettable and always supported me in tough moments. My special thanks goes to Maria Luisa- one of the most inspiring ‘teachers’ I have ever met.

My big thank you goes to my sisters and best friends at the same time: Gosia, Anka, Kasia and Aga for their unlimited support, friendship and love. I am the luckiest person to have you all.

My greatest dziękuję goes to my Parents for the enormous support during my whole life and showing me what love and being loved mean. No word can express my feelings and gratitude toward you.

The last, but not the least, my biggest MERCI goes to the love and light of my life Pouya, the familiar stranger who changed my life. For his unconditional love, never stopping to believe in me and keeping a sense of humor when I had lost mine. I would never stop saying ‘thank you’ دوستت دارم! .for the things you have done for me

The Europeanization of Polish and Portuguese Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This thesis aims to compare the process of Europeanization of Portuguese and Polish foreign and security policies. The theoretical framework of this study is formed by the Europeanization approach, in order to explore the dynamic processes of foreign and security policy change. Against the background of the reviewed Europeanization concept, with a particular focus on Portugal and Poland, the thesis explores the similarities and differences between both countries in order to understand the impact of their historical backgrounds and time of accession on their individual process of Europeanization. The comparison provides a perspective highlighting the impact of democratization at this stage. The Europeanization process is also analyzed while being divided into two main phases: ‘downloading’ (adaptation of the EU rules and norms) and ‘uploading’ (projection of their national preferences into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) level). For Portugal, the ‘downloading’ stage explores the domestic adaptation and institutional changes and the ‘uploading’ phases reviews the three rotation Council Presidencies. In the case of Poland, the EU´s influence on national administrative structures during the ‘downloading’ process and promoting of the Eastern Dimension during the ‘uploading’ phase are studied. After this, the Europeanization process of both countries is compared by taking into account the different characteristics and spheres of interest, the challenges they faced, and the role of NATO in their foreign and security policies. The results of the comparison demonstrate that despite numerous differences, distinct ways of ‘uploading’ and national preferences, the Europeanization could be attained for both of them. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that a proper uploading can only be obtained through an effective downloading process. Finally, the dissertation concludes that the projecting of national interests (vis-á-vis Ukraine in case of Poland and towards the Lusophone world for Portugal) had been achieved in full compatibility and faithfulness to NATO.

Keywords: Portugal, Poland, Europeanization, CFSP, CSDP, NATO

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A Europeização das Políticas Externas e de Segurança de Portugal e da Polónia: Uma Perspectiva Comparativa

Resumo

Esta tese tem como objetivo estabelecer a comparação entre a Europeização das políticas externas e de segurança de Portugal e da Polónia. O contexto teórico deste estudo tem como base o fenómeno da Europeização de forma a explorar os processos dinâmicos de mudança nas políticas externas e de segurança. Esta tese tem início com a apresentação de uma revisão do conceito de Europeização com especial foco em Portugal e Polónia. Posteriormente, as similitudes e diferenças entre os dois países são estudadas de forma a interpretar o impato dos respetivos antecedentes históricos e datas de adesão na adaptação ao processo de Europeização. O estabelecimento desta comparação permite aos leitores compreender o impato da democratização nesta etapa. Em seguida, o processo de Europeização é dividido em duas etapas principais: a fase de ’downloading’ (adaptação às normas e leis da União Europeia) e de ’uploading’ (projecção das preferências nacionais no domínio da Política Externa e de Segurança Comum. Para Portugal, na fase ’downloading’ explora-se a adaptação doméstica e mudanças institucionais enquanto que na fase de ‘uploading’ revê-se o trio de Presidências rotativas do Conselho. No caso da Polónia, a influência da EU nas estruturas administrativas nacionais e a promoção da Eastern Dimension são estudadas durante as fases ‘downloading’ e ’uploading’, respetivamente. Em seguida, o processo de Europeização dos dois países é então comparado, tendo em consideração as características diferenciais e áreas de interesse, os desafios que enfrentaram e o papel da NATO nas suas políticas externas e de segurança. Os resultados deste estudo comparativo demonstraram que, apesar de existirem numerosas diferenças entre os dois países, distintas formas de ‘uploading’ e de preferências nacionais, a Europeização foi ser alcançada para ambos os países. Adicionalmente, foi também demonstrado que um ‘uploading’ adequado só poderá ser alcançado através de um processo de ‘downloading’ efectivo. Conclui-se também que a projecção dos interesses nacionais (relacionados com a Ucrânia, no caso da Polónia e com a Comunidade Lusófona para Portugal) foi alcançada com total compatibilidade e fidelidade à NATO.

Palavras-chave: Portugal, Polónia, Europeização, CFSP, CSDP, NATO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents 1. Introduction ...... 10 1.1. The state of the art ...... 13 1.2. Theoretical framework ...... 24 1.3. Research design ...... 27 1.3.1. Research problem ...... 27 1.3.2. Research question ...... 27 1.3.3. Research methods ...... 28 1.4. Structure of the dissertation...... 29 2. The Foreign and Security policies of Portugal and Poland: The Impact of Democratization .. 32 2.1 Introduction ...... 32 2.2 Collapse of the non-democratic regimes and reorientation of foreign policy goals ...... 33 2.3 Security and Atlanticism: Role of NATO and relations with USA ...... 36 2.4 Membership to the European Union ...... 39 3. Portuguese Foreign and Security Policies after EU’s accession: Examining ‘Uploading’ and ‘Downloading’ ...... 42 3.1. Introduction ...... 42 3.2. Domestic adaptation and institutional changes ...... 43 3.3. Portugal and the development of the CFSP/ESDP: From Atlanticism to Europeanism .... 47 3.4. Uploading national policies to the EU’s agenda: Rotation Council Presidencies ...... 51 3.4.1. The first Presidency 1992: ‘Learning by doing’ ...... 52 3.4.2. The second Presidency, 2000: ‘at the core of the integration process’ ...... 55 3.4.3. The third Presidency, 2007: ‘Stronger Europe for a better world’ ...... 57 3.5. Playing the Lusophone card ...... 59 3.6. Portugal and the ESDP missions ...... 63 3.7. Conclusions ...... 66 4. Polish Foreign and Security Policy within the EU ...... 69 4.1. Introduction ...... 69 4.2. Domestic dynamics after the EU enlargement ...... 69 4.3. EU’s influence on national administrative structures ...... 73

4.4. Special alliances: Weimar and Visegrad Group ...... 77 4.5. Poland as an Eastern agenda shaper ...... 78 4.6. Projection of the Eastern Dimension to the EU: 2003-2009 ...... 82 4.7. Polish contribution to the CFSP ...... 89 4.8. From skepticism to pragmatism: Polish approach toward ESDP ...... 94 4.9. Conclusions ...... 95 5. Portuguese and Polish Foreign and Security Policies: A Comparative Analysis ...... 97 5.1 Introduction ...... 97 5.2. Changes in foreign and security policies orientation ...... 98 5.3. Concerns related to joining the CFSP/ESDP ...... 99 5.4. National adaptation and domestic changes ...... 100 5.5. Introducing national interests and preferences ...... 103 5.6. Contribution to the CSDP and NATO missions and operations ...... 105 5.7. Conclusions ...... 106 6. Conclusions ...... 108 6.1 Main findings ...... 108 6.2 Future work/outlook ...... 112

List of Abbreviations

AAs- Associations Agreements

ACP- African Caribbean and Pacific

CEE- Central and Eastern Europe

CEECs- Central and Eastern European Countries

CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy

CICE- Interministerial Commission for the European Communities

COMECON- Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CPLP- Community of Portuguese Language Countries

CSDP- Common Security and Defense Policy

DCFTA- Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

DGAC- General-Directorate of European Communities

EaP- Eastern Partnership

EC- European Community

EEAS- European External Action Service

EEC- European Economic Community

EED- European Endowment of Democracy

EFTA- European Free Trade Association

ENP- European Neighborhood Policy

EPC- European Political Cooperation

ESDP- European Security and Defence Policy

EU- European Union

IGC- Intergovernmental Conference

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KERM- European Committee of the Council of Ministers

KIE- Committee for European Integration

MES- Ukraine Market Economy Status

MFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PCP- Partido Comunista Português

PREC- Processo Revolucionario em Curso

SEA- Single European Act

UKIE- Office for the European Integration

UN- United Nations

US- United States of America

USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEU- Western European Union

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List of Figures

Figure 1. Europeanization model based on Miskimmon (2003) ...... 24 Figure 2. Similarities and differences between Poland and Portugal in the Europeanization process...... 107 Figure 3. Comparison of Poland and Portugal positions at the initial phase of the EC/EU accession ...... 110 Figure 4. Comparison of Poland and Portugal in uploading their national preferences to the CFSP/CSDP ...... 111

List of Tables

Table 1. Model of Europeanization process Kaminska (2007) ...... 25 Table 2. Participation of Poland and Portugal in the military missions and operation of the ESDP/CSDP and NATO (2003-2015 period)...... 106

1. INTRODUCTION

Europeanization has attracted attention of many International Relations scholars. In this area, different European Union (EU) member states’ policies, positions, and processes have been investigated from various points of view, and in different areas (Ladrech, 1994; Kassim, 2000; Bulmer and Burch, 2001; Risse et al 2001; Olsen, 2002; Dyson and Goetz, 2002; Börzel 2002; Featherstone, 2003; Miskimmon, 2007). While there is no doubt that there have been numerous changes in both internal and external policies of the states that have been chosen for analysis i.e. Portugal and Poland, these variations have been often considered case-specific, depending on the particular country in question (Schmidt, 1997; Börzel, 1999; Bache, 2005). The change of the nature of the selected countries for this study, from non-members states to becoming a part of the EU, has been associated with different complications and obstacles. In this connection, the foreign policy has been considered as a special case for representing a challenging area due to the strong intergovernmental character of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Similar to CFSP, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been also debated in the context of Europeanization approach, applied to various states. Studying the mechanisms of Europeanization would need comprehensive understanding of the national security and defence policies. This includes, in particular, the role of NATO and its relationship with the EU, in the context of the Europeanization research stream. A closer attention to the Europeanization of the national foreign and security policies from this perspective seems crucial for identifying the individual character of foreign and security policies of the member states. Against this background, the focus of this research is the interdependence between the national level and the EU level in the fields of foreign, security policies, as well as the degree to which the actors are adapting themselves to the evolution of the CFSP/CSDP and how they have been trying to impact on these policies.

More concretely, this present project aims to investigate the process of Europeanization of Polish and Portuguese foreign and security policies in a comparative perspective. The selection of these two countries as case studies is firstly based on various common features that served as the basis of the comparative analysis that the present dissertation will offer. The first one is their geographical location on the fringes of the EU, i.e., on the EU’s Western and Eastern borders.

The second one is their Atlanticism, as reflected in their strong commitment to NATO’s activities and interests. Another common aspect is that for both Poland and Portugal, besides the ‘European option’, the centrality of NATO has always been their foreign and security policy priority. Despite the different types of regimes in Poland and Portugal, one can identify similarities in the process of transition of their foreign policies following the regime change. The democratization process that took place between 1970s and 1980s in Portugal and in 1990s- 2000s in Poland, led to the foundation of the Western model of democracy. Polish accession to the NATO and EU were treated as complementary means to accomplish the security in Central Europe, an issue of special importance to Poland, given its geopolitical position and the direct proximity to Russia and Germany. Poland saw an urgent need to integrate into Western structures, notably NATO, with the aim of obtaining the hard security guarantees that could secure its position in the region which can be considered falling into a ‘grey zone of security’. In spite of different historical background and variation in terms of their size, as well as different timing regarding the EU accession, Portugal and Poland have been facing various similar challenges since their accession, which included the deepening of CFSP and CSDP against the background of their Europeanization processes. While both countries were skeptical of CFSP at the beginning, both eventually adapted well to it and came to use it as a way to fulfill their interests and increase their influence inside the EU. This is to say, Portugal and Poland have clearly managed to master the uploading of their national interests and preferences to the EU level. In this connection, the present study also investigates to what extent there is a similarity between the two countries in terms of ‘uploading’ of their specific security and defense-related concerns within the European foreign and security policy.

In order to fully understand the process of Europeanization of foreign and security policies, this research aims to study both the bottom-up and the top-down dimensions of Europeanization. Both of these dimensions will be analyzed separately; however, the main focus will be the national projection in order to see how the both countries have been able to upload their national preferences to the EU level and shape the agenda of the CFSP/CSDP. Nonetheless,

11 it is important to note that this comparative study does not take into consideration the cross- loading approach of Europeanization.1

The most prominent example of the uploading of the Polish goals on the European level was the promotion of the Eastern Dimension initiative of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), in 2007, which proved Poland to be a successful agenda-setter in EU’s policy toward countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus, and a bridge-builder between East and West. In this position, Poland has strengthened the EU efforts to support democratization of Ukraine, while acting as Kiev’s ‘older brother’. Portuguese ‘return to Europe’ in 1986, which was preceded by a long negotiation process, eventually indicated the process of pro-European reorientation in its foreign and security policies. Acting as a ‘good student in the Community classroom’, (Vasconcelos, 2000), Portugal has actively contributed to shape the EU external agenda in order to avoid its marginalization as a peripheral country and a small state power. Since the establishment of CFSP, Portugal has been an important and active player, while placing special emphasis on the strategic cooperation with the EU, NATO, and the United States. Portuguese government, too, has been successful in uploading its national foreign policy interest into the European level. Portugal’s three Presidencies of the Council of the European Union (1992, 2000 and 2007) were significant in shaping the CFPS, and have promoted an upgrade of EU´s relations with the Lusophone world. For example, the first and second EU–Africa summits and the first EU–Brazil summit, organized during Portuguese EU Presidencies of the Council are cases in point. One of the most significant achievements, however, took place during the third Presidency, which was held under the motto ‘A Stronger Europe for a Better World’. During the third Presidency term, the Lisbon Treaty was successfully concluded and signed, without any doubts contributing to a boost of the country’s strategic status, not only in Europe but also worldwide (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007, 2008). As the country became a more visible player in foreign affairs, it was easier to project its national foreign policy goals at the European level and also including the Lusophone world. The three Portuguese EU Council Presidencies provided an opportunity to shape the EU foreign policy agenda, notably to strengthen Europe’s dialogue with Latin America and Africa.

1 Quite recently, considerable attention has been paid to the cross-loading approach as a further dimension of Europeanization. Some authors such as (Lenschow, 2006) argued, that Europeanization should not be seen only as a top-down and bottom-up vertical process but also as the horizontal one where the policies and concepts are transferred among states and the EU. Moreover, according to (Radaelli, 2000), in core of this approach is a process of socialization and learning amongst EU Member States, which is not controlled by any of the EU institutions. 12

Among major goals of both Portugal and Poland’s foreign and security policy goals, have always been the promotion of close ties with the United States, perceived in both countries as the major guarantor of security in Europe. Their loyalty to Washington can be seen their support of the military Operation Allied Force against Serbia during the Kosovo War in 1999 and the Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq, in 2003. Moreover, NATO has always been a backbone of national security and collective defense for both countries, with the CSDP being considered as a complementary project to the CFSP/CSDP. In addition, Poland and Portugal took a series of initiatives in order to support the CSDP and have actively been taking part in most of the CSDP’s missions and operations.

1.1. The state of the art

“Europeanization can be a useful entry-point for a greater understanding of important changes occurring in our politics and society. The obligation of the researchers is to give it a precise meaning”

[K. Fatherstone]

The analytical approach of Europeanization has gained increased interest among scholars around the world over the last two decades, and generally perceived as a “fashionable” (Olsen, 2002), “faddish” (Featherstone, 2003), as well a “highly contested concept” (Kassim, et al’, 2000). As the Europeanization research has evolved, the term has been used to describe a variety of phenomena and processes, while a consensual and precise definition has been missing (Olsen, 2002; Kassim, 2000; Borzel, 1999, Radaelli, 2000, Mair 2004). What then, is Europeanization? And how is defined in literature? A group of scholars in this field understand Europeanization as a construction and development of the EU’s institutions of governance (Green Cowles et al 2001; Borzel 2003; Radaelli 200; Rise 2001) “that formalize and routinize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules” (Bartolini, et al 1999), while placing the emphasis on the domestic impact of European integration (Graziano and Vink, 2007). Others discuss about the scope of Europeanization, arguing if it should be limited only to the impact of the EU on member states (Featherstone

2003; Risse et al 2001) or rather seen from a much wider perspective, taking into consideration sociological and historical conditions or intercultural dimensions (Flockhart 2007; Howell 2004).

A significant amount of the Europeanization literature has been focused on two main dimensions: top-down (downloading) and bottom-up (uploading). In the context of downloading, Europeanization is seen as a process of change in the domestic policy processes and politics of the member states level as a result of pressures coming from the EU. Ladrech (1994) provides one of the earliest definitions of the top-down approach, while seeing Europeanization as a process by which the EU is able to influence the domestic policies and institutions. Correspondingly, Buller and Gamble (2002), as well as Hix and Goetz (2000), see Europeanization as an impact of the EU governance system on the policies and behavior of the member states.

Research on top-down Europeanization also examines the importance of the goodness of fit statement. The respective argument, according to Risse et al. (2001), holds that the main factor which regulates changes in domestic polity and politics is the degree of compatibility of the arrangements between the EU and member states. In other words, if the politics and policies of the EU are fully compatible with those at the domestic level, member states are not obliged to change their legal provision, which means that the Europeanization process acquires a less challenging character. Moreover, Bache and Jordan (2006) state that Europeanization cannot even happen without such a pressure of the EU, which is conceived as a sufficient condition for successful Europeanization process. From this point of view, some ‘misfit’ (Duina 1999) and ‘mismatch’ (Heritier et al.1996) between the politics, institutions, and processes on the European level and national one have to exist (Börzel and Risse, 2003). The top-down approaches have made an important contribution to explain the changes in member states policies as a result of accession to the EU. Nevertheless, there are many scholars who criticized this approach for its excessive simplicity. Börzel (2005: 60), for instance, argues that top-down approach is focused on only one-way interaction between the EU and national policies of member states, calling them just a “passive receivers of European demands for domestic change”. In his view, this approach disregards two-way process of ‘downloading’ and ‘projecting’ of the national policies at the European level. In the same vein, Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) and George (2001) state that member states are not just inactive recipients of the EU influence, and agree that

Europeanization should be considered as a two-way process. Similarly, Bache and Marshall (2004) point out that the success of uploading is determined by a fruitful downloading. Other groups of scholars in this field focus their research on the bottom-up approach of Europeanization which explains how member states are able to shape and upload their policies into the European level (Bulmer and Burch, 2001; Börzel 2002; S. James 2007). For Radaelli (2003: 30), Europeanization is the

Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.

In this definition, Europeanization is seen as a dependent variable plus interactive process, and goes beyond the conception of the EU influence on domestic politics. Similarly, Börzel (2005) states that in order to maximize profits and minimize the costs of the EU policies, the best way is to ‘upload’ national interests to the European level. Moreover, it may be a beneficial process for member states and will help to avoid changes and modifications in specific sectors of policy (Hang, 2011). In the same vein, Vale (2011) notes that taking into account ‘two-way’ Europeanization is useful in terms of clarifying the limitation of influence of member states, since he assumes that after uploading the national policies to the European level, they are additionally discussed and revised. Thus, member states cannot have a direct impact on the EU policy outcomes. Nevertheless, linking together the top-down and bottom-up approaches creates a huge methodological challenge for Europeanization research. If the two dimensions are seen as mutually influencing each other, the borders between independent and dependent variables are becoming fuzzy and difficult to differentiate (Alecu de Flers, 2010). In this context, Börzel (2001, 2003) points out the important role of the national governments in relation to EU institutions, describing them as a takers and shapers of the EU policies.

It is notable that some authors are focused on specific aspects of Europeanization, such as the changes in domestic institutions of member states which make the explanation too narrow and limited, while others consider wider theoretical implications while trying to employ a variety of interpretation of the term (Radaeli and Pasquiem 2007, Kassim 2000). Similarly, Dyson and

Goetz (2002) point out, that when it comes to a narrow usage of the term, scholars tend to bring up aspects of implementation of the EU legislation, while when talking more broadly, they emphasize policy transfer and learning inside the EU. Accordingly, Flockhart (2010) notices that many authors emphasize only political processes while excluding others. In this way, Radaelli (2000) claims that Europeanization is not easy to define, because in some way, all of the things “have been touched” by Europe, thus all these things have been Europeanized. Other discuss if Europeanization itself is an effect of integration rather a new way of creation of the European governing model (Koukis, 2001, Harmsen, 2000). Featherstone (2003) sets forward the argument that Europeanization cannot be classified as a theory, but rather a conceptual framework. Moreover, Olsen (2002) has raised a question about usefulness of this confusing term, while eventually concluding that, “It may be premature to abandon the term”.

In contrast to other policy fields, including those related with the EU’s first pillar, foreign and security policies have been much less analyzed and studied (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). Several authors (Miskimmon, 2007; Tonra, 2001; Torreblanca, 2001; Wong, 2005; Gross, 2009; Aleu de Flers, 2010), however, have made important contribution to this field. According to Alecu de Flers (2010), lack of attention to the Europeanization of foreign policy can be explained by a specific character of CFSP and in particular its strongly intergovernmental character which stands in contrast with the common policies associated to the first pillar. The author also argues that the distinction between the first and second pillars in terms of Europeanization can often be misleading, because the dynamics of Europeanization may be different in policy areas in the first pillar of EU. Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) point out that there is no single logic of Europeanization beyond the communitarized / EU policy areas, which is not the case of the foreign policy that is based upon non-hierarchical and voluntary basis as there is no clear obligation of adapting EU policy into the member states. In the same vein, Kaminska (2007) and Pomorska (2011) maintain that the dynamics of Europeanization in foreign policy areas differ from other policy fields as in this specific case there is no legal pressure or procedures of implementation and the European Court of Justice does not have any prerogatives. Torreblanca (2001) indicates that we cannot classify foreign policy as just another public policy; therefore, the Europeanization of this specific matter will follow a unique trajectory. In this connection, Risse et al. (2001) suggest that one of the important factors in this process is not only the adaptation of common rules, but also the learning dynamics. Accordingly, Schimmelfennig

(2001) claims that learning can be successful only when national actors are able to change norms and values and the way of thinking. Some of the authors such as Dumka (2013), de Flers (2010), Pomorska (2011), and Wong (2005) emphasize the importance of the mechanisms of the Europeanization of foreign policy such as socialization and learning as the key elements for successful policy adaptation.

According to de Flers (2010:12), the way of adaptation of foreign policy is different in individual member states, which is determined by many aspects such as size, historical variables, or the “extent of a state’s foreign relation network”. This view is supported by Miksimmon (2007) and Gross (2009) who argue that the larger member states are shapers, rather than takers, of European foreign policy. In addition, Tonra (2000) holds that the impact of the EU is usually more visible on the smaller member states. In the view of Kaminska (2010), however, the size of the individual countries is less important in comparison with the skillful entrepreneurship, the capability to shape the policy-making process, and the ability to build coalitions or affective cooperation with other member states. These tools, according to Kaminska, are necessary in order to be a visible player in the EU external relations.

With the regard of the Europeanization of Polish foreign policy, the respective literature has been recently increasing (Kaminska 2007, 2010, 2014; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Pomorska, 2011, 2014; Rapacki 2012; Nagorski 2014; Dumka 2013). All of the cited studies emphasize the Polish adaptation and learning process, as well as its impact on the CFSP, while especially focusing on the case of the Eastern Partnership. Poland is often referred to as an example of successful Europeanization process both in terms of the national adaptation of the EU policies, as well as of the projection of its preferences onto the European level. Brennan (2005) points out the fact that Poland is the largest country that had joined the European Union in 2004 and has been an important player in the EU region and NATO strategies since then. Copsey and Pomorska (2008) move further, claiming that the EU enlargement to the East could be even called the “Polish enlargement” due to the country’s population and economic weight in comparison to other Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). As Zaborowski (2004) claims, the closer integration with the West was caused by the regional defense reasons, especially the threat from Russia and concern to be left out in the ‘grey zone of security’. Moreover, Kaminska (2007) maintains that due to the former experience and geopolitical

17 position, Poland needed strong security guarantees, and therefore the accession to the EU and NATO was the only way to guarantee security for both the country and the region. She also highlights the difficulties of the Polish situation before the accession as a post-communist country, and its weak bargaining position soon after the enlargement in 2004, which, however, have not prevented Poland from becoming the front-runner in its successful adaptation to the CFSP. Nagorski (2014) argues that the reason of this integration, which turned out to be effective in spite of the country’s economic problems, was the ‘shock therapy’ commanded by the Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. This led Poland to reduce inflation from 10 percent to 2 percent from 2001 to 2007.

