Harry Winston Diamond Corp., Which Owns 100 Percent of the Shares in Harry Winston, Inc
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Harry Winston Diamond Corporation Alexis He & Tatiana Matthews Legendary DiamondsPorter Rhodes The Hope The Jonker The Crown of Charlemagne Industry Background Rough diamond prices down 40%-50% last year, but 10% increase since beginning of 09 Polished diamonds down only 15%-20% Pricing gap between rough & polished diamonds Rough diamond prices rose 10% in 09 Industry is heavily internally connected and exclusive, especially at the highest end Diamond availability stably and slowly rising, but not so much that it’ll affect pricing negatively Industry Background Few big companies control most of the mines Control over supply=ability to manipulate prices Online diamond retailers have been unsuccessful Middle class retailers most impacted • Tiffany’s, Jared, or even De Beers Temporary shutdowns • save operations cost • keeping underground diamond savings • Boost up prices Mining method improvement likely to cut cost Industry Background Cheapest product available: $125,000 – 16.60 carats $4,000 – 0.45 carats Industry Background Jared, Tiffany both around same level De Beers can’t match either Sell mostly G grade diamonds “Blue Nile” Most expensive: $6,000 Priceless – literally (not listed) Industry Trends “If not a bottom, then a plateau” – HW CEO Robert Gannicott on pricing and demand of rough diamonds. “The fact that the people who are buying rough diamonds for polishing are coming back to the market again and are prepared to pay a bit more indicates that they, at least, have some confidence that this is probably a bottom,” he commented. Competitors share positive opinions – De Beers: Q1 2009 has been tough, but "We have begun to see signs of improvement in the market and expect this to continue as the year unfolds,” stated Stephen Lussier, chairman of De Beers Botswana. Company Overview Specialist diamond enterprise with premium assets in the mining and retail segments of the diamond industry. Supplies rough diamonds to the global market from its 40 % interest in the Diavik Diamond Mine, located in Canada’s Northwest Territories The Company’s retail division, Harry Winston Inc., is a premier diamond jeweler and luxury timepiece retailer with salons in key locations including New York, Paris, London, Beijing, Tokyo and Beverly Hills. Salons opening in Singapore this summer. Company Overview Sold 61% of rough diamond production at $50 per carat Positioned at highest end “We need to stay very close to our heritage, which is about diamonds and fine designs. You draw a line, over which you don't cross. For example, we don't have silver jewelry, we don't have gold-only jewelry, we don't have platinum-only jewelry, other than for wedding bands.” HWD’s Quotes Harry Winston Diamond Corporation’s strategy is to leverage its supply of rough diamonds – and its extensive contacts and relationships throughout the industry – as a currency with which to secure a reliable supply of the largest, rarest and highest-quality polished diamonds for Harry Winston Inc. In addition, by participating in the production and retailing of diamonds - the ‘bookends’ of the diamond business - Harry Winston Diamond Corporation focuses on the two most profitable segments of the business. Another excerpt: The acquisition of the premiere retailer realized Harry Winston Diamond Corporation’s objective of building value in a diamond business through the exploitation of synergies between the two bookends of the diamond pipeline: mining and retailing. Stock Overview Currently trading at: $4.14 Market Cap: 294.59M • Small, but only caused by low stock prices 52-week range: $1.69 – $31.68 • Lowest in March 9th Continuous Dividend • 2007: $.25 x 4 • 2008: $.25 x 3 + $.05 Why the low price? Investors do not fully understand the high-end diamond industry • Stable • Easily manipulated by large companies Confusing HWD with lower end retailers • Such as Tiffany, Jared and De Beers • Retail makes up the lesser part of HWD’s business Dividend cut causing • Panic • Overreaction Thesis Points Unique & Profitable Business Model • Mining • Retail Solid Financials Brand Name & Stable Clientele Management & Strategies VAR Analyst Opinions John H. Christy, Forbes International Investment Report, 04.13.09 “In our January issue, I looked at shares of Harry Winston Diamond, one of the premier diamond miners and retailers in the world. At the time, I argued that it looked cheap at $3.90, an 87% plunge from its price just six months earlier and 30% of book value. It then proceeded to get even cheaper, hitting $1.72 on March 9. At that point, the valuation was simply absurd. Unique & Profitable Business Model Corporate Structure Business Model – Synergy Production and Retail: the “bookends” of the diamond business Harry Winston functions as producer, wholesaler, broker, and retailer of rough diamonds and polished diamond products Oversees production of rough diamonds Sells and packages rough diamonds to be