In the same vein, Rapacki (2012) discusses the institutional challenges that Poland had to face as a latecomer and ‘outsider’ to the Western-type capitalist system and describes Poland as the best performer among Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)-10 countries. In his view, the institutional factors have determined the Polish success to fully transform its economy, from the planned economy into the market economy. Domestic institutions, according to Juncos and Pomorska (2006), were the key elements of the fruitful transformation that created a base which ‚would allow for projecting and receiving from EU’. The integration process enforced the formation of new administrative bodies for productive harmonization of European policies (Kuzniar, 2008). However, the institutional setting was not the only one in need of a reevaluation: it was especially the way of thinking of the administration and political elites (Kaminska 2010). The lack of coordination and efficient cooperation among administrative bodies and well-established institutions in the area of CFSP has slowed down the decision- making process, and the inefficient professional civil service led to many opportunities to upload policy to the EU level that were missed. Moreover, the ‘communist legacy’ (Kaminska 2010), was still visible in the administrative structures, which represented a huge challenge for the successful development. Juncos and Pomorska (2006) also mention the problem of generation gap and strong politicization of public administration. Nevertheless, Kaminska (2008) argues that under the Civic Platform government, the administrative changes are visible in every government bodies related to EU issues, even though the process occurs slowly. According to Pomorska (2011), it took time for the officials in Warsaw to understand ‘the rules of the game’, but after undergoing a process of socialization, the learning process of the national representatives in Brussel has been incremental. Moreover, Juncos and Pomorska (2006)

18 highlight the importance of the role of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) who had to face the biggest challenge of EU membership and participation in CFSP. MFA, and the diplomatic staff, had the responsibility of translating Brussel’s politics to Poland. As Kaminska (2007) noted, although at first Poland was very critical and skeptical about ESDP/CSDP, it subsequently started to actively participate in ESDP/CSDP missions in many regions in the world, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, that has never been a domain of Polish foreign policy interest. Moreover, the CFSP became for Poland “a great instrument for achieving its goals and gaining influence in the EU” (Kaminska, 2007).

During the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2011, Poland had proven to be a fast learner of the EU’s rules, especially during the pro-European Civic Platform government and the Sikorski-Tusk ‘duet’ (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2012). On the one hand, according to Pomorska and Vanhoonacker (2012), the Polish presidency was well organized and managed to strike many deals inside the Council and other institutions, such as the European Parliament (EP); on the other hand , the Presidency has passed unnoticed, with the aoption of the Six Pack legislative being the biggest achievement. Pomorska and Vanhoonacker (2012) have concluded that: “While in the past it was at times of crisis when the Presidency used to catch the public eye, now it was exactly because of the crisis that the Poles remained in the shadows”.

Most of the literature on Europeanization of Polish foreign policy is a unique example of successful input to the CFSP deals with the Eastern Dimension initiative of the ENP, which Poland aims to shape. According to Kaminska (2007) and Antczak-Barzan (2015), the Eastern dimension and Poland’s ideational export to EU Eastern neighbors, especially to Ukraine, has been related to the regional security and democracy promotion and based on Poland’s own experience. Thus, Poland has acted actively as a ‘younger brother in democracy’ for the Eastern European states, while its main focus has been to stabilize the Eastern neighborhood by building alliances with the help of Western powers. Moreover, Nagorski (2014) takes into consideration the historical background of the two countries (i.e., Poland and Ukraine), arguing that it had important impact on future relations, as their starting point was very similar. Similarly, Petrova (2014) discusses that Polish leaders have, since beginning, believed that a stable Ukraine means a secure Poland, as Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratization without any doubts would result

19 in an improved stability in the region. According to the author, it was Poland that had played the central role in bringing Ukraine closer to the EU structures acting as a strong supporter of democratic reforms during the Orange Revolution in 2004. This engagement, as Pomorska (2011) argues, was one of the major achievements of Polish diplomacy and proved that Poland was able to contribute effectively to EU’s foreign policy. According to Sus (2011), it was the Eastern Partnership that meant essential success of uploading Polish national interest into the EU level. What makes it more unique is the fact that the idea of Eastern Partnership had emerged from a new member state and not from one of the ‘usual suspects’, i.e., countries such as France or Germany. That said, as Dumka (2013) claims, a fruitful relationship with Sweden brought not only the mutual cooperation and support for equal interests, but importantly gave the Polish policymakers a great opportunity to learn about the policy-making process from a more experienced counterpart. As noted by Petrova (2014), Polish democracy promotion in Ukraine successfully penetrated the elite and society of the country, especially after the engagement in the Euromaidan movement in 2014 and the prominent role of Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taken all together, these studies indicate that over the last two decades, Poland had successfully transformed from a ‘policy taker’ into a ‘policy maker’ and as a result of integration with the European structures, Poland became an important player in the European Union.

Europeanization of the Portuguese foreign policy has recently attracted attention of many scholars in this field. Portugal has been always eager to make a contribution to shape the EU external relations in order to avoid marginalization, despite its constraints in terms of economic and military resources (Raimundo, 2013; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007). Macedo (2006) and Teixeira (2005) emphasize that Portugal’s traditional foreign priorities, for many centuries, have been concentrated in the Atlantic and its overseas territories, which were considered vital to protect its sovereignty from the continental threats. Teixeira and Costa Pinto (2012) conclude that after the democratic changes and the accession to the EU in 1986, Portugal’s foreign policy acquired a strong European focus, without undermining its longstanding Atlantic roots. This is reflected in the description “of Portugal as a nation, simultaneously Atlantic and European”. Raimundo (2013) argues that Portugal, as a founder member of NATO, continued its strong engagement in the Atlantic Alliance and close cooperation with the United States. Moreover, as Ferreira-Pereira (2007) argues, during years of involvement in the European political integration process, the

Atlanticism and the centrality of NATO has never been seen in Portugal as a barrier in its relations with EU and particularly within the CFSP’s activities. Rather, in the Portuguese view, the CSDP and NATO should be seen as complementary projects.

Portuguese commitment to the European integration according to Vasconcelos (2000:5), was related to political reasons and perception of a peripheral position of the country. In his view “posing as a “good pupil” in the Community classroom, Portugal adopted a diplomatic approach which was highly cautious and based on defense of the status quo, and remained strongly attached to an intergovernmental outlook, on the assumption — which still exists — that Portugal’s interests were often minor or peripheral compared with the "Community average". Vasconcelos (2000) and Ferreira-Pereira (2007) describe the period after the Portuguese accession in 1986 as mostly economy-oriented. However, from the early 1990s, according to Raimundo (2012), Portugal changed its approach toward a more active and open attitude, especially regarding foreign and security policy. Robinson (2015) maintains that as a result of Europeanization, Portuguese foreign policy adapted well to the European realities, while showing an understanding of the increased interdependence and common priorities existing among the EU member states. At the same time, the country has successfully managed to bring the Lusophone matters into the European agenda.

Most of the literature on the Europeanization of the Portuguese foreign policy, investigates the role of the three Portugal-led Presidencies of the Council of the EU (i.e., 1992, 2000, 2007) as significant examples of successive uploading of the core national policies by Portuguese governments at the European level. There is a general agreement among the authors, that Portugal’s Presidencies had a crucial role in shaping the CFPS and characterizing the relations between the EU and the Lusophone world (Vasconcelos, 1996, 2000; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007, 2008, 2014; Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012; Robinson 2015, Magone, 2015; Cunha, 2015). The first Portuguese presidency in 1992 was described as the first “great test” and the main priority of the Portuguese foreign policy, and an opportunity to make its contribution to the European affairs and enhance the image of the country abroad (Vasconcelos, 2000; Ferreira- Pereira 2014; Robinson, 2015; Cunha, 2015). Some of the authors as Magone (2015) and Robinson (2015) argue that the second presidency in 2000 was more effective, as Portugal had learnt a lot from the previous experience and invested significant effort into developing the

21 experience and skills necessary to have a significant impact on the European integration process. The third presidency in 2007 was centered on the dialogue between the EU and Africa. The second EU-Africa Summit, as well as steps toward forging a closer cooperation with Cape Verde, were example of successful uploading of the Portuguese interests (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008; Guedes Vieira and Ferreira-Pereira, 2009). In the same vein, Robinson (2015) points out that during three Presidencies, the close cooperation between the EU and Latin America, and also Africa and the Mediterranean, has been always a core interest of Portugal, demonstrating the ability to use agenda-setting powers in connecting the national foreign policy goals with the broader priorities of CFSP. Moreover, as Ferreira-Pereira and Groom (2010) argue, the ‘Lusophone card’ in Portuguese foreign policy interests was played very successfully, which has strengthened image of the country in Europe and worldwide. Moreover, as noted by Fiott (2015), during its engagement in the development of Defense and security developments in Europe, Portugal has been using CSDP as a tool to represent its voice in the global arena; and had been actively taking part in most of the CSDP’s missions and operations, such as EUTM missions in Somalia and Mali and the CSDP anti-piracy operation ‘Atalanta’.

All of the presented studies above agree that Europeanization of Portuguese foreign policy is a success story, especially in the domain of the projection of its national interests. Moreover, the advocacy for the Lusophone countries has allowed the Portuguese foreign policy makers to develop a special role identity within the EU and effectively shape the CFSP.

This section aimed to review the existing literature on the concept of Europeanization in the foreign policy and security realm and the major scholar works related to the two case studies: Poland and Portugal. In view of all that has been mentioned so far, one may suppose that the research on the Europeanization of foreign policy is a growing body of literature and the numbers of publications are still increasing. However, many of them do not offer a clear definition on Europeanization, nor distinctions between the dimensions and mechanisms that drive Europeanization (Ladrech, 1994; Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Olsen, 2002). As there are a range of approaches, only few authors have tried to explain its exact meaning (Flochart, 2010; Hill, Wong, 2012). Moreover, some of the studies have focused mostly on the national adaptation (Bache; Knill and Lehmkhul, 2002; Bulmer, 2007; Wong, 2007 Buller and Gamble, 2002; Hix and Goetz, 2000) while overlooking the impact of national projection in EU’s

22 common policies. Also, most of the former studies in this area have mainly aimed to explore, in a brief way, the Europeanization of all member states and chose to concentrate on individual countries that play more influential role in the EU, such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Schmidt, 1997; Börzel, 1999; Goetz, 1995; Laderch, 1994; Bache, 2005). Among few exceptions to this tendency is the contribution of Eva Gross (2009).2 On the other hand, the peripheral countries, such as Poland and Portugal have been analyzed much less. Europeanization of the Portuguese foreign policy has been explored by scholars such as Ferreira- Pereira (2007, 2008, 2014) and (Robinson, 2015). Some scholars as Raimundo (2012, 2013) carefully investigated the impact on the EU membership on the relations with countries such as Angola or Mozambique, and therefore filled the gap in existing literature. However, most of the studies treat the Portuguese case in general terms (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012) instead of paying attention to the impact of Europeanization on the national policy (Vasconcelos, 1996, 2000). In addition, some studies that do mention Europeanization end up being unsystematic in the matter of what has been ‘downloaded’ and ‘uploaded’ (Magone, 2005).

In case of the Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy, scholars have been mostly focusing on the internal transformation or domestic economic situation (Brennan, 2005; Rapacki, 2012; Dąbrowski, 2012). Recently, authors have paid more attention to the Polish potential of shaping the EU policy agenda, especially in the case of Eastern Partnership (Schweiger, 2016; Pomorska, 2014; Kaminska; 2008, 2014; Sus, 2011; Szczepanik, 2011; Dumka, 2013). Most importantly, to date, no comparative study on the Europeanization process of both Portuguese and Polish in the security and defense fields has been produced, with exception of the contribution of Chrobot (2012) 3. Yet, with respect to the latter, the present study takes into consideration the uploading dimension of Europeanization of Portugal and Poland, while the previously mentioned one only focuses on the downloading process. Overall, the present study attempts to fill in this specific gap in the literature.

2 The author explains in details the contrasting positions of France, Britain and Germany toward the foreign and security institutional framework of the EU and their involvement in the European crisis management taking into account the military operations. According to the author, those countries had a crucial impact on the evolution of CFSP and ESDP instruments. 3 While representing the first of this kind of comparative contributions, this contribution has chosen to approach the Europeanisation as a one-way and top-down process, in addition to treating foreign and security policies as just one part of a more general Europeanisation process. Moreover, the study did not focus on Euroatlanticism and NATO which are important aspects in the comparison of both countries. 23

1.2. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of this study is based on the Europeanization approach, which allows understanding the dynamic process of foreign policy change in Portugal and Poland. Taking into account the analysis of the current state of the art, the present project aims to explore the downloading and uploading processes in an integrative way, rather than studying them separately. This perspective will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the Europeanization process in the two countries. Europeanization here is understood as “a process of incorporation in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures, and public policies of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined in the EU policy processes” (Moumoutzis, 2011) and ‘the impact, convergence or response of actors and institutions in relation to the European Union” (Featherstone, and Kazamias, 2001). The downloading dimension indicates the top-down process of national adaptation of the European policies and integrating choices made at the European level. At the same time, Europeanization is also a ‘bottom-up’ method of uploading domestic policies to the European level and being able to shape them.

Common Foreign Security of the EU

Downloading Uploading

Portuguese and Polish Foreign and Security policy The CFSP policymaking environment

Figure 1. Europeanization model based on Miskimmon (2003)

As Börzel (2003) points out, the national governments have been acting as “shapers and takers” of EU policies in the relationship between member states and the EU. In case of downloading, further analysis will follow the model introduced by Smith (2000), which identifies four main indicators of Europeanization at the domestic level: elite socialization, bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional changes, and changes in public perception concerning the political cooperation. At the ‘uploading’ level, the emphasis is placed on the Miskimmon and Paterson model (Miskimmon and Paterson 2003), which includes the dimensions of the institution building, agenda setting, example setting, and ideational export (can be seen in Figure 1). Kaminska (2007) has integrated these two models, which has eventually allowed highlighting different levels of uploading and downloading for Europeanization processes, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Model of Europeanization process Kaminska (2007)

Adaptation/downloading Projection/ uploading

1. Elite socialization 1.Institutions building

2. Bureaucratic restructuring 2. Agenda setting

3. Constitutional changes 3. Example setting

4.Changes in public perception 4. Ideational export concerning the political cooperation

Elite socialization takes place when the national elites, via interaction with the European institutions, are adopting the shared European values, promoting the European norms and “way of doing things”, coming from Brussel (Wong, 2011). It is the effect of contribution of the domestic actors in the CFSP system identified by the norms of the consultation, consensus-based decision making, and communication. The level of socialization among major decision makers is

25 considered vital for a successful decision-making on the EU level (Smith, 2000). Moreover, although their power is limited, the actions taken by the national elites may result in important costs for development and social change. Bureaucratic restructuring refers to the formation of new offices and positions inside the Member States and mechanisms that coordinate the relations with other government offices in order to fully participate in the CFSP. The deviations in the national environment are also leading to the constitutional change and may affect the transformation in the public discourse. The foreign policy collaboration may affect the public support for the CFSP, which ends in changes in public opinion of national foreign policy (Smith, 2000). The ability to shape the EU decision making process is connected to the proficiency of the high adaptation to the EU on the national institution level. The link between national and foreign is particularly visible in the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP (Kaminska, 2014). The first instrument of uploading dimension reflects the ability of the state to build the institutions in order to adapt to the new environment. Through contributions in such institutions, countries are able to pursue multilateral solutions to international challenges. The agenda setting refers to the ability of the national leaders to transfer domestic issues on the European agenda, especially during the 6-months country Presidency of the EU Council. The example setting means the ability of the state to act as an example on the specific field which is related to the capacity to serve as an expert of successful uploading of its national preferences. In the ideational export, the focus is on the process of projecting the policy objectives or new ideas, in terms of internal restructuring and also policy change (Kaminska, 2014).

The theoretical models proposed by Smith (2000) and Miskimmon and Paterson (2003) are the most suitable ones for this study’s purpose and most useful to analyze the Europeanization process in countries with such a different historical backgrounds and regional priorities. Moreover, the described models clearly distinguish both dimensions of Europeanization, in order to fully understand the key mechanisms of downloading and uploading processes. They are also useful to explain the indicators of the national adaptation process, as well as the tools and methods used by the states in order to project its national interests into the CFSP level.

1.3. RESEARCH DESIGN

1.3.1. Research problem

The main focus of this research is to compare Europeanization processes of Poland and Portugal in the specific fields of the foreign and security policies. In this regard, the ultimate goal of this study is firstly to identity the similarities and differences existing in the Europeanization processes of these two countries, and secondly to find out the factors that have influenced the existing differences and similarities in their trajectories.

1.3.2. Research question

In order to accomplish its objectives, the present work is steered by the following central research question:

How have Poland and Portugal been able to effectively shape the CFSP/CSDP and project their national preferences at the EU level while having to adapt themselves to the deepening in the European foreign and security policies?

This main research question is divided into a set of sub-questions in order to simplify the author’s effort to carry out a comprehensive research:

- Which changes have taken place in Poland and Portugal foreign and security policies as a result of their adaptation to the evolution of the CFSP/CSDP?

- How have Portugal and Poland been uploading their national foreign and security policy preferences to the evolving the CSDP/CSDP, particularly those ones related to their Atlanticism and relations to neighbors and historical allies?

- What are the main similarities and differences in case of downloading and uploading national preferences into the CFSP/CSDP level?

1.3.3. Research methods

The most suitable research method to achieve the goals and objectives of this project is the comparative analysis, which is often chosen for cross-national studies aiming to identify similarities and differences between a small numbers of states. As Poland and Portugal are two different countries in terms of their geopolitical location, as well as historical and cultural background, in addition to the regional priorities, national interests, and with different timing of accession to the EU, the comparative analysis is seen as a sufficient approach to investigate the similarities and differences of both countries. This comparison will be supported by the Europeanization as main theoretical framework of this study. In order to assure validity of relating causes to effects, a set of observations instead of a single inspection will be examined, as suggested by Gerring and Christenson (2015) for comparative studies. The orientation of the government toward the fundamental issues of history and politics will also be included in these sets of observation concerning recommendation of George and Bennett (2005). Moreover, the diversity of case studies, as well as their heterogeneity will be taken into consideration based upon the suggestion of Rihoux and Ragin (2009).

As a comparative research, this work will propose qualitative indicators for both case studies. By using qualitative indicators such as the level of accomplishment of the national adaptation and projection (administrative and institutional structure, adaptation and policy convergence, re- adjustment of geographic/regional priorities, strategy of uploading national priorities, contribution to the EU’s foreign policy making) and categorizing the criteria into sub-groups, comparison of both case studies will be performed. The qualitative strategy, in comparison to a quantitative one, emphasizes the meaning of words, rather than data collection or numbers, and reflects different ontological and epistemological positions (Bryman, 2012). Moreover, it is a suitable approach for investigating the social actors (Tuli, 2011). Regarding the data of this study, primary and secondary sources will be taken into consideration for this comparison, including official documents published by both the Polish and Portuguese governments, as well as by the EU and NATO. In relation to this, one of the main limitations of this study is the author’s lack of linguistic competence in Portuguese, a challenge that has admittedly conditioned the investigation process, but that has been addressed by recruiting to the help of native speakers,

28 which was facilitated by the author’s residence in Portugal between 2014-2017, in the framework of the Master Programme in International Relations at the University of Minho.

This work aims to investigate the Europeanization of foreign and security policies of both countries, since their accessions to the EC/EU until 2014. Thus, in terms of the time frame, the study explores the periods between 1986-2014 for Portugal and 2004-2014 in the case of Poland. Regarding the time frame, the thesis was initiated and the author had access to the published literature, interviewing the publications until 2014 (with some exceptions). However, the cultural and historical backgrounds of the studied countries are different, which has been taken into consideration. The study did not examine the recent happenings in Europe and worldwide (after 2014), such as the Ukrainian crisis and further developments in Western Ukraine (while the study briefly mentions the Polish role in and involvement into the Ukrainian crisis, in its very beginning in November 2013, these events have not been investigated in depth), government changes in both countries, Brexit process, or refugee flow. This thesis has mainly focused on particular dimensions of Portuguese and Polish foreign policies, in order to show how both dimensions of Europeanization occurred in both countries, and they were able to effectively shape the CFSP environment.

1.4. Structure of the dissertation

The presented project is organized into six chapters. The Introduction chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature and presents the basic concepts underpinning the investigation project. Moreover, the theoretical framework and the relevant research methodology are presented.

Chapter 2 starts with a brief historical background of both countries in order to understand the major changes that occurred in foreign and security policies after their democratization processes. The characterization of their contemporary foreign and security policies shall provide the backdrop against which this chapter will outline the process of Europeanization of foreign policies in both countries during the pre-accession and accession years of negotiations. Moreover, this chapter will compare the reorientation of foreign policies after the collapse of non-democratic regimes to show the similarities and differences between them and discuss to what extent this process was distinct and voluntary.

Chapter 3 will study the Europeanization of the Portuguese foreign and security policies. This section will take into consideration the downloading dimension, as well as the uploading dimension to investigate the Portuguese ability of projecting its national interests and shape the CFSP. In the case of uploading, this particular study will focus on the Portuguese Presidencies, as well as strong advocacy for the Lusophone world with the correlation of Atlanticism in foreign policy and security agenda.

Chapter 4 aims to explore the Europeanization of Polish foreign and security policies. The main focus will be on the national adaptation of the country to the European structures and domestic changes that have been taking place after the EU accession in 2004, as well as the national projection, in order to measure how Poland has been actively engaged in shaping the CFSP evolution. This section will investigate the Polish role in agenda setting in EU toward countries like Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia.

Chapter 5, shall identify the differences and similarities of the Europeanization processes of the two countries, while taking into consideration both the downloading and uploading dimensions.

Chapter 6, will draw conclusions based on the former findings, as well as indicate the challenges for future work.

Despite the differences of Poland and Portugal in terms of their size, as well as the background or regional priorities, both countries have experienced similar shifts in their foreign and security policies orientation. Shortly after the collapse of non-democratic regimes in Poland and Portugal, the European option with a full compatibility to NATO became their first foreign policy priority. Warsaw and Lisbon went through many administrative changes in order to adapt to the EU’s apparatus and be able to effectively shape the CFSP. It has to be noted that the Atlantic Alliance has been always seen as the most important national security guarantor, and both of the countries were against any development in the EU that could be incompatible with NATO’s interests. Poland and Portugal were able to leave their mark in the CFSP/CSDP by introducing their national preferences into the wider agenda. Both of them realized that only through the active CFSP/CSDP engagement could Warsaw and Lisbon avoid marginalization and reaffirm their importance among other EU states. Poland has successfully managed to bring

Ukraine closer to Europe by introducing the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and taking various initiatives in favor of Ukraine’s future membership in the EU. Portugal has since its accession played an important role for enhancing closer relations between the EU and the Lusophone world. Through its three Council Presidencies (1992, 2000, 2007), Lisbon was able to build the bridge between the EU and its former colonies and create a crucial platform for future cooperation. Beside their limitations, both countries have actively contributed to the CSDP and NATO missions and operations and were able to go beyond their traditional zones of interest. Poland and Portugal proved to be important players in the CFSP affairs, and learned that a proper uploading can be only obtained through an effective downloading process. Both countries understood the importance of fast learning and adaptation to the rules and policies of the CFSP. Mechanisms of Europeanization, such as socialization and policy learning, affected foreign policy making environment and projection of national interests. As both dimensions are linked to each other, it can be concluded that appropriate learning of rules of the Brussel game affects the country’s performance in uploading its national preferences into the CFSP.

2. The Foreign and Security policies of Portugal and Poland: The Impact of Democratization

2.1 Introduction

The Portuguese Revolution of 25th Abril 1974 and the Polish peaceful negotiations of Round Table in 1989 resulted in collapse of non-democratic regimes and led to the process of democratization and reorientation of foreign and security policies. The new leaderships, democratic transition and orientation of these countries’ toward the accession to the European Communities EC/UE resulted in a revision of geopolitical options and a redefinition of Portuguese and Polish roles in the world.

In Poland, the democratization process had a fundamental impact on the foreign policy and its redefinition. The process of transition was not an easy one, after a long period of dominance exerted by the Soviet Union and participation in organizations such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 4 and the Warsaw Pact. As other members of the Eastern bloc, Poland was militarily controlled and dependent on the USSR in political and economic terms. Thus, its foreign policy was controlled largely by the Soviet Union. The transformed and independent Polish ‘return’ to Europe and to the international politics started after joining the NATO in 1991 and the EU’s Eastern enlargement (Kaminska, 2007; Kuzniar, 2008; Zieba, 2012).

The process of the European integration was challenging for Portugal, to the extent that it was preceded by a lengthy dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar, during which the country was isolated from both the European and global arena, despite its participation in the United Nations since 1955 and in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) since 1960. Moreover, the substantial change in foreign policy direction from Africa to Europe was a complex process, also due to the geostrategic location of the country. The process of negotiations and final accession coincided with an especially active period of the European integration, which eventually led Portugal becoming a part of the Iberian enlargement in 1986. As a founding

4 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was an economic organization under the leadership of the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1991. COMECON comprised the states of the Eastern Bloc with others communist countries elsewhere in the world.

32 member of the NATO, Portugal had been devoted to the Atlantic Alliance and kept a close relationship with the United States (Vasconcelos, 2000; Royo, 2004; Ferreira-Pereira, 2008; Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 2004; Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012, 2014).

This chapter aims at introducing the historical background and changes that occurred in the foreign policies of Poland and Portugal, particularly toward Europe, after the collapse of non- democratic regimes. More specifically, it will investigate their commonalities and differences in terms of foreign and security policies and their path to the membership of the EC/ EU. Moreover, the chapter will point out their initial perceptions toward the CFSP/ESDP and the important role of NATO and relations with the US.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first will discuss the historical background of non-democratic regimes, democratic transition and the reorientation of foreign policy goals after the regime’s failure. The second section aims to investigate the role of the Atlanticism in the security policies of both countries, especially the crucial role of the NATO. The third part will briefly present their path through European integration process. After exploring each of these areas, final remarks and conclusions will be drawn in the fourth section.

2.2 Collapse of the non-democratic regimes and reorientation of foreign policy goals

Poland and Portugal had to face many challenges after the fall of the non-democratic regimes and during their democratic transformations. Besides the fact that Polish and Portuguese situations had varied substantially in terms of different regimes types, time of accession and regional priorities, both countries managed successful transformations along the adoption of similar foreign policy options. Full participation in the EC/EU and a strong relationship with NATO were cases in point.

Polish isolation from the Western Europe after the World War II and almost 50 years of dominant Soviet influence created profound challenges for integrating process with Europe and the NATO. Decisions regarding foreign policy directions in the People’s Republic of Poland were merely depending on the guidelines coming from Moscow (Zieba, 2012). Poland was forced to join the organizations ruled by the Soviet Union such as COMECON and Warsaw Pact

33 that were created in response to the Western Bloc, namely NATO. Similar to the other countries of the Eastern Bloc, Poland had to implement the instructions coming from Kremlin and create the policies under the Soviet supervision (Szczepanik, 2011; Kuzniar, 2008).

The inflexible politics of the Polish United Workers Party and international isolation resulted in creation of ‘Solidarnosc’ 5 and anti-communist attitude within the Polish society.6 The rising position of the Movement and its leader Lech Walesa in the late 1980s led to the Round Table negotiations in 1989 and the peaceful transition to democracy and a free-market economy. According to the agreement between the government and opposition, the first partially free parliamentary elections were organized in the same year. Consequently, in September 1989, the first non-communist government in the Eastern and Central Europe was established (Zaborowski, 2007).

Fundamental economic and political reforms were implemented and the first democratic Constitution introduced, for the first time since 1990. After the collapse of the communist regime and regaining sovereignty from the Soviet Union, Poland started its transformation to democratic 3rd Republic and reorientation of foreign policy goals (Kuzniar, 2008). The results of transition at the beginning of democratic transformation were uncertain, as the communist officials held important positions in the government. However, after the democratic parliamentary elections in 1991, the pro-Western direction had become the main one for the Polish foreign policy (Ibid). Moreover, the willingness to integrate NATO, as the best security guarantor, was the second priority (after the membership in the EU). Even though the Polish foreign policy was directed toward the Western structures, in the beginning, it was also focused on the relations with the (former) USSR, and building a formal legal framework of good neighborly cooperation with Germany. The first achievement of Polish diplomacy in the international arena was membership in the Council of Europe in 1991, something that became a symbol of effective transition (Kuzniar and Szczepanik, 2002). Parallel to the European integration, Poland tightened its cooperation with Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the framework of the Visegrad Group created

5 A Polish trade union the Independent Self-governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’, was established on 17th September 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk under the leadership of Lech Walesa. In the common public perception ‘Solidarity’ was not only a trade union but a social movement which represented the Poles against the communist regime and fought for their interests. 6 Inappropriate living conditions and society frustration emerged the protests against the regime (strike in the Gdansk Shipyard in 1980 and other parts of the country). In attempt to crush political opposition, the government imposed the martial law (1981- 1983) and as result, thousands of opposition protesters were jailed or killed and pro-democracy movements such as ‘Solidarnosc’ were banned.

34 in 1991, and together with these neighbors the country sought to become a full member of the EU and eventually contribute to the CFSP (Zieba, 2012). In particular, after the collapse of Soviet Block and Iron Curtain, Poland had to find its position between the West encompassing EU and NATO and the East, with its former allies. For the isolated country with little experience, in the early stage of transition to democracy and with a few security guarantees, such ‘in- between’ position had a crucial impact on future foreign policy directions (Sus, 2011).

During over 40 years of Antonio Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974) dictatorships, Portugal was on the margins of the European integration process (Royo, 2004). Salazar believed that Portugal’s strategic interests should be pursued beyond the borders of Europe and the government preferred to continue to secure trade relationships with the colonies (Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 2004). The non-democratic nature of the regime, the existence of colonies and low level of economic growth were the main conditions that disqualified Portugal from the accession to the EC. The exhausting colonial wars in the late 1960s and early 1970s as well as increasing popular dissatisfaction with the regime led to domestic changes, affecting, simultaneously, the Portuguese political and social culture. Thus, the failure of the African colonial empire promoted the collapse of the authoritarian regime (Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 2004; Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012).

The military coup of 25th April 1974 opened a new way to the transition of Portuguese foreign and security policies and redefinition of its position in the bipolar world (Manuel, 2010). Portugal’s transformation took place at the crucial moments of the Cold War when there was no strong international pressure for democratization (Costa Pinto, 2005). Due to the important geopolitical position of Portugal, the changing political situation was also the constant topic of the debates in the international environments from the US to Soviet Republics. The first two years after the Carnation Revolution were driven by the uncertainties of the new political system and highlighted the unstable character of a newborn democracy. The period of Revolutionary Process in Progress (Processo Revolucionario em Curso – PREC) and the attempts to create the left regime by the various military and political factions put the democratic changes in the country in question (Teixeira, 2014). The re-establishment of diplomatic relations as well as the disengagement with former colonial empire were the main challenges for Portugal after its democratic transition. Moreover, there was no consensus about clear foreign policy goals

(Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012). The supporters of a new elected President of the National Salvation Junta7, the general António de Spínola supported the approach promoting a special economic and political partnership with the colonies and their eventual independence in future (Royo and Manuel, 2003). Others, however, as those represented by the Communist Party (PCP- Partido Comunista Português), favored a strong relationship with the Soviet Union and stayed consistently opposed to the European integration (Costa Pinto, 2005; Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 2004). Finally, the majority of the newborn Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party preferred membership to the EC and the process of decolonization with full independence of the colonies (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012).

The formation of a democratic regime with the establishment of the first constitutional government in 1976 as well as the culmination of the decolonization process had clarified the foreign policy choices and started the formal negotiations for the membership in EC. The new government of Mário Soares prioritized membership to the EC and described Portugal as a ‘European’ and ‘Atlantic’ country. In his idea, only a closer cooperation with the EC could help to regularize the relations with European neighbors and support the modernization of old economic structures of the country (Royo and Manuel, 2003; Royo, 2004). Thus, having overcome the revolutionary period, Portugal oriented its foreign policy goals toward two main visions/directions: First, the Atlantic outlook with strengthening bilateral relations with the US and NATO and second, the ‘European path’ with the EC integration as the main priority (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012; Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 2004).

2.3 Security and Atlanticism: Role of NATO and relations with USA

The geopolitical position of Poland between Germany and Russia for years had been a source of worry for the country’s sovereignty (Sus, 2011; Kuzniar, 2008; Szczerbiak, 2012). The history had shaped the Polish security choices and gave a rise to the Atlanticist ‘security culture’ (Zaborowski, 2007). In the contrast to the EC integration, the Atlanticist option was absent in the first years of Third Republic policies (till 1991) that can be explained by three main reasons: First, the Soviet Union was still an important player in the region and the Soviet troops remained

7 National Salvation Junta was an association of military officials designated to control the government after the Carnation Revolution in April 1974.

36 present in Poland until 1991. Second, the dispute with Germany over the territories in Western Poland forced the government to maintain the security alliance with the USSR. Third, the communist military officers educated in the Soviet Union held important positions in the country especially in the control of internal security and defence sectors and they were seeing NATO as a hostile alliance. (Ibid.)

After 1991, a closer cooperation with the NATO and US became main priorities. In 1991 Poland joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and in 1994 the Partnership for Peace. The invitation to join the Alliance, offered to Poland (as well as Czech Republic and Hungary) at the Madrid summit in 1997, was an important step toward the NATO integration. The accession in March 1999 was interpreted as a huge success of the Polish diplomacy (Zieba, 2012; Kaminska, 2014).

Poland had considered the NATO as the main pillar of European security and expected that the membership would end the perception of Poland as a vulnerable buffer zone. After formally joining the Atlantic Alliance in 1999, Poland became one of the most pro-American and pro-Western states in the Central Europe (Kuzniar and Szczepanik, 2002). The fact that NATO’s Eastward expansion came before the EU enlargement had additionally strengthened the Atlanticist tendency in Polish foreign policy (Zaborowski, 2007). In 2000, the former Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski stated that the defence policy can be relaxed since the country was secure (Ibid.).

Soon after the NATO’s Eastern expansion to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, in 1999, the NATO started the ‘Operation Allied Force’ in Serbia and Kosovo. Poland endorsed this military operation without hesitation. This Polish support was perceived as the first sign that Polish security policy was in line with the US and that Poland was the strongest Atlanticist in Europe. The Polish public opinion saw the US as a more reliable, trustworthy and more effective ally than Germany or any other European nations (Kuzniar, 2008). The biggest proof of Warsaw’s Atlanticism in foreign policy came after the September 11th events. Poland quickly decided to support the George W. Bush’s strategy and stated that it would not remain a passive participant in the war against terrorism. The President Aleksander Kwasniewski claimed that Polish role is to: “act as a leader to coax Eastern nations into the Western camp and to persuade the West to accept them’ (Baylis and Roper, 2006). Polish participation in the ‘Operation

Enduring Freedom’ in 2002 in Afghanistan and ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003 confirmed the pro-Americanism direction in the Polish foreign policy. Moreover, the Polish involvement was directly linked to the desire of becoming an important and visible actor in the global politics.

Portugal, as a founder member of the NATO in 1949, has always considered the Alliance as a main pillar of the European security. However, for more than two decades, the Portuguese contribution to the NATO was marginal as country was involved in the colonial wars in Africa. Nonetheless, the Portuguese strategically located bases were crucial for the Alliance. The Azores provided the key base for the naval surveillance and antisubmarine tracking. The deep-rooted Atlanticist vocation has always been centered on a close relation with the US. However, before the Carnation Revolution, the US-Portuguese relationship has been mostly built around the Defence Agreement established in 1951, which permitted the US to have access to the military facilities in Azores. Since 1980, Portugal returned to full contribution and rejoined the NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and NATO’s exercises.8 In 1983, the Portuguese government extended the bilateral defence agreement with the US which stressed the critical importance of this relationship. During the first years after democratic transition, the other elements of Portuguese Atlanticism, notably the relations with Brazil and Lusophone Africa, were considered of secondary importance. It was clear that the integration with the EC became the main priority of the government foreign policy for the first time since the democratic transition in Portugal (Robinson, 2013).

Nonetheless, the strong pro-NATO position was never seen as anti-European. After 1986, the EC and NATO were treated as complementary aspects of foreign policy, and Portugal successfully managed to be Europeanist and Atlanticist at the same time and balance the believes of the EU as a ‘soft power’ and NATO as a ‘hard power’. The role of the NATO continued to be fundamental for the national defence and European security architecture as a whole, and Portugal had been always against any development in the EU that could be incompatible with NATO’s interests (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007).

8 http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11003.html

2.4 Membership to the European Union

In Portugal, the first democratic elections held in to the Constitutional Assembly in 1975 and Parliament in 1976, initiated the Portuguese democratic transition toward Europe and shaped the future direction of foreign policy choices. In March 1977, the government of Mario Soares made the formal membership application to the EC. The accession negotiations started in October 1978 (Costa Pinto and Teixeira, 2004). The application to the EC aimed to strengthen democratic reforms and had a crucial role in the success of the democratization process. Moreover, the accession could benefit the country economically and guarantee the prospects for modernization. However, while the economic support from the EC was an important factor for the country development, Portugal considered the membership as a guarantee for its domestic democratic consolidation (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012). Most of the Portuguese were supporting the European integration and desiring to end their isolation and become more European. The formal accession negotiations lasted seven years, which was related to such factors as governmental instability after 1974 and decisions taken right after the revolutionary period, including the nationalization of significant economy sectors. However, during the 1980s, Portugal was able to overcome these hurdles and signed the Treaty of Accession in June 1985 and became a full member of the EEC in 1986. Membership in the EEC made the Portuguese government pay closer attention to regions of the world that were not in the Portuguese national interests before. The EEC brought Portugal closer to the Mediterranean and the country went through a process of ‘Mediterranization’ in its foreign policy (Vasconcelos, 1996). Moreover, joining the EEC resulted in a fundamental change in the relation with Spain, a country with similar European objectives. The radical transformation of this bilateral relationship was visible especially in the economic area (Vasconcelos, 2000). According to Caramelo (2014:187) the initial phase of Portuguese and Spanish membership in the EC could be described as “period of normalization of relations”. A number of bilateral agreements was established, notably related to the railway and road infrastructures, as well as in the areas of police and judicial cooperation.

The signing of the Europe Agreement in 1991 established an associate relationship between the Poland and EC and set out the legal provisions for implementation of political, economic and cultural union (Zieba, 2012). The Agreement initiated the Polish process of European integration which was stated in the foreword of the document: "Poland's ultimate aim

39 is membership of the Community.9" In 1993, the European Council decided at the Copenhagen summit that: "the associate member states from Central and Eastern Europe, if they so wish, will become members of the EU. In order to achieve this, however, they must fulfill the appropriate conditions"10. These came to be known as so-called the Copenhagen (or membership) criteria necessary for the accession11. The formal negotiations were launched in 1998 and completed in 2002. The Accession Treaty was signed on 16th of April, 2003 and as a result Poland (together with nine other countries) joined the European Union on May 1st, 2004. Poland became the sixth largest member state and the biggest state among the ‘big bang’ enlargement (Kuzniar, 2008). By 2004, the main foreign policy goal stated in the beginning of the Third Republic was accomplished. Consequently, Poland joined the EU and NATO and established stable relations with neighbors. The independence was no longer under danger, external borders were secured and a new chapter of Polish foreign policy began (Kaminska, 2007; Zaborowski, 2007).

2.6 Conclusions

This chapter has explored the foreign and security policies of Poland and Portugal after the regime change and in the pre-accession and early accession periods, by paying attention to the challenging reorientation of the countries positions toward Europe with their strong commitment to Atlanticism. Exploring these periods and comparing the foreign and security policies of both countries resulted in highlighting the following points:

The foreign policies under the non-democratic regimes in Poland before 1989 and Portugal before 1974 were separated from the Western Europe. After the fall of non-democratic regimes, Poland and Portugal started new chapters in their foreign and security orientations and became frontrunners in democratization. The Polish transition in 1989 was the first in the Central and Eastern Europe, while Portugal initiated the Third-Wave democratization process in the region of the Southern Europe. However, both of the countries, in the initial phase of their

9 http://www.seul.msz.gov.pl/en/bilateral_relations/about_poland/poland_in_eu/ Access: 25.07.2016

10 Condition for Membership- the Copenhagen criteria. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions membership/index_en.htm

11 The Copenhagen criteria included the comprehensive approval that new member states wishing to join the EC need to have: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

40 transitions, underwent a short period of uncertainty about the future direction of the foreign policy. However, soon after the first democratic parliamentary elections, Poland and Portugal directed their foreign policy goals toward the Europe with membership in the EEC/UE as the main priority. These accessions were crucially important for the domestic democracy consolidation and economic transformation.

For Portugal and Poland, solid relations with the NATO have always been at the core of the country’s foreign and security policy goals and the Alliance was perceived as the main security guarantor in the Europe. Both of the countries had joined the alliance before joining the EEC/EU and even when their foreign policies became more pro-European, the position toward the NATO remained the same. Their decisions especially regarding the security policy were always made with a strong correlation with the Atlanticism. As this chapter has demonstrated, despite the differences existing between the two countries, namely in terms of geography, size, historical background, among others, the process of transition toward democracy and full participation in the European integration process, as part of a foreign policy orientation, were quite similar.

In order to evaluate the foreign and security policies of both countries during this period in a comprehensive way, the discussed happenings need to be related to the process of downloading/uploading of foreign and security goals from/to the CFSP. Therefore, in next chapters, these processes of national adaptation and national projection will be investigated and related to what were already discussed.

3. Portuguese Foreign and Security policies after EU’s accession: Examining ‘Uploading’ and ‘Downloading’

3.1. Introduction

Portugal’s accession to the EC in 1986 reflected a fundamental shift in the country’s foreign policy. However, the ‘return to Europe’ did not decrease the country’s strong Atlanticist connection and the centrality of the NATO as the main guarantor of security in Europe. The Atlanticism approach has always been a key factor that influenced the Portuguese national priorities and foreign/security policies making. Its loyalty to NATO was mostly caused by the country’s condition as a small state located in the periphery of Europe with low economic and military resources and very limited capability to defend itself. During the creation of the CFSP/ESDP, Portugal had mental reservations whether this new policy would not undermine the role of NATO. However, this approach started to change during the Maastricht negotiations, when the institutionalization of the CFSP converged with the Portuguese view: an intergovernmental initiative with protection of national sovereignty and a full compatibility with the NATO (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007). This position remained unchanged during the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties’ negotiations. Since the beginning of the accession, Portugal had tried to bring the Lusophone matters closer to the EU agenda that had roots in their deep historical and cultural ties. This was especially visible during the Portuguese three presidencies of the EU in 1992, 2000 and 2007. Enhancing the EU relations with its former colonies was seen as a top priority for Portuguese foreign policy makers and endorsed Lisbon to leave its mark in the EU’s foreign affairs. Moreover, acting as a bridge between the EU and Lusophone world allowed Portugal to make a characteristic role identity inside the EU and play more active role in shaping the CFSP (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008)

The first section of this chapter aims to discuss the ’learning phase’ (Magone, 2004: 31) which started shortly after the accession in 1986 and lasted until the first Portuguese Council Presidency in 1992. This section will briefly study the first years of membership including the factors that moved the Portuguese foreign policy makers toward the EC involvement, especially

42 the economic impact and the institutional changes caused by the accession. Moreover, the investigation will also focus on the Portuguese involvement in the CFSP/ESDP making through the negotiations of the Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties. The Lisbon’s initial approach toward emergence of the CSFP/ESDP will also be studied. The second part of this chapter will explore the Portuguese ability to project its national interests through the three Presidencies of the EU in 1992, 2000 and 2007. The main goal of this section is to show how Portugal was able to shape the CFSP environment by promoting the closer relations with its former colonies and bringing the Lusophone matter into the EU’s agenda. Moreover, Portuguese contribution to the ESDP missions will be studied as another example of country’s active engagement in the EU’s foreign affairs making.

3.2. Domestic adaptation and institutional changes

Following seven years of negotiations, Portugal became part of the European Community on the 1st of January, 1986 after its democratic transition initiated in 1974. The ‘return to Europe’ did not challenge the three fundamental objectives that characterized Portuguese foreign policy at that time: First, the protection of country’s independence and sovereignty, mainly in the security and defence domains. Second, the special relations with the Lusophone world rooted in the close historical and cultural ties between Portugal and its former colonies in Africa, South America and Asia. Third, the Atlanticism approach with the centrality of the NATO and close relations with the US (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007, 2008). This became noticeable in the final stage of the negotiations, when Jaime Gama indicated future role of Lisbon in the EC and stated that:

“Portugal's integration in the European communities will provide Europe with the Portuguese sensitivity to African problems and will give Portugal the support of community mechanisms to expand its African vocation. As a result, it will also provide Portuguese-speaking African countries with an ally and a friend within the community structures, balancing the game of influences which has been conducted there by other linguistic areas.” (Gama, 1985).

The first period of Portuguese membership between the accession in 1986 till the first Council Presidency in 1992 was seen as a learning phase of adapting itself to the norms and terms of EC. According to Vasconcelos, beside the initial political nature of the European integration, this period was also marked with the desire to gain highest possible benefits from the

43 membership. Besides the small and peripheral profile of Portugal, this highly pragmatic approach was fostered by the feeling that the main political decisions are taken in the industrialized European countries like Germany, France or the Benelux group. This perception of distance from other European countries and its NATO dependency had an important impact on the country’s performance in the EC as well as in case of creation of the European security and defence policy. Thus, as observed by Vasconcelos:

“Posing as a “good pupil” in the Community classroom, Portugal adopted a diplomatic approach which was highly cautious and based on defence of the status quo, and remained strongly attached to an intergovernmental outlook, on the assumption – which still exists – that Portugal’s interests were often minor or peripheral compared with the "Community average”(Vasconcelos, 2000:5).

During the time of Portuguese accession, country had undergone an important political shift. Aníbal Cavaco Silva broke up the Central Bloc coalition and was elected as a leader of the Social-Democratic Party, and in 1985 formed its government. Since Portugal became member of the EC, the Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva tried to demonstrate that Portugal was able to adapt to the challenges resulting from the accession (Cunha, 2015). At this time, some in the European institutions were worried that Portugal may have problems with integration to the Community political process which resulted in changes of the Council of Ministers Presidency rules in order to delay Portuguese turn in the following year. The new government’s strategy focused on the prospect of full Portuguese participation in the EEC while pursuing profit from social and economic advantages at the same time (Soares, 2007). In terms of the political perspective, the integration with Europe motivated the Portuguese policy makers to reconsider its European alliances. After the first years of accession, the government of Aníbal Cavaco Silva remained faithful to its Atlantics position and supported the former EFTA partners, especially the United Kingdom. Portugal believed that the government of Margaret Thatcher is a safe ally (Teixeira, 2014), which “was part of the historical strategy of national diplomacy” (Teixeira, 2003:86).

The fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989 and of the other communist regimes in the Eastern Europe had a big impact on the European integration process. At this time, the Portuguese foreign policy was still in line with the traditional Atlanticist approach. Nonetheless,

44 after the German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the European deepening made through the approval of a new treaty (i.e., Treaty of Maastricht), Portugal started to change to a more Euro-Atlantic option, which reflected the Europeanization of the strategic orientation (Teixeira, 2014).

Portugal entered the EC at the time when the European integration process was undergoing deepening, bringing with it important institutional changes, that led to the singing of the Single European Act (SEA) - the first European treaty since 30 years modification of the Rome Treaty. This change was met with doubts in Portugal. The political elites were not sure if the country would be able to meet these demands especially in the economic field, as in comparison with the other European states the financial situation of the country was uncertain (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012).

The implementation of the new cohesion policy allowed for the allocation of the structural funds of the EEC and allowed to support the Southern European countries through the Delors’ financial packages (Royo, 2004). In consequence of this, Portugal received a big financial compensation in order to help this new member state to overcome the confrontation with the liberalized European market. Portugal was one of the biggest beneficiaries from that policy as the financial support was much higher than expected (Royo, 2006). According to Teixeira:

“If in the early years of membership the dominant perception was one of concern regarding the country’s capability of meeting the challenges of joining the EEC, the massive financial transfers rendered clear and visible the advantages of that integration, hence radically changing Portugal’s perception of Europe” (Teixeira, 2014: 35)

Without any doubts, the financial help had a huge impact on the structural transformation of Portugal and to some extent, it changed the perception of the Portuguese society about the benefits that country could gained as part of the European integration. Moreover, the structural funds helped to modernize the country’s health service and development of public transportation (Ibid.). The impact of structural funds was especially visible in the case of Portuguese infrastructure. During the integration process it was visible that Portugal had a weak infrastructure in comparison to other countries like Belgium or Netherlands. The EU’s financial

45 help contributed in creation of many motorways and railway lines (Marques, 2014). As the quality of lives of people had increased, it was easier to gain their support for the pro-European political option (Royo, 2014). According to the Eurobarometer12 data in 1991, 80 % of people stated that Portugal benefited from the EC membership.