used as currency to clients in the diamond processing centers of Tel Aviv, Antwerp, New York, and Mumbai Re-acquires highest-grade stones for production into jewelry and retail by Harry Winston Inc. The vertical integration of its company gives Harry Winston an edge that other publicly-traded diamond retailers lack Diavik Diamond Mine Joint venture between Rio Tinto plc (60% ownership) and Harry Winston Diamond Corporation (40%); each of which retain the right to receive and market their share of the diamond production Some of the world’s highest per ton ore value Balances production between 4 orebodies , each of different average grades Strategy for the current economic climate: Cut production in highest- performing orebody to both reduce current supply and retain high- grade supply for future Rough Diamond Sales for Fiscal Year 2008: $328M Rough Diamond Production down 23% from previous year to 3.7 million carats produced Harry Winston Inc: Retail 100% Ownership by Harry Winston Diamond Corporation Headquartered in NYC with 18 salons worldwide including Beverly Hills, South Coast Plaza, Chicago, Dallas, Las Vegas, Paris, London, Dubai, Beijing, Tokyo, Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong Unique and Individualized Customer Relations Retail Segment Recorded 6% increase in sales to $281M in fiscal year 2009 Strong sales to clients in the Middle East, Russia, and Asia outside of Japan offset weaker sales in the US and Japan Strategies for Current Economic Climate: Close monitoring of inventory levels Selective Asian expansion Harry Winston does not conduct business in the broader retail jewelry market where prices were most negatively effected by the economic downturn Retail Financial Overview 2009 Fiscal Year Consolidated Net Earnings: $70.1M or $1.15 per share Retail Segment: Recorded Sales $281M ; 6% increase from previous year First and Second Quarters: 23% Positive Growth Rate in Retail Division Third Quarter sales (including Sept 2009): 8% Positive Growth Rate Fourth Quarter Sales: 21% Negative Growth Rate in Retail Division Price Range Sales Analysis, Fiscal Year 2009 Gift Purchases: $100,000 and below: 4% Decrease in sales $250,000-$650,000 Range: Largest Drop in sales at 13% Decrease $650,000-$850,000: 50% Increase in Sales $850,000+ Range: 7% Increase in Sales Financials – Statistics Good Ratios • P/E: 1.26 (Industry: 13.40) • Price to sales= .42; Piece to book= .36; Price to cash = 1.74 • Debt-to-equity: • Implication: If prices were to rise to proper level, stock trade at 10x its current price, assuming earnings do not change. EPS: $1.15 Financials – Sales The mining segment recorded sales of $328.2 million, a 21% decrease from $413.8 million in the prior year. The decrease in sales resulted from lower rough diamond production and lower rough diamond prices in the fourth quarter. Rough diamond production for the calendar year was down 23% to 3.7 million carats produced versus 4.8 million for the prior year. Earnings from operations for the mining segment decreased 24% to $168.6 million compared to the prior year. The decrease was due primarily to lower sales and to a lesser degree a decrease in gross margin. Financials – Sales The retail segment recorded a 6% increase in sales to $281.0 million, with a loss from operations of $2.5 million compared to a loss from operations of $3.1 million in the prior year. Retail segment SG&A as a percentage of sales remained consistent with the prior year at 48%. Financials – Balance Sheet Of the $78M debt planned for 2009, only $48M (income tax payable) MUST to be repaid With the closing of the Kinross transaction, all amounts outstanding on the Company’s senior secured term ($49.2M) & revolving debt on Diavik were repaid Current Liabilities: $313 M Long-Term Liabilities: $205 M Current Assets: $505 M Financials – Balance Sheet Financials – Cash Positive Cash Flow Retail: <$5M sustaining capital needed annually to maintain operations in salons after cutbacks (down from $12M) Mining: Sustaining capital was previously $39- 40M at the rate of 2.3M tons per annum Pre-12-Week-Shutdown Expected to be reduced by >30% Financials – Cash Projection: $160M Cash for Q1 of fiscal year 2010 from Kinross deal CAPEX at most $60M Cash Taxes at $48M Projection of Positive Cash Flow for Q1 of fiscal year 2010 of >$30M Amount necessary to sustain operations at ¼ : maintaining a positive cash flow… and this is the worst quarter Dividend Payment Suspended March 19, 2009 “for the time being” Allows for increased cash Facilitated the lucrative Kinross deal “Canada's Kinross Gold ( KGC - news - people ) apparently agreed with me. The company stepped in and bid $3 for a 20% stake in Harry Winston. This is no day trade. Strategic investors like Kinross don't buy because they think there's a slight 20% or 30% upside. They're looking to make their investment back several times over. In the words of Kinross CEO Tye Burt: "When do you buy a significant interest in a world class asset? When it's available and hopefully at an attractive price," he said.