Portuguese integration with the EC was seen by the political elites of that era as a way to consolidate its democratic structure. As a part of the membership process, Portugal had to align the institutions and laws to the acquis communautaire which enforced democratic practices and initiated the administrative reforms. This process in Portugal started already during the accession negotiations (Royo, 2007). In July 1979, the Council of Ministers for European Integration was established. The Council acted as the whole administrative machine for coordination of the negotiations with the EC and had significant impact on its progress. In the same year, another administrative body dedicated to the European affairs was created: the Secretariat for European Integration, which became an important element for the coordination of the Portuguese system of EU policy before and after the accession. In 1985, the Secretariat was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and shortly before the accession, it gained administrative autonomy in the MFA. One of the main reasons of this shift was that it was more efficient to have the EU policy administration structure in the Ministry which was responsible for relations with the world and this could help to have more efficient impact on internally and externally policy coordination. Therefore, Portuguese government decided to follow other European countries and located its EU policy coordination apparatus into the MFA. Moreover, as the accession negotiations and the first years of the membership required more solid efforts of expertise and coordination, the Secretariat increased and strengthened its position within the government (Magone, 2004).

Beside the governmental uncertainty as well as conflicts between right and left parties, the process of European integration and administrative restructuring was a priority (Magone, 2005). Since the accession, the Portuguese administrative structure as well as the policy coordination became more constant. Important factor in the democracy consolidation at this stage was a decade of the governmental stability. Aníbal Cavaco Silva won three elections, in

12 Relatorio Nacional. Portugal’, Eurobarometro 64, Outono 2005, p. 16.

1985, 1987 and 1991, which had a positive impact on the policy making processes. The period between 1986 and 1990 was the busiest in terms of cooperation between the national administration and the EU policy coordination. The Interministerial Commission for the European Communities (CICE) and the General-Directorate of European Communities (DGAC) were established. Moreover, different ministries launched specialized units in order to cooperate with the CICE (Magone, 2004). Beside these changes, the number of specialists in European policies and international law was growing, which improved the work of ministries and their cooperation with the then EC. Moreover, in order to meet the expectations of the EC membership, Portugal revised its Constitution twice, in 1982 and 198913. The first revision intended to modify or eliminate the ideological context of Constitution and to create more flexible economic market. Moreover, the Constitutional Court was created and the Council of Revolution was eradicated. The second Constitutional revision changed the economic system by making it more open and allowed for reprivatisation of nationalized companies during the revolution.14

3.3. Portugal and the development of the CFSP/ESDP: From Atlanticism to Europeanism

Lisbon was not directly involved in the building up the European Political Cooperation (EPC). However, before its accession, Portugal participated as an observer on its work and after joining the EC, acceptance of the EPC arrangements was smooth. In the Portuguese view, the foreign policy cooperation needed to be based on an intergovernmental basis and could not challenge the state sovereign external privileges. Moreover, it could not confront the country’s special relations with the Lusophone world and needed to respect strong historical and cultural connections between them. (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007, 2014).

In the early 1990s, the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union was launched in order to precede the institutionalization of CFSP, which aimed to replace the EPC. At the beginning, Lisbon did not feel motivated to support this idea as the EPC framework was

13 Since the 1979 Portugal had revised its Constitution 7th times : 1982, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2004 and 2005. 14 http://www.en.parlamento.pt/ConstitutionalRevisions/ Access: 8.08.2016 47 quite comfortable. However, due to the unfolding events of that time, mainly democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkan crisis, Europe had strengthened its position toward more collective foreign and security approaches and Portugal followed this direction (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007). Portuguese position toward the CFSP was stressed in the Memorandum of 30 November 1990 and in Lisbon’s view the CFSP should: a) be pursued gradually, b) be based on a pragmatic view of political, economic and social realities in Europe, c) respect national identities and diversity, d) preserve the existing institutional balance, e) ensure the correct application of the dual aspects of subsidiarity and solidarity.15

The IGC on the Political Union held under the Italian Presidency proved to be much more challenging than expected. The IGC was focused on two main topics: First, the EU’s institutional changes and then the construction of the CFSP. In terms of the institutional architecture, after demanding negotiations between member states, the pillar structure was adopted. The CFSP was placed as an autonomous pillar in harmony with the intergovernmental manner which was in line with Portuguese, French, British and Danish positions. In case of the CFSP and especially defence, there was a discussion of how much independence the European policy should get. An agreement had to be reached among: ‘common defence’ supported by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and Greece and ‘common policy of defence’ called for by the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal16. Consequently, the compromise was reached in the concept of ‘common defence policy’. Britain finally changed its position and the final agreement could be concluded. This is stated in the Title V of the Maastricht Treaty:

‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.17

Finally, Britain accepted the notion of common defence in exchange for the acceptance of the importance of NATO in member states policy and its compatibility with the CFSP. Portugal also decided to follow the British position. It can be stated that the outcomes of the Maastricht

15 Memorandum from the Portuguese delegation, 30 November 1990 (published in Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992:304) 16 http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_intergovernmental_conference_igc_on_political_union-en-183c7651-32ef-470a-85ac-8103435f4c58.html 17 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht , 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5; 24 December 2002, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39218.html

48 negotiations matched the Portuguese position toward the Political Union. The CFSP became compatible with the prime role of the NATO in creating the European security architecture and with respect to the security/defence policies of the member states (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007).

During the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, the Portuguese foreign policy makers started to change their initial economic-oriented approach toward the EC (Ferreira-Pereira, 2014). Lisbon started to realize that in order to be a visible player in the European affairs, it is impossible to keep its current stance within the EC by just keeping on benefitting from the structural funds, instead of contributing, i.e. becoming a useful member (Ibid.). The mental reservation toward CFSP also faded away as Portugal understood that the emerging role of the CFSP would not undermine the leading role of NATO. Any actions that could somehow damage vital transatlantic relations were opposed. However, it has to be noted that Portuguese government did not have any objections for the EU to intervene in the regions where the NATO would not (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008).

In the light of a new IGC, Portugal presented its national approach toward the CFSP. The document indicated that the CFSP should maintain its intergovernmental character and rejected any advance of communitarization of the CFSP which was described unrealistic. Portuguese policy makers sanctioned the development of a security pillar connected with the formation of the military structure as they believed that effective security dimension should have a military component (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007).

Since Britain shifted its position to a more positive attitude toward creation of sovereign European military capacity in the Saint Malo Declaration of December 1998, the new chapter in the CFSP had begun. In a Joint Declaration, the President of France Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair jointly announced that:

“The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.(…) in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO,

49 we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defense of its members”.18

The declaration proved that deepening relations with the CFSP does not mean undermining NATO’s position. After this guarantee, the Portuguese policy-makers were positive about the idea of providing the EU military capacity and launching the ESDP the year after (Ferreira- Pereira, 2014).

Due to the establishment of the Headline Goal in Helsinki Summit in 1999, the Portuguese Presidency in 2000 was mandated to develop several of tasks for the ESDP consolidation. The Portuguese policy makers were expected to submit the ‘Progress Report’ on strengthening the European security and defence at the Santa Maria da Feria Summit in June 2000. Since February, Portuguese military representatives started to be involved in the cooperation with the Military Committee and the military experts in order to strengthen the ESDP. Moreover, during the Portuguese Presidency, the ESDP institutional organs were established, namely the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. Furthermore, steps for closer EU-NATO cooperation were initiated. Presenting the ‘Presidency’s Report on the Reinforcement of the European Common Security and Defence Policy’ at the European Council of Santa Maria da Feira indicated that a big progress was made and proved the conclusion of the mandate (Ferreira- Pereira, 2007)

Another signs of Portuguese engagement in the ESDP implementation occurred in the second half of 2000 during the Capabilities Commitments Conference in Brussels when Lisbon together with other members presented its contribution to the Helsinki Headline Goal. Portugal contributed with 1,000 personnel (Ferreira-Pereira, 2014). During the IGC 2000 Portuguese position toward the CFSP/ESDP remained same as in 1991 and 1996/1997. Lisbon did not change its idea about the leading role of NATO in the European security and its compatibility with CFSP/ESDP. The Treaty of Nice did not provide changes to the framework of the CFSP/ESDP:

“The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the

18 Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, 3-4 December 1998. Access: 27.04.2016 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/FrenchBritish%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf

50 obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework”19

In the light of the European Convention initiated in 2003 and debate on how the ESDP should develop, Portugal continued its intergovernmental focus and its faithfulness to the NATO. Portugal also supported the establishment of the European Defense Agency (expansion of the Petersberg Tasks) as well as the clause which aimed to protect collective assistance in the context of terrorist attack or natural disaster. During the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty which occurred under the third Portuguese Presidency in 2007, Portuguese support for intergovernmental character of the CFSP/CSDP and again its loyalty to the NATO remained the same. The Treaty itself provided many important changes: abolishment of three-pillar structure or the establishment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European External Action Service (EEAS). Despite these changes, the foreign and security policies still remains separated from the others common policies (Fereira-Pereira, 2007).

3.4. Uploading national policies to the EU’s agenda: Rotation Council Presidencies

The Council Presidency serves as an important source of promoting the domestic interests inside the EU and significant instrument that has influence on the EU policy-making process. Presidency is a complex task and gives each of the member state chance to demonstrate their national preferences and be in the center of the stage for six months20. The Presidency is especially useful in the case of the smaller member states and can serve as a window of opportunity to have a stronger role in process of policy making. Even though the functions of presidencies are not formally laid down in the Treaties and still are under development, four of them can be highlighted:

19 European Union, Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 11 December 2000, Official Journal C 80 of 10 March 2001; 2001/C 80/01, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4e45f54.html

20 It is important to notice that signing the Treaty of Lisbon meant that the rotating Council Presidency would not have prerogatives relating to the foreign affairs. During the next Presidency, Portugal would not have the same ability to promote the relations with Lusophone as before. Moreover, Portuguese 2007 Presidency was the last one when Prime Minister could be the President of the European Council at the same time.

- Firstly, administration and coordination: the Presidency is in charge of coordinating the work of the Council by collecting documents or arranging all meetings and connecting the Council relations with Parliament and Commission. These administrative tasks are the key important factors in any Presidency. - Secondly, setting political priorities: the Presidency program of particular country, articulates their priorities, areas of special interest and to which issues the EU must pay more attention. - Thirdly: mediation: Each Presidency is supposed to conduct the Council negotiation toward final agreement. This means the capability of consensus and compromise building among all members. - Fourthly, representation: During the Presidency country is in charge to present the Council in relations with the EU institutions and in international negotiations (Elgstrom, 2003).

Since the accession, Portugal held three EU Council presidencies in 1992, 2000 and 2007. All of them occurred during different phases of the European integration and before the changes resulted by the Lisbon Treaty. The 1992 Presidency was marked by the domestic adaptation to the EU’s institutional mechanism, the Maastricht Treaty ratification and instability in Balkans (Cunha, 2015). The second 2000 Presidency was linked with the economic and institutional reforms, and saw the first EU-Africa summit and dialogue with Latin America (Magone, 2015). The third 2007 Presidency was focused on the Lisbon Treaty ratification, and developing political dialogue between the EU and Africa (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). Despite different Presidential programs, there was always one key issue on the top priority agenda during Portuguese Presidencies: the promotion of closer cooperation between the EU and Lusophone world (Raimundo, 2015).

3.4.1. The first Presidency 1992: ‘Learning by doing’

Portugal could hold its first Council Presidency in 1986; however, with the lack of preparation and knowledge, the Presidency was deferred till 1992. Against the background of the unsuccessful Greek Presidency in 1983 that followed this country’s accession, it was agreed that Portugal should firstly focus on the adaptation process. Thus, Portugal took the leadership role in

52 the Council of the EEC for the first time six years after its accession (Cunha, 2015). The Presidency was challenged by the unfolding events at that time: the escalating crisis in Balkans, relations with the Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as post-Cold War situation in Europe. In addition, the EC was concerned with the upcoming new intergovernmental conference and signing the Maastricht Treaty at the same year. For Portugal, the first EU Presidency was considered as a ‘learning by doing’ process where national political and diplomatic elites were getting familiar with the institutional apparatus in Brussels as well as an opportunity to promote its national interests into the EU level (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). Thus, the 1992 Presidency was the main external policy priority for Portugal to consolidate its position within the EEC states and transform its status from ‘pupil’ to a useful member (Robinson, 2015; Cunha, 2015).

During the six years of preparation, Portugal was able to improve its economic and social condition and achieved political prestige. Since 1989, there were numerous actions undertaken in order to prepare the country for the upcoming Presidency, including the training programs for the civil servants. The year before the Presidency was considered critical for the preparation phase

(Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1992). The institutional structure was modified, civil servants were trained intensively and REPER was improved in terms of staff members (from 24 to 50) (Magone, 2001). Finally, few days before starting the EU Presidency, the Portuguese Presidency’s program was presented. The program under the title ‘Setting Course for the European Union’ contained 39 pages and was divided into five areas:

 The new parameters for building Europe (signing the Maastricht Treaty and its ratification process as a priority, improving relations with the Latin America, Africa and Mediterranean countries)  Putting present achievements into practice (promotion of the Delors II package, strengthening the cohesion, establishing closer ties to the west, east and the south)  Projecting the future (challenges caused by the Maastricht Treaty and foreign and security policy)  Intergovernmental cooperation on justice and home affairs (asylum policy and immigration)

 European political cooperation (the EEC actions in numerous countries in Africa, Middle east and Yugoslavia) (Cunha, 2015).

Portuguese Presidency was forced to focus on the unfolding events of that year, namely the crisis in the Balkans. The war in Bosnia that started in 1992 was an important test for Portugal as the country never had any geopolitical interests in the Balkans before. Moreover, the region was almost unknown for the Portuguese diplomats that needed to mediate among different ethnic groups that took part in the conflict. In the first days of the Portuguese Presidency, the Yugoslav aviation force shot down a helicopter with five European monitoring officers and Lisbon had to manage the political outcomes of this situation. Furthermore, the unknown region was not the only challenge for Portugal: consensus had to be achieved among the EU member states in recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which was effectively secured on January 15th of that year (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). This learning phase for Lisbon proved that Portugal could go beyond its Atlantic-oriented interests and have an impact on regions such as Balkans (Teixeira, 2014).

The Balkan crisis received a huge attention from the Portuguese diplomats but the Portuguese Presidency was also active in promoting relations among Europe and Latin America, especially with Brazil. From the Portuguese perspective, due to the historical and cultural links, it was important to promote the closer relations with Latin America and cooperation based on new agreements (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). The Presidency also led to deepening the relations with Brazil and Mercosur bloc (Vasconcelos, 1996). On 29th May 1992 the European Commission and the Mercosur Council signed a collaboration agreement. In theory, the initiative aimed to strengthen the ties with this region, principally promoting the economic relations. In practice, the agreement matched the Portuguese national interests in that region (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). During the Portuguese Presidency several meetings took place in order to promote closer relations with Latin America and Africa like the ministerial meeting between the EEC and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) in Jamaica. Portugal also represented the Community on the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, the great importance was paid to deepening the cooperation with the PALOPs- the African countries with official Portuguese language as well as with the Maghreb countries. The Lisbon European Council of 1992 created a statement about the Euro-Maghreb relations in order to confirm the

54 solidarity with the Maghreb states especially in the case of information exchange regarding the security matters. The Portuguese Presidency highlighted the need to reinforce closer ties with the Mediterranean region due to its historical connections and needed cooperation between both continents (Robinson, 2015).

3.4.2. The second Presidency, 2000: ‘at the core of the integration process’

The Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2000 differed from the previous one, as many lesson had been learnt (Teixeira, 2014). The socialist government led by António Guterres changed the country image as a confidently integrated into the European structure. Moreover, Lisbon transmitted its picture from being a ‘good student’ in the community schoolroom to the country that was at the core of the integration process. The second Presidency was seen as platform to consolidate Portuguese position in the world through the European integration and bringing the African continent closer to the EU, which reflected country’s traditionally linked national interest (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012). Portugal adopted less administrative and more political approach, which meant that Lisbon wanted to leave a mark in the European integration process through leadership and projecting its national interests to the EU (Teixeira and Hermenegildo, 2015). Portuguese Presidency focused on six main priorities: the promotion of economic reform and employment, discussion regarding the reform of the Treaties, advancing the process of enlargement and reform of institutions, development of the CFSP and strengthening relations among Europe-Africa, harmonization and integration of judiciary and police structures between member states, and food and health safety (Magone, 2015).

The emergence of the CFSP as well as reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty meant that Lisbon had limited scope to establish its own agenda. By adopting the pragmatic approach, Jaime Gama promoted the adoption of common strategies and cooperated closely with Javier Solana as the CFSP High Representative (Ibid.). The Presidency also focused on the emergence of the ESDP launched in the Cologne Summit in June 1999, as at that time in the EU there were no formal instruments to deal with security and defence matters. Such issues were not in the Presidency’s formal program, but were within the scope of duties of the Portuguese Presidency of the Western European Union (WEU) which ran at the same time as the Council Presidency.

The Portuguese presidencies of both the EU and WEU came in the aftermath of the formulation of the Headline Goal in the Helsinki Summit in 1999. This meeting mandated Portugal to carry out several tasks needed for the CFSP consolidation. Presenting the ‘Presidency’s Report on the Reinforcement of the European Common Security and Defence Policy’ in the Santa Maria da Feira Summit implied a big progress in many different domains, and proved to fulfill the Helsinki mandate (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007; 2008).

During its Presidency, Portugal prioritized the relations with Europe and Africa in order to project its national foreign policy priorities into the EU. One of the biggest achievements in strengthening the bilateral relations was the first EU-Africa summit on the 3-4 April held in Cairo (Teixira, 2014). The summit resulted from the Lisbon proposal of 1996 and led to the reforms of the Lomé Convention21 and signature of the Cotonou Agreement22, which was considered by Portuguese diplomats as a significant process (Raimundo, 2013). Cairo summit established the ‘Plan of Aciton’ which regulated the future relations between Europe and Africa and built the bilateral dialog between them. The Cairo Declaration synchronized many different spheres of cooperation among both continents, especially the economic, cultural as well as linguistic aspects. The Cairo summit was seen as one of the biggest achievements of Portuguese Presidency when Africa started to return into the EU agenda (Robinson, 2015).

Despite the success of the EU-Africa summit, Portuguese Presidency was active in improving the EU’s relations with many countries around the world. Ministerial meetings and summits were held between the EU and the US, Canada, Australia and Russia Lisbon also hosted the first EU- India summit in June 200 and established the Asia-Europe Meeting in Seoul (which took place during the French Presidency) (Magone, 2015). Similar to what happened in the 1992 Presidency, Portugal highlighted the importance of relations between the EU and Latin America through several meetings with Mexico, Chile and Mercosur.

Moreover, the Portuguese Presidency had to deal with the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Conference of the Nice Treaty. The conference sought to resolve the questions around so-called ‘leftovers’ of the Amsterdam Treaty in order to prepare the EU for

21 The aid and trade agreement signed in 1975 in Lomé, Togo among European Economic Community and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 22 The agreement between European Union and the ACP countries which replaced the previous Lomé Convention. The main aim of the treaty is to reduce poverty, and integrate the ACP states to the world economy. 56 the Eastern and Central European enlargement. Portuguese Presidency was responsible for the preparation of work that could be accomplished in the second half of the year and had to act as a platform between challenging negotiations among the members states (Teixira and Costa Pinto, 2012; Magone, 2015). Teixeira and Costa Pinto highlighted the importance of the negotiations process and stated that:

“The Nice intergovernmental summit gave Portugal a platform upon which it was able to fulfill a leadership role in respect of the medium and smaller European states, defending their interests from the demands of the larger states. This role was paramount during the negotiations over institutional reform, at a time that was without doubt one of the most active moments of Portugal’s participation in the process of European integration.”(Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012:21)

3.4.3. The third Presidency, 2007: ‘Stronger Europe for a better world’

At the beginning of the third Portuguese Presidency, the then Prime Minister José Sócrates, highlighted the key issues in order to construct a ‘Stronger Europe for a better world’. Firstly, the reform of the Treaties; secondly, modernization of the European economies and societies; thirdly, strengthening Europe’s position in the world through Portuguese Presidency. Moreover, similar to the 2000 Presidency, efforts were made to bring to EU’s attention to the South and deepening relations between the EU and Africa. 23

Portugal, from the beginning of the preparation for the Presidency, knew that may need to apply new institutional reform after the demise of the European Constitution. The European Council held in Brussels on June 22nd opened a negotiation phase for a new treaty with an attempt to conclude it until the end of 2007. Thus, the negotiation and final agreement of a new treaty became one of the priorities of Portuguese Presidency. The country inherited form the Germany Presidency an important mission to complete the process of the reform to the new treaty. For Portugal, the mandate to supervise the institutional changes was a huge challenge, however, with competent and skillful diplomats accompanying the crucial stage of negotiations the commitment was reached fast. The compromise about the final text was agreed during the EU summit in Lisbon on 18-19 of October. After translation into all official languages of the EU,

23http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20070711+ITEM-004+DOC+XML+V0//EN

57 the Reform Treaty (also known as Lisbon Treaty) was signed on December 13th, 2007 in Jeronimos Monastery in Lisbon (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). Due to the fact that the Treaty was signed in Lisbon and is known as a ‘Lisbon Treaty’, the new document reaffirmed Portugal’s place in the history of European integration. This could not have been done without Portuguese policy makers who were able to negotiate and reach political compromise between different member states in a very challenging process (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008).

The third Portuguese Presidency, similar to the previous ones, prioritized the external relations with the regions of its national interest, especially with the Africa and Brazil. Portugal was successful in strengthening partnership between the EU and Brazil as the first EU-Brazil summit that was held in Lisbon on July 2007 (Teixeira and Costa Pinto, 2012). José Sócrates, the President of the European Council at that time, during the meeting with the Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva confirmed a strategic partnership between the EU and Brazil and stressed the need for deepening the political dialogue. Moreover, both sides agreed on the necessity to increase the economic cooperation among Europe and Mercosur bloc. The summit addressed the need to renew the EU’s links with an important global player and Latin America as a whole. Moreover, through the efforts of Portuguese Presidency, Brazil joined the list of annual summits among the EU and developing economic powers (Robinson, 2015).

In order to improve the country’s role in the European external relations, Portuguese policy makers were able to bring the political dialogue with Africa to the agenda of the EU and act as a ‘constructive bridge-builder’ (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). One of the most important events that occurred during the Portuguese Presidency was the second EU-Africa summit that took place in Lisbon on 8-9 of December 2007. Due to the agreements made in the Santa Maria da Feira summit, the EU-Africa summit should have taken place sooner during the Greek Presidency in 2003. However, this did not take place eventually. The summit was considered as one of the top priority of the Portuguese Presidency (Robinson, 2015) and in the word of José Sócrates: “Our Presidency’s biggest initiative” (Sócrates, 2007). Portugal felt responsible for bringing the African issue closer to the EU as both of the summits took place during its Presidencies. During the summit, the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership was endorsed which represented a new framework of collaboration between two continents. One of the biggest problems that challenged the EU-African Summit was the Zimbabwean case. The British Prime

Minister Gordon Brown claimed that could not attend the summit if the President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe attends. Due to the Mugabe’s human rights violations as well as economic misconduct, his presence raised a criticism among some of the EU members (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). Portugal believed that all the African Union members as well as the EU’s should be invited to this event. In order to respect the UK’s objections regarding the Zimbabwean President, Lisbon had to manage the situation carefully. Portugal argued that political cooperation and new agreement between both continents should be placed over the concerns of individual member states. Eventually, Portugal successfully managed to arrange the summit, Gordon Brown boycotted the event though (Robinson, 2015).

The 2007 Portuguese Presidency showed the efforts of Lisbon to promote a new strategic partnership among the EU and various regions of the World. An example of it was creating closer relations between the EU and Cape Verde. Portugal successfully advocated for the new agreement and through the dialogue between Praia and Brussels, the Council accepted the Special Partnership among the EU and Cape Verde signed in November 2007. The agreement was perceived to be different from the other arrangements with the African countries and was expected to be a real cooperative platform. Strategic Partnership was based on the promotion of mutual interests as well as fighting against terrorism, drugs and illegal trafficking of people. Making Cape Verde a special partner of the EU was a huge achievement of Portuguese diplomacy, as other efforts in the past were not successful (Vieira and Ferreira-Pereira, 2009). It is noteworthy that in addition to the EU summits with Africa and Brazil, Portuguese Presidency was also active in other parts of the globe and successfully supervised the summits with ASEAN, Russia, India, China and Ukraine.

3.5. Playing the Lusophone card

Promotion of good relations with the Lusophone countries was always at core of Portuguese foreign affairs goals. According to Gorjão, next to the European integration and transatlantic relations pillars, “political, economic and diplomatic relations with Portuguese- speaking countries – Brazil in Latin America, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe in Africa, and Timor-Leste in Southeast Asia – was the third pillar” (Gorjão, 2014: 172).

Lisbon strongly advocated closer cooperation with the South and since its accession to the EC felt responsible to introduce Africa into the EU agenda and always closely followed the political situations in the Portuguese speaking countries. In other words, Portugal encouraged to ‘more Europe’ in the field of political and economic relations with African countries, especially with Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde.

Within the EU membership, Portugal was very committed in enhancing the diplomatic relations with Mozambique, especially through its democratic transition. Lisbon played an active role during Mozambique’s peace process in the early 1990s, especially at its final stage. Moreover, Portugal had an influential role in the creation of the Mozambique peace agreement. Beside its limitations, Lisbon used the EPC in instrumental way to promote its national interests and pushed the EC for better engagement in the Mozambique situation (Gorjão, 2014). Under the ‘EU umbrella’ Portugal was also strongly involved in the Mozambique electoral processes in 1994, 1999 and 2004. During the EU ministerial meeting with the ACP in May 1994, Lisbon presented its proposal for the CFSP Joint Action on Mozambique. The proposal suggested the EU technical assistance and sending of the European observers. However, the initiative was not accepted and described as controversial, with some EU members preferring a bilateral approach to the African county rather than one coordinated via the CFSP. Nevertheless, under the German Presidency, the EU provided the electoral assistance and send 200 observes to the parliamentary and presidential elections (Raimundo, 2013). The second general election held in 1999 coincided with the EU’s Finish Presidency and Portuguese participation in the troika. Again in 1999 and 2004, the EU made a big contribution and sent largest foreign observation mission to Mozambique. The National Report on Portugal from 2004 issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Lisbon played significant role in both peace and electoral processes especially in the decision of providing the observation missions (Raimundo, 2012). In general terms, the Portuguese efforts to promote a European approach toward Mozambique were crucial for this country and were also connected to the national interest with its former colony. However, the rejection of Portuguese proposal of a Joint Action demonstrates that those actions were not always an easy process. Lisbon managed to promote closer cooperation between Maputo and Brussels in an attempt to achieve its own national goals.

Within the framework of EPC, Lisbon was also strongly involved in enhancing closer relations with Angola and tried to use its membership in order to promote peace in that country (Vasconcelos, 1991). After the Angolan war in the early 1990s, Lisbon played an important mediatory role in country’s transition and peace process. Portuguese arbitration facilitated the signing of the agreement, and even though peace did not last long, the mediation process was presented as a big victory for the Portuguese diplomacy. In June 1900, the EC supported the mediation role of Lisbon in the peace process and two years after, during the Portuguese Presidency, Troika mission visited Angola. Through promoting its ‘special relationship’ with Angola, Lisbon adopted a more active role in the EU and was able to reinforce the bilateral relations. Moreover, Portugal tried to strengthen the cooperation in economic areas and was actively engaged in the Lomé reform and new Cotonou Agreement which changed substantially the trade arrangements between the EU and ACP. Despite the economic matters, Portugal tried to mobilize Brussels for the political support to Angola through the peace transition and observation mission during the legislative election in 2008. Lisbon was able to use common instruments and mechanisms within the EU to present its preferences vis-à-vis Angola, which was visible especially during both Portuguese presidencies in 2000 and 2007 (Raimundo, 2012; 2013). African issues were on the top of Lisbon’s external agenda at that time. Due to its historical ties with Angola, Portugal was able to play important role in the Angolan peace process and strengthen its ‘Africanist specialty’ in the EU.

Talking about other African states, Portugal also had a huge contribution in bringing Cape Verde closer to the EU. Country was already party of the Cotonou Agreement and ACP, however, Cape Verdean authorities had aspiration to create closer form cooperation with the EU, different form the existing ones. This was rooted in country’s geographical proximity as well as historical and linguistic ties with Europe. Moreover, Cape Verde could also gain profit from the EU’s structural funds as Canaries, Azores and Madeira do. Since 2005 Portugal started efforts aiming to introduce the membership talks with Cape Verde and the year after the European Parliament accepted the resolution on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which was a milestone in bilateral relations. However, the biggest achievement was the agreement founding the Special Partnership between the EU and Cape Verde, ratified by the Council in 2007. The arrangement was a new framework to deepen bilateral relations based on the mutual interest promotion. It has to be noted that Lisbon put any efforts in order to create this agreement and

61 since the 2007 Portuguese policy makers were raising awareness of Cape Verdean case through many informal and formal EU meetings. Moreover, during Portuguese Presidency, Lisbon had highlighted the Cape Verde’s economic and democratic successes in order to point out the EU policy makers the importance of such an agreement. Overall, it can be said that despite its limitations Portugal proved that learned the EU procedures and mechanisms well and effectively acted as a bridge between the EU and Africa (Vieira and Ferreira-Pereira, 2009).

Portuguese ’Africanist specialization’ and approach of ‘Looking South’ was especially visible during the 2007 Presidency (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008). Lisbon was determined to create a new ‘window of opportunity’ to the Euro-African relations and managed successfully to organize second EU-Africa summit, beside the opposition from other member states. Moreover, the lack of firmly recognized common European position toward the Portuguese past colonies in Africa allowed Lisbon to pursue its national priorities in a way that were not contradictory to its European interests. The fact that the first and second EU-African summits took place during the Portuguese presidencies demonstrates the importance of relations with Africa in foreign policy agenda of Portuguese domain, unlike the other presidencies. Portugal was also effective in initiating the stable basis for the closer cooperation between the EU and Brazil. Since the first EU-Brazil summit initiated by Lisbon, Portugal and Brazil started to work closer on the common strategic interests through the regional blocs that both countries are members (Robinson, 2015).

As presented, three Portuguese presidencies of the EU Council (1992, 2000 and 2007) were successful examples of the country’s ability to project its core foreign policy priorities into the EU level and fundamentally increased Europe’s cooperation with the Lusophone world. The scope of Lisbon’s agenda setting during the Presidencies, demonstrated the huge aspirations of Portuguese policy makers to have impact on the EU’s foreign affairs. All of the presidencies raised the awareness with regard to its former colonies through high-level talks or meetings and put the Lusophone issues into multilateral fora (Robinson, 2015). Making the domestic interests and European more interdependent proved that Lisbon learned the EU’s key mechanisms of how to upload its preferences. Playing the Lusophone card during the Portuguese presidencies was successful for strengthening the country image in international arena which could not be done without skillful diplomats who held important positions in European institutions and represented country abroad in summits and top level meetings. Moreover, according to Robinson,

“Playing the Lusophone card enhanced Portugal’s position in international organisations, as being more Lusophone, more Portuguese, enabled Portugal to bring more added value to its roles in NATO and the European Union”. (Robinson, 2013:227).

It must be noted that Lisbon had big limitations in terms of its Lusophone advocacy during the three Presidencies. This was due to the fact that while the country is holding the EU Presidency, it should adopt a neutral behavior in spite of having its agenda setting powers. In other words, any particular country cannot promote its own interests. In addition to this limitation, there were difficulties regarding the position of other member states as some of them were not always supportive for Portuguese proposals. The Mozambique or Cape Verde cases can serve as examples of that.

Portugal adapted well to the post-Lisbon Treaty era and still continues to shape the CFSP effectively. Many of Portuguese diplomats occupy the significant positions in the EEAS in Brussels and also in the EU missions abroad. This fact allows further creation of domestic and European external policy in a corresponding way. Lisbon already has key Portuguese authorities serving in the EU’s delegations in Brasilia, Caracas, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, or East

Timor (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2013).

3.6. Portugal and the ESDP missions

Lisbon started to use the ESDP (known as CSDP after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 2009) as a tool to strengthen its position and make its voice heard in the international arena (Ferreira-Pereira, 2014), despite limited military and economic resources. Since the beginning, Portugal tried to show its commitment and cooperative behavior in order to avoid marginalization as a peripheral state. Lisbon has been playing an active role in the CSDP missions all over the world.

In January 2003, Portugal took part in the Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUMP), EU’s first civil operation and contributed with eight officers from the Public Security Police. In the same year, Portugal participated in the EU’s first military mission: Operation CONCORDIA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with six military personnel. After the operation terminated, the EU embarked second operation called PROXIMA which

63 committed only one police officer. This minimalist participation was caused by the fact that Portugal was at the same time the host country of the EURO 2004 football event and needed maximum amount of police officers. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 increased the security awareness at that time (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007).

In December 2004, Portugal took part in the Operation ALTHEA and despite its economic limitations, the country was able to contribute with 246 personnel. However, the government decided to maintain the same contingent as the one involved in the NATO’s SFOR operation. Through this engagement, Portugal tried to show its willingness to contribute into the first big ESDP mission and proved that even with lack of economic resources it was willing to play an active role in ESDP making. Portugal also effectively contributed to the missions in Africa and participated in almost all missions that took part in this continent: EUPOL KINSHASA, EUSEC RDCONGO, Operation Atalanta, EUTM as well as the AMIS II (Ferreira- Pereira, 2014; Palma, 2009). The Portuguese engagement was especially visible during the EUPOL KINSHASA mission launched in 2005. Lisbon not only participated in this operation but also lead it by Adílio Ruivo Custódio who was chosen as the head of the operation (Robinson, 2013). In 2008 Portugal joined the EUFOR Chad/RCA which was planned during the third Presidency, as Portuguese minister of Defence stated:

“Portugal, while holding the Presidency of the European Union, did everything to push for the concretization of a military mission within the framework of ESDP to support the UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic […] Portugal wants to be in the frontline of the foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union. Portugal participated in all the European military missions and had to do so in EUFOR ChadRCA, the fourth and biggest military operation of the European Union” (in: Palma, 2009)

Portuguese engagement in the operations held on the African continent proves the special importance of this region for Portugal. This fact is connected to the interest of enhancing the EU- Africa relations and Portuguese expertise on this matter. Since 2000, Lisbon had been tried to convince the European partners that the African issue should be part of the EU’s interests. The first and second EU-Africa summits can serve as examples of that (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007).

It has to be noted that outside the framework of the EU, Portugal took many initiatives in support of the ESDP. In 1995, Lisbon together with France, Spain and Italy created the EUROFORCES- the multinational rapid reaction force including the EUROFOR (land) and the EUROMARFOR (maritime). This component was initially created for the EU to perform the Petersberg tasks, but could also be engaged in the NATO or UN led operations. Moreover, following the 2000 Nice Summit which defined the Police Forces concept, Portugal with Italy, France, Spain and the Netherlands created the multinational Police Force (EUROGENDFOR) in 2004 that intended to improve crisis management capabilities of the EU (Branco, 2015). Since the ESDP missions and operation were created, Portugal has been playing an active role in it and trying to be a contributing member despite its economic limitations. Through this engagement, Lisbon has tried to prove that is an active EU player. Moreover, the ESDP was instrumental to mitigate its small state position located in the European periphery. With the commitment to the ESDP, Portugal did not undermine the superiority of NATO or decrease its visibility in the NATO-led missions, but has tried to strengthen the EU-NATO cooperation (Ferreira-Pereira, 2007, 2008).

It should also be noted that besides above mentioned missions and operations, Portugal invested significant effort in launching the security sector reform mission in the Guinea-Bissau (EUSSR Guinea Bissau) in 2008 (Ferreira-Pereira, 2014). At the beginning, Portugal preferred military mission as the Guinean armed forces played an important role in political life and decided to support Spanish General as a Head of Mission. However, other countries believed that mission should have a civilian character. Unfortunately, as a result of difficulties to find a consensus between member states, the mission got very limited personnel (Portugal contributed with 11 people) (Palma, 2009). Through the EUSSR Guinea Bissau (launched during 2007 Council Presidency), Portugal managed to attract the international community’s attention to the country that had been neglected and tried to strengthen its position within the EU. According to Ferreira-Pereira, the reactive and proactive commitment within the CSDP aimed at:

“Positioning the country at the frontline of the CSDP should be understood in the light of a somewhat multidimensional rationale inspired by a strong perception of diverse benefits and opportunities stemming from this developing policy area. One of the perceived benefits relates to the (exogenous) incentive for the internationalization and modernization of the armed forces as a

65 result of continued exposure to up-dated (doctrinal and technological) information, as well as to a series of synergies and lessons that this entailed” (Ferreira-Pereira, 2014:153)

3.7. Conclusions

Looking at the Portuguese case, it can be concluded that during its thirty years of membership Portugal made important progress in uploading its preferences into the EU level. The transformation from ‘taker’ to ‘maker’, started to occur after the first Portuguese Presidency when Lisbon became more visible player in the European affairs. Portugal passed the learning phase and not only fully integrated into the EU’s mechanisms but was able to use them in order to bring the Lusophone world closer to the EU’s agenda. Through promoting the cooperation with its former colonies, Portugal created its ‘own domain’ in the EU affairs and successfully managed to enhance the cooperation between the Europe and Lusophone world. This was visible especially during Portuguese third Presidency when the strategy of ‘Looking South’ was country’s first priority. The effective story of uploading can be seen in the Cape Verdean case where Portugal was able to create the strategic partnership with the peripheral state that had not been in EU’s top priority agenda. Moreover, Portugal was able to take part in the ESDP missions and operations in the regions beyond of its national interests such as the Balkans. Lisbon demonstrated its effective capacity of downloading and proper socialization of its diplomats who held the key position in the European institutions, positively affected the uploading process.

As the study demonstrated, Portugal is a successful example of the Europeanization process. According to the theoretical framework, the study explored different mechanisms of adaptation to the European structures: elite socialization, bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional changes, changes in public perception concerning the political cooperation. Moreover, in order to measure the effectiveness of projecting country’s interests to the EU level four different mechanisms were taken into consideration: coalition and institution building, agenda setting, example setting, ideational export.

The elite socialization in Portugal started even before its accession. The civil servants were trained intensively in order to adapt well to the EUs’ institutional apparatus. Moreover, Portuguese diplomats participated as observers of the EPC works which helped become more familiar with the bureaucracy mechanisms. Michael E. Smith claimed that elite socialization is

66 especially visible when national elites are able to change their attitude toward controversial issues (Smith, 2000). Portugal at the beginning had mental reservation toward the CSFP/ESDP creation. However, when the county realized that CFSP is fully compatible with the NATO, it changed its approach and became actively engaged in the ESDP missions. The bureaucratic restructuring started during the accession negotiations. In July 1979, the Council of Ministers for European Integration was established and the Secretariat for European Integration became an important element for the coordination of the Portuguese system of EU. Between 1986 and 1990, the CICE and DGAC were established. Moreover, different ministries launched specialized units in order to cooperate with the CICE. In terms of constitutional changes Portugal revised its Constitution twice in 1982 and 1989. The first one revision modified the ideological context of Constitution and created more flexible economic market. The second one changed the economic system by making it more open. The changes in public perception concerning the political cooperation were especially observable during the initial phase of membership when Portugal benefited from the structural funds. The financial help had a huge impact on the structural transformation of Portugal and to an extent, it changed the perception the Portuguese society of the benefits that the country could gain through the European integration. Portuguese agenda setting were visible during three Portuguese presidencies, where Lisbon successfully managed to advocate for closer relations with the Lusophone world. This was based on the country’s deeply rooted historical and cultural ties with its former colonies. The first EU-Brazil summit, the first and second EU-Africa summit, Special Partnership with Cape Verde, closer relations of EU and Mercosur and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) as well as the Cotonou Agreement are example of Portuguese effective agenda setting. Moreover, the agenda setting power and raising the importance of Lusophone countries through the Portuguese presidencies allowed Lisbon to develop its specific role identity and to ‘leave its mark’ within the EU. Portugal effectively managed to transfer its example setting and ideational export to Africa especially to Angola and Mozambique. After the Angolan war in the early 1990s, Lisbon played an important mediatory role in the country’s transition and peace process. Moreover, despite the economic matters, Portugal tried to mobilize Brussel for the political support to Angola through the peace transition and observation mission during the legislative election in 2008. Portugal was also very committed in enhancing the diplomatic relations with Mozambique especially through its democratic transition and played an active role during the Mozambique’s peace process in the

67 early 1990s and electoral processes in 1994, 1999 and 2004. Moreover, Lisbon took initiative to create the Joint Action in Mozambique.

4. POLISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY WITHIN THE EU

4.1. Introduction

Following the theoretical framework of the study, this chapter firstly aims to focus on the national adaptation of Poland to the CFSP before and shortly after the accession in 2004. In order to understand the country’s ability in active participation in the EU’s foreign policymaking, it is important to look into the domestic factors that had affected the effectiveness of Polish actions in the CFSP. Consequently, in the first part the changes that had occurred in the national administration as a result of Europeanization and adaptation processes will be reviewed to show that a fruitful downloading process means an effective uploading of country’s national interests. The second part of the chapter will investigate the Polish abilities to upload its national interests to the EU level, while especially exploring the EU relationship with Ukraine. Toward this, the Polish democracy promotion, the efforts of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU as well as Eastern Partnership program will be taken into consideration. Furthermore, other Polish contributions for shaping the CFSP will be presented by considering the AA negotiations with Ukraine, the Polish veto toward EU’s negotiation of a new partnership with Russia, the Polish Presidency of the Council in 2011 as well as Polish active participation in the ESDP missions.

4.2. Domestic dynamics after the EU enlargement

Poland’s active participation in the new foreign and security policy environment and especially its engagement with the CFSP after 2004, posed many challenges to the government. Warsaw was not ready to be an active and constructive participant due to the lack of knowledge, experience and capabilities. Excluded from participation in the CFSP before the accession, some of the Polish decision makers were still skeptical about the need of synchronization of Polish foreign and security policies with the EU and/or its individual members (Zieba, 2012; Kuzniar, 2008). Being concerned with other problems such as agricultural issues and structural funds, Warsaw did not see the CFSP as the main priority at that time. Moreover, during the first post- accession months, Polish government had not defined clear strategic foreign policy priorities in international relations in general and toward the EU in particular with the exception of the

Eastern Dimension and cooperation with NATO. Rather than defining such strategic priorities Poland at this time was focused on its existing commitments such as the intervention in Iraq, the engagement in the ESDP missions and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These factors had created pressure on the foreign policy makers like never before. The lack of experience in European institutions as well as a limited capacity and resources had resulted in many mistakes that eventually limited Warsaw’s influence in the CFSP (Pomorska, 2011). Furthermore, the Polish domestic situation and internal political changes had an important impact on the perception of the Europeanization process. Soon after the enlargement, the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections ended up occupying the minds of the Polish political elites, rather than closer cooperation with the CFSP (Kaminska, 2007).

That being said, while Poland demonstrated interest in direct contributions to the CFSP, such constructive posture continued to be unattended by its European counterparts. This situation was disappointing for Polish policy makers and “perpetuated the belief that they were still not equal partners” (Czubinski, 1998: 91). Moreover, factors such as the prevailing tendency in some of the member states that can be designated ‘Russia first’ policy, as well as a lack of clear EU strategy toward Ukraine and Belarus, along with the ‘European’ war on Balkans raised Polish concerns about the coherence of the EU’s foreign policy action. The Polish position toward the CFSP/CSDP was also influenced by the enlargement process of NATO by Warsaw’s relations with the US as well as a deep-rooted belief that the Atlantic Alliance is the main security pillar in Europe. Moreover, a reaffirmed support of the Atlanticism on the part of Warsaw was a result of Poland’s exclusion from the decision-making process of the security matters in Europe. This factor played a significant role in creating its primary attitude toward the CFSP/CSDP (Zaborowski, 2007). Before the 2004 EU enlargement, the country status of an ‘outsider’ had caused concerns in Warsaw. As a non-EU member, Poland was not enthusiastic about the CSDP project and believed that the EU involvement in security matters should not duplicate the Alliance dominant role. Moreover, in the first Poland’s Security Strategy adaptation in 2000, the development of the EU military and political structures were attributed a secondary place compared to NATO’s pillar of security. However, after the arrangements in Santa Maria de Feira in 200024, Poland started to be involved into the internal working of the EU and the attitude

24 The Santa Maria de Feira European Council held on 19-20 June 2000, identified the agreements which allowed the non-European NATO members or European candidate states to have contribution in the EU military management.

70 toward the CFSP/CSDP became more accepting and positive (Zieba, 2012). In 2002, Poland was one of the countries that was invited by the EU to participate in the first independent mission by the CSDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 2003 in the ‘Operation Concordia’ in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Moreover, with a prospect of the EU enlargement, Poland did not want to stay skeptical against the CSDP. In 2003, the Polish Minister of European Affairs Danuta Hubner, stated that:

"There is no contradiction between the development of defense capabilities of NATO and an effective European Security and Defence Policy. What's more, only through cooperation of NATO and the European Union interest of our safety can be protected”25.

After joining the EU, the status of Poland in the CFSP and ESDP were under essential changes. As an EU member, Poland obtained full access to the EU decision-making process, and new opportunities emerged to influence and shape the transatlantic relations (Zaborowski, 2007).

Just before the enlargement, the Leszek Miller government was broadly criticized for its corruption, nepotism and low public support. The government resigned just after the accession as a result of many domestic pressures from farmers, the Church and Euro-sceptic parties like Samoobrona and the League of Polish Families26. The parties argued that the EU wanted to limit Polish sovereignty and independence and Germany could conquest Polish land (Szczerbiak, 2012). Moreover, Euro-sceptic slogans like ’bringing Poland to the EU on its knees’27 resulted in the lack of solid cooperation between Warsaw and Brussels and its accession negotiations. Polish society was also confused, as the EU integration advantages for Poland were reappraised and appeared very questionable, in the context of what appeared to be Brussels intentions to limit Warsaw’s position in the voting system of Nice Treaty (Kuzniar, 2008). The Prime Minister Leszek Miller despite strong anti-EU opposition had to handle the criticism inside his Party as well as struggle for leadership among Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Marek Borowski. High

25 Przesilenie przed dobrym finalem. Rozmowa z Danuta Hubner, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, nr 25 (2814) z 22 VI 2003. 26 Samoobrona and the League of Polish Families included mainly conservative and elderly electorate and presented tougher position toward the EU integration. Both Parties were created from church societies or the protest movements and lacked the experienced elites. Their supporters and especially the Catholic Church were claiming that accession to the EU may legalize abortion, euthanasia or drugs and Poland will lost its Catholic values. The League of Polish Families and Samoobrona were also supported by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk the founder of a popular radio station: Radio Maryja. Rydzyk through his radio had an influential role in the promotion of nationalist and conservative agenda among Catholic population. 27 The slogans created mostly by the League of Polish Families Party were designed to weaken the position of Polish government toward the EU integration and to gain more public support among the Euro-sceptics for the upcoming elections to the European Parliament. The Party presented itself as the only one who defends Polish interests in Brussels and will never ‘give up’ Polish land to the foreign investors: ‘Our slogan will be freedom and our Fatherland’.

71 unemployment, corruption scandals and arrogance of policy makers were seen as the main reason of government collapse. The country was in difficult situation as there was no Party or coalition in Parliament to be able to form a government and Lower Chamber support (Chojan, 2015).

The new government of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and its rhetoric of working toward a deserved place for Poland in Europe constrained the effectiveness of country’s performance in the EU. Weak and inexperienced government with strong ‘back seat’ position of Jaroslaw Kaczynski28 brought many concerns about the future external policy goals. Moreover, very strong position of the President in foreign policy area confused many partners and initiated tough criticism of opposition and political experts (Szczerbiak, 2012). The subsequent coalition of two Eurosceptical parties, Samoobrona and the League of Polish Families, was characterized unstable29 and focused on the security issues rather than fruitful cooperation with the EU. The government was subject of criticism externally and internally for its populism, politicization of main institutions, decisional incapability of the ministers as well as the Prime Minister (Kuzniar, 2008). The rhetoric of safeguarding the country’s national interest, the lack of ability to compromise and build alliances resulted in weakening the Polish role in the EU. Moreover, the presented and reiterated vision of the foreign policy driven by Poland’s national interest, that was on the contrary of ‘on its knees’ before, was confusing for the European partners. The rhetoric of the Law and Justice Party harmed the country’s image as a new member in the EU and led to suspicions that Poland was not ready to join the European community (Zaborowski, 2007; Kaminska, 2010).

Stronger involvement in the area of security and foreign policy began in 2007 after the collapse of former coalition and new parliamentary elections, won by a more pro-European force, the Civic Platform. The new government aimed to balance the relations between Poland and the EU, strengthen ties with the United States and improve the cooperation with Germany and France, with whom relations were complicated following different position taken toward the US intervention in Iraq. Trying to improve the negative image of Poland established among EU diplomats as a consequence of actions of the previous ruling Party, the new government was

28 Formally, Jaroslaw Kaczynski did not hold any important position in the government but as an ‘éminence grise’ had a significant role in the decision making process from ‘behind the scene’. 29 The rhetoric of the coalition was described as changeable and based on the big expectation and hopes in the economy area. 72 eager to demonstrate good understanding of the European politics and attained many credits from the beginning. Tusk’s cooperative behavior and clearly defined foreign policy goals resulted in a more effective activity within the EU with support of the EU partners and institutions. As the result of the change that occurred in Poland, the government managed to create skillful and proficient diplomacy. The decision makers and elites also shared differed ideas toward the EU. They believed that Poland should be perceived as an embodied part of the Europe and CFSP. Those declarations showed the shift in Polish diplomacy and recognition of the CFSP as a necessary platform and tool in foreign affairs (Kaminska, 2010, 2014; Copsey and Pomorska, 2014).

4.3. EU’s influence on national administrative structures

The changes at the Polish bureaucratic level are here studied by looking into the influence of the EU on the institutional structures and national procedures. This section aims to look into the domestic and the European levels of Polish CFSP making. The domestic level includes the Prime Minister and his cabinet, the MFA, the Committee and Office for the European Integration (UKIE/KIE), the Polish Parliament (to some extent) and the President. In case of the European level, the Polish Permanent Representation in Brussels is explored.

The structure of Foreign policy administrative in Poland went through significant changes. The prospect of the EU integration led to create of new administrative bodies for better coordination of the Europeanization process (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). Highly bureaucratic and old ministries, corruption, politicization of public administration as well as lack of proficient diplomats in the beginning of Euroeanization limited fruitful cooperation with the CFSP. The diversity of the EU’s institutions required a significant effort and time from Poland as a new member state, in terms of its adaptation to the European political system and learning a new logic of behavior takes (Kaminska, 2014).

The most intense period of Europeanization toward EU-focused institutions started after 1997, during Polish official membership negotiations. Groups of ministerial expert committees were created in order to effectively lead the negotiations and reinforce Polish expertise. On the level of external affairs, various administrative units were launched for daily harmonization of CFSP- related issues including the European correspondent. Closer cooperation with the EU

73 resulted in the formation of new assistance structures like UKIE/KIE, which were responsible for the better harmonization of the adoption progress (Pomorska, 2006). This period of negotiations was a crucial point in the Europeanization process as the main decision making structures were formed. Although in practice some of them were mainly symbolic, they provided an important platform for downloading and a prospect for socialization of elites and experts (Kaminska, 2007, 2010; Copsey and Pomorska, 2014).

In terms of formal restructuring, the Prime Minister, the Parliament and the President, i.e. key decision makers, were not radically influenced by the Europeanization process, which was mostly characterized by the changes that were embodied in new institutions like UKIE/KIE and added to the already existing structures. However, the membership in the EU and participation in the CFSP did affect the interactions between those actors, mainly between the Prime Minister and the President (Pomorska, 2006). The main challenge in the cooperation between these two actors was the fact that there was no clear division of competences of the President and Prime Minister in the area of external policy. Some of the presidents like Aleksander Kwasniewski had very strong influence on the foreign policy performance which resulted in many problems in cooperation in national and international arenas. The misunderstanding was especially visible in above-mentioned case of President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Tusk and their disputes about who should represent the country at the Euoprean Council summits (Kaminska, 2007). However, in 2009, the Constitutional Tribunal established that the Prime Minister is the one who should lead the foreign policy and represent Poland at European Council summits.

The process of change in foreign policy institutions started to be visible, mainly in the case of the MFA. Before the enlargement, Foreign Ministry was not directly involved in the CFSP making even though it had participated in the policy making process. The position of MFA was challenged in the accession period when in 1996 the UKIE/KIE were established in order to increase the performance of national coordination (Pomorska, 2006). The main responsibility of the UKIE was to safeguard the proper performance of KIE and maintain the process of implementation of the European law as well as preparing the instructions for the European Council. While MFA was concentrated on wider foreign policy issues like bilateral participation in international and national organizations, the preparation for accession was mainly directed and supervised by the UKIE/KIE. According to the law the MFA was responsible for “foreign affairs

74 coordination with the exceptions of tasks reserved to the KIE”30. Low participation in the accession negotiations of MFA diplomats limited the Europeanization process and country’s performance in the CFSP shortly after the Enlargement. The situation changed after 2006, when the Law and Justice government decided to change the balance between the prime minister and the ministry of foreign affairs by assigning the MFA the Chair of the KIE. The KIE/UKIE institutions were important platforms for cooperation during the implementation process. However, since the post-enlargement institutional settings were not effective enough. The UKIE caused much confusion especially in the area of foreign policy and was often a source of rivalry among different institutions (Jakubek, 2008). The main problem in effective synchronization of European issues was a struggle over the competences of the UKIE and MFA and, as a result, many institutional reforms were blocked. As the ministries started to launch their own departments of European affairs that were able to connect with the EU directly, the UKIE was marginalized. In 2010, the competences of UKIE were formally taken by the Department of the Committee for European Affairs and the KIE by the Committee of European Affairs (Pomorska, 2006; Kaminska, 2014).

Important change in the post-enlargement government institution occurred such as the creation of the European Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM) in March 2004 as a forum for adoption and discussion of the official positions of the Polish government toward European issues. The composition of the KERM brought together top officials from major governmental bodies (Jakubek, 2008). The KERM was tasked with resolving differences and inter-ministerial conflicts on government’s position toward the EU Council (Pomorska, 2006). In the case of the failure of the KERM in concluding the common position, the draft could be sent to the Council of Ministers that prepared the final decision. The creation of the KERM as well as the transfer of power from the UKIE to MFA in the area of foreign affairs demonstrated Poland’s positive adaptation to the EU’s foreign policy management. The important point that clarified the management of Polish and EU affairs was the establishment of the CFSP department in 2010 within the MFA .This was a substantial shift of power from the Prime Minister to the MFA. The main motivation of the reform was to resolve the problem of unclear division between the competences as well as to simplify the Polish EU collaboration before the Polish EU Presidency

30 Law from 4 September 1997 concerning the Different Divisions of Government Administration] (Journal of Legal Acts), no. 141, pos. 943, art. 32.2).

75 in 2011 (Kaminska, 2014). Since 2010, the MFA had been maintained its dominant position in coordinating the Polish foreign affairs and became a center of expertise in the CFSP/ESDP area.

The Polish Representation to Brussels, known as ‘the little MFA’, is considered as one of the most significant institutions for dealing with the European affairs coordination. At the external policy level, the Representation had its foreign policy department that was responsible for dealing with the CFSP and ESDP and had a significant influence on the CFSP making on a daily basis (Pomorska, 2006). Representation’s diplomats were the key coordinators, negotiators and experts in foreign and security fields. Even though the main instructions came from Warsaw, the Representation had a large amount of autonomy especially concerning the EU working groups. A fruitful CFSP making, cooperation with the MFA as well as fast responses to the EU decisions made it the principal body of EU foreign policy. The Representation started to play a more influential role during the Polish Presidency in the Council in 2011 and became one of the main frameworks of cooperation between Warsaw and Brussels (Pomorska, 2011).

It was not just the institutional setting that needed the revision but also the reevaluation of way of thinking of the Polish political elites and administration. The Communist legacy and generation gap between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ officials was still visible and clashed at many levels with new European mechanisms. At the beginning a certain group of politicians had seen Europeanization as something that potentially undermines the goals of Polish foreign policy and sovereignty (Pomorska, 2007; Kaminska, 2010). Such slogans as ‘From Moscow to Brussels’ were illustrative of the public discourse and the mindset of some of Polish politicians. This view, however, was preset among the older diplomats while the younger generation was eager for a change. This may be seen as a paradox because the membership to the EU had been the priority for foreign policy makers since the 1989, just after the collapse of the communism. Nevertheless, by the time situation had been changed and the CFSP started to be treated as a tool to make Poland visible in the European affairs. The policy makers discovered the mechanisms and channels where the Polish voice could be heard outside the country (Pomorska, 2011).

4.4. Special alliances: Weimar and Visegrad Group

While at the beginning Poland underestimated the importance of coalitions within the EU, soon it realized that multilateral alliances could be helpful in pushing its national interests to the EU level. The Visegrad Group31 is an example of an organization that could be a platform for cooperation and influence inside the EU, since all of its members displayed a comparable view on foreign affairs and shared common past and similar way of integration with and accession to the NATO and EU. However, even though the Visegrad Group had some common initiatives, the Group did not use its potential at the EU level and was unable to make any visible impact at the CFSP level (Dangerfield, 2009). The members of the Group were supportive toward each other and instead of cooperating, they tried to look for other new allies in the EU. This situation can be partly explained by Poland’s aspiration to be the frontrunner of the group. Moreover, more than other members of the Group, Poland showed its willingness to shape the EU policies. Polish involvement into the US intervention in Iraq, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, the advocacy for Ukraine and the creation of the EaP are examples of that (Dangerfield, 2009). The big change was marked in 2008 when the Czech EU Presidency put forward, as one of its central objectives, the initiative which advanced by Poland: the EaP. However, this was also linked to the Polish Presidency in the Visegrad Group in 2008 and served as an additional opportunity for closer cooperation of the Visegrad Group and the Eastern Dimension32 (Gajewski, 2006). The Visegrad Group provided an important example of collaboration with the Eastern countries by offering Visegard Fund scholarship to Ukrainian and Belarusian students and establishing an additional forum for consultation with Ukraine in the formula of ‘V4 Plus’. However, in other fields of cooperation, the Visegrad Group countries did not present a common front within the EU in the cases such as having different attitudes taken toward Euromaidan protests in Ukraine in

31 Informal association of four Central European countries - Polish, Czech, Slovakia and Hungary created in 1991. Visegrad Group aims to deepen cooperation between the member countries and in the initial phase was mainly focused on issues related to accession to the European Union and NATO. Since 2004 all the Visegrad Group countries are members of the European Union and the Group is a forum for exchanging the experiences and working on common positions and issues of importance for the future of their region and the EU.

32 The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy aims to strengthen the bilateral relations among the EU and its Eastern neighbors. Following the Strategy Paper on ENP: “The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighboring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation” (Strategy Paper on the ENP 2004, 3). The Eastern Dimension in not mentioned in the ENP, however the ENP indicated the need for a closer regional cooperation of the EU Eastern borders.

2013/2014. Moreover, the lack of coordination and discussion among the Group members and willingness to come up with common ideas have limited its strength and impact on the EU.

Weimar Triangle served as the other platform for cooperation and idea sharing between Poland, Germany and France. The main reason of the establishment of this initiative in 1991 was to support Poland on its way toward European and Atlantic structures. This forum of cooperation was very active during good bilateral relations with Poland and Germany in early 1990s. When Polish accession became just a matter of time, the Weimar Triangle served as an important opportunity for exchanging opinions at the top level (Kuzniar, 2008). Since 2004, Weimar Triangle started to create a good chance for Poland to develop its relations with France and Germany and discuss its ideas with the most important countries in the EU. However, the Law and Justice government failed to understand the importance of the Weimar Triangle and its place in the EU, and it was Tusk government that tried to deepen the cooperation. Polish position toward this platform changed especially after 2013 with its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. The mediation of Foreign Ministers of Poland, France and Germany during the crisis confirmed and strengthened the forum’s importance (Kaminska, 2014).

The Polish performance within the EU demonstrated that in projection of its national interests the ad hoc bilateral and multilateral alliances are more effective. The Polish-Swedish cooperation in the EaP initiative or the partnership with Spain in case of the Nice voting system33 are examples of that. Visegrad Group was not considered as a strong tool of pressure while it could have had a big influence on any proposal made by its members, especially in the initial stage of development. Without such influences, the EU’s members like Poland are less efficient and slower in any proposal formation. However, after the success of the EaP, Poland started to change its position toward Visegrad members, and saw the need for closer cooperation to put national interests into the EU level.

4.5. Poland as an Eastern agenda shaper

In the first years after the enlargement, Poland had difficulties to fully integrate into the Brussel game and push its national interests into the EU agenda. This was especially visible in

33 The partnership with Spain will not be investigated as it is not at the core issue of this dissertation.

Polish actions under the government of Law and Justice Party and its coalitions with two Euro- sceptics parties: the League of Polish Families and Samoobrona. Highly politicization of the public administration as well as lack of experience and knowledge, made the uploading process very difficult (Szczerbiak, 2012; Zaborowski, 2007; Kuzniar, 2008). This section of the chapter aims to examine the Polish ability to upload its national interests into the EU level. The main attention will be paid to the Polish aspirations of shaping the Eastern agenda of the EU and its efforts of upload the Ukrainian issue to the EU level. The study will investigate Polish involvement in the agenda setting and ideational export toward Ukraine and one of the biggest successes of Polish diplomacy: the establishment of the Eastern Partnership.

Over last 25 years, the Polish relations with Ukraine have been changed and developed significantly. The wartime and postwar developments, especially the Ukrainian extermination of Poles in Volyn in 1943/194434 as well as the resettlement of the Ukrainian minority in the Vistula operation in 194735, have overshadowed the bilateral relations for a long time. However, soon after the Polish transition to democracy and Ukrainian independence in 1990s, both countries started to realize the need for strong cooperation the strategic partnership. The European course taken by Ukraine and similar way of democratization and transformation process in Poland have strengthened the friendly cooperation and reinforced the partnership (Zieba, 2012). In the early 1990s, however, no tangible outcomes followed from this partnership, as both countries were concerned about the same issue: their relations with Russia (Szczerbiak, 2012). Moreover, as mentioned before, at this time for Poland, the main priority in the external policy agenda was the integration with the Western structures, while the Eastern policy took the second place. However, when in the mid-1990 the EU and NATO membership were apparently seen as a matter of time, the development of closer links with the Eastern neighbors, especially Ukraine gained a greater priority. During this time, both states increased the military cooperation and even started to consider the establishment of a joint oil pipeline. Following the logics emphasized by Zbigniew Brzezinski that Russia can be an empire only if it includes Ukraine, Polish foreign policy makers tried to advocate Ukrainian stability and sovereignty (Kuzniar, 2008).

34 The Ukrainian extermination of Poles in Volyn in 1943/1944 was a part of an ethnic cleansing action conducted by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in the regions of Volhynia in Ukraine. As the result of massacre around 106,000 of Poles were killed. 35 Pacification action of a military nature, carried out against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1947. The operation was combined with the ethnic cleansing and mass displacement of civilians from the area of the South-Eastern Poland. 79

Poland emerged as a main supporter of Ukraine’s pro-Western direction and started to establish links with the European institutions which was a milestone step toward the EU integration. Polish policy toward the Eastern countries was based on the notion of launching a common EU attitude toward post-Soviet states and developing relations between the EU and rest of the Eastern continent. This included preventing the emergence of an Eastern European bloc of states under Russia domination and help maintaining their independence, the promotion of economic development and democracy in the region and perspective of the future Eastern enlargement (Szczerbiak, 2012). For Poland, supporting freedom of its neighbor both externally (sovereignty) and internally (democracy) meant to bring the stability and security to the region. The best proof for that are the words of Polish former President, Bronislaw Komorowski: “there is no stable secure Europe without free Ukraine”.36 Unquestionably, Warsaw favored Ukraine among other post- Soviet countries and aimed to created special relation with this state which was reinforced by the long friendship between the presidents Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leonid Kutchma, the factor that played a significant role in the future cooperation. Prior to the Polish accession in 2004, the Polish policy makers had already started to lobby in favor of establishing an autonomous Eastern Dimension to the EU relations and the East countries (Ibid.).

The real turning point in the Polish and Ukrainian relations was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November-December 2004. The rigged parliamentary elections in 2004 and Russian interference in the electoral process as well as Maidan Square protests brought a huge worldwide attention (Zaborowski, 2007). The engagement of Polish politicians and diplomats in the Orange Revolution was the turning point when Poland started to be perceived as an expert of Ukraine within the EU and gained a reputation as a supporter and democracy promoter of its Eastern neighbor (Pomorska, 2011). Poland realized that the effort to Europeanize the bilateral relations could help to transfer to the EU domestic preferences linked to the Ukraine while at same time asserting the country as an Eastern agenda shaper. This involvement was perceived as one of the most successful and constructive post- EU accession global initiatives (Cianciara, 2008). According to Longhurst and Zaborowski: it was ”an indelibly positive effect on mutual perceptions and historical sensitivities and thus helped deepen the rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine’” (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007:67). Polish advocacy of Ukraine was widely viewed as some kind of ‘Polish obsession’ in the EU, as Warsaw tried to include the

36 http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine/no-stable-or-secure-europe-without-free-ukraine-385755.html access date: 10.07.2016

Ukrainian case in all European agendas. From this point of view, it was clear that the position of Poland in the EU was strongly connected to the Eastern policy initiatives and its capability to act as a communication bridge between the East and West.

Why did Warsaw have such a limited achievement in promoting its Eastern agenda inside the EU during early years of the membership? It was somewhat because of the factors beyond its control. First of all, Polish efforts to promote Ukraine’s EU integration suffered a setback as the attitude toward future enlargement had changed after the 2005 Dutch and French rejections of the EU Constitutional Treaty in the May-June referendums, which caused an institutional crisis inside the EU. This anti-enlargement approach meant that prospects for future Ukraine’s enlargement, even in a long term, were difficult to reach. Some of the EU countries like the UK prioritized the Turkish accession, rather than any of the post-Soviet states (Szczerbiak, 2012). Somewhat, the EU decided to keep and develop its relation through the framework of the ENP to be based on the ‘privileged partnership’ arrangements which apparently offered no future prospects for the EU integration (Szymanski, 2007). Secondly, Polish attempts of democracy promotion and EU accession of Ukraine were weakened by a difficult political situation, namely the victory of the pro-Russian government of Party of the Regions in 2006 which raised the question of Ukrainian future European path. Thirdly, Warsaw somehow underestimated the fact that some of the EU states such as France and Germany were interested in developing relations with Russia in order to build links with the post-Soviet countries (Cianciara, 2008). Fourthly, the period of the Law and Justice government limited the ability of the Ukrainian advocacy within the EU especially due to its poor relations with Western EU members, namely Germany.

Even though in the early years of the membership the relations between both countries were very warm, Poland did not have a clear strategic vision of a possible contribution to the EU Eastern policy, along with limited knowledge and capacity to act. Moreover, after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine lacked the support of the European institutions and other countries as the EU did not give any integration guarantee to Ukraine even at some point in the future. Only Lithuania supported the idea that Ukraine’s closer cooperation with the EU should be seen as a priority in the present enlargement agenda (Kaminska, 2007; Szczerbiak, 2012, Marcinkowska, 2016). The main concern regarding the further enlargement to East among the EU’s Western members was mainly the external security challenges as well as unstable political situation in

Ukraine after the Revolution. The political struggle inside the ’Orange Camp‘, mainly between the President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Julia Timoshenko resulted in political chaos and general public disappointment with elites (Pomorska, 2011). Moreover, the country was paralized with incapability to create a majority government, as well as with corruption by all parties as well as constant political accusations. All these factors led to a situation where the Ukrainian policy makers were not able to make strategic decisions about the direction of their foreign policy (Marcinkowska, 2016). The EU was confused with instability between the pro- European Viktor Yushenko and the Euro-enthusiast, but at the same time eager to keep good relation with Yulia Timoshenko, and the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych. Moreover, the Ukrainian population was strongly divided between the EU skeptics and enthusiasts, while many were against the NATO participation (Kaminska, 2014). All these internal Ukrainian problems had a huge influence on the Ukraine’s future relations with the West, and eventually impacted upon EU’s stance toward the future cooperation.

After the failure to establish a strong and common European stance toward the Orange Revolution, Warsaw accepted the fact that Ukraine’s future accession called for the strategy of ‘small steps’. However, the strategic goal of future membership remained unaltered and at the level of NGOs and civil society there was constant cooperation and support for the Ukrainian democratization. Poland decided to be patient and wait for the right moment to bring the Ukrainian issue back on the EU agenda. In the meantime, Polish policy makers decided to focus on the following objectives to strengthen the security and political dialogue between both countries, help for granting Ukraine Market Economy Status (MES) and advocate for visa facilitation and society development (Pomorska, 2011).

4.6. Projection of the Eastern Dimension to the EU: 2003-2009

Since the 2003 it was clear that the Eastern policy should be based on support of democracy in the Eastern neighborhood which was necessary for maintaining security in the region. During the Social Democratic government, Poland-EU relations in 2003 and 2004 were mainly focused on the financial assistance, future place in the EU, preservations of the Nice Treaty voting system and intervention in Iraq. Nonetheless, as Poland did not have right to fully

82 participate in the EU’s decision making process, its efforts at this time were limited. In 2003 the Polish MFA released a non-paper which defined the main goals of the proposed policy (Kaminska, 2014). The aim was to keep the EU’s doors open and to support the East European neighbors (i.e. Ukraine, Moldavia and Belarus). In the same year, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, claimed that:

“It is our intention to intensify our policy in our Eastern neighborhood. After all, we are not acceding to the European Union in order to turn our back on our Eastern partners.[…] We would like to use our membership to give new impetus to the development in the whole region. Therefore we promulgate the concept of devising the Eastern Dimension of the European Union”. 37

Even with limited lobbying capacity Poland tried to encourage the Eastern partners about its future engagement into the need for the EU to develop the Eastern Dimension through various conferences and meetings in 2003 and 2004. For instance, the Polish European Minister, Danuta Hubner, stated the need for the Eastern Dimension during the Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels in October 2003. Such issues were also debated during the Polish-German diplomatic consultations and also Polish-Finnish consultation of Prime Ministers in 2003. Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller highlighted the important Finnish experience in launching the Northern Dimension, which for Poland could serve as an example in formulating the Eastern Dimension (Kuzniar, 2008). The promotion of support for the Eastern countries was also the main priority during the meeting of Prime Ministers of Poland and Sweden in December 2003, where the prospects of the EU’s relation with Ukraine and Belarus were discussed.

Poland, however, lacked the strategic partners in the region with the same concerns about the importance of closer cooperation within the Eastern Europe. The Visegrad Group members, although were supportive of Ukrainian integration, were not motivated enough in promoting the interests in the EU as much as Poland. It was only Lithuania who had strong interest in the creation of the Eastern Dimension (Kaminska, 2007). Unfortunately, Polish efforts in contributing to the Eastern policy agenda before the 2004 were characterized by low effectiveness. The biggest struggle in efficient influence projection in 2003 and early 2004 was

37 Government information on the Polish foreign policy in the year 2004, presented at the session of the Sejm on January 21, 2004 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz Access: 25.07.2016

83 linked to the limited administrative capacity of the Leszek Miller and Marek Belka governments. The rapid modifications in the ministerial and state secretaries levels also influenced the effectiveness of country’s administration in the EU (Szczerbiak, 2012).

After the Polish accession, lobbying for the future cooperation between the EU and Ukraine became one of the major topics for Polish foreign policy direction. Good bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland, as well as common history and the communism experience had resulted in an established belief that Poland should support the transformation and reform process as a ’younger brother in democracy’ (Kaminska, 2007). Based on the country’s own experience, Poland knew that democratization could only be achieved through the integration and cooperation with the European and Atlantic structures. Therefore, the membership of Ukraine in the EU as well as NATO were the key objectives of Polish external policy agenda at the European level, which was indicated in the foreign policy directions and objectives in the exposé of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz in 2004:

“Poland was and will be a spokesman for the integration of Ukraine with NATO and the European Union. It is obvious that consolidation of democracy and economic reform in that country will enhance the response of our partners to Poland's endorsement of that country. Kiev's pro-Western choice should find an unambiguous confirmation in facts. As an EU member, Poland will campaign for the quickest possible presentation to Ukraine of its clear European prospects, including the possibility of membership”.38

The Polish activity of bringing Ukraine closer to the EU was one of the main foreign policy priorities despite the domestic government changes just after the accession. While the efforts of Marek Belka’s government were mainly oriented toward the implementation of the EU laws, some achievements to support the Ukrainian cause had been made as well (Zieba, 2012). The issue was discussed during the Prime Minister’s trip to Sweden in 2004, meeting of Lithuanian and Latvian Prime Ministers in 2005 and also during the Visegrad Foreign Ministers of consultations in 2005. Low performance in uploading the national interest to the EU was accompanied with dismissiveness and replacement of many key officials and politicians in the European embassies as well as in Polish Permanent Representation to Brussels by the Minister Anna Fotyga. The elimination of experienced diplomats from the EU policy making resulted in

38 http://www.mfa.gov.pl/resource/3978ac78-64b4-4aab-9fbf-e004011515ec:JCR

84 declining contribution to the EU decision making agenda. Polish isolation in the EU was also challenging for Ukraine, raising concern about its future EU integration prospects (Kaminska, 2014). While the Law and Justice government declared its support for the Ukrainian integration in the EU, in practice it was unable to present any effective proposal for the Eastern Dimension issue.

The election of the Donald Tusk’s government in 2007 was received in Brussels with relief and received many credits from the start after the negative image the Law and Justice Administration had given before. The coalition of Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party Coalition were welcomed in many European countries (Cianciara, 2009). Even though the newly formed coalition was stable, the Law and Justice government gained strong opposition and strong position of the President who could veto laws of the Polish Parliament and needed to sign the international arrangements (Kaminska, 2010). The internal problems of cooperation between the Prime Minister and President were especially visible during the EU summits; the matter had even been addressed to the Constitutional Tribunal. The issue that who should represent Poland during the international meetings and summits damaged the country’s image abroad and the ensuing political rivalry became the main domestic problem between 2007- 2010. The politicized role of the President Office can be seen in the example of rejection to sign the Lisbon Treaty approved by Polish Parliament which was ratified on October 10, 2009 (Cianciara, 2008).

The creation of the institutionalized cooperation with the Ukraine and other Eastern neighbors was one of the main preferences of Donald Tusk and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski. Donald Tusk’s speech in 2007 noticeably indicated that Poland could continue its strong support for the Eastern Dimension:

“Poland has a legitimate ambition to participate in shaping the Eastern Dimension of the European Union. We believe that the extension of areas of security, cooperation and democracy in this direction will have a major positive impact on the whole Europe. Therefore, special attention will be paid to our relations with Ukraine and Russia and the situation in Belarus”. 39

The duet of Tusk-Sikorski was very active in projecting the Eastern Dimension into the EU agenda. The Foreign Minister decided to increase the development of efficient diplomatic

39 PM Donald Tusk: parliamentary exposé, 23 November 2007, http://or ka2.sejm.gov.pl/StenoIn ter6.nsf/0/6372FE4B9619C127C125739D0053E245/$file/pdf

85 services and young professionals in order to raise the country’s effectiveness in the EU. Good relations between Brussels and Polish new government created a good environment for solid cooperation (Cianciara, 2009; Pomorska, 2011). The opportunity to establish an autonomous agenda for policy toward the Eastern neighbors came again into agenda in 2007 when Polish non-paper was under development. Unlike other Polish initiatives, the paper itself did not directly mention the Eastern Dimension, but highlighted the importance of ‘regional cooperation’ and establishment the new framework of Eastern cooperation similar to the ENP, or the Northern Dimension. The proposed framework could apply to the six countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. Sikorski effectively managed to convince Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt to support this idea of EaP as a different dimension of the broader ENP. Poland considered Sweden as a trustable, honest broker and reliable partner mostly because of country’s reputation in international affairs as well as its involvement in Belarus. (Copsey and Pomorska, 2014). Moreover, cooperation with the Swedish partners was seen as a good choice taking into consideration the fact that country was about to start its Rotating Presidency of the EU. Swedes had an important influence on shaping the Eastern Partnership and its longer experience as a member state helped to push the project through the European institutions. For Poland it was a big asset, as it was interested in learning from the Swedish diplomats. For the Sweden too, collaborating with a new member state helped to be perceived as a modest partner in the EU (Sus, 2011). Along with the Swedish diplomats, Radoslaw Sikorski had a very important role in pushing EaP in the EU:

“The Eastern Partnership is the first Polish initiative incorporated into system of the European Union external relations... The Eastern Partnership is designed to facilitate the achievement of one of the key goals of Polish foreign policy, the approximation and integration of East European countries with the European Union”.40

On the draft level, the Polish-Swedish non-paper proposal41 was consulted with the Germany and France and Visegrad members and gained their full support which increased the importance of the EaP. The main aims of the document were to deepen the bilateral and multilateral cooperation, which included the advancement of visa facilitation, creation of the free

40 Ministry of foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Eastern Partnership, available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/Eastern,Partnership,19898.html 41 Polish–Swedish Proposal: Eastern Partnership’, June 2008, available at: http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/polish-swedish-proposal- eastern-partnership 86 trade area, and the support of the EaP states’ integration with the EU. Moreover, deepening the regional cooperation was one of the key elements of the proposal (Sus, 2011). In order to avoid the possible opposition about the funding of this initiative, Poles and Swedes argued that the EU budget could not be imposed and financial resources could be taken from the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument. The “Polish-Swedish proposal on the Eastern Partnership” non-paper was presented at the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council conference in Brussel on 26th of May 2008. Next month, on June 19-20, the European Council adopted the Polish-Swedish initiative and asked the European Commission to formulate the proposal for further cooperation. In autumn 2008 the Commission started to work on the EaP which included consultations and cooperation with the governments in Poland and Sweden (Kaminska, 2014; Copsey and Pomorska, 2014). However, between June and September 2008 there progress regarding the EaP was limited, mainly because of the French Presidency emphasized the Southern (i.e, Mediterranean) and not the Eastern Dimension of the ENP. In the light of happenings in Georgia, on September 1st the Council asked the Commission for speeding up the work on the EaP and presenting the proposals sooner than it was expected (Lapczynski, 2009).

On December 3rd 2008, the European Commission formally presented the EaP to public. The document proposed five main areas of cooperation: a) new contractual relations, b) gradual integration into the EU economy, c) mobility and security, d) energy security, e) supporting economic and social development.42 The Commission’s Communication highlighted the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Eastern neighbors and also with Russia. As Poland and Sweden claimed, the document regulated the contractual relations with the Eastern partners in the framework of Associations Agreements (AAs) and encouraged for the regional economic collaboration with prospect of launching in future the Neighborhood Economic Community. The AAs agreements could help to launch a closer relation with the EU’s standards and improve the cooperation on the CFSP/CSDP. In a longer term, visa facilitation was considered as one of further initiatives as well as energy security cooperation. The structural framework was established at four levels: biannual meetings of the EaP governments, meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, four thematic platforms at the level of senior officials from

42 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council: Eastern Partnership. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008DC0823. Access: 1.08.2016

87 individual policy areas and panels (Lapczynski, 2009). The Commission Communication developed many of the Polish-Swedish concepts into various initiatives and projects. The EaP was officially launched on March 20, 2009. The Council reiterated the main ideas suggested in the Commission’s Communication of December 2008 (Copsey and Pomorska, 2014). However, the final document excluded one of the major issues for Poland which was the statement about the European Perspective for Ukraine. The European partners did manage to agree on that and Poland was forced to accept the final text without the respective passage.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy stated that:43

“The time is ripe to open a new chapter in relations with our Eastern neighbors… Building on the progress of the last years we have prepared an ambitious and at the same time well-balanced offer. The security and stability of the EU is affected by events taking place in Eastern Europe and in the Southern Caucasus. Our policy toward these countries should be strong, proactive and unequivocal. The EU will continue with the successful approach of tailor-made programmes on a new scale and add a strong multilateral dimension”44

The reactions to the EaP’s establishment were mainly positive. Germany and France, skeptical at the beginning, eventually supported the initiative and declared their interest in this project. German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Frank Walter-Steinmeier, called the initiative as an “example of how, working together, we can take Europe forward”45, while the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, argued that there is a possibility to work on the East and South at the same time46.

43 In the same vein the President of Commission Jose Manuel Barosso argued that: “Only with strong political will and commitment on both sides will the Eastern Partnership achieve its objective of political association and economic integration. We need to make an even greater investment in mutual stability and prosperity. This will be quickly compensated by important political and economic benefits and will lead to more stability and security both for the EU and for our Eastern partners”.

44 “The Eastern Partnership – an ambitious new chapter in the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours,” EU Press Release IP/08/158, December 3, 2008,http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1858&for-mat=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 9 . Access: 6.08.2016

45 Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the 13th German-Polish Forum, December 5, 2008, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Rede/2008/081205-BM-DeuPolForum.html Access: 5.8.2016 46 In: LAPCZYOSKI M. (2009), The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives, Caucasian Review of International Affairs Vol. 3(2), p. 148.

The establishment of the EaP showed that during the five years of membership Poland learned how to upload national interests within EU and with Swedish help managed to play the Brussels game. Sweden provided support in many fields that Poland needed: negotiating and bargaining at top levels, guiding through the EU’s institutions and getting in touch with the EU top officials. Even though Poland, without the Swedish help, could probably had a limited influence on the CFSP, the EaP initiative helped to overcome the stereotype of Poland as a member who is unable to present constructive proposals and put its words into action (Copsey and Pomorska, 2014). The EaP was also considered in Poland as a finalization of a long aspiration of Polish diplomats to establish institutionalized cooperation with the Eastern Europe and especially with Ukraine (Kaminska, 2010) Moreover, it also allowed Poland to have an impact on future process of negotiations with its Eastern neighbor as Polish experts engaged themselves more vigorously in consultation about Eastern neighborhood. However, political and domestic changes in Ukraine constrained many of Polish efforts (Sus, 2011; Szcerbiak, 2012).

4.7. Polish contribution to the CFSP

Poland, at the beginning skeptical about the CFSP, proved to be a quick learner and effective uploader of its national interest to the EU level. However, as mentioned before, during the early post-enlargement period, Poland was unable to actively shape the EU external agenda. Low level of adaptation before the accession as well as lack of knowledge about the procedures and mechanisms of the EU, were the main reasons of ineffective participation in the CFSP. Poland needed time to fully integrate with the EU standards and refocus its foreign policy goals (Kaminska, 2007; Pomorska, 2011). During the first years, with the exception of visa facilitation negotiations, Warsaw had a very law input on the CFSP. Having auspices to be a regional leader, Warsaw tried to show its power and influence in the area of external relations. Moreover, Poland felt a significant pressure from the European institutions to form an Eastern policy in line with the European expectations.

The problems to recognize the culture of work in Brussels was visible in case of the veto toward the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia in late 2006. The Polish veto which was applied after Russia launching the embargo on Polish meat in October 2005, was seen as one of the most contested issues of the country’s performance in the EU. The decision

89 was not well received by other member states and Poland was widely criticized for its inability to compromise and stubbornness in the EU affairs (Copsey and Pomorska, 2008). As a newcomer, Poland did not have enough time to learn the interplay between different actors in the EU, namely the Council, Commission as well as member states. Neither the Commission nor the Polish diplomats in Brussels were informed that Poland could come up with this decision. As the veto was applied at the ministerial level it excluded the possibility of any other resolution at the lower level and put tough pressure on the Commission to solve this problem (Banat-Adamiuk, 2007). The veto case demonstrated the problems of the Polish EU diplomacy: a strong politicization of public administration under the Law and Justice government, lack of expertise in the EU affairs as well as lack of active cooperation between diplomats in Brussels. Moreover, the Polish image of a ‘Russophobe’ country complicated the effective performance at the EU level and a successful uploading of its national interests (Szczerbiak, 2012).

Polish desire to contribute to the CFSP was considered during the AAs negotiations with Ukraine. Even though, the outcome of the AA document was not satisfactory, Warsaw showed its willingness to do what was in its power to bring the Ukrainian case into the EU agenda. The negotiations were initiated three years after the Polish accession in 2007. Lessons learned from the visa facilitation negotiations as well as in other areas, of almost four years of membership, provided an important range of skills in uploading its interests to the EU level. The agreement was expected to cover various aspects of the Ukraine-EU integration for the next ten years. Both parties, however, shared different ideas about the agreement, which made the negotiation process complex. The main disagreement was about the declaration of future prospects for the membership of Ukraine as well as free visa regime (Shapovalova, 2008).

For the EU, the agreement was seen as a part of ENP and a form of a cooperation framework as the former agreement with Ukraine was about to expire soon. Poland took the Ukrainian side and voted for creation of a formal consultation mechanism between Ukraine and the EU, especially in the energy security area and regarding the issue of its association status. As the main supporter of democratic changes in Ukraine, Poland saw the need for a solid conditionality element leading up to the future membership promise. For Ukraine in its turn the agreement was not acceptable if it was not called an AA and if it did not provide prospects for future integration. Poland was placed in a difficult situation, trying to balance external pressures from both the

European and Ukrainian side. Moreover, the AA proved to be a difficult case for the bargaining and negotiating due to the complexity of the document. Poland had problems with successful communication and information exchange between different institutions as well as insufficient knowledge about the EU decision-making process (Kaminska, 2014). These intuitional limitations were important and led Poland to reconsider its position toward the AA in spite of advocating the Ukrainian integration with the EU.

Polish government understood that the successful implementation of the AA has no chance and focused more on the future of economic and political integration. Warsaw gave in to the pressure from the EU and accepted the EU’s approach on the future of the EU-Ukraine relations. Following 2008, the Ukrainian membership was not the priority for Polish policymakers, even though the issue reappeared on the agenda before the intended signature of the AA in the context of the 2013 EaP Vilnius summit. The European Parliament in its 2013/2014 resolutions asked for the European perspective for Kiev and called for a faster signature of the AA.47 One of the factors that facilitated the negotiations was the EP monitoring mission of democratization progress in the country headed by Aleksander Kwasniewski and the former EP President Pat Cox in 2012. The Vilnius summit was expected to be a big success in finalization of long process of negotiations, but Russia’s strong economic and political pressure on Kiev as well as its proposal of the Eurasian Custom Union participation for Ukraine resulted in Ukraine’s rejection of the AA, a surprise for the whole EU. Even though the AA process was not successful as expected, Poland showed its willingness to do everything what was in its power in order to encourage Ukraine to embark on the path of democratic transition and EU membership. Moreover, it has to be noted that the failures and difficulties in uploading the AA to the EU level, were connected to international factors beyond Poland’s control (Kudelia, 2015).

The lack of compromise on the part of other EU members, pressures from Russia on Ukraine and internal EU problems like financial crisis and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty played an important role in happenings of these events. Nonetheless, in general, during the Tusk government, Poland demonstrated its capacity to adapt well to the informal procedures and rules in quite a short time (Cianciara, 2009), as its position toward the AA developed along with a progress in negotiations. Polish role in the AA negotiations also showed how the motivation to

47 "EU Commissioner Fule expects Rada to pass European integration bills on November 21". Interfax-Ukraine. 20 November 2013.

91 be effective key EU player and the Eastern agenda shaper, drove forward the Polish adaptations to the procedures and policies of the EU (Kaminska, 2014).

The Polish role as an agenda shaper and important actor in European affairs was visible during its Council Presidency in 2011. Since the first years after accession, Poland had prepared itself for the upcoming Presidency and observed other countries and post-Lisbon Presidencies in order to learn from them. Poland felt a big pressure at the EU level and tried to prove its effectiveness, and from the beginning defined its foreign policy goals clearly (Cianciara, 2009). The high priority was given to the further improvement of the EaP, finalization of the AA with Ukraine and deepening its involvement in the CFSP. During the Presidency, Poland showed its profile as a democracy promoter not only to the East but also to the South. By launching the European Endowment of Democracy (EED), Warsaw proved to be fully a Europeanized member that understood the Brussels game well and was able to think beyond its national spheres of interest. An effort to upload the EED into the EU agenda during the uprisings in the South as well as Arab Spring was one of the big achievements of Polish policymakers at that time. (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2012). Also during the Ukrainian crisis 2013-2014, the EED became one of the best EU instruments for distribution of founding. During the Presidency, Poland tried to establish strong personal ties with the European leaders. Close relations of Minister Radoslaw Sikorski with Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister Carl Bildt and Baroness Ashton as well as Tusk and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, had significant roles in ensuing Polish interests. The EaP issue was all the time high on the agenda; however, the imprisonment of Minister Julia Tymoshenko made any progress difficult. Nevertheless, some parts of the AA negotiations were accomplished including launching of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) (Ibid.). After the six months of Presidency, Poland was considered as a reliable and experienced partner. As the leader of Socialists and Democrats in the EP Martin Shultz said: ‘without a doubt it was one of the very best presidencies we have ever had”48. Poland consolidated its position as the main Eastern agenda shaper and proved to be deeply committed in European affairs.

48 EUobserver, 14 December 2011.

The role of a powerful player in the EU was strengthened in more recent years, especially during the Ukrainian 2013-2014 crisis, where Warsaw increased its position in the CFSP. The refusal of taking the European path on the part of the Ukraine’s leadership led to uprising in Ukraine as well as the domestic political crisis and collapse of the government in 2013. Since that moment, Poland has been dynamically involved in the crisis and played an important role in establishing policies and decisions of the EU by not only announcing certain support of democracy in Ukraine, but also raising support on the part of other member states to assist this issue (Kaminska, 2014).

Many of Polish politicians and diplomats visited the Euromaidan movement to show their support. However, it was Radoslaw Sikorski who became the main influential Polish politician and the EU’s face in the crisis (Marcinkowska, 2016). In January 2014, Radoslaw Sikorski together with Donald Tusk established talks with the Jose Manuel Barroso and other Western European leaders in order to make a united European response to the Ukrainian situation. In February 2014, Sikorski with his French and German counterparts started to mediate between president Yanukovych and Euromaidan movement. The guidance was on the Polish side and negotiations were concluded successfully. Radoslaw Sikorski had also an influential impact on the creation of the Yetseniuk government. When Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, Poland had a leading role in lobbying the EU, NATO and US for finding a political response to the evolving events and for sanctioning Russia. However, some of the European members did not share the same idea about the policy toward Russia (Petrova, 2015). The Visegard group also did not work as expected and was not an appropriate platform for Poland’s improvement, leaving Warsaw alone in working toward finding a response to Moscow. Even without a common idea about Russia, Polish government concluded that there is a need for more efforts in the CSDP (Klus, 2014). This movement demonstrated that Polish diplomacy became more mature and experienced. Polish involvement in the Ukrainian crisis has therefore strengthened country’s position in the EU’s external affairs and proved that Poland was an important player rather than a playground (Petrova, 2015).

4.8. From skepticism to pragmatism: Polish approach toward ESDP

Poland’s initially skeptical approach toward the ESDP was rooted in country’s strong commitment to the Atlanticism (Kaminska, 2007). Poland had doubts whether the EU can act as an independent security actor. This pro-Atlanticism approach was visible during the 2003 Iraq war when Poland supported the intervention. Prior to the EU’s accession and since country could fully participate in the ESDP, Polish foreign policy makers started to change their initial stance. Moreover, Poles started to be more supportive to the EU security pillar when they understood that the ESDP could not undermine the prime role of NATO and especially the Article Five guarantee (Szczerbiak, 2012). Poland also accepted the permanent structured cooperation laid down in the Lisbon Treaty as Polish former Ministry of Defence stated:

“The concept that was endorsed in the end, and which is laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, was made more flexible and enlarged. And so we are now an ardent supporter of the idea. Poland is willing and is a candidate for participation from the start-up of implementation”.49

This statement proved the Polish willingness for a closer cooperation. Moreover, while at the beginning, Polish policy makers perceived the EU as a political, social and economic stability provider and NATO as security one, Warsaw started to change its position.

Warsaw has been an enthusiastic participant in EU military missions, to the regions that had never been Polish sphere of interest before. In the EUFOR RD Congo operation in 2006, Poland formed the fourth largest contingent among the member states, and in the EUFOR operation in Chad contributed with 350 soldiers (Marcinkowska, 2016). In 2008, Poland participated in the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia with contribution of 30 participants. Moreover, Poland took part in the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR Concordia and EUPOL Proxima, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.50 Poland also developed its humanitarian aid to Asia and Africa and has contributed to the functioning of battlegroups.

One of the biggest changes in the overall Polish foreign policy goals is the fact that Poland started to change its attitude toward the CFSP, and from the US Trojan horse in Europe,

49 Interview with Bogdan Klich, Polish Defence Minister: Poland Backs Integrated Defence Mechanisms’, European Report, 27 May 2008 50 http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/security_policy/eu_nato_operations/. Access: 1.08.2016 94

Warsaw started to be an enthusiastic contributor to the CFSP/ESDP. Polish inexperienced and skeptical approach has changes fundamentally, as Poland started to realize that only through active participation may gain various benefits. Polish position in the CFSP today is incomparable to 15 years ago, as Poland is not only turned into an expert agenda shaper, but also a big supporter of stronger integration in the area of foreign and security policy.

4.9. Conclusions

Poland, from the beginning, tried to show that as a new member state, it has high aspirations and was determined to make an impact on the EU’s external relations. However, as a new and unexperienced actor in the European environment, at the beginning, Warsaw lacked a clear idea of how the Eastern Dimension should look like in the future. Domestic problems and changes of government also weakened Warsaw-Brussel cooperation. Nonetheless, Poland has proved its ability to learn quickly and change its approach from ’taker’ to effective ’shaper’ of the EU’s foreign policy. The establishment of the EaP and advocacy for the Ukrainian integration made Poland an expert of the Eastern agenda. Taking into consideration the Polish engagement toward the Eastern issues within a quite short time of membership, one can conclude that Poland was effective in projection of its national interests.

According to the theoretical framework of the present dissertation, the study explored different mechanisms of adaptation to the European structures: elite socialization, bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional changes, changes in public perception concerning the political cooperation. In order to measure Polish effectiveness in uploading its interests to the EU level four different mechanisms were taken into consideration: coalition and institution building, agenda setting, example setting, ideational export.

The transformation process of elite socialization was visible in the pre-accession period in which Polish diplomats could look and learn how their European colleagues were operating in Brussel. An effective outcome of Polish policy makers’ socialization process was seen when Poland changed its approach toward the CFSP. After 2004, the government started to transform their rhetoric and even the Euro-skeptical Law and Justice Party and succeeded to integrate with the EU policies. Active commitment to the CFSP making also enforced bureaucratic restructuring. The period of pre-accession negotiations was a defining point in the

Europeanization of Polish national administration, as main decision-making institutions were launched at this stage. The changes in the foreign policy institutions were especially visible before the Polish Council Presidency in 2011, when the UKIE-MFA was restructured. There were no major constitutional changes that occurred as a result of the Europeanization process. Legal procedures and laws regarding the CFSP were implemented in the pre-accession period. The analyses at the level of Europeanization of foreign policy demonstrates that it is interesting to look at the changes in public perception concerning the political cooperation. The Polish public opinion, since the beginning was in favor of the CFSP/ESDP and the EU membership in general. Highly supporting the EU integration, the national public opinion was able to put strong pressure on the Law and Justice government in order to change its rhetoric and adapt well to the EU’s policies. Coalition and institution building after the first years of membership was considered Polish weak point. However, the situation changed in 2007 with the new Tusk’s government and especially during the EaP negotiations. The cooperation with Sweden was a key factor that determined its success, as the collaboration with respected and more experienced member state helped to gain the support for the EaP initiative in Brussels. Moreover, Poland also improved its position in this sense during its Council Presidency in 2011, when Polish officials started to create closer ties with other European leaders and decided to be more active in the Visegrad Group and Weimar Triangle networks. The agenda setting between 2004 and 2007 was quite limited; however, it became one of the most important tools during the EaP negotiations. The EaP itself is considered as one of the most important achievements of the country’s performance in the EU’s external agenda. Polish agenda setting was strengthened during the Czech Presidency and obviously during the Polish one. Example setting and ideational export proved to be important instruments during the visa facilitation and the AA negotiations as well as the establishment of the EaP. Poland also demonstrated to be an effective ideational exporter during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Ukrainian crisis in 2013/2014.

5. PORTUGUESE AND POLISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

In the earlier chapters, transitions of foreign and security policies of Poland and Portugal and their procedures of downloading and uploading were studied separately. This chapter aims to compare both countries to highlight the main similarities and differences between them. There are several points that must be taken into consideration in this comparison. Comparing foreign and security policies is principally a challenging task due to their intergovernmental characters and the fact that these policies are private domains of the country and linked to the states’ sovereignty. In the case of Poland and Portugal, significant differences between must be noted: First of all, while Portugal has been recognized as an experienced state in terms of European affairs and a part of the EU for thirty years, Poland’s experience as EU member is limited to twelve years. Another important aspect is the different timing of accession between these two countries. While Portugal has been a founder member of the NATO since 1949 with several participations in the Alliance’s activities, Poland was a communist country and part of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. When Poland joined the EU, Portugal had experienced eighteen years of membership. Moreover, Lisbon had taken part in forming the foreign and security pillars of the EU since the Maastricht Treaty and throughout the 1990’s during the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The mechanisms that Poland needed to accept upon its accession in 2004. Furthermore, Portugal had held the Presidency of the Council three times while Poland got this opportunity only once. Other factors such as the size of the country and geographical position also should be acknowledged in this comparison. Portugal is a country that once dominated the Atlantic and has deeply rooted ties with its former colonies in Africa and Latin America; On the other hand, Poland is a country situated between two giant powers and had been under strong influence of Russia for a long period. Besides, Poland is considered as the biggest country among the Eastern enlargement states with a significant economic potential and aspiration of being a regional leader. Portugal, however, is one of the smallest European countries with low economic and military capabilities. Nonetheless, both countries are situated in different fringes of the EU, at its Eastern and Western borders, and share different regional

97 priorities. It is noteworthy that their geographical positions were influential in forming strong commitments to the Atlantic Alliance that was considered as the main guarantor of their securities in the Europe.

In order to find out the similarities and differences, the most important dimensions of the process of Europeanization are taken into consideration. This includes changes in foreign and security policies orientation, concerns about the CFSP/ESDP, national adaptation and domestic changes, the uploading of national interests and preferences, and, finally, contribution to the CSDP and NATO missions and operations. In following subchapters, each of these items will be discussed comprehensively.

5.2. Changes in foreign and security policies orientation

Because of the Portuguese (Salazar’s) and Polish (communist) non-democratic regimes, both countries had been excluded from the European policymaking environment and isolated in the international arena for several years. Even though the nature of their regimes differed substantially in terms of ideology, similar process of transforming the foreign and security policies can be observed. For instance, both regimes preferred a closer cooperation with their own traditional partners rather than integration with Europe in their foreign policies goals. The leaders of dictatorial Portugal were mainly focused on maintaining good relations with the former colonies, particularly in Africa while the communist regime in Poland maintained strong ties with the countries of Soviet Bloc. The situation started to change with the collapse of non- democratic regimes by the military coup of 25th April 1974 in Portugal and in Round Table negotiations of 1989 in Poland. These events opened up new chapters in foreign policy orientations of both countries and influenced other states as well. After the Portuguese Revolution, similar processes were set in motion in Greece and Spain. Similarly, there was a ‘domino-effect’ following the events in Poland that eventually motivated other countries of Soviet Bloc to change.

In both countries, the period following the democratic shift was marked by doubts and uncertainties regarding their positions in the world affairs as well as the shape of their new political systems. In Portugal, during the first two years after the Carnation Revolution, the democratic changes were questioned by the country’s unstable political situation. In Poland, the

98 results of transition were uncertain as the communist officials held important positions in the government. The pro-European option was officially established after their first parliamentary elections in 1976 and 1991 in Portugal and Poland, respectively. Since then, the European integration became their main foreign policy goals and future membership in the EC/EU turned into their main priority.

It has to be noted that parallel to the European integration, both countries established a strong commitment with Atlanticism and considered NATO as their main guarantor of security in the Europe. For Warsaw, the integration with the Alliance was caused by its fear to be left in the gray zone of security and consideration of NATO as a trustworthy ally with military security guarantees. Portugal, as a founding member of NATO since 1949, always concerned Alliance as a hard power that was always loyal to its Atlantic roots.

Both countries were recognized as biggest pro-NATO supporters in the Europe. They had been against any development in the EU that could be incompatible with NATO’s interests since their beginning of full participation in the European project. When in 1999 NATO started the military operation Allied Force against Serbia, Poland and Portugal endorsed this action without hesitation. Similarly, both of the countries supported the war against terrorism launched in the aftermath of the September 11th and took part in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in 2002 in Afghanistan and ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in 2003. Their support for both interventions, without the key European players like Germany or France, proved the countries’ Atlanticism reflected in their commitment to NATO. The membership in NATO gave Poland and Portugal not only security guarantees in the form of Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, but also increased their positions and importance in the international arena. The need to adapt to the Atlantic Alliance standards, participations in missions and exercises and training with experienced NATO’s soldiers resulted in high modernization of Polish and Portuguese armed forces.

5.3. Concerns related to joining the CFSP/ESDP

Poland and Portugal shared similar concerns about the establishment of the CFSP and ESDP in light of their loyalty to NATO. They did not see the need for creation of other instrument which could undermine/overshadow the central position of the Alliance. Polish foreign policy makers were also concerned about future prospects of the Ukrainian accession to

99 the EU. Moreover, Warsaw felt that is not being treated equally in comparison with other partners before its accession and despite its willingness to have direct contribution to the creation of the ESDP, its voice is not always being heard. The ‘outsider’ status had a crucial role in the country’s initial perception of the CFSP, and Warsaw’s support to Atlanticism was a feedback of its perceived marginal role in the EU’s security making. Portuguese concerns were also related to the country’s traditional spheres of influence. While keeping its good relations with NATO, Lisbon had been concerned about the weakening of its ties with former colonies. Moreover, for both countries protection of independence and sovereignty in the security and defence domains was a priority issue. Poland’s position started to shift soon after its accession in 2004 when the country finally obtained a full access to the EU decision-making process and started to get benefits from new opportunities for influencing and shaping the transatlantic relations. As for Portugal, its position toward the CFSP also experienced a gradual change (in the context of the Maastricht negotiations) after realizing that deepening cooperation with the CFSP does not undermine the prime role of NATO.

5.4. National adaptation and domestic changes

The accession proved democratic characters of Polish and Portuguese political and economic transformations that led to crucial accomplishment of the democratization process. Moreover, the EU membership created new opportunities and empowered the countries’ positions in the Europe. At the same time, the accession brought many challenges to the foreign and security policies. As a part of big community, Poland and Portugal had to develop their positions toward new regions, which required more resources and efforts. The period during the accession negotiations and the first years of membership for both countries could be characterized as a learning phase of the norms and mechanisms of the EU’s functioning. Warsaw and Lisbon went through many administrative changes in order to adapt well to the acquis communautaire.

During the first years of membership, Poland was not ready to participate fully in the EU’s decision-making process due to the lack of knowledge and capabilities. Moreover, the inexperienced government was still skeptical about synchronization of foreign and security policies within the EU. The lack of experience in playing the Brussel game resulted in many

100 mistakes which were especially obvious in the case of the Polish veto towards the new PCA with Russia in 2006. This decision was not well received and understood by a part of other member states and Poland was widely criticized for its inability to compromise and displaying stubbornness in the EU affairs. Portugal, however, had acted as a ‘good student’ ever since the accession, something that can be linked to the acknowledgement of its smallness as well as the position in the periphery of Europe with limited military and financial capabilities. This initial period was also marked in Portugal with a desire to gain highest possible dividends from the membership and at the same time to consolidate the country’s democracy.

The changes to the domestic institutional setting in Warsaw and Lisbon started before their accessions, as there was a need to create responsible bodies for preparing the downloading of the acquis communautaire. The existence of several of EU’s institutions caused many complications for the two countries as the adaptation to the European political system and learning a new logic of behavior has not been an easy process. At the level of external affairs, various administrative units were launched for daily harmonization of the CFSP making. In Poland, structures such as the UKIE/KIE, KERM were created. In Portugal, the Council of Ministers for European Integration, the Secretariat for European Integration, CICE or DGAC were established. Moreover, beside the domestic administrative changes in both countries there were many specialists in European policies and international law who improved the work of ministries and their cooperation with the CFSP. Diplomats and foreign policy makers were also trained intensively in order to adapt well to the EU’s institutional apparatus.

It has to be mentioned that during the first years of membership both countries benefitted from the structural funds which had a big impact on their transformation and were conducive to the changing perception of the Polish and Portuguese society about the benefits the country in the EU. In addition, a similar change in both countries in terms of their MFA transformation took place as a result of their engagement with the CFSP. Both countries realized that in order to strengthen their performance in the European affairs, there is a need to shift their EU policy coordination apparatus into the MFA. One of the main reasons of this transition was to have the EU policy administration structure in the Ministry that had responsibilities for the communication with other countries which at the same time could help to have more efficient impact on internally and externally policy coordination.

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It must be noted that the domestic factors that influenced the Europeanization process of Poland and Portugal are different. The first difference is that the first years of membership for Poland were marked by the government’s rotations and political instability which decreased country’s dialogue with the EU and socialization of Polish elites. Moreover, high-euro skeptic slogans like ‘bringing Poland to the EU on its knees’ during the Law and Justice government resulted in the lack of solid cooperation between Warsaw and Brussels and its accession negotiations. Only after 2007, when the pro-European Tusk’s government came into power, the situation started to change and foreign policy makers managed to create a skillful and proficient diplomacy. In Portugal, however, the country experienced a decade of governmental stability as Anibal Cavaco Silva won three elections in 1985, 1987 and 1991. This fact played an important role in the Portuguese foreign policy coordination and its cooperation with the CFSP. As regards the second difference, the Polish communist legacy was still visible in the case of top political elites and administration. The generation gap between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ officials clashed at many levels with new European mechanisms. The slogans like ‘From Moscow to Brussels’ shared between older diplomats were visible in the public discourse. In Portugal, again, situation was different: foreign policy makers and diplomats shared a rather similar attitude toward the European integration and the gap among younger and older diplomats was not that critical as in the Polish case.

The first years of the membership for both countries were challenging, and at the same time it was an opportunity to prove that Warsaw and Lisbon could meet the expectations of the other European members and were able to adapt well to the administrative apparatus of the EU. Both of them tried to prove that they were not only passive members, but could have an impact on the EU’s foreign and security policies making. The transformation from the ‘takers’ to ‘makers’ proved the successful achievement of downloading process of Europeanization. Portugal, initially economically oriented, changed its position and soon realized that only through its active contribution to promoting the EU relations with its former colonies could be treated as equal member and visible player in the European affairs. Similarly, Poland understood that by introducing Ukraine as its own sphere of expertise, the country could be seen as an important and constructive participant of the European community.

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5.5. Introducing national interests and preferences

As soon as Poland and Portugal understood that the CFSP/CSDP works with full compatibility to NATO and with an intergovernmental character, both countries started to be active players in this domain. Warsaw and Lisbon realized that through the CFSP/CSDP engagement, the marginalization could be avoided and they could demonstrate their importance as active participants among other member states. Both countries from the beginning tried to build a bridge between the Europe and their traditional spheres of influence which led to creation of their ‘own domain’ in the EU affairs. By projecting their national interests into the CFSP level, both of them successfully managed to enhance closer relationships between Europe and their own spheres of interests. It has to be noted that all of the actions were taken with respect to the Atlanticism and NATO always remained the main security pillar in Europe for both of them. At the same time, their strong commitments to Atlanticism had never undermined their increased engagement within the CFSP/CSDP.

As both countries belonged to different geographical regions, the national interests that were uploaded into the CFSP level differed substantially. Poland, since the beginning of its accession, tried to bring Ukraine closer to the European agenda. This advocacy was rooted in the common history, culture and willingness to become an Eastern European agenda shaper. Moreover, for Warsaw supporting freedom of its neighbor both externally (in terms of sovereignty) and internally (in terms of democracy) meant bringing the stability and security to its region. Portugal strongly advocated for closer cooperation with its former colonies and since its accession to the EC felt responsible to introduce the Lusophone world into the EU agenda. As in the Polish case, the relations were deeply-rooted in historical, cultural and linguistic ties. Both of them tried to open new windows of opportunities to the regions that have never been a priority in the European agenda.

Poland had difficulties in playing an active role within the EU during the first years of membership due to its domestic problems. However, since the beginning it was clear that the Eastern European agenda will be Polish domain reserve. Acting as a ‘younger brother in democracy’, Warsaw actively supported the Revolutions in 2004 and 2014 in Ukraine. In 2009, together with Sweden, Poland has successfully managed to establish the EaP, which was

103 considered as one of the main achievements of Polish diplomacy. The EaP was also perceived as a finalization of Warsaw’s long aspiration to create an institutionalized cooperation with Ukraine while also proving that Polish foreign policy makers learned how to upload national interests to the CFSP and managed to play the Brussel game. Portuguese three Presidencies of the EU Council (i.e. 1992, 2000 and 2007) were successful examples of country’s ability to project its core foreign policy priorities into the EU and essentially improving Europe’s cooperation with the Lusophone world. Portuguese policy makers were able to act as a bridge between the EU, Africa and Latin America in order to bring their issues into the EU agenda. The first EU-Brazil Summit, the first and second EU-Africa Summit, the Special Partnership with Cape Verde, closer relations of the EU and Mercosur and CPLP are all examples of this effort. Portugal became the ‘African specialist’ in the EU, particularly during its third Presidency. Both of these two countries, struggled to promote their zone of interests despite their limited resources and capabilities and felt somehow responsible for bringing these issues into the wider European arena. Warsaw and Lisbon effectively managed to transfer their example setting and ideational export which had a crucial impact on the future of these regions. Poland was actively engaged in democracy promotion toward Ukraine and had an influential role in the country’s democratic transition. In the early 1990s (before the creation of the ESDP), Portugal played an important mediatory role in transition and peace making between Angola and Mozambique and tried to show its support toward those countries in spite of various difficulties.

Poland and Portugal effectively managed to leave their mark on the EU’s affairs by introducing their own areas of expertise. It can be observed that both countries had different tactics in projection of their national interests. Portugal tried to use its leading role of the Council Presidencies in order to push its domestic preferences into a wider international forum. Poland had a strategy of ‘small steps’ and advocated for the Ukrainian issue through various conferences, meetings and ultimately establishing its institutionalized form of cooperation. During the Polish Council Presidency in 2011, the Ukrainian case was present. However, considering the exception case of AA negotiations, there was no significant progress in the bilateral relations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that all of the Portuguese Presidencies were held before the Lisbon Treaty when the country had more ability to promote its domestic interests. The post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidencies had a more limited prerogatives and opportunities to shape EU foreign affairs.

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After the learning and adaptation phases, both countries proved to be more mature and experienced players in the European affairs. This was especially visible during the Portuguese Presidency in 2007 and the Polish Presidency in 2011. Polish foreign policy makers used the Arab Spring to push the European Endowment of Democracy (EED) into the EU agenda which was the most notable achievement of the Presidency and demonstrated that Poland is a full Europeanized country which can look beyond its spheres of interest. Portugal was determined to create a new ‘window of opportunity’ to the Euro-African relations and managed successfully to organize the second EU-Africa summit. Moreover, one of the successful cases was the agreement founding the Special Partnership between the EU and Cape Verde, which opened a new chapter in the EU-Cape Verde relations. During both Presidencies, countries benefited from having their national politicians holding important positions in the EU’s institutions. During the Polish Presidency, Jerzy Buzek was the President of the European Parliament and José Manuel Durão Barroso was the President of the European Commission during the Portuguese Presidency. Many of the Polish and Portuguese achievements in projecting their national interests could not have been accomplished without skillful diplomats who held important positions in the European institutions and others who represented countries abroad in summits and top level meetings.

5.6. Contribution to the CSDP and NATO missions and operations

Since the launching of the first CSDP missions and operations in 2003, Poland and Portugal demonstrated cooperative behaviors and active contributions. Through the engagements both countries tried to prove that they are important players of the EU and their voices can be heard at international stages. Moreover, Warsaw and Lisbon managed to go beyond their traditional zones of interest and took part in missions and operations all over the world. During these engagements, both countries not only did not undermine the superiority of NATO or decrease their visibility in the NATO-led missions, but also attempted to strengthen the EU- NATO cooperation. Table 2 summarizes the participation of both countries in the main military missions and operations of the ESDP/CSDP and NATO between 2003 and 2015.

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Table 2. Participation of Poland and Portugal in the military missions and operation of the ESDP/CSDP and NATO (2003-2015 period)

ESDP/CSDP or Military missions Polish Portuguese Country/region Year NATO and operations contribution contribution Bosnia and 2003- ESDP/CSDP EUPM   Herzegovina 2012 Republic of 2003- ESDP/CSDP EUFOR Concordia   Macedonia 2003 Democratic 2003- ESDP/CSDP Operation Artemis Republic of 2003  × Congo Democratic 2005- ESDP/CSDP EUPOL Kinshasa Republic of ×  2007 Congo ESDP/CSDP EUTM MALI 2013   Bosnia and ESDP/CSDP EUFOR Althea 2004   Herzegovina 2006- ESDP/CSDP EUFOR RD Congo   2006 ESDP/CSDP EUSEC RDCONGO Congo 2005   Central African 2015- ESDP/CSDP EU EUMAM RCA   Republic 2016 Chad, Central 2008- ESDP/CSDP EUFOR Tchad/RCA   African Republic 2009 ESDP/CSDP EUTM Somalia Somalia 2010 ×  Former Yugoslav EUPOL 2003- ESDP/CSDP Republic of   PROXIMA/FYROM 2005 Macedonia ESDP/CSDP EUMM Georgia 2008   2003- NATO ISAF Afghanistan   2014 Operation Active Mediterranean NATO 2001   Endeavour Sea NATO Ocean Shield Horn of Africa 2009   Bosnia and 1996- NATO SFOR   Herzegovina 2004 Operation Allied Kosovo and NATO 1999   Force Serbia NATO KFOR Kosovo Kosovo 1999   Bosnia and 1996- NATO SFOR   Herzegovina 2004 Resolute Support NATO Afghanistan 2014   Mission

5.7. Conclusions

The comparison of Polish and Portuguese foreign and security policies is a challenging process as both of the countries differ in terms of history, size and geopolitical situation.

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However, in spite of all existing differences, Warsaw and Lisbon shared a similarity in terms of the way in which the Europeanization process took place. In order to summarize this chapter, Figure 2 summarizes the main similarities and differences between the Poland and Portugal in terms of their Europeanization process.

Figure 2. Similarities and differences between Poland and Portugal in the Europeanization process

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6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Main findings

This thesis has aimed to analyze the Europeanization of Polish and Portuguese foreign and security policies in a comparative perspective. It started with conducting comprehensive literature review on the concept of Europeanization as well as on studies focused on cases of Poland and Portugal. Afterwards, the historical and political backgrounds of each country before the EU accession have been studied to understand the characteristics and concerns related to the Europeanization of their foreign and security policies. Consequently, the paths of Europeanization were investigated for each of them by taking into account the downloading and uploading processes and some implications resulting from such processes. Finally, the two cases were compared in terms of various dimensions and factors. This comparison pointed out the common and different challenges, difficulties and concerns that both countries have confronted. Studying the foreign and security policy orientation in Poland, discussed in the chapters 2 and 4, demonstrated that before 1989 this country’s foreign policy had been controlled extremely by the Soviet Union for almost 50 years. However, the collapse of the communist regime led to a process of democratization and complete reorientation of foreign and security policies targeting integration with the EU and NATO as its main priorities. The analysis of the direction of foreign and security policies of Portugal, discussed in the chapters 2 and 3, highlighted that the country had been isolated from the European and global arena during the Salazar dictatorship. After the regime change, Lisbon reoriented its foreign and security policies from Africa toward Europe by focusing on two main goals: 1) the ‘European option’ having the EC integration as its top priority and, 2) strong commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.

The comparison of these directions, presented in the sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, showed that due to non-democratic regime background, both countries had been excluded from the European policymaking and experienced substantial changes in their foreign and security policy directions. However, after the parliamentary elections, the pro-European shift was established and integration within the European structures became the main priorities of both countries. It was also discussed that in spite of the fact that they initially shared similar concerns related to the

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CFSP/CSDP, they eventually adjusted their approaches after realizing that CFSP/CSDP cannot undermine the role of NATO. Moreover, domestic administrative changes were made for the sake of better cooperation with the CFSP/CSDP. The analysis answered the first sub-question of the thesis, on the changes that have taken place in Polish and Portuguese foreign and security policies following their adaptation to the evolution of the CFSP/CSDP.

The outcomes of this study demonstrated to what extent the strategies and preferences of Poland and Portugal in terms of uploading of their foreign and security priorities differed. In the chapter 4, it was discussed that Poland has always been a strong supporter of Ukrainian integration and tried to bring it closer to the EU agenda. The establishment of the EaP and engagement in democracy promotion made Warsaw an expert in the Eastern agenda shaping. Poland has been advocated the Ukrainian accession since the beginning of its membership despite its limited capabilities and resources. Portugal in its turn has a different uploading approach and preferences (as discussed in the chapter 3). The comparison of uploading the national preferences of both countries, presented in the section 5.4, showed that the uploading the national interests have allowed Poland and Portugal to forge a characteristic identity inside the EU, closely related to a more active role in shaping the CFSP. Both countries were also very active in terms of contributing to the CSDP missions and operations (as discussed in the section 5.5). It has to be noted that the whole process of projecting domestic preferences at the EU level has always been done with a full compatibility to Atlanticism. Moreover, NATO has always remained the main security pillar for both countries. The discussion answered the second sub- question of this dissertation on how Poland and Portugal have been uploading their national foreign and security policy preferences to the evolving of the CFSP/CSDP, with a particular attention to their Atlanticism and relations to the neighbors and historical allies.

In order to answer the third research sub-question and compare the main similarities and differences of downloading, the outcomes are visualized in Figure 3 It can be seen that there were significant difference between two countries at the initial phase of EC/EU accession as they were different in terms of political background, geopolitical importance, domestic situation, and historical ties. However, the non-democratic background, transformation in foreign security policies with regard to the primary role of NATO, institutional adaptation and public support constituted comparable points for them.

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Figure 3. Comparison of Poland and Portugal positions at the initial phase of the EC/EU accession

In order to compare the process of the uploading national preferences into the CFSP/CSDP level, Figure 4 summarizes the similarities and differences of both countries. It can be noted that while Poland had been supporting Ukraine through the ‘small-step strategy’, Portugal had an advantage of three Council Presidencies seeking connection with the Lusophone world. This led to the affirmation of Poland as an Eastern agenda shaper and Portugal to an African expert. At the same time, the CSDP compatibility with the Atlanticism, insistence on maintaining and reaffirming the country’s own spheres of interest, the contribution to the CSDP and bridge-building, constituted points of similarity for both countries.

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Figure 4. Comparison of Poland and Portugal in uploading their national preferences to the CFSP/CSDP

Regarding the research question of this dissertation, it can be concluded that Poland and Portugal have been able to effectively shape the CFSP/CSDP, which was however, related to a challenging process. Moreover, during the first years of membership, the projection of their national preferences into the EU has been accompanied with various concerns and difficulties for both countries. For Poland, the first years of membership were the most challenging ones as the lack of knowledge, expertise and parties’ rotations influenced the proper uploading. Moreover, Poland lacked the partners in the region as Visegrad and Weimar groups did not work as expected and Warsaw remained alone in its advocacy for Ukraine. Similarly, Portugal, at the beginning of its membership, had limited capabilities to have an effective impact on the European affairs. As a small state in comparison to others, with limited economic resources, Portugal was aware of the fact that the most critical decisions would correspond to the interests of powerful countries such as France or Germany.

It was also demonstrated that both countries went through different paths for reorienting their foreign and security policies. Studying and comparing these paths allows one to conclude that a proper uploading can only be achieved through an effective downloading process to the extent that good reception and learning of the CFSP rules and their adaptation into the national

111 level has a crucial impact on exporting domestic policies and preferences to the CFSP. The key mechanisms such as socialization, learning and institutional changes play an important role in understanding the ‘way of doing things’ which affects both downloading and uploading dimensions of Europeanization. Moreover, both counties managed successfully to go beyond their zones of interest in order to accomplish the Europeanization.

This thesis has aimed to contribute to the debate on Europeanization of foreign and security policies, especially for those interested in cases of Poland and/or Portugal. While there are various studies on Europeanisation of such states as France and Germany, there are no studies comparing the Polish and Portuguese foreign and security policies. Moreover, while the study by Adrian Chrobot (2012) had investigated the Europeanization process of Poland and Portugal, but mainly focused on the ‘downloading’ dimension rather than the ‘uploading’ one and only considered two periods of pre-accession and early years of membership. This study filled this gap by taking into account both downloading and uploading dimensions for Poland and Portugal and comprehensively explored the changes in foreign and security policies of these countries after the EU accession. Moreover, the Atlanticism approach and relation with NATO of both countries was integrated into this dissertation and represents an added value as compared to Chrobot's work. Therefore, this study somehow completed the work of Chrobot (that was written in 2012) by investigating the ‘uploading’ dimension of foreign and security policies of Poland and Portugal and relating its importance in the Europeanization process with regard to the downloading dimension.

6.2 Future work/outlook

Concerning the dynamic essence of political area and occurrence of important events within and outside the EU, future research might explore consequences of such developments as the Brexit process and changes in the global politics. The presidency of Donald Trump and new US administration may change the course and dynamics of the Europeanization of the security and defence policies of the individual EU member states, including Portugal and Poland chosen for the present dissertation. In the case of Ukrainian crisis (mainly the annexation of Crimea), the EU has been unable to act inadequate as a conflict regulator and source of conflicts between the

112 states within the EU. Therefore, investigating the influence of these events on the new foreign and security policies of Portugal and Poland would be valuable.

As this study provided a framework for comparison of foreign and security policies, it can serve as a base for future studies that aim to compare these policies between two or more different states. The points highlighted in the comparative exercise of downloading and uploading processes as main differences and similarities of Poland and Portugal (such as the timing of accession, regional and national priorities, strategies of uploading the national preferences), can be useful staring points for other comparative studies. It would be especially interesting to compare the outcomes of this study with the Europeanization of foreign and security policies of other European member states to assess whether the identified characteristics, such as the connections with the former colonies, neighbors and historical allies, have roots in the national preferences of the studied countries or can be common in other states as well.

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